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
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THE
BRITISH AND FOREIGN
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AND

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* * The Papers marked with an asterisk are Original Contributions to the *Review*. The other Papers are selected from the sources indicated above.

We have reason to believe that some of the ablest and most valuable Articles which have recently appeared in the *Princeton Review*, and have been transferred to our pages, are from the pen of Dr Atwater, Professor of Mental and Moral Science in the College at Princeton; such as those entitled, "Recent Works on Mental Philosophy," "Congregationalism," "Logic of Religion," "Mill's System of Logic," "Miracles and their Counterfeits." Dr Atwater seems to be equally at home in philosophical and theological subjects; and certainly he discusses them with great ability.

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

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2. *Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform.* By Sir WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart. Second Edition, enlarged. London: 1853.

THOUGH of Lord Bacon it was said, by his friend Dr Harvey, the discoverer of the circulation of the blood, "He writes philosophy like a Lord Chancellor," it must be admitted Sir William Hamilton writes it like a philosopher; for he both thinks and writes more like a pure intelligence than any man in the history of speculation. In the first place, his diction is the most concise, the most accurate, the most direct, the most compact, and the most vigorous, ever used by any writer on philosophy. Familiar with all systems of philosophy ever proposed, and their criticisms, expository, supplementary, and adverse, and a master of the languages in which both the philosophies and the criticisms have been written, he has discovered how much of their error can be ascribed to the deficiencies of language, both as an instrument and as a vehicle of philosophical thought; and he has, accordingly, formed a language for himself, adequate to the exigencies of the highest thinking in the new career of philosophy which he has inaugurated. And his learning, in every department of knowledge, supplementary of philosophy or auxiliary to it, is so abundant, that there seems to be not even a random thought of any value, which has been dropped along any, even obscure,

path of mental activity, in any age or country, that his diligence has not recovered, his sagacity appreciated, and his judgment husbanded in the stores of his knowledge. And, in discussing any question of philosophy, his ample learning enables him to classify all the different theories which have, at successive periods, been invented to explain it; and generally, indeed we may say always, he discovers, by the light reciprocally shed from the theories, ideas involved in them which their respective advocates had not discriminated, thereby giving greater accuracy to the theories than they had before. By this mode of discussion, we have the history of doctrines concentrated into a focus of elucidation. And the uses of words, and the mutations in their meaning, in different languages, are articulately set forth; thereby enhancing the accuracy and certainty of our footsteps on the slippery paths of speculation. And his own genius for original research is such, that no subtilty of our intelligent nature however evasive, no relation however indirect or remote, no manifestation however ambiguous or obscure, can escape or elude his critical diagnosis. Add to all this, his moral constitution, both by nature and by education, is harmonious with his intellectual, imparting to his faculties the energy of a well-directed will, and the wisdom of a pure love of truth. Therefore it is, that, in the writings of Sir William Hamilton, there is nothing of that vacillation in doctrine which results from unbalanced faculties. He has built upon the same foundation from the beginning. Another notable characteristic is his extraordinary individuality. He seems in no degree under the influence of what is called the doctrine of the historical development of human intelligence. He confronts the whole history of doctrines, and with a cold, critical eye surveys them as the products of individual minds, and not as the evolutions of a total humanity. Of Eclecticism there is in his creed not the smallest taint. Truth seems to him the same everywhere, unmodified by times. Such is the marvellous man of whose philosophy we propose to give some account.

The history of philosophy seems, to the superficial observer, but the recurrence of successive cycles of the same problems, the same discussions, and the same opinions. He sees, in modern philosophy, only the repetition of the dreams of the earliest Greek speculators. Philosophy is to him but labour upon an insoluble problem. To the competent critic, however, it presents a far different view. He sees, in each cycle, new aspects of the problems, new relations in the discussions, and new modes in the opinions,—all indicating an advancement, however unequal and halting at times, towards the truth. Here, then, is at once evinced the supreme importance

of an enlightened philosophical criticism. It is the preparative and precursor of farther progress. The different doctrines which, in successive ages, have been elicited, are so many experiments, furnishing, to the enlightened critic, indications more or less obvious of the true solutions of the problems of philosophy.

Sir William Hamilton is the prince of critics in philosophy. In him philosophical criticism has compassed its widest scope, and reached its highest attainments. He is the critic of all ages, equally at home in all. He has sifted all of ancient, all of mediæval, and all of modern thought, with the most delicate sieve ever used by any critic; and while he has winnowed away the chaff, he has lost not a grain of truth. The barriers of different languages have not excluded him from a single field: he unlocked the gates of one as easily as another, and entered where he listed. With principles of criticism as broad as nature; with learning as extensive as the whole of what has been written on philosophy; with a knowledge of words, and of the things which they denote or are intended to denote, marvellously accurate and co-extensive with the whole literature of speculation; with a logic both in its pure theory and modified applications adequate to every need of intelligence, whether in detecting the fallacies or expounding the truths of doctrine; and with a genius exactly suited to use with the greatest effect these manifold accomplishments,—he stands pre-eminent amongst the critics of philosophy. As we have seen how he unravels the net-work of entangled discussions, discriminating the confusions by purifying the doctrines through a more adequate conception and expression of them, often correcting the text of the Greek writer, which for centuries had baffled the grammarians, by the light of the doctrine of the author, and in the sequel making the truth educed the starting-point for new development of doctrine, we have admired the matchless abilities of the critic, until we should have been exhausted in being dragged along the labyrinths of his mighty ratiocination, had we not been refreshed at every turn by the new light of truth disclosed by the master who was conducting the marvellous enterprise of thought. Bentley did not do more to enlarge the scope and enrich the learning of British literary criticism, when, by his dissertations on the Epistles of Phalaris, he raised it from the platitudes of the grammarian and rhetorician to the compass, the life, the interest, and the dignity, of philological and historical disquisition, than Sir William Hamilton has done to give profundity, subtilty, comprehensiveness, and erudition, to British philosophical criticism, by his contributions to the *Edinburgh Review*. These articles mark an era, not only in British but in European criticism, in

every department of philosophy—metaphysics, psychology, and logic. They were translated into the languages of the continent, and their stupendous learning, matchless subtilty, and ruthless ratiocination, received everywhere unbounded admiration. The very first article, the one on the doctrine of the infinito-absolute of Cousin, utterly subverted the fundamentals of the proud speculations of Germany, and fully exposed the absurdity of the attempt of Cousin to conciliate them with the humble Scottish philosophy of common sense. The continental philosophers saw that a critic had arisen, who, by the might and the majesty of his intellect, and the vastness of his erudition, gave dignity to the humble doctrine which he advocated, and they had all along despised. They began to feel,

“A chiel’s amang us takin notes,
And faith he’ll prent it.”

But Sir William Hamilton the critic is only the precursor of Sir William Hamilton the philosopher. His criticism is but the preparative of his philosophy. They, however, move on together. The state of the philosophy of the world made this necessary. The calling of Socrates was not more determined by the condition of thought in his time, than the labours of Sir William Hamilton are by the philosophical needs of this age. His erudition and critical skill are as much needed as his matchless genius for original speculation. Either without the other would have been comparatively barren of results. And his preference, like Aristotle, for logic rather than the other branches of philosophy, is the very affection that is desiderated in the great thinker of this age. It seems to be supposed by some, who even pretend to have studied the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, that he has merely rehabilitated the doctrines of Reid and Stewart. It might with much more show of truth be said that Newton only reproduced the discoveries of Copernicus and Kepler; for the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton is a greater stride beyond that of his Scottish predecessors than the discoveries and deductions of Newton are beyond those of Copernicus and Kepler. Let us then, as far as his published writings and our limits will permit, show what Sir William has done directly to advance philosophy.

With Bacon began a movement in modern philosophy which parallels that begun by Aristotle in ancient.* Aristotle

* When we say that Bacon and Aristotle began these respective movements, we do not mean literally that the movements originated with them, but only that, like Luther’s in the Reformation, their labours were so signal and paramount in these movements as to be associated pre-eminently with them. No great change ever originates with the person who becomes the most conspicuous in it, in the great spectacle of history. It always has antecedents, produced by the agency of inferior persons. We therefore beg that everywhere, in this article, the principle of this note may qualify our general remarks, even in regard to the claims of originality which we prefer for Sir William Hamilton, unless our remarks preclude qualification.

inaugurated the deductive process ; Bacon inaugurated the inductive. These are the distinctive features of those systems of philosophy which they advocated ; and they are in accordance with the spirit of philosophising in the respective eras to which they belonged. Ancient philosophy was more a deduction from principles ; modern philosophy is more an inquiry into principles themselves. Aristotle and Bacon both make logic the paramount branch of philosophy, and the forms of the understanding the limits of the knowable. Sir William Hamilton's philosophy is a preparative and an initial towards the conciliation of the systems of Aristotle and Bacon. Logic, with him, as with them, is the paramount branch of philosophy ; and his labours all tend to reconcile induction with deduction, and unify in one method these two great processes of thought. His philosophy is, in fact, a climacteric reclamation, vindication, and development of the one perennial philosophy of common sense, which, like the one true faith, is preserved amidst all schismatic aberrations, and vindicated as the only true philosophy.

It is in the essential unity of human reason returning again and again, from temporary aberrations in different ages, into the same discernments and convictions, that we have the means of verifying the true catholic philosophy. Though there may be nothing in the mutual relations of men at any given time, nor in the mutual relations of successive generations, that necessarily determines an uninterrupted advance towards truth, yet, notwithstanding the occasional wide-spread and long-protracted prevalence of error, the reason of man has hitherto vindicated itself in the long run, and proved that, though the newest phase of thought may not, at all times, be the truest, yet the truest will prevail at last, and come out at the goal of human destiny, triumphant over all errors. This is the drift of the history of human opinion as interpreted by enlightened criticism. Sometimes scepticism, recognising no criterion of truth ; sometimes idealism, knowing nothing but images in ceaseless change ; sometimes pantheism, dissolving all individuality, both material and spiritual, in the tides of universal being ; sometimes materialism, believing nothing beyond material nature, and that man is only a more perfect species of mammalia, and human affairs but the highest branch of natural history ; and other forms of error, each with its peculiar momenta and criteria of knowledge, have in reiterated succession, in different ages of the world, prevailed as systems of philosophy ; yet the reason of man has, nevertheless, under the guidance of some master mind, returned to the one perennial philosophy of common sense, and reposed in the natural conviction of mankind, that an external world exists as the senses testify, and that there is in man an element which lifts

him above the kingdom of nature, and allies him in responsible, personal individuality with a divine, eternal, and personal God.

The great office of the critic of philosophy, at this day, is to trace the footsteps of this perennial philosophy through the history of human opinion in all its manifold mutations, perversions, and aberrations; and to note its features, observe the paths it walks in, and its method and criteria of truth. This Sir William Hamilton has done. He has shown that the doctrine of common sense, as the basis of all philosophy, has prevailed for more than two thousand years. He has adduced one hundred and six witnesses, Greek, Roman, Arabian, Italian, Spanish, French, British, German, and Belgian, to its truth. Amongst the many Greek witnesses, Aristotle is found; amongst the Roman, Cicero; amongst the Italians, Aquinas; amongst the French, all the great philosophers from Des Cartes to Cousin, both inclusive; amongst the Germans, Leibnitz, Kant, Jacobi, and even Fichte, with a host of others: thus showing, that what is sometimes thought, even by those from whom we might expect better things, to be the superficial foundation of British philosophy, is in truth the only foundation on which the reason of man can repose. Philosophers, amidst all their efforts to break away from the common beliefs of mankind, have at last been compelled to come back to them as the only ultimate criterion of truth. "Fichte," says Sir W. Hamilton, "is a more remarkable, because a more reluctant, confessor to the paramount authority of belief than even Kant. Departing from the principle common to him and philosophers in general, that the mind cannot transcend itself, Fichte developed, with the most admirable rigour of demonstration, a scheme of idealism, the purest, simplest, and most consistent, which the history of philosophy exhibits. And so confident was Fichte in the necessity of his proofs, that on one occasion he was provoked to imprecate eternal damnation on his head should he ever swerve from any, even the least of the doctrines which he had so victoriously established. But even Fichte in the end confesses that natural belief is paramount to every logical proof, and that his own idealism he could not believe."

With the great fact before us, so triumphantly reclaimed and vindicated by Sir William Hamilton, that philosophers have never been able to find any other criterion of truth than the common sense of mankind, we will now proceed to show what is its doctrine.

The philosophy of common sense is the doctrine, in its development and applications, that our primary beliefs are the ultimate criterion of truth. It postulates, that consequents cannot, by an infinite regress, be evolved out of antecedents; but that demonstration must ultimately rest upon propositions

which, in the view of certain primary beliefs of the mind, necessitate their own admission. These primary beliefs, as primary, must of course be inexplicable, being the highest light in the temple of mind, and borrowing no radiance from any higher cognition by which their own light can be illuminated. Behind these primary beliefs the mind cannot see—all is negation; because, while these primary beliefs are the first energy of the mind, they are also its limitation. The primary facts of intelligence would not be original, were they revealed to us under any other form than that of necessary belief.

As elements of our mental constitution, as essential conditions of intelligence itself, these primary beliefs *must*, at least in the first instance, be accepted as true. Else we assume that the very root of our intelligence is a lie. All must admit some original bases of knowledge in the mind itself, and must *assume* that they are true.

The argument from common sense is therefore simply to show, that to deny a given proposition would involve a denial of a primary belief, an original datum of consciousness; and as the primary belief or original datum of consciousness must be received as veracious, the proposition necessitated by it must be received as true also.

It is manifest, that in arguing on the basis of our primary beliefs, they cannot be shown to be mendacious, unless it be demonstrated that they contradict each other, either immediately in themselves or mediately in their consequences. Because, there being no higher criterion by which to test their veracity, it can only be tested by agreement or contradiction between themselves.

We will now apply this doctrine, and in discussing the application we will explicate the doctrine more fully. In the act of sensible perception we are, equally, and at the same time, and in the same indivisible act of consciousness, cognizant of ourself as a perceiving subject, and of an external reality as the object perceived, which are apprehended as a synthesis inseparable in the cognition, but contrasted to each other in the concept as two distinct existences. All this is incontestably the deliverance of consciousness in the act of sensible perception. This all philosophers, without exception, admit as a *fact*. But then, all, until Reid, deny the *truth* of the deliverance. They maintain that we only perceive representations within ourselves, and, by a perpetual illusion, we mistake these representations for the external realities. And Reid did not fully extricate himself from the trammels of this opinion. For while he repudiated the notion, that we perceive representations distinct from the mind though within the mind, he fell into the error that we are only conscious of certain changes in

ourselves which suggest the external reality. But Sir William Hamilton has, by the most masterly subtilty of analysis, incontestably shown that we are directly conscious of the external objects themselves, according to the belief universal in the common sense of mankind.

It is manifest that the whole question resolves itself into one of the veracity of consciousness. All admit that consciousness does testify to the *fact* that we perceive the external reality. To doubt this is to doubt the actuality of the fact of consciousness, and consequently to doubt the doubt itself, which is a contradiction, and subverts itself. The data then of consciousness, simply as *facts*, or *actual manifestations and deliverances*, cannot be denied without involving a contradiction; and therefore the principle of contradiction, which we have shown is the only one to be applied to the solution of the question, recoils upon the sceptic himself, and makes doubt impossible. But then, the facts or deliverances of consciousness, considered as *testimonies to the truth of facts beyond their own phenomenal reality*, are not altogether to be excluded from the domain of legitimate philosophical discussion. For this proposition by no means, like the other, involves a self-contradiction, and thereby repels even the possibility of doubt. Therefore philosophers, while they admit the fact of the testimony of consciousness, deny its *truth*. The dispute is not as to *what* is said, but as to the *truth* of what is said.

As, then, it has been admitted that the *fact* is an affirmation of our intelligent nature, its mendacity cannot be consistently assumed; for, upon the principle of *falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus*, it would impeach the *fact* itself as an affirmation of nature, which we have shown involves a contradiction, and is therefore impossible. It is clear, then, that the burden of proof, in impeaching the absolute veracity of consciousness, lies upon those denying it. And as we have shown that the attempt to prove its mendacity has in all ages failed, and that all the most schismatic and sceptical have at last found repose for the struggling intellect only in the testimony of our primary beliefs, we are compelled by analysis and by history to acknowledge the doctrine of common sense the one catholic and perennial philosophy.

Here the question obtrudes itself into our view, *What is the logical significance of our primary beliefs?* and it is a question of paramount importance. Perhaps, in the answer to this question, we may differ from Sir William Hamilton; and therefore it is that we wish to signalise it.

It is implied in the doctrine of primary beliefs, that at the root of every primordial act of the mind there is a principle or law guaranteeing the procedure. For example, the initial

act from which induction starts is guaranteed by such a principle or law of intelligence—the *principle of philosophical presumption*. Now, in order to distinguish these principles or laws from the universal truths which are generalised from individual truths of fact, they are called universal truths of intelligence. Now, we prefer to call these principles *laws* of intelligence, as more expressive of their real character, rather than *truths* of intelligence; because, in the operations of the mind, they are regulative, and not cogitable, being in fact the poles on which thought turns. They are, in our thinking, silent in laws, rather than articulate in propositions.

We think that this is a discrimination that ought not to be slighted; and we venture to find fault that Sir William Hamilton uses the expressions, “fundamental facts,” “beliefs,” “primary propositions,” “cognitions at first hand,” as denoting the same primary data of consciousness only from different points of view. We are not convinced of the propriety of his opinion implied in such various designations; and are constrained to believe, that the confusing the distinction which we have endeavoured to indicate, is the initial, the root of that cardinal heresy in philosophy which makes all cognition egocentric—makes thought start out from a general notion native to the mind. We repudiate the doctrine that there ever is a belief or a cognition of the mind without its corresponding object. The deliverance of the primary and most incomprehensible belief is, *That its object is*. Thought never evades the fundamental antithesis of subject and object, which is the primary law of consciousness itself. In no instance is a notion, not even that of cause, time, or space, native to the mind, acquired from no adequate object, but purely subjective and regulative, imposing upon objective thought an illusive interpolation of itself.

We therefore repeat, that our primary beliefs are not *within* consciousness as comprehended thought, but *in* consciousness as bases of thought. We cannot therefore assent, that, in different points of view, they may or may not be regarded as cognitions or propositions. We think they have not the equivocal character which the ambiguous and various designations applied to them by Sir William Hamilton seem to us to indicate. They are but modes of one unifying consciousness, not rising, in degree of intellection, to cognitions.

But to call them “primary propositions” is what we chiefly object to. There are primary propositions, undoubtedly, which in the view of our primary beliefs necessitate their own admission; but then they are not to be confounded with the primary beliefs themselves. They are made up of a plurality of primary beliefs unified in a common conviction in con-

sciousness, and articulated in language. The point of our objection is, to every form and semblance of the doctrine, *that all knowing is through previous knowledge* (which will be considered in the sequel), instead of merely through *the power of knowing*.

But to return from this digression: And while Sir William Hamilton thus points out the bases and the elements of truth, he exhibits the canons by which philosophical research is to be conducted. As Bacon, in the first book of the *Novum Organum*, exposed the sources of error in physical inquiry, and laid down precautionary rules for conducting future investigation, so Sir William Hamilton has enounced maxims for conducting the loftier and far more difficult research into our intellectual nature. And his philosophy is, in this particular, the consummation of that of Bacon. It explores the depths of consciousness, and educes those primary beliefs and fundamental laws of intelligence which Bacon merely assumed in his philosophy. Sir William Hamilton has lighted his torch at the lamps of both induction and deduction, and it burns with their combined light; and therefore it is that he has been able to penetrate depths in the abysses of thought which to Bacon and Aristotle were unfathomable darkness. How much in the spirit of Bacon is the following admonition: "No philosopher has ever formally denied the truth or disclaimed the authority of consciousness; but few or none have been content implicitly to accept and consistently to follow out its dictates. Instead of humbly resorting to consciousness to draw from thence his doctrines and their proof, each dogmatic speculator looked only into consciousness there to discover his preadopted opinions. In philosophy men have abused the code of natural, as in theology the code of positive revelation; and the epigraph of a great Protestant divine on the book of Scripture is certainly not less applicable to the book of consciousness:—

"Hic liber est in quo quærit sua dogmata quisque;
Invenit et pariter dogmata quisque sua."

And Hamilton, like Bacon, is not at all dismayed by the past failures in philosophy; but with the proud hopes of a great mind, conscious of the power of truth, he anticipates mighty triumphs in future for that philosophy which he has shown to have prevailed for more than two thousand years. "And yet," says he, "although the past history of philosophy has, in a great measure, been only a history of variation and error, yet the cause of the variation being known, we obtain a valid ground of hope for the destiny of philosophy in future. Because, since philosophy has hitherto been inconsistent with

itself only in being inconsistent with the dictates of our natural beliefs—

‘For Truth is catholic and Nature one’—

it follows, that philosophy has simply to return to natural consciousness, to return to unity and truth.

“In doing this we have only to attend to three maxims or precautions:—

“1. That we admit nothing, not either an original datum of consciousness, or the legitimate consequence of such datum ;

“2. That we embrace all the original data of consciousness, and all their legitimate consequences ; and,—

“3. That we exhibit each of these in its individual integrity, neither distorted nor mutilated, and in its relative place, whether of pre-eminence or subordination.”—(Reid, p. 747.)

But Sir William does not stop his directions for investigation with these maxims. He gives marks by which we can distinguish our original from our derivative convictions—by which we can determine what is, and what is not, a primary datum of consciousness. These marks or characters are four:—1st. *Their incomprehensibility*; 2d. *Their simplicity* ; 3d. *Their necessity and absolute universality* ; 4th. *Their comparative evidence and certainty*. These characters are explicated by him, and rendered entirely capable of application to the purpose of analysing thought into its elements.

But, besides these positive directions for ascertaining truth, Sir William Hamilton exposes the very roots of the false systems of philosophy which have prevailed in different times. As he shows, by the most searching analysis, that the philosophy of common sense has its root in the recognition of the absolute veracity of consciousness in sensible perception, so he shows that all philosophical aberrations, or false systems of philosophy, have their respective roots either in a full or partial denial of its veracity. And he does not deal merely in generalities, but he articulately sets forth five great variations from truth and nature, which have prevailed as systems of philosophy, and shows the exact degree of rejection of the veracity of consciousness which constitutes the root of each. We are thereby enabled to see the roots of these great heresies laid bare, and can extirpate them by the argument from common sense.

Such are the rules which Sir William Hamilton lays down for conducting inquiry in the province of mind. They are a development of the method of Bacon in its application to psychology, the highest branch of phenomenal philosophy.

We now approach a new development of the philosophy of common sense, called the philosophy of the conditioned. It constitutes the distinguishing feature of the philosophical

system of Sir William Hamilton, and was developed by him to satisfy the needs of intelligence in combating the proud and vain-glorious philosophy of Germany. It is a remarkable monument of the largeness, the profundity, and the penetrating acuteness, of his intellect.

The philosophy of common sense assumes that consciousness is the supreme faculty,—in fact, that it is the complement of all the faculties,—that what are called faculties are but acts of consciousness running into each other, and are not separated by those lines of demarcation which are imposed upon them by language for the needs of thinking about our intelligent nature. The supremacy of consciousness was the doctrine of Aristotle, of Des Cartes, and of Locke. Reid and Stewart reduced consciousness in their system to a special faculty only co-ordinate with the others. This heresy Sir William Hamilton, amongst his innumerable rectifications and developments of Reid's philosophy, has exposed, and by a singular felicity of analysis and explication, has restored consciousness to its rightful sovereignty over the empire of intelligence.

Having postulated that consciousness is the highest and fundamental faculty of the human mind, it becomes necessary, in order to determine the nature of human knowledge, to determine the nature of consciousness.

Now, consciousness is only possible under the antithesis of the thinking mental self, and an object thought about, in correlation and limiting each other. It is therefore manifest, that knowledge, in its most fundamental and thoroughgoing analysis, is discriminated into two elements in contrast of each other. These elements are appropriately designated the *subject* and the *object*, the first applying to the conscious mind knowing, and the last to that which is known. And all that pertains to the first is called *subjective*, and all that pertains to the last is called *objective*.

Philosophy is the science of knowledge. Therefore, philosophy must especially regard the grand fundamental discrimination of the two primary elements of the *subjective* and *objective*, in any theory of knowledge it may propound.

Now, the first and fundamental problem which presents itself in the science of knowledge is, *What can we know?* Upon the principles of the philosophy of common sense, the solution of the problem is found by showing what are the conditions of our knowledge. These conditions, according to the thoroughgoing fundamental analysis of our knowledge just evinced, arise out of the nature of both of the two elements of our knowledge, the *subjective* and the *objective*.

Aristotle, who did so much towards analysing human thought into its elements, strove also to classify all objects real under

their ultimate identifications or categories in relation to thought. In modern times, Kant endeavoured to analyse intelligence into its ultimate elements in relation to its objects, and to show in these elements the basis of all thinking, and the guarantee of all certainty. Aristotle's categories, though extremely incomplete, and indeed we may say bungling, as they confound derivative with simple notions, did something for correct thinking, in pointing out with more exactness the relations of objects real to thought. But Kant, making a false division of intelligence itself, into reason and understanding, blundered at the threshold, and while he analysed reason into its supposed peculiar elements, to which he gave the Platonic name of ideas, he analysed understanding into its supposed peculiar elements, and gave them the Aristotelic name of categories. Kant's analysis of our intelligence into its pure forms made the human mind a fabric of mere delusion. The ideas of reason he proposed as purely subjective and regulative, and yet delusively positing themselves objectively in thought. And so too, in like manner, are his categories of understanding expounded as deceptive. His philosophy is thus rendered, at bottom, a system of absolute scepticism.

It is seen, from this account of them, that Aristotle's categories or predicaments, are exclusively objective, of things understood; and that those of Kant are exclusively subjective, of the mind understanding. Each is therefore one-sided.

Sir William Hamilton, discriminating more accurately than his predecessors the dual nature of thought, has distinguished its two fundamental elements, the subjective and the objective, by a thoroughgoing analysis, and at the same time has observed that these elements are ever held together in a synthesis which constitutes thought in its totality. He has therefore endeavoured to accomplish in one analysis of thought what Aristotle and Kant failed to do by their several but partial analyses. As thought is constituted of both a subjective and an objective element, the conditions of the thinkable or of thinking must be the conditions of both knowledge and existence—of the possibility of knowing, both from the nature of thought and from the nature of existence; and must therefore embrace intelligence in relation to its objects, and objects in relation to intelligence, and thus supersede the one-sided predicaments of Aristotle and Kant.

The first step towards discriminating the fundamental conditions of thought, is to reduce thought itself to its ultimate simplicity. This Sir William Hamilton has done, by showing that it must be either positive or negative when viewed subjectively, and either conditioned or unconditioned when viewed objectively. And he has discriminated, and signalised

the peculiar nature of negative thought, by showing that it is conversant about the unconditioned, while positive thought is conversant about the conditioned. This is a salient point in Sir William's philosophy. He shows that the Kantian ideas of pure reason, are nothing but negations or impotences of the mind, and are swallowed up in the unconditioned; and that the Kantian categories of the understanding are but subordinate forms of the conditioned. And while he thus reduces the predicaments of Kant to ultimate elements, he annihilates his division of our intelligence into reason and understanding. He shows that what Kant calls the reason is in fact an impotence, and what he calls the understanding is the whole intellect.

It had been shown by Aristotle that negation involves affirmation—that non-existence can only be predicated by referring to existence. This discrimination has become a fruitful principle in the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton. He therefore begins the announcement of the conditions of the thinkable by showing the nature of negative thought. He shows that negative thought is realised only under the condition of relativity and positive thinking. For example: We try to think, to predicate existence, and find ourselves unable. We then predicate incogitability. This incogitability is what is meant by negation or negative thought.

If, then, negative thinking be the opposite of positive thinking, it must be the violation of one or more of the conditions of positive thinking. The conditions of positive thinking are two: 1st. The condition of *non-contradiction*; 2d. The condition of *relativity*. To think at all (that is positively, for positive thinking is properly the only thinking), our thinking must not involve a contradiction, and it must involve relativity. If it involve contradiction, the impossible both in thought and in reality results. If the condition of relativity be not purified, the impossible in thought only results.

Now, the condition of non-contradiction is brought to bear in thinking under three phases constituting three laws:—1st. The law of *identity*; 2d. The law of *contradiction*; 3d. The law of *excluded middle*. The science of these laws is logic. Thus is shown the ultimate condition of the thinkable, on which depends the science of explicative or analytical reasoning. This we shall show fully in the sequel, when we come to treat of what Sir William Hamilton has done for logic.

The condition of non-contradiction is in no danger of being violated in thinking; therefore its explication is only of theoretical importance.

The condition of relativity is the important one in thought. This condition, in so far as it is *necessary*, is brought to bear

under two principal relations, one of which arises from the subjective element of thought,—the mind thinking (called the *relation of knowledge*),—the other arises from the objective element of thought, the thing thought about, (called the *relation of existence*.)

The relation of *knowledge* arises from the reciprocal relation of the subject and the object of thought. Whatever comes into consciousness is thought, by us, as belonging to the mental self exclusively, or as belonging to the not-self exclusively, or as belonging partly to both.

The relation of *existence* arising from the object of thought is two-fold ; this relation being sometimes intrinsic, and sometimes extrinsic, according as it is determined by the qualitative or quantitative character of existence. Existence conceived as substance and quality, presents the intrinsic relation, called *qualitative*; substance and quality are only thought as mutual *relatives* inseparable in conception. We cannot think either separate from the other.

All that has thus far been said applies to both mind and matter.

The extrinsic relation of *existence* is three-fold ; and as constituted by three species of quantity, it may be called *quantitative*. It is realised in or by the three quantities, time, space, and degree, called respectively, protensive, extensive, and intensive quantity. The notions of time and space are the necessary conditions of all positive thought. Positive thought cannot be realised except in time and space. Degree is not, like time and space, an absolute condition of thought. Existence is not necessarily thought under degree. It applies only to quality, and not to quantity ; and only to quality in a restricted sense, which Sir William Hamilton has explicated in his doctrine of the qualities of bodies, dividing them into primary, secundo-primary, and secondary.

Of these conditions and their relations in their proper subordinations and co-ordinations, Sir William has presented a table, which he calls the Alphabet of Thought.

Out of the condition of relativity springs the science of metaphysics, just as we have indicated that logic springs out of the condition of non-contradiction. Thus the respective roots of the two great cognate branches of philosophy are traced to their psychological bases in the alphabet of thought.

We will now exhibit the metaphysical doctrine which Sir William Hamilton educes from the analysis of thought which we have endeavoured to present. And here he elevates the philosophy of common sense into the philosophy of the conditioned, borrowing this appellation from the different point of view from which philosophy is considered. The former appel-

lation is derived from a psychological point of view, the latter from a metaphysical—the former from a subjective, the latter from an objective.

It is sufficiently apparent that the condition of relativity limits our knowledge. This is the fundamental fact which it is proposed to establish. It is proposed to show that of the absolute we have no knowledge, but only of the relative. This is the whole scope of the philosophy of the conditioned.

With a view of showing the argument from the philosophy of the conditioned, let us turn for a moment to the philosophy of the absolute, the unconditioned, which is the reverse doctrine, and of the refutation of which the conditions of the thinkable are adduced as a basis.

From the dawn of philosophy in the school of Elea, the absolute, the infinite, the unconditioned, has been the highest principle of speculation. The great master amongst ancient philosophers, Aristotle, in accordance with the general drift of his philosophy, denied that the infinite was even an object of thought, much less of knowledge. And that profound and subtle, but perverse and paradoxical genius, Kant, who, towards the close of the eighteenth century, made the first serious attempt ever made to investigate the nature and origin of the notion of the infinite, maintained that the notion is merely regulative of our thoughts; and declared the infinite to be utterly beyond the sphere of our knowledge. But out of the philosophy of Kant, from a hidden germ, grew a more extravagant theory of the absolute than any which had before perplexed and astounded the practical reason of man. It was maintained by Fichte and Schelling—who fell back on the ancient notion, that experience, because conversant only about the phenomenal and transitory, is unworthy of the name of philosophy, as incapable of being a valid basis of certainty and knowledge—that man has a faculty of *intellectual intuition*, which rises above the sphere of consciousness, as well as of sense, and enthroning the reason of man on the seat of Omniscience, with which it in fact becomes identified, surveys existence in its all-comprehensive unity and its all-pervading relations, and unveils to us the nature of God, and by an ontological evolution, explains the derivation of all things, from the greatest to the very least.

This philosophy captivated the brilliant and sympathetic genius of M. Cousin, of France, who strove to conciliate and harmonise it with the Scottish philosophy of experience as promulgated by Reid, with which M. Cousin had been imbued. He denied the *intellectual intuition* of the German philosophers, and claimed that the infinite was given as a datum in consciousness along with its correlative the finite; that these two

notions, being necessarily thought as mutual relatives, must, therefore, be both equally objectively true; these two notions, and their relations to each other, are at once the elements and the laws of the reason of both man and God; and that all this is realised in and through consciousness. This theory M. Cousin proclaimed as a powerful eclecticism, which conciliated not only what had been before considered counter and hostile in the reflections of individual philosophers, but also in the different systems of philosophy preserved in the history of the science. Thus the history of philosophy, with its various systems, was shown to be but the growth of one regularly developed philosophy, gradually culminating towards that one consummate knowledge, completed in the all-comprehending eclecticism inaugurated, in the central nation of Europe, by M. Cousin in a splendour of discourse worthy of the grand doctrine which makes the proud rationalism of Germany acknowledge its doctrinal affiliation with the humble Scottish philosophy of observation. When this doctrine reached Scotland, Sir William Hamilton at once entered the great Olympic of philosophical discussion, and stood forth as the champion of the humble doctrine of common sense, against the host of continental thinkers.

And now, for the first time in the history of philosophy, the doctrine of the absolute, the infinite, the unconditioned, was made definite. It was shown by Sir William Hamilton that so far from the absolute and the infinite meaning the same thing or notion, they were contradictory opposites,—the absolute meaning the unconditional affirmation of limitation, while the infinite means the unconditional negation of limitation—the one thus an affirmative, the other a negative. And he further showed that both were but species of the unconditioned. The question being thus purified from the inaccuracy of language and the confusion of thought, and it being shown that the unconditioned must present itself to the human mind in a plural form, it was seen that the inquiry resolves itself into the problem, Whether the unconditioned, as either the absolute or the infinite, can be realised to the mind of man? Sir William Hamilton shows that it cannot. He demonstrates that in order to think either alternative, we must think away from those conditions of thought under which thought can alone be realised; and that, therefore, any attempt to think either the absolute or the infinite must end in a mere negation of thought. These notions are thus shown to be the results of two counter imbecilities of the mind—the inability to realise the unconditionally limited, and the unconditionally unlimited. The doctrine of M. Cousin is shown to be assumptious, inconsequent, and self-contradictory. His infinite is shown to be

at best only an indefinite, and therefore a relative. And it is shown, by a comprehensive application of the Aristotelic doctrine, that the knowledge of opposites is one, that so far from the fact of the notions of the infinite and finite mutually suggesting each other, furnishing evidence of the objective reality of both, it should create a suspicion of the reverse. The truth is, the searching analysis to which the doctrine of M. Cousin is subjected clearly evinces that he did not at all apprehend the state of the question discussed, and in fact was confusing himself in a vicious circle of words.

And the *intellectual intuition* of Fichte and Schelling is shown to be a mere chimera, and his absolute a mere nothing. As Schelling could never connect his absolute with the finite in any doctrinal affiliation, so he was unable to discover any cognitive transition from the intellectual intuition to personal consciousness. This hiatus in his theory could not, of course, escape the penetrating sagacity of Sir William Hamilton. It was at once demonstrated, as the intellectual intuition is out of and above consciousness, and, to be realised, the philosopher must cease to be the conscious man Schelling, that if even the intellectual intuition were possible, still it could only be remembered, and *ex hypothesi*, it could not be remembered, for memory is only possible under the conditions of the understanding, which exclude the absolute from knowledge. By this analysis the absolute is shown to be a mere mirage in the infinite desert of negation, conjured up by a self-delusive imagination, conceiting itself wise above the possibilities of thought. It may also be argued against the intellectual intuition, that it is only through the organism of sense that the mind realises *form*, the image of an object; for consciousness in and of itself is not an imaging faculty. Now, the intellectual intuition realises *image* in the absolute. It therefore partakes of the character of sensation; and it, in fact, by this analysis, stands revealed as a sublimated sense postulated, by reason overleaping itself in the attempt to clear the circle of the thinkable. The doctrine of the absolute is thus proved to be a sensational philosophy, disguised under terms of supposed high spiritual import. And thus it is demonstrated, that to abandon consciousness as the highest faculty, is to necessitate a fall into sensuism, though we imagine all the while we are soaring on the wings of reason above the region of consciousness. Schelling and Condillac are thus found in the darkness of a common error listening to the same oracle. And this analysis is confirmed by the fact, that Oken, who, next to Hegel, was the most distinguished disciple of Schelling, in his *Physio-Philosophy* makes the absolute *nothing*, zero; and then, by pure reason, evolves out of it all

physics; thus ascribing to a faculty above consciousness the imaging power of the senses. And Oken thus enthrones the physical sciences, as he imagines, on a seat above consciousness, when it is, in fact, the footstool of consciousness, the senses, on which they sit the while.

Thus was trampled down this proud doctrine which had misled speculation; and philosophy was again brought back from its aberrations into the sober paths of common sense. And never before did so mighty a champion lead it. For whatever else may be thought, in comparing Sir William Hamilton with other philosophers, it must be admitted, that as a man of hostilities, a dialectician and a critic, he is altogether matchless.

Having given an all-comprehensive example of the argument from the philosophy of the conditioned, we will now proceed to expound in outline the philosophy of the conditioned. The distinguishing feature of this philosophy, the one which most articulately enounces its character, is the doctrine of a mental *impotence*. This doctrine we will now expound.

The problem most fruitful of controversy in philosophy is that of the distinction between experiential and non-experiential notions and judgments. Some philosophers contend that there is no such distinction, but that all legitimate notions and judgments are experiential. And those who have admitted the distinction have quarrelled about the criterion of the distinction. Leibnitz at last established the quality of *necessity*, the necessity of so thinking, as the criterion of our non-experiential notions and judgments. Afterwards Kant, in his Critic of Pure Reason, developed and applied this criterion. And it may now be considered as the acknowledged test of our unacquired cognitions amongst those who admit that there are non-experiential notions and judgments. Now, it is in relation to this fundamental distinction that Sir William Hamilton has developed the philosophy of the conditioned. He admits that we have non-experiential notions and judgments (we prefer to call the two classes of notions and judgments *primary* and *secondary*, as we think both classes, from a certain point of view, can appropriately be considered as experiential in a restricted sense), and he concurs with Leibnitz and Kant that *necessity* is their distinctive quality. But then he maintains that the doctrine as developed by all previous philosophers is one-sided, when it should be two-sided. And the side of the doctrine which philosophers have overlooked is the important one. The doctrine, as heretofore enounced and recognised, is, that the necessity is a positive one, *so to think*, and is determined by a mental power. But Sir William Hamilton considers, and very justly, that this is

only half of the truth, and the least important half; because this necessity is never illusive, never constrains to error, while the necessity which he indicates is naturally illusive. His doctrine is, that this necessity is both positive and negative: "The one, the necessity of *so thinking* (the impossibility of *not so thinking*), determined by a mental power; the other, the necessity of *not so thinking* (the impossibility of *so thinking*), determined by a mental impotence." This negative necessity, which has been overlooked by philosophers, plays an important part on the theatre of thinking. It is to the development of its function in our mental economy that the philosophy of the conditioned is directed. As philosophy stood, the very highest law of intelligence, which asserts that of two contradictories, both cannot, but one must be true, led continually to the most pervasive and fundamental errors. Because when one alternative was found incogitable, the mind immediately recoiled to the conclusion that the other contradictory must be true. When, for example, in examining the doctrine of the will, it was discovered that the freedom of the will was incomprehensible, could not be speculatively construed to the mind, the inquirer immediately recoiled to the alternative of the necessity of human actions; and so, on the other hand, when the necessity of the will was found incogitable, the inquirer fell back upon the alternative of liberty. So that philosophers, like Milton's fallen angels, had—

"Reason'd high
Of providence, foreknowledge, will, and fate,
Fix'd fate, freewill, foreknowledge absolute,
And found no end, in wandering mazes lost."

Thus the negative necessity, of *not so thinking*, which was not ever even suspected to exist, had been a source of constant errors utterly incapable of solution. But Sir William Hamilton has discovered that we may be negatively unable to think one contradictory, and yet find ourselves equally impotent to conceive the opposite. To this fundamental psychological fact he has applied the highest law of intelligence, *that of two contradictories, one must of necessity be true*; and that, therefore, there is no ground for inferring a fact to be impossible, merely from our inability to conceive its possibility. And thus is disclosed the hidden rock on which speculation in its highest problems had foundered.

The philosophy of the conditioned is the development and application of this negative necessity in combination with the positive. In order to give precision to the doctrine of the conditioned, the conditions of the thinkable are evoked and systematised under the two fundamental categories of positive and negative thinking; and these categories are themselves

subdivided, in order to bring out their import in generic instances of their application in practical thought. These conditions of the thinkable we have exhibited; but it now becomes necessary to recur to them, for the needs of the discussion and exposition on which we now enter.

The most important and comprehensive question in metaphysics is, *The origin and nature of the causal judgment*. No less than seven theories had been propounded on the problem; and now Sir William Hamilton has propounded an eighth, entirely new. He attempts to resolve the causal judgment into a modification of the law of the conditioned, which is so obtrusive in his view of philosophy. He makes the causal judgment a mere inability to think an absolute beginning,—a mere necessity to deny that the object, which we apprehend as beginning to be, really so begins,—an inability to construe it in thought as possible that the complement of existence has been increased or diminished,—a mere necessity to affirm the identity of its present sum of being with the sum of its past existence. The supposed connection between cause and effect is, in its last analysis, resolved into a mental impotence, the result of the law of the conditioned.

It is manifest that in this theory, the fact of our inability to conceive the complement of existence either increased or diminished is the turning point in the question. That because we are unable to construe it in thought that such increase or diminution is possible, we are constrained to refund the present sum of existence into the previous sum of existence, is given as an explanation of the causal judgment.

Now, it seems to us that this solution avoids the important element in the phenomenon to be explained. The question in nature is, not whether the present complement of existence had a previous existence,—has just begun to be? but, how comes its new appearance? The obtrusive and essential element is the *new appearance*, the *change*. This is the fact which elicits the causal judgment. To the *change* is necessarily prefixed, by the understanding, a cause or potency. The cause is the correlative to the change, elicited in thought and posited in nature. The question as to the origin of the sum of existence does in no way intrude into consciousness, and is not involved in the causal judgment. Such a question may, of course, be raised; and then the theory of Sir William Hamilton is a true account of what would take place in the mind. And this is the question which, it seems to us, Sir William has presented as the problem of the causal judgment. His statement of the problem is this: "When aware of a *new appearance*, we are *unable* to conceive that therein has originated any new existence, and are therefore constrained to think that what now

appears to us under a new form had previously an existence under others,—others conceivable by us or not. We are utterly unable to construe it in thought as possible that the complement of existence has been increased or diminished.”

This seems to us not a proper statement of the problem of causation. This problem does not require the *complement of existence* to be accounted for, but the *new form* to be accounted for; and a new form must not be confounded with an *entirely new existence*. Causation must be discriminated from creation; in the first, *change* only, in the last, the *complement of existence*, is involved. If we attempt to solve the problem of *creation*, the notion of an absolute beginning is involved; consequently, a negative impotence is experienced, as we cannot think an absolute beginning, and we would fall back on the notion of causation,—would stop short at the causal judgment, unable to rise to a higher cognition, the cognition of creation.

The causal judgment consists in the necessity we are under of prefixing in thought a cause to every change of which we think. Now, change implies previous existence, else it is not change. Of what does it imply the previous existence? Of that which is changed, and also of that by which the change is effected. Now, change is effect. It is the result of an operation. Operation is cause (potence) realising itself in effect. It seems to us, by this somewhat tautological analysis, that cause and effect necessarily imply each other, both in nature and in thought. Causality is thought both as a law of things and a law of intelligence. When we attempt to separate effect from cause, in our thought, contradiction emerges. It is realised to consciousness in every act of will, and in every act of positive thinking, as both natural and rational. Cause and effect are related to each other as terms in thought as well as realities in existence. Causality is primarily natural, secondarily rational. The woof of reasoning, into which its notion is woven, has the two threads of the material and the rational running together, by which existence and thought are harmonised into truth,—the objective responding to the subjective. If this were not the law of material thinking, we do not see how there could be any consecutive thinking about nature. The notion of cause always leads thought in material reasoning,—always determines the mental conclusion; as the notion of reason does in formal or pure reasoning. The law of cause and effect is in material thought what the law of reason and consequent is in formal thought.

It is doubtless true, that the negative impotence to think an absolute beginning necessarily connects in thought present with past existence; and as all change must take place in some existence, the change itself is connected in thought with some-

thing antecedent; and therefore the mind is necessitated by the negative impotence to predicate something antecedent to the change. But then, as a mere negative impotence cannot yield an affirmative judgment, it cannot connect present with past existence in the relation of cause and effect, but only in sum of existence, which it is unable to think either increased or diminished. The causal judgment is determined by a mental power elicited into action by an observed change, and justified thereby as an affirmation of a potency evinced in the changed existence; and it matters not whether the change be the result of many concurring causes or of one, still the notion of potency cannot but be thought as involved in the phenomenon. When we see a tree shivered to atoms by a flash of lightning, it is difficult to be convinced that the causal judgment elicited by the phenomenon is merely the impotence to think an absolute beginning.

We are conscious that we are the authors of our own actions, and this is to be conscious of causation in ourselves. But if we attempt to analyse this fact in consciousness, by considering it as made up of two elements related in time, we confuse ourselves by the impotence to conceive any causal nexus between the supposed antecedent and consequent. The fact is, that they are a simultaneous deliverance of consciousness, realising an antithesis in one inseparable act; because cause and effect are never realised separately, but conjointly. Efficiency is twofold, partly cause, partly effect, and cannot be thought otherwise without contradiction. Cause is thus thought as an indefinite, as not having either an absolute beginning or ending. Absolute beginning is not more necessary to the notion of cause than to that of time. Both are thought as quantities, and though both are thought as indeterminates, like all indeterminates they are capable of a determinate application. And while realised as particular, they are thought as universal.

We are prone to postulate principles more absolutely than they are warranted by nature. Therefore it is that the subtilities of nature so often drop through the formulas of the logician; and he retains in their stead abstractions not corresponding with existence. Excessive study of formal logic tends to lessen the capacity for appreciating the imports of intuition. The apodictic character of logical relations is so different from that of mere material relations, that a mind long addicted to the estimation of the former cannot but contract a fallacious bias, somewhat like that of the mere analytical mathematician, but of course to a much less degree. And on the other hand, a metaphysician who, like Locke, is deficient in a knowledge of logic, and unpractised in its precise distinctions and forms, becomes loose, inconsequent, and contradic-

tious in his opinions. We venture to suggest that the former of these biases is apparent in the application of the law of the conditioned to the causal judgment by Sir William Hamilton. He postulates it too unqualifiedly.

The doctrine of the conditioned rescues thought from otherwise insoluble contradictions, by carrying up the contradictory phenomena into a common principle of limitation of our faculties. For example: If we attempt to think an absolute beginning, we find it impossible; and on the other hand, if we attempt to think its contradictory opposite, an infinite non-beginning, we find it equally incogitable. If, therefore, both be received as positive affirmative deliverances of our intelligence, then our minds testify, by necessity, to lies. But the philosophy of the conditioned emphatically forbids us to confound, as equivalent, non-existence with incogitability; because it does not make the human mind the measure of existence, but just the reverse. It postulates as its fundamental principle, that the incogitable may and must be necessarily true upon the acknowledged highest principle of intelligence, that of two contradictories one must, but both cannot be true. Thus by carrying up these contradictions into the common principle of a limitation of our faculties, intelligence is shown to be feeble, but not false; and the contradictory phenomena are rescued from contradiction, by showing that one must be true. And by this doctrine the moral responsibility of man is vindicated from all cavil. Thus while the liberty of the will is inconceivable, so is its contradictory opposite, the necessity of human actions. As, then, these two negations are at equipoise, and can neither prove nor disprove any thing, the testimony of consciousness, that we are, though we know not how, the real and responsible authors of our actions, gives the affirmance to our accountability. And out of this moral germ springs the root of the argument for the existence of God; which, combined with the lately too much disparaged argument from design, constitutes a valid basis for the doctrine of natural theology. Thus are vindicated, by this new development of the philosophy of common sense, the great truths of our practical reason, as they have been called; and speculation and practice are reconciled. And the doctrine that God is incognisable is demonstrated; and that it is only through the analogy of the human with the divine nature that we are percipient of the existence of God. Power, and knowledge, and virtue, cognised in ourselves, and tending to consummation, reveal the notion of God. For unless all analogy be rejected, the mind must *believe* in that First Cause, which by the limited nature of our faculties we cannot *know*. In the language of the great Puritan divine, John Owen: "All the rational

conceptions of the minds of men are swallowed up and lost, when they would exercise themselves directly on that which is absolutely immense, eternal, infinite. When we say it is so, we know not what we say, but only that it is not otherwise. What we *deny* of God we know in some measure ; but what we *affirm* we know not, only we declare what we *believe* and adore."

While, therefore, this philosophy confines *our knowledge* to the conditioned, it leaves *faith* free about the unconditioned ; indeed constrains us to believe in it by the highest law of our intelligence. This fundamental truth of his philosophy Sir William Hamilton has enounced in this comprehensive canon : "Thought is possible only in the conditioned interval between two unconditioned contradictory extremes or poles, each of which is altogether inconceivable, but of which, on the principle of excluded middle, the one or the other is necessarily true." As therefore the unconditioned, as we have seen, presents itself to the human mind under a plural form of contradictory opposites, as either the absolute or the infinite, the problem comes under this canon, and the unconditioned is established as a verity, incognisable but *believable*. Thus, in the very fact of the limitation of our knowledge, is discovered the affirmation, by the highest law of our intelligence, of the transcendent nature of faith. There is no philosophy which, in its spirit, its scope, and its doctrines, both positive and negative, so conciliates and upholds revealed religion, as that which is based on this great canon of metaphysics. The conditions on which revelation with its complement of doctrines is offered to our belief, are precisely those which this canon enounces.

Having exhibited an outline of what Sir William Hamilton has done for metaphysics, we will now proceed to show what he has done for logic.

In what we have said about the relation which the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton bears to that of Bacon, we by no means intend to affirm that there is much intellectual sympathy between the two great thinkers. It is quite otherwise. Bacon was pre-eminently objective, exhausting his great powers chiefly in the field of physics, because, in his time, there lay the needs of truth ; while Hamilton, rather turning his back on physics, because of their now extravagant cultivation, is supremely subjective, throwing his vast energies upon inquiries in the province of intellectual philosophy. And though Sir William Hamilton does not directly disparage the labours of Bacon, yet he vaunts those of Des Cartes at their expense, and certainly nowhere does those of Bacon justice. But still, the philosophies of Bacon and of Hamilton are concordant developments of the one philosophy of common sense,

and are affiliated in unity of fundamental doctrine. Bacon is the forerunner in that great intellectual movement to which Hamilton has communicated such a mighty energy of thought, contributed the light of such vast erudition, and adduced such stringent historical proofs of its perennial existence. It is the inductive branch of logic, with its kindred doctrines, which Sir William Hamilton has brought out into bold relief, from the subordination in which it was held by Aristotle; while, at the same time, he has so developed, and simplified by a completer analysis, the deductive branch, that the Stagyrte only retains his superior fame by being the precursor. And it is by his successful labours upon these two great branches of logic that Sir William Hamilton conciliates the philosophies of Aristotle and Bacon, and gives to modern thought a force of reasoning, through the practical application of nicer discriminations of the forms of thought, and more adequate logical expression, which elevates this century to a higher intellectual platform. All this shall sufficiently appear in the sequel.

When in the year 1833 Sir William Hamilton published in the *Edinburgh Review* his criticism on Whately's *Logic*, there was prevalent in Britain total ignorance of the higher logical philosophy. The treatise of Whately was the highest logical standard; which though in ability it is much above mediocrity, in erudition it is far below the literature of the subject. The article of Sir William elevated the views of British logicians above the level of Whately, and gave them glimpses of a higher doctrine. But the chief service rendered by this masterly criticism, was the precision with which it defined the nature and the object matter of logic, and discriminated the whole subject doctrinally and historically, in the concentrated light of its literature.

The treatise of Whately presents indistinct, ambiguous, and even contradictory views of the proper object matter of logic. Sometimes it makes the process or operation of reasoning the total matter about which logic is conversant; at other times it makes logic entirely conversant about language. Now, though it involves a manifest contradiction to say that logic is exclusively conversant about each of two opposite things, yet Whately was praised by British logicians for the clearness with which he displayed the true nature and office of logic. In the low state of logical knowledge in Britain which these facts indicate, it behoved whoever undertook to point out Whately's blunders, to enter into the most elementary discussion of logic, both name and thing. This Sir William Hamilton did in the article now under consideration.

Aristotle designated logic by no single term. He employed

different terms to designate particular parts or applications of logic; as is shown by the names of his several treatises. In fact, Aristotle did not look at logic from any central point of view. And indeed his treatises are so overlaid with extralogical matter, as to show that the true theoretical view of logic, as an independent science, had not disclosed itself to its great founder. In fact, it has only been gradually that the proper view of the science has been speculatively adopted,—practically it never has been; and no contribution to the literature of the subject has done so much to discriminate the true domain of logic as this article of Sir William Hamilton. It marks an era in the science. Mounting up to the father of logic himself, it shows that nineteen-twentieths of his logical treatises treat of matters that transcend logic, considered as a formal science. It is shown that the whole doctrine of the modality of syllogisms does not belong to logic: for if any matter, be it demonstrative or probable, be admitted into logic, none can be excluded; and thus, with the consideration of the *real truth or falsehood* of propositions, the whole body of *real science* must come within the domain of logic, obliterating all distinction between *formal* and *real* inference.

The doctrine maintained in this article is, that logic is conversant about the laws of thought, considered merely as thought. The import of this doctrine we will now attempt to unfold. The term *thought* is used in several significations of very different extent. It is sometimes used to designate every mental modification of which we are conscious, including will, feeling, desire. It is sometimes used in the more limited sense of every *cognitive* fact, excluding will, feeling, desire. In its most limited meaning it denotes only the acts of the understanding or faculty of comparison or relation, called also the discursive or elaborative faculty. It is in this most restricted sense that the word *thought* is used in relation to logic. Logic supposes the materials of thought already in the mind, and only considers the manner of their elaboration. And the operation of the elaborative faculty on these materials is what is meant by *thought proper*. And it is the laws of thought in this, its restricted sense, about which logic is conversant.

It must be further discriminated, that logic is conversant about thought as a product, and not about the producing operation or process; this belongs to psychology. Logic, therefore, in treating of the laws of thought, treats of them in regard to thought considered as a product. What, then, is thought? in other words, what are the acts of the elaborative faculty? They are three, conception, judgment, reasoning. These are all acts of comparison—gradations of thought. Of these as producing acts psychology treats. Logic treats of

the products of these, called respectively, a concept, a judgment, a reasoning. The most articulate enunciation, therefore, of the intrinsic nature of logic is, *the science of the formal laws of thought, considered as a product, and not as a process.*

But we will show still further what a form of thought is. In an act of thinking there are three things which we can discriminate in consciousness. First, there is a thinking subject; second, an object which we think, called the matter of thought; and third, the relation subsisting between the subject and object of which we are conscious—a relation always manifested in some mode or manner. This last is the form of thought. Now logic takes account only of this last—the form of thought. In so far as the form of thought is viewed in relation to the subject, as an act, operation, or energy, it belongs to psychology. It is only in reference to what is thought about, only considered as a product, that the form of the act, or operation, or energy, has relation to logic.

With this explanation, we will now enounce the laws of thought, of which logic is the science.

In treating of the conditions of the thinkable, as systematised by Sir William Hamilton, we have pointed out the fact, that it is shown that logic springs out of the condition of non-contradiction; for that this condition is brought to bear only under three phases, constituting three laws: 1st, The law of *identity*; 2d, The law of *contradiction*; 3d, The law of *excluded middle*; of which laws logic is the science. Of these laws we will treat in their order, and explicate the import or logical significance of each.

The principle of *identity* expresses the relation of total sameness in which a product of the thinking faculty, be it concept, judgment, or reasoning, stands to all, and the relation of partial sameness in which it stands to each, of its constituent characters. This principle is the special application of the absolute equivalence of the whole and its parts taken together, applied to the thinking of a thing, by the attribution of its constituent or distinctive characters. In the predicate the whole is contained explicitly, and in the subject implicitly. The logical significance of the law lies in this, that it is the principle of all logical affirmation, of all logical definition.

The second law, that of *contradiction*, is this: What is contradictory is unthinkable. Its principle may be thus expressed: When a concept is determined by the attribution or affirmation of a certain character, mark, note, or quality, the concept cannot be thought to be the same when such character is denied of it. Assertions are mutually contradictory, when the one affirms that a thing possesses, or is determined by the characters which the other affirms it does not possess,

or is not determined by. The logical significance of this law consists in its being the principle of all logical negation, or distinction.

The laws of *identity* and *contradiction* are co-ordinate and reciprocally relative; and neither can be deduced from the other, for each supposes the other.

The third law, called the principle of *excluded middle*, embraces that condition of thought which compels us, of two contradictory notions (which cannot both exist, by the law of contradiction) to think either the one or the other as existing. By the laws of *identity* and *contradiction*, we are warranted to conclude from the truth of one contradictory to the falsehood of the other; and by the law of *excluded middle*, we are warranted to conclude from the falsehood of one to the truth of the other. The logical significance of this law consists in this, that it determines that, of two forms given in the laws of *identity* and *contradiction*, and by these laws affirmed as those exclusively possible, that of these two only possible forms, the one or the other must be affirmed as necessary of every object. This law is the principle of disjunctive judgments, which stand in such mutual relation, that the affirmation of the one is the denial of the other.

These three laws stand to each other in relation like the three sides of a triangle. They are not the same, not reducible to unity, yet each giving, in its own existence, that of the other. They form one principle in different aspects.

These laws are but phases of that condition of the thinkable which stipulates for the absolute absence of non-contradiction. Whatever, therefore, violates these laws is impossible, not only in thought, but in existence; and they thus determine for us the sphere of possibility and impossibility, not merely in thought, but in reality. They are therefore not wholly logical, but also metaphysical. To deny the universal application of these laws is to subvert the reality of thought; and as the subversion would be an act of thought, it annihilates itself. They are therefore insuperable.

There is a fourth law, which is a corollary of these three primary laws, called the law of *reason* and *consequent*, which is so obtrusive in our reasoning that it needs to be specially considered. The logical significance of this law lies in this, that in virtue of it, thought is constituted into a series of acts indissolubly connected, each necessarily inferring the other. The mind is necessitated to this or that determinate act of thinking, by a knowledge of something different from the thinking process itself. That which determines the mind is called the reason; that to which the mind is determined is called the consequent; and the relation between the two is called the con-

sequence. By reason of our intelligent nature, there is a necessary dependence of one notion upon another, from which all logical inference results as an inevitable consequent. This inference is of two kinds. It must proceed from the whole to the parts, or from the parts to the whole. When the determining notion (the reason) is conceived as a whole *containing* (under it), and therefore necessitating the determined notion (the consequent) conceived as its *contained part* or *parts*, argumentation proceeds, by mental analysis, from the whole to the parts into which it is separated. When the determining notion is conceived as the *parts constituting*, and therefore necessitating the determined notion conceived as the constituted whole, argumentation proceeds, by mental synthesis, from the parts to the whole. The process from the whole to the parts is called deductive reasoning; the other process, from the parts to the whole, is called inductive reasoning. There is therefore in logic a deductive syllogism and an inductive syllogism. The former is governed by the rule:—*What belongs (or does not belong) to the containing whole, belongs (or does not belong) to each and all of the contained parts.* The latter by the rule:—*What belongs (or does not belong) to all the constituent parts, belongs (or does not belong) to the constituted whole.* These rules exclusively determine all formal inference; whatever transcends or violates them transcends or violates logic.

Sir William Hamilton was the first to discriminate accurately the difference between the deductive and the inductive syllogism. All that had been said by logicians—except Aristotle, and he is brief, and by no means unambiguous—on logical induction, is entirely erroneous; for they all, including Whately, confound logical or formal induction with that which is philosophical, and material, and extra-logical. They consider logical induction not as governed by the necessary laws of thought, but as determined by the probabilities of the sciences from which the matter is borrowed. All inductive reasoning, logical and material, proceeds from the parts (singulars) to the whole (universal); but in the formal or subjective, the illation is different from that in the material or objective. In the former, the illation is founded on the necessary laws of thought; in the latter, on the general or particular analogies of nature. The logician knows no principle but the necessary laws of thought. His conclusions are necessitated, not presumed.

All this confusion was produced by the introduction into formal logic of various kinds of matter. Aristotle himself corrupted logic in this way; and Sir William Hamilton has been the first to expel entirely this foreign element, and to purify logic from the resulting errors, though Kant had done much towards the same result. When we reflect, that the

only legitimate illation in formal logic is that regulated by the law of reason and consequent, which connects thought into a reciprocally dependent series, each necessarily inferring the other, it is at once manifest that the distinction of matter into possible, actual, and necessary, is a doctrine wholly extralogical. Logical illation never differs in degree—never falls below that of absolute necessity. The necessary laws of thought, constraining an inevitable illation, are the only principles known to the logician.

We have just seen that Sir William Hamilton is the first to signalise the fact, that reasoning from the parts to the whole is just as necessary, and exclusive of material considerations, as reasoning from the whole to the parts. And he has evolved the laws of the inductive syllogism, and correlated them with those of the deductive syllogism.

We now proceed to another important addition which he has made to logic. He has shown that there are two logical wholes, instead of one, as the logicians had supposed. These two wholes are, the whole of comprehension, called by Sir William, *depth*; and the whole of extension, called by him *breadth*. These two wholes are in an inverse ratio of each other. The maximum of depth and the minimum of breadth are found in the concept of an individual (which in reality is not a concept, but only a single representation), while the minimum of breadth and the maximum of depth are found in a simple concept—the concept of being or existence. Now, the depth of notions affords one of two branches of reasoning, which, though overlooked by logicians, is at least equally important as that afforded by their breadth, which alone has been developed by the logicians. The character of the former is, that the predicate is contained *in the subject*; of the latter, that the subject is *contained under* the predicate. All reasoning, therefore, is either from the whole to the parts, or from the parts to the whole, in breadth; or from the whole to the parts, or from the parts to the whole, in depth. The quantity of breadth is the creation of the mind, the quantity of depth is at once given in the very nature of things. The former, therefore, is factitious, the latter is natural. The same proposition forms a different premise in these different quantities, they being inverse ratios; the summation in breadth being the subsumption in depth.

Another fundamental development of logic made by Sir William, is, that the categorical syllogism, though mentally one (for all mediate inference is one, and that categorical), is either analytic or synthetic, from the necessity of adopting the one order or the other, in compliance with that condition of language which requires that a reasoning be distinguished

into parts and detailed in order of sequence ; because explanation is sometimes better attained by an analytic and sometimes by a synthetic enunciation, as is shown in common language. The Aristotelic syllogism is exclusively synthetic. Sir William Hamilton thus relieves the syllogism from a one-sided view; and also rescues it from the objection of *petitio principii*, or of an idle tautology, which has been so often urged against it. Such objection does not hold against the analytic syllogism, in which the conclusion is expressed first, and the premises are then stated as its reasons. And this form of reasoning being shown to be valid, the objection of *petitio principii* is at once turned off, as applicable only to the accident of the external expression, and not to the essence of the internal thought. The analytic syllogism is not only the more natural, but is pre-supposed by the synthetic. It is more natural to express a reasoning in this direct and simple way, than in the round-about synthetic way.

We will next consider the most important doctrine, perhaps, which Sir William Hamilton has discovered in the domain of logic. Logicians had admitted that the *subject* of a proposition has a determinate quantity in thought, and this was, accordingly, expressed in language. But logicians had denied that the *predicate* in propositions has a determinate quantity. Sir William Hamilton has therefore the honour to have first disclosed the principle of the thorough-going quantification of the predicate in its full significance, in both affirmative and negative propositions. By keeping constantly in view that logic is conversant about the internal thought, and not the external expression, he has detected more of what it is common to omit in expression, of that which is efficient in thought, than any other philosopher. Inferences, judgments, problems, are often occult in the thought which are omitted in the expression. The purpose of common language is merely to *exhibit with clearness the matter of thought*. This is often accomplished best by omitting the expression of steps in the mental process of thinking; as the minds of others will intuitively supply the omitted steps, as they follow the meaning of the elliptical expression. This elliptical character of common language has made logicians overlook the quantification of the predicate. The purpose of common language does not require the quantity to be expressed. Therefore it was supposed that there is no quantification in the internal thought. When we reflect that all thought is a comparison of less and more, of part and whole, it is marvellous that it should not have been sooner discovered that all thought must be under some determinate quantity. And as all predication is but the expression of the internal thought, predication must have a determinate quantity—the

quantity of the internal thought. But such has been the iron rule of Aristotle, that, in two thousand years, Sir William Hamilton has been the first logician who, while appreciating the labours of the Stagyrte in this paramount branch of philosophy, has been in no degree enslaved by his authority, and has made improvements in, and additions to logic, which almost rival those of the great founder of the science himself.

The office of logic is to exhibit *with exactness the form of thought*, and therefore to supply in expression the omissions of common language ; whose purpose is merely to exhibit *with clearness the matter of thought*. Logic claims, therefore, as its fundamental postulate, *That we be allowed to state in language what is contained in thought*. This is exemplified in the syllogism, which is a logical statement of the form of thought in reasoning, supplying in expression what has been omitted in common language. Apply this rule to propositions, and it is at once discovered that the predicate is always of a given quantity in relation to the subject.

Upon the principle of the quantification of the predicate, Sir William Hamilton has founded an entirely new analytic of logical forms. The whole system of logic has been remodelled and simplified. The quantification of the predicate reveals that the relation between the terms of a proposition is one not only of similarity, but of identity ; and there being consequently an equation of subject and predicate, these terms are always necessarily convertible. So that simple conversion takes the place of the complex and erroneous doctrine, with its load of rules, heretofore taught by logicians.

By the new analytic Sir William Hamilton has also amplified logic. The narrower views of logicians, in accordance with which an unnatural art had been built up, have been superseded by a wider view, commensurate with nature. Logic should exhibit all the forms of thought, and not merely an arbitrary selection ; and especially where they are proclaimed as all. The rules of the logicians ignore many forms of affirmation and negation which the exigencies of thinking require, and which are constantly used, but have not been noted in their abstract generality. Accordingly, Sir William Hamilton has shown that there are eight *necessary* relations of propositional terms ; and, consequently, eight propositional forms performing peculiar functions in our reasonings, which are implicitly at work in our concrete thinking, and not four only, as has been generally taught. Logic has been rescued from the tedious minuteness of Aristotle and his one-sided view, and from the trammels of technicality, and restored to the amplitude and freedom of the laws of thought.

The analysis of Sir William Hamilton enables us also to dis-

criminate the class, and to note the differential quality, of each of those syllogisms whose forms are dependent on the internal essence of thought, and not on the contingent order of external expression, such as the disjunctive, hypothetical, and dilemmatic syllogism; and to show the special fundamental law of thought by which each distinctive reasoning is more particularly regulated. And those forms of syllogism which are dependent on the contingent order of the external expression, embraced in the three figures of Aristotle, are expounded anew; and while their legitimacy is vindicated, the fourth figure, which has been ingrafted on the system by some alien hand, is shown to be a mere logical caprice. But we cannot particularise further. In fact, the work-shop of the understanding has been laid open, and the materials, the moulds and the castings of thought, in all their variety of pattern, have been exhibited, and the great mystery of thinking revealed, by this great master, on whom the mantle of Aristotle has fallen in the nineteenth century.

Logic may be discriminated into two grand divisions—the doctrine of elements, and the doctrine of method. Thought can only be exerted under the general laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle, and reason and consequent; and through the general forms of concepts, judgments, and reasonings. These, therefore, in their abstract generality, are the elements of thought; and that part of logic which treats of them is the doctrine of elements. To this part of logic we have thus far confined our remarks. And the writings of Sir William Hamilton treat only of this part of logic. But in order to show the historical position of Sir William, and to exhibit the relation which, we have said, his philosophy bears to the philosophy of Aristotle and the philosophy of Bacon, as an initial, or step of progress towards harmonising the logic of the one with the method of the other, it becomes necessary to remark briefly upon the second part of logic, the doctrine of method.

Method is a regular procedure, governed by rules which guide us to a definite end, and guard us against aberrations. The end of method is logical perfection; which consists in the perspicuity, the completeness, and the harmony of our knowledge. As we have shown, our knowledge supposes two conditions; one of which has relation to the thinking subject, and supposes that what is known is known clearly, distinctly, completely, and in connection; the second has relation to what is known, and supposes that what is known has a veritable or real existence. The former constitutes the logical or formal perfection of knowledge; the latter, the scientific or material perfection of knowledge. Logic, as we have shown, is

conversant about the form of thought only; it is therefore confined exclusively to the formal perfection of our knowledge, and has nothing to do with its scientific or material truth, or perfection. Method, therefore, consists of such rules as guide to logical perfection. These rules are, definition, division, and concatenation, or probation. The doctrine of these rules is method.

Logic, as a system of rules, is only valuable as a mean towards logic as a habit of the mind—a speculative knowledge of its doctrines, and a practical dexterity with which they may be applied. Logic, therefore, both in the doctrine of elements and the doctrine of method, is discriminated into abstract or pure, and into concrete or applied. We have thus far only had reference to abstract or pure logic; and Sir William Hamilton treats only of this. It becomes, however, necessary for our purpose to pass into concrete or applied logic. Now, as the end of abstract, or pure logical method, is merely the logical perfection of our knowledge, having reference only to the thinking subject, the end of concrete, or applied logical method, is real or material truth, having reference only to the real existence of what is thought about. Concrete logic is, therefore, conversant about the laws of thought as modified by the empirical circumstances, internal and external, in which man thinks; and also about the laws under which the objects of existence are to be known. We beg our readers to remember these distinctions, and that all that now follows is about concrete or applied logic.

In order to show how the improvements and developments in formal logic, which we have exhibited, that have been made by Sir William Hamilton, conciliate the deductive or explicative logic of Aristotle with the inductive or ampliative logic of Bacon, it becomes necessary to state the difference of the philosophical methods of the two philosophers.

The great difficulty, with the ancient philosophers of the Socratic school, was to correlate logically the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* elements of our knowledge. The difficulty seems to have been suggested by the question, *How can we know a thing for the first time?* This question raised the doubt, that it is vain to search after a thing which we know not, since, not knowing the object of our search, we should be ignorant of it when found, for we cannot recognise what we do not know. Plato and Socrates, perhaps, solved the difficulty by the doctrine, that to discover, or to learn, is but to remember what had been known by us in a prior state of existence. Investigation was thus vindicated as a valid process; and also a useful one, as it is important to recall to memory what has been forgotten. Upon this theory of knowledge, Plato made

intellect, to the exclusion of sense, the faculty of scientific knowledge; and ideas or universals the sole objects of philosophical investigation. The Platonic philosophy, called, in this aspect of it, dialectic, had for its object of investigation the true nature of that connection which exists between each thing and the archetypal form or idea which makes it what it is, and to awaken the soul to a full remembrance of what had been known prior to being imprisoned in the body.

Aristotle made a great advance beyond Plato, towards correlating the *a priori* and *a posteriori* elements of our knowledge. He rejected the Platonic doctrine of ideas, as universals existing anterior to and separate from singulars; and thereby ignored the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence. Still he did not extricate himself out of the difficulties which environed the problem of human knowledge. He seems to have believed in the existence of universals or forms, not apart from, but in, particulars or singulars. And, to correspond with this metaphysical doctrine, he made both intellect and sense important faculties in science. He maintained an *a priori* knowledge paramount to, but not exclusive of the *a posteriori*: that while universals are known through the intellect, and implicitly contain particulars or singulars, yet we may be ignorant of the singulars or particulars, until realised in and through sense; and that, therefore, though all knowing is through previous knowledge, yet the investigation of particulars is not superfluous; because, while we may know the universal, we may be ignorant of the particular. Therefore intellect and sense combine in framing the fabric of our knowledge.

The Aristotelic method of investigation is therefore twofold, deductive and inductive; the first allied with intellect and with universals, the latter allied with sense and with particulars. Aristotle, in accordance with this doctrine of method, seems to have considered syllogism proper, or deduction, no less ampliative than induction,—that deductive inference did in some way assure us, or fortify our assurance, of real truth. We greatly doubt whether he discriminated at all the difference between formal and material inference; we think that he rather referred all difference in the cogency of inference to the difference of necessity or contingency in the matter. He, strangely enough, maintains for the syllogism proper the power to deduce true conclusions from false premises. Therefore the syllogistic inference is not wholly dependent on the premises; and consequently, deduction is not dependent on induction, whose office it is to supply the premises.

This logical doctrine of Aristotle corresponds with his metaphysical and his psychological doctrine. As he makes universals the paramount object of science, and intellect its

paramount principle; so does he make syllogism the paramount process, and induction the inferior process in logic: for though intellect is not with him, as with Plato, the sole principle of science, but conjunct with sense, yet sense is logically subordinate to intellect. There are, according to his theory of knowledge, certain universal principles of knowledge existing in the mind, rather as native generalities than as mere necessities of so thinking, which furnish the propositions for syllogism; therefore syllogism is not dependent for these on induction. It is nevertheless true, that, according to the Aristotelic theory, there is perfect harmony between intellect and sense, between syllogism and induction. And though syllogism is the more intellectual, the more scientific, yet induction can be legitimately used as corroborative and complementary of syllogism, and particularly by weak minds, who can discern the universal in the particulars, but cannot apprehend it *a priori* as a native generality. It was because of this theory of knowledge that induction holds so subordinate and inferior a place in the Aristotelic logic.

Whether our account of Aristotle's theory of knowledge be the true one or not, for there is much obscurity over his doctrine, it is nevertheless certain that Aristotle had a very imperfect insight into induction as an objective process of investigation. And the slighting manner in which he passes induction over shows how little he appreciated it. He has made a crude and superficial distinction, which has been perpetuated to this day, between the universals derived from induction and universals derived from similars. In other words, he has correlated induction and analogy as different kinds of reasoning. And all writers on logic, including, we suspect, even Sir William Hamilton, still speak of reasoning by induction, and reasoning by analogy. This, it seems to us, is a great confusion and error. We make induction the process, and analogy or similarity the evidence by which the illation is warranted. That analogy which is the mere resemblance of relations has nothing to do with philosophy, but only that analogy which consists of an essential resemblance or similarity. The tendency to generalise our knowledge by the judgment, *that where partial resemblance is found total resemblance will be found*, is an original principle of our intelligence, and may be called the principle of philosophical presumption. Upon this principle the objective process of induction is founded, by which we conclude from something observed to something not observed,—from something within the sphere of experience to something without its sphere. This principle of philosophical presumption is brought to bear under two objective laws: the first proclaims, *One in many, therefore one in all*; the

second proclaims, *Many in one, therefore all in one*. Through the first law, we conclude from a certain attribute being possessed by many similar things, or things of the same class, that the same attribute is possessed by all similar things, or things of the same class. Through the second law, we conclude from the partial similarity of two or more things in some respects, to their complete or total similarity. Both laws conclude to unity in totality; by the first, from the recognised unity in plurality; by the second, from the recognised plurality in unity. Both of the laws, it is very apparent, are phases of the principle of resemblance or analogy. To call the first of these laws *induction*, and the second *analogy*, as has been done, destroys the correspondence between abstract or pure, and concrete or applied logic. In abstract or pure logic, induction is recognised, but analogy not; therefore analogy cannot rest on the same basis with induction in concrete or applied logic, else, like induction, it would have its counterpart in abstract logic.

The theory of knowledge which we have expounded as his, in which the *a priori* element is so paramount to the *a posteriori*, prevented Aristotle from having any but the shallowest insight into the scope of induction. The inevitable result of this was, to make him slight observation through sense, and to rely chiefly on deduction from principles supplied by the intellect. This was the cardinal vice of Plato, and also of Aristotle, but not nearly to so great an extent. The philosophy, therefore, of Aristotle, is rather the result of an analysis of the contents of language, than a product of an original observation of nature. The philosophy of Bacon is just the reverse—it is a product of the observation of nature, and not an analysis of the contents of language. One of the chief precautions of the *Novum Organum* is, that language is but the registry of the crude notions of imperfect observation, and consequently that nature herself must be interpreted to ascertain the truth. The logic of Aristotle was designed more for evolving, sifting, and methodising, what had already been thought, than for conducting new investigations. The great purpose of Bacon was, to bring philosophy from books and tradition to nature, from words to things, from the syllogism to induction.

The true excellence of the Aristotelic logic, therefore, consists in its being considered formal, and not material. In this view, the *Organon* of Aristotle is conversant about the laws under which the subject thinks, while the *Novum Organum* of Bacon is conversant about the laws under which the object is to be known. Viewed in this aspect, the two logics, though contrariant, are not antagonistic, but are the complements of each other. The Aristotelic without the Baconian is null; the

Baconian without the Aristotelic is deficient. The Baconian supplies the material of the Aristotelic; and while the truth of science is wholly dependent on the Baconian, its logical perfection is wholly dependent on the Aristotelic. The transition, in thinking, from the Baconian to the Aristotelic is as follows: The *process* of induction, as founded on probability, is relative, but its conclusion is absolute. Similarities or analogies retain their character of difference and plurality in the inductive process, but become one and identical in the conclusion, or class, into which they are combined by an act of abstraction and generalization. This conclusion becomes the premise of deduction. It is then within the domain of formal logic.

That Sir William Hamilton has done much to reconcile the Aristotelic logic with the Baconian, by purifying the theory of both, and showing their interdependence, by developing that side of the Aristotelic which lies next to particulars and induction (for all his additions to logic are such), must be admitted by those who can appreciate his writings. And nowhere in the history of philosophy is there a definition of induction which reaches so thoroughly to the heart of the thing, the essential nature of the philosophical inference of the universal from the singular, as that which Sir William has given to discriminate the Baconian from the Aristotelic, the material from the formal. His definition is this: "*A material illation* of the universal from the singular, warranted either by the general analogies of nature, or by special presumptions afforded by the object matter of any real science." This definition shows that the inductive process of Bacon is governed by the laws, not of the thinking subject, *ratione formæ*, but by the laws of the object to be known, *vi materiæ*. This definition, though only used to discriminate negatively the Aristotelic or formal induction, sheds so much light on the Baconian induction, as to entitle Sir William Hamilton to the praise of having contributed to a true theoretic exposition of the Baconian method, by showing the ultimate basis of its validity, in disclosing the nature of the determining antecedent and the determined illation. The determining antecedent is shown to be the analogies of nature, which afford presumptions varying in all degrees of probability, from the lowest to the highest certainty, that what is found in the singulars observed is in all the singulars. The physical observer asserts, on the analogy of his science, that as *some* horned animals ruminate, *all* horned animals ruminate. The logician accepts the conclusion, all horned animals ruminate, and brings it under the laws of thought, and considers the *some* of the physical observer as equivalent to his *all*. Sir William thus extricates the theory

of material induction from the syllogistic fetters in which the logicians had entangled it. His design was, however, by no means to exalt the dominion of Bacon; but rather, all his labours are designed to draw the age from its one-sided culture—its too exclusive devotion to physics. We, therefore, standing as we do at the Baconian point of view of philosophy, step forward to hail the expositions of Sir William Hamilton, and concatenate them with the philosophy of Bacon. So that the Baconian philosophy, in the future, may cease to be “the dirt philosophy” which some of its heretical disciples have made it, and may embrace all the grand problems of thought which Sir William Hamilton has brought within the philosophy of common sense, and which Bacon certainly intended his philosophy to embrace.

ART. II.—*Bible Principles on the Subject of Temperance.**

WE wish to ascertain, by a candid investigation of the Scriptures, what are the true rules by which men are to be guided in relation to the great subject of temperance, both in regard to the use and traffic of intoxicating liquors. The world has been tremendously agitated on this subject for the last twenty years. The awful ravages of intemperance on private and public interests have excited, and continue to excite, the intense investigations of moralists, and more latterly of politicians, as to the causes, operation, and consequences, of this vice, and the principles of policy by which it is to be checked. The most prodigious efforts have been made, the pulpit and the public forum, the press and the arm of the law, have all been put into requisition. Associations of various forms, and of the most extensive ramifications, have been formed; large amounts of capital have been invested in the agencies and conduct of the reform; and high qualities of intellect and private virtue have been enlisted in its advocacy. A degree of interest so intense, producing efforts so vast and complicated, has necessarily accomplished a great deal of good; and like all other enterprises in the hands of fallible beings, and in a world like ours, although substantially good in themselves, it has also done a great deal of incidental evil.

The doctrines by which the great effort to extinguish the vice

* This article is directed chiefly against some very extreme views which have been broached in the United States on the subject of the use of intoxicating liquors. We are disposed to go somewhat farther than the author in urging upon grounds of expediency the practice of total abstinence, especially on the young.—ED. B. F. E. R.

and the consequences of drunkenness has been animated, have been placed on the most extreme ground. The use of every fluid possessing an intoxicating property has been proscribed. *The use of such fluids* has been denounced as well as *the abuse* of them, and sometimes as being the worse of the two. The *occasional* use has been confounded with the *constant*,—the *temperate* with the *intemperate*, the *conditional* with the *unconditional* use. The principles which the Bible lays down on the subject have by some been openly denounced, and by others either so strained or overslaughed in their attempt to explain them, that they have practically ceased to control public sentiment on this branch of morals. The public expositors of the new doctrines, whenever they are compelled to allude to the miracle of Cana, invariably endeavour to explain it away; and when they discuss the doctrines of expediency, as laid down by Paul, they always push them far beyond the limitation which the apostle sets for their employment, and endeavour not only to make a principle that is temporary and limited universal and permanent, but also to canonize the *weakness*, as the apostle terms it, in deference to which this principle is enunciated, as the only sound and permanent sentiment which an enlightened conscience should ever admit. Indeed, so far has this thing proceeded, that it is at the peril of a man's reputation for integrity as a Christian, and as an advocate for public morality, that he undertakes to stand on the example of Christ, and maintain the teachings of the Word of God on this subject. Unless he goes the full length to which the boasted enlightenment of modern morality may please to lead him, he is looked at with the oblique suspicion that there is something wrong about him, or he is at once denounced as the enemy of temperance and the opposer of public and private virtue. To oppose the extravagant lengths to which the advocates of temperance go, is to oppose temperance itself. To oppose an advocacy of morality which is ashamed of the example of Christ, and is perplexed to dispose of the various precepts of the Scriptures, is to oppose morality itself. To discriminate between abstinence and temperance,—between the occasional and the constant, or the temperate and intemperate use of intoxicating liquor,—between such a traffic in it as can be guarded from direct tendencies to foster vice, and such a traffic as feeds the vices and swells the miseries of the poor, by the pint and the gill,—is to forfeit all right to denounce drunkenness, or any of the collateral or direct causes of it. To all this we have only to say, that if we are to encounter it for returning without equivocation to the teachings of the Bible, we shall do so with perfect content. We shall not attempt to base our advocacy of the virtue of temperance upon any maxims of expediency drawn from our

own mind. Human reason is too much distempered by the passions of the heart, and in too confined a position to behold all the relations involved in the settlement of an issue like this. God has been pleased to give us a revelation, setting forth the true principles by which our moral conduct is to be guided, and pointing out to us unmistakably what is the true nature of his will in the case. Nor can we conceive any course better calculated either to set aside the Bible as useless, or to discredit it as a book of inspiration, than either to pass by its teachings altogether in the settlement of these questions, or to be ashamed and afraid of its determinations of the issue. We wish it to be understood, then, that we go to the Bible for the truth on this subject; that we go to it, not to interpret it by pre-conceived opinions upon our own part, but to learn simply what it teaches; and that we shall not flinch from any consequence which flows unequivocally from the principles enunciated in the Scriptures.

There are two modes by which the Word of God teaches on questions of morality: by example, and by incidental or direct assertion. Whatever is done by Christ is, by that very fact, stamped with the divine approval; and to say that any thing done by the Son of God is censurable, for any thing,—for intrinsic evil, or for mere inexpediency,—is to assume ground directly infidel and deistic. In investigating the question, whether wine as a beverage may properly be used, or not, we are at once arrested by the miracle at Cana. It cannot fail to have struck every observer of the current course of instruction given by the modern advocates of temperance, that whenever occasion has called upon them to explain this miracle, they have been greatly embarrassed by it, and that they have been compelled to adopt some theory of explanation which indicated a *consciousness* of embarrassment. The whole tone of allusion is the tone of apology. Now we must say plainly, we have no apologies to make for it. We shall not attempt to explain it away. We shall not put on an air of embarrassment, as if the Saviour had set a very equivocal example here,—an example, if not wicked *per se*, at least very *inexpedient*, to use the phrase with which these moralists dodge the charge of implicating the character of Christ. We say that the example was neither wicked nor inexpedient. We say it was an example fit to be made, and fit to be followed. We say, moreover, that they who go *beyond* this example, or its logical limitations, are as foolish as they are wicked, when they attempt to justify their excess by an appeal to this example. We say that those who think this example a warrant for drunkenness, are the advocates of the vice, and are to be denounced themselves as the enemies of the gospel. No man

can consistently be a believer in the divine original of the Christian religion, and yet entertain in secret, or openly avow, sentiments which arraign the purity of Christ's acts and character. If this example is made the occasion and excuse of excess in wine, it is because the example is perverted from its true implications; and for all such perversions the individual perverting it is himself responsible, and alone responsible. The example warranting a *right use*, must be perverted when used to justify a *wrong use* of a thing; and those individuals assume a fearful responsibility who either pervert the example of Christ, or who use it as an occasion of evil. Nor do those assume a responsibility one whit the less solemn who endeavour to evade or explain away the real nature of this example, from a guilty and weak apprehension that they will do mischief if they do not apologise for it. It is that spirit of apology for the example and teachings of the Bible which is doing so much to extend the spirit of infidelity. A distinguished infidel, quoted in a late work by a minister of the Virginia Conference, declares, that when he wished to disseminate infidel views, he did not attack Christianity as such,—he only inculcated such principles on the subject of temperance, slavery, and other popular topics, as would necessarily undermine all confidence in the Bible as an inspired revelation of truth. Any argument from the example of Christ in attending and countenancing a wedding which would prove the lawfulness of marriage, would equally prove, from his supplying the guests with wine, the lawfulness of using it. He was denounced in his own day as a wine-bibber and the friend of sinners; and we suppose that the cry is to be repeated until the advancing power of his kingdom on the earth shall dispose men to submit to his authority, and receive his teachings without limitation or reserve as the truth of God.

It is argued in explanation of our Saviour's conduct, by some, that to suppose him to have created wine, when the company "have well drunk," is to make him "the minister of excess." This explanation, which we have heard attempted, is the most absurd of all ever given of it. It proceeds on an assumption utterly false, and falls short in its conclusion of every thing but an attack on the character of Christ. We would inquire if this position means to deny that wine was made at all at the wedding of Cana: for, to avoid the charge upon Christ as a minister of excess, it is either necessary to deny that he made wine at all, or that he made it when "men have well drunk;" both of which assertions are positively contradicted by the record. If this inference is correct, that to suppose Christ to have made wine under such circumstances, is to make him the minister of excess, then *he is the minister of*

excess; for it is unquestionable that he did create wine under these circumstances. But the argument proceeds on a supposition utterly unfounded. The phrase, "When men have well drunk," does not mean, "when they had drunk enough," or "when they were all intoxicated." It simply means, "when they were nearly done drinking," "when the entertainment was well-nigh over." It was in these circumstances, the entertainment *nearly*, but not *completely* over, that the supply of wine failed, and Christ displayed his power to make up the deficiency. That this is the interpretation of the circumstances is clear, not only from the words themselves, but from the remark of the guests to the master of the feast, that he kept the best wine to the latter part of the entertainment, contrary to the custom which set the best wine forward at first. This exposition of the passage completely answers the fling of those who wish to cover all defenders of the Saviour's conduct with shame, as representing him as supplying a parcel of drunken rioters with the means of dissipation. Those who find it necessary to pervert the statements of the Scriptures in this way, in order to sustain their views, and bring reproach upon those who are presumptuous enough to defend the Word of God, exhibit a consciousness that a candid statement of the facts would not be favourable to their opinions.

Another sapient explanation of this act of Christ is, that he did not design to furnish wine, but simply to display his power and show forth his glory,—that he did not mean to sanction the use of wine as a beverage, but merely to prove his divinity. This is as true and as sensible as to say, that a waggoner in building a waggon did not mean to build a vehicle, but only to make money for his support; or a lawyer in making a speech, did not design to make a speech, but only a fee. The absurdity of this is obvious: it confounds the *ultimate* with the *immediate* end, and overlooks an issue about the propriety of a *means*, by tacitly affirming the impropriety of the *means*, and aiming to apologise for it by the excellence of the *end* to be attained. This is a question as to the propriety of *means*, not of *ends*: it is not, whether it was right for Christ to display his power and prove his divinity, but whether it was right for him to do it *in this way*, by making wine for the enjoyment of a wedding party. The *end* does not justify the *means*. This doctrine Paul pronounces to be damnable. Can Christ be supposed to act on it? It is certain that he did design both to make wine and to display his power; he designed to do the one in order to do the other; the one was his ultimate and the other his immediate purpose; and his act is not only a perfect guarantee of the propriety of the end, but it is equally a guarantee of the propriety of the *means* he used in order to

effect it. We are as much at liberty to condemn him for the one as to condemn him for the other.

Another plea equally unsound is, that Christ did not provide wine on this occasion *as a beverage*. We are at a loss to imagine, then, for what he did supply it. It is obvious that he supplied the deficiency of wine for the same purpose for which the original supply was provided. He came in to meet a deficiency in the provision for a certain end; what that end was in the original supply of wine by the master of the feast no one in his senses can doubt. The end was the same in both cases: the master of the feast provided a part of the means to it, Christ provided another. Such canvassing of the facts is puerile in the extreme. All of these pleas, it will be seen, proceed on the assumption that it would have been wrong in Christ to have acted contrary to what they endeavour to prove he did do. But this is to beg the question,—assume the very point in dispute. The question to be decided is, Whether it is wrong to use wine as a beverage? and they first assume this as admitted to be true, and then endeavour to explain away the conduct of Christ to an accordance with their views. We appeal boldly to the example of Christ, as proving it to be *right* to use wine as a beverage. Even admitting that the miracle of Cana could be explained away, this is not the only passage of Scripture which clearly sanctions the use of wine as a beverage. The psalmist declares of God, “He causeth the grass to grow for the cattle, and herb for the service of man: that he may bring forth food out of the earth; and wine that maketh glad the heart of man, and oil to make his face to shine, and bread which strengtheneth man’s heart.” If this passage authorises the use of *bread*, or *oil*, it also, and to the same extent, authorises the use of *wine*. The law of Moses distinctly warrants the use of it in many places. The whole Bible is full of implied and indirect assertions on the point. The blessings of redeeming mercy are repeatedly compared to wine; they are called the “feast of wine on the lees, well refined.” Could this have been the case if it had been esteemed the odious and destructive thing it is now supposed to be—the juice of hell—the water of damnation? What is the testimony of Jesus about John the Baptist and himself? He says to the Pharisees and lawyers, “John the Baptist came neither eating bread nor drinking wine; and ye say, He hath a devil. The Son of man is come eating and drinking; and ye say, Behold a gluttonous man and a wine-bibber, a friend of publicans and sinners! But Wisdom is justified of all her children.” This passage just as clearly shows that wine was used as an ordinary comfort of the table, as it proves that bread was used. It also shows that Jesus himself was a

user of wine, as well as the creator of it. And it proves beyond a doubt, that whether a man, under peculiar circumstances, and for religious reasons, abstains from bread or wine, as did John; or whether he employs his liberty in using both, as did Jesus; he is in both cases justified of Wisdom. "If he eateth, he eateth unto the Lord; if he eateth not, unto the Lord he eateth not." To condemn the man who, for good reasons, declines to use his liberty, is just as improper as to condemn him who chooses to use his.

It is argued lastly, and with far more dignity of argument, though with no improvement in the soundness of the plea, that the wine created by the Saviour *did not possess any intoxicating property*,—that it was the simple juice of the grape, prior to fermentation, and unpolluted by the presence of alcohol. This is an assumption which is not borne out by facts. It is not true, as alleged, that the wine of Canaan did not intoxicate. Noah got drunk on it; Nabal did the same; Eli evidently knew that the wines of his day were intoxicating, when he told Hannah, when he thought she was praying drunk in the temple, to put away her wine. Isaiah knew that the wine of his day was intoxicating, when he denounces woe on the drunkards of Ephraim as overcome of wine; when he inveighs against them that have erred through wine; and when he exclaims concerning the inhabitants of Ariel, "They are drunken, but not with wine; they stagger, but not with strong drink." Solomon marks the signs of intoxication, and ascribes it to wine: "Who hath woe? who hath sorrow? who hath contentions? who hath babbling? who hath wounds without cause? who hath redness of eyes? They that tarry long at the wine; they that go to seek mixed wine." The New Testament writers are equally decisive in their testimony to the intoxicating property of the wine of their day. "Be not drunk," says Paul, "with wine, wherein is excess." Peter declares, "The time past of our life may suffice us to have wrought the will of the Gentiles, when we walked in lasciviousness, lusts, excess of wine, revellings, banquetings, and abominable idolatries." These testimonies are overwhelming against the supposition that the wine made by Christ did not possess an intoxicating property. There can be no demand for such a supposition, except by begging the question in dispute. To say, as has been said, that Christ could not have created a wine containing an intoxicating property, because it would have been morally wrong, is to assume for granted the very thing in dispute, and to contradict the whole testimony of other parts of Scripture. The *general* fact, that the wines of that day would intoxicate if improperly used, is unquestionable. To say that in the case of this miracle a particular exception is made, is to assert

what cannot be proved,—an assertion which has a presumption against it absolutely overwhelming,—a presumption not only created by the general character of the wines in use, but by the other parts of Scripture, which clearly commend their use, on account of this very power in the fluid to produce exhilaration. It by no means follows, as these reasoners suppose, that because a man may use a fluid with an intoxicating property, he may therefore get intoxicated upon it; any more than because a man may use an article which has a poisonous quality in it, he may therefore poison himself. There is a deadly poison in tobacco; no man has a *right* to use it to such excess as to kill, or even to injure himself, while there is nothing to prohibit the limited and temperate use of the weed. The simple truth is, that although there is an intoxicating property in wine, yet *excess in the use of it* is a *condition* to this property coming into play; and to use wine within the conditions which are appended to the use of it, is really to use a fluid which cannot intoxicate. Though this quality exists in it, it exists in a state unsusceptible of doing harm, and only susceptible of doing good. The conditions which are prescribed for its use provide against the power for harm, and secure only its power for good. Whoever, therefore, violates this condition, by using wine in excess, does it at his peril; he makes a property useful when properly used, an instrument of evil when improperly used; and for this he alone is responsible. It is impossible to make God responsible for the abuses of his mercies. All his gifts are conditional; and the grand condition of all is, to *use without abusing*. To take the ground that wine cannot be used without abusing it, is to charge God with authorising in its use all the consequences of its abuse;—a course in which it is hard to tell which is the more conspicuous quality, the blasphemy or the folly. The simple truth is, God gives wine for one end: men use it for another. He gives it on one set of conditions, they use it without any limitation, but their own gratification and will. He gives it as a beverage: they use it as an agency of intoxication. He gives it as a gratification: they use it, when they abuse it, because it gives in excess a stimulus; which is not the gratification God had in view, and which in itself is utterly polluting and destructive. He has given it on the same general grounds on which he has given coffee,—to be used as a beverage: men, instead of using it as an occasional and temperate gratification, pervert it, by constant or excessive use, into a habitual source of criminal excitement. Suppose a man uses coffee as a constant drink, and in excess,—not merely at table, or as an occasional beverage between meals, but as an incessant and excessive potation,—would any man say that he was innocent? Still

less would any man say, that because this mode of using coffee was wrong, all use of it was censurable. Coffee possesses an injurious property,—nay, the vital air we breathe contains a gas which, in an uncombined condition, is deadly to all living things; but shall we therefore declare it to be sinful to use them. Would not the plainest understanding in the world be able to see, that while we may use coffee under certain limitations,—within which it is not only harmless but profitable—we are not thereby authorised to use it in such excess as to bring its injurious qualities into play? It is so with the use of wine and other intoxicating drinks. The excess in the use of them, as a general rule, is the indispensable condition to the active movement of their intoxicating influence; and the prevention of that excess is one of the conditions which God has appended to the use of them.

What, then, are those conditions which God has appended to the use of wine? They are, in the most general terms of expression, that we may use it so as not to do harm to ourselves or others. It is evident that the first of these conditions—indeed both of them, are of variable operation upon different persons, and upon the same person at different times. The zealot of modern reform will probably say that these conditions prohibit the use altogether, because a man cannot use wine under any circumstances without exposing himself to risk, or others to contamination by his example. But it is evident to any man that such logic is a contradiction: it is to grant a right to use, and then follow it by a condition which nullifies the grant, and prohibits the use of it altogether. The allegation is properly met by a full contradiction. We deny that it is impossible to use wine without harm to ourselves or others; we affirm that this is possible. But these conditions prescribe a different course of conduct to different persons under different circumstances, or to the same person under different circumstances, simply because one man may do without harm to himself what another cannot do: a man may do at one time, say under a certain state of health, what he could not do with impunity at another; and all men may do at some times, without harm to their neighbours, what they could not do at others. A man, too, may not so traffic in intoxicating drinks as to minister directly to the vices of his fellows. A man has no right to sell wine or other intoxicating liquors to all persons indiscriminately. If he knows a person to be a drunkard, one who will abuse the fluid, he has no more right to sell it to him than an apothecary has to sell laudanum to a man when he knows he means to use it as a poison, and take his own life with it, although he may sell it when he knows that it will be used for proper purposes, or at least has no right to suppose

the contrary. This is a part of the responsibility of one trading in liquors; and while it is absurd to announce that a merchant may sell no article until he has first received a certificate from the purchaser that he will do no harm with it, the maxim is of sufficiently easy practical application, if not of a complete and definite logical statement. A merchant has no right to sell powder or arms, if he has reason to believe the purchaser will use them on his own life, or the life of his neighbour. This is the consideration which makes the indiscriminate retail traffic in the article of intoxicating drinks so excessively improper,—a traffic which, in nine hundred cases out of a thousand, ought to be prohibited by law. No man can sell in this way without doing harm. He cannot sell in this way to those who will use, without also selling to those *who will abuse it*; and it is at the peril and responsibility of the seller that he does it. If he is at a loss how to discriminate in the case, the only safe chance is to alter his trade. A merchant may lawfully sell wines to customers from whom he can derive a reasonable assurance, from their character and habits, that they will not abuse it. No man has a right to sell it so indiscriminately that he cannot tell what is the effect of his trade. The responsibility is his, and he must determine on that responsibility what is that effect. He has no more right to sell to an indiscriminate mass of people, some of whom he knows must be abusing it, than an apothecary has to sell laudanum to an indiscriminate mass, some of whom he has strong reason to believe, even though he may not be able to tell who they are exactly, mean to use it as a poison, on their own persons, or on the persons of others. These are the general principles which should regulate the use and traffic in wines and other intoxicating drinks,—principles which afford a wide field for the exercise of a wise and discriminating judgment in the application. The Word of God allows the *conditional* use of wine,—*temperate*, as distinguished from *excessive*,—*occasional*, as distinguished from *constant*. The *intemperate* use of it all will condemn. The *habitual* use of it, even when *temperate*, is in the general dangerous and improper. It is the *constant* use of wine *temperately* which lays the foundation for the habit of intemperance, and it is in reference to *this* the cry is so properly raised against *temperate drinking*, as it is called. The danger is, however, not in the *temperate* nature of the use, but in its *constancy*. An *occasional* temperate use of wine, as at a wedding, or as a refreshment in weariness, or as an occasional gratification, is *right* in itself, and tends to no evil consequences whatever. Evil can only possibly result when the *occasional* is altered into the *constant*, and the temperate expands into the *intemperate*. Who will dare to say that

when God authorises the one he either authorises the other, or improperly exposes men to it in his permission to do the first?

The last limitation upon the use and traffic of wines which we shall notice, is the limitation expounded by Paul, founded upon the *weakness* of conscience in a sincere but erring brother. This principle we shall enunciate briefly, with the grounds upon which it proceeds, and the limitation upon its action. It is contained in these passages: "Him that is weak in the faith receive ye, but not to doubtful disputations. For one believeth that he may eat all things: another, who is weak, eateth herbs. Let not him that eateth despise him that eateth not; and let not him which eateth not judge him that eateth: for God hath received him. Who art thou that judgest another man's servant? to his own master he standeth or falleth; yea, he shall be holden up: for God is able to make him stand. . . . Let us not therefore judge one another any more: but judge this rather, that no man put a stumbling-block or an occasion to fall, in his brother's way. . . . It is good neither to eat flesh, nor to drink wine, nor any thing whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak." *

We shall extend the discussion of this principle, and urge, without reserve, both the positive and negative side of it. The sum of it is, that it is good neither to eat meat nor drink wine, or any thing by which our brother is offended. We shall discuss the nature of this offence hereafter. But where it exists, we are *imperatively required*, by this principle of duty, to suspend our use of a right which is offensive or injurious to the conscience or conduct of our brother. It applies as much to the use of meat as it does of wine. *But it does not require us to endorse and approve the weakness to which we yield.* We must still call it a *weakness*; and we are bound to *resist*,—not only not to endorse and endeavour to enforce it as a universal rule of faith and practice, but *to resist* it. Paul tells us, if our brother is offended at our use of wine, we must cease to use it; but he calls the state of feeling that would call for such a suspension of our liberty in the case, a *weakness*: and sure any conscience must be admitted to be *weak*, and somewhat crazy to boot, which offends at the example of our divine Lord himself. We will, to avoid offence, yield to the weakness of our brother; but we will both call it a *weakness*, and endeavour to instruct his conscience into a more complete accordance with the morality of the Bible. But we must not be misunderstood: we do not mean that a man cannot relinquish the use of wine at all, except by displaying weakness. Far from it. There is a mode in which a man can suspend the use of wine which is not weak, but honourable and proper in the highest degree.

* See the whole of 14th chapter of Romans.

If, with a clear conviction that he has perfect liberty to do otherwise, he asserts his right, yet declines, on any grounds satisfactory to himself, to use it, he is worthy of all honour. If, for the honour of religion, a man, with a rational and complete perception of his entire liberty *to use meat*, should relinquish the use of it, we should honour him highly. But if he declines from superstitious ideas of the merit or efficacy of it, and denounces every body who will not do likewise, we can neither respect nor tolerate him. It is so with the use of wines. The use of wine is as clearly warranted in the Scriptures as the use of meat. If a man declines to use meat under the above views, he is worthy of high respect; but the man who does not choose to follow his example is just as worthy of it as he is. It is only when individuals or societies get off from this high, clear, scriptural ground, that they cease to deserve the unqualified respect of all who honour the Bible. But when they come urging that the use of wine is wrong under all conditions,—contending that the dislike to its use is essential to Christian character, and that total abstinence should be made a term of communion,—and denouncing every body who stands in good faith on Bible grounds,—we shall not hesitate to arraign them as inconsistent with truth, and insubordinate to the Word of God.

We have said, the right to use or traffic in wine is conditioned upon the obligation *to do no harm with it, to ourselves or others*. This, of course, prohibits all excess in wine, of every degree. We have no right to use wine, or so to traffic in it, as to bring reproach upon our good name, or on the church of God,—to injure our health, or to debauch our morals. It is manifest that this condition implies that, a certain state of public sentiment would require a temporary and circumstantial abandonment of both the use and the traffic. Public opinion may be in such a condition,—an exaggerated and wrong condition it may be,—a condition not only unreasonable, but unscriptural,—that a man may even, by a use or traffic of the article, right in itself, expose himself or the church to obloquy. It would then be required, by a due regard to his own reputation, and the honour of the church, to abandon them. But it would not be required of him to approve the state of opinion to which he yields. On the contrary, it would be his duty, so far as in him lay, to defend the truth of the Bible, and endeavour, *in all prudent ways, to bring back public sentiment to an accordance with the will and truth of God*. If for this he brings his good name into peril, he must bear it, and leave consequences to God. It is one thing for a man to imperil his own honour and the honour of the church, by an imprudent pressure of a liberty of his own in the face of a strong though perverted public feeling; it is altogether

another for him to peril his reputation in defence of the truth of the Bible, and the honour of his Lord and Saviour. In one word, as a matter of course, this obligation to use without doing harm is of a variable application, and consequently requires a prudent judgment to decide when it becomes obligatory, and when it does not. It is variable in its application, simply because what can be done without harm in one case cannot in another. A man may take a glass of wine in his own house, for example, when it would be unbecoming in him to go to the bar of a tavern and call for it. We would not, as a minister, take wine at a social party; not because we should think it wrong to do so, but because, as a matter of prudence, in the present state of public opinion, it would be best not to do it. But the state of public opinion would be *the chief, if not the only* ground of our declining to do it; and if public opinion is suffered to become much more exaggerated on this subject, it will become absolutely necessary, for all who mean to stand by Christ and his truth, to resist by their example as well as their arguments all insinuations that the miracle at Cana was a breach of morality. To a certain condition of public sentiment we should deem it our duty to yield. To another state of it, we should feel it to be treason against the Master to yield a hairsbreadth, and we would resist it sternly, both by argument and by example.

It will be said, that the use of wine under any conditions will do harm, because it would set a dangerous example. To assert this broadly as a universal proposition, subject to no limitation, is to condemn Christ at Cana, without a doubt; it is to pronounce all those scriptures which warrant the right use of wine to be a license to sin. God has given a right to use; but this notion, that no man can take advantage of that right without setting an evil and dangerous example, is to say, in other words, that God has given a right to set such an example.—that he has given a license to sin. The simple truth is, that this assertion is an assumption of the very point in dispute. The question to be decided is, whether this is a *bad* example. What do you mean by a bad or improper example? Do you mean an example intrinsically wrong? Then it is always wrong, and Christ is a sinner. Do you mean an example which is susceptible of perversion, or of being made the excuse and plea of evil? Then all example whatever, good or bad, is wrong, and Christ is again convicted of sin; for it is certain that his example has been perverted, and many a sinner has gone raving into a drunkard's hell pleading the example of Christ as his justification. It is clear that whoever goes *beyond* the example of Christ, or of any one else, by the very terms of the proposition, does not follow it. The whole system of morals is a

system of limitations upon action, going to a certain extent as right, and there limiting itself, and becoming wrong beyond. Will it be called a proper following of an example, to walk with it up to the limit where it stops, to go beyond this, and then appeal to the example for justification?

There is another consideration in relation to this matter of example. An example right in itself may become objectionable, when attended by some circumstantial and temporary relations to other things. Paul orders that no man put a stumbling-block or an occasion to fall in a brother's way; and declares that if our brother is grieved with our meat, or is led by it into an improper use of it, we do not walk charitably. One branch of the Corinthian church could participate in the feasts of the heathen festivals merely as festivals, and without any sentiment of religious worship being mingled with it. But others were unable to do this; they could not participate in them as festivals without participating in them as worship: and they were emboldened to engage in those splendid celebrations by the example of their stronger brethren. On this ground, then, Paul prohibited all classes of Christians from engaging in them, because the act of the strong, though in itself right, or at least indifferent, was made an occasion of stumbling to the weaker and less clear-minded brethren. Here an example, proper in itself considered, from its relation to the mere circumstantial and temporary state of incomplete emancipation from superstitious notions existing in the minds of the weaker portion of the church, was pronounced to be improper, and prohibited by the apostle. Of course, the force of the obligation in this case to refrain from doing what was proper in itself, resting altogether on the circumstantial and temporary condition of feeling in the weaker brethren, was merely circumstantial and temporary in its existence. This is the grand peculiarity of these rules and maxims of Christian ethics: what belongs to the essence of an act always belongs to it, and if wrong it is always wrong; but a thing right in itself can only become wrong by some mere circumstantial and temporary relation attached to it by circumstances. The very highest forms of intrinsic good or evil are subject to this partial and limited transformation. Of this sort is the use of wine as warranted by Scripture. In itself, and under the general conditions annexed to its use, it is right, and no intelligent and unperverted moral sense can condemn it. Under peculiar circumstances, ascertainable under the general descriptions and maxims of the Scriptures, even this right, limited, and conditional use is entirely suspended. But this suspension is merely circumstantial in its reasons, and temporary in its duration; and to endeavour to establish it as a permanent and

universal law, governing through all time, and throughout all possible contingencies, is to change the whole form of the obligation. It is to make grounds nominally circumstantial really essential; and of course, an obligation properly temporary absolutely eternal. To take ground which makes the absolute exclusion of wine, through all time and under all circumstances, the law of all enlightened Christian conduct, is to take ground which, however it may be qualified and softened by deprecatory phrases, is essentially deistic. It makes the imitation of Christ at Cana an impossibility, because a wrong under all conditions of things and to the end of time. If the imitation is made so absolutely improper, the original example itself was improper. To say this, is to take the crown from the head and the honour from the character of Christ; and if this is not deistic in nature and effects, whatever it may be in design, we protest we are not able to understand in what Deism consists. But let it be remembered, that the obligation, circumstantial in its grounds and temporary in its duration though it is, is still of imperative force, as far as it goes, and will be neglected at the peril of him who neglects it.

The obligation to yield to the requirements of a weak brother's conscience is of the same general character with this general law, of not doing harm in the use of our liberty. This offence consists partly in offending his sense of right, and partly in inducing him to do wrong, by doing a thing in itself right while his own conscience is not satisfied of the right of it. We are not unnecessarily to offend the honest prejudices of our brethren, even though they may be weak and unscriptural. We may and must endeavour to correct them; and under the pressure of circumstances, in order to defend the truth, we may and must entirely overlook them. But we may not do this *unnecessarily*: we are required, by the broad and vigorous spirit of charity enjoined in the Bible, to yield the use of a mere liberty temporarily to the honest prejudices of our brother, while we endeavour kindly and firmly to remove them. We are ordered not to despise him that cannot conscientiously eat meat,—who, because of his weakness, eateth herbs. It may be that his views are mistaken; but his conscience is honest. To the Lord he eateth not; and therefore his principle, or motive power, is commendable, though his judgment may be mistaken as to what it requires him to do. We are then not to offend, by an unnecessary or wanton use of our liberty, the honest prejudices of such a mind: we must, in deference to his views, yield temporarily our right to act; while we are also bound to endeavour to instruct him. If he becomes clearly factious in opposition to the truth, we are no longer bound to yield to his prejudices. But if he is

humble, willing to submit to the truth, yet unable at once to perceive it, our obligation to honour his views continues to exist. At the same time, this rule works both ways. It seems to be generally considered, in the discussion, that it is only necessary to consider these rules in their application to the strong brother and the limitations upon his liberty. But there is also an application of them to the weaker brother. "Why," says the apostle, "is my liberty judged of another man's conscience? Who art thou that judgest another man's servant?" "What right have you to come forward and insist upon your mistaken convictions becoming the rule of my conduct?" In other words, there is a solemn duty binding on the weak brother, to look into the real nature of his convictions, to bring them honestly to the test of Scripture, and not to assume the responsibility of rashly or unwisely limiting the rights given to his brother by God himself. Paul, while he insists on the strong brother yielding to the honest though mistaken prejudice of the weak brother, insists with equal force on the weak brother promptly setting about examining the foundation of that prejudice. The strong is bound to instruct, the weaker to seek instruction; and when both unite in the humble, earnest, affectionate spirit of real brethren, animated by a simple desire to know the will of God in the case, it cannot be long before the prejudice of the one will be removed, and the other be enabled to resume the exercise of his rights and liberties, given by God, without any offence to a brother's mistaken sense of duty.

The apostle guards with the same fidelity against the other sense of offending our brother; which is, to induce him to do as we do in a thing which, though right or indifferent in itself, is wrong to him, on account of his mistaken convictions in regard to it. The thing is right in itself, and therefore we may do it, who are clear in conscience as to its propriety. But to our brother in his weakness it seems wrong; therefore he cannot innocently do it, on the principle laid down by the apostle, "To him who thinketh it to be sin, to him it is sin." A person in this condition of mind may be led by the example of another to do it *before his conscience is clear as to its propriety*. He therefore sins in doing what is in itself right, because he violates his conscience. To guard against such violations of propriety, the apostle lays down two rules. He first directs the strong brother, that whenever he has reason to believe that his example in doing a thing right in itself will be the occasion of stumbling to a weak brother,—that is, of leading him to do the same before his conscience is clear as to its lawfulness,—he must not use his liberty in such a case without strong and sufficient

reasons. He directs, secondly, that one universal rule shall be observed by the weak brother; and that is, never to act in imitation of any one, until his own conscience is clear on the point. The example may be right in itself, but it is wrong to him, because his conscience is not clear about it. "Let every man be persuaded in his own mind. All things, indeed, are pure; but it is evil for that man who eateth with offence. Happy is he that condemneth not himself in that which he alloweth." Not that every man is permitted to think just as he pleases,—not that any and every kind of notion is to be allowed in every mind; for every man is solemnly bound to examine his convictions, to bring them honestly to the test of Scripture, to resist all unscriptural and unfounded convictions. But that, while this gradual process of rectifying his views is going on, and before his conscience has become clear, he dare not do what he is not certain is right. "He that doubteth is damned if he eat; for whatsoever is not of faith is sin." It is obvious that the grounds on which these obligations are binding, both on the strong and the weak brother, are variable or movable in their nature, creating an obligation of the same variable, temporary nature. It will be seen then at a glance how mistaken is the ethics which lays down one rigid and universal rule, permanent and universal in its application, requiring at all times and under all circumstances, of all classes of men, as equally obligatory on all, the same conduct in all. The maxim of total abstinence, as a universal and permanent rule of moral conduct, finds no foundation whatever in the Scriptures. The great duty of man is obedience to conscience; the necessary correlative of that, is to educate conscience entirely by the Word of God, simply seeking to know its teachings, and always seeking for the Holy Spirit to guide us into the truth. Else it may often happen that a man will be placed in the unhappy dilemma of conscience ordering one thing and God ordering another; in which he can neither do right without guilt, nor refrain from doing wrong without a similar responsibility.

The obligation of total abstinence is not the same in its application to all,—not the same in force, in duration, or in the grounds upon which it rests. Upon the man who has once been the victim of intemperance, it is an absolute and unalterable obligation. He can never touch liquor again, except under the most stringent and unavoidable necessity of health, without guilt; because a melancholy experience has shown that no reformed inebriate can ever touch it again without imminent risk, nay, almost the inevitable certainty of reviving the sleeping devil of his ancient vice. It is the duty of all men to be temperate; it is the duty of some men to be uniformly absti-

ment, because it is only by being entirely abstinent they can be temperate. It is the liberty of some to use with a limited and conditional use; which limited and conditional right is susceptible of being entirely suspended, on circumstantial and temporary grounds. The circumstances of individual men may impose upon them a specific, and confined, and temporary obligation to total abstinence, which they would be guilty to neglect. But this obligation cannot be expanded into one rigid and universal rule, simply because it exists only in the circumstances of the individual, and expires with them. In all these cases the individual must determine his own duty, by a consideration of his own circumstances; but he is as unwise as he is uncharitable, when he infers that what may be obligatory on him is obligatory on his neighbour, and fiercely denounces all who do not follow his example.

This brings us to the last point which we wish to consider; which is, the right of men to suspend their liberty in the use of wine, the true grounds on which temperance societies may be erected, and the relations of these societies to the church of God, and the duty of church members in relation to them.

We have already indicated the principle which lies at the foundation of this subject. If a man chooses to relinquish the *liberty* which God has given him, he may do it; only provided he does so on no ground which conveys the remotest shadow of a hint that the *liberty itself* was improper. If he does it on any such grounds, he is to be resisted. The relinquishment of his liberty will be determined, as to its moral character, entirely by the reasons upon which it proceeds. If a man chooses to relinquish it with a clear perception of the true nature of his liberty, feeling that he is at perfect liberty to do otherwise, on grounds purely circumstantial, with an entire relinquishment of all right to dictate the line of duty to others, and for the purpose of doing good to man, arresting the progress of a vice, and staying its consequences, he is worthy of the highest respect. Others, acting on the same views, may unite with him and form a society; and the society so formed, and so remaining, is worthy of the high regard of all good men. But if a man relinquishes his liberty on grounds that proclaim *no liberty*, or a liberty to sin, on grounds essential and permanent, and with a disposition to suspect the integrity and denounce as suspicious all who will not join him in his views and unite in an association with him, then he is to be resisted; and any society formed on these grounds, and maintaining them, is to be resisted. If, as we have already said in a different connection, a man chooses to relinquish the use of meat, with a clear and scriptural sense of his right to use it, it is well; he is worthy of all honour. But if he requires that every one else

shall follow his example on penalty of denunciation, he is not to be respected. If he does it on superstitious or extravagant grounds, believing either in the efficacy or merit of not using meat, neither his understanding nor conscience is to be respected, except when these notions co-exist with great weakness of mind and evident and high honesty of conscience. It is so with wine; for the use of both of them and the relinquishment of both of them, are placed on the same footing by the apostle. If a man chooses, with a clear conscience of his right to use the limited and conditional privilege given in the Scriptures, to relinquish it, in order to avoid offence, or to get a vantage-ground to do good, on grounds circumstantial in their nature, and which convey no reproach on the liberty he relinquishes, relinquishing all right to force others to do the same,—then his action is worthy of all honour. Any society taking such grounds is worthy of the honour, respect, and countenance, of all good men. But when a man relinquishes his liberty with a feeling that it is a *liberty* to sin, or because his use of his liberty, as conditioned in the Bible, would set an example permanently censurable,—when he forgets the nature of his relinquishment, as a relinquishment of liberty, or as a compliance with an individual obligation, and consequently does not see that he has no right to require others to relinquish theirs,—when any individual or society takes this ground, no matter what may be the *design* in the matter, the *principles* on which they act are opposed to the Word of God, undermine all confidence in it as an inspired revelation of truth, censure the example of Christ as an example which had far better never been set, and thus become essentially deistic. The proscriptive spirit and the unscriptural theories which have too often disfigured the temperance associations of the world, are separable adjuncts of the associations themselves, and therefore opposition to them, or to the particular societies which hold them, is not opposition to temperance societies as such, much less to the general cause they are seeking to promote.

Temperance societies, based on the grounds already indicated, are valuable institutions of society,—just as societies for the suppression of gambling, for taking care of the poor, for the support of orphans; and, when properly managed, are sources of great good. But to say, that because they are such, therefore every individual, and particularly every member of the church, is absolutely bound to join them, is absurd. As a general rule, there is no obligation at all to join them; it is a mere matter of liberty. Particular circumstances might make it the duty of an individual to join an association of this sort, just as they might make it the duty of a man to join a masonic order, or an

orphan asylum association; but will any one say that such an obligation is universal and unlimited, requiring every member of the church to become *de facto* a member of these various orders and associations, though good in themselves? The argument that every good man is bound to aid in every good thing, and must therefore, join a temperance society, is absurd, as an unlimited proposition. The missionary operations of the Baptist Church are very good things; so of the Methodist; so of the Episcopal Church: is it therefore the duty of a Presbyterian to join all these churches at once? A masonic order is a good thing: is it therefore the duty of all members of the church to join it? Is it the duty of all members of the church to join an anti-gambling association? Any member may; it may be the duty of some, and the ascertainment of their obligation is wholly a personal matter. The simple fact is, it is impossible for a man to aid in every good thing; for there are so many enterprises for good, that there must be a division of labour. Any Christian is at liberty to join such a society if he pleases; having, of course, a wise reference to his other obligations, and to the doctrines and policy to which he will become committed by so doing. It may be the duty of *individual Christians* to join a temperance society; but the ascertainment of that duty is their own individual concern: the obligation itself is individual in its extent, and circumstantial in its grounds, and it is folly to expand it into a general obligation coincident with the extent of the church, and requiring every church member to become a member of a temperance society. In simple truth, as a general rule, it is purely a matter of *liberty*; and if an individual does not choose to relinquish his liberty, no one has any right to complain of it. If it had not been right to give this liberty, God would not have done it; to require it to be given up, as a permanent thing, is to impeach both the grant and the granter of the privilege. The member of the church of God is a member of a great and divinely-organised society, for the suppression, not merely of one vice, but of all vices. To say he is bound to join a second, is in effect to say his obligations cannot be fully met in the other. No member of the Sons of Temperance would admit there was any *imperative general* obligation resting upon him to join an old Washingtonian Society created alongside of his order: he would feel at liberty to do it if he pleased; but he would at once see that an alleged obligation of a general form to do it would be not binding, because it would be superfluous and unnecessary. These are the general maxims of Christian duty on this great subject. The *ends* which these societies have principally in view are the same, so far as they go, with those of the church of God.

They differ *in the means* of attaining them. The societies lay down the rigid maxim of total abstinence: the church lays down the general principles of the Scriptures. To say that the other is the best mode of reaching the evils of intemperance, is to beg an important question. We say that the advantages of this principle, in resisting the tide of intemperance, are absolutely dependent upon its being kept in the position in which it is placed by the Scriptures,—the position of a temporary, circumstantial, and local or individual principle. The very moment it is elevated into a permanent and universal principle, it is shorn of its power: the history of the temperance reform proves it. Although it may sound strangely in the ears of the modern reformers, it is nevertheless *true*, that the doctrine of total abstinence, as a universal law, is not the most effective principle on which to resist the evils of intemperance. It is best for certain cases, nay, indispensable to them,—and it is the Bible principle for meeting them; it is indispensable to the reform of the drunkard, and to the maintenance of the reformed inebriate in the ways of sobriety, but not to the virtue of all others without exception. But God's wisdom is superior to man's, and he has promulged no truth which is not better suited to its ends than any fancied improvements which man may endeavour to make upon it; and we hold that the free and unequivocal teaching of the general principles which the Bible enunciates on the duties of temperance, is far better calculated to arrest the terrible vice of drunkenness than the advocacy of the one rigid and universal maxim of total abstinence. The history of the temperance movement, in our judgment, proves the truth of this inference. No one feature in this great movement has been more strikingly developed than the singular want of stability which has marked its progress. The celebrated and eloquent champion of the reform, John B. Gough, is said to have stated recently, in a speech in England, that of five hundred thousand persons who had taken the pledge in the last fifteen years, our hundred and fifty thousand had broken it! The various modes of action in carrying forward the scheme have shifted with remarkable rapidity. The original pledge of partial abstinence gave way to the pledge of total abstinence; the old society yielded to the Washingtonian, the Washingtonian to the order of Sons, and the existence of the order in a given locality is of all things the most precarious! What is the reason of this?—a question often earnestly canvassed by the noble-hearted advocates of the enterprise. The reason is this, among others, without a doubt: their doctrines have been strung up too high; they have gone on extravagant grounds; they have assumed extreme positions; and the reaction of the

sober second thought of the people has carried away the misplaced foundations of their creed and policy. The sober judgment of man will not suffer him to condemn the limited and conditional right to use wine granted in the Scriptures. That sober second thought will infallibly settle down, as its final results, on the conclusions of the Word of God. "Every plant which our heavenly Father hath not planted shall be rooted up." If it is not in *the place* in which he planted it, he will transfer it. Human reason, in its calmest and deepest judgment, will invariably return, like the needle to the pole, and rest on the teachings of God in his Word. The sooner we learn this, as a practical rule of universal conduct, accepting at first the lessons of revelation, the sooner we shall find our action guided by the broadest of all intellects, the most perfect of all reasons. Let the principle of total abstinence be put into its true scriptural position, and it becomes instinct with power over the judgments and consciences of men, and is endowed with immortality. Remove it from this position, it excites suspicion of its soundness, it loses power over the intellect and conscience, it becomes a minister of evil as well as of good, and is doomed to expire in the wreck of its influence. "The weakness of God is stronger than man, and the foolishness of God is mightier by far than the wisdom of man." It is indispensably necessary, in the great agitations and conflicts of men, that there should be a constant recurrence to original principles. If no allowance is thus practically made for the weakness and infirmities of human nature, qualities which insensibly and inevitably will urge men into some false position, particularly on a point of controversy and in the heat of debate,—if no recurrence is made to original principles, it will be impossible to ascertain the existence or degree of the deflection from the line of truth. In the vehemence of their conflict with the evils of intemperance, when their hearts are full of a realising sense of the wretchedness it entails on the life of man, there is a powerful tendency operating on the minds of the advocates of total abstinence as a universal law, to take extreme ground, and to forget the moderation of truth and the principles of the Word of God. It is so much easier to advocate the application of a single maxim which seems to reach the whole case, than to draw the distinctions and define the *principles* which are set forth in the Scriptures, that there is a powerful temptation to choose the first of these as the policy to be pursued. This is greatly aided by the fear that the people cannot be made to comprehend these principles and distinctions; and by the belief that the single maxim will be more effective, and that it will soonest accomplish the end. But these views are too partial: we are still satisfied that the Word of God has

enunciated the grounds which are best and safest in the end. It may take more labour to expound them, they may be more susceptible of perversion; but they are the only principles upon which the sober and deliberate judgment of men will ultimately rest. What the maxim of total and universal abstinence gains by cutting off the necessity for the discrimination of principles, and in its immediate effect, it loses by not meeting the real demands of the reason of man, and of the revelation of God. In the long run, at the close of the immense experiments which are now going on, it will be seen clearly, on this as well as on other great topics of social welfare, that the lessons of the Bible, taken in the simplest and most direct teachings of that wonderful book, are the lessons of the deepest philosophy, the purest wisdom, the most extensive benevolence, and the most permanent application.

We would say in conclusion, we do hope that none will pervert the teachings of this review. If they do, they will do it at their peril; for they are the teachings of the Word of God. If any harm comes from them, it can only be because they are perverted from their true implications; and for this, he who perverts them is alone responsible. Indeed, so great is the fear of many persons of wisdom and excellence that such perversions will be made, that they cannot agree to the propriety of a perfectly direct and unequivocal statement of the real teachings of the Bible on this subject. But this only reminds us that human wisdom and virtue are not infallible. The conditions under which the voice of God is not to be heard on questions like this are excessively rare in occurrence, and of very brief duration when they occur. We have no apology to make for an unequivocal and complete statement of what He has been pleased to state on this issue. He has made it the duty of his ministers to declare his counsel fearlessly, and we dare not suppress it. We had infinitely rather encounter the responsibility of being an *occasion* of evil, by reason of the infirmity or wickedness of man in perverting the truth, than the responsibility of violating the first duty of the ministerial office, and either silencing, or incompletely re-echoing the voice of God on the issues on which he has chosen to speak in his Word. If he has seen fit to enunciate these principles, we can see no reason why we should impeach the propriety of his doctrine,—why we should be either ashamed to receive or afraid to avow them.

ART. III.—*Success in the Ministry.*

THE first call to the gospel ministry exhibits in a striking manner the true spirit of this work, especially with reference to the important element of success. It was given to Simon Peter at the shore of Galilee. The Saviour had just before directed him to “launch out into the deep, and let down the net for a draught.” In doing this he was not unaware of the fruitless toil of the night previous, but he designed to try the spirit of his new disciple. “And Simon answering, said unto him, Master, we have toiled all the night, and have taken nothing; *nevertheless*, at thy word, I will let down the net.” This reply evinced strong confidence in Christ, and a spirit of obedience to his will. The result not only justified, but also increased his confidence in the Master’s omniscience and power, and deeply impressed him with a sense of his own unworthiness. It was just as he had been brought to this point that our Saviour gave him the promise of employing him in the gospel ministry,—“Henceforth thou shalt catch men.” We are forced to believe that he had this *ministerial call* in view from the first of this transaction, and that he regarded the spirit of Peter’s answer as the true spirit of the ministry. He saw that the man who, after a night of fruitless though skilful and earnest toil, was yet ready to renew that toil, simply *at his word*, was the man who would, in the labours of the ministry, be ever ready to repeat exertions for *his* cause, even after protracted and discouraging labour,—provided only he had the word of his Master for so doing. This incident, as we conceive, exhibits the true relation between our responsibility and our success.

It is a painful but undoubted truth, that we are not warranted in expecting universal, even apparent, success, in the employment of the means of grace. It is true God has said, that “*his word shall not return unto him void,—that it shall accomplish that which he pleases, and shall prosper in the thing whereunto he sends it.*” No one can doubt that God *succeeds* perfectly and invariably in all that he really attempts. What we say is, that while the means of grace are adapted to save the souls of men, and are employed by the faithful servants of God to that end, yet neither the Bible nor experience warrants us in expecting that all, or even a large proportion, of those on whom they are brought to bear, will be saved—even when the efforts used are most scriptural in form and most Christian and faithful in spirit. “Many are called, but few are chosen.”

However desirable it be to labour in confidence of success, and however discouraging this truth may be to which we refer, it has nevertheless been realised by God's servants in all ages of the world. "Who hath believed our report? and to whom is the arm of the Lord revealed?" was the complaining and desponding inquiry of the prophet Isaiah. A similar experience was realised by many others, if not all, of the prophets of the old dispensation, who seemed to "stretch out their hands all day long to a disobedient and gainsaying people." But the most remarkable fact illustrative of this truth, was the want of apparent success in the ministry of our Lord. It was in anticipation of this the prophet represents him in saying, "I have laboured in vain; I have spent my strength for nought and in vain." Though "he spake as never man spake," yet how few regarded "the gracious words which proceeded out of his mouth!" Though he performed so many and such wonderful miracles, yet how few were convinced of his claims! At the close of his ministry, so abundant in labours, so instructive, and solemn, and faithful, so glorious and impressive in the manifestations of divine power, and withal so tender and persuasive in its spirit,—at the close of that ministry he was called to weep over infatuated Jerusalem, which refused, with only slight exceptions, to be gathered under his wings. And how many of God's ministers have found sad occasion to recall, for their own comfort, this remarkable example! The disproportion between the efforts employed and the results achieved has, in almost every age of the world, constituted a painful illustration of the fact of which we speak. Nearly every youthful preacher is doomed to have the buoyant anticipations of his early ministry disappointed, as were those of the gifted and enthusiastic Melancthon. Many a godly minister has been compelled to labour through long years of anxiety and desire, without being permitted to see the work of the Lord prosper in his hands, in the known conversion of a single soul. The distinguished Samuel Rutherford, one of the holiest and most faithful ministers of the seventeenth century, writes to a friend, "I see exceeding small fruit of my ministry, and would be glad to *know of one soul* to be my crown and rejoicing in the day of Christ." And even at the present day, when the accessions to the church are greater than at any previous time since the apostolic age, there are doubtless many similar instances. Indeed, to a greater or less extent, at one period or another, every minister of Christ, and every labourer in his vineyard, is called to encounter this discouraging experience,—to behold month after month, and some, year after year, of earnest and prayerful labour pass away, unrelieved by any marked indications of success in the conversion of souls. And

no doubt even the most successful are ready to join in this lamentation, when they contrast the *few* who are gathered in with the multitudes who remain in the way of death.

We propose to consider this general fact as a *source of temptation to all who are enlisted in the cause of Christ*. Not only is it adapted to *test* the reality and strength of our zeal,—it is also a source of serious *danger*, leading, in some instances to injurious, and in some to disastrous results.

The *first class* of these dangers to which we advert, arises from *improper views of the causes of this want of success*. It is not our purpose to discuss the question, what are these causes. We take it for granted that our readers recognise the distinction between those which are *secondary* and that which is the grand *ultimate* cause. With us there is no doubt that all the varied results of gospel preaching and Christian effort, whether successful or unsuccessful, are to be referred to the sovereign determination of Him “who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will,”—and “who will have mercy on whom he will have mercy.” There being in the hearts of men no natural nor self-originated disposition to yield to the calls of the gospel; and neither the word, nor sacraments, nor ministers of Christ, having any independent power to produce such disposition, the work of conversion must be, in the most literal sense, the work of God,—and as such, must be wrought *where* and *when*, on the persons, and to the extent, which God chooses. “So then, neither is he that planteth any thing, neither he that watereth; but God that giveth the increase.” Our Saviour referred to this very discrimination in God’s dealing with “the wise and prudent” on the one hand, and with “babes” on the other, when he uttered the words,—“Even so, Father, for so it seemeth good in thy sight.” Here, then, we are unquestionably to look for the ultimate cause of both failure and success. In the one case, depraved man is left in his sins,—in the other, man equally depraved is made willing in the day of God’s power. We are never to forget or undervalue this fundamental truth. It lies at the very basis of our Christianity. It is the most precious source of consolation and encouragement to the ministry and the church, and it should have a conspicuous place and a controlling influence in all our motives, efforts, and anticipations.

Assuming then, that we all, habitually, ascribe our want both of real and apparent success to the sovereignty of God, we remark that one danger arising from this want of success, is *that of falling into a spirit of indifference*. It is one mark of that selfishness which cleaves even to the renewed mind, that our interest in any result is generally in proportion to our

personal connection with that result, either as sharing in its benefits, or as having an agency in its production. It is true the Spirit of God fires the souls of true Christians with a zeal that is both disinterested and humble—a zeal which is willing to toil for others, and especially for Christ, and to be used as the obscure and dependent instrument in the hands of the Almighty. Still, it is difficult for even the truest, humblest servant of Christ, to tell how much the fervour of his zeal in the cause of religion is fed by the conscious-efficiency of his own exertions, and the visible success with which those exertions are crowned. Not that we would brand all such zeal as spurious and wrong. We know not to what extent God himself may be employing this very influence, in stimulating the interest and the activity of his servants. But it is quite apparent how the withholding of success endangers the very existence of that interest, and how surely it will damp a zeal which is not pure and strong. It is also apparent what relation there is between this influence and our views of the sovereignty of God. While our labours are successful, and souls are being converted by our instrumentality, it were easy to keep our interest alive and our zeal fervent, even while we renounce all self-reliance, and ascribe our success to the sovereign goodness and power of Jehovah. But when we seem to labour in vain and spend our strength for nought,—when no divine influence descends upon our work,—when the ungodly remain obdurate and impenitent, and few or none are plucked as brands from the burning;—and when we realise that there is, after all, no power in our arm,—no intrinsic efficacy in our efforts,—that not even a zealous Paul, nor an eloquent Apollos, can of himself secure the increase, and that God is the ultimate and sovereign source of all results;—then it is that the reality and strength of our zeal are brought to the test,—then it is seen whether that zeal be truly and supremely for God, or whether it depends upon our beholding the triumphs of our own exertions,—and then it is, that, if our zeal be spurious or feeble, or if it be based on wrong convictions, it will die away into a cold indifference. A false zeal cannot endure the combined influence arising from seeing the failure of our efforts to save souls, and from ascribing that failure to the sovereign will of Jehovah. It can live and labour only while flushed with at least seeming success. But a true zeal, which burns with pious love to Christ, and with compassionate love for souls, can labour for the Master, not only amidst animating triumphs, but also amidst discouraging failures, and that, too, even while it realises that the sovereign will of the Master himself withholds success. Though it has toiled through a long and dark night of discouraging exertion, it is ready for

new efforts, and for harder labours, just so far, and just in such circumstances, as the divine *word* of that Master requires. It shall not demand even the *certainty* of future success, to enliven its fervour, or to prepare it for its toils.

The true servant of Christ has a higher end, and a more animating motive, than even the prospect of success; *i. e.*, to do the will, to secure the approbation, of the Master. And just so long as he sees the standard of that Master advancing before him and leading the way, he is ready to follow. He is just as willing to labour for Christ without apparent fruit as with it. He is as prompt to follow the pillar of fire by night, as the pillar of cloud by day. Such, we say, are the attributes of a pure and perfect zeal. If ours be such, then we are above the danger of which we speak. But if ours be either a weaker or a more selfish zeal, then is it endangered by all our failures to do good; and if God sees fit to withhold success from our plans and exertions in his cause, we are exposed to the danger of becoming indifferent to the result and to the form and fidelity of our labours, and of fortifying that indifference by taking wrong views of the sovereign agency of God. In some instances, this indifference has led to the neglect of even external labour,—taking away all stimulus to action, and inducing a state of criminal sloth. In others, it has led to what we fear is not very much better,—a careless, heartless, and merely professional discharge of external duty,—a continued use of means, without much thought as to the end,—a regular employment of appointed instrumentalities, without any hope of success; between which, and an utter unbelief of God's promises, it is hard to discriminate. Against these evils it is of the utmost importance to guard and strive, since they are at once sinful and fatal to all future success. Just so far as God sees fit to try us by this want of success, let us recur to the grand motives for fidelity in the work of God,—our obligations as the purchase of the blood of his Son, as his adopted children, as his consecrated servants, as those who have by our own solemn and voluntary engagements dedicated our strength and time to him.

But this suggests another form of danger arising from this same source,—that of confining our view to the ultimate cause of our want of success, and *not duly regarding those secondary causes which pertain to ourselves*. God's sovereign determination seems indeed adequate to account for all the failures of our efforts; and as a source of consolation and an argument for submission, it is ample. Yet, as we continually teach, *we* are none the less responsible for all this. We are not, indeed, responsible for the actual conversion of one soul, yet we are responsible for acquiring all the mental and spiritual fitness possible, and for putting forth all the ability we have, in order

to secure the salvation of men. While, therefore, we turn to God's sovereignty for consolation, in view of our want of success, let us not forget that just so far as our failure is connected with our lack of industry, fidelity, and prayerfulness, to the same extent shall we be held accountable for all the ruinous consequences which ensue. Though God's Spirit alone can make our best warnings and exertions effectual, yet, failing to warn and labour as faithfully as we ought, God will require *at our hands* the blood of neglected souls. It is the spirit and teaching of our system of truth to labour just as earnestly and to care just as anxiously for the salvation of perishing souls, as if their salvation depended exclusively upon us,—while, at the same time, we look to God for success just as dependently and just as trustfully as if he dispensed with our instrumentality. It is this view which combines labour with faith, a sense of personal responsibility with dependence on God, and anxiety for success with submission to the divine will,—the only view and the only spirit which can enable any to toil and struggle on with a loving heart, a lively zeal, and an obedient mind, through all the discouragements and trials of unsuccessful, or apparently unsuccessful, labour.

But there is another extensive class of dangers arising from want of success, of a very different character, which we would describe generally, as consisting in a *departure from the word of Christ in the means and the mode of seeking after success*. The class of which we have been speaking consists in a failure of *all earnest effort*; this is a *departure from those efforts* which the Master had enjoined. The cold-hearted, indifferent servant may be willing to continue in mere outward but careless labours of the *prescribed form*, and often justifies his course on the ground that it is *regular* and scriptural in its method and means. The dangers of which we now speak are no less formidable, and the evils to which they tend no less to be deprecated. The warm-hearted minister of Christ, who loves the church and loves the souls of men, is prone to feel that visible success is the essential seal of his ministry. This conviction and this anxiety often become the sources of serious error, in regard both to his plans of effort and the nature of his exertions. They often beget a species of zeal which the best forms of success do not gratify, and which, in consequence, continually undervalues such forms of success, and fails to seek after them, while it pursues results which are less real, less valuable, and to some extent hinder those which are more to be desired. We refer to that species of zeal which is *confined exclusively to the conversion of souls*. Far be it from us to utter one syllable in disparagement of an end so glorious and so holy,—an end, worthy not only of man's, not only of a seraph's zeal, but even

of God's eternal purpose of redeeming love. Rather would we magnify and exalt an instrumentality having so blessed a design,—since “he that converteth the sinner from the error of his way shall save a soul from death, and shall hide a multitude of sins,”—and “they that turn many to righteousness shall shine as the stars for ever and ever.” All we wish to say is, that a zeal which is confined to this one part of the work of God is a defective zeal,—that it does not, while thus partial, lead to the best results, and that by failing to have other elements, of vast importance, it often leads to serious error and to injurious results. It is, therefore, a pertinent inquiry, What is the success after which we should aspire,—to which, as the ministers, officers, and members of the church, we should direct our exertions?

There are results which belong peculiarly to God, which in this, as in all things, we are to seek primarily. He has instituted the church for the display of his own glory and the vindication of his own character in an apostate world. To declare and defend his truth is the first great object to be sought, and nothing which would either thwart or hinder that, no matter how much it would seem to benefit men, is at all consistent with the grand mission and the first duty of the church. But happily, God has chosen to effect this, and in a way which, at the same time, and in the process itself, secures the highest welfare of his creatures. The first step in this great work is the conversion of souls. This lays the foundation, and is, indeed, essential to all the other parts. To aim at this as extensively as possible is indispensable to a true zeal for the cause of God; and hence, for this we should cherish an intense anxiety and desire,—for this we should pray with agonising earnestness,—for this we should toil with unwearied exertion. We cannot, indeed, exceed the required measure of zeal for an end so benevolent and holy. Yet, by confining our zeal to this one design, we shall be led to a course of effort involving the neglect, if not the injury, of other parts of the great work. Men are not only to be converted and brought into the church: it is the design and command of Christ that they be *edified* and built up on their most holy faith,—that they be enlightened and trained,—and that they be carried forward in a career of continual spiritual progress,—that they become more holy and more like Christ,—that they receive not only the grace of pardon, but also the grace of assurance, and comfort, and joy in God,—and that they be made to abound more and more in every good work. And it is by these achievements, no less than by their conversion, that God is glorified and the Saviour honoured. Herein, indeed, are attained the higher ends of the church, beyond which it

were impossible to seek for holier or more glorious results. It were a blessed work to toil exclusively for those who are perishing in sin; but it were no less blessed, and no less important and acceptable to God, to toil for the sanctification and comfort of the ransomed of the Lord. God, indeed, loves sinners. But the strongest expressions of his love refer to sinners as already redeemed, pardoned, and saved,—the church which he has bought with the blood of his own Son. God loves “the gates of Zion” with a special and distinguishing affection. The church is his peculiar treasure, on which he lavishes his choicest gifts,—on which he bestows his most extended labours. What end, then, can be more important, and what species of success more to be coveted by the true servants of God, than the spiritual advancement, the purity, the consolation, and highest usefulness of those who are already the children of Jehovah,—secure though they already be against eternal destruction?

And how important that the church, which is God’s kingdom and representative on earth, be pure in her membership,—uncontaminated by false and deluded professors! Is it not, then, a weighty concern of the labourers in Zion to press upon the church, as a body, such instructions, tests, and appliances, as will develop the true character of all? There never was a time when it was more important that the church of God stood forth in her true character,—in the maturity of Christian knowledge,—in the strength of solid and consistent piety,—clothed in the whole armour of God, and prepared to wield with wise efficiency the weapons of a spiritual warfare. And yet, there has never been a time since the Reformation, when so little attention has been bestowed upon the great work of training the membership. Hence, we urge that it is a defective zeal which leaves unaccomplished, and unsought, and comparatively uncared for, this grand purpose and requirement of the Almighty. And we add, for the encouragement of those whose zeal and anxiety embrace such labours as these, that if they be successfully engaged in building up the church of Jesus Christ in spiritual knowledge, in holiness, in the practice of family religion, in godly living, in prayerfulness, and in active usefulness,—they are doing a noble, a truly glorious work, both for God and their race, even though they are not permitted to see many converts from the world. It is not the *number* of professions, but their *consistency* which advances the divine glory. And in view of the number of spurious conversions, there is no field of effort for the conversion of souls more important than that which is embraced in the walls of Zion,—the conversion of self-deceived church members. And in view of the low state of piety among professed Christians

generally,—the covetousness, the indolence, the prayerlessness, the spiritual ignorance, the inconsistencies, the evil influence, and the bad examples which abound,—we are bold to say, that there is no species, no measure of success more excellent and more to be sought after than that which shall remove or diminish, perceptibly, these sore and wide-spread evils.

But what has all this to do with the danger which we ascribe to a want of success in the conversion of souls? It has at least this to do with it—that these important and neglected departments of the great work involve more labour, and anxiety, and real difficulty, than even the ingathering of converts; while at the same time, even their successful cultivation fails to afford that exciting gratification, and to produce that glow of triumphant feeling, which are experienced when our labours result in the conversion of sinners. The latter form, also, counts more largely and more rapidly, and is attended with more *eclat* both in the church and the world; while on the contrary, efforts to train, to instruct, purify, elevate, and edify the church by searching preaching and by faithful discipline, is not only a difficult, but also a slow and unpopular work; hence less inviting and less stimulating. Now, if a want of success in the conversion of sinners were to result in more diligent and faithful effort in this neglected part of the work, it would be a happy result of our failure, since it would not only lead to the noble ends of which we have spoken, but also by securing them, would lay the foundation for more extended and glorious successes in the conversion of men than have been witnessed since the primitive days; inasmuch as it would secure and set in motion that instrumentality, which, at the present day, is more needed than any other,—that of a holy, praying, active church, co-operating with the ministry in the salvation of a ruined world.

But such want of success does not always result in this; and here we come to the most serious danger of all from this source. Anxious for this species of success, and failing to secure it by such means and in such ways as the Master prescribes, many are led to resort to other means and other modes of effort, unlawful in their origin, and injurious in their results. For example, finding that the scriptural doctrines which they have been preaching are slow in their operation and scanty in their apparent results, many have been tempted to modify their teachings, with a view to wider influence and more rapid success,—a course into which every one unblest with success is in danger of falling. Again, finding that converts are few, when judged by the stern tests of the Bible, many are tempted to adopt a lower and a looser judgment, by which multitudes may be admitted to the church. Finding other denominations

so ready and urgent to secure for themselves all reputed converts, or who are willing to profess religion, some are led—*forced* as they feel it—to admit to the privileges of the church persons who are untried, and thus, in many cases, by a premature profession, made a cause of scandal, and in this way, at least, recklessly expose the church to the danger of impurity. And still further, inasmuch as the use of the appointed means of grace,—preaching the word, prayer, pastoral visitation, personal exhortation, and direct instruction to persons inquiring what they must do to be saved,—inasmuch as the use of these means seems slow in producing an effect, many are tempted to try other and more exciting measures,—measures which will be more rapid and extensive in their results, without regard to the character or permanency of those results,—measures which have been found to promote spurious conversions, and to be in many ways injurious to all the best interests of religion. And in these departures the ministry are often urged on by the membership of the church, who are apt to partake of the same impatience as to the result.

All these things, however plausible in appearance and indicative of zeal, form parts of a superficial system,—a system destitute of solid and lasting results,—a system which necessarily includes long seasons of coldness and deadness in the church, an irregular evanescent form of piety, and the multiplication of apostates,—a system which never acts, except with the violence of spasmodic action, and which as surely tends to decay and death. These dangers are all enhanced by the numbers, zeal, and apparently superior success of rival churches, which are striving to proclaim the largest accessions and the most rapid progress. Our system is not framed for such rivalry. It professes to be governed, not by expediency or human policy, but solely by the word of Christ. It professes to adopt that extended view of the great work which we have attempted to describe. It aims at the greatest possible *purity* of the church, rather than the greatest magnitude. It aims to glorify God, and not to be popular with men. It aims at solid, not showy results. It aims to build, not with “wood, and hay, and stubble,” which may be gathered in any field, and by any species of labourers; but with “gold, and silver, and precious stones,” secured with toil and care, but when secured, forming a building of strength and glory, in which God shall delight to dwell. We surely, as a denomination, *could* attain such results as are attained by others, having as we conceive no superiority in any of the elements of success, provided we adopt the same system of effort. But do we desire this? Do we envy the position, the character, the influence, or the success of any other church in Christendom? Why then should we ever

modify our system in order to emulate their triumphs? We are fully persuaded that just so far as we have copied the measures of others, as distinguished from our scriptural means, we have contributed to impair the permanency and value of our success, and have really lost ground. It is like sewing a piece of new cloth to an old garment, and like putting new wine into old bottles. Scriptural means are best adapted to plant and extend a scriptural theology and a scriptural organization. It is not enough that many have been truly converted by unscriptural means, and by designedly periodical and exciting efforts. By a more faithful adherence to the purity of our system, the regular ministrations of the word would have been more successful, the results achieved would have been more valuable, and we should this day have been a stronger, purer, and more useful church than we are. Who are they whose present condition illustrates our want of success in the conversion of men? In many of our communities they are, for the most part, those who have been already operated on by the very system to which we refer,—and on whom it has spent its power only to harden and to ruin, and to make them occasions of scandal. And many who have never professed religion, have yet, by their having been subjected to a strained system of effort, become insensible, not only to all less exciting influences, but even to the most moving appeals. Let us therefore heed the lessons of experience. Above all, let us be careful to adhere, in all our labours, to the word of our Master. “Let us not be weary in *well-doing*; for in *due season* we shall reap, if we faint not.” “The husbandman *waiteth* for the precious fruit of the earth, and hath *long patience* for it.” Doing this, we shall at least serve Christ. Doing otherwise, we have no assurance of any real success.

ART. IV.—*Jephthah's Vow.*

THE supposed immolation of Jephthah's daughter has been strenuously urged, by the oppugners of divine revelation, as a capital objection to the morality of the Bible. This consideration alone is sufficient to invest the exposition of Judges xi. 29–40, with the highest importance. The usual interpretations of that deeply interesting narrative may be resolved into two opposing theories,—that of *immolation*, and that of *consecration*. Among divines and biblical critics, distinguished names, of equal eminence for talent, piety, and intelligence, are found arranged in support of both these theories of interpre-

tation; while Josephus, it is well known, positively asserts the immolation of the daughter of this judge in Israel. To this theory of exposition Dr Kitto not only subscribes, but assumes the personal responsibility of the doctrine contained in the article "Jephthah," as it is not credited to any of the learned contributors to the "Cyclopædia of Biblical Literature." That the authority of such a name, on either side of the question, is not inconsiderable, will not be questioned. But the question as to the nature of this vow, must, after all, be decided, not by authority, but by the weight of argument in support of the assumed facts in the case. This will justify a careful re-examination of the whole matter, together with Dr Kitto's argument in support of the immolation hypothesis.

There are two sources of difficulty in determining the real character of the vow,—the extreme brevity of the narration, and the remoteness of the period when the event occurred. Its high antiquity invests it with a degree of obscurity which the brief reference of the historian leaves quite unremoved. And that either of the current hypotheses is entirely unembarrassed is more than can be claimed. But left to the necessity of balancing probabilities, and of choosing between alternatives, that theory of exposition will command our concurrence which presents the fewest difficulties, and which is sustained by the highest probability.

That there is a connection, intimate and vital, if not inseparable, between the character of Jephthah and the nature of his vow, will not be disputed. And what this was is more easily determined than some other points in the narrative; since what was left obscure by the sacred historian has been amply cleared up by the inspired apostle. From his character, then, we assume that his vow was a pious act. It was indisputably such in his own intention, and such, also, as to the circumstances under which it was made. Both go to establish his piety, while the latter were more marked and solemn. Let us briefly recount them. He was summoned from his retreat in Tob to the headship of the martial forces of Israel in repelling the invasion of the Ammonites. The specified conditions on which he had consented to take the direction of affairs at this critical juncture were acceded to by the people, and the covenant between him and them had been confirmed by an oath. The whole transaction had been recounted "before the Lord in Mizpeh." The attempt to terminate the invasion by negotiation proving abortive, and "the Spirit of the Lord" coming upon him, he promptly addressed himself to the arduous work of vanquishing the invaders, and of retrieving the fortunes of his country. His chief reliance for success was upon the arm of God. To secure the favour of heaven upon

the enterprise, and as a proof of his confidence in that favour, he made the vow in question.

Granting the piety of the act, where is the proof that his piety was not as enlightened and rational, at least for his times and the dispensation under which he lived, as it was ardent and confiding? Of the pure and elevated character of his faith we have the testimony of the apostle.—(Heb. xi. 32.) He is placed with David, Samuel, Gideon, Barak, and Samson, all honourable as being eminent examples of “faith.” But how does this testimony to this eminent grace accord with the hypothesis that he immolated his daughter? On this theory, here is an act and a trait of character utterly irreconcilable! On this supposition he must have sacrificed her either to Moloch, the heathen god of the Ammonites, the hated enemies of the Hebrews, or to the God of Israel. That human sacrifices were offered to Moloch is an undisputed fact in sacred history. The law of the Hebrews (Lev. xviii. 21) specifically inhibited them from causing their children to “pass through the fire” to this god. How absurd to suppose, that despicable as the Ammonites were to the Israelites on account of their gross idolatry and its cruel rites, now doubly so by this unprovoked invasion of the inheritance given their fathers, that this judge, prince, and general should first consult the God of his fathers, and then sacrifice his daughter to the revengeful god of his enemies! Where is the evidence that either in making or in paying his vow, he copied the example of these most besotted idolaters? Besides, he was well versed in the history of divine providence toward the Canaanites who were exterminated for their idolatry. Neither could he need instruction as to the requisitions of the law respecting sacrifice. He knew that *human* sacrifice would be even a greater abomination to God than that of any unclean animal. Hence, it is not conceivable that he should obligate himself, in any contingency which might arise, in making a vow to the Lord, to do that to *secure* the divine favour which he knew must be *offensive* to him. How could he have acted so preposterous a part as to have offered his daughter to Moloch, or to have offered *such* a sacrifice to Jehovah? And that there must have been some qualification to his vow, latent or implied, beyond what appears in the narrative, is evident from the absurdity of taking the words of the vow in their literal acceptation. On his return some *person* might have “come first out of the doors of his house,” over whom he had no legal control; some neighbour, man or woman. His vow, of course, could not embrace them. It might be a *dog*, or some unclean animal, in which case it could not be offered, but must be redeemed, and the price devoted to a sacred purpose. Such a condition-

ality in his vow, implied if not expressed, must have been involved.

This conditionality will be evinced by a reference to the Hebrew text. It cannot be denied that the particle *ve*, *and*, is used both in a copulative and disjunctive sense by Hebrew writers. See Exod. xxi. 17, and Lev. xxvii. 28. Separating the pronoun from the rest, and referring it to "Lord" as its antecedent, and leaving out "for," which is not in the Hebrew, the passage literally rendered would be: "shall be the Lord's; or I will offer him a burnt-offering." In the Septuagint it stands thus: ἔσται τῷ Κυρίῳ, ἀνοίσω αὐτὸν ὀλοκαύτωμα.—(Judges xi. 31.)

But, says Dr Kitto, "The explanation which denies this [the immolation of Jephthah's daughter] maintains that she was rather doomed to perpetual celibacy; and this, it appears to us, on the strength of phrases which, to one who really understands the character of the Hebrew people and their language, suggest nothing more than that it was considered a lamentable thing for any daughter of Israel to die childless. To *live* unmarried was required by no law, custom, or devotion among the Jews; no one had the right to impose so odious a condition on another, nor is any such condition implied or expressed in the vow which Jephthah uttered."

This passage contains the strength of the argument of the doctor for immolation. An important concession is, at least, implied in the statement: "That it was considered reproachful for any daughter of Israel to die childless." And if the advocates of the *consecration* hypothesis can show that the perpetual celibacy of Jephthah's daughter would be in accordance with the provisions of the law of Moses, they may claim possibility for their exposition. Should they be able to show this state highly probable, they advance another step toward certainty in their conclusion.

Consulting the law of a Nazarite (Num. vi. 2-12), it is clear that woman as well as man might come under its provisions: "When either man or woman shall separate themselves to vow a vow of a Nazarite, to separate themselves unto the Lord," &c. From this glance at the preface to this law, which, to save space, we do not transcribe, two things are clear: 1. That the vow of a Nazarite was common to both sexes. 2. That all who took it upon them were consecrated or "separated unto the Lord." It was a setting apart, a separation from things secular, a devotion to things sacred, a consecration exclusively to the service of God. When we take into consideration that this law, a statute of Moses, had been in force in Israel some three hundred years, it lends no feeble support to the hypothesis that this daughter of Israel was in some such way "separated unto the Lord." Nor is the probability materially

impaired by the fact that so little is said in Jewish history respecting the Nazariteship of women. It is enough that they were embraced by the law regulating that state. And who can show that celibacy was not held obligatory upon all who entered into the Nazarite vow during the term of its continuance? If this cannot be done, the probability cannot be denied, nor is there the least absurdity in the admission of its high probability. And the phrase "it was a custom in Israel" (ver. 39), may refer to female Nazarites; because it may as legitimately relate to the declaration respecting Jephthah's daughter immediately preceding, as to an entirely different subject in verse 40. In Dr Clarke's note on the passage the reader will find this reference adopted by that eminent commentator.

The argument on this point—that one *had* the right among the Jews of "imposing so odious a condition as celibacy upon another"—will be strengthened to a degree little short of conclusiveness by a glance at that section of the law which provides for the consecration, by vow, of a *child*, by its father, to the service of God. It is contained in Lev. xxvii. under the title of a *singular vow*. The law provides for the estimation of the amount at which the child or the adult might be exonerated from the personal discharge of such vow by a commutation in money, as an equivalent for the service due, whether the devotement was made by the parent or by the individual himself. The estimation contemplated three distinct periods, which, taken together, would amount in aggregate to the whole effective term of ordinary life. The period most available for effective service is first estimated, namely, from twenty to sixty years of age. As this term of forty years was in that age, and still is, by far the most vigorous and useful in life, the estimated commutation is more than twice that of any other term of years estimated. The next period estimated was from five to twenty years of age; the next from one month to five years. Thus from one month to five years, from five years to twenty, from twenty to sixty, were the three periods for which an estimate providing for commutation in the discharge of a vow was fixed by law. What might remain of life above sixty years of age would be uncertain as to its duration, and as to the vigour of the person, under the accumulating pressure of infirmities, leaving the amount of available service extremely contingent. Hence, in foresight of this, though an amount in commutation is named, a *proviso* is added for abatement on the plea of inability to pay—a question to be decided by the priests.—(Lev. xxvii. 3–8.)

From this is it not clear that the father by vow might consecrate his child to the service of God, or his sanctuary, from the age of one month to twenty years, or during life? Nor can

there be a reasonable doubt that it lay in his own breast to make such singular vow more or less stringent. And for aught that appears, he might impose upon his daughter the obligation of perpetual celibacy; if, indeed, this were not necessarily included in her "separation to the Lord." Her standing in this relation to God may have been deemed of itself incompatible with the conjugal relation. If this were included in the vow as such, there could be no release during the child's minority, except at the instance of the father; and then only by paying the estimated commutation. After reaching majority, and after the death of the parent, the person under the vow might be released at his or her option by paying the estimation. But whether the parent or the child at any age would use this legal provision, would depend upon contingencies which will readily suggest themselves to the reflecting reader.

Once more. An important distinction should here be noticed between the "singular vow," in Lev. xxvii. 2, and the "devoted thing," in verse 28. The former might be cancelled by paying the legal estimate or commutation. The devotement admitted of no such exoneration. All vows seem to have been included in these two classes; and to which that of Jephthah belonged remains to be seen. A reference to the original will show that both in Judges xi. 30, where his vow is described, and in Lev. xxvii. 2, where we have the law providing for commutation as above explained, נֶדֶר, *ne-der*, a *vow*, is the word used. In verse 28 we have הֶרֶם, *herem*, a *devotement*, a *thing devoted to a good or bad purpose*. This distinction is equally marked in the Septuagint; ὁρκία, a *vow*, occurs in the two former passages, while in the latter we have ἀνάθημα, a *thing or person devoted to holy purposes*, a *victim devoted to destruction*. In the former case the vow admitted of commutation; in the latter the devotement must be inviolate. To this the Vulgate also corresponds, having *votum*, a *vow*, in the two former passages, and *quod consecratur*, a *consecrated or devoted thing*, in the latter. Hence it is clear that Jephthah's vow belonged to the class of commutable vows. We also learn that it was competent for the father to bind his child by his vow from the age of one month to five years, or to the end of life, from the personal obligation of which exoneration could be obtained only by conformity to the provisions of law. These facts, brought to the exposition of this interesting narrative, shed much light upon some of its obscure statements. Thus, when she met her father, who stated what had passed his lips, from which he said "he could not go back," she promptly declared her cheerful and hearty concurrence; in which, whether she appeared more *filial* or *pious*, it is not easy to determine.

Comparing the law of a Nazarite with the law respecting a "singular vow," any one can see how far Dr Kitto is warranted in saying: "To *live* unmarried was required by no law, custom, or devotement, among the Jews." Because for this to be "required" is one thing, and for continuance in this state to be *incidental* to the subject of a "singular" or Nazarite vow, made and executed under the provisions of law, "in such cases made and provided," is quite another. The denial of this is more than any advocate of the immolation hypothesis would be willing to aver.

The remark of Dr Kitto, that "to get rid of a difficulty which has no place in the text, but arises from our reluctance to receive that text in its obvious meaning, we invent a new thing in Israel—a thing never heard of among the Hebrews, in ancient or modern times, and more opposed to their peculiar notions than any thing the wit of man ever devised;" if it contain argument at all, contains something besides argument. As to getting "rid of a difficulty," are there none on the immolation hypothesis? Does an open sea spread out in the direction of that theory? When the commendation of Jephthah's faith by the apostle is harmonised with the immolation exposition, it will be time enough to inquire how the advocates of the consecration interpretation "get rid of the difficulties in the text." The reader will judge whether the advocates of immolation or consecration are more justly open to the imputation of extravagant and witty inventions. It is generally unfortunate for such sweeping assertions, that they may be retorted with all their force upon those who utter them. They prove nothing, unless naked assertion is proof. But why, on the immolation hypothesis, did Jephthah's daughter request a respite of "two months, that she might go up and down upon the mountains, and bewail her virginity with her fellows?" Who can help inquiring, Why not much rather bewail her *death*? Her own allusion to her virginity,—rather, her celibacy,—with the reference to it in the next two verses, admitting her immolation, makes a mere circumstance more deplorable than the loss of life itself! If this would not be to magnify "the weaker into the stronger reason," it is inconceivable what should be so regarded.

"Reluctance to receive the text in its obvious meaning," may be retorted with double stringency upon the advocates of immolation. Why evince so much "reluctance" to *relinquish* an interpretation of a dark and difficult passage in an isolated and brief narrative, especially when such interpretation, called the "obvious meaning," so manifestly neutralises and outrages all just claims to *piety*, on Jephthah's part,—substituting for it the grossest superstition of the most blind and reckless wor-

shipper of Moloch,—thus coming in direct and open conflict with all the purest and deepest sentiments of the paternal heart; and this allowed to pass, not only without a word of reprobation, or even so much as one allusive censure by the inspired writers, but the faith of this judge of Israel receiving in the meantime the highest commendation! If difficulties like these rank not among the “insuperable,” we cannot imagine what should be so considered. And all, let it be remembered, is based upon the interpretation of a solitary Hebrew text, which some of the most celebrated biblical critics and commentators maintain is susceptible of a translation more literal, involving no such consequences; for it is obvious, that all that is said in allusion to this vow, after the statement of the utterance of the vow itself, accords quite as well with the consecration exposition, to say the least, as with the immolation hypothesis. It is passing strange, though true, that a seeming predilection for the marvellous and the tragical should maintain such a dominion over the popular mind,—a propensity which is greatly cherished by giving this Scripture narrative what is claimed to be the “obvious meaning.” Could it be shown that the view which strikes the great mass of ordinary readers really favours immolation—which we are not prepared to concede—this should still go for nothing, yea, less than nothing, in opposition to a sober, intelligent, critical investigation of the *law* and the *facts* in the case; because, to substitute the “obvious” for the critical import of a passage of Scripture, would be at once to repudiate all research and intelligent biblical exegesis; to transfer our confidence for the needful guidance on all questions of intricacy, doubt, or difficulty, from the learned, laborious, and scrutinising, to the mass of unscrupulous and superficial readers,—persons who are wont to take up first impressions instead of tracing out ultimate truths, or comparing separate acts or principles with the analogy of faith or consistency of character, seldom searching below the surface for a solid foundation for the superstructure of their opinions. It would be to adopt a maxim in biblical exposition fatal to truth on all great questions relative to religion, politics, the arts and sciences—questions involving the most vital interests of mankind; a doctrine to which, when placed in a clear light, Dr K. would be the last to subscribe. Hence we are compelled to dissent from his position, both as respects the conclusion he arrives at, and the reasoning by which it is reached. “But,” he adds, “the more the plain rules of common sense have been exercised in our views of biblical transactions, and the better we succeed in realising a distinct idea of the times in which Jephthah lived, and of the position he occupied, the less reluctance there has been to admit the in-

terpretation which the first view of the passage suggests to every reader, which is, that he really did offer her in sacrifice."

On this we remark, finally, that while we go for the adoption of the "plain rules of common sense" in ascertaining correct "views in biblical transactions," and for "realising a distinct idea of the times and position of Jephthah," we have *more* instead of "less reluctance" to admit an interpretation of his vow which involves the morality of an act of one so highly commended by an inspired writer, and thus confirming the captious sceptic in his cavil against the morality of the Bible, whatever may chance to have been our "first" view of the matter; especially when a more comprehensive critical investigation of the whole subject compels us to exonerate this honoured parent from so vile an imputation. With us vastly more reliance should be placed upon sober, intelligent, patient, sacred thought, in such examples of obscurity and difficulty, than upon mere first views; not, however, because we esteem the "plain, common-sense first views of ordinary readers" *less*, but because we appreciate the diligent research, the rigid and enlightened scrutiny of the pious, intelligent, critical biblical student *more*. On this ground we cheerfully place the two theories, leaving the reader to decide the issue.

ART. V.—1. *Trench on the Study of Words*. New York. 12mo, pp. 236.

2. *Fowler on the English Language*. New York: Harper & Brothers. 8vo, pp. 675.

3. *Bartlett's Dictionary of Americanisms*. New York. 8vo.

4. *Richardson's English Dictionary*. London. 4to.

WHEN an ordinary workman digs out from the quarry a block of sandstone, it may seem to him but so many square feet of rock that may be used in building a wall. If his attention should be attracted to the curious marks that appear on its surface, they will do little more than excite a momentary curiosity. But let the keen eyes of a Hugh Miller or an Agassiz rest upon this rock, and it becomes instantly a record of the deepest significance. These mysterious marks become hieroglyphics instinct with meaning; and in tracing them out there is revealed the history of an undated past. In the curling surface of the rock the geologist detects the ripple-marks that

tell the story of an ancient sea that rolled its peaceful waves along the beach during the long, still summer night, and of the morning breeze that covered gently with the sifted sand the traces of this rippling tide, and sealed them up in perpetual remembrance. In the dotted marks that indent it, he sees the trace of the pattering rain-drops that came suddenly down from the summer sky upon the smooth, dry strand, and passing quickly away, left braided on the retiring cloud that beautiful bow that was afterward selected by God as the symbol of hope to man. And as he looks yet closer, he finds the foot-prints of living things, that have here daguerreotyped themselves to distant generations. A yet further examination reveals to him the very forms of the ancient dwellers in these waters, entombed in this enduring sarcophagus, and presenting in strong hieroglyphics at once their biography and their epitaph. In the structure of their jaws, and the contents of their stomachs, they betray the nature of their food; in the forms of their fins and skeletons, they evince their habits; and in the attitude of terror, resistance, and struggle that they bear, they tell the story of a sudden and violent death. There rises thus to the reading eye the picture of this ancient world, with its swarming tribes of life; now gambolling in the sunshine; now fleeing in terror before the tempest and the earthquake; and now lashing the waves into foam in the fury of their deadly and terrible contests. Other fossils will tell him the story of a more advanced period in the earth's history. In the stomachs of the huge saurians that he finds, are yet preserved the undigested remains of the enormous reptile, the capture of which demanded that terrible combat, which in the end may have cost the victor his life, by a fit of saurian dyspepsia. In others he finds the remains of the very vegetables and trees whose enormous fossils are built into the coal measures, or deposited beside the unwieldy frame that once devoured them. As the geologist gazes on these stony pictures, there rise to his eye those ancient forests and marshes, with their towering tree ferns waving like queenly palms in the hot and mephitic atmosphere; reeds that stand like the mast of "some tall admiral;" and huge club-mosses shooting fifty feet in the air; while rolling their ponderous bulk in the tepid waters, or browsing lazily amid this gigantic herbage, are reptiles to which the crocodile of the Nile is but a whisking lizard, and forms of mylodon, megatherium, and dinotherium, that seem but the horrid creations of the sick man's dream.

All this history, and much more, is written in these stony annals of the past; and yet, generation after generation might quarry, and hew, and build these rocky registers, in utter ignorance of their wonderful contents. Hugh Miller the

mason might have used these rocks as building stone just as well if Hugh Miller the geologist had never discovered them to be the archives where God had deposited the history of a world.

Now, precisely the same state of facts exists in regard to the words that we use in daily life. They have been formed in the remote past. They have lived in other elements of thought, and served other uses of action than the present. They have mingled with the changes of human history, and contain imbedded in their structure a record of these changes, which a careful inspection will enable us to trace with great distinctness. Words are in truth the fossils of history; embalming in their very structure the record of facts that have found no other memorials. Their value in this respect has only been fully known in our own day, that has given birth to the science of comparative philology. This science, by comparing the various languages of the earth, is detecting facts of history and ethnology that have found no other record. It is yet in its infancy; but the results already reaped give promise of a rich harvest when more abundant materials for its use shall have been collected.

It is not our purpose to attempt a sketch of this young science, nor is it needful for our present design. They who are ignorant of all languages but their own, may find much to interest and instruct in studying that, even though they never venture into the tangled thicket of comparative philology. Indeed, it has been well said that "the discovery that words are living powers has been to many a man like the dropping of scales from his eyes, like the acquiring of another sense, or the introduction to a new world."

Our object is rather to induce those who have turned but little attention to this subject, to devote more careful study to it, by giving some insight into the treasures contained in words. Could we be assured that Trench's little volume on "the Study of Words" was known generally to our readers, we should deem a further prosecution of this subject comparatively needless, for some of our best illustrations have been taken from its pages. But as the study of words has usually been esteemed a very dry topic, this most entertaining and instructive volume has probably been but little read by the masses. It is our purpose to endeavour to show, that dry as this subject seems generally, it may, like the dry carcase of the lion that Samson slew, contain a hidden treasure of sweetness; that very valuable uses may be made of words beyond their use in speaking and writing; and for these ends to select from any source facts suitable for our purpose, without giving in each case a formal acknowledgment of the author or the book. If

the profound philologist shall consider some of our illustrations commonplace, and some of our etymologies questionable, we hope that he will remember that the commonest things are those that most men overlook; and that there exists the widest room for difference of opinion as to the etymologies of words, and that even a doubtful etymology may illustrate a true principle.

To give a notion of the subject in hand, let us select a simple illustration. Take, for example, an every-day transaction, the dating and signing of a letter. The words "dating," "signing," and "letter," have wrapped up in them certain historical facts. We have derived the word "date" from the Roman custom of inscribing a letter as "*datum*," "given" on a certain day, though the custom has been long laid aside; the word "signing," from the ancient use of the signet-ring, and the later custom of our illiterate ancestors in making the sign of the cross in place of their names, which they were unable to write; and the word "letter," from the Latin *littera*, which again is from *lino*, in allusion to the use of waxen tablets in writing. All these words indicate our connection with old Rome, through a rude and uncultivated ancestry. But the same fact is yet further embodied in the date. The amazing power of Rome in impressing her practical organizations on the world, and her mission thus in human history, is seen in the fact that we adopt her calendar, deriving the very word from the *kalends*, or "calling days," in which the augurs proclaimed *kalenda*, or called out the beginning of another month. The name of the month that we write is Roman, and embodies some fact in Roman life, either the name of a god, like the months of Janus (January), Mars (March), Maia (May), or Juno (June); or a religious ceremony, like February, from *februo*, to lustrate or purify; or a climatic fact, like April, that records the opening (*aperio*) of the leaves; or the two great Cæsars, Julius and Augustus; or the fact that the old Roman year began in March and consisted of but ten months, in the numerical designation of the four closing months of the year. The names of the days of the week also carry us back to Rome, but indicate that we have received this notation through a Teutonic ancestry, where the *dies solis* became Sun-day; *dies lunæ*, Mo(o)n day; *dies Martis*, Tuisco's-day; *dies Mercurii*, Woden's-day; *dies Jovis*, Thor's-day; *dies Veneris*, Freia's-day; and *dies Saturni*, Saturn's-day. And it may be a betrayal of the ignorance of our fathers, that while the Roman arrangement was astronomical, or rather astrological, the Teutonic nomenclature was adopted as if it were purely mythological, and governed by the names of the Scandinavian divinities. In the date of the year we record

that awful fact in the world's history, that God was made manifest in flesh, and dwelt incarnate on earth. And in most cases, the name of the place where we date from has some historic relations, and will connect us with some person or place of the past, either in the old world or the new, that determined the adoption of this name. It will thus be seen that as we look into the most familiar words, we find fossilised facts, one within another, each carrying us farther back towards the remote and unrecorded past.

There is much curious history, doubtless, wrapped up in names, now irrecoverably lost. The very fact that surnames became necessary embodies an historical fact. A *sur*-name, or *super*-name, is simply an added name, and implies the arising of reasons for this addition. In feudal times, a single name only was necessary, as is practically the case now among the slaves of the South, because the legal relations of the serf did not demand any more specific designation. As the feudal system began to disintegrate, and the enlarged intercourse of the people united with their enlarged rights to give importance to particular persons, it became necessary to adopt some expedient to distinguish between different individuals. Among the Romans we find a system, which like every thing else about that wonderful people, indicates that tendency to compact organization that was so striking a feature in their national life. The Roman citizen had three names,—the first, or *prænomen*, indicating the individual; the second, or *nomen*, the *gens* or clan; and the third, or *cognomen*, the family. Thus in Marcus Tullius Cicero, Marcus is the individual name, Tullius indicates his descent from the Tullian *gens* or clan, and Cicero the particular family of that *gens* from which he descended. Such a methodical nomenclature obviously indicates an advanced state of civil and political life. But it is otherwise with our surnames. They indicate no settled conditions of life, no definite relations of families, but a state of transition in which mere accident determined the choice of the name. The simplest and perhaps earliest designations would be those of relation. Thus, from the sons of Robert, John, William, &c., we have Robertsons, Johnsons, Williamsons, Jamisons, Thomsons, Dicksons, Wilsons, Harrisons, and others. The same fact was expressed by the Highlanders in the prefix *Mac*; by the Normans in the word *Fitz* (which is only a corruption of *filius*, son); by the Welsh *Ap*; the Russian suffix *witz*; the Polish *sky*; and the Spanish *er*; while the Irish extended the nomenclature to the relation of grandson by their *O*, or *Oy*. The next step would naturally be the expression of remoter relations; and the kinsfolk of Tom, John, or Jean, Wat, &c., became the Tomkinses, Jenkinses, and Watkinses, although in some cases

the suffix *kin* may have been a diminutive, like *lambkin*. There are some curious facts connected with the name John. Its derivatives are very numerous, both as to the number of persons bearing the name, and the number of names. We have the boundless family of the Joneses, and the kindred names of Johns, Jack, Jenks, Johnson in all its spellings, Jackson, Hanson, Jenkins, Jennings, Jenkinson, &c., indicating a prodigious number of Johns, or rather that the name of John was a sort of generic name in early times; just as we now know all sailors by the name Jack. The same fact is indicated by its use in so many combinations that express contempt. Thus we have jackanapes, jack-pudding, jack-straws, jack-o'-lanterns, jack-sauce, jack-ass, boot-jack, jack-daw, jack-knife, kitchen-jack, &c., &c.; while from the Italian form of Gioanni, we have Zani, or Zany, a mountebank; and the Spaniards have their Bobo Juan, or foolish John; and the French their Jean Potage. All these facts indicate a generic use of John, or Jack, in feudal times, somewhat like that which a modern satirist has almost succeeded in giving to the appellation James.

After the numerous Christian names had been exhausted, then would come the trades, from which we have the Bakers, Barkers (Tanners), Butchers, Carters, Coopers, Carpenters, Glovers, Fowlers, Harpers, Sawyers, Smiths, Shoemakers, Porters, Taylors, and Waggoners. The immense family of the Smiths is accounted for by the fact, that the word "smith" (from the Saxon *smitan*, to smite), meant originally any workman who smote or struck with his tools, whether he worked in wood, metal, or stone, and therefore included several trades now designated by other names. The residence of the family furnished the Hills, Fields, Bridges, Streets, Lanes, Woods, and Houses. The offices of the parent, in church or state, furnished the Deans, Parsons, Marshalls, Constables, Sergeants, &c. The colours are represented by the Blacks, Whites, Grays, Browns, Greens, and Tawneys. Personal characteristics are perpetuated in the Sweets, Littles, Longs, Longfellow, Longmans, Smalls, Strong, Swifts, Speeds, Lightfoots, Brights, Blunts, and Broadheads. Sometimes the same name comes to us in several languages. We have in this country the families of three brothers, who in Germany were all called Klein, but who emigrating at different times, and two of them, without the knowledge of the other, thinking it necessary to translate their names, have given us the three families of Kleins, Littles, and Smalls. The various objects of nature, positions of the body, cries, sports, vessels, tools, weather, and indeed the sheerest accident, would seem to have given us many of our surnames. Facts are embodied that one would scarcely wish

to perpetuate. It is bad enough to have a cramp, or an aching-side for a few hours, without embalming them in such names as Cramp, Akenside, Ague-cheek, &c.; and other facts perpetuated are still more inexplicable, as we read such names as Drinkwater, Gotobed, Twelvetrees, Dolittle, Pop-kiss, Shakelady, and Clapsaddle. But this endless confusion of surnames evinces a breaking up of social institutions, and an absence of any settled state of affairs, such as we see in the exact method adopted in the bestowal of proper names among the Romans. They are a deposit of conglomerate and diluvium, indicating a turbid and disquieted condition of the waters during their formation.

The geographical names of a country always embody much of its history. The names of many of our states, such as New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and the two Carolinas, perpetuate the historical facts of their settlement. A full gazetteer would enable the careful student to detect many facts in our history. The most obvious fact that would present itself would be the various European names occurring in our new settlements. From these we should infer that the country was settled by a mixed population from all parts of Europe, who perpetuated the fatherland names in the land of their adoption. To some extent he would be able to trace the various streams of immigration, by the deposit of names that they have left behind. In the English names of Lower Virginia, he would find traces of the cavalier settlement; in the Antrim, Derrys, and Donegals, he would detect the Scotch-Irish streams; in the New Rochelles and New Bordeaux, he would see the Huguenot trace; in the Amsterdams, Haarlems, and Katskills, the Dutch infusion; in the St Marys, St Louises, St Augustines, St Pauls, &c., he would discover the old Roman Catholic element from France and Spain; while in the Jerusalems, Jerichos, Goshens, and Bethlehems, he would suspect the presence of the men who rejoiced in such patrónymies as Resist-the-devil Jones, Fight-the-good-fight-of-faith White, and who have not yet renounced such Hebrew appellations as Shearjashub, Adoniram, and Abimelech. That the people of this country had a high regard for liberty, would be indicated by the countless towns named Freedom, Freeport, Freetown, Independence, Liberty, and Union. That the present inhabitants of the country were only a secondary deposit, and not the primary occupants of the soil, would be indicated by the fact, that while the towns and political divisions have European and English names, the great natural features of the country, that existed before this stratum of immigration had been poured over it, the mountains, rivers, lakes, and bays, have such names as Alleghany, Kittatinny, Tuscarora, Appomatox, Alabama,

Ohio, Mississippi, and Chesapeake. The various epochs of our national history will also be found marked by strata of names, as clearly as the successive deposits of fossils mark the great epochs of geology. The Revolution, the Indian wars, the war of 1812, and the Mexican war, and the great civil epochs, have deposited on our gazetteers the leading men and facts of their history, in such names as Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Taylor, Clay, Lexington, Tippecanoe, Chippewa, Monterey, and Ashland; so that a careful chronological arrangement of the names would readily reconstruct a great part of the history that is thus monumentally perpetuated.

This record of national history and character appears also in the words and phrases in common use. It is true that many of the phrases termed Americanisms are only imported Anglicisms; and it is also true that the English language is spoken in more purity in the United States than it is anywhere in the world, except by the highly educated classes of Great Britain. This fact is not accidental; but grows out of peculiarities in our national life. The different shires of England were at one time so much separated socially, that dialects grew up, which were almost as distinct as different languages; and since this social separation has been diminished, there has not been such a general enjoyment of the various agencies of popular instruction, such as the common-school, the newspaper, and the printed volume, as to obliterate these distinctions. In this country, however, the original conglomerate of the population, their restless and changing character, the constant intermingling of the residents of all sections, and the universal diffusion of the school, the newspaper, and the printed book, have made the formation of such provincialisms as the Yorkshire, Derbyshire, and Wiltshire dialects in England utterly impossible. Now, as the geologist infers a still and isolated condition of the waters when he finds separate deposits lying side by side in the same field, and a disturbed condition when he finds a wide-spread mass of conglomerate; so the student of language may perceive in the absence of provincial dialects in the United States, and their existence in England, indications of the different social and political conditions of the two countries, in their more general features.

But there is another class of facts that may be found in our language. As the geologist will find traces of the various streams that have contributed to deposit a mass of diluvium in the pebbles and drift which he discovers brought from distant sources, so the linguist may find in the words in common use traces of the various streams of life that have mingled in our national history. He sees the Indian current in such words as "hominy," "canoe," "barbacue," and "moccasin;" the

ancient French and Spanish and the modern Mexican dash, in the words "calaboose," "bayou," "levee," "crevasse," "pistareen," "chapparel," "cavortin," "vamosé," and "fandango." There are other words and phrases that betray clearly the peculiar condition of the country in which they arose. The roving character of the population, the absence of all ceremony in intercourse, and the frequent meeting of those who are unknown to each other, is indicated by the fact that while the French will courteously say "Monsieur" (My sir, or my lord); the Englishman, more curtly, "Sir;" the German, more kindly, "Neighbour;" and the Quaker, "Friend;" the Western man will say, "Stranger;" showing thus that those who meet are generally strangers, and that this fact does not debar intercourse. The great physical features of the country have given birth to such words as "backwoods," "bottoms," "canabrakes," "clearing," "deadening," "digging," "dug-out," "corn-shucking," "stump-speaking," and "log-rolling;" and the political features of the country have given other secondary meanings to some of them that are by no means flattering to our legislative customs. The traces of our wild frontier life, of the dog, the gun, the temporary hut, and the perils of the forests, are seen in such vulgarisms as "to flash in the pan," "to fix his flint," "to bark up the wrong tree," "to pull up stakes," "to flat out," "to be a caution," and "to be among the missing." The same thing appears in the fact that what the Englishman would call "game," and put in "a preserve" to keep it for sport, owing to their comparative scarcity, the American calls "varmint," because their number and annoyance are such as to lead him to desire their destruction as a huge sort of vermin. The rioting intensity of life that rushes through our veins is shown by our fondness for such epithets as "awful," "powerful," "dreadful," "monstrous," "almighty," and "all-fired." There is a rude vigour of vitality embodied even in such outrageous syllabic combinations as "absquatulate," "cantankerous," and "catawampous;" and our whole American life is condensed into the characteristic phrase, "go ahead." There are other words and phrases, which, though local in their origin, yet by their general adoption indicate facts in our condition not always of the most complimentary character. Among these are such as "gerrymandering," "talking to Buncombe," "lobbying," and "pipe-laying;" such appellations as "Barn-burners," "Old Hunkers," "Hards," "Softs," "Silver Grays," "Woolly Heads," "Loco Focos," and "Bucktails;" and such phrases as "give us your corn-stealer," "give him Jessy," "acknowledge the corn," and "see the elephant." The cautious and inquisitive character of the New-Englander is seen in his saying, "I guess," when others would say, "I think, or believe,

or suppose," and his exclamation of surprise, "du tell!" instead of the usual interjections. His social relations are indicated by the word "helps" where an Englishman would say "servants;" the predominance of the religious element in his life by the phrase "true as preachin'," when the rough Western man would say, "true as steel;" and the restraints of his religious training are curiously exhibited in his employing such gingerly anathemas as "darn you," "tarnation," "goshens," "golly," &c., in those times of mental excitement, when the more unscrupulous profanity of West and Southwest would, in their own phrase, "pile on the agony." The same sectional characteristics may be seen even in peculiarities of pronunciation. The genuine Jonathan will draw out in the most cautious manner, as if unwilling to commit his organs too much, his "keouw," "dang," "eend," "waal;" while the semi-centaur of the Southwest will blurt out in headlong haste his "whar," "thar," "bar," "yaller," &c., with the most reckless outspurt of utterance; and the Southerner, who is in the habit of speaking to those who do not care to hear or to remember, betrays it in his constant "d'ye hear?" when addressing a servant, and his use of such words as "tote," "gwine," "nary-one," and his constant disuse of the *r* in pronunciation. Thus, without the formation of dialects such as we find in England, whenever there is a real difference of character or social condition in different parts of the country, these differences will record themselves in differences of language. We can thus see the process going on before our eyes in which the facts of our national life are slowly crystallising into verbal forms; and just as the geologist can reproduce much of the condition of a past epoch of the earth from the study of its fossils, so the philologist can reconstruct from our forms of speech very much of our national character and history.

But as these causes act slowly, and require time for their complete development, we must go further back in the history of our language for the treasures that are deposited in its words. We therefore propose to take an excursion among the hills, and look at the out-croppings of the strata.

The first fact that strikes us in looking at the English language is, that the primary element, the underlying granite on which all the rest reposes, is Saxon. Of the nearly forty thousand words that compose our language, about five-eighths are of Saxon origin, and they by far the most important portion for the common uses of speech. Added to this primary formation, we have successive strata of Gothic, Celtic, Latin, Norman-French, Greek, and other more recent deposits. The curious fact that meets us here is, that the Anglo-Saxon constitutes the basis of the language, and not the Celtic, which

was the speech of the original inhabitants of England. This brings to light the historical fact that the conquest of the Angles, Saxons, and Jutes, from which arose the Saxon Heptarchy, was, like that of the Indians in this country, almost an extermination of the aboriginal inhabitants. The old Celtic occupants were driven to the mountains of Wales, to the Highlands and islands of Scotland, to Ireland, and to the Isle of Man, where we still find their memorial in the Cambrian dialect of the first, the Erse or Gaelic of the second and third, and the Manx of the fourth place of their refuge. The only Celtic words of ancient date are the names of mountains, rivers, &c., which remain in England, like the Indian names of this country, the monuments of a race that were wholly swept from their original habitation.

But we have embodied in our language not only the relation of conquerors to the conquered, but also their relations to one another. The fact that the language became Anglo-Saxon perpetuates the fact that there were four kingdoms of Angles, three of Saxons, and one of Jutes, previous to the consolidation of the heptarchy. The Saxon element was infused not solely because of any political predominance, but because the literary tastes of Alfred led to the cultivation of the West Saxon, which then, by the translations of books from other languages, and by original writings, became the immovable basis of the English speech,—a basis so deeply rooted that no subsequent conquest could remove it. The predominance of the Angles just mentioned is further shown by the name of the island and language of England. When the country ceased to be called Britannia, on the total routing of the Celts, it became not Saxon-land, or Jut-land, but Angle-land, or England. It is a curious fact, illustrating the secondary growth of this name, and its adoption subsequent to the banishment of the Celts, that their descendants to this day in Wales and the Highlands of Scotland call the English not Angles or English, but Saxons, the name that their exiled forefathers carried with them and embalmed in their hatred and curse. The matured strength of this Anglo-Saxon civilization appears from the fact, that its terms of political division have remained to the present day. We have political and municipal divisions in this country that we call Essex, Sussex, Norfolk, Suffolk, &c., without reflecting that we thus perpetuate the old Saxon boundaries, in which the East-Saxons were called Essex,—South-Saxons, Sussex,—North-folk, Norfolk,—South-folk, Suffolk, &c., through the various portions of the Saxon, or Anglian kingdoms. The strength of the political life contained in these forms is proved by the permanence of the terms created by it; just as the perfection of a fossilised skeleton or shell usually proves the original

hardness and firmness of the osseous structure of the living animal.

The nature of the Norman conquest, and its difference from the Saxon, is also embodied in the language. That, unlike it, it was not an extermination, is shown by the fact that the name and language of the island remain. England did not become Normandy, as Britannia had become England, and the Norman-French did not supplant the Anglo-Saxon, as it had supplanted the Celtic. This proves that it was only a conquest, and not an extermination. But we have still deeper glances into the relative condition of the two parties from the language. That the Saxons, in spite of their political and literary culture, were in a rude social condition, appears from the fact that they had so few words to express any of the luxuries or elegancies of life, and therefore but few of the things represented by the words. We find a number of names for small rude houses, such as "hut," "hovel," "cot," "cottage," &c., showing that these were the dwellings most familiar to them. The fact that names for more elegant houses, such as "castle," "mansion," "palace," "hall," &c., are foreign words, shows that the things thus expressed came in with these foreigners. That the Norman was the conquering race, we learn from the fact that the terms of honour and office are Norman, such as "sovereign," "sceptre," "realm," "royalty," "throne," "prince," "duke," and "count." There is one remarkable exception to this: the word "king" (*könig*, or *kaning*, the man who *can*, who has might) is Saxon. This records the fact that the conqueror came in not as an unauthorised usurper, but on the plea that he was the rightful heir to the throne, the lawful king. All the inferior names of official authority, however, were changed. The Saxon "shire," which was once the portion of land shired, sheared, or cut off by the king when he created an earl, became "a county," or the portion assigned to a count. That the Norman flourished and fattened on the Saxon's toil, is shown by the fact that while the names of articles of luxury, terms of the chase and chivalry, are Norman, the names of implements of toil, such as "spade," "plough," "flail," "sickle," &c., are Saxon; as are also those of the great objects of nature, "sun," "moon," "stars," "earth," "water," &c.; and the relations of life, such as "father," "mother," "wife," and "son." This fact has not escaped the keen eye of the author of *Ivanhoe*, who makes poor Wamba the Witless for the nonce a philologist, as he points out the fact to the swineherd, that when the swine, ox, and calf were alive and needed attention, they were called by Saxon names, but when killed and ready to be eaten they became pork, beef, and veal, Norman appellations. To these he might have added that the Saxon sheep, deer, and fowl, became the Norman mutton, veni-

son, and pullet, showing that the poor Saxon ceased to have any thing to do with them as soon as they were prepared for the table.

That the sturdy Saxon was refractory under his yoke, and required severe measures to keep him from plotting rebellion, is indicated by the word "curfew." This is from the Norman-French *couvre-feu* (cover the fire); because William the Conqueror required the Saxons to cover their fires and extinguish their lights when the curfew bell rang, in order that there might be no nightly plottings of revolt. The warlike character of these early times is strikingly indicated by other words. In modern times there is no necessary disgrace attached to a surrender as a prisoner of war, nor is it a necessary stigma of cowardice. But that it was otherwise with our fierce forefathers, is shown by the words "caitiff" and "craven;" one of which meant only a captive, and the other one who asked or craved his life from an enemy. That these acts became marks of disgrace, proves the ferocious spirit with which war was waged in these sanguinary times. The word "poltroon" also indicates the same fact. A poltroon was a *pollice truncus*, one who had cut off his thumb so that he could not draw the bow, and thus might evade military conscription.

It will be seen by these few illustrations, how the main facts in the two early epochs of English history, the Saxon and Norman conquests, have recorded themselves in our language; so that a future historian might reconstruct much of the early history of England, just as Niebuhr has that of Rome, from these fossilised preservations of the events of the past.

Nor has the Danish irruption left no traces behind. It is marked as clearly as a coal deposit by the names that it gave to the towns that were then occupied. The Danish termination "by," meaning "town," will be found in such names as Wetherby, Derby, Whitby, &c, marking with great exactness the limits of the Danish settlements in England.

There is another great historical epoch not far distant from these events, that has also left some impress on our language. We refer to the Crusades. From them we have the word "palmer," the mendicant pilgrim who brought back his palm staff as a proof of his visit to the Holy Land. The character of these pilgrims, or perhaps rather of those who pretended to be pilgrims, is curiously recorded in the word "saunter." A saunterer was originally one who went on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, *à la sainte terre*. These pilgrims were gladly entertained by those to whose hospitality they appealed. But in process of time the pilgrimages attracted the lazy louts who were too indolent to work, and the cunning impostors who sponged on the hospitality of strangers under the pretext that

they were pilgrims *à la sainte terre*, and who wandered from place to place on this plea, so that finally to profess to be a holy-lander, or saunterer, became synonymous with being a loitering, idle fellow. Our word "loafer" has had probably a similar origin, from the German *laufen*, to run or wander from place to place; although it is true that in our country the loafer rarely runs except at the sight of a police-officer.

We have also probably a trace of these times in our word "miscreant." This means literally an unbeliever, and was applied in this sense originally to the Turks. But as they were regarded with intense hatred by the Christians, this hatred at last intensified the word to the meaning it now has, of a man whose works are as bad as his faith; and thus records the unconscious judgment of the human race that wrong thinking will soon develop into wrong doing. The word "assassin" was also introduced about this time. It was originally the name of a tribe of fanatics in Persia, who, like the Thugs of India, murdered as a matter of religious duty all that were devoted to death by their prince, the Old Man of the Mountains. These wretches were extirpated about this time, and their name was transferred to our language as a memorial of their bloody fanaticism; thus recording their history, just as the word "burking" records one of the monstrous forms of murder in modern times. The designation of all Europeans by the name "Franks," in Mahometan countries, had its rise at this time. The French being the most prominent in these wild forays, gave their name to all Europeans, just as the restless, roaming character of the New-Englanders has given to all Americans the soubriquet of Yankees. Indeed, the word "Frank" embodies an historical fact that carries us yet further back. The early tribe of Germans that received this name possessed a manly independence and an open candour, which contrasted so strikingly with the crafty Gauls and the degenerate Romans, that their name became the designation of this type of character, just as the adjective in the phrase, "a Yankee trick," describes a species of adroitness that is by no means monopolised by the descendants of the pilgrims.

This kind of record may also be seen in the word "chouse." This comes from the Turkish *chiaous*, a messenger, and had its entree into our language in this wise. In 1609, a messenger or *chiaous* of the Grand Seigneur cheated the Turkish and Persian merchants in England out of about 20,000 dollars, a large sum at that time. From the notoriety of the fact, to perform the same game was called "to chouse;" and thus, like a fly in amber, this rascally Turk has been handed down to posterity. Some of the financial transactions of our own country are in danger of adding some specimens of this doubtful species of riches to our language.

A curious exchange of meanings has occurred in the words "barter" and "cheat." Barter once meant to cheat, from *barrater*, "to cheat;" a meaning that is still seen in the legal term "barratry." Cheat, on the contrary, is simply a contracted form of *escheat*, a forfeiture to the crown or government; and had originally no intimation of dishonesty connected with it. But as the escheator who attended to these forfeitures was not very scrupulous in his proceedings, escheating, in the legal sense, became cheating in the illegal sense, and thus passed into the language of common life, to carry down to other generations the practices of these officers of the law. The merchants may hence twit the lawyers with the fact, that the mercantile term passed from a roguish meaning to an honest one, while the legal term took the opposite track; though the lawyers may probably claim some of the credit of this change by their success in detecting roguery, and may perhaps be in possession of facts, professionally, that would show that bartering has not yet lost its original and less creditable signification.

There is a curious piece of mediæval history embodied in the word "dunce." John Duns Scotus was one of the acutest men of the middle ages, and the leader of the metaphysical party in the Church of Rome. His logical and theological writings became thus a text-book for his disciples for many years after his death. At the revival of letters, the scholars of the new era began to quote Greek and Hebrew, which the Scotists rejected as an innovation, clinging to the syllogisms of their great master, and quoting his sentences as sufficient authority. Hence, as Tyndal has noted, the Duns disciples became the violent opponents of learning, so that a Duns-ist, or Dunse, became the name of contempt for an ignorant booby. Thus, by a peculiarly hard fate, poor John Duns Scotus, the most subtle intellect of his age, is perpetuated to posterity in that juvenile martyr to literary pursuits in the village schools whose melancholy visage is surmounted by the dunce-cap.

The word "melancholy" suggests to us another kind of history that is contained in words. It is the history of opinions. Old Burton, in his "Anatomy of Melancholy," remarks, "The name melancholy is imposed from the matter and disease denominated, from the material cause, as Bruel observes, *melancholia*, as if *μίλαινα χολή*, from black choler. Frascatorius, in his second book of 'Intellect,' calls those melancholy whom abundance of that same depraved humour of black choler hath so misaffected that they became mad thence, and dote in most things, or in all belonging to election, will, or other manifest operations of the understanding." We have, then, in this word a record of the old system of humoral pathology. This system taught that there were four humours or moistures in the body, namely, blood, phlegm, choler, and melancholy or

black bile; and according to the mixture of these humours was the temperament of the man, both bodily and spiritual. When the blood predominated, it made a sanguine, hopeful man; when the choler, which was supposed to contain the principle of natural heat, it made a choleric, fiery, irritable man; when the phlegm, it made a cold, dull, phlegmatic man; when the melancholy, or black bile, it made a gloomy, desponding, melancholy man. We retain these terms in common use, though the pathology which gave them their significance has long since been exploded, and almost forgotten. The same physiological theory, also, has bequeathed to us other words still in use. It taught that a man's disposition depended on the right mixture of these humours; and hence we speak of a humorous man, a man's humour, a good-humoured or bad-humoured person; and, also, of a good temper, a bad temper, a distemper, a temperament of body, &c., all of which terms had their origin in the theory that the disposition of a man depended on the tempering of these primary humours of the body.

Another set of terms that still continue in use are those of astrology. We have long since ceased to believe in sidereal influences on the lives of men, and yet we retain the word "influence," which originally referred to the flowing down (*influens*) of a force or virtue from the planets upon the earth. The word "ascendant" is from the same terminology. We also speak of a "disaster," from *dis*, against, and *aster*, a star, which originally meant that a man's star was malignant, or against him. We still speak of a man as "jovial," although we do not think that it is owing to his being born under the influence of the planet Jupiter or Jove, the roystering chief of the Pagan Olympus; and we use the terms "saturnine," and "mercurial," though we do not think that gloomy Saturn, or light-heeled and light-fingered Mercury, have any thing to do with the matter whatever.

The ancient tendency of the human mind to refer its acts and states to superhuman and sub-human influences, what Comte calls the theological phase, is also embodied in words. A "guilty" man was at first a guiled or guilt man, that is, one guided by the devil. So a "wicked" man was a man witched, from *wiccan*, to bewitch. We retain these terms, though we fasten the responsibility nearer home than either the devil or the witch. We also speak of a person as fascinating, without having any faith in the power of killing with the evil eye, as the word *fascino* originally meant; and talk of another as "enchanting," although we know that the day of enchantments, or wizardly incantations, is over; and call others "bewitching," without the slightest intention of intimating that

they perform nocturnal journeys on a broomstick. The word "journey," we may remark in passing, also records a state of facts that antedates our age of railroads, and even coaches, that have night lines as well as day. It meant, originally, a day's travel, (*jour*, a day,) and hence we have the words journeyman, journey-work, which were originally applied to men who worked by the day, and work that was performed by the day. Hence a nocturnal journey is etymologically a contradiction.

We have, also, in a number of words, records of particular notions that have long since been laid aside or forgotten. In the phrase, "Sardonic laugh," we record the ancient opinion of the Greeks, that there was an herb in Sardinia that would make those who ate it die with laughter. In the word "sarcophagus," which is literally "flesh-eater," and which seems to be an unaccountable name for a receptacle designed to preserve, and not to destroy the bodies of the dead, we perpetuate the opinion of the ancients, that the stones of Assos in Troas, from which tombs were made, would in forty days consume the bodies that were placed in them, all but the teeth, as Pliny informs us, and hence were called sarcophagi, or flesh-consumers. In the word "panic," we retain the notion of the Greeks that the god Pan had some finger in the mischief thus designated. In the phrase, "hermetically sealed," we transmit the notion that Hermes Trismegistus was the author of the chemical art; in the word "electricity," that amber (*electron*) was the substance in which electric phenomena were supposed solely to reside, because first noticed in it. We also speak of the "halcyon days" of human life, and are somewhat puzzled to learn that the halcyon is the king-fisher, until we find out that the seven days before and after the winter solstice were so named, because then this bird made its nest among the reeds by the sea-shore, inasmuch as during these days the sea was usually calm and the sky bright. We speak of the "nightmare," also, without believing that the old Runic spectre Mara seizes and throttles us during the night. We also continue to call a metallic medicine "antimony," although we do not believe that it has any special antipathy to monks, as its discoverer did, who gave it to an unsuspecting monk by way of experiment, and killed the poor fellow; and hence called it antimony, or anti-monk, in view of its supposed anti-popery properties. Thus we find, by chipping off the outer shell of many of our words, we have embodied a record of the crude opinions of our predecessors on many subjects.

But we have not only records of crude opinions in words, but also of the crude condition of the arts in ancient times. Most persons are aware that "paper" is so called from the

Egyptian reed *papyrus*, the early writing material; and that "volume" (something rolled) is derived from the rolling of MSS. before the discovery of the arts of printing and book-binding. But we have other words that embody records of similar facts. In the word "library" (from *liber*, bark) we have the fact that men once used the smooth bark of trees to write on; a fact also preserved in the word "book," which is the old Anglo-Saxon for a beach-tree, because its polished bark was used in this way. In the word "style," we preserve the name of the Roman *stylus*, the iron pen, one end of which traced the lines on the waxen tablet, and the other erased them when the writer made his corrections. The word "pen" is undergoing this change in our own day. It is literally a *penna*, a feather or quill, though we now speak of a quill pen and a steel pen. We also speak of "calculating," although we no longer use *calculi*, or pebbles, to aid us in the process; and use the word "stipulation," though the custom of handing a *stipula* or straw from the seller to the buyer of a piece of land, in attestation of the contract, is no longer used. We count by "scores," meaning twenties, although we have more convenient methods of reckoning than our ancestors, who counted by notches, and when they had reached twenty, scored; that is, cut off the tally, from the old verb *seuran*, to cut off. The laying aside of this method of reckoning was adduced by Jack Cade as one of the misdemeanours of the Lord Say in Henry VI.: "Thou hast most traitorously corrupted the youth of this realm, in erecting a grammar school; and whereas before, our forefathers had no other books but the score and tally, thou hast caused printing to be used; and contrary to the king, his crown, and dignity, thou hast built a paper-mill." So we use the phrases "signing our name," "signature," &c., notwithstanding we no longer make the sign of the cross, as our unlettered fathers did, when, unable to write their names, they made a sign for them, or signed instead of writing them. And the tenacity of these ancient customs is indicated by the fact, that when a man is compelled to make his mark, we find him, Protestant though he be, making the sign of the cross as duly as the devoutest Catholic, although in the very act he seems to confess to being a know-nothing.

There are also national and social customs that are embodied in words. Thus "candidate" is from *candida*, white, because a Roman aspirant to office always wore an unusually white toga,—a custom that is perhaps perpetuated in modern times by the white-washing that is commonly given to these gentlemen by their friends. From the same source we have the word "ambition," which is literally a going about, (*ambitio*),

and was applied to that patriotic impulse that led men to desire to sacrifice themselves to the service of their country on the altar of one of her fat offices, and hence to go about soliciting votes,—a sort of pilgrim's progress that our annual elections show has not yet become wholly obsolete. So a "clerk," at one stage of the changing history of its meaning, meant any one who could read, although now it means any one who can write; and when the phrase, "benefit of clergy," was first introduced, clerks and clergy were the same class,—although in our day the clerks would be very unwilling to be held to all the restraints that are imposed upon the clergy. A "husband" was so called because he was regarded as the "house-band," as old Tusser has it:—

"The name of a *husband*, what is it to say,
Of wife and of *household* the band and the stay."

And yet, in spite of old Tusser's authority, we know that often the stay of the house comes from the other side. The "wife" was so called from *weben*, to weave, because among our simple Saxon ancestors, she did the weaving of the household; and the unmarried lady was called "spinster," because she did the spinning. We retain the terms wife and spinster, although these operations have long been laid aside, except in the insinuations of crabbed satirists, who are fond of charging modern spinsters with the manufacture of a less profitable kind of yarn, outside of the house, than that which is produced by the stationary spinning jennies. The word "bonnet" is derived from *bonad*, a covering; it being an antiquated prejudice that this article of dress was designed to cover the head; a blunder of our great-grandmothers that is exposed now in the most barefaced manner. The word "bead" comes from *beden*, to pray, and had its origin in the use of the rosary in praying, when one bead was dropped for every petition. In our day, however, wearing beads and saying prayers are things that have no necessary connection. The word "gossip" has also wandered very far from its original meaning. It meant originally a sponsor for a child in baptism. These sponsors were supposed to acquire a spiritual relationship to the child that created a kinship with each other that made intermarriage unlawful. Hence, as the male sponsor was called the godfather, and the female the godmother, their relationship was called godsibb, or kin in God, using the old word sibb, which meant kindred. The christening-days and birth-days naturally brought these spiritual relatives together in a festive manner, and, as Junius very ungallantly observes, they soon came together to tell stories and to tipple over them. Thus, by an obvious process, the word gossip acquired its present meaning, which involves a very different kind of sponsorship, oftentimes,

than that which is assumed at the baptismal font. Thus it is that words remain as witnesses of facts long after those who acted in them have passed away.

A number of words carry in their structure the history of the places from which the articles described by them had their origin. Thus the damson, or damascene plum, tells us that it came from Damascus; while the cloth called "damask" tells the same story. The "bayonet" proclaims that it was made originally at Bayonne; "cambric," at Cambray; "dimity," at Damietta; "carpet" at Cairo, (*Cairo tapet*, or Cairo tapestry); "muslin," or *mousseline*, that it came from Moussul; "calico," from Calicut; "gingham," from Guinchamp; "gauze," from Gaza; "arras," from Arras; "holland," from Holland, though now it comes mainly from Ireland; "currants," from Corinth; "guinea," from Guinea gold; "camlet," from camel's hair; and "artesian wells," from Artois, where they were first made. The same process is going on at the present time in such things as Petersham coats, Mackinaw blankets, Lowell cottons, and other commercial articles, where the adjective is gradually absorbing to itself all the force of a name. The word "bedlam" had an original of this kind. It is simply a corruption of Bethlehem, the hospital of St Mary, Bethlehem, having been given to the city of London, in 1545, as a receptacle for lunatics, whence a madhouse is called a bedlam. The word "tariff" has had a parentage that will rejoice the enemies of a protective system. It comes from Tarifa, the promontory that juts out from Spain into the Straits of Gibraltar, where the piratical Moors were in the habit of arresting all ships entering the Mediterranean, and compelling them to pay toll for the privilege. This levying of black-mail was called tariffing, from whence we have our word tariff; a derivation which the fiery free-trader will think to be a very appropriate one for what he regards as a system of legalised piracy.

But we must pause in our fossil hunting; not, however, for want of material, for we have left some of the richest veins of this great deposit untouched. There are mournful chapters of national history contained in the changes that have occurred in the meanings of words. What volumes of Roman history are contained in the word *virtus* every Latin scholar knows. It is a cameo-picture of Roman history for many centuries. But what a mournful proof of change is evinced by the fact, that the people who tread on the ashes of Brutus and Cato, now mean by *vertu*, not the stern manliness of its old Roman original, but tit-bits of rarity, gimcracks, and old curiosities! as if to possess these were the highest attainment of man. It is a further proof of Italian degeneracy, that by a *virtuoso* they

mean not a brave, or even a virtuous man, as the old Latin *virtuosus* meant, but a man skilled in the fine arts ; by a *bravo*, not a hero, but a brigand or an assassin ; and by a *cicerone*, not a Ciceronian in the choice and utterance of eloquent words, but the glib and gabbling showman who pilots strangers around the relics of their nobler ancestry. One is painfully reminded of those Dead Sea apes, of which Carlyle makes so much use in some of his writings. The French language has a number of such indications of national character. Such words as *perfidie*, *roué*, *beau*, *belle*, *hotel*, *religieuse*, *chevalier d'industrie*, *pondre de succession*, and the whole vocabulary of mockery in which this language is so rich, give volumes of insight into the interior life of the people whose thoughts are either expressed or concealed by such words. Nor is our English language wanting in such tokens of degeneracy. There are in English history as marked eras of degradation as Hugh Miller has ever discovered in the records of the old red sandstone. We have a number of words that now convey a degrading sense, in the meaning of which there was once nothing at all derogatory. Thus, *maudlin* is from *Magdalene*, a weeping penitent ; *cant* from *chant*, or *canticle*, a solemn hymn to God ; *prude* once meant only one who was *prudent* ; *demure* (from *des mœurs*), one who was regardful of morals ; *saint* and *godly* had no more lurking sarcasm than their synonymes, *holy* and *god-like* ; *homely* once meant simply *homelike* ; *gallantry* meant only a chivalrous bravery, and had no equivocal sense ; *resentment*, even as late as the time of Bacon, was used in its primitive sense of reflection, from *re-sentire*, to think again, and had no anger involved in it whatever. A *rake* once meant only a reckless, and not necessarily a debauched, person ; a *varlet* was only a valet or hireling ; a *villain*, only a *villanus*, a country labourer or servant ; a *wench*, a young girl ; an *imp* once meant only a descendant. So that Lord Cromwell, in writing to fierce old Henry VIII., could call his sainted son, Edward VI., in a phrase meant to be highly complimentary, “ that goodlie imp ; ” a *libertine* once was only a liberal or free thinker on religious subjects, and not one whose creed had crept into his life ; *paraphernalia* was originally only a woman's dower, and had no sense of tawdry ornament ; and the word *tawdry* itself only meant originally those ornamental things that were sold at the fair of St Audrey. Thus it has been with many words that once had a primeval innocence of meaning, but, like the race that used them, have had a fall. Many of them may be found changing about the time of the restoration of the Stuarts, recording thus the influx of corruption that came in with the witty and wicked Charles. Indeed, the very process of transition in some cases may be traced in the pages of Dryden,

evincing the mournful degradation that was then occurring in the English character. In the reaction from Puritanism, honour, virtue, religion, and purity, were becoming mere mockeries; all belief in their very existence was dying out among the classes that gave currency to language, and hence, by an obvious process, the names of these qualities became terms of sneering contempt, and now stand as ghastly memorials of the degenerate days of the Restoration.

The mere absence of words in a language often indicates national character most strikingly, for it indicates the absence of the things expressed by those words. How significant a fact is it that only in our English tongue do we find that rich word *home*, a word so full of the music of household joys and fireside memories! What a striking fact is it that most heathen languages, even so cultivated a one as the Chinese, have no word expressing the name of God; and yet one Australian tribe has a word to express a form of infanticide for which we have not coined a term; while another has four words to express as many different kinds of murder, none of which involves any moral disapprobation, and yet has not one word to express love! Nor is our own language without these ethical indications. What an argument for the Maine law may be found in the opulence of our vocabulary respecting the immoderate use of strong drink! Men speak in the most gingerly terms of a man as being "in liquor," "the worse for liquor," "shot in the neck," "half seas over," "a brick in the hat," "how came you so," "on a frolic," "on a spree," "disguised," "incubriated," "intoxicated," "funny," "joyful," "muddled," "jolly," "corned," "tight," "boozy," "slewed," "fuddled," "high," "sweet," "soaked," "drunk," down to "dead drunk;" and yet the remarkable fact is, that many of these terms are absolutely apologetic, and not one of them implies disapprobation, except the Latin derivative, "intoxicated," from *toxicum*, poison. But on the other hand, how discouraging are the prospects of the Maine law among a people that have more than two dozen terms to describe getting drunk, and only one to describe staying sober!

We have purposely left untouched some of the profoundest questions of history connected with the study of words. We refer to the ethnological aspects of philology. These are among the most absorbing questions of science in our day. As the geologist may trace the path of a boulder, or the drift of a diluvium, back to the rocky bed from which they were originally torn, though leagues distant, so the comparative philologist is now tracing the relations of different languages, not only in the meaning of particular words, but also in their grammatical structure, and then reaching facts of primeval

history that have no other record on earth. Nations as widely separated as the Ganges and the Rhine are thus found to have a common origin; and grammatical peculiarities that have puzzled the English, Latin, and Greek scholar, are found to be explained by that old and sacred tongue in which the Hindu religion and philosophy have been sealed up for so many centuries. Thus, like the sea-shell that murmurs to the ear of the chiming waves of the far-off ocean home of its earliest life, our western languages are found telling the story of their origin in that ancient homestead of the race, the beautiful valleys of Central Asia.

There are also rich ethical treasures found in words, containing as they do the profoundest moral judgments of the race, the more forcible because undesigned. How emphatic the testimony to the tendency of all passions to make their possessor wretched, that is found in the word *passion*, which originally meant suffering,—a meaning which we still retain in speaking of “the passion of our Lord;” also, in the word *anger*, which has the same root with *anguish*; also, in calling a covetous man a *miser*, that is, a miserable man; and a *penurious* or *parsimonious* man, a man of *penury* or *scarceness*, (*parcitas*,) though he may possess great wealth. By many such words men have thus recorded their own condemnation.

Rich gems of poetry are also embedded in language, especially in the more impassioned languages of the East. How full of poetry is our word *fall*, that echoes with the rustling of the falling leaf, compared with *autumn*, which tells only of the *auctum*, the adding or increase then given to the fruits of the earth! How beautiful is the German *morgen-land*, (morning-land,) applied to the east; *fader-land*, (father-land,) to one’s native country; and our *mother tongue*, as applied to the language that we learn from the lips of a mother. How full of poetry, also, is our word *cemetery*, literally sleeping-place, applied to the last resting-place of the dead; a Christian thought rises still higher in its range of poetic imagery in the beautiful Saxon name, *God’s acre*, by which was designated the hallowed spot where the dust of dear ones was laid in hope.

There is also music in words. Indeed, much of the melody of poetry is in the music that is contained in the words.

But all these and other topics must be omitted. Our object has been mainly to induce those whose attention has never been directed to these studies, to turn it thitherward, and to show how richly our noble English tongue has come down to us laden with the treasures of an undated past, and what glorious promise is thus given of its future. Indeed, the very

composite character that has been often urged as one of its defects, is one of the very attributes that seem to mark it as yet destined to be the universal language of the earth. It descends to us like some magnificent army of occupation, gleaming with the armour and banners of every race that has been mightiest on earth. Central in its solid columns do we see the stalwart forms of the Angle, and the Saxon, and the Jute, whose brawny muscles have gathered thew in the dark forests of the North. Glittering on one of its wings we see the nodding plumes and prancing steeds of the Norman Frank, as he links his fiery chivalry with the serried squadrons of the Anglo-Saxon; on the other we descry the stately maniples of Rome, the compact phalanxes of Greece, the stern and solemn tribes of the Hebrew, and the gorgeous array of the Orientals. All these mighty and magnificent elements we see moving in steady, calm, and unbroken march along the plains of Europe, the continent of America, and the colonial occupations of Asia, Africa, and Australia, carrying, as we believe, by a more resistless might than that of armies and navies, Anglo-Saxon literature, Anglo-Saxon science, Anglo-Saxon civilization, and Anglo-Saxon religion, to the destined conquest of the world.

Since writing these pages, we have seen another of Mr Trench's admirable books, in which some of our previous remarks have been anticipated; but as our obligations to him have already been so great, we have not thought it needful to make any change in what is written, even at the risk of making those obligations seem greater than they really are.

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- ART. VI.—1. *The Life of Jesus Critically Examined.* By Dr FRIEDRICH STRAUSS. Translated from the 4th German edition. By MARIAN EVANS. New York: Calvin Blanchard. 1855.
2. *The Essence of Christianity.* By LUDWIG FEUERBACH. Translated from the 2d German edition. By MARIAN EVANS. New York: C. Blanchard. 1855.
3. *Cours de Philosophie Positive (Systeme de Philosophie Positive.)* Par AUGUSTE COMTE. 6 vols. Paris. 1842.
4. *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte.* Freely translated and condensed. By HARRIET MARTINEAU. 2 vols. New York and London. 1853.

5. *Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences.* Being an Exposition of the Principles of the Cours de Philosophie Positive of AUGUSTE COMTE. By G. H. LEWES. Bohn's Library. London. 1853.
6. *Système de Politique Positive ; ou, Traité de Sociologie. Instituant la Religion de l'Humanité.* Par AUGUSTE COMTE. 3 vols. Paris. 1851, 1853.

DOUBT is not necessarily infidelity. In its essence it is negative and temporary. It may be only the cloud upon the pure azure of the soul. It is compatible, under peculiar circumstances, with a certain amount of faith. "Lord, I believe," said one of old, with a singular self-knowledge, "help thou mine unbelief." Doubt, indeed, is nearly always the transitional discipline through which vigorous, independent minds pass to a stable faith. "He that never doubted," says Cowper, "never believed." Never, indeed, in this life of half knowledge and imperfection, where we "see through a glass darkly," does doubt leave certain minds. It is the dark shadow which accompanies them all the way to glory. It leaves them only when, in the effulgence of heaven, they see "face to face." It is true that doubt may be the beginning of infidelity. If not thoroughly understood and resisted, it will necessarily increase. Above all, cherished, it will deepen and deepen into the night of infidelity. Faith is positive, and must be dominant in the soul, in order to live. Doubt may attend it as its shadow, but doubt must never take the place of faith. Else, the shadow becomes the substance ; the cloud is condensed into the poison of death, in which faith instantly expires.

It will thus be seen that we regard infidelity as possessing a positive character. Infinitely diversified in form, it is one in essence ; and for this simple reason, that it is a negation of all that is distinctive in Christianity, and by implication, as we shall presently show, of all that is distinctive in religion. It is under the control of a specific law, and must thence, in the long run, find a specific issue. Like attracts like the world over. All things, in fact, have their affinities. They thus attract or repel each other. This truth holds in the domain of mind. Thought and feeling are under law, and find their natural issues. Every soul, like Judas, "goes to its own place," finds its own sphere, tends to its own doom. A good soul ascends ; a bad one descends. "That which is born of the flesh is flesh, that which is born of the Spirit is spirit." "The natural (*animal or unspiritual*, or as we understand it, *unregenerate*) mind is enmity to God, and is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be." Hence, Christianity, embodying in its most perfect form the idea of God, of righteousness, and immortality, attracts

all hearts that truly love God. It is a provision of mercy for the guilty, it proffers aid and transformation to the weak, and thus unites them to God, in loving and eternal bonds. It is pre-eminently a system of reconciliation and reunion, the grand object of which is to bring all souls to "glorify God and enjoy him for ever." It is, therefore, of the nature both of an attractive and repellent force. It is life to some, it is death to others; and must be such, by a resistless law.

In order to accomplish its beneficent design, Christianity comes to us as a fact or reality, outward and historical; and not only as a fact, but as a power interior and divine, and demands to be received as an infallible religion. The fact and the power are inseparable. They stand to each other in the relation of body and soul. To deny the one is to deny the other. To receive the one is to receive the other. Thus, Christianity can admit no change, accept no compromise. Fitly designated "the truth as it is in Jesus," it is its own reason and law, its own philosophy and life. It is a divine, indestructible unit, and thus powerfully attracts or powerfully repels all who come within the sphere of its influence. In a word, Christianity must be all in all, or nothing.

Infidelity, therefore, in rejecting either the essence or the fact of Christianity, rejects it wholly. If pretending, Judas-like, to embrace it, it betrays it with a kiss. It compliments it only to crucify it.

In this relation, then, the heart of man, like all else, is under the dominion of fixed law. It either loves or hates, either receives or rejects Christianity. Moreover, in rejecting Christianity, it finds itself compelled on logical grounds, or if not on logical, certainly on moral grounds, to reject the very idea of religion, except as the merest abstraction, or the veriest form. Its constant tendency must be to atheism, to the denial of a personal God and a conscious immortality. But as the word atheism is excessively unpopular, this will not be admitted by all infidels. Others, truer and bolder, will freely admit it, nay glory in it. The majority, however, will deny or disguise the fact in some form or other. They will call it pantheism, perhaps spiritualism, with the Hegelian Straussites; naturalism or humanism, with the followers of Feuerbach; and positivism, with those of Comte and Martineau. They will even claim to have a Deity, a faith, and a worship: but their God will be *the Nothing* of Oken, or *the Humanity* of the positivists; their faith, a faith in themselves; their worship, the worship of nature and man!

Or, assuming a higher strain, and claiming to be especially "scientific" and transcendental, as in the case of Hegel and Strauss, their God will be the Universe, in its spiritual and

abstract totality (in which all things are God, and God all things); yet coming practically to the same conclusion as Feuerbach and Comte, by making God one with humanity, and thus identifying the finite with the Infinite. The latter, they say, God, or the Infinite, manifests itself or comes to consciousness in man,—so that man is transformed into an object of worship; not indeed man the individual, for as an individual or person he is nothing, but man the whole, or humanity as immutable and eternal. The whole results in self-assertion, self-adoration or man-worship, involving the full denial of a “living” God and a real immortality. This is the essence and end of infidelity. It annihilates personal religion,—that is, an intelligent, conscious union with God, as the Father of our spirits and the God of our salvation; in which the true essence of Christianity and of all religion worthy of the name consists.

Infidelity, then, being the antagonism of personal piety, is governed by a fatal law, and for ever tends to the abyss of personal annihilation and despair. Its essence and end are the same, whether it appear in the gorgeous pantheism of Strauss, Carlyle, and Emerson, the arid positivism of Comte, or the blasphemous humanism of Feuerbach and Heine.

Like much else in this world which has a long life and a varied career, it is only of late that infidelity has become in any degree conscious of its real tendency and power. And yet it is much more subtle and fallacious than ever; for instead of attacking Christianity rudely and maliciously, as in the days of old, it claims to comprehend it in a higher synthesis. It pretends great regard to the soul of religion, while covering the body all over with fatal stabs. Doubtless it occasionally deceives itself, or rather it deceives some vigorous, but reckless thinkers, like Carlyle, as to the true object of its attack. Earnest, terribly earnest, in such cases, it goes forth professedly to contend against shams, but confounding facts with figments, dashes furiously against the whole. Blind with rage, like Polyphemus, (*cui lumen ademptum*,) it strikes right and left, at friend and foe. We are, indeed, strongly inclined to adopt the sentiment of Burke: “Where there is no sound reason, there is no real virtue.” Still, in some cases at least, we wish to distinguish between infidelity and persons. Some who have unwittingly fallen under its influence, may possess noble and generous traits. They may be ignorant of themselves, and for a time unconscious of the terrible influence under which they act. For, infidelity is a possession, a demon, so to speak, which hurries even naturally noble souls to perdition. Well might we say in reference to such, “Father forgive them, for they know not what they do.” But some of those who attack Christianity know well what they are about;

as well, indeed, as Judas did when he betrayed his Master. They comprehend Christianity in a higher synthesis, they say; that is, they stifle her in their serpent embrace. Feuerbach, who scouts the very idea of a God or a religion higher than man or humanity, as he calls it, announces his system to the world as *The Essence of Christianity!* In good truth, it is the very essence of atheism. So also, Comte, not a bad man personally, so far as we know, but certainly the very incarnation of cool, calculating infidelity; or, if the expression be more agreeable, of deliberate godless science, in his *Politique Positive* presents his religious [irreligious?] system and worship under Christian forms! He borrows, indeed, rather from the system of the Roman Catholic hierarchy than from Christianity, but he knows no difference between the two; and thus, while denying the very notion of supreme cause, of God, of the soul, and of immortality, actually purposes an *Etre Supreme*, and a regular worship of forms and festivals, as necessary to the welfare of society. His Supreme Being, however, is precisely that of Feuerbach, namely, Humanity; and his worship the worship of man! God, indeed, is not in all his thoughts, nor in all his system. His man, too, has no soul, no immortality, no heaven. All that is distinctive in Christianity, all that is distinctive even in religion, is abjured.

This is the essence and end of infidelity in the present day; and this will be its end in all future time. A few German or French dreamers, with their bewildered admirers in this country, may hold on to an imaginary Christianity in cloud-land; but the people who follow them, and who drive all things at once to their practical issues, will be atheists and revolutionists. Hence, in its moral and political effect, infidelity is uniformly demoralizing and disorganizing. It breaks up society and rushes to ruin.

The works named at the head of this article are becoming naturalised in this country. They will undoubtedly produce some effect among us as a people. What that will be, can be readily foreseen. Those who receive their teachings will abandon Christ and the church. They will hold on, perhaps, to some nominal religion, but it will be a religion without prayer, without love, without regenerating power. Instead of worshipping God, they will worship themselves. Selfishness will become their law, atheism and demoralization their end. The thing may not appear in this light at first. Possibly it will be held in check by certain counteracting influences. But in the end, moral and spiritual, ay, and social death will be the result. Were the country as a whole to come under their influence, entire social and political destruction would inevitably follow.

It is not at all probable, however, that they will meet with any general acceptance. The people yet revere religion; many truly love God and his church. Infidels, happily, have little social or political influence. Divided among themselves, they exert no organized force. Their notions are ever changing and passing away. Strauss and Feuerbach are becoming obsolete even in Germany. Comte has a very narrow circle of followers even in France. The poor old gentleman has to make constant appeals to them for a support. A sort of literary Ishmaelite, his hand is against every man, and nearly every man's hand is against him. His intimate acquaintance with mathematical science, and the originality of some of his suggestions, can easily be separated from his infidelity, and will soon pass into the treasures of general science. Except this, in a few years he will be remembered only for the strange eccentricity of his genius. One of his admirers, Mr Lewes, prematurely called him the Bacon of the nineteenth century; but we have no apprehension that the century will admit the preposterous claim. In this country we intermeddle with all knowledge, and occasionally defend even an absurd or dangerous dogma. But under a certain practical instinct, most of us get tired of it, and return to religion and common sense.

Still, infidelity, in these or some other forms, will exist among us to some extent, as it does in all other countries. It is the opposite of religion, and so long as men are depraved, they will reject God and his Word. Infidelity is only another name for vice.

Is this a hard or bigoted judgment? Is it not rather a calm, philosophical induction? Of course, we willingly except from this category certain speculative minds, who, transcending the bounds of their reason, are bewildered for a time in the mazes of doubt, even while they love the truth, and live indirectly under its influence. We except those also who really cling to the substance of Christianity, while rejecting some of its aspects or phases. God knows his own, undoubtedly; though some of them, like stars, far from their centre and hidden in the deep shadows of space, may be shining only in the eye of Omnipotence, and very slowly revolving around the Sun of Righteousness. For such we have all charity. But for an infidel, a thorough-going infidel, who rejects Christianity, and does all in his power to draw others after him into the abyss, we have no charity. We pity him as a man, but we abhor and denounce him as an infidel.

No, it is not bigotry; it is not uncharitableness or exclusiveness. It is the calm and sober dictate of reason; for reason can never unite contraries. It detects the law of attraction and repulsion in all spheres. It must insist upon principle

and coherence. It must stand by the ideas of cause, of right, of God, of religion, and immortality; and as Christianity is the most perfect embodiment of these truths, as well as the divinely appointed medium of their realization among men, reason must defend Christianity as divine and beneficent, while rejecting infidelity as atheistic and dangerous.

But these general statements will receive a clearer illustration if we give some further account of the elementary systems of infidelity prevailing at the present time, as illustrated in the writings of Strauss, Feuerbach and Comte. Fundamentally there are only two essential forms of infidelity. All, at least, may be reduced to these: first, *pantheism* as illustrated in Strauss; and secondly, *naturalism*, sometimes called *materialism*, more recently *positivism*, as illustrated in Feuerbach and Comte. We are aware that theism may be held for a time without faith in Christianity. But this kind of theism, involving the idea of a personal God, as well as the conscious immortality of the soul, is borrowed from revelation, and in Christian lands is held illogically and inconsistently without it. The tendencies of all modern thought, not controlled by Christianity, is to pantheism or atheism. Into these fall all really vigorous and logical thinkers who abjure the cross. The strong philosophical minds of France, Germany, and Italy, who are not Christians, range themselves with Hegel or Comte. The Carlyles and Emersons of England and this country are pantheists. The Mills and Martineaus are positivists. Theodore Parker, who yet retains something of the puritan preacher, rejects Christianity as a supernatural system, but holds to the idea of a personal God, but not in the sense that Christians generally do; while all his proclivities are with the pantheists and so-called spiritualists. Indeed, he is but the American Strauss. Moreover he is a natural preacher; oratory is his forte. He loves to utter himself, and thus he keeps the pulpit while ignoring Christ. He prays also, because preachers in this country, to keep up even the semblance of propriety, or give any Christian air to their preaching, must pray. But prayer recognises the supernatural, prayer acknowledges a personal God. Prayer is especially Christian. Infidels generally give it up as absurd. And it is absurd in all who reject divine revelation. How Mr Parker, with any comfort to his own mind, holds to the puritanic usage, is a problem. In other things he is bold and reformatory enough. Emerson, when a Unitarian preacher in Boston, frankly gave it up, after giving up the celebration of the Lord's supper; and this, of course, brought his ministry to a speedy close. No preacher who abandons prayer will be heard in New England; and possibly Mr

Parker loves preaching so well that he cannot yet bring himself to abandon "the form of prayer." The temptation indeed is great; for Mr Parker has fine oratorical powers. He expatiates in the pulpit with rare force and affluence. But his prayer strikes us as a sort of odd supplementary farce. Still, it may be only the force of habit. It is difficult to abandon every thing pertaining to the faith of our childhood; and we would fain hope that Mr Parker, after all, is not himself personally conscious of the solemn absurdity. We maintain, however, both from his books and the general spirit of his preaching, that his sympathies are in the direction of pantheism. He sees in lofty mountains, green forests, and flashing waters, more of the divine, than in all the miracles of the Son of God.

Mr Parker, too, is perpetually changing in the form and pressure of his views. He glories in freedom of thought, and who knows but to-morrow he may announce to his people that he has ceased to pray, and that he no longer believes in a personal God, or a conscious immortality? Emerson did so, and why not he, why not any one of our New England Straussian transcendentalists, who have grown wiser than the prophets, and transcended all the teachings of the Son of God?

Certain it is that Strauss, Feuerbach, and Comte, are leaders in the [infidel] movement of the present day. They are the demigods whom all classes of sceptics combine to revere. Their works are more influential in this direction than all others put together. Combined, they assist to form the dark stream of infidelity which rolls turbidly to the abyss.

We confine our examination, therefore, to them, and proceed to indicate as briefly as possible their characteristic features.

Strauss has been considered chiefly critical; and, indeed, the greater part of his thousand-paged volume, with its vast German prolixity, is occupied with the criticism of the gospels. But the question was settled in the mind of Strauss on speculative grounds long before he undertook this criticism. Indeed, this was an after thought, a mere supplementary affair, brought in to aid weak souls in rejecting the gospels, and rising to that higher elevation which he had reached by a shorter path. Strauss is a philosopher of the extreme Hegelian school, without any prepossession in favour of historical Christianity, nay, with a sentiment of profoundest contempt. It is impossible he should treat it with reverence and tenderness; he must necessarily find it worthless. Hence he is as cool and merciless as a fiend in his destructive criticism. He believes nothing, spares nothing. All here, in his philosophic view, is contradiction and absurdity, and must be so, for the question is pre-

judged. Miracles are impossible; their very presence in the narrative is a proof of falsehood.

But why are miracles impossible in Strauss's view? Is there not a God to perform them, if he so wills it? On the philosophical theory of our critic there is no such God. Strauss is a pantheist. His God is an abstraction, according to Hegel, till he comes to consciousness in man. Miracles, therefore, are impossible; and Christianity, with some basis of natural truth or fact, is a myth or series of myths, of which miracles are the conclusive evidence. Thus, what to most men is a proof of its divine origin, is to Strauss a proof of its human origin. Hence, in the preface to the first edition of his work, he frankly states his ground as one of entire liberation from evangelical prepossessions, which he claims as a special qualification for the criticism of the gospels, on the basis of the mythical theory. "The majority," he says, "of the most learned and acute theologians of the present day fail in the main requirement for such a work, a requirement without which no amount of learning will suffice to achieve any thing in the domain of criticism, namely, *the integral liberation of the feelings and intellect from certain religious and dogmatical pre-suppositions: and this the author early attained by means of philosophical studies.*"

Thus, then, one of his great criteria for discovering the unhistorical or mythical character of the gospels, is the simple fact that they contain accounts of miracles, which he claims are impossible. "That an account," says he, "is not historical, that the matter related could not have taken place in the manner described, is evident, first, when the narration is irreconcilable with the known and universal laws which govern the course of events. Now, according to these laws, agreeing with all just philosophical conceptions and all credible experience, *the Absolute Cause never disturbs** the chain of secondary causes, by single arbitrary acts of interposition, but rather manifests himself in the aggregate of finite causalities, and of their reciprocal action. When, therefore, we meet with an account of certain phenomena or events of which it is either expressly stated or implied *that they were produced immediately by God himself*, (divine apparitions, voices from heaven, and the like,) or by human beings possessed of supernatural powers, (*miracles, prophecies,*) *such an account is IN SO FAR to be considered as not historical.*"

On this ground, no religion can authenticate itself as supernatural. Indeed, the supernatural is impossible. God is an absolute cause, not a personal agent; and, therefore, not only all miracles, but all divine revelation, all supernatural

* The italics are ours.

religion, are inconceivable. God and the universe are one. The method of nature, or of God, which is the same thing, is absolute and changeless. Creation, miracle, resurrection, redemption, regeneration, are all impossible and absurd. There is no personal Creator or Redeemer,—no future resurrection,—no conscious immortality,—no true and eternal heaven. Man is a part of the great whole, which ebbs and flows for ever,—is now *Das Nichts* or *Nothing*, then *Everything* or *All*.

And yet, like the rest of his compeers, Strauss claims to believe in the *essence of Christianity*; nay, to reproduce it, after having destroyed the gospel history. While denying the birth, the resurrection, and the ascension of Jesus Christ as *fact*, he has the cool assurance to express his belief in their reality as *essence*. "The author is aware that the essence of the Christian faith is perfectly independent of his criticism. The supernatural birth of Christ, his miracles, his ascension, remain eternal truths, whatever doubts may be cast on their reality as historical facts."

How is this? False as fact, and yet true as essence,—false as miracle, and yet true as dogma; how can this be, even in the mind of Strauss? We reply, By means of the Hegelian pantheism. That is, by an utter denial of all that is distinctive in Christianity,—a denial of the miracles, of the doctrines, of the promises of Christianity, as a supernatural religion; and a resolution of the whole, along with the legends and myths, the superstitions and fancies of heathenism, into the absolute essence, which ebbs and flows, now as nothing, and then as everything. This is the coming together of the finite and the infinite; or rather, this is the infinite, now viewed as absolute, and then as relative,—now as God, and then as man. Remember, there is no personal God,—man is God, and God is man. The procession of the infinite into the finite, and especially into man, is the incarnation of the Christ, is the "supernatural birth" of the divine;—the union of the two, the reconciliation, the atonement, or the *at-onement* of Christianity; when "God becomes conscious as man," and "man becomes conscious as God," and the God-man, or divine humanity, rises up into the sphere of absolute and eternal being. And in this way, that is, by a total negation of a personal, individual soul, and a personal, self-conscious Deity; a total negation of the birth, miracles, resurrection, and ascension of our divine Saviour, does Strauss maintain them as realities! One can scarcely believe his eyes. But these are his words in the very preface to his elaborate refutation of the gospel history: "*The supernatural birth of Christ, his miracles, his resurrection, and ascension, remain eter-*

nal truths, whatever doubts may be cast on their reality as historical facts."

Thus, what Strauss and Feuerbach call the essence of Christianity, is the essence of infidelity. What its end will be, can easily be guessed. Take away the gospel as fact; take away Jehovah, or the personal governor of the universe, as fact; take away the conscious immortality of the soul as fact, and what have we left? The soul is gone, God is gone, heaven is gone! Nothing remains but "the blackness of darkness for ever."

Nor are these inferences of ours. We are in all seriousness, and with as much candour as we can command, reproducing Strauss. He gives his process of reasoning in the remarkable dissertation at the close of his work, the most significant and instructive thing in the whole book; and to this, in his preface, he refers his readers. There they are to find in essence what in the body of his book he has destroyed as fact. Let us look, then, at this dissertation, for it contains, so far as Hegelian pantheism is concerned, the essence of Strauss's faith, which we maintain to be the essence of infidelity.

In the very outset of this dissertation, Strauss shows that he is fully aware of his position. He knows what he has done. Christianity, as history, lies dead at his feet. But, with an assurance which is perfectly astounding, he proposes to resuscitate it; nay, more, to give it a higher and more perfect life. In a word, he attempts the miracle of the resurrection. He can do what in his view is impossible for God himself. And this not for his own benefit; oh no! As a critic and a philosopher, he can do without Christianity; but in pity to his weaker brethren, he will attempt the mighty task of raising the dead. Hear him:—

"The results of the inquiry which we have now brought to a close, have apparently annihilated the greatest and most valuable part of that which the Christian has been wont to believe concerning the Saviour Jesus, have uprooted all the animating motives which he has gathered from his faith, and withered all his consolations. The boundless store of truth and life, which for eighteen centuries has been the aliment of humanity, seems irretrievably dissipated; the most sublime levelled with the dust; God divested of his grace, man of his dignity, and the tie between heaven and earth broken. Piety turns away with horror from so fearful an act of desecration, and, strong in the impregnable self-evidence of its faith, pronounces, that, let an audacious criticism attempt what it will, all which the Scriptures declare and the Church believes of Christ will still subsist as eternal truth, nor needs one iota of it to be renounced. Thus, at the conclusion of the criticism of the history of Jesus, there presents itself this problem: to re-establish dogmatically that which has been destroyed critically.

"At the first glance, this problem appears merely to exist as a challenge addressed by the believer to the critic, not as a result of the moral requirements of either. The believer would appear to need no re-establishment of the faith, since by him it can not be subverted by criticism. The critic seems to require no such re-establishment, since he is able to endure the annihilation resulting from his own labours. Hence it might be supposed that the critic, when he seeks to rescue the dogma from the flames which his criticism has kindled, acts falsely in relation to his own point of view ; since, to satisfy the believer, he treats what is valueless for himself as if he esteemed it to be a genial, while in relation to the believer he is undertaking a superfluous, task, in labouring to defend that which the latter considers in no way endangered."

In reply to this, he goes on to show that after all the believer is no better off than the sceptic, having without knowing it, in his heart, as much real doubt as the other, nay, being by implication a little more exposed. And thus, while the critic might live through his destructive criticism, the believer cannot sustain his own doubts, and so needs the surer faith of "philosophical demonstration." He therefore justifies the attempt to raise the dead, or rather to bring from death a higher and more beautiful life, in the form of absolute and immutable dogma !

He tries first the dogma or theological system of the church, and finds that it will not answer the purpose ; and, indeed, he might well have spared himself this labour, for that of course was destroyed with the gospel. Still, he evidently means to make it the basis of his system, for it involves the divinity and humanity of Christ, the doctrine of the atonement, and the new life in God ; only, it is "outward and empirical," and so historically as well as dogmatically false. He then tries the Christology of rationalism, represented by such men as Eichhorn and Paulus, who, rejecting the supernatural elements in Christianity, propounded in its place a natural, or as they called it, "rational," system of belief ; but this also Strauss rejects as illogical and lifeless, chiefly because it denies the central fact of Christianity, which is the personal influence of Christ as the Redeemer of men.

On this ground Strauss treats Socinian or naturalistic Christianity as pre-eminently unchristian and powerless.

He then advances to what he calls the Eclectic system of Schleiermacher and his followers, who, on philosophical grounds, insist on the spiritual relation of God and man, and their possible union in Christ ; finding by subjective experience that Christ has freed them from sin, and raised them into the life of God, they acknowledge his supreme divinity, even while rejecting more or less of historical Christianity, and especially external miracles.

But Strauss pronounces this illogical or unscientific, as it attempts to combine contradictions, namely, pure science or philosophy, with an actual historical Redeemer, an outward historical faith. He regards it as a noble and beautiful effort of thought, but unsatisfactory as a basis of absolute and permanent conviction.

He passes to the moral system of Kant and De Wette, which, relying upon the conscience, or "the categorical imperative," to use the peculiar language of Kant, elevates mere words or abstractions into the place of realities, and at once ignores the Christ of the church and the Christ of pure philosophy:—

"But not the faith alone;" he says, "science also in its newest developments has found the system unsatisfactory. Science has perceived that to convert ideas simply into an obligatory possibility, to which no reality corresponds, is, in fact, to annihilate them; just as it would be to render the infinite finite, to represent it as that which lies beyond the infinite. Science has conceived that the infinite has its existence in the alternate production and extinction of the finite; that the idea is realised only in the entire series of its manifestations; that nothing can come into existence, which does not already essentially exist; and, therefore, that it is not to be required of man that he should reconcile himself with God, and assimilate his sentiments to the divine, unless this reconciliation and this assimilation are already virtually effected."

Now we are on the threshold of the grand discovery. The infinite has its existence in the alternate production and extinction of the finite; nothing exists which did not really or virtually exist before." Everything, then, is eternal. God is eternally manifesting himself (rather itself) as nothing and something. "God is in man, and man is in God." "The idea" (that is, God) is revealed only by "the entire series of its manifestations." Man is no sinner, needs no forgiveness, no reconciliation. He is virtually reconciled already; he is virtually one with God now. The finite is nothing, the infinite all; for the finite is alternately created and extinguished. The universe is an eternal circle, in perpetual movement; a pendulum, so to speak, in eternal oscillation. Man, therefore, has only to realise his relations to the universe, his relations to God. *He is God, in finite manifestation*; and realising this, he becomes not only really, but consciously one with God. The finite is united with the infinite. Man has become Christ; that, is the God-man. This is the teaching of the Hegelian philosophy. "Schelling," adds Strauss, "laid down the proposition, *the incarnation of God is an incarnation from eternity*." By "the incarnate Son of God," adds Strauss, "Schelling understood the finite itself, in the form of the human con-

sciousness, which, in its contradistinction to the infinite, with which it is nevertheless one, appears as a suffering God subjected to the conditions of time."

He then proceeds to show, in harmony with the further development of "science," under Hegel and others, how God and man are one, in the sense thus hinted. He criticises Rosenkranz and Marheineké, Hegelian theologians, for attaching too much importance to the "personality of Christ," as a *historical* character, and falls back upon "the idea," as he calls it; to which, in his view, corresponds "the reality," namely, the real "unity" of God and man; man being God as a matter of actual fact: so that the great aim of all theology and of all philosophy must be to make men recognise this fact. It is not in the *historical Christ*, then, we are to find the truth, but in the *ideal Christ*, or *Humanity* as a whole.

In proof of this, we quote his own words, near the close of his dissertation:—

"This is the key to the whole of Christology, that as a subject of the predicate which the church assigns to Christ, *we place instead of an individual an idea*; but an idea which has an existence in reality, not in the mind only, like that of Kant. In an individual, a God-man, the properties and functions which the church ascribes to Christ contradict themselves; *in the idea of the race*, they perfectly agree. *Humanity is the union of the two natures, God become man*, the infinite manifesting itself in the finite, and the finite spirit remembering its infinitude; it is the child of the visible Mother and the invisible Father, Nature and Spirit; it is the worker of miracles, in so far as, in the course of human history, it completely subjugates nature, both within and around man, until it lies before him in the inert matter on which he exercises his active power; it is the sinless existence, for the course of its development is a blameless one,—pollution cleaves to the individual only, and does not touch the race or its history. Humanity that dies, rises and ascends to heaven: for from the negation of its phenomenal life, there ever proceeds a higher spiritual life; from the suppression of its mortality as a personal, rational, and terrestrial spirit, arises its union with the infinite spirit of the heavens. By faith in this Christ (humanity), especially in his death and resurrection, man is justified before God; that is, by the kindling within him of the idea of humanity, the individual man participates in the divinely human life of the species."

Thus, then, the individual or personal soul is lost, along with the individual, personal, or historical Christ. All personal religion, all personal hope is gone. Not only the Bible, not only Christianity as a fact or reality, but God himself, as an intelligent, gracious God, for ever gone. Nature and spirit, in their eternal oscillation, alone remain. Man is left to worship himself! Humanity is Christ; Humanity alone is divine! In other words, atheism itself is reached. It may be

called pantheism, but that is *vox et præterea nihil* ! The foundations are destroyed. Our blessed Saviour, our adorable Lord God, the Father of our spirits, the Judge of the quick and the dead, the Redeemer of man, is no more. Nothing is before us but the abyss, absorption in the infinite, the loss of the soul.

Such, then, is the essence and end of Straussian theology, say rather, Straussian infidelity.

No wonder that its author was haunted with the idea of hypocrisy in preaching "such stuff" from the pulpits of his native land. And yet such is his hallucination, that he actually devotes a couple of pages at the close of his *Leben Jesu*, to prove that such a minister may retain his place, and, in preaching, descend from the heights of speculation to the popular conceptions, for the sake of *spiritual* edification; "*an expedient which*," he adds, "*is commonly understood and judged too narrowly.*"

It is time, however, to pay our respects to Feuerbach, whose "Essence of Christianity," ingenious and elaborate as it is, will not detain us long. Happily for criticism, his fundamental principle lies in a nut-shell, and is easily grasped. He accepts the conclusions of Strauss and Bauer respecting the evangelical history. He adopts also their fundamental philosophical postulate touching the "supreme divinity of man," but on grounds altogether different. He renounces abstract speculation, and claims to be "a natural philosopher." Still he speculates quite transcendently in his way, and expatiates on the infinite and eternal as much as Strauss, only it is the infinite and eternal of man, who is "all in all." Feuerbach, however, renounces materialism; he even claims to refute it. Indeed, materialism is at a discount with modern infidel philosophers. It is altogether too meager, or as Feuerbach calls it, "crass," for their refined lucubrations. We must, however, do him justice to say that he is *technically* not a materialist, for a man, in his view, is endowed with "intellect, affection, and will." These in fact, are his Trinity; for, according to him they are "perfect," nay, more, "infinite." Hence he claims that they must have "an infinite object." But that object is "humanity," that infinite is the perfection of man. Religion is necessary to man, he freely admits, nay, earnestly argues; but it is not *objective*, but *subjective*. Its object, apparently objective, or beyond himself, is actually found to be subjective or within himself. This is Feuerbach's grand discovery. On this basis he constructs his anthropomorphic religion, the worship of humanity, which is to renovate the world. Hence he claims that he has indeed ignored, and yet completed all prior speculations, by proving that "the

secret of religion itself is *atheism*,"—in the sense explained by himself, viz., that religion itself, not indeed on the surface, but fundamentally, not intentionally, or according to its own supposition, "*believes in nothing else than the truth and divinity of human nature.*" On this ground he regards Christianity as the last effort of the human mind, "projecting" itself into the realms of the infinite, (that is, of humanity,) and takes it under his special patronage. Indeed, the doctrines of the church supply the frame-work of his system, as illustrated and applied. Thus he endeavours to prove that the Trinity, the Word of God, Christ, the incarnation, &c., are "not foreign but native mysteries, the mysteries of human nature." Thus he asserts, that so far from denying religion as a phantasm, or a nullity, he maintains it as a reality, the most immediate and practical, as well as the most sublime and beneficent. "Religion," he says, "is the dream of the human mind. But even in dreams we do not find ourselves in emptiness or in heaven, *but on earth*, in the realm of reality; we only see real things in the entrancing splendour of imagination and fantasy, instead of in the simple daylight of reality and necessity. Hence I do nothing more to religion, and to speculative philosophy and theology also, than to open its eyes, or rather, to turn its gaze from the internal towards the external; *i.e.*, I change the object as it is in the imagination into the object as it is in reality." That is, he turns it away from God to man!

Thus man "creates" himself; nay more, creates nature, in all its glory. He is "God incarnate,"—he justifies himself, he forgives his own sins. Sinless indeed in essence, he "takes upon him the imperfections and miseries of sensuous beings." This seems so monstrous, and even blasphemous, that we must verify our statement by the following quotation, which forms the closing paragraph of his third chapter:—

"Mercy is the *justice of sensuous beings.*" [He means the justice of human beings, not of God, who, in his view, is an abstraction.] "Hence God does not forgive the sins of men as the abstract God of the understanding, but as man, as the God made flesh, the visible God. God as man sins not, it is true; but he knows, he takes on himself, the sufferings, the wants, the needs of sensuous beings. The blood of Christ cleanses us from our sins in the eyes of God. It is only his *human blood* that makes God" (*i.e.*, man) "merciful, allays his anger; that is, *our sins are forgiven us, because we are no abstract beings, but creatures of flesh and blood.*"

On the same ground, prayer is "self-application:" faith is "trust in self," or certainty of success; miracle, a lofty human or "supra-naturalistic wish realised;" heaven, "the existence adequate to my wishes, my longing;" immortality is "God,"

or "the perfection of man." "Thus," adds Feuerbach, at the close of the first part of his treatise, "we have reduced the super-mundane, supernatural, and super-human nature of God, to the elements of human nature as its fundamental elements. Our process of analysis has brought us again to the position with which we set out: *The beginning, middle, and end of Religion, is Man.*"

What then, upon this theory, is the chief end of man? To eat, drink, and die,—one would say. Religion is reduced to the idolatry of self, the sacraments of which are fitly described by Feuerbach himself, as *bathing, eating, and drinking!* "I in fact," says he boldly, "put in the place of the barren baptismal water, the effect of real water." "If the whole of religion is contained in the sacraments, &c., then I grant that the entire purport and positive result of my work are, *bathing, eating, and drinking.*" Of course the implication is, that it is something quite beyond this; but in his "concluding application" he returns to "the mystery of the sacraments," as if attaching great importance to his exposition; and among other things, says,—"*The sacrament of baptism inspires us with thankfulness towards nature; the sacraments of bread and wine with thankfulness towards man. Bread and wine typify to us the truth, that Man is the true God and Saviour of Man.*" "Therefore let bread be sacred for us, let wine be sacred, and also let water be sacred! Amen!"

But enough of this "madness;" for though it has method in it, it is the very delirium of infidelity. Said we not well, however, that the essence of infidelity is enmity to God, and its end atheism and despair?

Vastly superior, as a thinker, both to Strauss and Feuerbach, and claiming some degree of respect on account of his vast attainments in science, and his valuable suggestions on the subject of method, Comte, in the matter of religion, must be placed in the same category with the boldest enemies of true religion. But he, too, rejects the idealism of the metaphysicians on the one hand, and the materialism of the atheists on the other. He is even offended with the charge of atheism frequently brought against himself. He pours contempt on the theories of all his predecessors. And this he does with a certain theoretical consistency; for his fundamental position is, that *causes* are not proper subjects of scientific investigation. Laws alone,—that is, the conditions or circumstances under which phenomena occur, and the relations in which they stand to each other in the sphere of space and time,—come within the range of philosophical inquiry. To say, then, with the materialists, that there is nothing but matter, or that all things are mechanically produced, is to assume too much;

is, in fact, to go in search of causes. On the same ground, or nearly so, he speaks contemptuously of the vulgar herd of atheists who reject the very idea of religion, and propose all sorts of imaginary *causes* to account for the origin and movement of things. Comte, however ingenious in thus distinguishing himself from the grosser "atheistic crew," after all refines a little too much, and must in the common-sense view of the matter be set down in this "bad company." For, he sees within or without no evidence of a Supreme Intelligence. He denies, in fact, the very existence of spirit, whether human, angelic, or divine. At least, he claims that neither nature nor the mind of man furnishes any proof whatever of the existence of such a Being. To him, man, like nature, is a congeries of forces, of whose origin or cause we know and can know nothing. Of his nature, essence, or destiny, beyond the sphere of space or time, we are profoundly ignorant. The laws which govern him, or rather, the conditions and circumstances under which the various facts or phenomena occur comprehended in the idea of man, may be ascertained, but nothing more. So of the universe or nature around us; all we know, or ever can know, are the methods of its working, or the various circumstances under which its changes occur in space and time.

The essence then of positivism, as Comte calls his philosophy, consists in this, that science can not go beyond the limits of space and time. It is thus essentially finite, knows nothing either of first or of final causes, nothing of God as a spirit, or of man as a spirit.

Within the domain of space and time, the proper sphere of natural or physical science, Comte therefore may be admirable in his way. Here his method, unquestionably, has certain advantages. In this field it may make beautiful discoveries, discoveries which may ameliorate the condition of man. In this respect, also, it is superior to the crude atheism of by-gone days. Kept within the limits of nature, as bounded by space and time, it may even be defended as a legitimate method of investigation, in the matter of purely physical science.

But Comte extends it infinitely beyond this. He applies it not only to nature but to man, not simply in his physical or animal, but in his moral and spiritual relations. In fine, he denies that we can know man as a spirit, as he denies that we can know God as a spirit. He thus ignores all the facts of consciousness. And denying these, of course he excludes all ideas of cause, of creation and miracle, of God and immortality.

In this respect, however, he is more consistent than Feuerbach, who admits the facts of consciousness, and contends for

the spirituality of man. Comte sees nothing but by the senses, knows nothing but by outward observation. It is true, that in his "Politique Positive" he admits the instinctive affections; but this was an after-thought, as in fact he himself intimates. Falling in love with Madame Clotilde de Vaux, his "mediating angel," (*ange mediatrice*), he awoke to the great fact of affection; but in his "Philosophie Positive" there is no place for it, there can be no place for it. *Consciousness*, or spiritual introspection, he not only abjures, but ridicules as absurd. We might verify this by several quotations, but the fact is so well known that it is unnecessary. Moreover, we must be brief. And happily, as in the case of Feuerbach's system, the ground-principle of positivism lies on the surface, and can be indicated in a very few words. We have taken great pains to inform ourselves of the views of M. Comte, both from translations and expositions of his works, and from such of the originals as we could procure. Some of his minor works we have not seen, but his "Philosophie Positive," in six volumes, and his "Politique Positive," in three (to be completed by one or two more volumes), we have examined; and though they cover an immense field, and abound in nice distinctions and ingenious illustrations, we can unhesitatingly affirm that their grand peculiarity consists in denying the fact or principle of causation, in rejecting the testimony of consciousness, and by implication, the idea of a supreme controlling Intelligence of the universe. In the whole domain of astronomy, for example, as he boldly and blasphemously affirms, he sees "not the glory of God," but "the glory of man." Nay, he goes further even than this, and with an insane self-confidence, declares that the elements of the solar system are not disposed in the best manner, and that science (Comte himself) can easily conceive a happier arrangement. But we will quote his own words from the "Philosophie Positive:"—

"To those who are strangers to the study of the heavenly bodies, though frequently masters of the other parts of natural philosophy, astronomy has still the reputation of being an eminently religious science, as if the famous verse, '*The heavens declare the glory of God,*' still preserved all its value. To minds early familiarised with true philosophical astronomy, *the heavens declare no other glory than that of Hipparchus, of Kepler, of Newton, and of all those who have aided in establishing their laws.* It is, however, certain, as I have shown, that all real science is in radical and necessary opposition to all theology; and this characteristic is more decided in astronomy than anywhere else, just because astronomy is, so to speak, more a science than any other, according to the comparison made above. . . . Besides, the accurate exploration of our solar system could not but dispel that blind and unlimited wonder which the general order of nature inspired, by showing, in the most sensible manner, and in various respects, that *the*

elements of this system are certainly not disposed in the most advantageous manner, and that science permits us easily to conceive a happier arrangement."

Science, Comte maintains, has three stages; first, *the theological*; secondly, *the metaphysical*; and lastly, *the positive*. In the theological, all phenomena are referred to the gods or God; in the metaphysical, to certain spiritual entities; in the positive, those causes, and indeed all real causes, are ignored, and facts alone, with their laws, or the conditions of their occurrence, are recognised. This is the last and most perfect state of scientific inquiry, in which the positive philosophy, by an absolute "prevision" of nature, can detect her secrets and foretell her changes. The system, therefore, is purely natural. It comes to the same result as the more vulgar materialism. It is atheism in its scientific development. But this allegation M. Comte dislikes. With him "theology is atheism!" He gives it this name over and over again. The idea of the "soul" as an immaterial, immortal essence, and of God as the supreme Creator and Preserver of all, is peculiarly abhorrent. He has made up his mind that "will" must necessarily be capricious, and thence inconsistent with the idea of uniform method or law, which science can alone recognise; and whether, therefore, will, as a creative and controlling cause, is claimed for man or for God, it must be rejected. Thus, then, according to Comte, we have no soul, no Creator, no Father in heaven, no Redeemer on earth, no immortality, no heaven beyond this world and time.

But positivism must take cognizance of facts. Evidently man is a religious being. He is governed, after all, by his convictions. Worship is natural. He can be bound only by reverence. Society must organize itself around central, all-controlling ideas. It must live and act under the dominion of thought and affection. All this Comte finally admits. His "Politique Positive," indeed, contains an exposition of these things. Man, then, must have a system of belief, of discipline, and worship. He must have a God, an order of sacraments and duties; a worship of supreme benignant powers. M. Comte meets the exigency. Man is his own God; not man the individual, but humanity, the life of the whole, or the whole of humanity, as a continuous and eternal life,—"*Toute l'ensemble de l'humanité.*" This is Comte's *Etre Suprême*. Like the God of the Bible, this human Deity of course must possess unity, omnipresence, omniscience, omnipotence, eternity, &c. These attributes M. Comte insists belong to humanity. This God, then, must be inaugurated in the new and perfect condition of society, in which true order, with liberty, equality, and paternity, is to be realised. No matter if this

life of humanity, or the idea of God as constituting this collective life, be an abstraction. M. Comte is fully prepared for such an alternative; for, in the conclusion of his "Philosophie Positive," he says boldly, "Man, so termed, is in reality nothing but a pure abstraction; there is nothing real but humanity, especially in the world of intellect and morals."

The worship of such a "nouvel Etre Supreme" is made to consist in a sort of sentimental fervour, inspired by the genius of humanity, and arising especially in the contemplation or adoration of its respective *saints*, the priests of humanity, the great men, like Pythagoras, Plato, Socrates, Jesus, Newton, Charlemagne, and others. Whether M. Comte is to be supreme high priest, we are not informed. He would certainly to his stultified followers be an admirable object of religious veneration. Woman, headed by Madame Clotilde de Vaux, his *ange meconnue*, his pure *compagnon immortelle*, is to be the mediator, to whom, as to "Mary, the mother of God," the knee of man may reverently bow. Like the papal system, after which it is modelled, M. Comte's "Religion of Humanity" must have not only its priests, forms, and festivals, but its social sacraments, nine of which he proposes to institute, viz., *presentation, initiation, admission, destination, marriage, maturity, retirement, transformation, and incorporation*. These correspond to the infant baptism, confirmation, holy orders, marriage, &c., of the Catholic Church. Canonization is also provided for. Those who have served humanity take their place, after death, not indeed in the heaven of the Christian, for there is no such place, but in the ideal galaxy of *glorified humanity*!

But enough of this. We have proved our point. We have, in all the forms of unbelief, transcendental, critical, humanitarian, or positive, which have come under our observation, shown that the essence and end of infidelity, are *atheism* and *extinction*. The motto of all is, NO GOD, NO SAVIOUR, NO HEAVEN.

ART. VII.—*The Roman Catholic Press.*

THAT the power of Romanism has grown since the beginning of the present century is an indubitable fact. The history of the Papacy has for centuries been an alternation of periods of advance and retreat; we are now in the midst of one of its forward movements, to be followed, as usual, by a still greater step backward. Amid all vicissitudes, however, the aims o

Rome remain the same; and, under whatsoever guise presented, they are always inconsistent, fundamentally, with general liberty, whether religious or political.

The Roman Church has achieved her conquests, in every age, by using means adapted to the time; nay, even by turning the weapons of her enemies against themselves. So, at the present time, in countries where the press is the great power, both moral and political, Rome finds herself compelled, in spite of the essential antagonism between her system and the spread of general knowledge, in spite of her own repeated anathemas against books, newspapers, and printing in general, for the *people*, to make use of that very press to further her own ends. She handles the uncongenial weapon awkwardly enough, it is true; but that she handles it at all is one of the most pregnant characteristics of the age. It is our intention in this paper to give a brief survey of the principal periodical journals now published in this country in the interest of Rome. But before we proceed to details, a few remarks upon the *status* of journalists in the Roman Catholic Church itself will not be out of place.

The first point to be noticed is, that journalism has no proper place in the organization of the Papal Church; it is an excrescence upon the system, not its natural outgrowth. By the continuous efforts of the popes throughout the middle ages, and by the final adjustment of the Roman system made at the Council of Trent, all ecclesiastical power was secured to the priests, more especially to the bishops, and pre-eminently to the pope. According to the Tridentine theory, Christendom owes allegiance to an infallible episcopate, whose head is the bishop of Rome. None but the clergy were to be allowed to rule, to instruct, to educate the people. Journalism was at that time unknown, or doubtless its functions would have been recognised in some way. As the case stands, the luckless Roman Catholic editor, if a layman, is *nowhere* in the ranks of church functionaries, and can be *nothing* but the tool of his bishop or his pope. The papal journalists of the present age, —an age of reaction and obedience,—acknowledge this position, and profess to be satisfied with it, proclaiming openly that they speak only as they are authorised to speak by the bishop or the pope.

These statements will suffice to clear up a few strange phenomena. In wholly papal countries (*e.g.*, Italy, Spain, Portugal) religious journals are almost unknown. They begin to appear only in periods of revolution, or of general enlightenment, when the church has to struggle against enemies who know how to conduct journals. Even where the necessities of the times call forth such journals, their indiscriminate circulation is not en-

couraged by the priests; the more pious and exemplary ecclesiastics prefer that their flocks should read no papers at all, not even the ablest Catholic ones. In Roman Catholic countries you may often hear those priests who are most noted for their devotion to the papal see dilating upon the perilous tendencies of journalism. They fear (and with reason) that such an irresponsible power, even though employed for the advancement of the hierarchy, may wax too great, and be turned against the church. In convents, where, according to Roman accounts, the church appears in her richest bloom, journals are rarely seen; the monk who reads them constantly is in danger of making his piety or his orthodoxy suspicious.

We can now understand, also, the otherwise inexplicable fact, that hardly an instance is known in which a man, whose whole training and education have been Roman Catholic, has achieved distinction as a journalist. The youthful Romanist whose views are limited entirely by the narrow boundaries of the system in which he has been reared, rarely seeks the editor's chair; or if he does, however able and vigorous his intellect may be, he finds himself utterly incapable of coping with men whose weapons are strange to him. If he emerges from his cave, the new light dazzles him; if he seeks to sustain the cause of Rome by new ideas, or in a new path, he imperils his own position as a Catholic, and must either retreat or fall. Lamennais was the most gifted writer that had sprung from the bosom of Romanism for a century; in his earlier career he was devoted to Rome, and was even styled the "father of the church of the nineteenth century;" nay, his apologetic works procured him the offer of a cardinal's hat. But he continued to write; his genius developed itself freely,—and Rome lost him. We by no means deny that many of the Romanist journals are ably edited; the fact is notoriously otherwise. But wherever you find force, freshness, vigour, in such a journal, you may almost take it for granted that its editor became a Catholic in middle life. His sinews acquired their force in another atmosphere. The following statements sufficiently show this. Perhaps the most powerful papal journal that has yet appeared,—certainly the most scientific,—is the *Historisch-politische Blätter* of Munich. It was established by Professor Phillips, a Lutheran, who held the chair of law in the University of Berlin, and afterwards passed over to Rome. He is now Professor of Law at the University of Vienna. One of the chief contributors to this journal in its palmy days was Yarke, an intimate friend of Phillips, and, like him, formerly a Lutheran. The ablest political pen now at the command of Rome in all Germany is that of Von Florencourt, formerly an orthodox Lutheran, and now in the service of the

Emperor of Austria. The ablest of the French Catholic papers,—the one which wields the widest influence in Europe and stands highest in favour with the pope, is the *Univers*; its editor, Veuillot, was originally an atheist. The editor of the *Tablet*,—the chief political and ecclesiastical organ of the Catholics of Great Britain,—is Mr Lucas (now M. P.), a renegade from the Society of Friends. The leading Romanist journals of this country, both as to talent and to the frankness with which they avow the broadest ultramontane doctrines, are, unquestionably, *Brownson's Review*, the *Freeman's Journal*, and the *Shepherd of the Valley* (now discontinued); but the chief editors of them all were originally Protestants. The editor of the *Catholic Herald* was, if we mistake not, born a Methodist; and Mc'Gee, editor of the *Celt*, was, in his radical days, as hostile to ultramontane Romanism as he is now zealous for it.

Let us now turn our attention more in detail to the Catholic press in the United States. Brownson says in his *Review* (for April 1853) that the pope is nowhere so truly pope, and finds nowhere, so far as Catholics are concerned, so little resistance in the full exercise of his authority as visible head of the church, as in the United States. The remark is well-founded. In no country of Europe can the Roman Church develop itself with entire freedom; here she may be as ultramontane as she pleases without let or hinderance from king or kaiser. No episcopacy can be so thoroughly papal as an American episcopacy. Few European editors would dare to write as Brownson and the editor of the *Shepherd of the Valley* have done for the last few years. Most of the Romanist papers in the country have avowedly put themselves under the control of their several bishops; the collaborators of the most important of them are chiefly priests. Even the bishops find it necessary to emerge occasionally from the sacred gloom in which they generally dwell, and to appear, like common mortals, as newspaper writers. Unfortunately the prelates here, as in Europe, are not often eminent for scholarship; there are only two in the land (Hughes and O'Connor) who can dare, without the risk of disgracing the mother church, to enter the lists against their more able and learned but heretical brethren. The bishops, nevertheless, rule the editors. An occasional apparent disagreement between them need deceive no one; let the bishops but give the word, and all the editors are found fighting together. Thus, even in what to the uninitiated appear to be purely political questions, the papal press utters but one voice. Of European revolutions, whether in Italy or in Prussia, of revolutionary leaders, whether Kossuth, Mazzini, Meagher, or Louis Napoleon, of slavery, Cuba, and the Maine

Law, they all think, or at least speak, alike. So it has been, and so it will be, with regard to all questions which the bishops may choose to consider as involving the interests of the Papacy. The priests and the editors who, in the American republic, could overlook the perjuries of Louis Napoleon and sanction his brutal *coup d'état*, simply because they hoped much from his success for the cause of ultramontaniam in France, would contemplate with equal complacency a similar usurpation in America, were it possible, in view of the same end. True, we have heard, and may still hear, praises of republican institutions from Romanist bishops and editors; but, unless all history is false, we must always suppose, along with these uttered laudations, a suppressed *salvâ ecclesiâ*. Nay, these very men avow that they aim in this country, as elsewhere, at the absolute dominion of Rome. This love is for them the measure of every other.

Orestes A. Brownson is universally considered a high authority among Papists. The whole American episcopate endorses his Review; it is reprinted in England; and he himself has recently been elected to an Irish Professorship. The ultramontane party in Europe believe him to be, especially in scientific capacity, the first representative of American Romanism; and the Catholic press in America generally accepts his *dicta* as the words of a master. Even those to whom his bold and rugged utterances appear perilous in the extreme, take great care to speak of them most tenderly, if they speak of them at all. In a word, no thorough *Roman Catholic* can do otherwise than acknowledge that Brownson's pages are, in the main, the truest organ of priests, bishops, and pope, that has ever been known in America. Very differently is he regarded by the so-called "Liberal" Catholics; a party by no means despicable in point of numbers, but utterly destitute of ecclesiastical influence. They write bitterly against Brownson and the whole ultramontane system; and their arguments are valid enough, but *not from the Roman Catholic stand-point*. Nothing can be more absurd than the endeavours of some writers of this class to free their Church from responsibility for Brownson's unrepugnant and fanatical sentiments, and to stigmatise as a bad Catholic the very editor who stands highest in the favour of priests, bishops, and pope.

In these days, and in this country, any man of Brownson's talents and culture, who turns ultramontane Romanist, may be sure of soon taking a high place in a Church that can boast few members combining thorough scholarship with papal convictions. In the communions to which Brownson formerly belonged (we know not how many he has passed through), he had many equals, both in intellect and cultivation; but in the

Roman Catholic Church of America he is without a peer. He has carried into that communion an amount and kind of knowledge seldom found there, never of native growth. In dialectical skill he has no superior in that church, and very few out of it. Though he takes the strongest and most unpopular ground as the very foundation of his ecclesiastical and political theory, he makes a much more plausible case for the church than any other writer of the time; and he is wonderfully skilful in putting a new face on old arguments. Keen to detect an open place in the armour of his foes, he has the great advantage, besides, of having learned that armour itself, both in its strength and weakness, from personal use. Having passed through so many phases of religious belief and non-belief himself, it is one of his strongest points to contrast the dissensions and confusion of the world of free thought with the seemingly magnificent and durable unity of Romanism; and he *makes* that point often and ably enough. Like all renegades, he is intolerant and overbearing to a high degree; but his arrogance, it must be acknowledged, is well backed up by strength.

Not only in point of talent, but also of the boldness with which he maintains the strictest ultramontane doctrines, is Brownson at the head of the papal writers of the age. No writer of the present century has painted the world without the pale of Rome in darker colours than he has done in many a graphic picture. The suppression of religious liberty in Roman Catholic countries is all right in his eyes; nay, there should be no such liberty anywhere if the church could prevent it. He believes in "the direct *temporal* authority of the Pope, as vicar of Jesus Christ on earth;" and that the head of the church has "temporal jurisdiction over sovereigns, at least indirect, by divine right." He holds, in substance, that for Roman Catholic powers to kill heretics, as such, is not persecution, but punishment. He can "better endure open, avowed Protestantism itself, than stingy, narrow-minded, and frozen-hearted Gallicanism, always studying to split the difference between Peter and Cæsar, God and the devil." He hates and reviles those trimming Romanist writers who would detract from the papal authority, even in seeming, and from prudential considerations.

"There is, in our judgment, but one valid defence of the Popes, in their exercise of temporal authority in the middle ages over sovereigns, and that is, that they possess it by divine right, or that the Pope holds that authority by virtue of his commission from Jesus Christ, as the successor of Peter, the prince of the apostles, and visible head of the church. Any defence of them on a lower ground must, in our judgment, fail to meet the real points in the case, and is rather an evasion

than a fair, honest, direct, and satisfactory reply. To defend their power as an extraordinary power, or as an accident in church history, growing out of the peculiar circumstances, civil constitution, and laws of the times, now passed away, perhaps for ever, may be regarded as less likely to displease non-Catholics and to offend the sensibilities of power, than to defend it on the ground of divine right, and as inherent in the divine constitution of the church; but even on the low ground of policy, we do not think it the wisest in the long run. Say what we will, we can gain little credit with those we would conciliate. Always, to their minds, will the temporal power of the Pope by divine right loom up in the distance, and always will they believe, however individual Catholics here and there may deny it, or nominally Catholic governments oppose it, that it is the real Roman Catholic doctrine, to be re-asserted and acted the moment that circumstances render it prudent or expedient. We gain nothing with them but doubts of our sincerity, and we only weaken among ourselves that warm and generous devotion to the Holy Father which is due from every one of the faithful, and which is so essential to the prosperity of the church, in her unceasing struggles with the godless powers of this world.”*

In perfect accordance with this theory, he maintains boldly that the Catholic society in America “is, as under the pagan Cæsars, the germ or nucleus of a *new Catholic state* ;” that our “American society is pagan, not Christian,” and that it is in process of “continual decline and corruption.” He declares, too, without reserve or hesitation, that “what the church has done, what she has expressly or tacitly approved in the past, *that is exactly what she will do, expressly or tacitly approve, in the future*, if the same circumstances occur.” His political doctrine for America is, Papacy first; the republic, if the Papacy will it:—

“But would you have this country come under the authority of the Pope? Why not? But the Pope would take away our free institutions! Nonsense. But how do you know that? from what do you infer it? After all, do you not commit a slight blunder? Are your free institutions infallible? Are they founded on divine right? This you deny. Is not the proper question for you to discuss, then, not whether Papacy be or not compatible with republican government, but whether it be or be not founded in divine right? If the Papacy be founded in divine right, it is supreme over whatever be founded only in human right, and then your institutions should be made to harmonise with it, and not it with your institutions. The real question, then, is not the compatibility or incompatibility of the Catholic Church with democratic institutions, but, Is the Catholic Church the church of God? Settle this question first. But, in point of fact, democracy is a mischievous dream, wherever the Catholic Church does not predominate to inspire the people with reverence, and to teach and accustom them to obedience to authority. The first lesson for all to learn, the last that should be forgotten, is to obey. You can have no government where

* Brownson's Review, January 1854, p. 90.

there is no obedience; and obedience to law, as it is called, will not be long enforced where the fallibility of law is clearly seen and freely admitted. But is it the intention of the Pope to possess this country? Undoubtedly. In this intention is he aided by the Jesuits and all the Catholic prelates and priests? Undoubtedly, if they are faithful to their religion."

But Brownson was a Protestant too long not to have carried away with him into the new camp somewhat, at least, of the Protestant sentiment. In analysing the philosophical opinions of his Romanist contemporaries, which he does with the utmost fearlessness, he often forgets his own principle of submission, and forgets, too, the unity of Roman opinion of which he boasts so loudly. There is hardly any quarter in which he does not find something to find fault with. Thus, at one time we find him assaulting, *vi et armis*, Dr Newman and the whole school of converted Puseyites; at another, he falls with lusty blows upon the *Univers* and the *Ami de la Religion*; and again, he turns his spear against the *Annales de la Philosophie Chretienne*; though all are alike sheltered under episcopal and papal protection. In the heat of controversy he often forgets himself as well in assaulting Roman writers as Protestant; even the *Freeman's Journal* tells him that he has charged the *Univers* with tendencies which that journal never professed. Indeed, he is far from careful in his statements of fact, or accurate in his appeals to history. We have, in fact, very little confidence in his boasted historical knowledge,—especially of ecclesiastical affairs. Any cultivated man, who has studied both sides of the controversy between the Papists and the Protestants, could easily discover from the inaccuracies that abound in Brownson's pages that he had not been brought up a Romanist. Apart from this, the Protestant *tone* of his style is often offensive even to Romanists. Although as a faithful Catholic he subordinates himself always to the church, and especially to his bishop, and although, not being a priest, he writes no article without presenting it to his bishop for approbation, nevertheless many passages are found in his pages which seem to owe their origin more to the mines of modern science than to Catholic tradition. A stupid Catholic pastor in Connecticut was induced by passages of this kind, and by others which were beyond his reach, to charge Brownson with a tendency to Atheism, Pantheism, and all possible heresies.

As Brownson writes all the most important articles of his Review himself, it is necessarily very limited in scope. He confines himself mainly to the line of apology for Romanism in the province of general theology and philosophy, and can, therefore, not be looked upon as the representative of Roman Catholic literature as a whole. But, in spite of this, his Re-

view is undoubtedly the most important journal of American Romanism, and the only one that can be compared with the more prominent Catholic organs of Europe, such as the *Univers* of France, the *Civiltà Cattolica* of Rome, the *Dublin Review*, the *Tablet*, and the *Historisch-politische Blätter*, before mentioned. The fact that it is the only scientific journal of Catholicism in the United States, shows sufficiently the deplorable state of papal literature among us.

A monthly journal, *The Metropolitan*, was commenced a year or two ago at Baltimore, but it has obtained no *status* in the scientific or literary world; indeed, the publishers only promise an effort to diffuse, at cheap rates, useful knowledge and Catholic principles.

Let us now glance briefly at the religious and secular newspapers published in the interest of Romanism in America. Of these the *Freeman's Journal* undoubtedly takes the lead, in point both of talent and of influence. The editor, Mr M'Master, is, like Brownson, a converted Protestant; and, like him, adopts the strictest Roman doctrines, which he follows to their consequences with entire fearlessness, and not without a rudeness and arrogance of style approaching to vulgarity. The assaults of Rome upon human freedom, in all times and among all nations, find in him a willing defender. No one cries out more lustily than M'Master when any step in American legislation, or any popular combination, manifests even an appearance of operating against Romanism; but, at the very same time, the most rigid European despotisms, provided they only support ultramontane views, are for him mild and equitable governments. The Roman Church must have the largest liberty here and elsewhere; but for Protestants to seek a modicum of religious freedom at Rome is the height of impudence. In dialectic skill he is inferior to Brownson; but he has a certain adroitness in managing an argument which serves him with *his* readers in place of logic. Brownson, even in his bitterest moods, hardly ever fails to write like a scholar, and seldom forgets the dialect of gentlemen; but M'Master's style is often disfigured by slang that would not be out of place in a bar-room. He rarely keeps within the limits of decency in writing of Protestants, and especially of Protestant clergymen. Nor does he spend all his gall upon heretics: even his offending Romanist brethren sometimes come in for a share of it. A few years ago, the *Pittsburgh Catholic*, weary, if we remember correctly, of his intolerable railing, refused to exchange with him. He has a bad habit of overrating the power of Romanism in this country in order to overawe the trading politicians; and in dragooning his readers for an election he has repeatedly shown himself a master. In this matter he

and some of his co-workers are perhaps beginning to think the Romanists have gone a *little* too far. Their general failure on the school question has perhaps given them a salutary lesson.

Zealous and ultramontane as the *Freeman's Journal* has proved itself, it is yet by no means a greatly popular paper even among Catholics. Its want of variety, of system, of organization, is sadly complained of. Its European news consists chiefly of excerpts from foreign Catholic journals, and of these there is no redundancy. There was talk some time since of a daily issue of the *Journal*, but the enterprise, we believe, has been abandoned.

The *Shepherd of the Valley*,* of St Louis, is also a thoroughly ultramontane journal, edited by a renegade Protestant. There are some tender points in Romanist history and doctrine (*e. g.*, the Inquisition, liberty, freedom of conscience, &c.) which have been carefully touched by papal writers for a century past; but Mr Phillips writes for American readers in 1854 as if he were in Spain in 1620. He tells us openly that whether heretics shall be punished or not is a question of mere expediency,—that Romanist governments are bound to prohibit Protestantism,—and that should his church ever gain the ascendancy in this country, religious toleration will soon be at an end here.

That these are really the sentiments of the Papacy every student of church history well knows; but it has by no means been always the policy of Romanists to admit the fact. Nay, many Roman Catholic laymen to this day do not believe it; and both Brownson and Phillips are denounced by some of them in the public prints as bad Catholics. But the *bishops* sanction all that they have written. The milder Romanist papers do not avow such principles as the *Shepherd*; but they entertain them nevertheless. Some time since the *Pittsburgh Catholic* censured the *Shepherd* for the outspoken freedom of its utterances; but the *Boston Pilot* (itself belonging to the "mild" class of journals) thus remarked upon the quarrel: "We are sorry to find in our valued contemporary, the *Pittsburgh Catholic*, certain strictures upon the *Shepherd*. Mr Bakewell has his style of Catholic newspaper-writing, our friend of Pittsburgh has his, we have ours, and so every Catholic paper has its own style. An article on religious toleration appeared in the *Shepherd* some months ago: some of the statements therein were strong, *but true nevertheless*. It was an article which neither our friend of Pittsburgh nor we could have written, yet it was true withal. Perhaps if we could have written it, we would not." Honestly spoken! Yet this same *Pilot* goes

* Discontinued since this article was prepared.

on to add,—“If it could come to the point, we suppose that the editor of the *Shepherd* would be one of the last men to hurt the hair of a Protestant head;” and, with still greater inconsistency, declares that “no Catholic wishes to abridge the religious rights of Protestants.”

We must be content with very brief statements with regard to the remaining Romanist papers. The *United States Catholic Miscellany* of Charleston, S. C., the *Catholic Telegraph and Advocate* of Cincinnati, the *Catholic Herald* of Philadelphia, the *Pittsburgh Catholic*, the *Catholic Mirror* of Baltimore, the *Catholic Instructor* of Philadelphia, the *Western Tablet* of Chicago, the *Catholic Vindicator* of Detroit, and the *Messenger* of New Orleans, are all weekly papers, published under the authority of the bishops of their respective dioceses. None of them manifest any great force or possess much influence; in the main they are ill conducted, so far as organization goes, but are decent and decorous in their mediocrity.

The Roman Catholics of this country who speak the English language are, for the most part, Irish, or of Irish descent. While many among them are thorough Papists of the ultramontane obedience, there is also a large party—perhaps even a majority of the whole—who are for Ireland first and the Pope afterwards. Indeed, it has been matter of deep concern to the prelates for many years, that so many Irish Romanists either become loose in their allegiance, or shake it off altogether after a few years’ residence in America. One of the bishops, in a lugubrious lament put forth some time ago, stated that if all the immigrants with their families had adhered to the faith of their fathers, the number of Catholics in this country would now number six or seven millions instead of about two millions. The bulk of the immigrants themselves, however, remain Catholics—but *Irish* Catholics. But Romanism in Ireland is a *national* cause, and is therefore intermingled with feelings, passions, and interests often discordant with the true papal spirit. In Ireland almost every county has its own Catholic paper; and it is therefore natural enough that Irish papers would be issued here to meet the wants of the immigrant population; and most of those named above belong to this category. Their reports of Irish news are generally as copious as those which they give for all the rest of Europe, and very properly so, in view of the class for whom they cater. Among the journals expressly published for the Irish, the *Boston Pilot* and the *Celt* (formerly of Buffalo, now of New York,) perhaps, hold the first place in point of ability and influence. The *Pilot*, now in its sixteenth year, has probably a more extensive circulation than any other Romanist journal in the country. In 1848 it took the liberal view of the European revolutions,

for which it was duly chastised, and became in course of time properly penitent. But it lost caste in Europe; and not very long ago the *Univers*, in giving an account of Catholic journalism in America, excluded the *Pilot* from the list of the orthodox. The *Pilot* transferred the article to its columns, but added, "with great satisfaction," that an American bishop, lately travelling in France, stated that the paper "had now become a truly Catholic *Pilot*." The editorship is now (or was lately) in the hands of a priest, the Rev. I. F. Roddon, who conducts it with a degree of moderation, but who nevertheless keeps it in line (as it boasts) with Brownson and the *Freeman's Journal* on all vexed questions, such as European or African freedom. The editors follow their natural Roman instincts, and support despotism at home and abroad, *con amore*. Nevertheless, the *Pilot* is not flagrantly ultramontane; it even sided with the Archbishop of Paris against the *Univers* in their conflict of last year. It is more copious in its news reports, we think, and is therefore a better source for the contemporary history of the church than any other of the Romanist journals. It is also more reasonable and less fanatical; and, as a whole, may be considered as the best of its class. It is our duty to say, however, that in the arrangement of its matter it is an example of what a newspaper ought not to be.

The city of New York is the proper centre of the Roman Catholic press in America, especially for the Irish immigrants. It is well known that this portion of our population tends to herd together; and this tendency is fostered by political leaders as well as by the Roman Catholic clergy. They have associations of various kinds, political, social, benevolent, and others, in all the large cities; in some of which none but Catholics are admitted, while in all they form the majority. These organizations are useful in more ways than one; and not their least value lies in the fact, that they tend to withdraw their members from the immediate control of the priests, and to habituate them gradually to at least some degree of independent thought and action. It is a fact, that at this day Irish nationality and Roman Catholicism are disputing for the mastery among the Irish immigrants in America. Priests and bishops make many concessions here that are unknown elsewhere in the domains of Romanism. A significant dispute arose a year or so ago out of the annual banquet of the "Tom Moore Club" of Boston. Several of the Roman Catholic clergy attended this banquet, and the editor of the *Pilot* was among the speakers. It will be remembered that, in his later life, Tom Moore was any thing but a rigid, or even a practical Romanist; and it has, in fact, been doubted whether he even

died within the pale of the church. It was, therefore, according to Catholic usage, quite out of the way for priests to attend a banquet in his memory. The ever-watchful *Shepherd of the Valley* soon raised its voice against the scandal: "We do not understand this respect for the memory of Moore. Catholics certainly have little reason to venerate the Anacreon of modern paganism; and Irishmen, we should suppose, have still less cause to cherish the memory of a man who was ashamed of his country's religion during life. Moore lived in England and died in England, and after his death English preachers performed their mummeries over his grave." The *Pilot* bore this sharp reproof with laudable meekness. The *Shepherd's* views were "strong, yet true;" but still the *Pilot* thought that if his "excellent contemporary knew the young men of the association, he would not have written the paragraph quoted above; and that a little reflection upon the circumstances in which Catholic young men in America find themselves, would suggest to him certain reasons which might convince him that the Tom Moore Club does not deserve his strictures." Another instance of the "forbearing" policy.

No man of late years, perhaps, has given the Roman Catholic clergy of America so much trouble as Thomas Francis Meagher. Ardent, eloquent, intrepid, he is the pride and joy of Young Ireland, and his banishment and sufferings have given him the added glory of martyrdom. His approach to this country was heralded by newspapers of all classes, Roman Catholics among the rest, with a feeling second only to the outburst which welcomed Kossuth. But he had hardly reached our shores before it came to be understood that for him, at least, Ireland was to be considered before Rome, and that he did not intend either to abnegate his sentiments on the subject of religious freedom, church and state, &c., or to keep them secret. It was clear that trouble was to be looked for from this new apostle of liberty. The Irish Catholic papers at first sustained Meagher, though faintly; at least, they busied themselves in putting mild interpretations upon his fiery language, in the hope, doubtless, that he, like the radical, M'Ghee, might soon be brought into fitting obedience. But this forbearance was by no means universal; and a series of bitter attacks on Meagher, in which the *Freeman's Journal* led the way, were soon promulgated from Maine to Arkansas. A very pretty quarrel arose; and at last Meagher went so far as to charge the priests of Ireland with the failure of the Irish Revolution, and to exhort his countrymen to emancipate themselves, in all but spiritual affairs, entirely from priestly authority. But one Romanist newspaper, so far as we know, (the *Catholic Instructor* of Philadelphia,) ventured to sus-

tain Meagher in this dispute; the rest, when compelled to choose between Romanism and Irish patriotism, declared decidedly for the former, and Meagher was put under the ban. To the credit of the Irish be it said, that they did not forsake their brave and brilliant leader; thousands of them, including most of the better educated, sustained him and still sustain him. A new paper, the *Irish American*, was established as their organ in New York, and it has sprung into popularity at once, if we are rightly informed. The views of the party are well set forth in the following extract from one of its editorials:—

“Our faith and course, as an organ of opinion—particularly for our fellow-countrymen of Ireland—is to separate religion from politics; they who endeavour ‘to extinguish us’ live by preaching up the connection. We are for keeping church and state asunder, knowing what evils the partnership has wrought and continues to perpetrate in the old world; they go to knit them closely, contending that all authority or power should rest in the former. We are for republicanism—rational American republicanism—everywhere, and the triumph of popular power over oppression and tyranny; they are for the divine right of kingship, for monarchy, for conservatism, for checking democratic tendencies, opposed to revolutions, no matter how profligate or brutal the governments revolted against may be. We are for universal liberty, education, progress; they for stringent rule, for military despotism, for separate education, and against all complaints, efforts, and upheaving of the masses. We oppose the dragging in of religion upon every occasion, social and political, in which the Irishman may happen to be engaged. We especially object to such a combination of words as ‘Catholic soldiers,’ ‘Catholic voters,’ ‘Catholic chairmen of meetings,’ ‘Catholic speakers,’ &c. These distinctions and denominations in the discharge of citizen duties are against the spirit of the American constitution, which gives privileges to all without reference to religious belief. We would know no political or social distinction between Protestant, Catholic, Presbyterian, or Jew. We would unite them in one arch of peace, giving to each the fullest and freest liberty of conscience. We would leave religion to the church, at the altar, in the sanctuary, to the family—not to be contaminated by the things of this world. They condemn and abuse Protestantism in every shape and phase of its existence—in religion, in morals, in the family, in literature; a condemnation and abuse which are mutual and retorted with interest by the parties on the other side. We consider the newspaper recriminations as evil and a curse, and never omit an opportunity to press the fact upon our readers.”

On this the *Shepherd* remarks:—

“It is certain that there is a party now organising in this country, with the intention of doing the last injury to old Ireland and to Irishmen, by taking from the children of St Patrick that faith which has been their support and glory through ages of unheard-of persecution. It is well that these men should be exposed; in themselves, they are

contemptible enough, and there is danger of magnifying their importance by treating them with open and serious opposition; but they have on their side the world, the flesh, and the devil, and who does not know that in our corrupt world, children can destroy with ease what saints and sages have with difficulty built?

"What a mercy of God that these men did not succeed in their revolt! A godless republic in Ireland! English rule has been bad enough; but English tyranny has been enlightened benevolence compared with the horrors which these hair-brained revolutionists would set on foot in their native land."

But the *Shepherd* is dead, and Meagher survives! Nevertheless, the end of the civil war is not yet; and, indeed, no man can foresee the issue. The liberal party has the talent and the truth on its side; but on the other is the fearful power of the apostate church, which has seldom been escaped except by those who utterly abandon her. The priests have sought in vain for a champion to equal Meagher; such men cannot be had "to order."

A very brief account of the non-English Roman Catholic papers published in this country will suffice. Among these the *German* press is, on all accounts, the most important. The vast immigration of late years has been made up of Germans, to a far larger amount than formerly,—indeed, the prospect now is that they will far outnumber the Irish, who have, up to a recent period, formed a large proportion of the immigrants. The Protestant German states send us more emigrants than the Catholic; but it is believed that of the whole number who arrive, one-half, or, at least, one-third, were Romanists in their native land. But the losses to Romanism among the German emigrants are far greater than among the Irish; the priests have far less hold upon them in Germany than in Ireland; and here they often evince a sturdy independence, which, till recently, has been unknown among the Irish Catholics. The condition of the German Catholic press in America is a significant index of the comparative weakness of ecclesiastical ties among the people. In 1852 the number of German newspapers in the United States was one hundred and fifty-two; and of these only *five* were Roman Catholic, while *eleven* were published in the interest of other Christian denominations. The oldest of the Romanist journals is the *Wahrheitsfreund*, of Cincinnati, and it is the best, in every respect, among them. The *Katholische Kirchenzeitung* (now of New York) does no credit either to Rome or to the German tongue.

Besides the Germans, three other nations of continental Europe have contributed their contingent to the Roman Catholic population of this country,—France, Spain, and Italy.

The emigrants from these lands are comparatively few in number, and do not seem to combine for political purposes as do the Irish and Germans. The population of Louisiana is still, to a considerable extent, French and Romanist; and the *Propagateur Catholique*, of New Orleans, has for eighteen years been their organ. It is well conducted, but ultramontane. The most widely known French newspaper in the country is the *Courrier des Etats Unis*, of New York, which was formerly a republican paper, and neutral or indifferent in religious affairs. Since the usurpation of Louis Napoleon, it has become, to a decided extent, a Romanist paper. The Spaniards have a paper in New York, and another in New Orleans, but neither of them is of much weight. They are first Spanish, then Catholic. There is no Romanist journal in the United States in the Italian language.

Since this paper was written a great change has come over the spirit of the Roman Catholic press, and of the bishops, too, we opine. The exultant and defiant tone in which they were wont to insult the Protestant feeling of the nation in 1852,—just before and after the election of President Pierce,—permeates their writings no longer. The spirit of fear evidently possesses them, and well it may. One of the strongest possible signs of this change is afforded by *Brownson's Review* for July 1854, which contains an article on "Native Americanism," and another on "Schools and Education," setting forth doctrines which no Romanist would have dreamed of promulgating, except in an hour of dismay. Speaking of the fathers and founders of the American Republic, Mr Brownson says:—

"In all they did there was a wise moderation, a sobriety, and a good sense, which proved that they had in them the elements of a great, free, and noble people. In this respect, there is a marked difference between them and every considerable class of immigrants, except those of the old English stock. The Irish, owing to the fact of their having been for ages in a state of hostility to their government, to their never having regarded the government of England over their country as legitimate, or her laws as binding upon them in conscience, have never acquired the American respect for law as a civil enactment; and though loyal by nature, they require the law to be embodied in a person, and represented by a chief. We see this in their tendency to group around an individual, and to follow blindly the leader who chances for the moment to possess their confidence. They are republican in their convictions,—no people more so; but they retain in their interior life many of the habits which belonged to them when Ireland was ruled by chieftains, and each sept or clan followed to the death the banner of its chief. The Germans have been accustomed to regard their princes as the living law, and when they escape from this autho-

riety, if not Catholics, they lose their respect for the laws, become wild democrats, and favour either the despotism of the state, or the unrestricted freedom of the individual, and are socialists or anarchists. But whatever the doctrines they avow, or the real convictions of their minds, it must be conceded that the great body of foreigners naturalised or simply resident among us are not republican in their spirit, their interior habits, and their interior life and discipline. They have not that inward and abiding sense of the state, of law in the abstract, and of liberty with authority, which is so essential to practical as distinguished from theoretical republicanism. Hence their invariable tendency to confound republicanism with democracy, and democracy with radicalism. They lack practical republican training. You feel it the moment you begin to converse with them, and it is the want of this interior republican discipline in uneducated Catholic immigrants that strengthens the suspicion that Catholicity is incompatible with republicanism,—a suspicion both unjust and ridiculous, for the defect under a republican point of view is the result of their previous political, not of their religious, life.”

The entire article, in fact, is a plea for Native Americanism. The Roman Catholics were as much astounded at its appearance as the rest of mankind; and it was too much to expect of their human nature that they would take it easily. In a very short time the whole clan of Irish and German Romanist newspapers was about the daring editor's ears. An “explanation” was called for, and given by Mr Brownson in the *Catholic Mirror*, from which the following extract is taken:—

“I had a motive in what I did, and a motive which I supposed would be *patent enough to every intelligent Catholic*; but it seems that in this I overrated their sagacity, and of course must suffer for my mistake. The end I had in view was, I am sure, such as every Catholic who is, and every foreigner who wishes to become, a citizen of this Union, would have heartily approved; and believing that I enjoyed the confidence of the Catholic public, I felt very sure of accomplishing it. But I was mistaken, and by the hastiness and passion of my Catholic friends, it has been defeated.

“But allow me, gentlemen, to conclude by calling your attention to one or two facts which should be known without my telling them. *We Catholics are in a small minority, and the sentiment of the country is strongly anti-Catholic.* Every measure that we oppose as hostile to us, the country will favour and adopt; and every measure we *support as favourable to our interest, it will reject.* I am sorry that it is so, but so it is; and I think that in regard to matters which depend on popular votes, and in which we are interested as Catholics, the more quiet we keep the better it will be for us. *You ought from this to understand me.*”

Comment on all this is needless. It is clear that the Jesuits are not all dead. Mr Brownson gives a more extended and cautious “explanation” in his number for January 1855:—

“It cannot be denied that the immense majority of our Catholic

population have emigrated from various foreign states, principally Ireland and Germany, and have brought with them, as it could not otherwise happen, foreign sentiments, attachments, associations, habits, manners, and usages. They bear not on coming here the stamp of the American mint, and are to the American people foreigners in feeling and character. This is not said by way of disparagement to either party, but as a fact, and a fact that gives to our church something of a foreign aspect, and prevents her from appearing to the natives as a national or integral element in American life. They are apt, therefore, to conclude from it, not only that the mass of Catholics are foreigners, or of foreign birth and manners, tastes, and education, but that Catholicity itself is foreign to the real American people, and can never coalesce with our peculiar national sentiment, or prevail here without altering or destroying our distinctive nationality. This conclusion, all unfounded as it is, is nevertheless honestly entertained by many, and directly or indirectly enlists on the side of the Know-Nothing movement, not simply the anti-Catholic bigots and demagogues of the country, but a very considerable portion of the more sober non-Catholic body of Americans, who, though they love not our religion, would otherwise stand by the religious liberty recognised and guaranteed by our constitution and laws.

"It was to meet this view of the case, that we wrote in our last Review the article on 'Native Americanism.' We saw, or thought we saw, the sentiment of American nationality fearfully excited against Catholics; we saw a storm gathering and ready to break in fury over our heads; we saw anti-Catholic mobs and riots taking place in a large number of the States; we saw that Catholics could be attacked, their persons and property endangered, and their churches desecrated or demolished, with impunity; we saw that the authorities were in most places favourable to our anti-Catholic assailants, and indisposed to afford us protection, and that Catholics, a feeble minority as we are, could, however brave and resolute, do little to protect themselves in a hand-to-hand fight. We found a secret sympathy with the Know-Nothing movement where we least expected it, and men secretly encouraging it who would naturally condemn it, actuated by dislike to foreignism rather than by any active hostility to Catholicity, as distinguished from the foreign elements accidentally associated with it. We wrote mainly for these, to show them that they had no reason for their secret or open sympathy, for we, a staunch Catholic, were a natural-born American citizen, and as truly and intensely American as the best of them.

"Some of our friends, mistaking our purpose and wholly misconceiving the drift of our argument, construed our remarks into an attack on our foreign population, and as an especial insult to Irish Catholics,—not stopping to reflect that a Catholic American publicist could not possibly dream of insulting the Irish Catholics in the United States, unless an absolute fool or madman, neither of which any of our Catholic or non-Catholic friends readily believe us to be. We deeply regret the misapprehension of our friends, and their hasty and uncalled-for denunciations of us; because they have thereby, unwittingly, played for the moment into the hands of the Know-Nothings; because they

have as far as they could given a practical refutation of our argument, and confirmed in the minds of our non-Catholic countrymen the very impression which we wished to efface,—that an American cannot become a Catholic, be a good Catholic, and maintain his standing among his Catholic brethren, without virtually renouncing his nationality, ceasing to feel and act as an American, and making himself a foreigner in the land of his birth. We fear the denunciations of us, under the circumstances, by the larger portion of the Catholic press in the English tongue, will hereafter, when it is no longer an object with them to excite Catholics against us personally, be used by the Know-Nothings with terrible effect against the Catholic population of the country. We hope, however, that the candid among our non-Catholic countrymen—and we trust that there are many such—will not fail to perceive, what is the real fact, that these denunciations, after all, do not make any thing against our position, for the offence which our Catholic friends took was taken in their quality of foreigners, not in their quality of Catholics.”

Mr Brownson goes on at great length, and with great skill, to justify his *quasi* Native American position. But our readers—and perhaps some of his—already understand that he, like the rest of the apologists for Rome, can take any side of any public question when the interests of the church demand it.

We close with an extract from the “Pastoral Letter of the Archbishop and Bishops of the Province of New York to their venerable brethren of the clergy and beloved children of the laity,” with reference to the public press. It will be found to confirm the views given in the earlier pages of this article, although those pages were written months before the session of the “council” which issued the “Pastoral :”—

“Two other subjects, dearly beloved brethren, have engaged the attention of the fathers in the council which has just been brought to a close. One is, the indiscriminate reception into your families of journals not at all calculated to impart, either to you or to those committed to your care, those solid maxims of public instruction which would tend to edification. We do not here intend to speak of merely secular papers. But we do speak rather of those which, taking advantage of certain feelings supposed to be alive in your breasts, whether in reference to kindred, country, or religion, involve you in political relations which it would be expedient for you to avoid ; except, indeed, in the sense in which it is the right of every freeman to give his vote freely, conscientiously, individually, as often as the laws of the country call upon and authorise him to do so. There appears to be abroad an ignorance or prejudice on this subject, which it would be our desire and your interest to have removed. It is to the effect that every paper which advocates, or professes to advocate, the Catholic religion, or which advocates some imaginary foreign interest in this country, is, as a matter of course, under the direction of the priests or bishops in the locality where it is published, and consequently authorised to speak for

and in the name of the Catholic Church. Hence, when the editors of such papers publish their own sentiments, by virtue of their indisputable right to exercise the liberty of the press, it is assumed by persons outside of our communion that they speak in the name of the church, and under direction of her pastors. Nothing could be more false than this inference, and we exhort you, venerable and beloved brethren, to leave nothing unsaid or undone to remove every shadow of foundation for this inference, so absurd in itself, but yet so injurious to us."

The cautious language here employed will afford an admirable cover for escape when any Roman Catholic journalist may happen to incur public odium by advocating too openly the *real* doctrines of the Papacy.

ART. VIII.—*Intellect, The Emotions, and the Moral Nature.*

By Rev. WILLIAM LYALL, Free College, Halifax, Nova Scotia. Edinburgh: Thomas Constable & Co. 1855.

It might be stated, as an axiom of universal truth and importance, that without a true science of mind there can be no true science at all. An axiom cannot be proved; but it may be applied, and its truth thereby shown. All our knowledge of the external world must depend upon the mind, for mind alone can know. The mind can know only according to its own constitutional nature and laws, by means of which it apprehends what the external world presents to it to be apprehended and known. A false science of mind must needs stamp fallaciousness on all its perceptions, or at least on all the philosophical inferences drawn from that false mental science, or through its medium. So long as men followed implicitly the theories of mind which attempted to explain all our knowledge of material existence by means of "ideas," "sensible species," "genera and species," &c., it was found impossible to construct a true science of matter, or physical science. But when Bacon gave forth the principles and laws by which alone true science could be produced,—principles and laws truly philosophical,—a mighty revolution began to guide the human mind as it entered on the new course thus laid open before it. The effect of this was first perceived in the regions of physical inquiry, which have advanced into what may now be fairly termed the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. Even these inductive sciences, however, are shown by their historian, Dr Whewell, to rest upon the primary ideas of the mind,—those laws of our mental constitution which form the basis to us of all our capacity

of knowing and believing our own existence and that of the external world.

The science of mind is itself experiencing a precisely similar revolution, later in its commencement, and not yet completed. It would be interesting and instructive to trace the progress of this revolution in mental philosophy,—from the time when sound and earnest thinkers began to brush aside the ancient shadowy forms which had so long obscured the whole region of inquiry; but this our space does not permit us to attempt. A few points only can we touch, and that chiefly as referring to what we must assume our readers already know. The first decided improvement in mental philosophy was made by Reid, when he boldly took his stand on what he termed, not very happily, “Common Sense.” That position was improved when its principles were designated the “Fundamental Laws of Human Belief,” or, “Laws of Thought,” or, “Principles and Laws of Intuition.” But mental philosophers still continued in their writings to treat of mind and its faculties and powers in a minutely detailed manner, as if mind might be regarded as a congeries of faculties and powers,—a mental confederacy among whose elements there might be harmony, or contention, or anarchy. Another important position in advance was taken by Dr Brown, when he asserted the absolute unity of mind, and termed these faculties merely “states of mind.” But even he continued to treat of these states of mind too much as if they were separate faculties or powers, having at least so much of independent existence as to impair somewhat the feeling of united responsibility. Of this, that pseudo-philosophy termed Phrenology readily availed itself, and produced a fine congeries of convolutions in the brain, each the abode of its own separate faculty, tending to a very gross system of materialism. Such a theory could be but temporary, and has already almost sunk into oblivion, only leaving here and there some superannuated adherent, like a tide-mark, serving to show how far the flood of sound philosophy has advanced.

In Germany, the progress of sound mental philosophy has been retarded by the influence of its peculiar idealism; and very specially by the attempts of the German philosophers to ascribe potency to what they term, “forms of thought,” as possessing a formative, almost a creative power,—not merely seeing nature as it is, but making it what it is. A recoil is beginning to take place in Germany also; and we may expect ere long to see not merely a return to the principles of sound philosophy, but an advancement of true mental science in accordance with those principles, produced by the strong and earnest energy characteristic of the German mind.

We do not hesitate to say that another and a very impor-

tant addition has been made to the philosophy of mind by the author of the volume before us. Before his appointment to be Professor of Literature and Philosophy at Halifax, the Rev. William Lyall was well known to have devoted considerable attention to the philosophy of mind, and to be thoroughly conversant with that profound science. His appointment to that chair gave him time to prosecute studies so congenial to his mental bias, and the work before us appears to be the result of these studies. Mr Lyall's design has evidently been to construct a true philosophy of mind, advancing from its lowest to its highest development. He manifests an ample and accurate acquaintance with all the works of any importance that have been written on the subject; while with the open frankness of a free and independent mind, he binds himself to no system, but states his own opinions and gives his reasons for them. The work is eminently constructive; that is, the earnestly thoughtful author is so much bent on producing such a work as may advance the science of mind, that he devotes himself much more to the duty of stating truth, than to the task of refuting error. In the cases when it is imperatively necessary to refute error, in order to obtain admission for truth, Mr Lyall does not shrink from that task; but it is evident that his chief pleasure consists in building up what he deems the truth in mental science.

In a well-conceived Introduction, Mr Lyall vindicates the science of mind from the depreciatory sneers of Carlyle and others, and states the real nature and design of that important branch of human knowledge. He then proceeds to his subject, the first department of which is "The Philosophy of Intellect." "Mind and matter," says Professor Lyall, "are the two substances about which all philosophy is conversant. These two substances may be said to divide the universe." He next defines "substance" to be "that which *subsists under* certain *qualities*, these *qualities* being the only proper object of observation." What, then, is the distinction between these two substances; for they are totally distinct in kind? This at once suggests the great inquiry which has occupied the attention of all philosophers, and divided them into two grand classes,—those who would account for all the phenomena of matter by what are called the *formative laws of the mind*; and those who ascribe all the phenomena of mind to mere *organizations of matter*. Professor Lyall states directly his position. "The only true system of philosophy is that which allows a real existence to both provinces, assigning to matter all that appertains to it, and to mind all that appertains to it." The attempt to do this philosophically is Professor Lyall's work.

The point from which he starts is *consciousness*. But what is consciousness, that earliest source of our knowledge? It is the mind sensible of its own states or acts,—mental states, self-cognisant, intimating their own existence. The idea of personal existence is thus the primary source of all knowledge; and as this is a mental state, the idea of mind is contained in it. This is equivalent not only to the famous Cartesian axiom, *Cogito ergo sum*, but also to the now equally famous German axiom, “The *me* asserts itself.” This consciousness is not only the primary source of all knowledge, and a mental state, but it is also the result of a primary law of the human mind. It might be shown that no irrational creature, no mere animal, can have the idea of personal consciousness, which thus arises intuitively in the human mind by the necessity of its primary constitutional laws. But the idea of *self* cannot long exist, if indeed it can exist at all, without exciting the idea of *not-self*, and hence the idea of *externality*. This too depends on the testimony of consciousness, and cannot be rejected. In vain has a certain class of philosophers attempted to dispute the idea of an external world, in vain denied that it has or can have the testimony of consciousness; for since consciousness is a feeling, it must equally testify to what is *negative* as to what is *positive* in that feeling. It cannot testify to the *me* without testifying also to the *not-me*, and with equal certainty in the one case as in the other. Suppose the idea of the *not-me* to be suggested by the feeling of resistance when the hand is stretched forth and something stops its motion, the mind is instantly cognisant and conscious of that resistance, and at once, without reasoning, believes the externality of the object by which the hand’s motion was interrupted. Sceptical writers would insist that the mind was conscious only of its own sensation, but had no ground for referring that to an external cause. Why not admit at once that the mind, by a primary law of its constitution, attached the idea of externality to all that consciousness affirmed to be *not-self*? If this be the constitution of mind which God gave to his rational creature man, and one of the primary laws of that constitution suited to an embodied spirit placed in a material world, there to live and act in full harmony with his own nature and nature around him, then no further explanation is needed, no further information is possible. It is so, because such is the will of God, and such the constitution and the primary laws of mind which he has given to man.

Professor Lyall concludes his inquiries on the origin of our knowledge in a fine passage, a part of which we here extract:—

“The occasion on which the *idea of matter* would arise in the mind, is the presence of certain sensations of *touch*, such as hardness, so-

lidity. The *idea* of *matter* then rises in the mind, and this must be accompanied by the cognate or co-relative idea of *mind*. It seems impossible that the one idea could arise without the other ; it is at that instant, probably, that the idea of each, and the distinction between both, takes place, or is perceived. It is then that the firmament is reared which for ever divides the two—mind from matter. For the consciousness of self is not necessarily that of *mind*. The *ego* or *self* is merely the *ego*; it is nothing more till the two ideas, mind and matter, are discriminated. Then, indeed, mind is seen to be the *ego* or *self*, or self is seen to be *mind*, *immaterial*, *spiritual*; and the *not-self*, or that which is external to self, is discovered to be *matter*, or is *pronounced matter*. It is true that the infant will, as yet, have a much more distinct idea of matter than of mind. Indeed, mind will, as yet, be only the kind of penumbra of matter, hardly an idea,—not matter, yet attending it; till by and by it will no longer be the penumbra, but the light in which matter itself is seen, and with which it is contrasted. How soon does the child come to have an idea of mind—of spirit! How soon a spirit haunts it and broods over it,—“a presence that will not be put by;” and it talks of shadows, and can conceive of the dead, in spiritual bodies, revisiting their former dwelling-places; or, better taught, can take in the doctrine of immortality, and think of the spirit of its departed parent that has gone to God who gave it, and of God himself, the great and good Spirit, to whose spiritual dwelling-place it is itself taught to aspire. So early then are these two ideas obtained, and the distinction between them for ever and indelibly fixed. The child is neither a *materialist* nor an *idealist*. It neither ascribes all to mind nor all to matter. It has a perfect belief in both. The skies do not appeal to it in vain, nor the flowery fields, nor the thousand glad objects that crowd within the sphere of its daily vision; nor in vain do the sounds in earth and air salute it. But as little does its own consciousness, do its own internal feelings, its spiritual being, appeal to it in vain,—awake within it those ideas of a spiritual substance as something distinct from, and nobler than matter,—than even the world on which it gazes, or on which it treads, with a tiny foot, indeed, but already of more account in the scale of being than the world itself.”

Every one must admit the truth of this passage as descriptive of a child's mental condition, whether its truth as philosophy be admitted or not. But it could not be true as descriptive of a child's mental condition, if it were not philosophically true. In its guileless simplicity, a child's mind receives impressions direct, and conceives of them according to the laws of his own mental constitution with equal directness. He neither respects a fallacy nor frames one. He is conscious of a perfect harmony between the world within him, and the world without him. He intuitively believes in an infinitely great, and wise, and good Being, who created both, and whose wisdom and goodness are manifested in their adaptation to each other. To doubt that felt adaptation cannot occur to the ingenuous and simple mind of a child in the

awakening of its intelligent consciousness ; and it is more accordant with true philosophy to attend to the earliest information deducible from the simplest states of mental being and consciousness, than to assume a state of confusion and contradictions, and then to attempt to reduce them to order. A very high yet simple philosophy would tell us, that without God there could not be existence at all ; that God alone has eternal self-existence, can alone create, and know beforehand what created beings must be ; that, while God's own nature needs no contrast to make it conscious of itself, it is essential to the nature of created beings that there must be contrast, in order to self-conscious intelligence,—that in creation there must be both *matter* and *mind*, in order that mind may be self-conscious, and, through the laws of creation, may arise to the belief of a Creator and Lawgiver. Created mind can thus know itself by contrast with matter, and matter by contrast with itself, and may believe in God, the Creator of both. Such a conviction, more or less distinctly entertained, is actually the earliest conviction of the awakened conscious intelligence which we call the human mind, and it is more philosophical to view this earliest mental state as giving a true testimony, than to suppose that testimony false. The intimations of earliest consciousness are both true, and must needs be so, else neither of them is,—neither the consciousness of *self*, nor of *not-self*,—which is impossible ; both, therefore, are true. Why is this so ? Because God has willed it to be so. He has created *matter*, and given to it certain *qualities*. He has created *mind*, and given to it certain *principles*. He has created man,—a being composed of both matter and mind, body and soul ; and the *life* of man is the synthesis of matter and mind. By means of the senses and the sensations thereby received, man's body is percipient of matter ; by means of the mind and the principles therein inherent, man's soul is cognisant of itself ; and by the constitutional laws of man's compound being, he becomes conscious of both mind and matter, of the world within and the world without,—and the true philosophy resulting from the whole is, the intelligent knowledge that he is himself the synthesis of mind and matter, and constituted so for the very purpose of knowing, loving, glorifying, and enjoying his Creator and God.

Such is the conclusion to which Professor Lyall's philosophy appears inevitably to lead,—a conclusion to which every true Christian will rejoice to be philosophically led. The Christian will, indeed, be a believer in these views without having obtained them through philosophy ; but being aware of the very different views which philosophers commonly entertain, he may rejoice that such a work as that of Professor Lyall has appeared, to establish on scientific ground the belief which he

has received and entertains by faith in the Word of God. It would not surprise us to find that infidel philosophists attempt to disparage Lyall's work by sneering at its religious tone and spirit. But this will not serve their purpose. They must grapple with its arguments; they must meet it scientifically, for it is truly a scientific work,—and not the less so that it is imbued throughout with Christian principles and feelings, and that its author calmly dares to state and appeal to the great and sacred truths of the Word of God.

It would be at once pleasing and instructive to follow Professor Lyall as he traces the origin and nature of the elementary ideas of the mind, in doing which he displays much acuteness, and a sound judgment, in knowing when to stop, and how to state his conclusion. As the result of his inquiry regarding the idea of space, he says, "It is that in which a substance exists. Substance is that in which qualities exist,—space is that in which substance exists. It is not a quality or attribute of substance, but it is that in which substance exists, yet which might itself exist without substance. Farther our ideas cannot go." His analysis of the idea of space leads him to say, "Duration accompanying every act of memory implied in self-consciousness, the idea of time would necessarily arrive." "We would trace, therefore, this idea to a *series of feelings* of whatever kind. *Prolonged self-consciousness*, or *ever-recurring self-consciousness*, seems enough to give us the idea." "While the notion of time is derived from *succession*, it is not itself succession. Succession only *measures* time; time is itself absolute. Time is, therefore, necessary, as space is. We are not able to conceive *no time*, or time not existing. Thus, we are led to the idea of eternity. The two eternities, past and future, meet in God. The name 'I AM,' accordingly, is the peculiar title which he challenges for himself."

Professor Lyall manifests great respect for Dr Brown; but he is far too independent a thinker to follow any master,—*nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri*. It was one of Brown's chief efforts to get quit of the idea of *power*, and thereby to reduce cause and effect to mere *sequence*. Professor Lyall, on the contrary, terms *power* one of our simple elementary ideas; and instead of setting aside cause and effect, affirms that "it is an intuition of the mind, that *every effect must have its cause*." A few sentences from the passage in which this very important question is discussed we cannot withhold:—

"It is an intuition of the mind, that every effect must have a cause. *How soon would the feelings or states of the mind be recognised as effects?* The idea seems to be implied, at least, in the reference of certain internal states to an external cause. How could there be such a reference without the idea of cause? For what does the reference amount to?

Is it not this? *There is something without me which produces this state or feeling.* The development of our ideas is something like the opening of the leaves of a flower. The one is involved in the other, and hardly separable from it; it is like a part of it; it opens as the other opens. The idea of power would brood, perhaps, over the mind at its earliest dawning. It would be involved, almost, in its earliest consciousness. It would be felt to be a *power* that was stirring in that first consciousness. At all events, it would undoubtedly accompany the first act of reference by the mind to something without. The principle that every effect must have a cause, which is just the idea of power, may be awakened by that which calls for the reference of a feeling or feelings to something without. It is very manifest that the idea must have been developed, if not before, at least in the very appeal of the outward to the inward, when the outward to the inward were distinguished. *'There is something without me which produces this feeling.'* The mind would be surprised into the knowledge of the external world, or rather of externality, and of *power* at the same time."

In a very acute note, Professor Lyall adduces the authority of Sir William Hamilton as confirming this view. Reid had said, "It is very probable that the very conception or idea of active power and of efficient causes, is derived from our voluntary efforts in producing effects." Sir William Hamilton adds, "It is true, however, that the *consciousness of our own efficiency illuminates* the dark notion of causality, founded, as I conceive, in our impotence to conceive the possibility of an absolute commencement, and raises it from the vague and negative into the precise and positive notion of power." On this Lyall remarks, "The impossibility of conceiving an *absolute commencement* is, in other words, the impossibility of conceiving of an *effect without a cause*, which is just the principle of causality. We believe this is the true account of the matter." Here this long agitated question may end; or if men will dispute about it a little longer, they may, but in the conclusion stated above it must at least end, and the idea of power be restored to sound philosophy, to perform its part there as it does throughout the universe. We feel inclined to add, that since all the created universe is an effect, of which God is the cause; and since man is the synthesis of created mind and matter, he is by his constitution the very creature by whom the principle of causality should be more readily apprehended, and the idea of power entertained. For the same reason, although he cannot produce new power, and ought always to ascribe all absolute power to God, he can ascertain what powers exist, employ them according to their kinds, and become thus the interpreter of nature in glorifying God, and the delegated sovereign of this world. This would be at once true philosophy and true religion.

"*Intellection*," says Professor Lyall, in a passage full of meaning, which we extract before quitting this department of the work,—

"Intellection is the word we would be inclined to adopt as expressive of the action of *mind*, as *mind*, and in antithesis to *sensation*, which is partly a corporeal and partly a mental function or state. On the presence of certain sensations a mental act takes place, and our ideas of externality, of matter, substance, mind, space, time, power, are obtained. These are purely the products of a mental operation, while this is by no means to say that they have not their counterparts for which they stand, or of which they are the ideas. So wonderful is the connection between the external and internal worlds. The objects of our ideas, or their prototypes, are without us, but these ideas are purely mental, or given to us by mind. But for this power of fashioning its ideas, the external world would appeal to us in vain; and figure, distance, magnitude, every thing about which *science* is conversant, and with which taste and morals have to do, would be a nonentity, at least to us. It is a marvellous connection which exists between the world without and the world within. While all about which the mind is conversant is a kind of mental creation, even as if it had no independent existence,—and the Germans were right in making every thing phenomenal and subjective,—we believe and cannot question that there is that *without* which is more than phenomenal, and is *objective*. God has created a material universe; he has endowed it with certain qualities, or it possesses those properties which are essential to matter; he has placed mind in this material frame-work or universe,—as He himself is a Spirit, or Mind of infinite perfection,—that created mind may learn those qualities or properties of the universe in which it exists; and it does so in a manner which is characteristic of itself, by an act or acts purely mental, so that the ideas are its own, while at the same time they have their counterpart without. This independent action of the mind may be designated, generally, *intellection*, or the action of pure mind. We think it is of importance to employ a term by which this action of the mind may be designated, both as opposed to sensation as the first law or state of the mind, or to any view that would stop short of recognising the operation of *mind* purely or simply, even in the formation of our most rudimentary ideas. The grand point to be noticed is the distinction between a sensation and an idea,—the one partly a corporeal, the other strictly a mental product. We vindicate the separate integrity of mind, its distinct nature, and its independent action. . . . The mind, first by its own spontaneity and activity, and then according to certain laws, obtains its simple ideas, such as self, externality, &c.; then these ideas are modified, and we have the idea of *universal* space, eternity, causality under all its phases; we can limit or extend our idea of space *ad libitum*; and all this is just mind, one and indivisible in all its operations, regarding its ideas under those aspects in which they present themselves to it, or may be capable of being considered; it is, in short, *intellection* operating in various ways, or *intellection* affected variously by limiting circumstances, supposed or actual. By the idea of causality we obtain the idea of *God*, or at least of a *First Cause*. The mind perceives that a cause of the creation

must be supposed, to account for the existence of the universe : the universe is the *effect*, God is the *cause*. But the effect is one exhibiting or implying *intelligence*; the cause must therefore have been an *intelligent* one. Again, the effect is stupendous,—it was *creation*; but for such a stupendous effect nothing less than *omnipotence* was adequate, while creation is the effect of a *Creator*, and a Creator must himself be *uncreated*, and an *uncreated being must have always existed*; and what have we here but the natural perfections of God? See how simple, how unobserved, how unwitting, how silent, but how irresistible the process is! Yet that process is but a further extension of that by which our simplest ideas arise.”

Professor Lyall terms Causality, Generalization, and Deduction “the three grand *principles* of mind;” and his disquisitions on these topics are very valuable. But we cannot afford space to follow him in these disquisitions, nor on those which follow on association of ideas, memory, abstraction, judgment, reasoning, and imagination. On these subjects our author’s remarks are always ingenious, often acute and profound, and several times very beautiful. The only point to which we can advert, for a sentence or two, is to the reasons given by Professor Lyall for constantly refusing to treat of the mind as if it were a congeries of *faculties*. He mentions that Dr Brown was the “first to take another view of the mind, and to account for, or explain, its phenomena in a different way. He was led to his peculiar view by the doctrine which he entertained on the subject of causation, viz., that causation was nothing but sequence in events, which led him to consider the mental phenomena in the same light, as sequences, or states of succession, all power being denied to mind as well as to matter. But the unity and simplicity of mind seems to require that we regard it not as possessing so many powers or faculties, but rather as *existing in so many states*. We regard it as having *susceptibilities* rather than *faculties*, or such a constitution impressed upon it, that it exists in those states, or exhibits those phenomena which we have endeavoured to trace or explain, from the first consciousness to the most abstract conception and most complicated train of thought. The only power belonging to mind is *will*, the power of volition; all apart from that is mind simply, existing in those states, or presenting those phenomena, which are characteristic of mind when brought into certain circumstances. To *sensation* we allow nothing more than the power of originating our ideas, and that by being only the occasion on which they arise. If we attend to all our original ideas, we shall find that we are indebted for them to mind simply, operating we had almost said arbitrarily, and yet according to the nature of mind. The simple ideas acquired, they now pass through various modifications.

The simple idea of externality, for example, becomes the idea of an external world. The term *idea* is now employed generally for that state of mind in which something is *mentally present*, be it an object of sense or some abstraction of the mind. We take ideas, then, for the thoughts of the mind, whatever these are,—those mental states which may be called generally, thoughts, ideas, conceptions, notions, apprehensions. Our ideas present themselves in the mind under the modifications which the laws of mind impress upon them or produce, and all that we mean by laws is, that the mind operates in such and such a way, or is capable of perceiving or contemplating objects or ideas under such and such aspects or modifications. It is beautiful to contemplate mind as an indivisible, spiritual substance, and every operation as that mind itself acting,—not even its ideas separate from the mind,—these ideas being but *mind* itself. Who is not lost in the admiration of this simplicity, in the marvel presented in the contemplation of a spiritual substance, thus changing, yet simple and undivided in all its changes? Have we not an approach here to an explanation of the immutability of God; for all truth being known to him, every idea present to his mind—in one wide and comprehensive intelligence,—how can he change? The identity and diversity in all objects which he has created, their resemblances, contrasts, the fine analogies, the proportions, every relation, as every existence, every substance, being, quality, the whole range and universe of truth, and possible truth, are present to his omniscient and all-comprehensive mind. It must exist then ever the same,—Himself the ‘Father of lights, with whom there is no variableness or shadow of turning.’”

Professor Lyall proceeds to the second part of his philosophical work, in which he treats of “The Emotions.” A few sentences will place his views before the reader :—

“Man, besides being capable of intellectual effort,—besides being an intellectual existence possessed of reason, understanding, intelligence, with imagination, is also endowed with an emotional nature or capacity. He is capable of feeling as well as of thinking. The spiritual substance within him is capable not only of the quick motion of intellect, but of the exciting sensations of emotion; and these two parts of his nature are very different. The emotional is more allied to the sensational than to the intellectual, though still so different from either. There is a region of feeling in the mind; or the same spiritual substance which thinks can feel,—which exhibits the phenomena of intellection, exhibits the phenomena of emotion. Man is not all intellect merely. His mind warms under the sun that enlightens, kindles with emotion, and bursts into all the fruitfulness of moral and spiritual vegetation. There is an atmosphere in the mind as well as light,—a region of emotion,—and it is the interpenetration of the two that produces all those

varied and beautiful phenomena which we find distinguishing the mental, as the combination of the same two agencies produces such admirable phenomena in the natural world. . . . An emotion, like all the states of the mind, when we come to define them, is insusceptible of definition, except in language which would need itself to be defined. It may be called a mental feeling, as sensation is a bodily one; and this is the nearest, perhaps, that we can come to any thing like an accurate description of the peculiar phenomenon which we call by the name emotion. We can safely appeal to every one for a correct enough idea of emotion, although it may be incapable of definition. It is a state of feeling, and we call it a mental feeling, as distinguished from sensation, which is partly bodily and partly mental."

It would require more room than we can afford to give an adequate view of this department of Professor Lyall's work, in which he displays a rare amount of originality in conception, and accuracy in analysis and expression. What we have termed originality in conception is, perhaps, the result of a more profound analysis than any previous philosopher had made, guided by a more piously thoughtful mind than had ever previously undertaken the task. Our author is a Christian as well as a philosopher, and he has moral courage enough to take his Christianity openly with him in his philosophy,—nay, to use the true light which revelation sheds on the mental and moral nature of man. This has enabled him to produce for the first time in mental science a true philosophy of the emotions, the truth of which no philosopher will be able successfully to dispute, and in which every Christian will gladly concur, because he will feel that it explains many of the mysteries of his present condition. We shall endeavour, by a condensed series of extracts, to give our readers some idea of this valuable part of Professor Lyall's admirable work:—

"The first essential condition of emotion would seem to be one of calm and placid enjoyment. The balance of all the emotions would seem to require or necessitate a calm and settled state. Any thing else would be the predominance of some one emotion, existing in a higher degree of excitement or strength. In the case of an infinite being, the condition supposed may be compared to the full ocean over which no storms sweep, and in which no internal agitation obtains. We must connect man in his condition with his first origin: it is a state of derangement in which he is now found. Philosophy has contented itself with an incomplete view, when that view is limited to the present state of man, and is not carried up to one of prior superiority and perfection. The details of man's primeval condition, and his fall, could never have been guessed at by reason; but even reason may teach us that man did not come from his Maker as he now exists. We may suppose, then, that the balance of all the feelings in man was similar to that in the Divine Being himself—only, their centre would be God, just as God would be the centre to himself; and every feeling would move in harmony with that primary and supreme law of regard

to our Maker. It is difficult to form an idea of such a state. Man is not as he once was. It is from a very different point of view that we now contemplate his whole mental and spiritual constitution. We see not that constitution in its perfect state. We see it deranged or broken into fragments, or an element in it which introduces an entirely new set of phenomena. The question is, whether we are to regard man as he now is, or as he must have been,—from the present point of view, or from that from which he might once have been contemplated. It may seem that we have nothing to do with his former state, as it may be contended we become acquainted with that state from a foreign source, not from our own consciousness. But it is enough to contemplate man's present state, to see that he is not what he once was, and that the phenomena he must at one time have presented must have been very different from those which he now exhibits. We are not indebted to revelation alone for this. Revelation gives us the circumstances of the fall; enough may also be seen in the phenomena of man's emotional nature to tell us what they once were, to speak even of their own primeval character. An entire set of emotions testify to the sin which has affected our moral constitution. We cannot look at these without seeing that an element has crept into the soul which once had no lodgment there, and has made man the empire of evil, as he was once the scene only of what was fair and lovely and of good report. Writers upon this part of our mental phenomena have, for the most part, had no regard to this element. Man's emotional and moral nature have been descanted on as if all was as it should have been—as it only could be; and the best compensating circumstances have been introduced to account for any eccentricity, and to justify it in consistency with the wisdom and purpose of the Creator. We cannot regard these attempts at explanation, these apologies and vindications, but as an entire overlooking of the real state of the case and even of the actual phenomena. . . .

"Christian serenity is very different from mere cheerfulness. It has a different source, a more stable basis, a more permanent action; nor is it liable to the same interruptions as the other; and yet it may be said to bear the same relation to the rest of the graces or states of the renewed soul that cheerfulness does to the merely moral virtues. The calm of the renewed soul is the result of all the spiritual virtues or graces in nearly equal exercise. In the soul of the Christian there is a serenity too deeply seated to be disturbed, which all the storms of life cannot break. Faith in the divine Providence, and in the reconciling power of Christ's death,—of his work,—puts the soul on a basis which nothing can shake, gives it a serenity which nothing can disturb. Cheerfulness becomes the Christian, and he is the one most able to repress any unamiableness of character or disposition, in virtue of those principles by which he is actuated, and those dispositions which have been implanted in him. It should be the endeavour of every one to attain to that cheerfulness which is surely within the reach of all, if virtue is within the reach of all; and who should be always happy, or should 'rejoice evermore,' if not the Christian? It is he alone who can rejoice even in tribulation. His peace goes with him even then. It fills him with a calm,—not the 'slumber of the dead,'—but the calm of a heart whose trust is stayed upon God. . . .

"It is worthy of remark how each emotion should have its counterpart or opposite; for cheerfulness we should have melancholy; for joy, sorrow; as to meekness, we should find opposed anger; to hope, fear. It would seem as if the mind was capable of existing in opposite states, and that between these opposites there was every manner of degree, constituting the whole emotional phenomena of the mind. But the interesting circumstance is, that the mind is capable of such opposite emotions, while yet it is only the one class of emotions that is consistent with an originally perfect or sinless state, a state in which moral evil did not exist. This sinless state is the only one reconcilable with the condition of a good and perfect Creator. How did it come, then, that when the conditions of creation altered, when evil crept in, when this new state took effect, a corresponding and opposite emotion to every several emotion originally possessed, now had place in the soul, or, as occasion offered, developed itself? This antagonism of emotion is worthy of notice. If it was in the original provision or constitution of our nature, it shows that such a new state as arose on the introduction of evil was contemplated by God, and that he endowed us with an emotional capacity accordingly; or, are we to suppose such an antagonism inevitable, and does not emotion pass into its opposite by a law of its own, or in virtue of its own nature? We can hardly avoid adopting the latter of these conclusions. It seems as if the shadow of evil ever attended upon good, except in the case of that all-perfect Being who can suffer no change in his nature or attributes. With Him is no variableness or shadow of turning. . . .

"If we look at the final causes of our emotions, we find none for those which suppose a previous perfect state. They were their own end. Every end was subverted in that state by things as they were, and of each by itself. It were in vain to ask for the final cause of any of the virtuous emotions, or of the emotions growing out of these. Each was its own end; but the glory of God was the end of all, or God's glory in the happiness of the creature. Man was created in the image of God; and just as the attributes of God subserve no end, can subserve no end, but must be considered as absolute in their nature, so was it with the attributes with which God endowed man. They, too, were an end to themselves, but God's glory shone in all, as his own perfections were reflected or illustrated. But consequent upon the introduction of evil, the counterpart emotions took effect, or came into being; they had no place before in the soul; but then they immediately sprang up, and each like the *alter idem*, or the counterpart of what had previously existed,—a dark side as it were of the other emotions. The counterpart emotions are themselves partly primitive, partly the inevitable result of the existence of evil. . . .

"Love is an emotion which has more directly for its object our fellows of the same species, after that great Being who gave to ourselves being, and whom it is our first duty at once supremely to love, and reverently to adore. Love is by far the most important emotion of the soul. It excels every other in value as in kind. Its object, if we may so express ourselves, is *more directly its object* than is the object of any other emotion the object of that emotion. Pleasure or delight in an object, joy at an event, is very different from the love of an object, or from that object's being the direct object of love. Not only is the

emotion in this instance produced by a cause, or, at least, awakened by an object, it terminates on that cause; it has it *for its object*. Love in itself is *absolute*,—is a part of that emotional nature with which, as we were created in the likeness of God, he was pleased to endow us. . . . Love absolute presents no modification, and exists for no purpose but itself. The one state of love exists; every object, every being, shares in its exercise; it has selected no object for its exercise, but every object receives a part of its regard as it comes within its sphere. In its most absolute character, *being* is its object. If *being* is thus properly the object of love, there is a sense in which a being may really be the object of our love, in spite of moral qualities the opposite of excellent. It is the distinguishing circumstance of God's love, that it loved not only its enemies, but sinners. In what other case has such a love been exhibited? This is made the very marvel even in Scripture of God's love. This is the absolute view of the emotion, and it may be pronounced its highest state or character. Its object is *being* as such; it does not need a cause; it includes *all beings*, even our enemies, and the only object it cannot love is the enemy of good,—not *our* enemies, but the *ENEMY of being*. It is the crowning malediction of Satan, and those who are involved in his condemnation, that they are the enemies of being, and that they are hated of all being. God has given them up, and no being still on this side of such a doom, especially no pure and holy being, can love them. . . .

“The gospel is the true regenerator of our species; for it is its object to implant anew that principle of universal law, which is consistent only with a state of unfallen innocence, or one of innocence restored. When the source of enmity is removed, enmity itself will be removed. National distinctions will not exist, or will exist but as the separate municipalities under one government at the present day, united under one empire, and that the empire of Christ. That love, the absence of which is the occasion of all enmity, will have exercise, having been reimplanted by the gospel. The world seems yet far from that consummation which the love of the race, the love of man to man, will ultimately secure. That consummation will yet be attained. The gospel will assuredly accomplish it. The unbroken love of the species will be felt. Nations and communities will exist under the reign of Christ alone, cemented by one uniting affection, having the same interests,—the interest of one the interest of all,—governed by the love of Messiah the Prince,—order, and justice, and every good, secured in the reign of universal love.”

Many have been the attempts made by philosophers to reconcile the existence of what they call the malevolent affections with the idea of the goodness of the Creator. They all assumed that these malevolent affections are so inherent in the very nature of man, that they must have been implanted in him by the hand of God. Professor Lyall has set the question at rest, for he has proved that those emotions which have been termed the malevolent affections are not elements of man's original nature, any more than sin is; but that they are the consequences of sin, and the antagonistic mode in which the emotional nature

of man acts, when perverted by sin. This is profoundly true, both as philosophical truth and as scriptural truth; and the statement of it will give Mr Lyall a high and permanent place among those whose writings have advanced the progress of mental science, while it proves that the light of revelation is the best guide even to philosophy, and the science of mind will, when studied by the aid of that light, become divine philosophy.

We must pass unnoticed many fine passages which occur in those sections of this department, where the author is treating of the various emotions in some of their higher aspects. These he often illustrates by quotations from the poets, and in the application of these quotations he displays a very cultivated taste, and acute and true criticism. But on such topics we cannot dwell; we pass on to the third department of the work, which treats of "The Philosophy of the Moral Nature." Our readers will not be surprised to be informed that in this department also Professor Lyall both asserts the oneness of mind, and depends confidently on the information of consciousness; nor, as we think, will they be surprised to find that he is satisfied when he has reached an ultimate fact in the moral, as well as in the mental and emotional departments of our nature. And they will, we venture to anticipate, be delighted to find that, by following this course, he gives a satisfactory solution of several important questions regarding which philosophers have hitherto carried on a fruitless controversy. As our disposable space is already well nigh exhausted, and as our readers will be more anxious to know what Professor Lyall says, than what we might say about his opinions, we shall give some extracts on one or two important topics:—

"That there are eternal distinctions of right and wrong, who can for a moment doubt? But the ground of moral approbation—the distinction between right and wrong—is essentially an ultimate question, and can admit of no analysis, and further than the distinction itself we cannot go. The distinction in our minds between right and wrong, as every phenomenon of our nature is calculated to do, leads to the inquiry, What is the amount of the distinction?—what is the nature of it?—why do we regard this as right and that as wrong? [Having shown, as Sir James Mackintosh had previously done, that great confusion has been introduced into the investigation by introducing two questions as if they were one—namely, the distinction itself, and the standard by which we judge of that distinction, our author proceeds:] The proper object of inquiry is, What is right and wrong in itself?—what constitutes the distinction?—can we lay down any principles or reasons why we pronounce an action right or wrong?—are there such principles, either discoverable, or at all?—or is the distinction ultimate, and can we find no ground of it beyond itself? This seems to be the proper question; and the *standard* of right and wrong, and the *nature* of *virtue*, are just the rightness and wrongness of an action itself,

perceived to be such by the mind ultimately ; and the moral faculty is the judgment, with the accompanying feeling, by which we perceive this distinction, and by which it has such authority over us. That the mind recognises a distinction between right and wrong in action, is undoubted. Can we explain *why* it is right, or *why* it is wrong? We perceive at once the quality of rightness or wrongness apart from any explanation ; in other words, the distinction is an ultimate one, and the best reason for the distinction is the distinction itself. Why should we seek a reason? The distinction is cognisable by our minds in itself, and depends on nothing else. The mind is capable of apprehending right and wrong ; the perception of this relation as much belongs to it as that of any other. But there is something in the nature of this relation which there is in no other. This is accompanied by the *feeling of obligation*, or the strong feeling that impels to duty. We not only perceive, but we approve what is right ; as we not only perceive, but disapprove what is wrong. The peculiarity of the relation excites a certain emotion in the moral percipient. That we possess a moral nature is not more wonderful than that we possess a nature at all. He that formed us, formed us with that nature, and we have but to mark its operations and obey its dictates. Nor, because we were so made, is our nature arbitrary,—might have been so or not so. If it were arbitrary, then were God's nature arbitrary, and moral distinction were a thing of creation. But it is not so ; moral distinction is eternal, and God made other natures like his own, moral in their constitution, and capable of moral discernment.

"The *law* of right is *one*. It is the *obligation of right*. There is the eternal distinction between right and wrong ; and to appreciate that distinction, is to come under its obligation ; in other words, the nature that can perceive the distinction is also bound by it, and must either observe the distinction, or incur guilt in disregarding it. The distinction between right and wrong is the eternal law which mind perceives, by an ultimate principle of the mind itself, and which imposes obligation upon every moral being. The mind does not perceive this law, however, without an emotion accompanying the perception ; and the *feeling of obligation is in the very perception with its accompanying emotion*. We perceive the right, we experience the emotion ; and the perception and emotion form our moral approbation and obligation. The perception is as necessary as the emotion ; the emotion is as necessary as the perception ; and the right is not the right because it inspires this approbation, but it inspires this approbation because it is right.

"We are now in circumstances to determine the nature of the moral faculty, or conscience, which would appear to be nothing else than just the capacity to perceive the right, and to be affected by the moral emotion which accompanies that perception. If we seek for something else distinct in the mind, as the faculty in question, we either just arrive at a supposed *original* faculty, which can be nothing else than that power of judging of right, and being affected by the appropriate emotion, or we seek in vain, and we discover no faculty beyond the capacity of moral judgment and moral feeling. The moral faculty, conscience, with all its mighty influence, is just the power of perceiving the right, with the emotion accompanying. The faculty of conscience, however, is more properly spoken of when it is the capacity of moral

approbation or disapprobation of our own actions or moral states, in which case a distinct emotion accompanies its exercise. Simply, it is moral approbation or disapprobation when it is not upon ourselves we pronounce; it is *conscience* when it is upon our own actions that we decide. We need not wonder at the power of this principle, when we recollect that it is mind itself in a state of approbation or disapprobation, and *that* when itself is the object of its own approval or disapproval. The mind itself is the subject of its own moral judgment. Conscience is just our moral nature perceiving law, approving of right and disapproving of wrong, with the peculiar satisfaction or pain which is experienced when it is of ourselves that we approve or disapprove. It is obvious, then, that conscience, while it is not a distinct faculty or principle of the mind, is, as the faculty or principle of moral approbation or disapprobation, still characterised by an emotion which is peculiar, and that because we ourselves are in such a case the object of the moral approval or disapproval.

"We perceive, then, that there are active principles in our nature; that the desires are those principles; and that it is only when there is obedience to law, rendered from a regard to law, that we are acting *irrespective of desire*, though still under the influence of motive; for reverence for law is motive, and the reverence for law is always accompanied by love to it. The relation of our *desires*, then, to law, to conscience, to moral obligation, is very obvious. At first, love to God and to our neighbour would be the controlling principle, the paramount motive in every action. Every thing would be done from this principle, from this motive; and hardly law itself would be recognised. Conscience would then be but the law of love, in unison with all that is good. Since evil took effect in the world, a brood of desires sprung up in the mind which had no existence before, and *many of what are called principles of action, are essentially vicious principles*, would have no existence, and can have no existence, in a perfect state. Whatever our desires may be, they should be suffered no further than conscience approves, and the perception of right allows. And from the view we have presented, we shall perceive the harmony between* strictly ethical views, and the view of our nature and of duty or obligation as given in Scripture, or by revelation. We see there, that the only principles of action are love to God and love to our neighbour; and every thing inconsistent with these is sin, is morally vicious. Allowance is made for no other principles.

"An evil desire, even, must be guilty in the sight of God. It is more directly culpable, however, if entertained and accompanied by an act of *will*,—and the relation of a will to an act is what we must now explain. The will is that phenomenon of mind by which we allow or assent to any act or state, whether of the mind itself, or of the body with the mind,—that is, of our entire nature. Every act is a result of will, and will is necessary to every act when the agent acts freely. Like all our other ultimate states, it cannot be explained, but may be intelligible enough without explanation, as it is a subject of every one's own consciousness, about which every one's own consciousness is conversant daily and hourly. It is understood because it is a subject of consciousness. We know what *will* is, because we obey it. We can do nothing without an act of will. If we act, it is because we will to

act. The general phenomenon or principle is different from that phenomenon or principle in exercise, or any single act of the phenomenon or principle. The one is called *the will*, the other *an act of will*, or a *volition*. The peculiarity of this phenomenon is, that it commands or controls the other phenomena of the mind, and that our whole compound being is under its influence, and would be nothing otherwise. It is the will, therefore, that makes us active beings, and capable of regulating our actions. Will, however, is not a mere *principle*, like the *principle of motion* in the external world; it is under the direction of reason. Reason *directs*, will *moves*. There is a certain influence of the will, however, over the operations of mind itself. We may, by an act of will, and by the influence which it has over our trains of thought, secure a certain emotion; we may, by the same act of will, prolong that train of thought, and so prolong the state of emotion. The connection of the will with our active principles, with action, and consequently with the right and wrong of an action, is obvious. Our active principles are the prompters to action; but without a volition, action would not follow. Unless volition followed upon desire, no action would take place. There must always be *some volition* in the mind, else we would never act in any way; and the volition supposes a preference to some mode of acting over another, or a preference to acting rather than not acting. It has, therefore, always a positive and negative character,—it is a preference to act in one way rather than in another, or a preference to act rather than not act. The preference, however, is before the will, or volition, and is in the preponderating desire of the mind. There is a judgment in the preference as well as a desire, and the two go to constitute that state of mind which leads to a volition, and hence to action, and is therefore called a motive,—is the motive to action. We never act without a motive; and a motive is just a state of desire, along with a judgment, producing preference, and leading to volition. The desires are consequent upon emotion, as emotion is consequent upon some conception of the mind, and all go to make up motive. The will follows upon motive, and leads to action. We are now in circumstances to consider the relation of will to action, and to enter upon the consideration of the question as to the freedom of the will.

“A conception or judgment of the mind, an emotion, and a desire, constitute motive. Motive is so called from its connection with the active decisions of the mind, or with the acts of the will, and the corresponding actions of intelligent moral agents. The last of the strictly mental conditions to action is the decision of the will, or the act of the will: the exertion of power is not strictly a mental phenomenon, it is the phenomenon of active being. All prior to this is within the being itself,—belongs to the internal phenomena,—action is the being, not internally and by one of its states or operations, but in its whole being, putting forth a power, which has its effect or result without itself. There would seem, from the very statement of the phenomena themselves, to be the relation of a judgment to an emotion, the relation of an emotion to a desire, the relation of a desire to will, and the relation of will to action. What is that relation in each case? That it is that of cause and effect between the judgment and emotion, and between emotion and desire cannot, we think, be doubted. But is it the same connection in the last link of the series or chain? is there a causal

connection between the desire and the will? is it cause and effect which obtains here? is it causation where the will follows upon desire? It is here, we think, that the whole stress of the question regarding the freedom of the will lies. It does not seem causation in the same sense between the strongest emotion, or the prevailing desire, and will, as between a judgment and an emotion, or an emotion the effect of a conception or judgment. Or taking the motive conjointly, as including the judgment, the emotion, and the desire, still it is obvious to every one's own consciousness, that the will does not follow upon that, precisely as an effect follows upon a cause. The will follows reasons, inducements, but it is not *caused*. It cannot in any proper sense be said to be so. It acts under inducement, but it does so sovereignly. It is not a slave, or a servant, it is a sovereign. For the mind to will is for the mind to act, and to act sovereignly without control, though guided by law, or influenced by motive. It chooses to act; it *wills*. A motive precedes it, and it follows the motive, acts under its influence; it is from a certain motive that the will decides in any particular way, it would not decide that way but for that motive; but still it is the *phenomenon of will* that we are contemplating, and it is the very nature of will to be active and free. Whatever is *active* is free; all else is *caused*. Will is the only phenomenon of our nature that is active. There is what we call the activity of mind, the spontaneity of mind; but it is a different activity from the activity of will; it is the activity of nature, not the activity of being. The peculiarity of will is, that it is the being that wills; in every thing else it is only the nature that is in operation that acts, or that is the subject of phenomena. Where we will, it is we, in our personality, and as beings, that will; not in our subjectivity, but in our personal activity. The being is acting. It is the being that wills. We have a motive, we have inducements, but it is *we* that will. Even with the strongest motive that could operate, to obey that motive is to be free, it is to *will*, and that is freedom. The will does not determine itself; it may be allowed even that it is *determined* by motive; but still to will is to be free, or it is to act; and if we attend to the idea implied *in action*, we have the essence of freedom. What other freedom could be desired? The will does not control motives; it does not even choose between motives; it follows or obeys a motive, a motive prevailing at the time,—the strongest motive, as apprehended; but in doing so it *wills*, and that is activity, freedom. Freedom is freedom to obey motive,—for *the will* to obey motive, or to decide in obedience to motive. In that consists essential freedom. The motive which the will obeys is influential, but the will acts, and that is its freedom. It is unlike any other effect proceeding from a cause. It is not a self-determining power; it is activity that is the phenomenon which the will exhibits, and which is sufficient to claim for it freedom. Will is far from the nature of a mere effect. The least attention to our own consciousness will tell us this. It is an effect so far as it is under influence, but it acts under that influence by an activity of its own, derived from nothing without itself. The mystery of the will, *spontaneously acting, and yet in obedience to motive*, is one which cannot be explained, though it is very obviously a subject of consciousness. No argument whatever can bring the will within the category of ordinary effects.

“It is to *action* that morality belongs, and to action the will is neces-

sary. Will constitutes action, for the will is active. But while it is to *action* that morality belongs, the morality of action depends upon motive; it is in motive that morality resides. The purpose, intention, feeling, with which an action is done, gives its character to that action. Morality is in the agent, not in the action. It is what the agent does, not what is done,—what was in the intention of the agent, what feeling he had, what motive he was actuated by; it is this which is the object of praise or blame, of approbation or disapprobation. The action is therefore good or bad according to the motive. This transfers the question, then, of the relation of the will to morality, from the relation of the will to action to the relation of the will to motive. The morality of an action is in the motive,—how then is it affected by will? The morality is not in the will,—how then does it affect morality? Because the will is the consent of the whole being to its own states or acts, and this consent fixes its character and its moral culpability, even though no external effect should follow, for the *will* is the *act of the being*.”

After a short but very profound inquiry into the origin of evil, which we do not extract because Professor Lyall himself admits that “perhaps it is best to leave the phenomenon unaccounted for, and to acknowledge that we cannot account for it,” he concludes his very able work with the following sentences:—

“This is a fact we have to deplore; evil we find existing, and that much more personally concerns us than any question regarding the origin of evil. We see in the *introduction* of evil, however, an event of mighty consequence and solemn interest, the rationale of which it is not at all necessary for us to give,—Scripture even does not give it. It relates the circumstances of the fall; it does not satisfy our curiosity by explaining the fall itself. How simply does it relate that event! How simple the circumstances of the event itself! Yet how momentous in its consequences! How great must the sin have been which involved such consequences! In the Scripture account we have the only—we have the authoritative—statement of man’s apostasy. Philosophy may speculate; the Bible reveals, not the mode or the nature of the change, but the circumstance of the change. The great fact is told, the *modus* of it is left unexplained. Redemption comes upon the scene, and regeneration—the creation of fallen man anew—is the grand doctrine of Scripture,—the implantation of a new will, new motives, a new emotional nature, the susceptibility of holy emotions, desires, and the power of again willing what is right.”

In our desire to present Professor Lyall’s opinions as fully as possible in his own words, we have both abstained from comment, and left at last scarcely any room for the concluding remarks which we are inclined to make, and shall therefore be very brief in these remarks. Regarded as a work on mental science, we view Professor Lyall’s book as one of very great merit. It is thoroughly philosophical in its character, and must take its place, as a systematic work on mental science,

in the very foremost rank of such productions. There is not, so far as we have perceived, a single instance of taking for granted the position to be proved. Viewing the human being as a wondrous unity, consisting of body and mind, and thus in contact with matter and conscious of mind, on the testimony of consciousness and the senses and their sensations, he admits that testimony as true, and traces back all the operations, laws, and states of mind to their principles, or ultimate elements, beyond which no analysis is possible. Ultimate principles, as so traced and ascertained, form, therefore, the basis of his philosophical system. This is shown in the department of the work devoted to Intellect, or mind itself; next in the department which contemplates the Emotions, or mind and its states of feeling; and lastly, in the department which treats of the Moral Nature, or mind in its highest state,—knowing, feeling, judging, conscious of obligation and duty, and yet willing and acting. The plan is perfectly simple, yet exhaustively comprehensive, forming a complete philosophy of mind. By adhering firmly to the commencing principle—the unity of mind—all the confusion arising out of the theory of numerous powers and faculties is avoided, and many a question set aside or solved which could not have been otherwise satisfactorily met. For example, the questions relative to the idea of *power*, *causation*, and *the freedom and efficiency of the will*, we regard as satisfactorily settled, so far as philosophy can either reach or fairly demand. The philosophy of the Emotions is placed, for the first time, in its true light, by its being proved that man's emotional nature is the synthesis of love in the mental state and sentiency in the physical, producing benevolent emotion, which delights in seeing good and doing good; *right*, therefore, in man's original nature and state, but *wrong* in his fallen state, or at least susceptible of wrong, by the infusion of the evil element sin, and in that fallen and perverted state manifesting antagonism to love and benevolence, or positive hatred and malevolence. The philosophy of the moral nature is also, in our opinion, advanced a stage by the able disquisitions of Professor Lyall. It was the favourite attempt of Sir James Mackintosh to produce a theory of conscience which might "underprop" Butler's great argument. In that attempt he completely failed, as we think; but the similar attempt of Professor Lyall is, in our opinion, completely successful. This is high praise, but it is well deserved. The question regarding the freedom of the will is solved, we think, so far as any solution is required, or can be carried; and it is proved that there is necessarily an element of efficiency in the will, adequate to secure all the freedom that a moral and responsible created nature can possess or need. *Power in created existence* can be

nothing more than *derived efficiency*; but as no one will say that derived efficiency is impossible,—that God could not impart efficiency to a moral, intelligent, and active creature; and as every man's own consciousness testifies to his possession of voluntary efficiency, the question may be allowed to rest on the ground on which it is placed by Professor Lyall. Throughout the whole work there is always a perceptible, and often a frankly and fearlessly avowed reference to Scripture authority, as entitled to be held conclusive on every point on which it has given forth its divine decision. This we regard as a degree of moral courage seldom shown by writers on mental science; but highly befitting a true man, a true philosopher, and a true Christian. The result is, that we have obtained from him a positive philosophy of mind, in full harmony with nature, reason, and Scripture.

Our only regret is, that the size and consequent expensiveness of the work may tend to limit its circulation. It might have been compressed into smaller compass. Constructed, as it has obviously been, from a course of lectures, it has a considerable number of passages which are in a great measure repetitions in varied expressions of what had been previously stated. These might be omitted, and that with advantage to the book, as a work on mental and moral science. There are also a few redundances in style, and a very few instances of defective expression, which should be corrected. This thorough revision, we think, the excellent and able author ought yet to undertake; for we venture to assure him that the work is well worthy of his best exertions to render it as perfect as it can be made, and that such exertions will promote the end which he has no doubt had in view,—the advancement of a sound and true philosophy, fitted to conduce to the glory of God and the welfare of man. The work is already so good, that no pains should be spared in rendering it as perfect as possible. It is well worthy of being entirely re-written, as several of our best authors have done with their best works, till the utmost has been done that thought, critical skill, and taste can effect. In a considerably condensed state it would be admirably suited for general use as a text-book on mental and moral science, and its compressed philosophy expanded and illustrated by a course of lectures. Its author will at least pardon the suggestion. Meanwhile we give Professor Lyall's noble work our most hearty approbation.

ART. IX.—*The Epistles of St Paul to the Thessalonians, Galatians, Romans : with Critical Notes and Dissertations.* By BENJAMIN JOWETT, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Balliol College, Oxford. Two vols., 8vo. London : John Murray. 1855. Pp. 417, 505.

THIS work both deserves and demands a thorough review. The penetration which it displays in the treatment of some of the most important questions of historical criticism, and the tide of fresh and powerful thinking which it pours over nearly the entire field of theological speculation, constitute strong claims on the attention of all critical students of the New Testament. And yet great as its merit is, considered simply as a product of thought, we know of no modern work of equal pretension so bitterly disappointing in its results. We speak not at present of the soundness, but simply of the definiteness of its conclusions. In this respect it resembles the wide waste of waters after the flood had done its work of destruction, and not a trace of dry land was to be seen. Mr Jowett, while he destroys nearly all that has hitherto been most surely believed in catholic Christendom, builds up positively nothing in its stead. His theological criticism is frightfully negative. His Christianity seems to have hardly any positive elements. What he builds up with the one hand he goes far, by qualifications and insinuations, to pull down with the other. Even what seems to remain is, by his treatment of it, made to appear a variable and evanescent quantity. When he has eliminated all the conventionalisms which he holds to have gathered around Christianity for ages : when he has disencumbered it of the crudities which attach, it seems, even to the apostolic teaching in its earliest stage ; and of the Alexandrian rhetoric, of which, at a later stage, the argumentative Epistles of the New Testament are chiefly made up : and finally, when he has sat in judgment even upon the small residuum, and found that it represents Christianity in a form, the narrowness and exclusiveness of which he thinks it quite impossible to regard as essential and unchangeable ; a form which time and events have shown, he considers, to be accidental ; a form in which Christianity is, in point of fact, not held by the majority of Christendom, whom we are not surely to believe on the road to perdition on that account, not to speak of the heathen outside :—when we find Christianity thus tapering away in the hands of our author, one is at a loss to know on what *terra firma* his own feet repose, or what he proposes to offer to Christendom as a substitute for its present baseless faith. That he believes in the historical truth of the facts of Christianity, is manifest enough. He speaks of it

throughout, too, as a vital, and, *in its infancy*, victorious principle in the human soul. But in what respect it is so, and where its great strength lies, or rather did lie—for much of its original force is now spent, if we read him aright—you will in vain inquire. But what is *not* in it you are told with a boldness which will startle most people who know that the author, now Regius Professor of Greek at Oxford, is a minister of the Church of England.

The following examples will illustrate this remark. The sin of Adam and the death of his race have no sort of causal connection; nor was Adam ever in a pure and perfect state; nor is death the consequence of sin at all, either original or actual. Atonement for sin by the death of Christ is simply a Jewish figure. As to the Person of Christ, and the Personality of the Holy Ghost, we can only gather the author's opinions; but unless we have quite misread his volumes, we suppose we do him no wrong in presuming that he would sympathise with Sabellius, in maintaining that all such distinctions in the Godhead are merely modal, not essential. The Old Testament is almost always quoted in the New without reference to the connection in which the passages originally occur, and in a different sense from that in which the prophet or psalmist intended them. This new sense of the Old Testament imparts to it its only vitality. As it stands, and without the service thus rendered to it by the New Testament writers, it would be a petrification. Some apology is to be made for these New Testament writers, in making such constant use of sacrificial language to express and illustrate the death of Christ, notwithstanding that there is no real relation between them. We must remember that the apostles were Jews, and could not be expected all at once to shake off their Judaism; their own sacrifices they could not understand, but they could understand much about Christ's death; and when once the thought *occurred* to them to connect the one with the other, it would admit of indefinite application. And there is less of this in Paul's writings than in the Epistle to the Hebrews, which is steeped in Alexandrian modes of thinking and phraseology. Indeed, the leading thought of Paul's mind is not the identification, but the opposition of the Law and the Gospel. But even this is handled in the loose and rhetorical manner of his day. His argumentation is not at all logical, in our modern sense: it is even doubtful whether he "was capable of weighing evidence," as we understand it. Nor, if you would do Paul and his writings justice, must you overlook the *date* of his compositions. Not only were his ideas of Christianity very rudimental at first, but as time showed him that these were crude and erroneous, he abandoned them. Thus, he at first expected, to witness the second coming

of Christ; but in process of time he substituted for this the expectation of his own departure to be with Christ. And whereas he predicts the national conversion of the Jews, he would have "changed his manner of speech" if he could have foreseen that after eighteen centuries all things would continue as they were from the beginning. After this, of course, it would be superfluous to ask what our author's views of Inspiration are—on which, by the way, as on the Person of Christ, there is not, amongst some five-and-twenty or thirty Dissertations, sweeping over nearly all theology, any separate essay, nor even one direct and unequivocal statement.

More painful, however, to us than all these negations is the spirit of its criticism. We do not mean the temper of it, for that is perfect. We refer to the energy of the destructive element, which presides over the whole field of the author's investigations, and is too uncomfortably near us even where the argument is defensive, and where the result of it is a vindication of portions of the New Testament against the subtle attacks which have been made upon them. Hence the lack of warm exuberance under the beams of positive Christian truth, even such as our author conceives of it. It is over-mastered by the dominance of another and a colder element. We are treated to a *criticism* of the Christian religion, as exhibited in certain of its apostolic records, and in its logical character and historical bearings, rather than presented with a contribution towards a truer apprehension of its supernatural character and healing virtue as the life of the world. Indeed, how could it be otherwise, when his chief points of view are those of the *semi-naturalistic* school of Germany, the virus of which kills what life his religious earnestness might otherwise impart to his work? This earnestness, coupled with his rare ability and scholarly accomplishments, makes us feel inexpressible regret at the character and tendency of his theological speculations. One thing which we think we have observed in his work, while it increases our apprehension of the injury it will do, only adds to our interest in the state of his own mind. If we misinterpret not greatly, Mr Jowett is one who, after being shaken as to all Christianity, has recovered his footing so far as to be firmly persuaded of its historical truth and supernatural character; and we would venture a step farther, and say, that there are indications not to be mistaken of his having been nurtured under strong Evangelical influences, whose effects even upon his present conceptions of Christian truth constitute their only vital and truly conservative elements. And one principal and most laudable object of his work seems to be, to show the thoroughness of the critical ground on which certain powerfully-assailed books of the New Testament can be vindi-

cated against the recent Tübingen school. But since side by side with this has grown up in his mind a deep dissatisfaction with the Christianity of the Orthodox Church from the beginning, his dialectic subtilty has, unfortunately, exercised itself with at least as much energy in taking down the latter as in building up the former. So that even what is almost wholly unexceptionable, and truly admirable, has not that weight *upon the whole* and *in the end* which by itself it is fitted to have, by reason of the commanding effect of other things of a very different and deadly character which pervade the work.

Here, perhaps, lies the main difference between Mr Stanley's recent work on the Epistles to the Corinthians and that of our author. The two books have so many things in common, both in matter and form, that there can be no doubt of some understanding existing between these authors. But besides that Mr Stanley is very far from going the length of some of Mr Jowett's negations, you are constrained under his pages to feel that Christianity is the one religion of heaven, the one interpreter of human life, the one medicine for all its ills, the one vital link between time and eternity. Mr Jowett is Mr Stanley's superior in mental grasp, in dialectic subtilty; but for photographic reproduction of the apostolic age,—for living, breathing representation of the apostolic princes, of the scenes in which they moved, the parties they had to control, and the state of things which they left behind them, the author of "Sermons and Essays on the Apostolical Age" has no equal in the present day. And with all the faults of his volumes on the Corinthians, they have at least this excellence, that they do not leave you, as Mr Jowett does, with the blank and desolate feeling that the chief use of studying the New Testament now-a-days is to get rid of the ideas which you have hitherto attached to it; but make you feel that you have in them mighty principles of present action, unchanging laws of the divine kingdom—"the word of the Lord, which endureth for ever."

But it is time to come to particulars.

The work before us embraces the four following features:—First, the Greek text of the Epistles to the Thessalonians, Galatians, and Romans—that of Lachmann being selected in preference to the Textus Receptus; next, the English of the authorised version on the opposite page, altered only where the sense appeared to have been misapprehended by our translators, or where a different reading required a corresponding change in the version—both cases being carefully marked; thirdly, critical notes, in a somewhat smaller type,

below the text, and in double columns ; and lastly, Dissertations—amounting to more than half the matter of the whole work—not printed at the end of the book, or even of the Epistles to which they more especially belong, but interspersed through the body of the work.

In giving a critical edition of the Epistles he was to illustrate, Mr Jowett has acted wisely in selecting a text made ready to his hand, instead of attempting to construct one for himself. Mr Alford's success in the herculean undertaking of framing at once a critical text and a critical commentary on the New Testament, is certainly not encouraging. Of both the text and the commentary we may take occasion, possibly, to speak more in detail in some future number. Meantime, as both have been mercilessly attacked in certain quarters, and not without indications of an *animus*, we deem it due to a man of sound scholarship, manly faith, and remarkable industry, to state here, that, with some grave faults, it is, in our humble judgment, decidedly in advance of any thing of the kind that has yet appeared in our language ; and that if his text, *as a whole*, cannot be regarded as any real improvement upon the labours of those who have spent their strength almost exclusively upon this very difficult species of work, he has only failed where decided success was next to hopeless.

Mr Jowett, in his Introduction, has stated very lucidly the principles on which Lachmann constructed his text ; which will be found detailed by that accomplished editor in the preface to the first volume of his larger edition, published in 1842 ; and illustrated and defended, chiefly against his friend, De Wette, in the preface to the second volume, which appeared in 1850, shortly before his lamented death. This text, opposed as it was on its first appearance with great keenness, and by some of the most eminent scholars, is gradually rising in public estimation, as a highly successful attempt to reproduce the Greek Testament as nearly as possible as it was read by the Christian Church about the *fourth* century. In making use of Lachmann's text, however, the following things should be carefully borne in mind :—That he does not profess to *weigh*, but only to *report* the diplomatic evidence, his object being to give the text with no reference to *what it originally was*, or may be concluded from all the data in our possession to have been, but only *as it stood* in point of fact *at the date of the oldest existing manuscripts* ; that he has not in every instance adhered to his own principles, and that great as his success has been, it would admit of improvement even on his own plan ; that the plan itself is open to grave objections, inasmuch as the authorities to which it limited the editor are so very few—in some cases he is reduced to two and even to one manuscript,

as evidence of how the New Testament was read over all the Church in the fourth century; that Lachmann held himself bound by his principles to insert readings which he was convinced were *not* the original ones, but only those then existing; and therefore that his labours are only to be regarded, and even by himself were only regarded, as materials for further investigation, and as a contribution towards as near an approximation as possible to the original text. In fact, if any thing is fitted to show the need of more materials, and a broader basis of facts, than Lachmann's plan admitted of his furnishing, it is just the continuous use of Lachmann's own edition. Hence the importance of Tischendorf's labours in this field, on which the following judicious observations are made by Mr Ellicott, in his recent valuable "Critical and Grammatical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians:"—"It was long with me a subject of anxious thought whether I should use the text of Lachmann, for whose critical abilities I have a profound respect, or that of Tischendorf. The latter I consider inferior to Lachmann in talent, scholarship, and critical acumen. But as a palæographer he stands infinitely higher, as a man of energy he is unrivalled, and as a critic he has learnt from what he has suffered.* Moreover, he is still with us, still learning, still gathering, still toiling; while Lachmann's edition, with all its excellences and all its imperfections, must now remain as he left it to us."†

Mr Jowett's critical penetration is nowhere better exemplified than in his observations on Paley's "*Horæ Paulinæ*;" in the general tenor of which (with some slight exception) and in their details we are disposed to concur. He does justice to that celebrated work, as one that "has been, and always will be, to our countrymen [or English-speaking Christians] one of the greatest bulwarks of historical Christianity." Still, where a writer undertakes to point out a great number of undesigned, minute, and in some cases intricate, coincidences between a historical work, such as the Acts, and the letters of one who forms a principal figure in that history, as an argument for the truth of both, it cannot be denied that, resistless though the argument may be as a whole, it will probably be

* His shameful charge of bad faith against Mr Alford for the use he made of his (Tischendorf's) text—not to speak of his sneer at Mr A.'s work in other respects—is no great proof of amendment in some points at least:—"Certe quod rem textus sacri criticam attinet, Alford tam parum studii, judicii, religionisque probavit, ut vix in scholarum usum scripsisse censendus sit. Tamen editionem meam recentissimam ubi primum nactus erat, omni modo, *neque vero sine mala fide*, suam in rem convertit."

† Preface, p. xv. J. W. Parker, 1854.

The best account of Lachmann's edition will be found in Dr Tregelles' valuable work on "The Printed Text of the Greek Testament," pp. 97-115. Bagster, 1854, 8vo.

in some instances overdone. Blunt's "Coincidences" is a case in point; nor is Paley's great work quite faultless in this respect. Our author speaks—we have no doubt it is his own case he is describing, but he is not alone—of the anxiety one naturally feels, after reading what the Tübingen school have written against the genuineness of many of the Pauline epistles, and the unity and truthfulness of the Acts of the Apostles, to observe how far this affects the argument of the "Horæ Paulinæ." Written at a time when the one simple question was, The New Testament whole and entire—Is it true or false? it could not be expected to meet the new and more subtle arguments by which our faith in historical Christianity, after Strauss's failure, is attempted to be undermined by piecemeal attacks upon its canonical books. At the same time, it is right that students, while they read Paley with just admiration, should be aware that now-a-days the argument has taken a new turn, which makes it necessary that this work of enduring value should be supplemented by others in which the question is looked at from a new point of view. "Bad reasons," says Mr Jowett with perfect truth, "on behalf of a received opinion, or an established authority, have often hitherto found more favour than good ones against it. But the time has passed for *ex parte* inquiries into the evidences of Christianity, or into any other historical subject. It is the interest of every one to see how we really stand. Let us know the truth, and 'the truth will make us free.' Without hesitation, therefore, though not without reverence for so great a name, a brief examination will be attempted of that portion of Paley's work which relates to the Epistles to the Thessalonians."—(Vol. i., p. 110.) Into these details it would be tedious to go here; but we cannot withhold the following tribute to the work itself, whose partial defects are freely pointed out, if it were only to neutralise the prejudice with which we know that any one will be listened to who presumes to detect any flaws in that book:—

"But after making all these deductions, it must be conceded that no author has done as much as Paley, in the *Horæ Paulinæ*, to raise up a barrier against unreasoning scepticism, and to place the Epistles on an historical foundation. The ingenuity of his arguments, the minuteness of the intimations discovered by him, the remoteness and complexity of his combinations, leave the impression on the mind, in reference to the great epistles to the Romans and Corinthians, of absolute certainty, and of high probability in reference to most of the others. And even though some of his defences may be untenable, it is true also, that other lines of argument, first indicated by him, admit of being carried farther than he has carried them. Such are those from undesignated coincidences of style and of character; that is, from similarities

which, with a previous knowledge of the style and character of an author, are capable of being recognised and appreciated, and yet are so latent and complex, that no forger could have invented them.”—(Vol. i. pp. 109, 110.)

In discussing the genuineness of the Epistles to the Thessalonians, in reply to the arguments of Dr Baur, our author displays his usual acumen, power of compression, and independent investigation. Those who have waded through Baur's “Paulus,” * will at once see, from Mr Jowett's summary of his objections, culled from eleven pages of his work, how much better that learned Coryphæus of the destructive school can be represented by another than by himself. After adverting, in one very well put paragraph, to the external evidence for the genuineness of the Epistles to the Thessalonians, our author takes up seriatim the arguments of Baur against it from internal evidence, showing not only that they form no proof against, but some of them very strong evidence in favour of their genuineness. The following paragraphs from this part of the work will perhaps illustrate the author's manner :—

“If it were admitted that the absence of doctrinal ideas makes the epistle unworthy of St Paul, it makes it also a forgery without an object.”—(Vol. i. p. 17.)

“It might be truly said of the early ecclesiastical forgeries, that nothing could exceed the readiness with which they were received; but on the other hand, nothing could exceed the clumsiness of their falsification. They made no attempt to imitate the style of the author whose name they bore; they commonly carried on their face the object with which they were written. A forgery so ingenious as the First Epistle to the Thessalonians, containing so many latent resemblances to the genuine writings of the apostle, would be unique in ecclesiastical literature.”—(Vol. i. p. 22.)

“It has been objected against the genuineness of this epistle, that it contains only a single statement of doctrine. But liveliness, personality, similar traits of disposition, are far more difficult to invent than statements of doctrine. A later age might have supplied these, but it could hardly have caught the very likeness and portrait of the apostle. The strength of this argument is considerably increased when it is placed side by side with another of a wholly different kind, derived from mannerisms of style and language. Such are,—

“(1.) The expansion and association of words traceable in passages, such as in i. 2-6, 7, 8.

“It is an old observation respecting St Paul, that he is apt to ‘go off upon a word;’ the point to which attention is drawn is an exaggeration of this peculiarity, which renders the connection, for several verses together, wholly verbal. Other characteristics are, the epexegesis of one expression or one verse by another, in apposition with it, as in i. 9, iv. 3, 6; the aggravation and accumulation of language in

* Paulus, der Apostel Jesu Christi, u. s. w. Stuttgart, 1845, 8vo, pp. 698.

such passages as i. 2, 3, 5, 8; the apparent unmeaningness of some emphatic expressions, ii. 5, iii. 11, v. 27; the recurrence of the same forms of speech and thought at the commencement of successive verses and paragraphs, i. 9, ii. 1, ii. 3, 5, ii. 7, 11, often traceable at a great distance, as in i. 6, ii. 14; climaxes, ii. 8, i. 5, in the latter passage with the favourite *οὐ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ*; negative and positive statements of the same thought, ii. 1-7; &c.

“(2.) Peculiarities of another class, found in the Epistles to the Thessalonians as well as in other writings of St Paul are the following:—

“The play of words, *δεδοκιμάσμεθα, δοκιμάζοντι*, in ii. 4; the paradox in i. 6, *ἐν ἡλίψει πολλῇ μετὰ χαρῆς πνεύματος ἁγίου* (compare Col. xxiv. 12;* 2 Cor. vii. 10, viii. 1); the mixed metaphor respecting the day of the Lord in v. 5, also in the same passage the double use of *κλέπτῃς, κλέπται* (compare Rom. xiii. 12, 1 Cor. iii. 15; and the inversion of thought in Rom. vii. 1-7); the substitution of the present for the future, in iii. 19 (compare Rom. ii. 16); verbal antithesis of prepositions, i. 5, *ἐν ὑμῖν δι’ ὑμᾶς*, iv. 7, *ἐπὶ ἀκαθαρσίᾳ, ἀλλ’ ἐν ἁγιασμῷ*, ii. 3, *οὐκ ἐκ πλάνης οὐδὲ ἐν δόλῳ*; pleonasms, as in i. 3, ii. 9, v. 23; repetition of *γὰρ* in several successive verses, i. 8, ii. 1; use of *γὰρ* in question, ii. 19, iii. 9; resumption of sentence after a digression with *διὰ τοῦτο*, iii. 5, iii. 7; the use of the double *ἵνα*, iv. 1; peculiar uses of words and expressions, such as *εὐαγγέλιον* for the preaching of the gospel, 1 Thess. i. 5; *ἀγών*, Col. iii. 1, 1 Thess. ii. 2, to express the passionate earnestness of his feelings towards his converts; *χαρὰ ἢ στέφανος*, 1 Thess. ii. 19; Phil. iv. 1, said also of his converts; *ἵνα μὴ ἐπιβάρῳ*, 2 Cor. iii. 5; *δυνάμενοι ἐν βάρει εἶναι*, 1 Thess. ii. 6, of his burdening the Church with his maintenance. Compare also the following:—

“*ἅπαν τῷ σώματι, παρὼν δὲ τῷ πνεύματι*, 1 Cor. v. 3; *ἐν προσώπῳ καὶ μὴ ἐν καρδίᾳ*, 2 Cor. v. 12; *προσώπῳ οὐ καρδίᾳ*, 1 Thess. ii. 17.

“Such intricate similarities of language, such lively traits of character, it is not within the power of any forger to invent, and least of all of a forger of the second century.”—(Vol. i. pp. 24-26.)

Similar niceties of identity in style are adduced with much ingenuity in regard to the second epistle.

While on this subject we must extract the following passages from the brief remarks on the genuineness of the Epistle to the Galatians:—

“Considering the number of forgeries which we know to have existed in the second century, and the absence either of the spirit or of the faculty of criticism in the early Church, we cannot set a high value on the testimony of the fathers, except to events which were contemporary with themselves. What they really testify respecting the books of the New Testament, is to their use and authority in their own day as the writings of the authors whose names they bear. But if the external testimony to the books of Scripture seems in this way to be weakened, the internal evidence of the genuineness of many of

* Qu. Phil. iv. 12? This is but one of many less excusable misprints.

them may be regarded as greatly enhanced. What criticism has restored, though incapable of being put in a definite and tangible form, abundantly compensates for what it has destroyed. If it will not allow us to take our stand upon tradition, it supplies us with many new kinds of proof. . . . And it fortunately happens, that the age least capable of affording reliable external testimony, is the age also least capable of feigning the marks of a genuine writing.

“The internal evidence for the Epistle to the Galatians is of two kinds:—First, that from the manner and character of St Paul; secondly, from the allusions to the history. No forger ever made an imitation in which were so many secret threads of similarity, which bore such a stamp of originality, or in which the character, the passion, the language, the mode of thought and reasoning, were so naturally represented. No forger, either with or without the Acts before him, would have given such an account of the relation of St Paul to the other apostles as we here find. There was no period in the later history of the church in which such a state of things could naturally have been conceived. Least of all could the dispute at Antioch, so agreeable to the character of the two apostles, yet so unlike the first thoughts of a later age respecting the earliest Christian church, have been the invention of the second century. It is a real evidence of the genuineness of the epistle, that Origen as well as Jerome and Chrysostom can only account for so remarkable a passage of history by resolving it into a collusion between the apostles.”—(Vol. i. pp. 198, 199.)

Some, we know, consider it waste of time, if not something worse, to reply in detail to such men as Dr Baur, whose whole method is so unhistorical, who has been triumphantly refuted in his own country by some of the first biblical scholars of the age, and whose school of criticism, with the works which represent it, has already seen its day. But such persons should remember that all minds are not established by one and the same process; that Baur and his coadjutors are men whose critical sagacity has been acknowledged by those who have least sympathy with their peculiar notions; that there is a *reformed* section of the Tübingen school, which, with all the learning of its elder branch, is not so wild in its theories regarding the documents and the character of primitive Christianity; and that profound research and critical acuteness are apt to have their weight with studious minds, in spite of the poison which runs through them. In this view, we are so far from sympathising with the feeling which would disparage the argumentation of our author against this party as superfluous, if not suspicious, that we heartily thank him for it. The study of the earliest Christian antiquity has advanced prodigiously within the last twenty or thirty years. The discovery by Cureton of the Syriac recension of the Ignatian Epistles, and other relics of early Syriac literature, and the labours of Bunsen on the ante-Nicæan literature of Christianity, have

had all the effect of the Ninevite discoveries on the reading portion of intelligent and liberal-minded Christians. In particular, the plausibilities of Baur with respect to the strength, the continuance, and the claims of the Petrine or anti-Pauline party in the early Church, in opposition to the representations of the Acts of the Apostles, forced the defenders of the canonical books to re-examine them with the utmost care, in immediate juxtaposition with all the sub-apostolic writings, orthodox and heretical, and every extant fragment and historical allusion. Out of all this has come not merely a complete exposure of the baselessness of the Tübingen theory of those canonical books which it assailed, but, what is of far more consequence, much new light on the earliest Church history, the influence of particular views, and the rise and character of the first Christian literature. And if we would not fall behind the day in which we live, and render ourselves unfit to guide those who *will* study these things, we must not barely tolerate,—we must encourage such investigations, sure that in the end all truth will be found a jewel, a jewel, too, in its right place; and that the inspired records, and what we can gather of the state of things for the first century after the last of the apostles left the stage, can be historically and critically studied to best advantage when viewed together.

We could willingly linger on this part of our subject, both from the interest which we feel in it and to do justice to our author, who in this field, though he treads it with a boldness which sometimes occasions exaggerated statement, is full of power. How masterly, for example, is the Dissertation entitled “St Paul and the Twelve,” notwithstanding some things decidedly overstated, and some expressions which seem to convey what we certainly cannot go along with. The following passages, though somewhat long, are perhaps the most suitable for quotation.*

We cannot afford space to notice the many striking views which occur in the Introduction to the Epistles treated; particularly those in the Introduction to the Epistle to the Romans, on the place which the Jewish religion held in the cultivated world immediately before and at the coming of Christ, and onwards for the first twenty or thirty years of the Christian Church. But one passage, on the uselessness of mere topographical researches and political history for the illustration of the Pauline Epistles, is so just and so well expressed, that before proceeding to “change our voice,” we must be allowed to give it in full. The allusion in the first paragraph to the

* * These passages, from vol. i. pp. 328, 343–345, and a beautiful remark at the close of the observations on “The Subject of the Epistle (to the Galatians),” pp. 196, 197, were all in type, but want of space has obliged us to omit them.

otherwise admirable work of Messrs Conybeare and Howson on the Life and Epistles of St Paul cannot be mistaken :—

“ It is not one of the objects of the present work to enter minutely either into the history of the cities to which the Epistles were addressed, or into the local features of the country in which they were situated. To fill the mind with historical pictures or descriptions of scenery, will not in any degree help us to feel as the apostles felt, or think as they thought; any more than the history of the reign of George III., or a description of the scenery of Somersetshire or Cornwall, would enable us to understand the life and character of Wesley or Whitefield. Interesting as such pictures may be, they tend to withdraw us from a higher interest, which is to be found only in the private character of the gospel narrative itself.

“ It is not in the first, but in the second century, that the Church comes into contact with the world. The life of Christ and his Apostles stands in no relation to the public history of their time. None of the great events of the world appear to touch them; no edict of the Roman emperors, with the single exception of the command of Claudius that the Jews should depart from Rome, has the least effect on the fortunes of the infant communion. Even in this case, we arrive at no other result than that Aquila and Priscilla met with St Paul at Corinth; and may conjecture of the possible influence of the dispersion of so many Jews throughout the empire. No name of any Christian convert in the New Testament can be certainly identified with the name of any one known to us from profane history.

“ Neither are the descriptions of particular cities or countries at all more instructive. The fact, that at Thessalonica there were many thousand Jews, is of very slight importance in connection with an epistle addressed to Gentiles; it is not more than a probability, that we can trace in the erring Galatians the spirit of the worshippers of Cybele or of the followers of Montanus. No amount of research into the history of the time would inform us of the first question respecting all the Epistles, whether they were addressed to Jews or Gentiles.

“ Such historical or topographical inquiries are of interest to the antiquarian; they are like the relaxation of foreign travel after severe study: but they have no real connection with the interpretation of Scripture; and they tend to withdraw the mind from the true sources of illustration of the Epistles, and the true nature of the earliest Christianity. They lead us away from the internal relation of all Jewish and heathen thought to the truths of the Gospel, to a relation between the Church and the world which is purely accidental and external. They tend to give a national and historical character to Christianity, ere yet it appeared to the eye of man as a phenomenon of history. It is not the least danger of such inquiries, that they fill up the void of materials by innumerable conjectures.

“ The traveller in Greece or in Asia who has followed in the footsteps of the Apostles, who has beheld with his own eyes the same scenes that were looked upon by St Paul and St John, is loath to believe that he can add nothing to our knowledge of the seven Churches, or of the labours of the Apostle of the Gentiles. Those scenes have a never-dying interest; but it is for themselves alone. Fain would we

imagine the sight upon which St Paul looked, when, standing on Mars' Hill, he 'beheld the city wholly given to idolatry ;' fain would we see in fancy the desert rocks of the sea-girt isle on which St John gazed when he wrote the Apocalypse. But we must not transfer to the ancient world our own impressions of nature or of art. Of that sensibility to the beauties of scenery, or of that romantic recollection of the past, which are such remarkable characteristics of our own day, there is no trace in the writings of the New Testament, nor any reason to suppose that they had a place in the minds of its authors.

"Taking the other aspect of the subject, we are far from denying that the birth of Christianity is the most interesting of historical facts : but its interest is also for itself alone ; it is not derived from any political influence which the Gospel at first exercised, or from any political causes which may have favoured or given rise to it. In the vastness of the Roman world it is a small isolated spot, the light, as it were, of a candle, which must be sought for,—not in the court of Cæsar, nor amid the factions of Jerusalem, but in the upper chamber in which the disciples met when 'the number of the names together was about an hundred and twenty, and the doors were shut for fear of the Jews.' It is one of those minute facts which escape the eye of the contemporary historian, and must not be drawn before its time into the circle of political events. *Its first greatness is the very contrast which it presents with the greatness of history.* Strange it is to think of the contemporary heathen world, of Tiberius at Capræ, of the Roman senate, of the solid framework of the Roman empire itself. But when this first feeling of surprise has passed away, we become aware that the page of Tacitus, or even of Josephus, adds nothing worth speaking of to our knowledge of the earliest Christianity. *The most remarkable fact supplied by them is their unconsciousness of its importance.*"—(Vol. i. pp. 27–30.)

In dealing with the objectionable portions of Mr Jowett's work, it is proper to state at the outset, that though the criticism contained in the foot-notes is quite in harmony, of course, with the theological discussion to which the Dissertations are chiefly devoted, it is far from affording the whole basis on which the author rests his conclusions. Indeed, it is plainly intended to occupy a very subordinate place. With his views of the looseness of the apostle's mode of thinking, and the rhetorical character of his language, he probably regards it as a waste of time to collect grammatical and philological materials for a right exegesis of his Epistles. By him, accordingly, all this is eschewed ; and though he is known to be an accomplished Grecian, he limits himself in his notes to the barest illustrations of the train of thought, the historical allusions, the light in which certain doctrinal statements are to be viewed, a few occasional remarks on the force of the connecting particles, and here and there of an important word. Any thing, therefore, like a separate examination of this part of the work is not here called for. Some specimens of interpre-

tation will be by-and-by forced on our notice by the theological interests which have plainly prompted them; but beyond these it will not be necessary to advert to the Critical Notes.

We have a natural starting-point for our observations in what relates to the apostle himself. "Remembering," says the author most justly, "that it is to the character of St Paul we must look for the illustration of his Epistles, and that his life and character centre in his conversion; and also that in this we find the image of that spiritual change, which, at sundry times and in divers manners, every Christian experiences in himself; it will not be out of place to consider at length the conversion of St Paul."—(Vol. i. 226.) Accordingly, we have one Dissertation on "*The Conversion of St Paul*"—(Vol. i. 222–235); and another, corresponding to it as the general to the particular, "*On Conversion and Changes of Character*," or what may be called the philosophy of Conversion.—(Vol. ii. 196–219). Along with this we shall take those pregnant observations, in the Introduction, on the enlargement of the apostle's mind, and the changes which his views underwent after his conversion (Vol. i. 3–14), with one or two passages from other Dissertations, and some of the Critical Notes.

These portions of the work afford a characteristic example of our author's manner. What is good is very good, and very able; but mixed up with so much of a very different nature, in the way of insinuation rather than of direct statement, that the feeling of delight in the one is wholly destroyed by that of disappointment and pain at the other.

How striking are the following paragraphs:—

"Conversion is the turning of the heart and affections towards God. It may be the work of an instant; it may occupy many years; it may diffuse itself imperceptibly over the whole of life. It may take place not at one time only, but occur again and again, and form a series of eras in our existence. It may arise from some accidental occasion; it may seem like the reaction against some great sin. Nations as well as individuals have been subject to the all-transforming power. The conversion of St Paul, the apostle of the Gentiles, is the type and beginning, also, of the conversion of the world.

"It is the nature of this great change to be independent of outward causes. It is not moral, but spiritual; that is to say, it transcends all the ordinary laws and known rules of our nature. It has a creative power of its own, which fashions the character of the individual and the institutions of the church alike. 'We are the clay, and He the potter.' When we consider mankind from without, they seem to have only a mechanical being; creatures, as they are often termed, of circumstances, dependent on habit, education, associations. When we consider them from within, we seem almost incapable of analysing our common nature; so rapid is the current of emotions, so absolute and

unlimited our apparent freedom. The change which we are considering is the highest act of this freedom of which men are capable, directed towards its highest object. It implies that at some time in their life they pass into new relations with God, and anticipate nature by grace, and have a new life breathed into their members. What they experience may be described in the words of the evangelist respecting our Lord: 'The Spirit of God descends upon them in a bodily form, like a dove, and rests upon them.'—(Vol. i. p. 222.)

"The mystery in which our whole moral being is involved, necessarily obscures the greatest change of which our moral nature is capable. There are changes of another kind, which we are, perhaps, as little able to analyse,—moments of action or of passion, which have altered the whole course of after life. But they have not been without their outward sign appearing on the surface. The change of which we are speaking, is the first-love of the soul towards the unseen, the single heroic act in which more than life is at stake. To describe it adequately is not within the power of language, and beyond the compass of human forms of thought. It can only take place by the soul passing out of itself; it can only be expressed in words that sound mystical; it remains only as a hidden life, which, the moment we attempt to withdraw it from its retreat, and see it as in a certain sense it truly is, becomes changed and different. 'Ye are dead, and your life is hidden with Christ and God.' It is a contrasted notion of himself the Christian has; 'as dying, and behold he lives;' as 'unknown, and yet well known;' standing in no relation to the outward world, upon which, except for purposes of action, he scarce permits himself to dwell. When other men call him good (as he truly is), he is ready to reply in the words which Christ used, not merely in irony, but as conveying the true sense of human nature respecting itself, "Why callest thou me good?"

"Such views may be censured as mystical, and as tending to discourage the due use of the means and instruments of religion. It would carry us beyond the subject of the present essay to consider the safeguards by which they may be surrounded. It is sufficient for us to say, with the apostle, 'God forbid; how shall we who are dead to sin live any longer therein?'"—(Vol. i. pp. 224, 225.)

To these we add the following from the Dissertation on "Conversion and Changes of Character:"—

"And yet these sudden changes [in the character of the first Christians] were as real, nay, more real than any gradual changes which take place among ourselves. The Stoic or Epicurean philosopher who had come into an assembly of believers speaking with tongues, would have remarked, that among the vulgar religious extravagances were usually short-lived. But it was not so. There was more there than he had eyes to see, or than was dreamed of in a philosophy like his. Not only was there the superficial appearance of poverty, and meanness, and enthusiasm, from a nearer view of which we are apt to shrink, but underneath this, brighter from its very obscurity, purer from the meanness of the raiment in which it was apparelled, was the life hidden with Christ and God. There, and there only, was the power which

made a man humble instead of proud, self-denying instead of self-seeking, spiritual instead of carnal, a Christian instead of a Jew,—which made him embrace, not only the brethren, but the whole human race in the arms of his love.”—(Vol. ii. p. 200.)

“Leaving further inquiry into the conversion of the first Christians at the point at which it hides itself from us in mystery, we have now to turn to a question hardly less mysterious, though seemingly more familiar to us, which may be regarded as a question either of moral philosophy or of theology,—the nature of conversion and changes of character among ourselves. What traces are there of a spiritual power still acting upon the human heart? What is the inward nature, and what are the outward conditions, of changes in human conduct?—(Vol. ii. p. 205.)

After a number of acute observations on the causes which operate to produce changes of character—some partial, some radical—the author continues:—

“We have wandered far from the subject of conversion in the early church, into another sphere, in which the words ‘grace, faith, the Spirit,’ have disappeared, and notions of moral philosophy have taken their place. It is better, perhaps, that the attempt to analyse our spiritual nature should assume this abstract form. We feel that words cannot express the life hidden with Christ and God; we are afraid of declaring on the house top what may only be spoken in the closet. If the rites and ceremonies of the elder dispensation, which have so little in them of a spiritual character, were a figure of the true, much more may the moral world be regarded as a figure of the spiritual world of which religion speaks to us.

“There is a view of the changes of the characters of men which begins where this ends, which reads human nature by a different light, and speaks of it as the seat of a great struggle between the powers of good and evil. It would be untrue to identify this view with that which has preceded, and scarcely less untrue to attempt to interweave the two in a system of ‘moral theology.’ No addition of theological terms will transfigure Aristotle’s *Ethics* into a *Summa Theologiæ*. When St Paul says—‘O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?’ ‘I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord;’ he is not speaking the language of moral philosophy, but of religious feeling. He expresses what few have truly felt concentrated in a single instant, what many have deluded themselves into the belief of, what some have experienced accompanying them through life, what a great portion even of the better sort of mankind are wholly unconscious of. It seems as if Providence allowed us to regard the truths of religion and morality in many ways which are not wholly unconnected with each other, yet parallel rather than intersecting; providing for the varieties of human character, and not leaving those altogether without law, who are incapable in a world of sight of entering within the veil.

“As we return to that ‘hidden life’ of which the Scripture speaks, our analysis of human nature seems to become more imperfect, less reducible to rule or measure, less capable of being described in a language which all men understand. What the believer recognises as the record

of his experience is apt to seem mystical to the rest of the world. We do not seek to thread the mazes of the human soul, or to draw forth to the light its hidden communion with its Maker, but only to present in general outline the power of religion among other causes of human action.

"Directly, religious influences may be summed up under three heads:—The power of God; the love of Christ; the efficacy of prayer."—(Vol. ii. pp. 214, 215.)

Passing what is said on the first of these, we cannot withhold what is said on the second:—

"But yet more strongly is it felt that the love of Christ has this constraining power over souls, that here, if anywhere, we are unlocking the twisted chain of sympathy, and reaching the inmost mystery of human nature. The light, once for all, of Christ crucified, recalling the thought of what, more than 1800 years ago, he suffered for us, has ravished the heart and melted the affections, and made the world seem new, and covered the earth itself with a fair vision, that is, a heavenly one. The strength of this feeling arises from its being directed towards a person, a real being, an individual like ourselves, who has actually endured all this for our sakes, who was so much above us, and yet became one of us, and felt as we did, and was like ourselves a true man. The love which he felt towards us, we seek to return to him; the unity which he has with God, he communicates to us. By looking upon him we become like him, and at length we see him as he is. Mere human love rests on instincts, the working of which we cannot explain, but which nevertheless touch the inmost springs of our being. So too we have spiritual instincts, acting towards higher objects, still more suddenly and wonderfully capturing our souls in an instant, and making us indifferent to all things else. Such instincts show themselves in the weak no less than in the strong; they seem to be not so much an original part of our nature as to fulfil our nature, and add to it, and draw it out, until they make us different beings to ourselves and others. It was the quaint fancy of a sentimentalist to ask whether any one who remembers the first sight of a beloved person, could doubt the existence of magic. Much more truly we may ask, Can any one who has ever once known the love of Christ, doubt the existence of a spiritual power?"—(Vol. ii. pp. 216, 217.)

One other half paragraph we give belonging to the third head:—

"This indistinctness in the very subject of religion, even independent of mysticism or superstition, may become to intellectual minds a ground for doubting the truth of that which will not be subjected to the ordinary tests of human knowledge, which seems to elude our grasp, and retire into the recesses of the soul the moment we ask for the demonstration of its existence. Against this natural suspicion let us set the fact, that, judged by its effects, the power of religion is of all powers the greatest. Knowledge itself is a weak instrument to stir the soul, compared with religion; morality has no way to the heart of man; but the Gospel reaches the feelings and the intellect at once."—(Vol. ii. p. 218.)

Such views of Conversion from an English Churchman contrast refreshingly with the perpetual references to Baptism, not only by Tractarians but by High Churchmen generally, as the grand solvent of all the mysteries of the spiritual life ; nor is it in less pleasing contrast with the empty generalities of Mr Maurice, whose substitute for Baptism as the all-transforming element in humanity is the universal justification and regeneration of the human race, and of each and every individual man, by the resurrection of Christ, independent altogether of their faith in it or apprehension of it;—which would have saved poor Cowper, if he had but known it, from sinking into despair.* Mr Jowett not only owns, but writes like a man who personally recognises, “*the greatest change of which our moral nature is capable*”—“*that spiritual change which at sundry times and in divers manners every Christian experiences in himself*”—assigning to Conversion, accordingly, the paramount place amongst the mysterious influences which go towards a change of character and life among men.

But now for two heavy drawbacks.

First.—The author cannot decide whether the circumstances attending the apostle's conversion on his way to Damascus were “*outward fact,*” or “*a sudden internal impression ;*” and even supposing the former, he considers it of little importance.

How much is involved in this will appear by-and-by. But let himself state the case :—

“There is no fact in history more certain or undisputed than that, in some way or other, by an inward vision or revelation of the Lord, or by an outward miraculous appearance, as he was going to Damascus, the apostle was suddenly converted from being a persecutor to become a preacher of the gospel.”—(Vol. i. p. 227.) But “if we submit the narrative of the Acts to the ordinary rules of evidence, we shall scarcely find ourselves able to determine whether *any outward fact* was intended by it or not. Such is indeed the impression at first sight conveyed ; but we must remember that this impression is gathered from our author, to whom the distinction of the spiritual and supernatural, which is so familiar to ourselves, had scarcely an existence;† who, if he had been asked the question which we are now considering, would probably have replied,—‘Whether in the body or out of the body, I cannot tell.’ It must be observed further, that the more objective character given to the event in the Acts, compared with that in the allusions of St Paul himself, is but such a difference as we might expect between the impressions made upon his own mind and the colour that the circumstance would naturally acquire when conceived by another. And the wavering of the different accounts, which has been already dwelt

* Theological Essays : Essay IX., On Justification by Faith, pp. 199–202, 205, 206, 216.

† Mr Jowett here means *Paul* ; but it was the *Author of the Acts* he was speaking of ; and Mr Jowett slips away from the one to the other by a singular substitution, which the reader will do well to observe. In the next sentence they are properly kept apart.

upon, as it prevents our insisting upon the details, so also *forbids our attaching much importance to the external or objective character of the event itself.*"—(Vol. i. p. 232.)

This opinion may not appear to involve much; but it is here that his *semi-naturalism* begins to peep out. The small importance which the author attaches to the external or objective character of what occurred on the way to Damascus he extends to *all the miracles of the New Testament*. We must examine it therefore:—

"It has been often remarked, that miracles are not appealed to singly* in Scripture as evidences of religion, in the same way that they have been used by modern writers. Especially does this remark apply to the conversion of St Paul. *Not a hint is found in his writings that he regarded 'the heavenly vision' as an objective evidence of Christianity.* The evidence to him,† was the sudden change of heart; what he terms, in the case of his converts, the reception of the Spirit; what he had known, and what he felt; the fact that one instant he was a persecutor, and the second a preacher of the gospel. The last inquiry that he would have thought of making, would be that of modern theologians,—'How, without some outward sign, *he could be assured of the reality of what he had seen and heard.*'"—(Vol. i. pp. 230, 231.)

"It is not upon the testimony of any single person, even were it far more distinct than in the present instance, we can venture to peril the truth of the Christian religion. Weak defences of comparatively unimportant points undermine more than they support. He who has the Spirit of Christ and his apostles has the witness in himself; he who leads the life of Paul has already set his seal that his words are true. Were the other view supported by the most irrefragable historical evidence, had the sign in the clouds been beheld by whole multitudes of Jews and Gentiles, believers and unbelievers, it is to the internal aspect of the event we should be more inclined to turn, both as *the more religious one*, and the one which more closely links the apostle with ourselves."—(Vol. i. p. 232, 233.)

To depreciate the evidence of miracles in proof of Christianity, is, we were well aware, the fashion now-a-days with a certain class, who affect to look at the question in a more *spiritual* light, and, under the influence of a morbid subjectivity of conception, resolve all into what our author calls "the internal aspect of such events,"—"the witness in one's self who

* It will be seen by the reader that this word "singly" is quite out of place. It implies that an appeal to miracles *collectively* might be competent, though not "singly," in evidence of Christianity; whereas the author means to affirm that they are not competent, as *objective evidence*, in any sense. To insert, therefore, the word "singly," though it may serve to soften the harshness of his statement to some ears, only vitiates its simplicity and serves as a blind.

† Here, again, the author substitutes one thing for another, and slips away marvellously from his point. That point is, that the apostle never thought of making "the heavenly vision" an *objective evidence* of Christianity; that is, an evidence independent of his own subjective impressions—an evidence for others. But in the words which we have printed in italics, in this and in the following sentences, the reader will observe that he retreats into the apostle's own subjective convictions. The most shallow must see that these are two quite different things.

has the Spirit of Christ and his apostles,"—who, "leading the life of Paul, has already set to his seal that his words are true." This they consider "*the more religious*" way. But we were scarcely prepared for so flat a contradiction from our author of the whole testimony of the New Testament regarding miracles. "It has often been remarked," he says, "that miracles are not appealed to singly in Scripture as evidences of religion—as an *objective evidence* of Christianity." Let him tell us, then, what our Lord meant when he said, "*If I had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had sin*" (John xv. 24); let him tell us what that most *subjective* and "*spiritual*" of all the evangelists meant by the following reflection, "*But though he had done so many miracles before them, yet they believed not on him*, that the saying might be fulfilled, He hath blinded their eyes," &c. (chap. xii. 37, 38, 40);* and what view of miracles it was which prompted him to say, at the close of his Gospel, "And many other signs truly did Jesus *in the presence of his disciples*, which are not written in this book; but these [few, as samples of the whole,] are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God," &c.—(Chap. xx. 30, 31).† And what means the very first appeal which Peter made to the multitude on the day of Pentecost? "Ye men of Israel, hear these words: Jesus of Nazareth, a man *approved of God among you by miracles, and wonders, and signs, which God did by him in the midst of you, as ye yourselves also know*. . . . This Jesus hath God raised up, *whereof we all are witnesses*."—(Acts ii. 22, 32.) In exactly the same light, as "an objective evidence of Christianity," is the cure of the lame man represented in the following chapter: "Ye killed the Prince of life, whom God hath raised from the dead, *whereof we are witnesses*; and his name, through faith in his name, hath made this man whole, whom ye see and know: yea, the faith which is by him hath given him this perfect soundness *in the presence of you all*."—(Chap. iii. 15, 16.) "What shall we do to these men?" exclaimed the rulers, "*for that indeed a notable miracle hath been done by them is manifest to all them that dwell at Jerusalem, and we cannot deny it*. But that it spread no further," (that is, the

* Most people would understand this to mean, that nothing but judicial infatuation could account for their resisting such miraculous *objective attestation* to Christ's teaching.

† It will be observed, that the evangelist, though he speaks of the miracles of Christ as "many," yet views them as many "single" miracles, whose number and glory only aggravated the guilt of those who resisted their evidence. So that when our author says, "miracles are not appealed to *singly*," as though an appeal to them *collectively* might be competent, but not singly, as already observed, he suggests a distinction which has as little foundation in Scripture as it has in common sense.—a distinction, too, which even his own train of argument does not admit of,—a distinction introduced for no other end that we can see, but to soften somewhat the impression which his statement is fitted to make upon his readers.

doctrine preached by these men, which the miracle only attested,)* "let us straitly threaten them, that they speak henceforth to no man in this name."—(Chap. iv. 16, 17.)

So much for miracles in general. Now for that great miracle which was the turning point in the apostle's life. "Not a hint," says our author, "is found in his writings that he regarded 'the heavenly vision' as an objective evidence of Christianity." Astonishing! On the contrary, it is beyond all dispute that he makes the most explicit appeal to it, and in this very light. The example which will occur to every one is in his great chapter on the Resurrection.—(1 Cor. xv.) Mr Jowett may depreciate the apostle's logic, and doubt if he "was capable of weighing evidence" (vol. i. p. 300); but in the logic of this chapter he will find it hard to detect a flaw. Intending to argue the resurrection of believers from that of their Lord, he begins by reminding the Corinthians that he had made that mighty fact a fundamental article in his teaching, in connection with his Death and Burial,—as a fact attested by a multitude of witnesses on different occasions, and *by himself among the rest*, who had seen him with their bodily eyes after he rose from the dead. And it is worthy of notice that *the same word is employed throughout the whole passage, to express the sight of the risen Saviour by one and all of these eye-witnesses, himself included*: "For I delivered unto you first of all that which I also received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures; and that he was buried, and that he rose again the third day according to the Scriptures; and that he was *seen* (ὤφθην) of Cephas, then of the twelve: after that he was *seen* (ὤφθην) of above 500 brethren at once; of whom the greater part are alive unto this present, but some are fallen asleep. After that he was *seen* (ὤφθην) of James; then of all the apostles. And last of all he was *seen* (ὤφθην) of me also, as of one born out of due time."—(Chap. xv. 3-8).†

But we have another and a previous assertion of the same thing in this Epistle, in terms equally naked, and for precisely the same purpose,—to make good his apostolic claims. "Am I not free? *Am I not an apostle?* HAVE I NOT SEEN JESUS CHRIST OUR LORD?"‡ Of course this must mean that he had

* This, and all that we have quoted from the Gospels, shows, by the way, that the miracles were never held up by *themselves* as objective evidence of Christianity—*apart from the truths* which they attested, and with a view to which alone they were wrought. In any other light they would have been valueless.

† Luke employs the same word in his Gospel, to express the risen Saviour's *appearance* to Simon, ὤφθη Σίμωνι (Luke xxiv. 34); and in the Acts, of his being "*seen* of them (ἀπαρίσταντες) forty days" (i. 3, with which compare ch. xiii. 31); while in reporting Ananias's address to the newly-converted apostle he uses the same word—"Brother Saul, the Lord, even Jesus, that *appeared* unto thee (ἐφθίς) in the way," &c.

‡ This order of the three questions is adopted on the authority of the two most

seen him just as others had done, with his bodily eyes. Mr Jowett may say, 'Why so, if only he saw him convincingly enough—no matter how—for his own satisfaction?' We answer, Because the apostle's point is not, whether he had evidence enough *for himself*, but such as to convince *others*; that is, the palpable and objective vision of his risen Lord, which all the apostles had as their indispensable qualification for being "witnesses of his resurrection." And yet Mr Jowett affirms that "not a hint is given in his writings that he regarded the heavenly vision as an objective evidence of Christianity."

But why are we to be restricted to "his writings?" Is the graphic narrative of his conversion, by his constant companion, in the Acts, to go for nothing? And are we to rest nothing on his own oral relations of what occurred to him on his way to Damascus? In reply to these questions, Mr Jowett does not deny that "the impression at first sight conveyed by the narrative of the Acts is, that *an outward fact* was intended by it." But "the more objective character given to the event in the Acts, compared with that implied in the allusions of St Paul himself is" (he thinks) "but such a difference as we might expect between the impressions made upon his own mind, and the colour that the circumstance would naturally acquire when conceived by another. And the wavering of the different accounts, as it prevents our insisting on the details, so also forbids our attaching much importance to the external or objective character of the event itself."—(Vol. i. p. 232.) Now, we have seen that the narrative in Acts is not one whit more objective than "the allusions of St Paul himself" to his sight of Christ,—if we except one passage in Galatians to which we shall come presently. And as to the wavering or variation of the accounts, which undoubtedly "prevents our insisting on the *details*," our question with Mr Jowett, and even Mr Jowett's own point here, is not about the details at all, but *about the objective or subjective character of the whole occurrence*. It is quite true that the accounts differ in detail; and though the usual explanations may be correct enough, our knowledge of the facts may not be such as to enable us to fuse all the accounts into one minutely accurate narrative. But the historical truth of the occurrence itself is only rivetted in the mind by these circumstantial divergencies, and twenty suppositions will immediately occur to any candid and intelligent person to account for these diversities. Be this however as it may, our author's point, and

valuable MSS. (A and B), and of most of the versions, by Griesbach, Scholz, Lachmann, and Tischendorf, and it has internal evidence in its favour, as it not only makes the apostle start with what he intends to expatiate upon—his apostolic *freedom*—but throws together the other two points, which are in the received text somewhat unnaturally separated—his *apostleship* and the *proof* of it.

ours with him, must not be shifted by this sidelong reference to "the details." And as he himself admits that the occurrences are narrated *objectively* in the Acts, we pass from it with this remark, that *Neander*, who might be presumed from the character of his mind to take this narrative in a subjective sense, if the evidence would possibly admit of it, and who in his actual treatment of it, has shown how very strong were his leanings in that direction—for which, indeed, he was twitted by Strauss—even *Neander* says, "The circumstances related in the text [of his own book], compared with the expressions of Paul himself, COMPEL ME TO ADMIT ITS REALITY [he means its objective reality]; and I recognise the importance of it for Paul himself, IN ORDER THAT, LIKE THE OTHER APOSTLES, HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO TESTIFY OF CHRIST AS RISEN FROM THE DEAD." * *

As to the apostle's own oral accounts of the matter, they stamp it with at least as *objective* a character as it is admitted that the historian of the Acts gives it, and in some expressions more so. Thus, while *Ananias*, in the historian's narrative, is made to say to the newly converted persecutor, "Brother Saul, the Lord, even Jesus, that appeared (*ὁ ὁφθείς*) unto thee in the way," &c. (chap. ix. 17); the apostle, in his own relation of the matter on the stairs of the castle, speaks still more emphatically, "The God of our fathers hath chosen thee, that thou shouldest know his will, and SEE (*ἰδεῖν*)† that Just One, and hear the voice of his mouth; FOR thou shalt be his witness unto all men of what thou hast SEEN (*ἑώρακας*) and heard."—(Chap. xxii. 14, 15.) Now, wherefore all this stress laid upon seeing as well as the hearing of that Just One? If all were one "internal impression," either the seeing and hearing would be undistinguishable from each other, or of no importance to distinguish. But they each relate to distinct parts of his furniture as a witness for his risen Lord. The autoptic testimony which he was to bear was purely to the FACT of his Master's resurrection; but "the voice of his mouth," which it was ordained that he "should hear," was intended to reveal to his soul the CHARACTER of Him on whom he gazed with his eyes. In the one feature of the scene, we have the Object seen; in the other, we have the Object interpreted. Without the latter, the former would have been all meaningless and fruitless to this hot but singularly gifted persecutor; but both together accomplished him, in a way peculiar to himself, for his witnessing work. And while a Christ seen with his bodily eyes is what he refers to once and again, as we have found, in

* Hist. of Planting, &c., (Bohn) 1851. Vol. i. p. 87, note.

† Compare chap. ix. 27, "But Barnabas took him, and brought him to the apostles, and declared unto them how he had seen the Lord (*ἰδεῖν τὸν Κύριον*) in the way, and that he had spoken to him," &c.

one epistle, where his sole object was to make good his apostolic "freedom,"—when he has to deal with the Galatians about "*the truth of the Gospel*," which had been corrupted by those false teachers that had "bewitched" the Galatians, it is no longer a Christ seen, but a *Christ interpreted* to his soul by the very "voice" of the risen One's "mouth," that he refers to. Beyond all doubt, this is the true explanation of that remarkable diversity of reference to the circumstances of his conversion which we find in Galatians, as compared to those in Corinthians. And hence, instead of arguing from it, that the whole scene was purely inward—or, as Mr Jowett would express it, if outward was of no importance as an objective occurrence—we but see here that *side* of the matter which alone had any bearing upon the truth of the Gospel, the other side being reserved for occasions of another kind. The very reading of the passage is enough to show this, without a word of comment: "But when it pleased God, who separated me from my mother's womb, and called me by his grace, to *reveal his Son in me,** that I might preach him among the heathen, immediately I conferred not with flesh and blood," &c.;—that is, in order to learn what he was to preach, having got all through the medium of this vision, and subsequent apostolic illumination.

This most significant and carefully observed distinction between Paul's testimony to the *Resurrection* of his Lord revealed to his *eyes*, and to the *Grace* of his Lord revealed in his *soul*, is a sufficient answer to Mr Jowett's insidious assertion, that the apostle could not, or at least did not, distinguish "between the *spiritual* and the *supernatural*,—a distinction" (he says) "which, familiar as it is to us, had scarcely an existence to him:" in other words, that when the changed man related, before the multitude and before Agrippa, in minutest detail, "how he had *seen the Lord* in the way," if any one had interrogated him about this alleged manifestation, whether he meant that the Lord Jesus had appeared to him in "*outward fact*," or he had merely had an "*inward impression*" of him, he would have been quite puzzled for an answer, since "such a distinction had to him scarcely an existence;" and when "in his writings" he classes himself with the other apostles, as having seen Christ as really as they, and was as competent therefore as they to witness to his resurrection, he would not have been able to tell, if he had been asked, whether this said sight of Christ was any thing more than such a "*spiritual*" impression of him as every Christian has, though perhaps more lively.

* *ἐν ἐμοί*, (says Mr Jowett, in his critical notes on these words, most justly,) in my inmost soul, not simply for *ἐμοί*. Compare *ὁ λατρεύων ἐν τῷ πνεύματι μου*. It was a revelation that dwelt in, and became one with, the apostle's thoughts.—(Vol. i. p. 217.)

But—and let the reader mark this—the whole object of Mr Jowett in such statements about the apostle, is to *reduce his authoritative character, to strip off from his testimony whatever is supernatural, and to hand over the man and his teaching to the critical judgment of modern Christians according to their own purely intrinsic merits.* We shall soon see how, by sundry processes, even these taper away, until the quantum of positive and intelligible truth remaining is so small as to amount to a *reductio ad absurdum*, revealing the destructive, rationalistic character of the author's whole method. Meantime we conclude our observations on this point with the words of Thiersch, whose writings against Baur and the Tübingen school form so valuable a contribution to the history of the apostolic and sub-apostolic periods—words which may justify the length of our observations:—"Paul himself bears witness that the risen Christ had appeared to him as really and bodily as he had to the other apostles during the forty days.—(1 Cor. xv. 8.) The other companions of Paul had an experience similar to that of the guardians of the grave at the moment of our Lord's resurrection.—(Acts. ix. 7, xxii. 9, xxvi. 14.) They who venture to apply the critique of their *semi-naturalism* to this appearance of Christ, ought to weigh the consequences of doing so; for if Paul was mistaken here [*i.e.*, in thinking it 'an outward fact,' when it was not], his whole faith and labours as the founder of the Church among the heathen, were mere fanaticism."*

Second.—The apostle Paul, according to Mr Jowett, was *the subject of no abiding apostolic illumination different in kind from that of any eminent Christian*; and underwent changes of opinion, such as others do, during his apostolic career, under the action of advancing time and unfolding events.

We should be extremely sorry to wrong the author; and considering what a balancing of one thing against another his Dissertations consist of, and what a bringing together of opposite features of mind and character there is in his treatment of the apostle Paul, one might have some apprehension that in the above statement we may be doing him injustice. But after carefully weighing all that bears upon this point, we can come to no other conclusion than we have expressed. In his apostolic *authority* to preach and gather in the first-fruits of a world-wide Church, Mr Jowett does indeed believe;

* "The Church in the Apostolic Age, and the Origin of the New Testament Writings." (Die Kirche im Apostolischen Zeitalter, und die Entstehung der Neutestamentlichen Schriften.) By Heinr. W. J. Thiersch, 1852. We quote from the English translation (Bosworth, 1852, p. 108). The more critical work, from the materials of which this first portion of a popular history of the Church is chiefly framed, is entitled, "Essay towards the Restoration of the Historical Standpoint for the Criticism of the New Testament Writings." (Versuch zur Herstellung des Historischen Standpoints für die Kritik der Neutestamentlichen Schriften.) 1845.

and nothing can be more able, and, on a very difficult question—the relation of Paul to the other apostles—expressed with more judgment than the views which he unfolds. Nor does he appear to have any doubt of his being the subject from time to time of “visions and revelations.” But with all this he seems to have no faith in his being the subject of ABIDING SUPERNATURAL ILLUMINATION—*such illumination as demands for the views of Christian doctrine which he gives forth the implicit, unquestioning belief of Christians in all time.** Every one must see that this point involves unspeakable results. If the apostle’s views of Christian doctrine are of *binding authority*, there is an end at once of every thing but exegesis to discover what he really does give forth, and a mind and heart of proper susceptibility to receive it. Whereas if Paul, divinely called though he was to preach Christ, had no authority for any thing which he uttered beyond the historical facts of Christianity which every other preacher had,—if every thing in his oral addresses and canonical writings, over and above those historical facts—in short, ALL HIS PECULIAR DEVELOPMENT OF THOSE FACTS—is to be regarded not as *part and parcel of authoritative and abiding Christianity itself*, but merely as that *phase* in which Christianity presented itself to the mind of the most wonderful man whom the Christian Church has ever possessed, a phase, too, varying even in his mind, as time and events enlarged and corrected his first ideas;—if this be the state of the case, it is at least well to know where we are.

That this is, in brief, Mr Jowett’s view, will, we think, immediately appear. We shall not quote particular passages in proof of it, because it comes out not so much by explicit avowal as by every thing, both in the critical notes and in the Dissertations, being conceived and reasoned on the supposition of this being the actual state of the case.

Our author opens up a pathway for his views upon this point, though with a good deal of caution, at the very outset, in his Introduction to the work, arranging “the greater number of the Epistles of St Paul into two groups”—those written before his imprisonment (Galatians, Corinthians, and Romans), and “the Epistles of the Imprisonment” (Ephesians, Colossians, Philippians, and Philemon); and “placing at either end, and at a distance from the rest,” the two Epistles to the Thessalonians at the one end, and the Pastorals at the other. He then says :—

“Reading the Epistles in chronological order, many will be tempted

* We use the phrase “abiding supernatural illumination” here, in place of “*inspiration*,” as the latter has become with a certain class the chosen and almost cant term for any species of mental elevation, whether religious or poetical.

to trace in them a gradual development of idea and doctrine." Others, again, will seek to impress upon them the same fixed type of truth held from the beginning, 'the faith once delivered to the saints.' Neither of these views is justified by an examination of the Epistles themselves. Both seem to lose sight of their practical aim, and of their fragmentary and occasional character. There is a growth in the Epistles of St Paul, it is true; but it is the *growth* of Christian life, *not of intellectual progress*—the growth *not of reflection*, but of spiritual experience, enlarging as the world widens before the apostle's eyes, passing from life to death, or from strife to peace, with the changes in the apostle's own life, or the circumstances of his converts. There is a rest also in the Epistles of St Paul, discernible not in forms of thought or types of doctrine, but in the person of Christ himself, who is the centre in every Epistle, however various may be his modes of expression, or his treatment of controversial questions."—(Vol. i. pp. 3, 4.)

The words we have printed in italics in this extract may seem to negative the statement we have given of Mr Jowett's views; and the following paragraph, which in justice to him we must quote, seems to express nothing but what we can thoroughly assent to :—

"The difference, as well as the identity, are most clearly seen by the general comparison of the first with the second of the two above-mentioned groups of the Epistles. Such an one as Paul the aged, the prisoner of the Lord, regarding the strife of the world and of the Church from his cell at Cæsarea or Rome, is another man from the same Paul when immersed in the strife itself, bearing the cross of Christ from place to place; in contests and trials everywhere,—from the Jews,—from false brethren let in unawares,—from the fickleness of his own converts, ever 'ready to affect others rather than himself,'—yea, and from those that 'seemed to be pillars,' the apostles at Jerusalem. No man leading two entirely different lives writes and expresses himself in precisely the same manner. There is one mode of expression we naturally adopt when near, another at a distance,—one in the fulness and vigour of life, another in the near approach of death,—one in joy, another in sorrow,—one in sympathy with others, another when at variance with them. Change of sphere will often produce a corresponding change in the style and cast of our thoughts. What we have long or often meditated upon we express differently from what flashes upon us for the first time; what comes to us sealed by the experience of many years, assumes a different character in our minds from what with equal confidence we believed and acted upon in the fervour of first conviction.—Such is the kind of difference between the first and second of the two groups into which we have divided the Epistles of St Paul."—(Vol. i. p. 4.)

But as the author goes on to point out the *kind* of difference which we observe between the earlier and the later Epistles, we find that very change of views which seems repudiated, in the words above printed in Italics, asserted and contended for at considerable length. He affirms, for example, that "one

whose life was spent in conflict with his own nation *must in the course of that conflict more and more have laid aside the garb of Judaism*, the weak and beggarly elements" of the law, and "we should infer," he adds, "that in the short period of three or four years (spent as he remarks in three of the most cultivated cities of the world, Athens, Corinth, and Ephesus), surrounded as the apostle was by so many influences, pouring himself out daily in prayer and exhortation to all the Churches, *perhaps coming in contact more nearly than before with the Alexandrian learning*, such a change might very well have taken place," &c.—(Vol. i. p. 7.) Such a change Mr Jowett sees implied in a passage which our readers will be as much surprised as we are to see pressed into the service. We refer to 2 Cor. v. 16, "*Yea, though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now henceforth know we him no more.*" To our author, it is beyond a doubt that Paul is here referring not to the Corinthians, or to Christians generally, but to himself; and not to the period before his conversion, but to his earlier Christian apprehensions and preaching, as contrasted with his then riper and better views. And what was this earlier Christianity of the apostle?—

"In general terms, it may be explained as *the knowledge of Christ in a more Jewish and less Christian manner*, from without rather than from within,—a knowledge of him, the very antithesis of that which St Paul speaks of in his later Epistles, as 'the life hidden with Christ in God;' such as St Paul had himself had in 'the beginning of the Gospel;' such as he imparted to his converts, 'when he was not able to speak unto them as unto spiritual but as fleshly, as babes in Christ.'"—(1 Cor. iii. 1.)

"The remarkable expression in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians is not absolutely isolated, but derives confirmation from other places in the writings of the Apostle. About four years later, in writing to the Galatians, he says (chap. v. 11), '*And I, brethren, if I yet preach circumcision, why do I yet suffer persecution? then is the offence of the cross ceased.*' These words can have no other meaning than that St Paul had once preached what his opponents declared to be the doctrine of the circumcision. That he was conscious also of a certain progress in his life, '*forgetting those things that are behind, and reaching forth to those things that are before,*' is also manifest from such passages as Phil. iii. 13, Eph. iv. 13, 14. That there was a difference in his mode of preaching to the Jew and to the Gentile—to the weak and to the strong—he himself asserts, where he says, '*To the Jews became I as a Jew;* and, '*I, brethren, could not speak unto you as unto spiritual, but as unto carnal, as unto babes in Christ.*' Compare 1 Cor. ii., Heb. vi. 1–3. It is remarkable also, that long afterwards, in writing to the Philippians, he should have described this very time, the time, that is, of his writing the Epistle to the Thessalonians, though more than fourteen years after his conversion, as the beginning of the Gospel.—Chap. iv. 15."—(Vol. i. pp. 9, 10.)

On the passages here so perversely interpreted, the reader will find a remark or two in the note below, as we must save space in the text to let the reader fully see how the author practically carries out his theory of a *flux in the Apostle's views of Christian doctrine*.* As an example of this, he brings into contrast, first, both the Epistles to the Thessalonians, as a specimen of the Apostle's earliest views and teaching, with the Epistle to the Philippians, as one of the riper Epistles of the

* The whole context of the passage first quoted (2 Cor. v. 16), shows clearly that the contrast is not between two periods in the Apostle's *converted life*, or that of his fellow-Christians or preachers, but between the view taken of Christ by believers *before and after conversion*. The "henceforth," or "no longer," (*μὴκέτι*), of ver. 15, the "henceforth," or "from this time," (*ἀρὰ τοῦ νῦν*), of ver. 16, and the "now henceforth no more," or "now no longer," (*νῦν οὐκέτι*) of the same verse, with the resumptive "therefore," (*ἵνα*) of ver. 17,—all point to one transition from the unconverted to the converted state. "From and after this latter period, we see every thing and every person—even Christ himself—in a new light.—(Ver. 16.) In short (*ἵνα*), if any man be in Christ (has made that mighty transition), he is a new creature; old things (belonging to his unconverted state) have passed away, all things have become new."—(Ver. 17.) There is not a trace in the whole context of any comparison between a *crude* and a *ripe* Christianity in the same person, Paul or any one else.

We deeply regret to observe that Mr Stanley, though he does not make this the direct sense of the verse in question, yet thinks the words "lead us to *infer*" such a change in the Apostle's mind after conversion, and deems it "a remarkable confession of former weakness or error, and of conscious progress in religious knowledge."—(Epistles of St Paul to the Corinthians, with Critical Notes and Dissertations, vol. ii. p. 106, note.) This is one of the all too close coincidences between the two works.

The turn which Mr Jowett gives to his first confirmatory passage,—Gal. v. 11, "And I, brethren, if I *yet* preach circumcision, why do I yet suffer persecution?"—as if it "could have no other meaning than that he had *once* preached what his opponents declared to be the doctrine of the circumcision," is if possible more surprising. A glance at the context, and the whole Epistle, with a very slight recollection of the opposition which the Apostle encountered from the very first, (unless our author is prepared to give up the Acts to Dr Baur as a one-sided history, drawn up to sustain Paul's consistency,) should suffice to dissipate so very uncalled-for a sense of the Apostle's words—words in which, as the best interpreters, from Chrysostom downwards, have held, are only an allusion to a charge made against the Apostle, that with all his zeal against circumcision, there were facts, such as the circumcision of Timothy, which showed that his leanings were in that direction,—an insinuation which by the word "yet," (*ἔτι*), he scouts, as if he would *still* linger amongst the antiquated shadows of Judaism. (See Bengel, Olshausen, &c.) On his second and third confirmatory passages, about Paul's forgetting the things that were behind, &c., and believers growing up to the stature of Christ (Phil. iii. 13, and Eph. iv. 13, 14), it is scarcely necessary to say a word, as they imply no more than that gradual progress, in spiritual apprehension and experience, which is realised in the life of grace as much as in that of nature, and in Apostles no less than in other Christians,—a very different sort of progress from what Mr Jowett sees in our great Apostle.

His fourth passage—"To the Jews became I a Jew"—is surely a strange proof of the Apostle's being at one time too much of a Jew himself in his Christianity.

But what shall we say of his fifth passage—"And I, brethren, could not speak unto you as unto spiritual, but as unto carnal, even as unto babes in Christ,"—as if it were a confession of his own former carnality and babehood, and consequent *inability* to dispense to them any thing better than babe's meat! Was there ever such a perversion of Scripture! Here, at least, Mr Stanley diverges from him, referring the Apostle's "inability" wholly to the want of spiritual apprehension on the part of the Corinthians to take in that profound wisdom of the Gospel which otherwise he was prepared and desirous to dispense to them.

Finally, he refers to what the Apostle calls "the beginning of the Gospel" (Phil. iv. 15), as if Paul was alluding to a time when the Gospel was only "beginning" to open upon his own mind,—when his knowledge of it was but crude and elementary. This is perfect trifling. The obvious meaning is, 'In the beginning of the Gospel's being preached efficaciously among those Philippians.' (See the Commentators.)

These specimens of interpretation only show to what wretched shifts one is put who searches for proofs of a flux in the Apostle's Christian theology—from the raw to the ripe, from first hasty impressions to such as time and events tended gradually to shape out and consolidate in his mind.

Imprisonment; and next, even the First Epistle to the Thessalonians itself with the Second. We must ask the reader's careful attention to our extracts on both these contrasts, and particularly to what we print in italics and capitals:—

“That such a change is capable of being traced, has been already intimated. Both Epistles to the Thessalonians, with the exception of the personal narrative and of a few practical precepts, are the expansion and repetition of a single thought—‘the coming of Christ.’ It was the absorbing thought of the Apostle and his converts, quickened in both by the persecutions which they had suffered. Not that with this expectation of Christ’s kingdom there mingled any vision of a temporal rule over the kingdoms of the earth. That was far from the Apostle. *But there was that in it which fell short of the more perfect truth.* It was not ‘the kingdom of God is within you;’ but ‘*lo here, and lo there.*’ (!) *It was defined by time, and was to take place within the Apostle’s own life. The images in which it clothed itself were traditional among the Jews; they were outward and visible, liable to the misconstruction of the enemies of the faith, and to the misapprehension of the first converts, imperfectly, as the Apostle saw afterwards, conveying the inward and spiritual meaning. The kingdom which they described was not eternal and heavenly, but very near and present, ready to burst forth everywhere, and by its very nearness, in point of time, seeming to touch our actual human state. Afterwards the kingdom of God appeared to remove itself within, to withdraw into the unseen world.* The earthen vessel must be broken first, the believer unclothed that he might be clothed upon, that mortality may be swallowed up of life. HE WAS NO LONGER ‘WAITING FOR THE SON FROM HEAVEN;’ but ‘*desirous to depart and be with Christ,*’—(Phil. i. 23.) Such is the change, not so much in the Apostle’s belief as in his mode of conception;* a change natural to the human mind itself, and above all to the Jewish mind; a change which, after it had taken place, left the vestiges of the prior state in the MONTANISM OF THE SECOND CENTURY; which may not improperly be regarded as THE SPIRIT OF THE FIRST CENTURY overliving itself. Old things had passed away, and behold, all things became new. And yet the former things—the material vision of Christ’s kingdom—have ever been prone to return; not only in the first and second century, but in every age of enthusiasm, men have been apt to walk by sight and not by faith. In the hour of trouble and perplexity, when darkness spreads itself over the earth, and Antichrist is already come, they have lifted up their eyes to the heavens, looking for the sign of the Son of man,

“We do not pretend precisely to draw the line between the earlier and later teaching of the Apostle. Some elements of the earlier mode of thought may be traced in the later Epistles, *but as it were ready to vanish away, and attaching themselves less to the substance and more to the form of the Apostle’s writings.* When the things spoken of are such ‘as eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the

* Let not the reader be deceived by this convenient distinction, according to which a Sabellian and a Trinitarian may be said to differ, “not so much in their belief as in their mode of conception;” and even Pantheism may shelter itself under this broad canopy of a “mode of theistic conception.”

heart of man to conceive,' it would be an error to dwell too much on the manner in which they are presented to us. Nor is it meant entirely to describe *the nature of the Apostle's preaching according to the flesh*, or to determine *how much of it may have been based upon popular or traditional beliefs of the Jews, or what it had in common with the Montanism of the second century*. The only sources from which it is possible to gather an answer to questions like these, are the Epistles to the Thessalonians themselves, the difference of which from the later Epistles is too plain to be mistaken. Whether the passage in the Corinthians be connected with them or not, that difference remains the same. However little we know about it, the change which we have been describing is not imaginary but real.

"Nor must it be lost sight of, that in the difference between the First and Second Epistles themselves, we find a link of transition between the Thessalonians and the later writings of the Apostle. The Second Epistle, it is true, is not more mystical and spiritual in its character than the First; it speaks of a future judgment under the same outward imagery. *But it defers its advent: the course of this world is to go on for a time; THE DAILY OCCUPATIONS OF LIFE ARE TO BE PURSUED; the day of the Lord is not at hand in any such sense THAT SUDDEN CONFUSION SHOULD ARISE.** It is in this respect that it agrees with the later writings of St Paul, viz., in withdrawing the mind from an expectation of an immediate as well as *outward* coming of the Lord Jesus."—(Vol. i. pp. 10–12.)

In the following paragraph the author thinks it a confirmation of these statements, "that St Paul should *in his first two journeys* have been carried before Roman governors as an enemy to Cæsar,—that he and his fellow-teachers should be designated as 'they that turned the world upside down,' as, though in one sense false, such accusations have generally a colour of truth; and it is hardly likely, that at Thessalonica itself the Jews would have said, 'These all do contrary to the decrees of Cæsar, saying that there is another king, one Jesus,' had the Apostle only spoken of a kingdom not of this world. It is remarkable (he adds) that *on his third journey*, the persecution of the Romans has wholly ceased. Neither at the places which he then visited, nor on his trial at Jerusalem, is any suspicion urged of his teaching contrary to Cæsar."

What, now, does all this amount to? Why, to this shocking position: That up to the period of the Apostle's third journey—that is, FOR FIVE AND TWENTY YEARS AFTER HIS CONVERSION—the Apostle's views of Christian truth were characterised by Jewish narrowness, and his teaching was "according to the flesh," whereas after that, he apprehended

* Let the reader mark the insinuation conveyed by the clauses printed in capitals with reference to the First Epistle to the Thessalonians, by contrast with the Second; as if it had not been till the second was written that the Apostle himself clearly saw the possibility and propriety of pursuing the daily occupations of life, and keeping themselves from sudden confusion—such was his excitement under the daily expectation of Christ from heaven.

and taught the same truths "in a more *spiritual* manner." In particular, during the former period, he believed in and preached an external and visible coming and kingdom of Christ, "a kingdom defined by time, and to take place within his own lifetime,"—or, as Mr Jowett deems it, *incipient Montanism*. In this state of mind, when he wrote his First Epistle to the Thessalonians, he could not urge "pursuit of the daily occupations of life, nor guard against sudden confusions;" and it was only as his own mind was progressing towards "spirituality," when he wrote his Second Epistle, that he was able to restore the ordinary balance of things. Under such exciting doctrine it was no wonder, nay rather was quite natural, that he should be charged with hostility to Cæsar, and to the whole existing order of things. But when at length he came "no longer to wait for the Son from heaven, but only for his own departure to be with him in heaven," when the kingdom which he preached "removed itself within, and withdrew into the unseen world;" in other words, when Paul ceased to believe in any coming of Christ again to the earth, and substituted the more spiritual doctrine of our going to him at death,—*then* all charges of disloyalty to Cæsar ceased, and he was no longer regarded as inimical to society. In a word, for a quarter of a century the preaching of Paul only anticipated and antedated the Montanism of the second century; and when that Phrygian phrenzy,—the materialistic fanaticism of Montanus,—at length broke forth, it was but the spirit of Paul's earlier Christianity, and indeed of the first century generally, overliving itself.

It would be easy, indeed, to show, by a comparison of the later, and even the latest, with the earlier writings of the Apostle, how baseless is this theory of a change in his views regarding the coming and kingdom of Christ, with all collateral topics. But it is quite superfluous. No doubt, there is a difference, a great difference, between the topics handled and the manner of handling them, in the former and in the latter. But sufficient explanations of this will occur to any one, without resorting to the rationalistic theory of Mr Jowett.

We have called our author's theory regarding the Apostle's Christian teaching *rationalistic*; and we must now show, in a way which has not yet come out, how fearfully accurate this term is. We the rather take a little pains to do this, even at the risk of curtailing our space for the discussion of specific points of doctrine, because it is beyond doubt *far more dangerous to suck in the poison of such rationalism*, as to the unchanging and authoritative character of all Apostolic teaching, *than to be carried away by his plausibilities on any specific doctrine*.

In his critical notes on the eleventh of the Romans, he tells us in his summary, that "now a further insight into the purposes of God breaks upon him. In the order of providence came the Jew first, and afterwards the Gentile; and the Jew last returning to the inheritance of his fathers. The erring branch, that has twined with the briers of the wilderness, is brought back to its own olive, and the tree covers the whole earth."—(Vol. ii. p. 266.) In other words, the light of Jewish national restoration breaks upon the Apostle. But presently we are told that if he had lived long enough, he would have "changed his voice," and given up the whole thing as unbelievable. The light, then, that was in him when he wrote this chapter, must just have been darkness. Hear his words:—

"And yet it will be urged, and cannot be denied, that the Jewish people remain as they did from the beginning. Judging humanly, might we not say that every century, if it has not increased their animosity to the Gospel, has rendered more inveterate those differences of thought and habit, which to nations as to men become a second nature, and cannot be laid aside? How is this to be reconciled with the language of the Apostle? RATHER LET US ADMIT THAT IT IS NOT TO BE RECONCILED, and yet that the truth of the Gospel may remain with us still. *It is 'I,' NOT THE LORD, who am speaking, as an Israelite of Israelites, within the circle of the Jewish dispensation,* after the manner of the time, according to the received mode of interpreting prophecy in the schools of Philo and the Rabbis. 'I cannot but utter what I hope and feel.'*† There is no irreverence in supposing that St Paul, *who after the lapse of a few years looked, not for the coming of Christ, but rather for his own departure to be with Christ, would have changed his manner of speech when, after eighteen centuries, he found 'all things remaining as they were from the beginning.'*‡ *His spirit itself bids us read his writings not in the letter, but in the spirit.*§ He who felt his views of God's purposes gradually extending, who read the voice within him by the light of daily experience, could never have found fault with us for not attempting to reach beyond the horizon within which God has shut us up."||—(Vol. ii. pp. 279, 280.)

* These are just so many euphemisms for the force of Jewish prejudice.

† That is, all the unhesitating and authoritative announcements of this chapter are nothing but the expressions of human "hope and feeling," nay, those only of a rabbinical Jew, and him but the mouthpiece of his day.

‡ That is, as Paul found himself mistaken as to the return of Christ to us, and had to substitute for it our own departure to him, there can be no irreverence in supposing that when he found himself mistaken about the Jews' recovery to Christ, he would have substituted something else,—some analogous *spiritual* expectation in place of it. Certainly, there is no more irreverence in the one than in the other. If the former way of treating his writings be right, there can be nothing wrong in the latter.

§ That is, since he himself dealt so freely with the truth, modifying and adjusting his ideas of it as time and events showed him the crudity of his earlier conceptions, we may very well deal in like manner with himself, correcting such of his statements as he would in all likelihood have corrected himself if he had lived long enough to see, as we see, the untenableness of them.

|| In other words, as events have proved that the Jews are *beyond change*, and we cannot, therefore, believe in Paul's predicted conversion of them to Christ, we must just take it for granted that, treating him only as he treated his earlier self, he would not think us guilty of any undue disrespect to his dicta!

After the running comments which we have made—in the footnotes, to save space—on this extraordinary paragraph, it will not be necessary further to develop the undisguised rationalism which it expresses.

But it is necessary to show that *the whole circle of divine truth—experimental and practical as well as dogmatic Christianity—is treated exactly in the same style; in other words, that the whole teaching of the Bible is subjected to a critical examination, not for the better comprehension of it as authoritative divine teaching, but to determine whether, and how far, it is possible to believe it in the present advanced state of the world and of the human mind.*

One illustration of this, on a specific doctrine, and one on vital and practical Christianity in general, will suffice. Take, then, the very first topic except one, which is formally handled in the Dissertations—the Essay, “*On the Belief in the Coming of Christ in the Apostolical Age.*”—(Vol. i. pp. 96–107.)

In the very first sentence of this essay, we have one of those *blinds*, which we are sorry to have observed once and again throughout the work, the object of which seems to be to veil somewhat the nakedness, and soften a little the harshness, of its more startling positions. “The belief,” says the author, “in the *near approach* of the coming of Christ, is spoken of or implied in almost every book of the New Testament,” &c. From this commencement you would conclude, that the author is simply going to discuss the question, How to reconcile the predicted *nearness* with the proved *distance* of the Second Advent. But what is your astonishment to find, ere you have finished the first paragraph, that the question he proposes to discuss is no less than, How to reconcile the announcement of another Coming of Christ *at all*, seeing *there is to be none*. True, “it is spoken of, or implied, in almost every book of the New Testament, in the discourses of our Lord himself, as well as in the Acts of the Apostles, in the Epistles of St Paul, no less than in the Book of the Revelation.” Nevertheless, *it is not to be*. “To depart and be with Christ,” is all we have now to expect. But how can this be? Well, “*it is a subject from which the interpreter of Scripture would gladly turn aside*. For it seems as if he were compelled to say at the outset, ‘*that St Paul was mistaken, and that in support of his mistake he could appeal to the words of Christ himself.*’ Nothing can be plainer than the meaning of those words [of Christ, announcing his coming again], and yet they seem to be contradicted by the very fact, that after eighteen centuries the world is as it was.”—(Vol. i. p. 96.) After various suggestions on this point, there occur the following words:—“It may also be regarded as an indication, that *we were not in-*

tended to interpret Scripture apart from the light of experience, or violently to bend life and truth into agreement with isolated texts." As to "isolated texts," this is just another of our author's *blinds*. He has admitted that the whole New Testament proclaims the coming of Christ again: If, then, "the light of experience" is against this, it is not "isolated texts" that stand in his way, but "*Scripture*" itself, as he properly says in the other clause of the same sentence; and the plain meaning of his words is, that since "experience" says one thing and "Scripture" another—"life and truth" go one way and the "texts" another—we must abide by the former, come what will of the latter. Why will he not speak this out? The next sentence is worse still.

"LASTLY, SO FAR AS WE CAN VENTURE TO MOVE SUCH A QUESTION OF OUR LORD HIMSELF, we may observe that HIS TEACHING here, as in other places [the author means *on other topics*, for "places" of Scripture there are none referred to], IS ON A LEVEL WITH THE MODES OF THOUGHT OF HIS AGE, clothed in figures, as it must necessarily be, to express 'the things that eye hath not seen' limited by time, as if to give the sense of reality to what otherwise would be vague and infinite [qu. indefinite?], yet mysterious in this respect too, for of 'that hour knoweth no man;' and that however these figures of speech are explained, or these opposite aspects reconciled, their meaning dimly seen has been the stay and hope of the believer in all ages, who knows, nevertheless, that since the Apostles have passed away, all things remain the same from the beginning, and that 'the round world is set so fast that it cannot be moved.'—(Vol. i. p. 97.)

The phraseology of this long sentence is exceedingly deceitful. That things which eye hath not seen should need to be clothed in figures—things infinite in concrete forms—we can quite understand. But deceitful forms and figures that teach the reverse of truth are worse than none; and such, by Mr Jowett's own showing, is the announcement that Christ is coming again to this earth. Such an intimation cannot by any possibility be fitted to teach a rational man that he is *not* to come at all, but that we are to go to him. Accordingly, has not Mr Jowett already told us that when Paul came to see that his early teaching was wrong, he adjusted it? when he discovered that Christ was not to come to us, but that he was going to Christ, he "changed his manner of speech?" Yes, it was not that such departure to be with Christ would be unintelligible unless clothed in the figure of Christ's coming to us; but that as soon as he came to see that the one was not correct, he substituted the other. So that all this about "clothing things mysterious and infinite in figures," is just a blind. It has nothing to do with the momentous question which the author dares to moot. That question is this: *Is*

our Lord's teaching, on this and other topics, on a level with the modes of thought of his age,—in other words, accommodated to the current ideas of his time? Not, Does he employ current figures and forms of speech, but is *the thing taught* by him, in the subject-matter of it, thus accommodated? This is what Mr Jowett means to affirm, as the next paragraph makes perfectly plain. "The surprise," he says, "that we naturally feel when the attention is first called to *this discrepancy between faith and experience* [that is, between what Scripture says and experience shows to be true] is greatly lessened by our observing that even the language of Scripture is not free from inconsistency." After quoting some of these "inconsistencies," he asks, "Is it reverent or irreverent to say that Christ knew what he himself declares that 'he did not know?' Is it consistent or inconsistent with the language of the Gospel that the Apostle Paul should at first have known no more than our Lord had taught his disciples? or that in the course of years only he should have grown up to another and a higher truth, that 'to depart and be with Christ is far better.'"—(Vol. i. pp. 97, 98.) The *principle* at the bottom of these statements is so awfully vital that we hesitate to notice any thing subordinate in them, else we might ask whether it is meant to reduce the Apostle's first teaching to the level of what "our Lord taught his disciples," or made them to understand before his death, and before the illumination of their minds on the day of Pentecost? and whether, when the Apostle says that "to depart and be with Christ was *far better*," he meant "far better than *Christ's coming to us?*" Mr Jowett knows that he did not, but that he meant it was far better to depart to Christ than "*to abide in the flesh*," and it is unworthy of him to twist the Apostle's words into the other sentiment. But these things are a bagatelle compared with the question about our Lord himself. In what sense our Lord meant those words to be taken, "Of that day and that hour knoweth no man, no not the Son, but the Father only," has been the subject of much discussion, and some difference of opinion, among theologians. But what Mr Jowett *means* to ask, under cover of his question on this point, is, DID OUR LORD KNOW, OR DID HE NOT KNOW, WHETHER HE WAS TO COME AGAIN AT ALL? He who ventures to raise such a question shows at least in what direction his own mind leans; and as our readers would not thank us for discussing so monstrous a question here, it is only necessary to observe how our author follows out his train of thought. The paragraph we are quoting from concludes thus:—"Our conception both of time and place becomes indistinct as we enter into the unseen world. And does not the Scripture itself acknowledge these necessary limits of its own revelation to man."

—(Vol. i. p. 98.) This is plainly intended to cover the denial of any coming of Christ from heaven to earth, as involving questions of “time and place,” “of which, as we enter into the unseen world, our conception becomes *indistinct*.” Whether Mr Jowett believes in any bodily and local ascension of the risen Saviour, or that he now possesses a “glorious body,” capable of palpable descent to this earth, we do not know—we should apprehend not. But as Paul’s “departure to be with Christ” was far better, in our author’s view, than Christ’s coming again, probably it is better than the *resurrection of the body* too. To the fifteenth of First Corinthians it is needless to refer on that point, as that belongs to the Apostle’s *early* teaching, out of which he “grew up”—though only “in the course of years,” or, as we have seen, after about a quarter of a century—to “other and higher truth.”

What follows in this essay is only an ingenious attempt to show that “the expectation of the day of the Lord was not a *belief* but a *necessity* of the early church,” that “clinging as it did to the thought of Christ, it could not bear to be separated from him,” and so it sprang, not from any teaching of an event to be expected, but from the fond instinct of affection for “a lost friend whom they could not believe to be taken from them for ever. It was the feeling of men who had an intense sense of the change that had been wrought in themselves, each moment of whose lives was the meeting-point to them of heaven and earth, and who scarcely thought either of the past or future in the eternity of the present.” In this strain the author goes on, endeavouring to make out that the ideas of the first Christians were just those of enthusiasts, absorbed in the spiritual and heavenly world, and indifferent to that which was without, incapable of distinguishing past and future, and only persuaded that all things would be as suddenly and entirely changed as themselves had been. The inference that is drawn from this is quite natural: that whilst “such a belief increased the awfulness of life, *it almost unavoidably withdrew men’s thoughts from its ordinary duties*; it *naturally* led to the state described in the Corinthian Church, in which *spiritual gifts had taken the place of moral duties*, and of those very gifts the less spiritual were preferred to the more spiritual; it *took the mind away from the kingdom of God within*, to fix it on signs and wonders, ‘the things spoken by the prophet Joel,’ when the sun should be turned into darkness and the moon into blood. It *made men almost ready to act contrary to the decrees of Cæsar*,” &c.—(Vol. i. pp. 103, 104.)

Thus, all the disorders and excesses which manifested themselves in the primitive Church are deliberately set down to the *natural* action of its faith in the coming of Christ; not as an

abuse of this expectation, natural in their new and infantile condition, but as *the natural operation of that faith itself*, which was not a faith so much as a mere fond *feeling*, a "necessity" of their early state, which, as the Church sobered down, melted away into a "preparation for death." And if you ask again how all this can apply to the teaching of our adorable Lord, the meaning of which upon this subject is admitted to be beyond dispute, all the answer you get is, that "His teaching was on a level with the modes of thought of his age," and that perhaps—shall we dare to write it?—His own knowledge did not extend so far as to enable him to teach "the higher truth" upon "this and other" topics! Rationalism like this in the Church of England we can hardly characterise. It is one only, and not the worst effect of this poison, that it kills that emphatically "BLESSED HOPE," bereaves us of "the glorious appearing of the great God and our Saviour, Jesus Christ," (words, by the way, which occur not in the earlier but in the latest, and, as our author deems the Pastorals, the ripest of the apostle's writings.—Tit. ii. 13.) Those magnificent words of the sublimest of human compositions, which have resounded from the lips of ten thousand thousand worshippers through rolling centuries, "WE BELIEVE THAT THOU SHALT COME TO BE OUR JUDGE!" we are taught by Mr Jowett, who utters them perpetually in the service of his Church, to regard as "the spirit of the first century overliving itself," the stereotyped expression, the embalmed remains of only the earliest and crudest expectation of the Church, which eighteen centuries' "continuance of all things as they were" have proved to be fallacious.

But we have said that this is not the worst of the deadly poison of this work. Mr Jowett *rationalises away vital and practical Christianity itself*. This was to be our other illustration of his rationalism; after which it will only remain that we rapidly glance at his treatment of a number of specific doctrines.

This is done in several insidious ways: By exaggerating the difference between the Christianity of apostolic times and any Christianity which does or can now exist; by calling attention to the very fractional number of those who possess even what vital Christianity still exists, to whom it were revolting, he thinks, to all right feeling to confine eternal salvation; and by so treating the different religions of the world as to make it appear that mankind differ only as occupying higher and lower states of development in their religious nature. We have space only for a few sentences in illustration and confirmation of this; but as here the subtlest poison of the work lies concealed, we must let our readers see how Christianity is thus rationalised away.

(1.) Mr Jowett's representation of the enthusiasm of the primitive Church is neither more nor less than a caricature. We have already seen something of it; but as strong, if not stronger, statements than we have quoted occur in other parts of the work. The change wrought on the first Christians, apostles and all, is described as carrying them clean off their feet and turning their heads. The thoughts, feelings, and duties of this present life were swallowed up and lost sight of in the spiritual atmosphere which they breathed, the heavenly world they dwelt in, and the total change expected every day to come over this whole scene of things. To them there was neither future nor past, visible nor invisible, earth nor heaven, but only one all-absorbing, new, and glorious present. In this state of mind, proper subjection to the civil authorities was hardly possible; and the charges brought against them on this head, as they were not without a foundation in truth, so they were applicable, not merely to the ill-instructed and head-strong converts, but to the Christian community *as such*, leaders and led alike; and it was only as time began to show them how airy were such views and feelings that they cooled down into something like reason and loyalty.*

But if these fantastic representations of primitive Christianity are painful to those who tremble at God's Word, not less melancholy is the opposite exaggeration of its present feebleness. In that very Dissertation on "Conversion and Changes of Character," from which we have quoted such striking passages, Christianity is represented as a *stereotyped force in humanity*.—(Vol. ii. p. 201.) Amidst much that is true in the statement to which we refer, who can endure to be told, in effect, that *it has reached its uttermost point of progress*, and is capable now only of such change as the body undergoes "*when it has already arrived at its full stature*"? Every one knows what kind of change that is—not certainly a change to greater enlargement or more vitality, but if to any thing at all, *to just the reverse of both*. Such views of Christianity can be borne by none but those who believe in no Holy Ghost, in no divine power transcending the operation of our own spiritual nature; or, which is much the same, who hold that when the power of the Spirit of God descends into humanity, its action is thereupon necessarily circumscribed within the sphere, and subject to all the counteractions, of creature forces. Let such views be at least called by their right name—*Semi-natu-*

* Passages nearly, if not quite, opposite to every one of the above statements might be produced, we are aware, from the work before us; for the author seems to delight in holding up such contrarieties, to show the subtlety of that mysterious element in man's nature—the religious. But that we have faithfully expressed the spirit and strain of all that relates to this point, will be attested by every candid reader of the book.

ralism. In the following passage the empty character of all Christianity since the apostle's days is thus affirmed :—

“That sense of the invisible which to most men is so difficult to impart was like a second nature to St Paul. He walked by faith and not by sight. . . . Not less different [than the Greek world of phenomena, of true being, knowledge, and opinion, from the tenets of any philosophical school of the present day] is what St Paul meant by the life hidden with Christ and God, the communion of the Spirit, the possession of the mind of Christ. . . . COULD ANY ONE SAY NOW, ‘The life’ not that I live, but that ‘Christ liveth in me’? Such language with St Paul is no mere phraseology, such as is repeated from habit in prayers, but the original consciousness of the Apostle respecting his own state. Self is banished from him, and has no more place in him, as he goes on his way to fulfil the work of Christ. No figure is too strong to express his humiliation in himself, or his exaltation in Christ.”—(Vol. i. pp. 297, 298.)*

All this is simply a calumny against vital Christianity, against the religion of men renewed by the Spirit of God, against the life of all believers in every age. We affirm, without fear of contradiction from any one entitled to give a verdict on this subject, that Paul had no “sense of the invisible” which is not essentially possessed by every real believer; that he “walked by faith” only as they do; that his “life hidden with Christ in God, his communion of the Spirit, his possession of the mind of Christ,” were nothing but what every Christian possesses, who can say, in the very same sense as the apostle himself—and God forbid that he should not—“Christ liveth in me.” We have heard much of the wondrous uniformity of the teaching of the Spirit of God among savage and civilised alike—what springs of new life, love, purity, freedom, joy, heavenly-mindedness, self-sacrifice it opens; and yet withal, what sobriety, self-government, attention to the duties of life, and active usefulness. Facts of this nature have forced themselves upon the notice, and extorted the admiration, of mere worldlings. But it is all a mistake, it seems. Between the Christianity of Paul and that of any one in this “full stature” of the world, Mr Jowett sees a great gulf fixed that cannot be bridged over.

(2.) Mr Jowett thinks it high time that we should cease to recognise the Scripture distinction between those two classes, the Church and the world, the wheat and the tares, the sheep and the goats, the friends and the enemies of God; since there is a large class, not to be overlooked, who belong to neither. As our readers will scarcely believe that this is expressed so boldly as we have put it, and as the destruction of every an-

* A similar passage will be found in p. 234, second paragraph; and indeed these views frequently recur.

cient landmark in this work is nowhere more virulently active than in the Dissertation to which we refer—"Natural Religion"—we must give it in his own words, at the risk of exceeding the proper limits of quotation:—

"It is impossible not to observe that innumerable persons—may we not say the majority of mankind?—who have a belief in God and immortality, have hardly any consciousness of the peculiar doctrines of the Gospel. They seem to live aloof from them in the routine of business or of pleasure, 'the common life of all men,' not without a sense of right, and a rule of truth and honesty, yet insensible to what our Saviour meant by taking up the cross and following Him, or what St Paul meant by 'being one with Christ.' They die without any great fear or lively hope; to the last more interested about the least concerns of this world than about the greatest of another. They have never in their whole lives experienced the love of God, or the sense of sin, or the need of forgiveness. Often they are remarkable for the purity of their morals; many of them have strong and disinterested attachments, and quick human sympathies; sometimes a stoical feeling of uprightness, or a peculiar sensitiveness to dishonour. It would be a mistake to say they are without religion. They join in its public acts; they are offended at profaneness or impiety; they are thankful for the blessings of life, and do not rebel against its misfortunes. Such men meet us at every turn. They are those whom we know and associate with; honest in their dealings, respectable in their lives, decent in their conversation. The Scripture speaks to us of two classes represented by the church and the world, the wheat and the tares, the sheep and the goats, the friends and enemies of God. We cannot say in which of these two divisions we should find a place for them. The fact that we are considering is not the evil of the world, but the neutrality of the world, the indifference of the world, the inertness of the world. There are multitudes of men and women everywhere, who have no peculiarly Christian feelings, to whom, except for the indirect Christian institutions, the fact that Christ died on the cross for their sins has made no difference, and who have, nevertheless, the common sense of truth and right almost equally with true Christians. You cannot say of them, 'There is none that doeth good; no, not one.' The other tone of St Paul is more suitable: 'When the Gentiles that know not the law do by nature the things contained in the law, these not knowing the law are a law unto themselves.' So of what we commonly term the world, as opposed to those who make a profession of Christianity, we must not shrink from saying: 'When men of the world do by nature whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, these not being conscious of the grace of God, do by nature what can only be done by his grace.' Why should we make them out worse than they are? We must cease to speak evil of them ere they will judge fairly of the characters of religious men. That, with so little recognition of his personal relation to them, God does not cast them off, is a ground of hope rather than of fear—of thankfulness, not of regret. Many strange thoughts arise at the contemplation of this intermediate world,

which is neither good nor bad, nor much in earnest about either good or evil. Some of those whom we thus class with the larger division of mankind are 'our kinsmen according to the flesh.' We cannot think of them as the subjects of divine wrath. It is not mere civility that prevents our naming 'hell to ears polite.'"

"Time and experience have revealed to us the complexity of those new relations which the Gospel has introduced into the world. The very term world is itself ambiguous, meaning the world very near to us, and yet a long way off from us; which we oppose to the church, and which we nevertheless feel to be one with the church, and incapable of being separated from it so long as human nature lasts as it is. Such reflections draw our minds to that side of the world and human nature from which we are apt to turn away—from which the conservative instincts of mankind seem to shrink, and entangling us in a labyrinth in which we see no end: 'in wandering mazes lost.' Yet they are not doubts, but facts; whether we veil them in the ambiguities of language or not, they remain as they are. *The only tendency they have towards scepticism* * is the contrast which they present to us of words and things. Doubtless the lives of individuals that rise above this average standard of truth and honesty, are the salt of the earth. They show us not only the practical life of natural religion, but also the image of Christ until his coming again. And yet, probably, they would have been the last persons to wish to distinguish themselves from their fellow-men. And that humble spirit which the best of men have ever felt in reference to their brethren, is in a measure also the true spirit of the church towards the world. There is no need, because men will not listen to one motive, that we should not present them with another; there is no reason, because they will not hear the voice of the preacher, that they should be refused the blessings of education, or that we should cease to act upon their circumstances because we cannot awaken the heart and conscience. We are too apt to view as hostile to religion that which only takes a form different from religion, as trade, or politics, or professional life."

"The God of peace rest upon you, is the concluding benediction of most of the epistles. How can he rest upon us, who draw so many hard lines of demarcation between ourselves and other men; who oppose the Church and the world, Sundays and working-days, revelation and science, the past and present, the life and state of which religion speaks and the life which we ordinarily lead? It is well that we should consider these lines of demarcation rather as representing aspects of our life, than as corresponding to classes of mankind. It is well that we should acknowledge, that one aspect of life or knowledge is as true as the other. Science and revelation touch one another: the past floats down in the present. We are all members of the same Christian world; we are all members of the same Christian Church. Who can bear to doubt this of themselves or of their family? What parent would think otherwise of his child?—what child of his parent? Religion holds before us an ideal which we are far from reaching; natural affection softens and relieves the characters of those we love; experience alone shows men what they truly are. All these three must

* This shows that the author knows on what confines he is treading.

so meet as to do violence to none. If, in the age of the apostles, it seemed to be the duty of the believers to separate themselves from the world and take up a hostile position, not less marked in the present age is the duty of abolishing in a Christian country what has now become an artificial distinction, and seeking by every means in our power, by fairness, by truthfulness, by knowledge, by love unfeigned, by the absence of party and prejudice, by acknowledging the good in all things, to reconcile the church to the world, the one half of our nature to the other; drawing the mind off from speculative difficulties, or matters of party and opinion, to that which almost all equally acknowledge, and almost equally rest short of—the life of Christ.”—(Vol. ii. pp. 416–421.)

Comment on these statements is surely superfluous, since Mr Jowett’s question is not with us, but with “the Scripture,” which, as he admits, draws that “hard line of demarcation” which he contends should be blotted out. Nay, but it is with our blessed Lord himself, who draws the line as sharply and as repeatedly as any of the Scripture writers do. Mr Jowett will say—he has said—that this was intended for a time when the Gospel was but a little leaven hid in three measures of meal, whereas now the whole is leavened.—(Vol. ii. p. 419.) But the line drawn by our Lord is not between *Christendom*, as it is called, and *the unchristianised world outside* that visible pale, whether large or small, but between men who *believe in him* and those who do not; between men who *love him* and those who do not; between men who *live to him* and those who do not. The closing words of the Sermon on the Mount put this beyond all doubt, and show that the corresponding description of the Judgment (Matt. xxv. 31, &c.), which represents the sheep and the goats as separated for ever, is designed to distinguish two “classes” within the Church itself—the “meal” after it has been “leavened.” And this shows what we are to deem of that “*unconscious love to Christ*,” on the part of those who “*have never in their whole lives experienced the love of God, or the sense of sin, or the need of forgiveness*,” who “*are insensible to what our Saviour meant by taking up the cross and following him, or what St Paul meant by being one with Christ*.” It is a pure fiction. But it is infinitely worse. It gives the lie to the Faithful and True Witness, who is blessed for evermore. But our author asks, “Who can bear to doubt” the saving Christianity “of themselves or of their family? what parent of his child? what child of his parent?” We answer, Let God be true, and every man a liar. He that loveth father or mother more than Me, is not worthy of me. We judge no man; but we judge “classes”—not “aspects of our life,” but “classes of mankind.” Nor is it we that judge them. It is the Judge Himself, whose mightiest words,

uttered in the days of his flesh, we do but echo and vindicate from the scepticism which dares to impugn them.

(3.) There never was, according to Mr Jowett, any "primitive religion common to all mankind." It is "the baseless fabric of a vision." "There is one stream of revelation only—the Jewish."—(Vol. ii. p. 395.) By this the author must mean, that there was no revelation at all till the separation of Abraham's seed from other nations; the religions of all other tribes of mankind have grown up, "varying with their race, climate, language, physical susceptibility," without any ray of traditional revealed light, from a period prior to the call of Abraham. For many pages together he argues against the possibility of such a primeval revelation, consistently with the facts of mythology and language. Now as this cannot for a moment be held consistently with the historical truth of the Book of Genesis, it is plain that our author makes that of no account, regarding it as, perhaps, a collection of myths. It is out of the question even indicating here (as space begins to fail us even for the more important remaining department of our task) how our author's considerations, drawn from mythology and language, are to be reconciled with the statements of the Book of Genesis. But in connection with his views of the origin of the early religions of the world, it is important to observe his views of their *moral* character:—

"Nor should the want of morality in the oldest heathen religions be regarded as equivalent to immorality, but rather as something different in kind. So unconscious are they, that we cannot even venture to censure them for their indecency. No metaphysical analysis will reach beyond conjecture of that singular state which may be described as a prison of sense, in which morality, if mention of it occur, is but a fact of nature, and 'wisdom at one entrance quite shut out.' How long such a state may have lasted; what different forms it assumed in China, India, Persia, Egypt, &c."—(Vol. ii. p. 397.)

The reader, when informed that this Dissertation on "Natural Religion," immediately follows the text of the Epistle to the Romans, will wonder what can be the "critical notes" on the first chapter of that Epistle, in the face of whose plainest, strongest, and most reiterated statements, this view of the morality of the heathen religions is given. We can only tell him that those statements are just *sophisticated away*. The author does not dispute the facts, of course, which the apostle refers to, nor that, *in the light of Christianity*, they are such as we instinctively regard them; but the *moral estimate* which he would have us to form regarding them is—as is usual with him on all other subjects—a negative one; that they were *non-moral* rather than *immoral*. A fine distinction this for missionaries to carry with them to the seats of those hoary

usurpations over the mind and heart of man ! But, alas ! they seem to be looked at by such men as Mr Jowett rather in an *antiquarian* and *artistic* point of view, than with the apostle's eye; and missions to the heathen will be under small obligations to the exertions and the prayerful, believing anticipations of such speculators.

We had intended in the sequel of this paper to examine carefully those specific doctrines of Christianity which Mr Jowett impugns, and the subversion of which lays the edifice of the Gospel in ruins. But as the space already occupied precludes this, so the necessity for it is superseded by what has already so fully come out. With such rationalistic views as Mr Jowett entertains of all apostolic teaching, it will hardly appear of much moment what he thinks on any particular points of it. We shall limit ourselves, therefore, to a few brief observations on his treatment of two or three of them; to show, on the one hand, what a wreck is made of the unsearchable riches of Christ; and on the other, what a floating and *unfinal* state of religious opinion in his own mind it reveals. Under the *dry rot* of rationalism every thing appears crumbling down.

Our author has two ways of getting rid of the whole circle of Pauline doctrine. By *textual* criticism he makes it appear that such doctrine is not taught by the apostle at all; and where that will not do, by what the Germans call the *higher* criticism, he sits in judgment on the text itself, and gives sundry considerations why, even if such doctrine be there, we are neither obliged nor able to believe it. In plain terms, if the text will *bend*, well and good; but if not, it must *break*. Usually it is made to do both; the one chiefly in the "critical notes," the other chiefly in the "Dissertations" which follow them up.

FIRST. From the famous contrast between Adam and Christ, Rom. v. 12-21, the author teaches the following astounding doctrine:—

ADAM NEVER "EXISTED IN A PURE AND PERFECT STATE." Consequently, NO PROPER FALL EVER TOOK PLACE.

THERE IS NO PENAL CONNECTION BETWEEN SIN AND DEATH, —either the sin of Adam or actual sin.

The criticism by which this is supported is so wretched, as to be almost inconceivable. It is not denied—it could not be—that sin and death *are* penally connected in this great passage. But whether it is meant that "death is the penalty of Adam's sin, or of the actual sin of all mankind, as of Adam himself," is queried. The author thinks the *latter* (its being

the penalty of actual sin) best suits the context. But he cannot believe that "so subtle a distinction, [as whether it flowed from the one or the other,] had any existence in the mind of the apostle."—(Vol. ii. p. 157, *b*.) But though a penal connection between sin and death is taught in this passage, "it would be an error to lay any great stress on the precise points of view taken by the apostle in this chapter, considering that a different view occurs in the parallel passage, 1 Cor. xv." There "THE APOSTLE MAKES NO REFERENCE TO A PRIOR STATE OF INNOCENCE FROM WHICH ADAM FELL."—(Vol. ii. p. 157 *a*.) In proof of this the author does not direct us to verse 21, "For since *by man came death*, by man came also the resurrection of the dead;" nor to verse 22, "For as *in Adam all die*, even so in Christ shall all be made alive;" although in his Dissertation he asserts that this may well enough mean no more than that Adam's death is "the *type*" of ours.—(Vol. ii. p. 163.) But he refers to verses 47, 48, in which "the earthly body and the heavenly (*χοϊκός, ἐπουράνιος*)—the natural and the spiritual" (*ψυχικός, πνευματικός*)—are contrasted, "*without any reference to the connection between sin and death*:" and because the contrast in these verses is between *natures*, not *acts*, he denies that in this whole chapter there is any allusion to a fall of Adam, or to death being the penalty of his sin; and from this he vaults to the conclusion, that in the parallel passage of Rom. v., though the connection of sin and death is taught, we must not "lay any great stress" upon it. But as such criticism must have been felt to be just trifling with a great subject, we have in the Dissertation six mixed considerations, in view of which the reader is expected to arrive at the author's sweeping conclusions. We subjoin them in brief:—

"(1.) A very slight difference in the mode of expression would make it impossible for us to attribute to St Paul the doctrine of the imputation of the sin of Adam." And as "his modes of thought and language are very varied, and very different from our own,"—so "to him it was but one of many figures of the same kind, to oppose the first and second Adam; and unless in such parallels there is not even the appearance of attributing Adam's sin to his posterity. (2.) The Apostle is not speaking of Adam as fallen from a state of innocence; nor could he have said in 1 Cor. xv. 'The first man is of earth, earthy,' if he had had in his mind that Adam had previously existed in a pure and perfect state. He is only drawing a parallel between Adam and Christ. The moment we leave this parallel, all is uncertain and undetermined. The logical consequences which are appended to his words, are far out of his sight. He would hardly have found language to describe the nature of Adam's act, whether occurring by his own free will or not, or the way in which the supposed effect was communicated to his posterity. (3.) There are other elements of St Paul's teaching, which are either inconsistent with the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, or at any rate are so

prominent, as to make such a doctrine, if held by him, comparatively unimportant. According to St Paul, it is not the act of Adam, but the law, that 'brought death into the world and all our woe;' and the law is almost equivalent to the knowledge of sin, whereas original sin is, or may be, wholly unconscious." * (4.) "The language here used by the Apostle, expressing the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, is that of his age and country;" and therefore "we ought to feel still greater reluctance to press his statement to its strict logical consequences. The Jews connected sin and death, and the sins and death of mankind with the sin of Adam, in the same way as the Apostle," though, "human nature or philosophy sometimes rose up against such inventions." † (5.) We are deceived into this doctrine of imputation, by "the logical symmetry" of its application to the righteousness of Christ equally with the sin of Adam. (6.) "We can attach no meaning to the imputation of sin and guilt which are not our own, and of which we are unconscious. If God would not allow a fiction of mercy to be interposed between ourselves and him, still less a fiction of vengeance. Nor can any thing be in spirit more contrary to the living consciousness of sin of which the Apostle everywhere speaks, than the conception of sin as dead, unconscious evil, originating in the act of an individual man, in the world before the flood. On the whole, the difficulty of supposing St Paul to be allegorising the narrative in Genesis is slight, in comparison with the difficulty of supposing him to countenance a doctrine at variance with our first notions of the moral nature of God."—(Vol. ii. pp. 164-167.)

What hard work of it Mr Jowett has—what with bending and what with breaking the apostolic text—to get the Fall, and the Imputation of Adam's sin to the human race, out of the way! But he knows what he is about. For if Imputation be an apostolic doctrine, his views of the Person and Work of Christ are a subversion of all Christianity; whereas if Imputation be nothing better than Jewish rhetoric, of which Paul knew how to avail himself when it suited him, even though it involved, in any strict interpretation of it, a contradiction of our first notions of God's moral nature,—then the whole doctrine of human recovery from a fallen state, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, is nothing better than a house of cards.

We have only to add on this point—for it is impossible at this stage to discuss either the criticism or the theology of it—that the same view of the Fall, or rather *no-fall*, and the same denial of any connection between sin and death, will be found in *Usteri's* "Development of the Pauline System;" ‡ and

* This extraordinary statement about the law is repeated over and over again in the Dissertations, and reasons are founded on it, as to the Apostle's views on such subjects, which make one wonder whether Mr Jowett has really any respect for the Apostle's understanding.

† We need not wonder at such treatment of the Apostle, after finding the same charge brought against our Lord himself.

‡ Entwicklung des Paulinischen Lehrbegriffes, u. s. w. sechste Ausgabe, s. s. 24-34. It is dedicated to his master, *Schleiermacher*, as "*seinem theuern Lehrer*," the poison of whose school of criticism runs through it all.

the reader will thus understand one reason, at least, for his name being put first in the list of "German theologians, to whom the author is under especial obligations." It would not do for Mr Jowett to be so irreverent as to call "the narrative of Genesis," (chap. iii.,) as Usteri does, "*a myth*," (s. 33,) for English people have some horror at such phraseology; but the reader will judge whether it was really worth his while to substitute the euphemism of "the narrative." *

We must be contented with one other, but awfully solemn topic.

SECOND. THE ATONEMENT.

That one who believes in no Fall, and sees no penal connection between sin and death, should have no faith in the Atonement, is only what was to be expected; but that a minister of the Church of England should proclaim his disbelief of this most fundamental truth with the boldness which characterises the Dissertation on "*The Doctrine of the Atonement*," with the relative critical notes, is more than could have been looked for. For the sake of the truth involved, as well as in justice to Mr Jowett, we grieve to find that we have no space now to give his own statements in full, and must content ourselves with dovetailing fragments of them into a brief statement of our own, framed with religious care not to misrepresent him—as he shamefully does the orthodox doctrine.

1. HEATHEN AND JEWISH SACRIFICES WERE ALIKE OF HUMAN INSTITUTION.

2. BOTH "SHOW US RATHER WHAT THE SACRIFICE OF CHRIST WAS NOT, THAN WHAT IT WAS."—(Vol. ii. p. 479.)

"They are the dim, vague, rude, (may we not say?) almost barbarous, expression of that want in human nature which has received satisfaction in Him only"—the want of confidence in God, which Christ's mission and death *teach* us to cherish.—(Vol. ii. p. 479.)

THERE IS NO ATONEMENT SAVE THE MORAL INFLUENCE OF CHRIST'S LIFE AND DEATH.

"When it is said that Christ gave himself for our sins (Gal. i. 4), or as a sin-offering, it is figurative, natural and intelligible to *that* age,—not equally so to us; the figures are varied, showing they are figures only; the same sacrificial language is applied almost equally to the believer and his Lord; identity with Christ in the various stages of his life is a far more common class of figures; and so, in general, the thing meant is, *that Christ took upon him human flesh, that he was put to death by sinful men, and raised men* [*i. e.*, by moral influence] out of

* Kurtz, in his "Geschichte des alten Bundes," (1853), has some good remarks on the Mosaic narrative of the Fall (Gen. iii.), with reference to modern mythic views, (Erster Band, § 22). But in developing the essential character of the transaction, our own writers are, in our judgment, superior to the Germans.

the state of sin,—in this sense, taking their sins upon himself.”—(Vol. i. pp. 209, 210.) “There is enough here for faith to feed on, without sullyng the mirror of God’s justice or overclouding his truth [*i. e.*, by our theories of sacrifice, satisfaction, ransom]; peace and consolation enough, without raising a suspicion [by this sacrificial doctrine], which secretly destroys peace. IT IS A GREAT THING TO SET CHRIST ALWAYS BEFORE US AS AN EXAMPLE; AND HE WHO DOES SO IS NOT FAR FROM THE KINGDOM OF HEAVEN. But what the Apostle speaks of is not merely the example of Christ, but *communion with him*, the indwelling of Christ in our hearts,” &c.—(Vol. ii. p. 480.)* “We wish to know that when we close our eyes the light is there; that when the grave covers us there is a God to whom we still live. That assurance is given by the life and death of Christ. That perfect harmony of nature, that absolute self-renunciation, that pure love, that entire resignation, continued through [Christ’s] life and ending in [his] death, are facts, independent of our feelings, which remain as they were, whether we acknowledge them or not.

“NOT THE SACRIFICE, NOR THE SATISFACTION, NOR THE RANSOM, BUT THE GREATEST MORAL ACT EVER DONE IN THIS WORLD—the act, too, of one in our likeness—IS THE ASSURANCE TO US THAT GOD IN CHRIST IS RECONCILED TO THE WORLD.”†—(Vol. ii. pp. 480, 481.)

THE GOSPEL KNOWS NO SACRIFICE AND NO MEDIATOR AT ALL. Romanists have both; and the Reformers, instead of making “the antithesis” to Romanism to be “*between the Gospel as without sacrifices and Romanism as retaining sacrifices*,” and “*between the law [of Moses] as having a mediator and the promise as a more ‘open way’*”—made the antithesis *erroneously* to be “BETWEEN THE GOSPEL AS HAVING ONE MEDIATOR, and the Roman Church with many priests and the ever-recurring sacrifice of the mass”!—(Vol. ii. pp. 477, 478.)

The darkest and saddest thing of all, perhaps, in this sad Essay, is the next to the last paragraph, in which all “DEFINITE STATEMENTS RESPECTING THE RELATION OF CHRIST EITHER TO GOD OR MAN” are deprecated, and “*mystery*” is represented as “*the nearest approach we can make to the truth—only by indefiniteness can we avoid putting words in the place of things*.” There are hope and peace in what we see: yet more “*as we believe in possibilities of which we are ignorant*.”—(Vol. ii. pp. 481, 482.)

Here we must leave this awfully vital point. Perhaps our inability to go farther into it is not without its benefits. Perhaps the feeling of dumbness is not the most unsuitable way of meeting such teaching, at the close of a paper like this.

* This “communion with Christ,” however, we have seen in the preceding extract to be itself but a figure, and a figure just of a certain moral attraction, which Christ’s life and death have to draw men under their ennobling influence. That is all. But see the next paragraph.

† By “God in Christ” is not meant, God *through* any thing done by Christ, but merely the divine character reflected in the events of Christ’s history.

And the close it must now be. We have left many specific doctrines, as well as some sweeping generalities, untouched. In particular, we regret that we cannot direct attention to the criticisms on Rom. i. 4, "Declared to be the Son of God," &c.; and Rom. ix. 5, "Of whom as concerning the flesh Christ came. God, who is over all, is blessed for ever, Amen,"—as our author translates the text; by the one of which he shows what distortion can be practised upon a word; and by the other, how a scholar can peril his Greek for a purpose too glaring to escape any one's notice. Still more do we regret the impossibility of taking up the enormous Essay on "St Paul and Philo" (vol. i. 363–417,)—the materials of which are almost wholly from Gfrörer,—intended to show, by the remarkable similarity of their style and phraseology on theological subjects, that the Apostle, in all his argumentative writings, was just a Christian in the dress of an Alexandrian Jew. It might have been of some use to show, by the great difference discernible between them in the very midst of those similarities of style, how a Platonic Jew, bending over the pages of Scripture with devout, but still more philosophic, reverence, and practising a method fundamentally false, could grope his way to something wonderfully *near* to truth, picking up at the same time whole masses of rubbish, and mistaking them for gold;—while "Paul, an Apostle not of man, neither by man, but by Jesus Christ and God the Father, who raised him from the dead," could fashion and crystallize what was fitted to be a vehicle of truth in the religious style which had grown up at that remarkable seat of Judæo-Platonism, and was spreading far and wide when he wrote, giving to it such a purified and heavenly form as to constitute a shrine for the sublimest truths, so long as language shall be employed here below. But space has failed, and our task must here be finished.

Poor Oxford, torn first by Romanism scarcely disguised, and next by Rationalism quite as naked! Church of the Reformation, ancient bulwark of the Protestant faith! strange children are nurtured in thy bosom. *Are they thine own?* Others have their answer to this question. *What is to be thine?*

ART. X.—*Faith in God and Modern Atheism Compared, in their Essential Nature, Theoretic Grounds, and Practical Influence.* By JAMES BUCHANAN, D.D., LL.D., Divinity Professor in the New College, and Author of "Comfort in Affliction," &c. 2 vols. 8vo. Edinburgh: James Buchanan, Junr. 1855.

IT is certainly strange, and in some respects not a little humbling, that in the nineteenth century of the Christian æra, men of the highest talents and learning, in the most enlightened countries of the world, should be occupied with an elaborate investigation into the most elementary and fundamental principles of all religion,—the existence, character, and providence of God. These topics have from the earliest period occupied the thoughts and tasked the powers of the highest minds of our race, and it might be supposed that by this time all that could be learned regarding them, from Reason or Revelation, would be ascertained, and that the minds of men would be made up, both as to what should be believed concerning them, and as to the grounds on which the truth believed should be defended. And yet it can scarcely be disputed, that in the present day a larger number of educated men profess, more or less openly, Atheism and Pantheism, in some of their forms, than at any former period; and that views and discussions of an anti-theistic tendency, fitted to shake men's faith in the doctrines which have generally prevailed in Christian countries concerning God, are more widely diffused than ever before, in the current literature of the day. We are thus driven back upon an investigation of the most elementary and fundamental principles of all religion, and we are warned of the necessity of being well acquainted with the grounds on which our convictions upon these momentous subjects are based. This necessity now attaches not only to those who are called upon to study religious subjects professionally, but to educated men in general,—a description which includes a very considerable portion of the community. We suspect that many of the pastors of our churches, especially among those who have been ordained for twenty or thirty years, have given but little attention to the study of Natural Theology with its proofs and evidences. To those who began to be students of theology above a quarter of a century ago, there was little or nothing to suggest the importance and propriety of giving much time or labour to the investigation of this department of theological literature. The study of Natural Theology was, we fear, too much neglected by those who now form the senior portion of the ministry amongst us; and this arose not from any im-

pression that such subjects as the existence, character, and government of God, had ceased, or could cease, to be topics of the highest intrinsic value and importance, as objects of contemplation and study, but solely from the idea that the generally received doctrines concerning them were so thoroughly established, that it was not to be expected that they would ever again be seriously questioned, or become topics of controversial discussion.

This was in the circumstances a natural and not an unreasonable impression. In a preceding generation, the ingenuity of Hume had been brought to bear upon some of the leading departments of Natural Theology, without doing much to shake the established belief, or to diffuse any serious doubts in men's minds. Kant's elaborate attempt to show that the ordinary arguments for the existence of God did not thoroughly approve themselves to the Speculative Reason, was commonly looked upon merely as an ingenious piece of unsubstantial special pleading; while his profession of founding the belief in this great truth upon what he called the Practical Reason, was generally regarded as an admission of the validity of the argument which preceding writers upon Natural Theology were accustomed to deduce from the conscience or moral nature of man. The Atheistic and Pantheistic speculations of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, were not, thirty years ago, much known in this country, and had not found their way, as they have now done, into our current literature. In these circumstances, it is not strange that Natural Theology did not in general occupy a very prominent place in the prelections of theological professors, or the reading of theological students. Except in cases where there happened to be a special predilection for this branch of study, even the most diligent and intelligent of our divinity students were contented with a careful perusal of a very few of the old standard books upon the subject. Of those who, like ourselves, attended the Divinity Hall during the third decade of this century, few probably did more in this department of study than peruse Cudworth's *Intellectual System*, some of the principal Boyle Lectures, such as those of Bentley and Clarke, perhaps *Buddæus de Atheismo*, and the chapter *de Deo* in two or three of the leading systems of theology. Such works as these, with perhaps Leibnitz and Archbishop King on Theodicy, with Butler's *Analogy* to furnish the substance of an answer to all objections, and Paley to supply the illustrations of the argument from design, used to form the subjects of study under the head of Natural Theology. Those who had perused these books with some care were in general thoroughly satisfied, that the commonly received doctrines concerning the existence, character,

and government of God, had been conclusively established, had been proved to be true by evidence the validity of which, while it might be cavilled at, could not be successfully assailed. The general tendency of this state of mind was to disincline men to give time and attention afterwards to the study of Natural Theology. It was looked upon as a topic settled and set by, one the grounds of which were too firmly established to afford matter for serious doubt, and one of too solemn a character to be taken up and dealt with as a mere matter of speculation, as a mere subject for intellectual exercise. For ourselves, we confess that, after having examined this subject in the way and to the extent above stated, about the beginning of our theological studies, we have never since felt much interest in it, as a topic of speculation, and have never again returned to the investigation of it, further than to take a glimpse occasionally of the recent speculations of philosophers, in order to satisfy ourselves that nothing has yet been *discovered and established*, in the world either of matter or of mind, at all adequate to shake our old convictions, or to overturn any of the leading arguments on which they were based.

But though, in common with many of our brethren in the ministry, we have never felt called upon to give much time or attention to the study of Natural Theology, and have never become much interested in mere speculative discussions on the subjects which it includes, yet our judgment is thoroughly satisfied that it ought now to occupy a more prominent place in the course of a theological education, and ought to be more minutely and familiarly known by ministers and candidates for the ministry. The ground of this conviction is the fact, that unsound and dangerous views upon subjects comprehended under the head of Natural Theology, now prevail to a considerable extent among educated men, have attained considerable prominence in our general literature, and are extensively brought to bear upon the whole circle of theological questions,—upon the evidences and the contents of the Christian revelation. Not only are more zealous and plausible attempts made now than ever before to undermine the authority of what has been most surely believed amongst us, but positively erroneous views upon many important topics connected with the divine character and government have been advocated, and have been urged as precluding the possibility of the authority of the Christian revelation being established, and of some of its fundamental doctrines being received as true. Such views are not now confined, as used to be the case in former generations, to books which formally discussed these subjects, whether on philosophical or theological grounds, but they pervade widely our general literature, and come more or

less under the cognisance of almost all reading and reflecting men. It is scarcely possible now-a-days for young men of intelligence and mental activity, to have gone through a literary or philosophical course at any of our colleges, without having come into contact with views about God, plausibly urged, and sanctioned by men whom they have learned to respect as high authorities, which are fitted to shake their faith, both in the validity of the proofs, and in the authority of the contents, of the Christian revelation. This consideration is quite sufficient to establish the propriety and necessity of Natural Theology occupying a somewhat prominent place,—a more prominent place than used formerly to be assigned to it, in the beginning of a course of theological study; and of its being treated with a full knowledge of, and a constant reference to, the mode in which it is discussed in the present day. It is true, indeed, that the whole substance of what can be said upon the subject, both in the way of directly establishing the truth, and of answering the objections that have been adduced against it, has been said frequently, and long ago, and is to be found in the writings of famous authors who flourished in old times. And this is a position which it is of great importance to bring out and illustrate, not only in regard to this, but to several other departments of theological literature, as an excellent antidote against being led away by what is supposed to be original and new. But this affords no reason why the subject, if discussed at all, should not be treated in the way best adapted to tell upon the minds of the present generation, and of course with a special reference to the most improved and plausible forms in which error may have been put forth. If real talent and ingenuity have been brought to bear upon the subject in the recent discussion of it, something will have been done to change the aspect of the case, and to present error in a dress that is partially new, and perhaps in some respects more plausible than it ever wore before. This is undoubtedly realised in the actual state of things amongst us; and it is amply sufficient to require a careful study of the most recent forms of the discussion, on the part, especially, of those who are engaged in superintending the studies of candidates for the ministry. Young men who are just entering upon the regular study of divinity have of course read few or none of the old standard books on Natural Theology, which used to be regarded as having settled satisfactorily its leading doctrines, while they can scarcely fail to have been brought into contact with discussions fitted to shake their faith in these doctrines. It is of great importance to show them that these questions have been satisfactorily and conclusively settled long ago; and that the philosophy

and the ingenuity of the present day have not materially affected the substance of the argument in its fundamental principles, and have not produced any new thing of a really formidable description against the cause of sound Theism. But this can be done adequately, effectively, and to good purpose, only by one who has mastered the newest and most improved methods of adversaries, the most fresh and plausible speculations of those who oppose, more or less openly, the generally received doctrines. Without the possession and application of this knowledge, the necessary work could not be well done; and even if it could, it could scarcely be expected to exert its appropriate influence.

Upon such grounds as these, we are thoroughly satisfied that Natural Theology ought to occupy a more prominent place than used to be assigned to it, in the studies of ministers and of candidates for the ministry; and that, since the conclusions of Natural Theology are after all much more important in their bearing upon the evidences than upon the contents of the Christian revelation,—and since certain notions, alleged to be comprehended in the religion of nature, are often now-a-days brought to bear injuriously upon the whole mode of investigating and ascertaining divine truth,—this subject ought to be taken up in the commencement of a course of theological study. It seems to have been to a conviction to this effect, that we owe the original preparation of the very important and valuable work which we have placed at the head of this article. Dr Buchanan having been called by his official duties, as one of the professors in the theological seminary of the Free Church, to superintend the education of students in the first session of a theological curriculum, prepared, as the first branch of this work, a course of lectures upon Natural Theology, in which the leading topics usually comprehended under this head were discussed, in connection with a view of the speculations of modern Atheists and Pantheists. Dr Buchanan seems to have been led by his convictions of duty, as well as by the bent of his studies and inclinations, to go fully and elaborately into this subject; and having been afterwards, on the death of Dr Chalmers, transferred to another department in the labours of the seminary, he has published the substance of his lectures in this department of the course, in the two volumes which now lie before us.

The work we regard as eminently successful, and deserving of the highest commendation. It is an able, learned, comprehensive, well-digested, and lucid exposition of the leading topics usually ranked under the head of Natural Theology, followed up by an elaborate and masterly refutation of the prevalent modern systems of Atheism and Pantheism. Dr Buchanan is

already well known and highly esteemed as an author. Above 21,000 copies of his work entitled "Comfort in Affliction," and above 6000 of his work on the "Office and Work of the Holy Spirit," have been circulated in this country, while large editions of them have also been issued in the United States of North America. The work now before us exhibits all the excellencies by which the former productions of its author are distinguished, while, as might be expected from the subjects of which it treats, and the purpose for which it was originally prepared, it exhibits a higher reach of ability and erudition. Dr Buchanan has evidently studied the subject thoroughly in all its bearings; he is familiar with all the most important works that have been written upon it in ancient and modern times, down to the most recent productions of the present day; he has subjected all these materials to the deliberate and independent action of his own pure, elevated, and well-balanced mind; and has clothed the results of his studies and reflections upon the different departments of this interesting and arduous theme in a singularly lucid and beautiful style.

The work is divided into four sections; of which the first gives a "Statement of the Evidence for the Being and Perfections of God;" the second, an "Examination of the Rational Principles which are involved in the process of Proof;" the third treats of "Modern Atheism, and the Theories which have been applied in support of it;" and the fourth unfolds the "Uses and Defects of the Natural Manifestation of God." It is, we think, admirably arranged, so far as concerns the order and connection of the different parts, both in the great leading divisions just stated, and in the subdivisions of these principal heads. Dr Buchanan gives, first, a full statement of the direct and positive evidences for the being and perfections of God, expounding here five distinct arguments in proof of the great conclusions of Natural Theology; derived, first, from the fact of existence; second, from the existence of mind; third, from the phenomena of conscience; fourth, from the marks of design in nature; and, fifth, from the vestiges of the historic fact of creation. Having thus given the direct proof in support of the great truths of Natural Religion, Dr Buchanan, in the second section, investigates the philosophical ground or *rationale* of the leading processes of proof developed in the preceding section, with the view of establishing their solidity when tried by the soundest and most generally recognised principles of psychology and metaphysics, and answering some of the attempts which have been made, upon philosophical grounds, to disprove or undermine their validity. He then, in the third section, gives a full and elaborate exposition and refutation of the principal theories and grounds on which con-

elusions, more or less directly opposed to the great truths of Natural Religion, have been advocated in the present day, under the heads of Development, Pantheism, Materialism, Government by Natural Laws, Secularism, &c. This arrangement produces the result of presenting the materials bearing upon all the different departments of the subject in a singularly clear and lucid order, and of bringing out the great conclusions sought to be established, in a peculiarly satisfactory and effective way.

The two leading characteristics of Dr Buchanan's book are, *1st*, The complete recasting of the leading arguments for the being and perfections of God, in the full knowledge and application of all that the philosophy of modern times, down to the present day, has produced bearing upon the subject; and, *2d*, The thorough investigation into the different theories of Atheism and Pantheism, in the forms in which they are most extensively and industriously pressed upon public attention in the present day. These two important objects are most successfully accomplished, by a very fine combination of a thorough and masterly knowledge of the whole subject in all its bearings, of great soundness and discrimination of judgment, and of singular clearness both of thought and diction. Indeed, Dr Buchanan's success in expounding and discussing the most profound and perplexed questions in a thoroughly lucid and perfectly intelligible way, while he fairly faces and fearlessly grapples with their deepest difficulties, is one of the most remarkable features of the book,—one that entitles it to the strongest commendation, and stamps it with the highest value. An infusion of outlandish and unintelligible jargon seems to be thought by many in the present day to be an indispensable mark of anything like philosophy or profundity, though it can be easily assumed by those who possess very little of either. Those who judge by this standard will not be satisfied with Dr Buchanan's work. He belongs, indeed, to a class of writers, of whom Professor Dugald Stewart has been mentioned as one of the most distinguished, whose very success in putting their views in the clearest light, and clothing them in a lucid and beautiful style, is apt to lead men to underrate the solidity and depth of their matter, and thus to detract from their reputation as acute or profound thinkers. With superficial thinkers, Dr Buchanan is not unlikely to suffer injustice in this way. But we are persuaded that the most competent judges will most readily admit that he is thoroughly qualified for the satisfactory discussion of the momentous themes to which his work is devoted, and that the difficult and perplexing questions which come under review are handled with eminent ability, with singular wisdom and judgment, and with a full and intel-

ligent acquaintance with all that is necessary for estimating and expounding them aright. Dr Buchanan is one of the very few men in this country who have read and mastered the ponderous "Positive Philosophy" of Comte; and he brings also under our notice a very interesting department of contemporaneous French literature, almost wholly unknown as yet amongst us, in which modern Pantheism, in its grounds and history, seems to be discussed in a very satisfactory way.

In the course of his book, Dr Buchanan has occasion to refer to a variety of minor points, on which the soundest defenders of Theism have differed from each other, especially with respect to the weight due to particular modes of proof, and the best ways of stating and vindicating them. Our views do not precisely concur with his on all these points. But we believe that in most cases he has hit upon the truest and soundest views of the different questions discussed; and we are confident that on all topics of material importance he will be found to be a very safe and judicious, as well as very agreeable and interesting guide, by all who wish to be thoroughly abreast of the present condition of a very important department of investigation, which may be said to belong to the domain both of Theology and Philosophy, and with which every educated and reading man in the present day is called upon, by a regard to his own safety and comfort, to make himself acquainted.

We do not intend to discuss any of the subjects which are brought before us by Dr Buchanan's book. We intend merely to make a few observations on one particular point, and to give some extracts from the work itself. We are not sure, indeed, that by any extracts we will be able to give a fair impression of the work, whose excellencies stand forth more conspicuously when it is viewed as a whole, than when broken up into parts and sections. One of the most interesting and valuable features of the work, is the full exhibition and exposure, given in the third section, of the schemes of an Atheistic or Pantheistic character or tendency which have been most zealously pressed upon public attention in the present day. This department of the work is embodied in five chapters, entitled, "Theories of Development," "Theories of Pantheism," "Theories of Materialism," "Theory of Government by Natural Laws," and "Theory of Secularism." These chapters, especially perhaps the one on Pantheism, contain some of the most valuable materials which the work presents; but they do not, we think, afford suitable portions for extracts, which would be at once interesting in themselves and fair specimens of the book. This, however, is perhaps the less to be regretted, as these five chapters have been thrown off separately,

each one by itself, and will thus, we trust, reach a far wider circle of readers than those who can be expected to possess themselves of two octavo volumes.

The first extract we give is from the Introduction, and it contains some important observations on the general character of the evidence, and the sources from which it is derived :—

“ For the reasons that have thus been briefly indicated, we are disposed to regard almost every method of proof which has been adopted as containing some element of truth,—some fact or principle, which at one stage or another may be beneficially applied in the way of either confirming or illustrating the doctrines of Natural Theology. The evidence for the being and perfections of God is not simple, but complex ; it springs from various sources, and flows in different channels ; it cannot be embodied in a single syllogism, nor exhausted by any one process of reasoning ; it is essentially *a cumulative proof*, embracing a vast variety of different facts, and depending on several distinct laws of thought ; and we shall do no justice—we may even do great injury to the sacred cause, if we venture either to circumscribe the field of inquiry within narrow and arbitrary limitations, or to confine ourselves to one principle of reason as the sole basis of proof.

“ We have said that the *objective* and the *subjective* elements of proof are equally indispensable,—that the facts observed in nature would afford no evidence apart from those rational principles by which alone they can be discerned and interpreted ; and that these rational principles, again, could have no occasion for their exercise apart from the phenomena of nature and experience. This necessary correlation between the *facts* of observation and the fundamental *laws* of thought, suggests the inquiry, whether, in the statement of the evidence, we should begin with a discussion of the *principles of reason*, on which its validity depends, or with an exhibition of the *facts in nature* by which these principles are called into action ? Considered as subjects of speculative inquiry, these two topics, although closely related, are radically distinct ; and it might seem to be the most scientific course, to establish, in the first instance, the rational principles or laws of thought on which the validity of the proof depends, and thereafter to apply them to the facts of nature and experience. But, for practical purposes, we think it better to adopt a different course, and one that is more in accordance with the actual progress of the mind in the acquisition of knowledge. It should never be forgotten that a large portion of our most important knowledge is acquired, in the first instance, by the *spontaneous* exercise of our faculties on their appropriate objects, and that it is not till a later stage that we derive any advantage from the process of *reflective* thought, or the analysis of the mental laws by which our spontaneous judgments were determined. If the laws of thought, to which we appeal, be really connatural to the human mind, they will come into play spontaneously on the presentation of the objective evidence ;—and by our own consciousness of their operation in our bosoms we shall be best prepared for estimating their force, and appreciating their value, as constituent elements in the general proof. State the *fact* in the first instance, and let the *law* operate

spontaneously: then advance, with the aid of this new-born consciousness, to a critical inquiry into the mental process. By reversing this order we involve ourselves at the outset in what must be an abstruse discussion of the principles of psychology and metaphysics, which is in nowise necessary to legitimate our spontaneous judgments, and which may be reserved with advantage for a later stage. At each stage in our course we present a fact, or a class of facts, which are no sooner understood in their true import, than the mind spontaneously acts upon them according to its fundamental laws; and it is thus prepared to respond to any appeal that may be afterwards made to its own consciousness in verification of these laws. And as, in point of fact, the only parts of the proof which can be seriously questioned, are those which depend, not on the facts of nature, but on the principles of reason, it is advisable, we think, to present the *facts* in the first instance, that they may make their own natural impression on the mind, and to proceed thereafter to a separate consideration of the psychological principles which are involved in the process of proof.”—(Vol. i. pp. 29–31.)

Dr Buchanan next sets before us a very able discussion of some important preliminary questions:—

“On a survey of the various methods of stating the proof, as they have been successively exhibited, *four* questions of a preliminary kind are naturally raised:—*first*, whether a formal proof of the existence of God be either *possible* on the one hand, or *needful* on the other? *secondly*, whether, on the supposition of its being both possible and useful, it may be best conducted in the *a priori* or the *a posteriori* method? *thirdly*, whether, on the same supposition, it should consist chiefly of those facts and considerations which are patent to all, so as to be adapted to the popular mind, or should also embrace the philosophical explanation of these facts, so as to assume a scientific form? and, *fourthly*, whether it should proceed exclusively on the ground of ‘natural evidence,’ or avail itself also of the light of revelation. A brief answer to each of these questions will serve at once to determine the plan, and to explain the *rationale* of the arrangement which we propose to adopt.

“The *first* of these questions demands our notice at the very threshold of the inquiry, chiefly on account of a very singular coalition of apparently adverse parties, who, differing in all other respects, concur in this, that any thing like an effective and legitimate proof of the existence of God is impossible. On the one hand, the speculative Atheist, whether his infidelity assumes the sceptical or the dogmatic form, denies not only the validity of every extant proof, but the existence of any accessible body of evidence, or of any intellectual faculty capable of affording the slightest rational ground for belief in God. On the other hand, the transcendental Idealist and the sentimental Mystic speak of such an ‘intellectual intuition,’ such a direct and immediate ‘apperception’ of God as is altogether independent alike of any process of reasoning, and of any external sign or manifestation in the shape of evidence; and they conclude that all argument on the subject is superseded by its self-evident certainty—that a formal proof is impossible, just because it is superfluous. Wide as is the distance between these

two extremes, there is a point at which they meet and coincide: they both concur in affirming that the existence of God *cannot be proved*, while only *one* of them adds that *it need not be proved*. Hence we hear it reiterated on every side, and sometimes in quarters where it might have been least expected, that the existence of God is not a topic for argument, but an object for faith; that if it be credible at all, it must be credible simply in the light of its own self-evidence; that it cannot be established by any process of reasoning; and that all reasoning on such a theme weakens rather than confirms our convictions. Did we defer to the *dictum* of a recent writer whose erratic genius seldom fails to express itself in strong language, we should feel that we are engaging in a useless and even perilous task. 'The Deity exists by a necessity of his own nature, and men will never cease to believe in his existence. The most impious act a human creature can commit, is the attempt to prove a fact so omnipresent and irresistible. He who asserts that there is no God is a madman: he who, by elaborate reasoning, endeavours to show that there is a God, is a fool!'

"We think it necessary to take this state of feeling into account, when we are entering on a statement of the evidence, both because we have reason to believe that it prevails to a considerable extent, not only among particular schools of speculative inquirers, but even in the mind of the Christian community, insomuch that the study of the 'natural evidence' is distasteful to many, who have no doubt in regard to the truth itself; and also because we apprehend that there is a confused mixture of truth and error in the supposition from which it springs. It seems to have been supposed that, when we speak of *proving* the existence of God, we mean to do so by a long process of reasoning or argument,—a series of concatenated syllogisms, such as is sometimes employed in the department of pure science; and, on this supposition, proof has been deemed superfluous, on the very natural ground that there must surely be a shorter and more direct access to one of the most universal, as well as most important, convictions of the human mind. To a certain extent, we sympathise with this feeling; and were the supposition well founded, we might even concur in the conclusion to which it leads. There could scarcely be a greater or more mischievous error than to represent the evidence for the being and perfections of God, as so abstract or so complicated, that it could only be exhibited in a long chain of reasoning, or discerned and appreciated only by men of science. But when we speak of *proof* as either possible or necessary in such a case, our language is not meant to imply this. On the contrary, the process may be extremely short, consisting of a very few steps; it may take place spontaneously under the operation of the natural laws of thought, without our being distinctly conscious of a train of reasoning, and the evidence may be no sooner discerned than the truth is intuitively believed. There is much that is *intuitional* and *spontaneous*, both in the perception of the evidence and in the reception of the truth,—just as in every other branch of ontology, whether it relates to our own existence, or the existence of our fellow-men, or the reality of an external material world. But in no case, so far as we can see, is there any *intuition* so

direct and immediate, or any belief so spontaneous, as to be altogether independent of evidence. Our belief, for instance, in the existence of our fellow-men, and of their radical resemblance to ourselves in respect of intelligence and feeling, may be said, in a certain sense, to be intuitive; it is so natural and so inevitable, that we are scarcely conscious of passing through any process of reason in reaching it: and yet it springs, unquestionably, from certain *signs or manifestations* of thought and emotion in them, which are immediately discerned to be similar to those of which we are conscious in ourselves, and which are not equally displayed by any of the inferior animals. There is not only a spontaneous perception, there is also a real evidence,—an evidence which may not require, and may scarcely admit of, a formal statement, but which is, nevertheless, the sole ground, and the sufficient justification of our belief. There is both a strong resemblance, and a radical difference, between the grounds of our belief in the existence of our fellow-men, and those of our belief in the existence of God. There is a resemblance, in so far as our belief, in both instances, depends on certain *signs or manifestations* which are discerned and interpreted as a natural evidence of the truth; but there is also a difference, arising out of the different nature of the evidence to which they respectively appeal. It is utterly inconceivable that any sane mind should ever deny or doubt the existence of kindred beings around it, not because this truth is discerned without evidence, but because the *medium* is so transparent, and the facts so familiar and undeniable, that no one, except the systematic sceptic, will even profess to call them in question. It is otherwise with the doctrine which affirms the being and perfections of God. That doctrine may be as true in itself, and as certain in its evidence, as the other; but our belief in it, in so far as it depends on the unaided light of nature, rests on a variety of considerations which require to be considered and reflected on before their force can be duly felt. The evidence is of a kind that may possibly be overlooked and neglected by men immersed in the cares and business of life. Hence the necessity of directing their special attention to the natural evidence for the being and perfections of God. This necessity is not equally felt in regard to the grounds of certain other primary beliefs, partly because they are generated naturally and inevitably by the circumstances in which we are placed, and partly also because there is no temptation to deny or to doubt their certainty. Whereas, with reference to God, the evidence, although equally conclusive, is not equally apparent or irresistible; it is more liable to be overlooked or disputed; we may neglect it, when we are engrossed with the pursuits of business, or even of science; we may reject and spurn it, from a latent consciousness that religion, if true, would bring us under obligations, and impose restraints, to which we are unwilling to submit.

“These considerations, derived from the very nature of the case, are abundantly sufficient to vindicate any judicious attempt that may be made to illustrate the ‘natural evidence’ for the being and perfections of God. It is an attempt merely to place the *facts of nature* before the *minds of men*, so as to call into action the principles of reason or the laws of thought to which theology makes its appeal. It only remains to be added, that even were the grounds of our belief more

intuitively discerned than we have supposed them to be, yet, when these grounds are called in question, when our belief itself is assailed by argument or undermined by sophistry, there may be occasion for reasoning, if not to prove the truth, yet to disprove the objections which have been urged against it; and this is, in point of fact, the reason of by far the larger amount of argument that has been employed on the side of theism in its conflict with infidelity. That argument has been directed, not so much to the object of *proving the truth*, for the *proof* consists mainly in a direct appeal to a body of "natural evidence," which depends on facts and is independent of argument,—but rather to the object of exposing the fallacies, and neutralising the objections of its assailants; and as long as there are sceptics or atheists in the world, so long must this warfare continue to be waged. In this respect, theology has been called to encounter the same perils, and to pursue a similar course, with sound philosophy itself; for the same scepticism which assailed our belief in the existence and providence of God, has equally called in question the evidence of our senses, the reality of an external material world, and the very possibility of proving any one conceivable truth. Its assaults were, in either case, met by argument; but by argument directed, not to prove by reasoning what neither required nor admitted of such proof, but to show that our beliefs rest on grounds that are impregnable to every such assault, and to neutralise the presumptions that might seem to lie against them. On these grounds we conclude, that a *proof* of the being and attributes of God, in the only sense in which we are concerned to defend it, may be alike legitimate and useful in itself; and that it may even be absolutely necessary, both for the production of an intelligent belief in the popular mind, and for the prevention or cure of atheism, at certain critical stages in the course of speculative inquiry. It may be called an argument,—a proof,—or a demonstration; but it is nothing more than a statement of the evidence which exists in nature; and it consists in an investigation of the sources from which that evidence is derived, and the principles of reason on which its validity depends."—(Vol. i. pp. 31–37.)

This first question touches upon a point of the deepest and most fundamental importance. We have a few observations to make regarding it; but in the meantime we give the exposition of the second of these preliminary questions, which seems to us to exhibit profound and judicious thinking, and a thorough appreciation and mastery of the topic discussed:—

"The *second* question,—whether, on the supposition of a proof being possible, it may be best conducted after the *a priori* or the *a posteriori* method,—may be differently answered according to the sense in which these phrases are understood. They are often used somewhat vaguely. Sometimes they denote a *process of reasoning*; at other times they describe merely the *source of data* on which that reasoning proceeds. In the former sense, an *a priori* argument corresponds to a process of 'deduction' by which particular truths are derived from more general theorems which virtually comprehend them; while an *a posteriori* argument corresponds to a process of 'induction' by which

we rise from particular facts to general laws. In the other sense, they are applied to denote, not a process of reasoning or a method of argument, but merely the supposed *origin of the constituent elements of thought*. Thus, any element of thought is said to be an *a priori* principle, when it is supposed not to be given in 'experience,' but to be furnished by 'reason:' and so, any other element of thought is characterised, with reference to its source or origin, as an *a posteriori* idea when it is supposed to be given, not by reason, but by experience. The 'ideas of reason' are thus distinguished from the 'ideas of experience,' and any argument which proceeds mainly on the former, is often called an argument *a priori*, while that which proceeds mainly on the latter is as often said to be an argument *a posteriori*.

"After the most serious reflection, we admit the distinction, both between the *inductive* and the *deductive* methods of reasoning, and between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* elements of thought: but, in applying that distinction, we are prepared to maintain that there never has been, and never can be an argument so purely *a priori* as to have no element in it derived from the 'ideas of experience,' nor an argument so purely *a posteriori* as to have no element in it derived from the 'ideas of reason.' There is a real and a wide difference between the two methods of reasoning; but that difference does not consist in the entire exclusion from either of ideas derived both from reason and experience. If you call that element of thought which is furnished from within an *a priori* principle, and that other element which is furnished from without an *a posteriori* idea, you may thus discriminate between the two; but if you attempt to disjoin them, or to found an argument, directed to any practical object, exclusively on either, the attempt must prove abortive, for 'what God hath joined together,' in the very constitution of our nature,—in the co-relation of *subject* and *object*, 'no man may part asunder.'

"If by an *a priori* principle, you mean an element of thought furnished from within, and springing immediately and spontaneously from the structure and laws of the mind itself,—then there is an *a priori* element, not only in the process of abstract reasoning, but in the simplest case of induction,—in the most common act of perception,—and even in sensation itself,—it is involved in all 'experience.' In sensation, which is often supposed to be merely empirical, there is really an *a priori* element; it is not the exclusive product of any external cause, it is the joint product of subject and object, of matter and mind; it depends as much on the constitution of the one as on the properties of the other; and hence both Kant and Mill have shown, that the theory, which represents the mind as purely passive in sensation, proceeds on a partial view of the conditions required, and that the laws of our organization and mind are as much concerned as the properties and influence of outward objects. And if there must be, on the one hand, an *a priori* element in every judgment or argument *a posteriori*, it is equally evident, on the other hand, that the converse is also true,—that there is an *a posteriori* element in every *a priori* proof. Mr Mill has endeavoured to show, that the whole force of the syllogism depends on a prior 'induction,'—that every process of deductive reasoning presupposes some idea derived from experience,—and that geometry itself rests ultimately on 'definitions,' such as

are possible only on the supposition of our having observed figures and magnitudes.* In short, human knowledge, in all cases without exception, depends on the combination of two elements,—a certain 'rudimentary experience,' and some mental law or principle of reason; and in the absence of either, knowledge is non-existent, and reasoning impossible.

"Let us apply these general views to the special subject of our present inquiry. It appears to us that neither the *a priori* nor the *a posteriori* proof of the being and attributes of God could be valid or conclusive, did it confine itself either to the facts of experience, or the ideas of reason *exclusively*, and that both must be combined in any effective statement of the evidence. This remark is abundantly confirmed by the result of all the attempts that have ever been made to construct a proof out of materials derived exclusively either from reason or experience. It has been well said, that Descartes' celebrated arguments for the existence of God 'have all been sometimes called by courtesy *a priori* arguments, though some of them are as much deductions *a posteriori* (the elements, however, being from the mind, not from the material universe) as those which are usually so called; i.e., they are from effects to causes, and from effects manifesting a certain nature to a cause manifesting a similar nature.'† We cannot advert to all the examples; but we may select one, which all competent judges will admit to be, in many respects, the most memorable effort of human reason to elevate itself, by pure thinking, to the knowledge of Him who is infinite and eternal. The 'Demonstration of the Existence of God' by Dr Samuel Clarke, is one of the noblest monuments of human thought. It is the product of a mind at once acute and profound; and whatever defects may be ascribed to it, by the rigorous criticism of reason, or the sceptical criticism of un-reason, it will ever retain a permanent value in the eyes even of those who decline to adopt or sanction it, on account of that portion of truth which unquestionably belongs to it. It is characterised throughout by that vigorous intellectual energy, which made Clarke a fit associate and correspondent of Newton, and Leibnitz, and Butler.

"On a careful analysis of this celebrated argument, it will be found that it may be divided into *two* great branches,—and that in *each* of these, it depends entirely for its validity on the combination of an empirical fact with a law of reason,—in other words, on the conjoined force of the *a priori* and *a posteriori* elements. In the *first* branch, which proceeds on what Kant would have called the fact of 'unconditioned existence,' experience is called in, but only to the extent of postulating 'the existence of something;' and then, on the ground of this fact of experience, the author rises, by the aid and under the guidance of an established law of thought, to the inference that something must have existed from all eternity, or that there must be in the universe some Being that is *necessary* and *self-existent*. He next proceeds to *deduce* from the idea of a necessary and self-existent Being certain conclusions respecting its nature, and the attributes which must belong to it. Without enlarging on this part of the proof, in which he

* J. S. Mill, "System of Logic," i. 198, 226, 249, 297, 301, 336, 363, 534.

† Edinburgh Review, January 1852, p. 36.

finds on mere 'unconditioned existence,' as Baronius says a metaphysician ought to do,*—let us turn to the *second* branch of his argument, in which he attempts to prove the intelligence, wisdom, goodness, and other perfections of God. In *this* he finds, not on bare existence as unconditioned, but on existence *so* conditioned as to afford evidences of *design*, and is compelled again to have recourse to the combined strength of reason and experience. In proving his *eighth* proposition,—that the Supreme Cause and Author of all things must be an Intelligent Being,—he frankly admits that this, which, nevertheless, is said to be the main question betwixt us and the Atheists, 'does not so obviously and directly appear to us by considerations *a priori*; because, through the imperfection of our faculties, we know not wherein Intelligence consists, nor can see the immediate and necessary connection of it with *self-existence*, as we can that of eternity, infinity, and unity. But *a posteriori*, almost every thing in the world demonstrates to us this great truth, and affords us undeniable arguments to prove that the world, and all things therein, are the effects of an Intelligent and Knowing Cause.' The argument, considered as a pure *a priori* speculation, thus breaks down in the hands of its ablest advocate, and that, too, just at the most critical point,—the point which, by his own admission, is 'the main question bewixt us and the Atheists.'

"It is only fair to add his own candid estimate of the comparative value of this kind of proof, as that is frankly stated in a letter appended to his work. 'The proof *a posteriori*,' he says, 'is level to all men's capacities, because there is an endless gradation of wise and useful phenomena of nature, from the most obvious to the most abstruse, which afford proof of the being of God to the several capacities of all unprejudiced men; and this is what, I suppose, God as a Moral Governor expects that moral agents should be determined by. The proof *a priori* is, I believe, strictly demonstrative; but, like numberless mathematical demonstrations, capable of being understood by only a few attentive minds,—because it is of use only against learned and metaphysical difficulties, and, therefore, it must never be expected that this should be made obvious to the generality of men, any more than Astronomy or Mathematics can be.' This graceful admission is satisfactory, so far as it goes; but the fact, that such minds as those of Butler, Reid, Stewart, Brown, Brougham, Whately, and Chalmers, were not convinced, after the most careful study, of the validity of this demonstration, may be regarded as a sufficient proof that not only 'the generality of men,' but some even of 'the few attentive minds,' may desiderate something which they can by no means find in it.

"And yet we are very far from saying that this elaborate argument deserves the ridicule with which it has sometimes been treated. On the contrary, we hold that it does contain the substance of a valid proof, both from *conditioned* and *unconditioned* existence; and that its chief defect lies in the professed attempt to prove every thing *a priori*, when, from the very nature of the case, we are under the necessity of combining 'the principles of reason' with 'the facts of experience.' Still it has a permanent and imperishable value, as one of the loftiest monuments of human thought: and the *deductive method* which it

* Baronius, "Metaphys.," p. 2,—"*Metaphysica contemplatur ens quò ens est.*"

pursues is, and ever will be, applicable to some topics, included in the general subject, which cannot be so well or so clearly proved in any other way. The masterly critique by Dr Waterland * amply proves the truth of this opinion. He rejects the proof, for reasons which are distinctly and forcibly stated ; but he adds—that ‘ it may be legitimate to argue *a priori* from *existence* to *attributes*, or from *one* attribute to *another*,’—‘ that the Divine existence may be considered in the first place, and after that the attributes, in their most natural order of conception ; and when they are so placed or ranked, we may argue from them in that order, and such arguing may, without impropriety, be styled arguing *a priori*, as arguing from something *antecedent* in natural order of conception, to something *subsequent* in conception to it. And this kind of arguing *a priori*, which is reasonable, ought not to be confounded with the other, which is manifestly ὕστερον πρῶτον, and palpably absurd.’—(Vol. i. pp. 37–44.)

The subject adverted to in the second of these extracts is one of paramount importance in the present day, when there is so strong a tendency to deny that the great doctrines of Natural Theology can be fully proved and satisfactorily established, and when so many men of different views, and upon various grounds, concur in countenancing this startling notion. This notion has been put forth of late by many who profess, and often, we doubt not, sincerely, to be decided Theists,—to be themselves convinced of the truth of the leading conclusions of Natural Theology, though denying that they can be logically proved or established,—nay, to hold that the intuition, or the faith, or whatever other vague and indefinite thing it may be, on which they rest their views upon these subjects, affords a better and surer ground for them than any thing coming under the heads of reason, argument, proof, or evidence. We have no sympathy whatever with these notions, and, on the contrary, regard them with great jealousy. Wherever we meet them, and in whatever spirit they may be brought forward, they remind us unpleasantly of Hume’s well-known sneer about “our holy religion being founded not on reason but on faith.” We are convinced, that no doctrines will long continue to regulate the convictions of men, unless they can be proved or logically established, unless they can be shown to commend themselves, by a vinculum more or less direct, to the understanding or reason of man, meaning thereby that department of man’s mental constitution which is more immediately conversant with the investigation and establishment of truth, and unless the objections which may be adduced against them can be disposed of, more or less directly, by successful dialectics ; and we are also convinced, that the leading doctrines of Natural Theology, as they are generally received amongst us, can be

* Law’s “Inquiry into the Ideas of Space, Time, Immensity, and Eternity,” Appendix, p. 197.

proved or established in this way against all gainsayers, can be so commended argumentatively to the understanding or reason as to shut men up to utter scepticism, as the only alternative to receiving them as true and proved.

We have no room at present for discussing this subject ourselves, or for giving extracts of any length regarding it from Dr Buchanan's book. We can only make a few miscellaneous observations upon it. Kant and Schleiermacher seem to have exerted no small influence in leading men to disconnect the conclusions of Natural Theology with the intellectual or cognitive department of our nature; the former basing them on the moral nature, and the latter on the intuitional consciousness. The general tendency of Sir William Hamilton's philosophy is to favour the same result, to substitute in a question of this sort faith instead of reason. His views upon this subject are probably much the same as Kant's, though in stating them he has used an expression which, if it was not employed inadvertently, goes farther in a right direction than Kant would have done. He says (Discussions, second edition, p. 623), "The only valid *arguments* for the existence of a God and the immortality of the human soul, rest on the ground of man's moral nature." We would fain regard this as a proof that Sir William admits that there is one source whence valid *arguments, properly so called*, for the existence of God can be derived. But many now-a-days, though professing to believe in the existence of God, maintain that there is no true and conclusive argument in proof of this great fact, or of the doctrine which proclaims it. The last number of the *Westminster Review* (No. XVI. p. 352) puts the matter in this way:—"Evidence that there is 'a Being all powerful, wise, and good, by whom every thing exists,' fails us, but fails us because the theme transcends all evidence, because, in the very nature of things, we, the finite, cannot from the finite educe or reason out the Infinite,—we, the merely immortal, cannot from the successional attain even to logical apprehension of the Eternal. But He witnesses to Himself within us all. He proclaims Himself, His *infinitude*, there. This inward witness, in its essential nature and free unbiassed utterance, is authoritative and supreme." This is sufficiently explicit in the repudiation of every thing like an intellectual or rational ground for belief in the existence of God; and so far as concerns the alleged substitute for this, it seems to be little else than empty verbiage and unmeaning declamation. Views of a similar tendency are to be found in that singular and dangerous storehouse of almost all that is unsound and heretical, "The Epistles of St Paul to the Thessalonians, Galatians, Romans, with Critical Notes and Dissertations," by Mr Jowett, now Professor of Greek at Ox-

ford. He says (vol. ii. p. 410), "The arguments from first or final causes will not bear the tests of modern metaphysical inquirers." "Arguments from first and final causes may be regarded as a kind of poetry of natural religion." It is an alarming state of things when such views as these are issued, and with impunity, from the high places of the Church of England.

Most of those who adopt these views profess to believe in the generally received doctrines concerning God; and if these doctrines are true, it is surely in the highest degree improbable that they should not admit of being fully commended to that department of our mental constitution which is specially conversant with the discovery and establishment of truth. There is no improbability that other departments of our nature should contribute to suggest to us and to impress upon us some knowledge of God, but there is the highest improbability that the cognitive and ratiocinative part of our nature should not. The question is not, in what way the idea of God, and some conceptions and beliefs regarding him, may have been originally produced in our minds, nor, in what way they may have been most powerfully impressed upon us; but simply this,—whether processes of reasoning and argument can be produced, which cannot be successfully redargued, and which, as their legitimate and appropriate result, constrain men's understandings to receive as true the commonly-received doctrines concerning God? In order to find a sufficient warrant for answering this question in the affirmative, it is of course not necessary to ignore or reject the informations of the senses, of consciousness, and of reasoning, or the intuitive fundamental laws of thought or first principles of belief, as they have been called. The results or products of these capacities and departments of our mental constitution enter into all our processes of reasoning or argument, and essentially affect all the conclusions we adopt. But there are many of our convictions which we could not have reached, unless our reasoning powers had been brought to bear upon the materials derived from these other sources; and even though the conclusions might have been otherwise reached, it is only by the exercise of our understanding that their validity can be thoroughly tested, and that they can be defended against the assaults of adversaries. If legitimate and unanswerable processes of argument can be produced, leading logically to the conclusion of the truth of the fundamental doctrines of Natural Theology, then the favourite allegation of the present day, about our views of God being founded on intuition or faith and not on reason, must fall to the ground, and the doctrines of Natural Theology must be held to be logically proved and conclusively established in argument, although it may have been by some other natural process that

our conceptions of God have been introduced into our minds, and although it may have been by a supernatural process that they have been most deeply impressed upon us.

We have said that a great amount of improbability attaches to the view we are opposing, both from the nature of the case and from the fact, that the great body of the ablest men who have most carefully considered this subject have been satisfied of the soundness of some of the common arguments for the existence and perfections of God; while the efforts of those who have taken the other side wear very much the appearance of being traceable, in most cases, to perverted ingenuity, to an affectation of superiority to commonplace arguments and vulgar prejudices, or to something worse. But while these considerations furnish strong presumptions in favour of our position, the proof of it can be based only upon the production of actual arguments in support of the leading conclusions of Natural Theology, so put as to be unanswerable by fair reasoning, and followed up by an exposure of any attempts that may have been made to answer them, or to prove their insufficiency. Dr Buchanan's book is so arranged as to correspond beautifully with this division of the subject; and this affords a special indication of its suitableness to the state of the discussion in the present day. He first gives the direct and proper proof for the being and perfections of God under five leading heads; and then, in his second section, he gives an examination of the rational principles which are involved in the process of proof, just for the purpose of proving, that the process of proof which had been presented is in full accordance with the most generally-recognised and best-established principles of psychology and metaphysics, and that no valid objection derived from these sources can be adduced against it. He introduces the subject, and states the position on which we have been animadverting, in the first chapter of this section, under the title of "The Metaphysics of Theism," and then he defends the validity of the process of proof, and answers the objections to it, under the heads of "The Principle of Causality," "The Doctrine of Final Causes," and a notice of Kant's attack upon the common arguments for Theism. This is a very important and a very able portion of the work, and we regret that our limits enable us only to give two short extracts from it:—

"We have thus briefly adverted to *three* distinct opinions respecting the psychological origin of our belief in God, which have all been applied to disparage or supersede the proof arising from the *natural* evidence in favour of his being and perfections. Sometimes by representing the idea of God as *innate*, and indelibly engraved on every human mind,—sometimes by ascribing our belief in his being to *intui-*

tion, rather than to *inference*,—sometimes by referring it not to *reason*, but to *faith*,—not a few have attempted to persuade the public mind, that any thing like *proof* in such a case is unnecessary or even impossible, and have succeeded, it is to be feared to a large extent, in creating a prejudice against the study of *the natural evidence*. But if Nature be indeed a volume which contains any information respecting its Author,—if it be true that ‘the heavens declare the glory of God,’ and that the ‘invisible things of Him, even his eternal power and Godhead, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made,’—it is alike our duty and our privilege to study ‘the works of the Lord, and to consider the operations of His hands.’ Believing that there is a valid natural evidence for the being and perfections of God, and that it is by the aid of that evidence, in conjunction with the revelations of Scripture, that we can best arrive at sound religious convictions, we propose to examine the *process of proof*, with the view of ascertaining what are the principles, intuitional or logical, which are involved in it, and of showing that it is neither less legitimate nor less conclusive than the processes which are employed in any other department of science.”—(Vol. i. p. 328.)

“It is enough for the vindication of our cause, if we can establish the *two* following positions:—*first*, that all speculative objections are equally applicable to each of the three great branches of ontology, which relate respectively to the soul, the universe, and God; and, *secondly*, that in applying the principle of causality to the proof of the existence of God, we are following precisely the same method by which we arrive at the knowledge of other existences and causes. If these two positions be established, it will follow that there is nothing peculiar or anomalous in the process by which we infer, from the natural evidence, the being and perfections of God; and that we must either admit its validity, or sink into utter scepticism in regard to the most familiar objects of human knowledge.”—(Ibid. p. 338.)

We have no doubt that Dr Buchanan has conclusively proved these positions, and thereby established his case. Thus we have not only processes of proof for the being and perfections of God, in which no flaw or defect in logic can be established, but also a distinct proof of the legitimacy of the principles involved in these processes, a proof of their accordance with the recognised principles applicable to the discovery and establishment of truth in general. The practical result of all this is, either that the leading doctrines of Natural Theology must be admitted to be argumentatively proved, to be established to the satisfaction of our reason, or else it must be held that nothing is to be certainly believed under the head of what is commonly called contingent truth, beyond the immediate, individual, informations of perception and consciousness, or what Hume called impressions and ideas, and this would be virtually to introduce a system of general scepticism. The doctrines of Natural Theology, indeed, come under the head of what is usually called contingent and concrete, as distinguished from necessary and abstract, truth, and, therefore, the evidence in

support of them cannot be of the kind that is called, in the strictest sense of the word, demonstrative, such as that by which the truths of Geometry are proved. And this consideration, while making it probable that these doctrines may be argued against, and that the arguments adduced against them may be possessed of some plausibility and may not admit of being met in every case with a direct and explicit answer, does not necessarily affect the real strength of the evidence, or the certainty of the conviction which it may produce. The real question is, Can such evidence be set forth as ought in right reason to convince our judgment and to carry our assent,—such evidence as can be successfully defended when assailed by argument, and should, therefore, even though every difficulty that ingenuity may suggest be not entirely cleared away, carry conviction to all who allow their rational faculties to work naturally and fairly, and who honestly and impartially submit to the guidance of apparent truth, wherever it may lead them? Evidence answering this description is, we are persuaded, necessary to give to any doctrines that may be propounded, a firm and permanent hold of men's convictions, to save them from becoming the prey of sophistry and scepticism; and evidence of this sort, varied and multiform, derived from many different sources, and adapted to every different capacity, has been hundreds of times produced in support of the commonly received doctrines concerning the being and perfections of God, and has been successfully defended against all adversaries.

The leading positions which may be derived from the light of nature concerning God, are admirably stated in the following passage from Bishop Stillingfleet's "*Origines Sacræ*," so stated as, by the very mode of stating them, to furnish a strong presumption of their truth:—

"But yet for those whose minds are so coy and squeamish as to any thing of divine revelation, we want not sufficient *evidence* in point of *reason* to prove to them the existence of a Deity. In order to which, I shall clear these following propositions:—

"1. That the true notion of a Deity is most agreeable to the faculties of men's souls, and most consonant to reason and the light of nature.

"2. That those who will not believe that there is a God, do believe other things on far less reason, and must by their own principles deny some things which are apparently true.

"3. That we have as certain evidence that there is a God as it is possible for us to have, considering his nature."—(B. iii. c. i. p. 267.)

These different positions are there satisfactorily established; that is, such considerations bearing upon them are brought forward as, when duly weighed and fairly applied, are sufficient to commend them to the assent of our understandings,

and to make it our duty, as reasonable and honest men, to regard them and to deal with them as true and proved. The third position suggests to us the chief difficulty commonly founded on by those who are most confident in asserting that the doctrines of Natural Theology cannot be proved, viz., that, to adopt the words of the *Westminster Review*, "we, the finite, cannot from the finite educe or reason out the Infinite," or, that in consequence of the inadequacy of our finite faculties to grasp the idea of infinity, or the conception of an Infinite Being, there must be a gap or incurable defect in the process by which we profess to prove the existence of such a being as God. Now, all that we contend for is, as Stillingfleet says, "that we have as certain evidence that there is a God as it is possible for us to have, *considering his nature*." There may be, or rather there must be, peculiarities, involving something of the nature of defects and difficulties, which affect all our mental exercises with respect to an Infinite Being. But these defects or difficulties affect only our capacity of forming a full and definite conception of an Infinite Being, or of the import of the proposition asserting the existence of such a being, and do not affect the question of what are the sources from which our conceptions of such a being or our beliefs regarding him are derived, or of what are the processes by which we may be satisfied of their soundness and validity. The men who use this consideration, to show that the existence of God cannot be proved, profess to believe that God exists and is infinite. Even the *Westminster Review* says, that "God proclaims his infinitude within us." So that it appears that there is a conception and a conviction of an Infinite Being produced in our minds, in some way or other, and that we may be convinced that such a being exists, notwithstanding all the difficulties, defects, impossibilities, whatever these may be, resulting from the disproportion between our finite faculties and an infinite object. And if so, then nothing of essential importance can depend upon the question of what department of our mental constitution it is that furnishes us with our views of God, or, at least, there can be no good ground why these views may not be furnished, or at any rate tested, by the reason or understanding. Suppose that God were to proclaim to us his infinitude, not in the vague, unmeaning, and baseless sense in which this is predicated of him by the *Westminster Review*, but by an explicit declaration to that effect conveyed to us in words, a supposition, as we believe, virtually realised in the sacred Scriptures, the disproportion between our faculties and infinitude, with all its consequences, would still continue; but there would be nothing in this to prevent us from doing what we could in forming a conception of the Infinite Being thus brought

before us, and nothing to deter or incapacitate us for investigating, in the exercise of our reasoning powers, the validity of the evidence that God has given us this revelation concerning himself.

Upon grounds substantially the same, we think it can be shown that there is no general *a priori* ground for denying the competency or practicability of producing processes of argument directed to prove the existence of an Infinite Creator and First Cause of all things. Processes of reasoning have been produced, professing and appearing to establish this conclusion, against the validity of which nothing can be alleged, except the difficulties connected with the idea of infinity;—difficulties which we have shown to be irrelevant, so far as concerns the topic at present under consideration. The psychological or metaphysical questions concerning infinity and our mode of conceiving of it are of no real importance, with relation to any thing about which the advocates of a rational Natural Theology need be concerned. What they have to do is simply to produce processes of argument, the natural or appropriate effect of which is to satisfy men's understanding that there exists a Creator and First Cause of all things who is practically infinite, or exalted above the highest conceptions we can form of glory, majesty, and excellence; and then to show, that all the attempts which have been made to prove that these processes of argument are defective or inadequate, may be convicted of unintelligibility, irrelevancy, or sophistry. All this has been often done, but never, we think, better and more thoroughly than in Dr Buchanan's "Faith in God and Modern Atheism Compared."

CRITICAL NOTICES.

The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature. Also, Fifteen Sermons, preached in the Chapel of the Rolls' Court. By JOSEPH BUTLER, Bishop of Durham. With a Life of the Author, a copious Analysis, Notes, and Indices. By JOSEPH ANGUS, D.D. London.

THIS reprint of Butler's Analogy and Sermons is one of a series of works in the course of publication by the London Religious Tract Society, partly original and partly selected, and designed more especially for the use of students, and others who, though not students by profession, share to some extent in the spirit of intellectual activity and religious inquiry common to the times. In the Biblical department of the series, to which this work belongs, there have already appeared some publications of much merit, and fitted to be extensively useful. The well-known volume of Paley on the Evidences has found an able and discriminating editor in Mr Birks,—who, besides supplying an antidote to the defective evangelical tone and sentiments, and correcting the wonderfully few inaccuracies that are found in the original work, has, in the shape of supplementary notes appended to it, somewhat enlarged Paley's reasonings on those points, a fuller discussion of which was necessary to meet the demands of religious doubt or argument at the present day. Notwithstanding the affectation, recently manifested in certain quarters, of undervaluing the external evidences of Christianity, we have no doubt that Paley's work, under the judicious hands of such an editor, is destined for long to hold its place in the very first ranks of our apologetical literature. A similar service has been rendered by Mr Birks to another, and perhaps still more valuable work of Paley, in this same series. The "Horæ Paulinæ" of the latter author has been edited and enlarged by Mr Birks in a manner worthy of a work which, with the exception of Butler's Analogy, is perhaps, in respect of originality of conception and ability of execution, the most valuable contribution which, in this country, the Christian argument has ever received. With a sound and cautious judgment, he has brought to bear upon Paley's reasonings all the lights which a fuller study of the inspired record, aided by the investigations of modern criticism, could furnish. And especially he has, in the second half of the volume, entered upon the field of original inquiry for himself,—taking Paley's argument, and extending it to other portions of Scripture, and bringing out many undesigned coincidences between the inspired writers which Paley had left unnoticed or untouched. In this portion of the work Mr Birks has ren-

dered valuable and original services to the apologetical argument; and if he has not altogether rivalled his master in his own field, it is no small praise to have been found not unworthy to follow in his steps. The edition, by Birks, of Paley's "*Horæ Paulinæ*," with the "*Horæ Apostolicæ*" appended, is well entitled to supersede every other.

We are indebted to Dr Angus, as author or editor, for the two remaining volumes of the Biblical series. The "*Bible Hand-book*" is an introduction to the study of the sacred volume, sufficiently learned to satisfy the scholar, and sufficiently plain to be suited for popular and general use. We know of few books to be compared with it for the amount of valuable materials bearing on an intelligent study of Scripture which it contains, in a form at once compact and useful, or that exhibits so many of the best fruits of an extensive and sound erudition, with so little of its pedantry or pretensions. With no attempt at originality or novel research, where these would have been greatly out of place, Dr Angus has shown much industry, skill, and judgment, in arranging and condensing into a brief compass and simple form all that the learning and criticism both of earlier and later times have done for the defence and illustration of the Books of Scripture; and he has succeeded in producing a volume well adapted not only for the student who is entering upon a course of theological training, but also for that large class of inquirers who may desire to know something of the results of theological study without passing through its schools.

The edition of the *Analogy* before us is not unworthy to find a place in the same useful series. We are not prepared, indeed, to say that we value as highly Dr Angus' labours in his capacity of editor and commentator on the pages of Butler, as those in his previous character of author of the "*Bible Hand-book*." It was perhaps a more difficult task to follow in the footsteps of the author of the *Analogy*, and to illustrate his path, than to rival such writers as Horne in his popular "*Introduction to the Study of the Scriptures*." Nevertheless, the republication in a cheap form of such a work as the *Analogy* in the present day is peculiarly seasonable, and the illustrative labours of the editor are fitted to be useful in no small degree. He has wisely adopted the text as amended and fixed by the care of Mr Fitzgerald in his recent admirable but somewhat expensive edition of the *Analogy*; while the literary and philosophical notes contained in that volume, together with Chalmers' prelections on Butler, the valuable analysis of Duke and Wilkinson, and other works of Butler's many disciples and illustrators, have afforded varied materials, which Dr Angus has freely and advantageously used for the illustration of the argument. One portion of the notes is directed to point out and correct those deficiencies or inaccuracies in the reasoning of which even Butler was sometimes, although not frequently, guilty, when tempted to link on his argument to the fallacious help of the prevailing metaphysics or scholastic theology of his age. Another portion is applied to the still more important object of supplying what is wanting in the evangelical tone and statement of some parts of the *Analogy*; although such is the harmony and consistency of truth, and so firm a grasp had Butler taken of the fundamental principles of the divine administration, that the necessities of his argument often carried him in the right direction farther than his theology might have led him; so that when he sins

against a sounder creed, it is oftener in the way of defect than of positive error. And the remainder of the notes is intended to explain the doctrines which Butler combats, or to point out the influence of his views upon the subsequent history of theological opinion. Prefixed to each chapter there is an analysis of its contents, giving in a distinct and brief form a *vidimus* of the order and substance of the argument, and affording a very useful help to those who are beginning the study of the Analogy.

It is by no means an easy task to read the Analogy and appropriate its reasonings with a full insight into the meaning of the author, and more especially with the power to follow out Butler's principles in their varied and extensive application. The production of the Analogy was the labour of half a lifetime,—“the hard thinking of twenty years having been packed up” within this little volume. No one can read it with any measure of attention without feeling that every sentence is laden with meaning,—that each clause of a sentence is suggestive, nay, that every word almost is made to look before and after. Still farther, no one can have studied it without being convinced that the principles embodied in the Analogy traverse well nigh the whole field of theological speculation, in so far as it bears on the evidences and informations of the Word of God, and that they admit of ready and extensive application not only to errors other than those to which Butler has applied them, but to forms of unbelief unknown in his day. We are satisfied that there are to be found in the Analogy principles fitted and sufficient to meet almost every form of speculative unbelief prevalent at the present time; and that there needs but some disciple of Butler, inspired by his master's spirit and equipped in his armour, to go forth against the enemy, and the victory is sure. It did not lie within the scope of Dr Angus' aim to enter upon such a field. In his office as editor he has satisfied himself with illustrating Butler's views, and explaining his principles, in so far as he himself has indicated their application. But beyond this there is a most inviting field for any one qualified and competent to occupy it. A commentary on the Analogy that should explain and develop its principles in all their depth and extent,—that should exhibit their application not only to the errors of Butler's day, but to those that subsequently have arisen,—that should adapt them to the varied forms of speculative unbelief which, the same in substance as before, but under new and different guises, have troubled the mind of the church in recent times,—that should illustrate the power of these ancient truths in their victory over present falsehoods, would be a contribution to the cause of Christianity, inferior in value to none which our age has witnessed. In the meantime, and in the absence of such a work, we welcome every attempt made to render Butler's volume more familiar to the thinking portion of the rising generation, satisfied that there can be no better antidote to nine-tenths of the errors of the day than a revival of his principles and spirit.

Holidays at the Cottage; or, a Visit to Aunt Susan. Edinburgh :
Shepherd & Elliot, 1855.

MANY little books are produced at this season of the year for the amusement and instruction of children. We applaud the custom, as a kindly thing in itself, and fitted to draw forth right feelings in the

hearts of children. But we feel special pleasure when the books of this class do really provide at once amusement and instruction, blended with and pervaded by sound religious principle. For this reason, we give our cordial approbation to the little book now before us. It is well and pleasingly written; the dialogue full of nature, simplicity, and genial sense and warmth. The little stories introduced are both well conceived and well related; and the spirit of the whole is one of unobtrusive, but healthful and congenial piety, in thought, feeling, and language. As a little, cheerful, interesting, and right-hearted present for a child, we could very confidently place it in the hands of those most dear to us, and we can advise others to do the same.

The Suffering Saviour; or, Meditations on the Last Days of Christ upon Earth. By the Rev. FRED. W. KRUMMACHER, D.D.
Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. Pp. 481.

Twenty-seven Sermons, preached in St George's Church, Barnsley.
By the Rev. W. J. BROCK, B.A. London: Longman & Co.

WE are led to associate these volumes,—the one of German, the other of English authorship,—partly because of their external character as discourses which have been preached, but mainly on account of the practical cast of their contents.

Though missing, in some degree, in them both, the close adherence to a rigid exegesis of the words of Scripture,—which, so valuable at all times, is of especial importance in our own, when an urgent demand for what is individual and fresh in pulpit ministrations is so frequently made,—we have marked with peculiar interest no little edge and vigour in dealing with the sinner's conscience, much of what is both searching and soothing in the offer of Christ, with a heartiness in manifold exhortation that carries the presage of its success along with it.

It is a matter of regret to us that our space does not allow of our making any extracts in evidence of the favourable opinion now expressed, or following out into some little detail the reflections suggested by Dr Krummacher and Mr Brock, on the points of resemblance and contrast in the present methods of preaching in Germany and England, especially in reference to the present state and prospects of spiritual religion in both countries.

The Gift and the Gauge; or, God's Gifts and Man's Responsibility. By ROBERT COWE, A.M. London: J. Nisbet & Co. 1855. Pp. 364.

THIS is an admirable book. The basis of it is the Parable of the Talents (Matt. xxv.), under which name the author includes that of the Pounds (Luke xix.), which, though regarded by the best interpreters as a different parable, is yet so analogous, and in its general object so similar, that the author has judged very properly in embracing it along with the other in his treatment of the great theme of "God's Gifts and Man's Responsibility." Mr Cowe has filled his small book on this subject with more truly fine thoughts and precious sentiments, couched in beautiful and eloquent language, than are to be found in many a portly volume. Addressing himself more especially to readers of cultivated mind and of literary taste, his object is to guard them on the

one hand against the idolatry of mere intellect, and on the other to show how every human gift, when laid at the feet of the Lord of all, is thereby transfigured into a minister of his glorious kingdom, an angel of mercy, a spring of living waters in this dry and thirsty land. This excellent object the author keeps steadily in view throughout, and prosecutes with entire success. Whether he expatiates on our Lord's "departure to receive the kingdom," his coronation and enthronement, or on the "goods" which he "delivers to his servants,"—the mental gifts, the warm and genial affections, the rank and power, the worldly substance, the time, the kingdom of God within us, the richness and variety of these gifts,—or on the duty of "occupying" till the Master come, involving the momentous subject of Human Responsibility, or on the "reckoning" awaiting all of us, embracing the equally great themes of Reward and Punishment; on each and all of these the author brings out just such views as are fitted to counteract the erroneous ideas of the present day, to attract his readers to the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world, and to guide their feet into the way of peace. His mind, richly stored with the best literature, in prose and poetry, gives forth of these treasures in no stinted measure. The last chapter, on "The Universality of the Dominion of the Lord," is founded on another passage, and though a fitting sequel to the former chapters, is independent of them and a complete dissertation in itself. We had marked an anthology of passages for extracts, but unceremonious hints as to space, already otherwise appropriated in this number, must be succumbed to. Were the author to ask us how he might improve his volume, we should perhaps say by toning down a few passages which seem a little overdone (an example of which he will find at page 5, line 15); but this is scarcely worth mentioning, as it goes to no excess. On the whole, if one is at a loss for a New Year's Christian gift, we can cordially recommend the volume before us, whose tasteful appearance suits it for the drawing-room table, while its solid qualities fit it for more private use.

Sweden: Its Religious State and Prospects, with some Notices of the Revivals and Persecutions which are at present taking place in that Country. By the Rev. JAMES LUMSDEN, Free Church, Barry, Forfarshire. London: James Nisbet & Co., 1855. Pp. 80.

THIS is a very interesting and seasonable little book, bringing before us a subject well worthy of a place in our interest and in our prayers. For some time past a vague impression has prevailed that something interesting and important, in a religious point of view, was going on in Sweden, though very little was known about it. The whole of what is certainly known concerning it is embodied in Mr Lumsden's little work, and it is quite sufficient to show that God's Spirit has been poured out, that a real work of spiritual revival has begun, and is producing its appropriate and unmistakable fruits, both in those who are the subjects of it and in those who attempt to counteract it. The materials which Mr Lumsden has collected, partly by a personal visit to the country, and partly through other channels, are singularly interesting in themselves, and they are presented in the work before us in a very judicious and intelligent way. We cordially commend this

little work to all who take an interest in the advancement of the kingdom of Christ.

The Gospel in Ezekiel. By THOMAS GUTHRIE, D.D.

THESE discourses will fully sustain, and even raise, if that be possible, the reputation of Dr Guthrie as an eloquent and attractive preacher. They exhibit a rare combination of serious reflective thought on subjects of the most solemn and urgent interest, such as can scarcely fail to make a deep impression on 'the conscience and the heart, with a style of rich poetical illustration—a copiousness and variety of natural imagery—admirably fitted to arrest the attention, and to awaken vivid conceptions of the truth. One feels in reading them as if he were introduced into a saloon of art, or the studio of a painter, where various figures are grouped together in distinct pictures—each beautiful in its kind—but whose full significance is only discerned when he comes to see that, although detached, they are not isolated, but arranged—like the prints of Hogarth—so as to constitute a series, which develops a history while it inculcates a moral. For Dr Guthrie's work—miscellaneous as some of its contents may at first sight appear to be—contains a systematic series of expositions, and, considered as a whole, may be said to possess an organic unity. He has selected as the basis of his discourses a passage in the book of Ezekiel, which affords a suitable occasion for bringing under review, in their natural order, all the leading truths of the gospel; and he illustrates in succession the doctrine of the fall,—of original and actual sin,—of God's punitive justice,—of his unmerited mercy,—of his regard to the glory of his own name,—of his purpose to save,—of the remission of sins,—of the regeneration of sinners,—of the restoration of believers to the privileges of sons,—of the Lord's promise as the security, and of believing prayer as the means, of these inestimable blessings. He seems to have been guided in the selection and arrangement of these topics, as well as in his method of treating them, by the same conviction which was so strongly felt and expressed by Dr Chalmers, that the topics of theology may be best treated, at least in the first instance, "in the order of those inquiries which are natural to the exercised spirit of an individual man," and that we should ascend "in the order of man's wants and fears, and of his efforts to be relieved from them." In illustrating these topics, Dr Guthrie presents a full and faithful statement of gospel truth, but not in the shape of dry doctrinal discussion; it is everywhere blended with graphic descriptions of natural scenery,—with felicitous application of the incidents of common life,—with forcible references to every man's experience, and pungent appeals to his conscience,—with apt and beautiful similitudes, derived sometimes from nature, sometimes from history, sometimes from the creations of genius; and all pervaded by the solemnity of a deeply reverential spirit towards God, and by the tenderness of a large-hearted sympathy and kindness towards man. There are, no doubt, some peculiarities, both of style and sentiment, which a minute critic may possibly carp at, and which a cynical satirist might easily caricature; but he who will open his mind and heart to the full impression and genial influence of the book will rise from its perusal a wiser and better man. To offer extracts from such a work is superfluous; it will soon be in the hands of all our readers.

Discourses, by the late Rev. John Sym, Minister of Free Greyfriars, Edinburgh. With Memoir, by the Rev. GEORGE CRAIG, Minister of Sprouston Free Church, Kelso. Edinburgh: Johnstone & Hunter.

THIS volume we did not expect to receive in time to notice it in our present number. It has just come to hand, and we have only space to express our conviction that it is a worthy memorial of one who occupied a very high place in the esteem of all who knew him, and whose sudden removal in the midst of his years and usefulness stirred the deepest fountains of feeling in many a heart. Mr Sym enjoyed in no ordinary degree the esteem and affection of all who had the privilege of his friendship. They ever found in all their intercourse with him the working of a sound and vigorous understanding, the predominance of high Christian principle, the manifestation of many Christian graces, the most kind and amiable dispositions, the most thorough freedom from self-seeking, the most steady and straightforward prosecution of all righteous and honourable objects. With all his gentleness and amiableness of temperament, he combined a manly independence, and a high sense of all that was magnanimous and honourable. His friends counted with perfect confidence on the soundness of his judgment, the kindness and cordiality of his disposition, the steady consistency and the manly honour of his whole deportment; and the loss of such a friend they could not but deplore as a bereavement of no ordinary kind, especially as he was suddenly cut off in the midst of growing usefulness and reputation,—when, notwithstanding his retiring modesty, his excellent and valuable qualities were becoming better known and more highly appreciated in the church and the community. There was a great desire on the part of many to possess a permanent memorial of one whom they had esteemed and loved so much; and this feeling has led to, and will, we have no doubt, be gratified by, the preparation and publication of the volume now lying before us. It consists of a Memoir of Mr Sym, extending to above 100 pages, and of twenty Discourses, selected from his manuscripts. The Memoir has been prepared by the Rev. Mr Craig of Sprouston, an old and intimate friend, a man in every way qualified for such a work, and is characterised by great good sense and good feeling, and the uniform prevalence of good taste. Of the sermons we are, perhaps, not very impartial judges. But we do think, that even when brought to the bar of cool and uninterested criticism, they may be said to be deserving of high commendation as very superior specimens of pulpit instruction, and exceedingly well fitted to be useful. They were not composed or prepared for publication by the author, and this is no doubt a disadvantage. Still they furnish abundant evidence of having been carefully thought out and carefully composed. They contain a large amount of clear and discriminating exposition, of refined and pleasing illustration, and of searching and impressive application, of the great doctrines of the gospel. The volume will be much valued and cherished by all who had the privilege of having Mr Sym as their friend and pastor, while the Discourses, on the ground of their intrinsic merits, both with respect to matter and style, are entitled to a very high place among recent specimens of pulpit instruction.

GERMAN RELIGIOUS PERIODICALS.

I.—STUDIEN UND KRITIKEN.

THE fourth number (the last of this year's issue) of the *Studien und Kritiken* (edited by Drs Nitzsch, Rothe, Ullmann, and Umbreit) opens with an article in commemoration of the late Dr Lücke. It describes the position occupied by him in the church and his time, characterises him as an academical teacher, gives an outline of his theological views in general, and of what he accomplished on the territory of Exegesis, Systematic Theology, and Ethics more particularly. The article scarcely admits of condensation; suffice it, therefore, to remark that Dr Lücke was born in 1791, at Egeln, near Magdeburg, studied in Halle and Göttingen, and having finished his studies, settled as a *repetent* in Göttingen. Thence he went to Berlin, where he soon became *professor extraordinarius*; then, in 1818, as *professor ordinarius*, to Bonn; and, in 1827, he was called to Göttingen, where he remained until his death. His principal works are a Commentary on the Gospel and Epistles of John; an introduction to the Revelation of John; *Commentatio de ecclesia Christianorum apostolica*; on Modern Hermeneutics; on the Canon of Eusebius, &c. He was one of that noble band of men who, in the providence of God, were called to set again before the German nation a living Christianity, a Christianity of which Christ the Son of God is the centre, and which, in opposition to a one-sided intellectualism, as well as moralism, insists upon regeneration and close union and communion with Christ,—who viewed Christianity as a vital power, determining not only the life of the individual, but closely connected with all that is great and true in history, and destined to renew and regenerate, not only science, but also the life of church and state. This idea was the aim and object of his life; to realise it, he laboured in the sweat of his brow, and in all he did he had regard to the wants of the present time, and of the church more particularly. Although not a man of great originality, but rather of a pre-eminently receptive nature, yet he gave a peculiar form and expression to every thing which he had received. He was, it is true, not free from the errors and defects which attach to all the men of this school; but it should never be forgotten that he was to very many a guide to faith and peace, who afterwards looked down upon him as an unsettled man, who had remained behind, and was destitute of a right sense and sympathy with the Church. He least of all has deserved the abuse which was poured upon him during the last years of his life by bigoted Churchmen, whose exclusiveness he thought himself in duty bound strenuously to oppose. As a man of peace, his theology was pre-eminently a theology of peace; and the violent commotions caused, on the one hand, by the assaults of Strauss and his followers upon every thing Christian, and, on the other hand, by the

blind zeal of an exclusive High-Churchism and Confessionalism, with family affliction superadded, embittered the last years of his life. The character of his theology was pre-eminently Melancthonian.

The second article in this number is the first of a series of articles on "Dogmatik," by Dr Rothe. It contains the introduction, and speaks, first, of the Dogma and Dogmatik in general; and, second, of the Evangelico-Protestant Dogmatik. Under the first head, he remarks: Dogmatik is the science of doctrines (*Dogmas*); the Dogma has its root in religion. Religion viewed subjectively is piety, though its necessary supposition is a revelation. The order, in point of time, is therefore—revelation, subjective religion, objective religion. The latter appears first as opinion, then as a doctrine (*dogma*), and, finally, as a system of doctrines. This process is carried out in the religious community, *i. e.*, the church; it is only by the express, written sanction of the church, that a religious opinion becomes a *dogma*. The dogma, therefore, always supposes a church. By outward impulses, as well as by an inward necessity, the church is soon compelled to systematise these dogmas; and so there arises a system of doctrines, or *Dogmatik*. Dogmatik is, therefore, "the systematic or scientific representation of the doctrine publicly recognised by, and prevailing in a certain ecclesiastical community." Dogmatik has thus *first* to ascertain the dogmas of the church, and *then* to represent them in their inward unity. The latter implies, of course, a free criticism; but no other measure is admissible except that acknowledged by the church in question. Dogmatik is thus a *positive* historico-critical science, not a speculative one. To speak of a philosophical dogmatik is nonsense. Nor does there exist a biblical dogmatik; for the Bible contains only religious doctrines, but no dogmas; and dogmas are made by the church, not by the theologian. Under the second head, "The Evangelico-Protestant Dogmatik," Dr Rothe has the following divisions:—1. *Its principle*. It must be the same as that of the Evangelico-Protestant Church, which again can be recognised from the peculiar character of its piety only, which again is only a modification of the general Christian piety. The peculiar nature of the latter, however, consists in this, "that it is a real union of man with God, accomplished by Jesus of Nazareth as the Redeemer from sin." This, then, is to be modified and qualified by the *material* principle of the Evangelical Church (*i. e.*, the justification of man solely through *faith* in Christ, by the free grace of God, without any human merit), and its *formal* principle (*i. e.*, Scripture the sole and exclusive rule of faith).

2. *Its sources*. It has to receive its facts, *i. e.*, the dogmas themselves, from the symbolical books of the church, and to illustrate them from the scientific tradition of the church, and by the writer's own powers.

3. *Its systematic arrangement*. By the consciousness of *sin* and *grace* the two main divisions are suggested. Subdivisions of the former are, (a) doctrine of God—*theology*; (b) doctrine of man—*anthropology*; (c) doctrine of sin—*hamartiology*: while the latter has the subdivisions, (a) doctrine of the Saviour—*soterology*; (b) doctrine of salvation—*soteriology*. The ancient dogmatik began with the *bibliology*, or the source from which we derive our knowledge of the Christian truth. This, it is true, belongs properly to the section, "*De mediis gratiæ*;" but since this arrangement is characteristic of the Evangelico-Protes-

tant piety, our modern theologians cannot be allowed to change any thing in this arrangement. 4. *The method of the treatment of the single doctrines.* First, the facts are to be stated, and then the illustration and demonstration have to follow. In the latter, the dogmatician has to exercise a criticism, and in doing so he has to apply these criteria: (a) agreement with the Bible, *i. e.*, the New Testament, for to the Old Testament he stands merely in a historical relation; (b) the religious convictions of the community, for nothing can really be a dogma unless it answers to the immediate religious feelings; (c) scientific correctness and perfection, inasmuch as all dogmas are theological doctrines, theologoumena and scientific productions. This criticism must be exercised upon these doctrines specially which have not been produced by the Evangelico-Protestant Church herself, but have been simply taken from the Romish Church. And if, in the exercise of this criticism, the writer should find that the dogma of the church cannot stand the test, he has finally to indicate those points from which it might obtain the necessary reformation. At the close of his article, Dr Rothe points out the dangers threatening, on one hand, from Confessional zeal and High-Churchism, and, on the other, from those dogmaticians who pass off their own theologoumena for the doctrine of the church. To systems of that kind he refuses the name of *dogmatik*.

II.—EVANGELISCHE KIRCHENZEITUNG.

Of the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*, edited by Professor Hengstenberg, we have before us the numbers for July, August, and September. The July number contains an article under the title, "The Mystery of Baptism," the author of which labours hard to prove from Scripture, from the traditions and doctrines of the church, and from scientific arguments, that in baptism the new life is communicated and the new creature is implanted. The remainder of the July and part of the August number are taken up with an article on "The Three Prussian Regulations concerning the Instruction to be given in the Normal Seminaries, and in Preparatory and Elementary Schools." It gives, first, a sketch of Pedagogy in Germany during the last century. Rousseau's *Emile* called forth the so-called *philanthropic* education, which, disregarding the historical and positive conditions,—religion, family, community, and native country,—aimed at educating *men*. The leader of this new method, which soon outlived itself, was Basedow. A new period dates from Pestalozzi. In one respect he was the heir and successor of the philanthropists, inasmuch as he has laid all stress on intellectual culture and the method of teaching; but he, at the same time, acknowledged the importance of educating the child in connection with the historical realities of family and community, and was of opinion that dead morals could not give to man that peace, and comfort, and support which he needed, but that these could be bestowed only by a faithful surrender to God. The God of whom he taught, however, was not the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, but only the God and Lord of the Universe. From Pestalozzi then two schools issue, the so-called German Pedagogy and the Christian Pedagogy. The former acknowledged his merits as to method, but rejected religion as an element in education. Only that which is

human is to be developed in the child by education, and it is wrong to limit this by religion. It acknowledges, indeed, domestic, civil, and political interests, though as subordinate ones only, but not the religious interests, nor any other eternal realities. The chief representative of this school is Diesterweg. But in connection with that other element in Pestalozzi, there sprang up another school, the Christian Pedagogy, which not only professed Christ, the Crucified One, but made Christianity the foundation of their education, and proceeded from the principle that education should have regard to life and its objective forms and conditions. Family, vocation, community, fatherland, were to this school important realities. The father of it was Zeller, in Beuggen; its chief representatives are Volter, Stern, Henning, Palmer, Goltsch. For a time both these schools existed by the side of one another; but the more the former lost itself in abstract methodology and subjectivism, the more the latter appropriated to itself all the results of the formal pedagogy; so that even its opponents were obliged to acknowledge it as their equal in this respect. The deepening Christian movement, above all the revolution of 1848, in which the adherents of the former took a rather conspicuous part, have gained the victory to the Christian Pedagogy, which is confirmed and secured to it on the part of the state by the above regulations. We cannot here enter into the details of these regulations; it is sufficient to say that they acknowledge it as the chief object of the school to serve *life* and its wants. Life is to be re-organised on the foundation of Christianity, and the realities of church, family, vocation, community, and state. The matter to be taught is to be in close connection with, and to be selected with a regard to them. Mere intellectual culture is no longer to be the exclusive aim of these schools. The Bible is to be the principal book, Bible history and religious instruction the chief objects, in all the normal seminaries and schools.—The September number contains an article on “The Relation between Church and State,” remarkable because it comes from the *Evangelische Kirchenzeitung*. It is an address delivered at the Pastoral Conference in Berlin, by Dr Wuttke. The aim of the whole historical development is, according to him, to do away with the present condition in which church and state are separate, to establish a perfect unity, a *theocracy*. They are internally one. For wherever the church has a historical reality, there she must have a political character; and wherever the state is not a mere legal institution, but aims at a realization of morality, there it must have something of the nature of a church. But though both are moral persons and have moral aims, there exists a great difference between them. While the church maintains a standard of pure and perfect morality, the state is able to embody in its laws a small portion only of this pure and perfect moral law. While the church claims a voluntary obedience only, and can force no one to be a member, the state demands and enforces obedience to its laws. In her relation to the state, it is now the duty of the church, (1.) to maintain her dignity and independence. After having laid open and confuted the error of Rothe, who, in his “*Ethik*,” denies to the church the claim of being an independent moral person, and insists upon her amalgamation, *i.e.*, losing herself in the state, he goes on to remark that though, in consequence of national, local, and temporal

circumstances, the individual Christian churches may have different constitutions, yet a church ought always to be conscious that she is an independent body, not merely a political institution; and that implies that she should have an organization and outward unity, and that she should manage her internal affairs without the interference of the state. After having described the injurious consequences of the Erastian principle, and shown the futility of fearing any danger to the state from this independent position of the church, he remarks, (2.) that the church, on her part, too, has to acknowledge the state as an independent moral person. Protestantism never refused to do this; it has a tendency to do rather too much than too little in this respect. But there may, after all, collisions arise, especially as regards the schools and marriage. The church must have schools if she does not mean to give herself up; but the state, as a moral person, likewise claims a right in them. The church can grant the state's claims only in so far as it is really a Christian state; in all secular branches of education, however, she must acknowledge the higher claims of the state. Marriage, too, presents a religious and civil aspect. If the state be really a Christian state, both these aspects will coincide, but otherwise they will clash. It is of her members only that the church can demand compliance with her regulations in this respect; for those who do not submit to the authority of the church, the state must lay down peculiar regulations (civil marriage); but its legislation should never come down to, but always keep above the moral consciousness of the mass of the people.

III.—ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PROTESTANTISMUS UND KIRCHE.

The *Zeitschrift für Protestantismus und Kirche* (edited by Drs Thomasius, Hofmann, and Schmid, professors of theology at Erlangen) contains in the numbers for July, August, and September, besides several articles of mere local interest, and a longer, interesting, but still unfinished article, on "The Humanists and the Gospel," to which we shall revert in a future number, *two* articles on prophecy—one under the title, "The Prophetic Word and the Church;" the other, "The Catching up of the Believers, (1 Thess. iv. 17), and The Irvingites." This is a circumstance which evidently proves the growing interest for the study of prophecy in Germany,—an interest, however, which, as both these articles confess, has to a certain degree been forced upon our German friends by the position taken up and the progress made by the Irvingites. In the first of these articles, "The Prophetic Word and the Church," the author says that the Reformers, and especially Luther, had assigned to them the task of proclaiming and securing to the church the doctrine of justification through faith, but that they neither were able nor called upon to afford to us that knowledge of the last things of which we now stand in need. The shakings of the last years, however, have directed the looks of believers to the future, and have imposed upon the church the duty of applying to the investigation and understanding of prophecy. It is owing to the neglect of the church in this respect that sects such as the Irvingites and Darbyites have sprung up. The study of prophecy was in Germany renewed by Bengel and Crusius, and is at present much more general than formerly. What, however, is wanting is, on the one hand, the application of the

results of it to the problems of the present time ; and, on the other, their being brought into connection with the preaching of repentance. This he then illustrates by bringing before the reader, as the result of the study of prophecy, the two fundamental positions of (a) the uninterrupted existence of the kingdom of the world, and (b) the future of Israel. Under the first head he remarks, that ever since the destruction of the Davidic kingdom, which, though small in itself, yet typified the kingdom of God, there exists only a kingdom of the world. The prophets, ever since the Babylonish captivity, when speaking of the condition and circumstances of the world, no more refer, therefore, to the kings of Judah and Israel, but to the kings of Babylon and Persia. Our present view of history, however, is still that of Herodotus, and not of Moses and Daniel. We are still in [the time of the fourth kingdom of the world,—a fact indicated also by the decrease of morality, notwithstanding the progress of art and science. Nothing in this respect has been changed by the state calling itself Christian. The church, while sympathising with the national life and all national interests, must not become the handmaid of the state, but maintain her dignity and independent position. Under the second head he remarks, that the early Gentile Church, as little as the Reformers, understood Israel's importance and position, but simply usurped the place of Israel. As Israel, by its Holy Scripture and its apostles, is the foundation of the Gentile Church, so the latter can attain to its completion, to a national outward form, by the conversion of Israel only. That, however, will take place only when the Gentile Church herself shall be filled with the fulness of divine life. Hence the necessity which there is for constantly preaching, "Repent ye, and turn again."

The drift of the second article,—*"The Catching up of the Believers, (1 Thess. iv. 17), and The Irvingites,"*—is to disprove the position advanced by the German Irvingites, that this catching up shall have taken place before Antichrist and Antichristianity are revealed in their full power,—that the believers are brought in safety from the severe tribulations and sufferings of that time to be with Christ ; while the Jews shall be given up to Antichrist's wrath, and be brought back to their country by fearful sufferings and persecutions,—but that then all the promises of the Old Testament shall be fulfilled upon Israel, and the saints who previously had been caught up shall appear with Christ, and execute judgment upon the son of perdition. In opposition to these views, our author attempts to prove that the conversion of the Jews and the appearance of Antichrist must precede the catching up. This he establishes from Old Testament types (ark of Noah, Lot, Israel's deliverance from Egypt), from Moses and Elijah's appearing with Christ at the transfiguration (which he brings into connection with the two witnesses in Rev. xi. 3-7), from Matt. xxiv. This chapter, according to him, establishes the following order of events :—*"The gospel must be preached in the whole world ; love, faith, patience will wax cold ; temptations and persecutions will then arise, and continue increasingly, as a fiery trial for the faith and patience of the saints, in which many will fail and fall away. Meanwhile, the spirit of enmity and opposition to God will increase, Antichrist will rise, and, supported by lying prophets and by miracles, make war against the Most High God. At that time Israel, converted and gathered together,*

shall be the stay and refuge of the church, and be joined by the elect from among all nations. The sufferings, however, will become intolerable, and, in consequence, the longing for the coming of the Lord more ardent. But the Lord delays, so that even the faithful become weary and faint; then suddenly the voice of his messengers is heard, his coming is beheld. The faithful, along with the risen, glorified saints of past times, shall be gathered and caught up to enter into his holy kingdom. The lukewarm are excluded; the enemies of God, along with the Antichrist, are given up to judgment. Christ, the Son of David, reigns as king on earth, with his saints, over them that have not been received into his kingdom, the centre and seat of which is the land of converted Israel." The same doctrine he finds in Mark, and Luke, and the Acts; with it, 1 Thess. iv. 17 and 2 Thess. are in perfect harmony; and corroborating arguments are derived from 1 Cor. xv., Rom. xi. 25, 26, Rev. iii. 10, vii. 4, xiv. 1.

In an article inscribed, "The Power of the Church," an able answer is given to Papists boasting of the strength, unity, and power of their church. From history, and the many secessions from the Church of Rome which have taken place, the writer proves that this talk of her unity and power is without foundation; that her unity exists only where her claims to infallibility are granted; that, at best, it is the unity of an official confession, enforced by a strict hierarchical order and outward laws, but at the expense and sacrifice of the rights of the individual. Protestantism, on the contrary, looking up to Jesus as the author and finisher of faith, holds fast the importance of every single soul, and the rights of the individual, and does not consider the church as a legal institution, but as an institution for the salvation of man,—not as the aim, but as the means only. And as Christ came not to claim services, but to serve, so Protestantism holds that the highest glory of the church is not to rule and force, but to serve. And while Romanism says that the faithful must be held together by the hierarchy, Protestantism says that faith itself is this bond and tie, inasmuch as it has the one and the same object, viz., Christ; one and the same cause, viz., the Holy Spirit; one and the same rule, viz., the Word of God. And it is not only self-evident, but is also proved by the course of history, that that which is thus inwardly connected will keep together longer, more firmly and safely, than that which is merely outwardly connected.

The July number contains also some remarks on the parable of the vineyard.—(Matt. xx. 1-16.) The writer is of opinion that those murmuring would be saved. He thinks that this feature belongs merely to the imagery of the parable, and must not be pressed. For these people have entered upon the labour in the vineyard, and hence are justified, although not free from sin. He assumes a process of purification, going on from the time of death to the last judgment, but endeavours to steer clear of the Popish doctrine of purgatory, and the rationalistic doctrine of a purification by means of natural powers.

IV.—DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR CHRISTLICHE WISSENSCHAFT UND CHRISTLICHES LEBEN.

Of the *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Christliche Wissenschaft und Christliches Leben* (established by Drs Jul. Müller, Neander, and Nitzsch,

edited by Schneider) the July number contains, besides an article of mere local interest, and an historical article on the Armenian church by Pischon, under the somewhat strange title, "The Development of the Armenian Church from the Gospel to the Gospel," an article on "The Night Visions of Zechariah," by Dr Neumann, in which he attempts to explain these visions in accordance with the import which the symbolical language employed in them has throughout Scripture. The subject of the whole book is, according to him, stated in the words, "Turn ye unto me, and I will turn unto you."—(Chap. i. 3.) It consists of two main parts, viz., the visions of one night sealed by a prophetic sign (chap. i. 7–vi. 15), and Israel's glorious future (chap. ix.–xiv.); the transition being formed by discourses delivered on a special occasion.—(Chap. vii., viii.) The centre of the first part is the Servant Zemach (the Branch); that of the second, new, holy, and glorified Jerusalem: the former answering to, "Turn ye unto me;" the latter to, "I will turn unto you." He then takes up the seven visions. In the first,—the rider on the red horse among the myrtle trees in the shady place* (chap. i. 8–17),—the myrtles are the fields of blessedness, pervaded by the eternal love of God, bestowing love and fulness of blessings upon the children of men. The shady place is the majesty of eternal peace springing forth from the love of God. In the red horse the colour is the chief thing, as the rider is, by the prophecy itself, designated as the angel of God, and red is the emblem of the majesty of love, of the reconciliation and atonement, by a love which loved even unto death. By the colour of the other horses, from red down to white, the whole richness of the thoughts of God is symbolised, all of them being directed towards the redemption of the world. The red colour (אדום), moreover, points to the colour of blood, and intimates that by a bloody death the Lord will make atonement for the world. The import of the whole vision is thus,—the decree for the redemption of mankind formed by the eternal love of God. The second and third visions show in what manner this decree is carried out: the former (the four horns and four carpenters, chap. i. 18–21) intimating the destruction of all the powers of the world hostile to Israel, and hindering the coming of salvation; the latter (the man with the measuring line, chap. ii. 1–5), declaring the immeasurable fulness of blessings bestowed upon Jerusalem. The fourth vision (Joshua the high priest, chap. iii.) symbolises the present and future condition of Israel. Their filthy garments are, by the Servant Zemach, to be changed into glorious splendour, when he blots out in one day all the sins of the land, and brings back reconciled Israel to the love and tender mercies of Jehovah. In the fifth vision, that of the candlestick (chap. iv.), the sanctification and glorification of the people are declared. The temple, the foundations of which are now laid, shall be completed, and be glorious, on account of the grace which proceeds from it, through it, and to it. The whole earth shall be a temple of the Lord, and Jehovah shall be the light of his people. In order that such may be possible, it is necessary that sin in every form should be destroyed. This is symbolised by the sixth and seventh visions; the former (the flying roll, chap. v. 2–4) intimating the fact that sinners and sin shall be utterly

* במשלה, our English version: in the bottom.

destroyed; and the latter (the Ephraim, chap. v. 5-11), the mode in which this purification of the earth is to be brought about. The closing vision (chap. vi. 1-8) symbolises the whole earth as purified, and filled with the light of Jehovah. The Zemach, by whom all this is to be accomplished, shall be adorned with the royal diadem and the priestly crown.—(Chap. vi. 9-15).

In an article, "On the Words at the Institution of Baptism, Matt. xxviii. 19," great emphasis is laid on the circumstance that it is said there, βαπτίζοντες εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Πατρὸς, κ.τ.λ., baptizing *into* the name, &c., not *in* the name; that the words hence imply an introduction into the communion of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. From this the author then draws arguments against the Baptists, and in favour of baptismal regeneration, inasmuch as the command implies that those baptized shall obtain this communion.

A "First Article on Schleiermacher and Modern Theology," by Stechow, describes the time before Schleiermacher. It is characterised by subjectivism and opposite tendencies. Theology had become estranged from the church and Christian life; the relation between faith and science was disturbed; orthodoxy was opposed by heterodoxy, rationalism by supernaturalism; the truths of salvation were viewed in a doctrinal, to the almost entire exclusion of the moral aspect. And with all that, there was the want of a scientifically defined notion of theology.

In the August number, there is an article, "The Ministry of the Word," containing extracts from Nitzsch's "Praktische Theologie," vol. ii. 1, on the importance of the sermon, its object and aim, its contents as to matter, division, and treatment, and its form as to style and delivery.

The article, "Thomas Hobbes on State and Church," contains nothing but extracts from Hobbes' "Behemoth" and "Leviathan." The remainder of the number for August, and the greater portion of that for September, are taken up with an article by Köstlin, "The First Germs of the Roman Catholic View of the Church." The author traces, in the writings of Clemens, Hermas, and Ignatius, first, the germs of the later Romish errors in general; and, secondly, the seeds of the later Romish views of the church. Under the first head, he shows that these apostolic fathers do indeed faithfully preserve the treasure of the doctrines handed down to them by the apostles; but that, notwithstanding, faith is displaced from its centre, and ceases to be that which appropriates salvation and transforms the life. It is in Ignatius that the position of faith is most faithfully maintained; but in Clemens we have a justification by works, by the side of justification by faith; while according to Barnabas and Hermas, salvation is received in baptism, and the whole life is to be a life in conformity with outward commandments. In Hermas, we find already penance, fasts, *opera supererogatoria*. Under the second head, he likewise shows that, along with the true apostolic view of the church, as a *congregatio in Spiritu Sancto*, in each of these writers a peculiar feature of the later Romish system is to be found. In Clemens, we have the first traces of a separation between the priest with his λειτουργία, and the Christian as the ἀνθρώπος λαϊκός. Though sound in his views as to the bishop's office and its transmission, yet he claims a peculiar power

and authority for the bishops on Old Testament grounds. Ignatius brings forward the idea of the unity of the church as represented by the bishop, whom he distinguishes from the presbyters, and for whom he claims divine power, although the idea of apostolic succession is quite strange to him. In *Hermas*, we meet with the idea of the unity of the church; out of her there is no salvation. She is to be a holy church; but her holiness is to be the result of the holiness of her members, which is to be effected by penances and moral discipline. We have thus, in these three apostolical fathers, the individual features from the combination of which proceeds that which constitutes the essential peculiarity of the Roman Catholic system.

In an article, "If you can only have *Unity* or *Truth*, which of the two?" Tholuck addresses words of warning to those who, esteeming unity to be of greater importance than truth, go to Rome,—showing that its much-boasted-of unity exists only in its *official* confession, in consequence of its organised hierarchy and strict discipline; and also to those Protestants who, imagining that they have the *absolute* truth in their individual churches, contemptuously look down upon those differing from them, and stigmatise them by the appellation of heretics.

The article, "On the Origin of the Symbols of the Lutheran Church," shows that the Augsburg Confession, the Apology, and the Smalkalden Articles, were not written with a view to their being symbolical books, but that they became so in the hand of God. After the first love had cooled down, the schoolmen began to quarrel; and from their controversies the Formula Concordiæ proceeded. It did not build up the Lutheran Church; it was not even received everywhere; and can hence not be in the way of a union of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches.

Besides these articles, the September number contains exegetical remarks by the late Dr Schneckenburger on Phil. ii. 12, 13, 14, 18; and the beginning of a review of Auberten's book on Daniel, and on the Revelation of John.

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

APRIL 1856.

* ART. I.—*An Address delivered before the Presbyterian Historical Society at their Anniversary Meeting in the Tenth Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia, May 1st, 1855.* By the Rev. CHARLES HODGE, D.D., Professor in the Theological Seminary, Princeton, N. J.

OF course we have no fault to find with Professor Hodge for discussing, on the above occasion, the question, "*What is Presbyterianism?*" For, holding, as he does, that Presbyterianism is "not a skilful product of human wisdom, but a divine institution, founded on the Word of God, and the genuine product of the inward life of the church," we honour him the more for the honest, outspoken expression of his opinions. Neither would we fail to evince our hearty respect for that sturdy conservatism by which the Presbyterian body is so emphatically distinguished from the other non-Episcopal communions of our country. Neither, again, do we object at all to his going out of the way a little to pass in review the differing systems of Popery, Prelacy, and Independency, for the sake of comparing them with Presbyterianism, and so getting the light and shade for his picture. Only, the professor, having thrown down the glove with a somewhat confident air, will, we trust, find no cause of complaint if, so far as the "Prelatical theory" is concerned, he is held strictly responsible both for the correctness of his statements and the soundness of his arguments.

* This first article is from the *Church Review* for October 1855, and consists chiefly of an extract from a sermon of Bishop M'Ilvaine's, occupying here p. 261-273. Our second article is Dr Hodge's reply to the *Church Review* and Bishop M'Ilvaine, published in the *Princeton Review* for January 1856. We have been induced, on this occasion, to give both sides of the question, because a discussion betwixt two such men as Bishop M'Ilvaine and Dr Hodge cannot but be interesting and useful. These two eminent men, whose labours have been so beneficial to the Church of Christ, were once, we believe, fellow-students at Princeton.—ED. B. & F. E. R.

Professor Hodge proposes to get rid of Prelacy on two grounds: *first*, because he maintains, that, according to the "Prelatical theory," "*all church power*" is vested exclusively in the clergy; and, of course, that in no department of its government,—legislative, executive, or administrative,—have the laity any thing to do. And, *secondly*, because the apostolic office, a higher grade of office than that of presbyters, was designed to be merely temporary in its duration, and actually ceased with the twelve apostles themselves. He says, "The apostles, *the twelve*, stand out just as conspicuous as an isolated body in the history of the church, without predecessors and without successors, as Christ himself does. They disappear from history. The title, the thing itself, the gifts, the functions, all ceased when John, the last of the twelve, ascended to heaven." The whole force of his argument to prove all this lies in the following syllogism: "If prelates are apostles, they must have apostolic gifts. They have not those gifts, therefore they are not apostles."

Now, this is, unquestionably, a very convenient method to dispose of the Prelatical theory. And it would be more satisfactory if there were not certain difficulties in the way, in the shape of stubborn facts and principles, which Professor Hodge seems to have, unfortunately, overlooked. Both the above positions of the professor we propose to examine,—the first, briefly; the other, more at length.

And, first, that in the "Prelatical theory" the rights of the people are thoroughly ignored, while by the Presbyterian system they are effectually secured. Now, we have been accustomed to suppose, judging from the Presbyterian "Form of Government," from the manner in which their Church-Sessions, Presbyteries, Synods, and General Assemblies are actually constituted, and from their practical working, that if there is one ecclesiastical system in our country from which the lay element is effectually excluded, that system is the Presbyterian. Professor Hodge must confess that it is the merest sophistry to pretend that the lay element is fairly represented by the ruling elders. For the ruling elder, in becoming such *by ordination*, ceases to be any longer a mere layman. His office of elder, or presbyter, is declared in their "Form of Government" to be "perpetual," and one of which, while he lives, he cannot possibly be divested, save by deposition. To maintain that an office possessing thus perpetuity, indelibility in the ordinary sense, and exclusive power, represents the people, because its possessors were originally chosen from among the people, is a sort of logic which, in our college days, used to be called the *ignoratio elenchi*. Indeed, there is not a confessedly despotic ecclesiastical system in our country,

Popery not excepted, which might not use this argument as well as Presbyterians. Nor is it quite so satisfactory even among his own sect as the learned professor seems to suppose. If we have read the history of Presbyterianism in this country aright for the last twenty years, here has been one of the sharpest weapons in the hands of the so-called "New School;" to wit, that Old School Presbyterianism of the Princeton stamp persists in ordaining the ruling elders (or presbyters), and in regarding them as an inferior yet a real and permanent order of the ministry, and in concentrating all ecclesiastical power in the hands of the Presbytery. Certain it is, that the tendency towards a more popular system of administration which has of late rent that body in twain, and which was never more vigorous than now, has taken hold of the mass of the people on the express ground, that in old-fashioned Presbyterianism the lay element is as completely ignored as it is in the system of Popery or Methodism. Even the New School Presbyterians in their General Assemblies, where the question has more than once been up, have never yet been quite ready to deny that ruling elders are indeed a part and portion of the ministry. The question, however, is evidently a sore one with them.

Still more are we surprised at language which Professor Hodge has ventured to use on this point concerning what he terms the "Prelatical theory." He could not have read a page of our ecclesiastical history, he could not have looked at our General or Diocesan Constitutions, nor opened one of the journals of our General or Diocesan Conventions, nor have noticed at all the operations of one of our parochial organizations, without discovering in them all the existence of the lay element, having every opportunity for vigorous, healthy action. It is a system representative, and so faithful to all,—of subordination, and so effective to the end in view,—and yet so guarded by checks and counter-checks as to be oppressive to none. Indeed, if it were now proposed for the first time to frame an ecclesiastical system which, in its constituent elements of power, and their well-balanced distribution, should correspond exactly with the first and model council at Jerusalem, where "the apostles, and presbyters, and brethren," should each have their appropriate place, it would not be possible to conceive of one more exactly in harmony with that scriptural pattern than the Protestant Episcopal Church in this country. This feature has so often been the theme of praise with those not of her communion, that we marvel that it escaped the eye of the Princeton professor. But really, to prefer old-fashioned, rigid Presbyterianism above Episcopacy, because the former cherishes such tender regard for the

"rights of the people!" must, we think, have staggered the credulity even of a "Presbyterian Historical Society." Presbyterianism is nothing more or less than a close oligarchy, and, as such, can never become a widely influential religion in our country. Popery is an absolute despotism. Independency is what its name implies. It is without form or order. It is not even a system. It hardly deserves to be called an *ism*. It is rather the prolific mother of *isms*. If it is any thing more than this, if it can be called a *system* of ecclesiastical government, then, just so far as it is any thing of this sort, it is in spirit, if not in form, one of the most thorough-paced ecclesiastical despotisms in our country. Indeed, their people are beginning to find out that the "little finger" of these irresponsible "lords brethren," is thicker than the "loins" of a well-regulated constitutional Episcopacy. Nor is it the first time that the sins of men have found them out in kind as well as in reality. At the late General Association of Connecticut, the question of admitting laymen to membership was thoroughly discussed and negatived, apparently unanimously.* Episcopacy, as a mode of government, approaches more nearly than any other ecclesiastical system in this country to a constitutional republic, and is better fitted than any other existing religious system to work in perfect harmony with the genius and spirit of our free institutions.

The main argument of Professor Hodge, however, against Episcopacy, and that on which he chiefly depends, is his second position, *i. e.*, the *temporary character of the apostolic office*; and this point he elaborates at considerable length. Here, of course, is the real question between us. Was there to be through all time, and has there actually been thus far in the church, an order of men succeeding to the apostles, and superior to the presbyters in the ministry of the church? Here we, and Churchmen generally, affirm; while Presbyterians deny. On this fundamental point Professor Hodge's main reliance is on the bare supposition, that if the apostolic office was to be continued, the miraculous gifts originally appertaining to that office would have been continued also. Aside from this, his whole argument is a mere *petitio principii*, a begging of the question. To meet this position, we cannot do better than present an argument which has already, and in a different form, though to a limited extent only, been given to the public, and which deserves to have the widest possible circulation and influence. If there is a flaw in the argument, we believe it has never yet been pointed out. Our readers will be glad to preserve it, both for the perspicuity of its statements and the irresistible force of its conclusions. They who can deny them,

* *Independent* for June 28, 1855.

may as well deny that any two sides of a triangle are together greater than the third side, or the truth of any other demonstrable proposition.*

What was the peculiar characteristic nature of the office which the apostles were commissioned to exercise?

The authentic voucher of office is the *commission*. To the commission of the apostles, then, we must refer you for the distinctive peculiarities of their office. Whatever is not contained therein either expressly, or by necessary inference, must be considered as not pertaining to the characteristic duties and powers of the apostles.

Now, the apostles were distinguished by certain circumstantial peculiarities and certain miraculous gifts. Were these so connected with the apostolic office as to constitute in any sense its distinguishing features? *They are not mentioned in the commission* as found in the text. For example, the apostles were distinguished by the fact, that they had seen Christ in the flesh after his resurrection, but so had many others, "*even five hundred brethren at once.*"† Thus were the apostles *qualified* to be "witnesses of his resurrection;" but this *qualification* was not their *commission*. It was part of their furniture, but no part of their office. Again, they had been set apart to their office *by the immediate and visible act of the Saviour*. But Matthias was afterwards numbered with the apostles; and Barnabas, and Timothy, and Epaphroditus were apostles, to whom belonged no such distinction;‡ so that,

* We copy from the Right Rev. Bishop McIlvaine's Sermon, at the consecration of the Right Rev. L. Polk, D.D., Dec. 9, 1838. We give the argument of the Sermon (notes and all) without alteration. Even the *italics* are preserved. It was introduced to the reader in the following correspondence:—

"CINCINNATI, Dec. 9, 1838.

"RIGHT REV. AND DEAR BROTHER,

"We have listened to your sermon this morning with emotions we will not attempt to describe. We pray the divine blessing upon the holy truths contained therein.

"In asking you to furnish a copy for publication, we feel assured that we shall gratify not merely those who heard it, but far more who will delight to read it. We pray that God may long spare you, and give you grace to exhibit and recommend in your life and labours the exalted sentiments set forth in the sermon of which we hereby request the publication.

"Yours most affectionately in the gospel of Jesus Christ,

"WILLIAM MEADE, Assistant Bishop of Virginia.

B. B. SMITH, Bishop of Kentucky.

JAMES H. OTEY, Bishop of Tennessee.

LEONIDAS POLK, Missionary Bishop of Arkansas."

† 1 Cor. xv. 6.

‡ Acts i. 26, xiv. 14; 1 Thess. ii. 6, compared with chap. i. 1; Phil. ii. 25, "My brother, and companion in labour, and fellow-soldier, but *your messenger*," (*your apostle*, ἡμῶν ἀπόστολος.) Because Epaphroditus is here called "*your apostle*," or messenger, no more warrants the inference that St Paul only meant that he was sent *by the Philippians*, a messenger for a special errand, and not an apostle *in the strict sense*, than the phrase "*apostle of the Gentiles*" applied to St Paul, or "*apostle of the circumcision*" applied to St Peter, authorises the inference that such only was the office of St Peter and St Paul. The apostleship of Epaphroditus was understood in the strictest and highest sense by the fathers. Theoderet, writing on the above passage

eminent as was this personal honour, it was not necessary to the designation or place of an apostle. Again, the apostles were possessed of miraculous powers. But so were divers others, as Stephen and Philip, to whom the name of apostle was never given. It follows that such endowments were not peculiar features of the apostolic office. Essential to its success in those days they undoubtedly were, but essential to its nature they certainly were not. We must not confound *authority* to act with the *means* of acting successfully; the *office* of an ambassador with the force of mind or the personal endowments with which he sustains his embassy; the *commission* of one whom the king despatches to subdue and govern a distant province, with the array of martial force with which he marches to the work. No more must the essential office of the apostles, sent to subdue, and establish, and rule, as ambassadors of Christ, be confounded with those extraordinary endowments and all that striking array of miraculous powers with which they were furnished for their enterprise. Such endowments were needed for the first propagation of the gospel. They have not been needed since; they have therefore ceased. But the essential commission of the apostles to which they were appended has not ceased, nor can cease, while the world lasts, for Christ has promised that he will be with that office to the end of the world. That commission was complete as soon as delivered, and from that moment its recipients were invested with all the functions of the apostolic office. But not so with regard to miraculous gifts and qualifications. These were not bestowed till many days after the delivery of the commission. It was before the ascension of Christ that the full *authority* of apostles was bestowed. It was not till the Pentecost that they received "*power from on high*" for the support of that authority.

Thus are we brought again to the question—*What was the peculiar and characteristic nature of the apostolic office?* They themselves applied to it a name which will aid the answer. Peter, in addressing his brother apostles concerning the filling of the vacancy caused by the death of Iscariot, expressly styles the office which the traitor had vacated, *his bishopric*, or *his episcopate*, as the original reads. The same is also called, in the same transaction, *his apostleship*. Hence, in the writings of the fathers, the names of *apostle* and *bishop* are used as pertaining essentially to the same office.* But the word

of Philipians, calls his office an *episcopate*, just as Peter calls that of the apostles: "*Dictus Philippensium Apostolus a S. Paulo, quid hoc aliud nisi episcopus?*" Jerome also says that Epaphroditus was called apostle, "*because he also had received the OFFICE of being an apostle among the Philipians.*"

* Cyprian writes of the apostles in that manner, as for example, "*Apostolos, id est episcopos, Dominus elegit.*"—"The Lord chose apostles, that is to say, bishops."

bishopric or *episcopate*, in the abstract, only means an office of *supervision* in general; and the supervision may be either of single congregations, as in the cases of "the elders" of Ephesus,* or of many congregations, *with their overseers*, as in the case of Paul, who assembled and charged those elders. What, then, was the peculiar nature of the supervision, or episcopate, exercised by the apostles, that *name* of itself does not indicate. Whither shall we go to ascertain whether it was a particular or a general supervision,—congregational, or the contrary? Their commission decides: "*Go and teach all nations,*" &c. Therefore, whatever powers their *apostleship* or *episcopate* embraced were not limited to any particular congregation of the church, but extended to the whole church; in other words, the "bishopric" in the hands of the apostles was evidently general, as distinguished from congregational. What particular functions belonged to that general oversight or episcopate, their commission leaves no room to doubt. First, "*Go and teach all nations,*" or, as the more accurate and universally preferred translation is, *Go and make disciples of all nations*. Thus was given authority to propagate the gospel. "*Baptizing them in the name of the Father,*" &c. Here was authority to administer the sacraments of the church, and by the sacrament of baptism to open the doors of the church and of its privileges to disciples out of all nations. Finally, "*Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you.*" These words conveyed to the apostles the authority to *rule the church*, after they had made disciples by preaching, and members by baptism. An essential part of the government of the church consisted in seeing to the *succession* of its ministry. That the authority to do this—to ordain successors in the ministry—was included among the powers of the apostles, is not only necessarily implied in their authority to govern, but also in those impressive words of the Saviour, "*As the Father hath sent me, even so send I you.*" For as it was part of the office on which Jesus was sent to institute the ministry of his church, so it follows from these words, that it was part of the sending of the apostles to continue that ministry by the ordaining of others to its functions.

The conclusion, then, with regard to the characteristic nature of the apostolic office is, that it was one of a *general supervision or episcopate*, and embraced essentially the authority to preach and propagate the gospel, to administer the sacraments of the church, to preside over its government, and, as a

"They which were termed apostles, as being sent of Christ to publish his gospel throughout the world, and were named bishops, in that the care of government was also committed to them, did no less perform the offices of their episcopal authority by governing, than of their apostolical by teaching."—*Hooker's Eccl. Pol.*

* Acts xx, 28, *Overseers, bishops, ἐπισκοποι.*

chief part of government, to ordain helpers and successors in the ministry. All these powers the apostles held, *not as a collective body, or college, but severally and individually*. Hitherto we have been, so far as I know, upon undisputed ground. Let us proceed.

This apostolic office was intended by the Saviour to be continued; in other words, the first apostles were intended to have successors to the end of the world.

This is undeniably manifest from the promise of the Saviour annexed to their commission, "*Lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world.*" Now, if neither the *persons* of the apostles were intended to remain to the end of the world, nor *their miraculous endowments*, nor *their distinguishing office*,—if all have passed away,—we are quite unable to comprehend how that promise is fulfilled, or what it could have meant. But *the persons* of the first apostles do not remain. Their *miraculous gifts* have not been continued in the church. It follows, then, that their *distinguishing office* must remain; that it was to this office, and to those who should hold it in succession, that the Saviour promised his presence "to the end of the world." No other sense can possibly be put on his words. If, then, the office of the apostles, as learned from their commission, and interpreted by all the acts of their ministry, was an episcopate,—an office of supervision, and that of a general kind,—and if *each* apostle did embrace in his *individual* office the right to preach, administer the sacraments, exercise supreme jurisdiction in the church, and, under the head of jurisdiction, to ordain and rule ministers of the gospel,—it follows that an office of precisely that description was intended to continue, has continued from that time to this, and will be continued in the church, by the will of its divine Head, to the end of the world.*

But where shall we find this office in the present church,—this union of authority to preach and administer sacraments,

* In some respects, every presbyter is a successor of the apostles, inasmuch as he has authority to preach, to administer the sacraments, and to feed or rule as a pastor the particular flock over which he is placed. In some respects, neither bishop nor presbyters are, or can be, successors of the apostles, since these "were sent as *chosen eye-witnesses* of Jesus Christ, *from whom immediately* they received their whole embassy and their commission to be the *principal first-founders of a house of God*, consisting as well of Gentiles as of Jews. In this there are not after them any other like unto them; and yet the apostles have now their successors upon earth,—their true successors, if not in the largeness, surely in the kind of that episcopal function whereby they had power to sit as spiritual ordinary judges, both over laity and over clergy, where Christian churches were established."—*Hooker's Eccl. Pol.* viii. sect. 4.

The peculiarity of the apostolic office to which presbyters cannot be considered as having succeeded, and to which in the text we have special reference, is that kind of episcopal function (as Hooker says) "*whereby they had power to sit as spiritual ordinary judges*" over clergy as well as laity; in other words, to preside, not only over many flocks, but over the *pastors of those flocks*, and to ordain those *pastors*. This was the office of the apostles, not collectively, but *individually*, and this the Saviour promised to be with "to the end of the world."

with this individual right to ordain, and this presidency over clergy,—this original apostolic episcopate? Evidently, there must be somewhere in the church at the present time, unless the Lord's word has failed, officers of whom it may be said without arrogance, and in simple deference to the promise of Christ, that in all essential features of the apostolic office they are *the successors of the apostles*. Where are they? The question we have no right to treat as unimportant. Whether a most solemn promise of Christ has been fulfilled or not; and if it has, where its fulfilment appears; whether an office intended by the Head of the church to continue therein, and, as its chief office, to last to the end of time, has continued to the present time; or whether it has been dropped, and some other placed in its stead,—is surely a question of no ordinary importance, by no means of a merely incidental consequence, but, on the contrary, of vital connection with the permanent interests of religion, and not by any to be passed over “unadvisedly or lightly,” but considered “reverently, discreetly, soberly, and in the fear of God.”

But before I further put this question, it is well to remove the idea which so commonly starts up in the minds of those who hear or read on this subject, when any persons holding office in the church of Christ, in the present day, are termed *successors of the apostles*, are said to have *succeeded to the apostolic office*, as if there were some exceeding arrogance and presumption in the claim. Whether it be arrogant or not, depends entirely upon whether it be true. Nothing is so humble and unpretending as truth. Did any one claim to have succeeded to the *personal* distinctions and endowments, *the inspiration and divers miraculous gifts*, by which the apostles were qualified for their extraordinary circumstances, he would indeed be chargeable with arrogant presumption; because, concerning these things, there was no promise of the Lord that they should continue in the church to the end of the world. But in relation to the *office* of the apostles, there is the plainest promise of such continuance; and, consequently, however the assertion may sound, it must be true that somewhere in the church at this time there are office-bearers, either bishops, presbyters, or deacons, who *severally*, and in virtue of their office, are successors of the apostles,—occupying *individually* just that relation to the present church which the apostles, by virtue of the essential features of their office, sustained *individually* to the church of their days. The prejudice that arises against such an idea will not bear a moment's reflection. If it spring from a comparison, *as to personal character and fitness*, of the modern successors, with the first in the chain, be it remembered that Judas Iscariot was numbered with the apostles

by our Saviour himself, and Judas was a traitor. If the prejudice arise from the consideration that the commencement of the apostles' office was miraculous; that it was under the immediate and extraordinary designation of the Son of God; whereas the continuation of the gospel ministry is by the ordination of men, an ordinary designation by fallible instruments,—we answer by referring you to the analogy between the new creation and the old, in regard to origin and succession. The beginning of the grass of the field was miraculous—by the instant and immediate mandate of God. It was created in full maturity. But its succession was provided for by no such measure. The grass, and the herb, and the fruit tree were furnished with the means of a succession by ordinary laws, each having “*seed in itself, after its kind.*” Thus also with man. The head of the human race was created by the immediate hand of God; but the succession from that moment to the end of time was provided for by laws of ordinary nature. But we hold it to be no arrogance to say of any man, though the lowest of his kind, that he has succeeded to the nature of the miraculously created first man; nor to say of the herb of the field that though it be but the offspring of the little familiar seed in the ground, which sprang and grew by an ordinary law and a human planting and rearing, it is nevertheless, in all the essentials of its nature, the successor, in an unbroken line of descent, of the herb which, on the third day of the world, sprang into maturity at the wonderful fiat of the Almighty. I know not that the man, or the herb, is any the less a man, or an herb, or any the less descended from the miraculous beginnings of the creation, because the laws of growth were but ordinary, and the intermediate agency of production was but human. And so I know not that a minister of the gospel is any the less a successor of the first apostles, because, instead of receiving his authority, like them, immediately from Christ, it has come to him by the intermediate communication of a chain fastened, at its beginning, upon the throne of God, and preserved as inviolate as the line of the descent of Adam, or the succession of seed-time and harvest, of day and night, of summer and winter. I know not that this day is not a true day, and strictly a successor of that very day when first the sun appeared; though that, you know, was made by the sudden act of God suspending the sun in the skies, and this arose by the ordinary succession of the evening and the morning. The beginning of every institution of God must of necessity be extraordinary; its regular continuance, ordinary. So with the course of providence in all its branches. What is now an ordinary providence was once an extraordinary. What began with miracle is continued by laws of familiar

nature. And so is it with the ministry of the gospel. What was created by the direct ordination of God is propagated and continued by the authorised ordination of men. Its "*seed is in itself after its kind*," and at every step of the succession it is precisely the same ministry, and just as much of God, sanctioned by his authority and sustained by his power, as if it had been received from the laying on of the hands of Christ himself. And so with the office of the apostles. It was the promise of Christ, the Lord, that it should continue to the end of the world. It is not more sure that sun and moon, seed-time and harvest will continue to the end of the world; and though its succession be now in the hands of very feeble and fallible men,—of men unspeakably inferior to the apostles in every personal and official qualification,—yea, though many Iscariots be found under its awful responsibilities, the integrity of *the office*, as essentially identical with that of the apostles, is in no-wise affected.

That the office of the apostles *did* descend from them to successors, that it *was* communicated to others by the hands of those who received it from the Lord, is manifest. For not to mention Matthias and Barnabas, who were apostles,* we find Timothy, who was ordained by St Paul,† not only called an apostle by that writer, as he is called bishop by the writers of the next century, but actually charged by St Paul with the exercise of all the authority we have mentioned as contained in the apostolic commission. The First Epistle to Timothy is the plainest evidence that he was put in trust with the government of the church of Ephesus, which at that time, as the Acts of the Apostles declare,‡ contained a *plurality of presbyters*; that *over those presbyters*, as well as over the deacons and laity, he was invested with the personal charge of discipline and government; and that in discharging such government, the *authority to ordain* was distinctly in his single hands.§ The same is evident concerning Titus, from the epistle of St Paul to him. It was his charge from St Paul to "set in order" all the churches of the large island of Crete, and "ordain presbyters in every city." Thus we see the office of the apostles handed down by a succession of hands to one of the latest dates of which the Scriptures speak. It certainly continued in the world as long as the lifetime of the apostle St John; and he

* Acts xiv. 14.

† 2 Tim. i. 6.

‡ 1 Tim. i. 3; Acts xx. 17, &c.

§ See especially chap. iii., and chap. iv. 17, 19, 22. It is of no force to say, that the presbyters of Ephesus and of Crete are called in the epistles to Timothy and Titus *bishops*,—of this we have no doubt. That was not a *specific name of office* till after the apostolic age. The highest rank of the ministry had then the title of apostle. We go by *office* more than *name*. That Timothy and Titus had the powers attributed to the apostles' office is granted on the other side of this question. The plea is that they were officers *extraordinary*; but it is only a plea.

lived to the hundredth year of the Christian era. Did it continue any longer than that hundredth year?

We ask who were those "*angels*," or messengers, of the seven churches of Asia, to whom the seven epistles of the book of Revelation were addressed, called also "*the seven stars*" in the right hand of the Lord, held responsible for the whole church, embraced within the limits of those several extensive cities, with their suburban dependencies? * Of one of them, Ephesus, we know from Acts xx. 17, &c., that *some forty years before the book of Revelations was written*, it had several presbyters, and, of course, several congregations. Who then was the angel of that church of Ephesus? What was his office? Evidently it was one of *presidency*, and that over clergy as well as laity. The most learned and noted non-episcopal writers contend that it was the office of president *for life*.

The learned Blondel, whose authority on this subject is not excelled by that of any non-episcopal writer, contends that the angels of the seven churches were "*exarchs* or chief governors," who were superior in office to *the other clergy* of those churches; held their places *for life*, and were so superior that "*the acts of the church, whether glorious or infamous, were imputed to those exarchs.*" And this, he says, is necessary to be maintained, otherwise the difficulties are insuperable.† If such was the office of the angel of one of these seven churches, it must have been that of the angels of all the others; and as we have no reason to suppose that the government of those seven churches was not similar to that of all others, such must have been the office of the chief ministers of the whole Christian community, in the latter days of the apostle St John. This leaves us but little to contend for. But it is not disputed that to those angels was appropriated, during their lifetime, the title of *bishops*, as a distinctive title of their special office. Ignatius, bishop of Antioch, who personally knew and conversed with St John, writing to the church of Ephesus, not more than twelve years after St John had addressed the angel of that church in the book of Revelations expressly says that Onesimus was then its bishop. "*Who*," he says, "*according to the flesh is your bishop.*" So that not only did the essential *presidency*, but the name also, of bishop belong to the chief officers of that church of that early period. It is beyond

* Ephesus, Smyrna, Pergamos, Laodicea, were, according to Pliny, *κεφαλαι διωκῆσις*, heads of the diocese, in regard to secular jurisdiction. The church of Ephesus embraced what Ephesus, in the common language of that day, was known to embrace, viz., the city proper and the "*regio suburbicaria*," the suburban and dependent villages; precisely as when we now speak in common phrase of London, we include all the connected villages of Camberwell, Peckham, Hackney, &c. &c.

† Blondel's Apology. Blondel wrote this work at the earnest request of the Westminster Assembly of Divines. Such an acknowledgment, therefore, is of no common value.

question that the fathers regarded those angels of churches as having been *diocesan* bishops.* Irenæus, bishop of Lyons, who wrote about the year 178, speaking of Polycarp, his own teacher, and a disciple of St John, and certainly the angel of the church of Smyrna, calls him bishop of that church; and that he used the title as designating a bishop *in the strict sense*, is manifest from the fact that, by almost universal consent, diocesan Episcopacy, in the strict sense, was general in the time when he wrote. And could Irenæus be mistaken as to the office of Polycarp, *whose disciple he was*?

But that these presidents for life, entitled angels of churches in the Scriptures, and bishops by contemporaneous ecclesiastical writers, who dwelt in the midst of diocesan Episcopacy, were regarded as *successors of the apostles* by the Christian ministry of their own age, we have the plainest and most unquestionable evidence. Irenæus, we have said, was a disciple of Polycarp, who was the angel and bishop of the church of Smyrna, and a personal disciple of St John. Thus was Irenæus too near the apostles to be mistaken as to their successors. "We can enumerate," he says, "those who were appointed by the apostles bishops in the churches, and to be *their successors* even unto us,—leaving them *the same power and authority which they had*."†

This same primitive writer has left on record the succession of those who had been bishops of the Church of Rome down to his time of writing, viz., about seventy-eight years from St John. The first named is Linus; the last, whom he calls "*the twelfth in order from the apostles*," is Eleutherius.‡ He calls both by the same name of bishop, without the least indication that the office of the one *whom Paul instituted* was in the least dissimilar from that of the other, who was *twelfth* in the descent. Now, it is generally granted that the office of the latter was that of a *diocesan* bishop, in the present customary sense. What, then, are we obliged to infer as to the office of the former, and consequently as to the nature of the office received by the primitive churches from the hands of the apostles?

We might exceedingly multiply quotations to the same effect. But it is sufficiently shown, that in the age next suc-

* As Irenæus, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Eusebius, &c.

† *Advers. Hæres.* lib. iii. c. 3.

‡ "The apostles having founded the Church of Rome," says Irenæus, "committed the bishopric to Linus. Of this Linus Paul maketh mention in his epistles to Timothy. To him succeeded Anacletus; after him, and in the third place from the apostles, the bishopric devolved upon Clemens, who also had seen the apostles and conferred with them. This Clemens was succeeded by Euarestus, and Euarestus by Alexander. Afterwards Xystus, the sixth from the apostles, was constituted bishop, and next Telesiphorus, who afterwards glorified God by martyrdom. Then followed Hyginus, and after him Pius, whose successor was Anicetus, who was followed by Soter, and now this station is filled by Eleutherius, twelfth in order from the apostles."

ceeding that of the apostles, there were officers called bishops in the church, who were considered then as *successors of the apostles*, and as having received from them *the same power and authority that they had*. And how those officers came to have appropriated to them exclusively the name of bishop, which at first was not peculiar to the highest grade of the ministry, instead of the older name of apostles, Theodoret, a Christian writer, who flourished only about two hundred years after those times, informs us. "Those now called bishops," he says, "were anciently called apostles. But in process of time the name of apostle was left to them who were truly apostles, and the name of bishop was restrained to those who were anciently called apostles." Thus we learn that a special reverence for the first apostles was the cause of the leaving of that name to them, and calling their successors by another.

I cannot take time to proceed any further with a quotation of testimony. We have found the promise of the Saviour as to the continuance of the apostolic office evidently fulfilled in the age next to that of the last of the apostles. The facility of proving the same of subsequent periods, rapidly increases as we descend the enlarging tide of Christian men and things;* till we come to the period of only one hundred and fifty years from the death of St John (the age of Cyprian, bishop of Carthage), when non-episcopal writers, who concede the least, acknowledge that the church, without a known exception, was presided over by diocesan bishops, who exercised the prerogatives, and were then considered, without a question, to have succeeded to the full office of the apostles. Whether it be left for the nineteenth century to correct the universal belief of the church, in an age so soon after the last of the twelve apostles, on a matter of plain historical tradition, concerning which it is quite unintelligible that the learned should then have been ignorant, I must leave others to decide.

We shall conclude our remarks on the question whether an office such as that of the apostles has been in the church since the apostles' times, with but one more aspect of the matter. It is notorious that at this present day, about eleven-twelfths of those called Christians in the world are under the spiritual jurisdiction of an order of ministers called bishops, whose individual office embraces the essential particulars of that of the apostles, and whose succession they regard as derived by an unbroken chain from apostolic times. It is quite notorious

* Tertullian of the second century, in answer to certain heretics, writes, "Let them recite their bishops, one by one, each in such sort succeeding other, that the first bishop of them have had for his author and predecessor some apostle, or at least some apostolic person, who persevered with the apostles. For so apostolical churches are wont to bring forth the evidence of their estates. So doth the Church of Smyrna, having Polycarp, whom John did consecrate."

that from the sixteenth century, up to within one hundred and fifty years of the last of the apostles, the whole church, in all lands, was under such jurisdiction. We go higher, and say that the most eminent non-episcopal writers acknowledge, that within *sixty* years of the death of St John, such was the government of the church.* And within this short period, we have shown you the testimony of writers who then lived, asserting that bishops were then exercising the jurisdiction of the churches, and were considered, without the moving of a question, as having succeeded to the office of the apostles. Now, suppose this were a mere mistake. Then the mistake must have arisen *within the lifetime of men who had conversed with the contemporaries of the apostles*, for after their death it was in full operation; and this a mistake, not concerning a trivial circumstance of the church, but a main and fundamental feature in its constitution, government, and discipline; and this immensely important mistake must have spread *so rapidly and powerfully* as to have revolutionised the government of the church of all lands, in the course of some sixty years after the death of St John,—and *so silently*, that history has preserved not the slightest trace of its beginning and progress,—and *so perfectly and universally*, that though the Scriptures were daily read in the churches, and presbyters and laity were made of the same materials as they now are, none perceived the usurpation, but all took it for granted, without a question, that such had been the government of the church from the beginning, and was to be to the end of the world; and this mistake *so permanent*, that without a dream of its being else than the most unquestionable truth, it continued till the sixteenth century entirely unsuspected. Now, if we can believe this, what vital mistakes may we not suppose to have been made, just as easily, and just as silently, in other great interests of Christianity? If the whole church, so near its first ages, was capable of such an egregious blunder, in a plain matter of fact and of daily observation; if the whole form and principle of her primitive government could be so silently, and suddenly, and universally subverted, and the very opposite be so silently, and suddenly, and universally inaugurated in its stead, as that no one was conscious of the process of change; and no part of the Christian

* *Blondel* acknowledges that Episcopacy was introduced before Tertullian wrote his work on baptism, which he dates A.D. 197. He thinks the change was made at Jerusalem about 135 or 136; at Alexandria about 143; at Rome about 140. In the appendix to the work on the ministry, issued by the Presbyterian Provincial Assembly of London, in 1654, we read thus, “Dr *Blondel*, a man of great learning and reading, undertakes, in a large discourse, to make out that before the year 140 there was not a bishop set over presbyters; to whose elaborate writings we refer the reader for further satisfaction in this particular.” We might say, then, that leading non-episcopal writers virtually acknowledge the introduction of Episcopacy as early as *forty* years after St John. *Sixty* will answer our purpose.

community, even in the most distant regions, continued as they had been originally constituted; and none rose up to vindicate the claims of the primitive government as abandoned, and to complain of its intrusive substitute;—if such a complete revolution can be believed to have taken place in the priesthood of the Christian temple, and so secretly that neither friend nor foe, advocate nor complainant, heathen, heretic, nor Jew, is known to have observed it, what change may not as well be supposed to have occurred, quite as easily, quite as silently, and quite as unobserved, in the precious oracles, the books of Holy Scripture, deposited in the temple, and specially entrusted to the guardianship of that priesthood? I know not that it is any easier to revolutionise, unnoticed, the whole form and character of a government, than it is to change, unnoticed, its very statute books. If the former has been done, how do we know that the latter has not been also? We know it has not, by the testimony, unbroken, of the church, from century to century. But why is not that testimony as valid in the one case as the other? Why not believe it as well when it proves the unbroken descent of the apostolic office, as when it witnesses to the canonical books of Holy Scripture? How can we suspect the fathers of the church when they testify of the former, without rendering their testimony suspicious when they speak of the latter, yea, without casting entire doubtfulness into the whole region of historic testimony? The care of the church to preserve the Scriptures inviolate is no more manifest in the history of Christianity, than her watchful care, in all ages and countries, and now even among the long-wasted and oppressed Christians of oriental nations, to guard the descent of the apostolic office. This unsleeping watch over the preservation in each diocese of an original, independent Episcopacy, wanting and allowing no common and infallible head, but “the chief Shepherd and Bishop of souls,” “*who is God over all*,” has been the chief barrier that has prevented, in the ancient churches of the east and elsewhere, the entire ascendancy of the Papal usurpation. As the system of our several state governments, united in one civil confederacy, each having its own chief governor, is the real protection of our liberties, and of our union, against the entire consolidation of the whole nation into one exclusive jurisdiction under one supreme ruler, and he mounting the higher in power as his footing should become the more consolidated and extended, till at last such an expedient for *more unity* proves itself the very fountain-head of the wildest and most destructive divisions: so have been the several diocesan governments of the universal church; each with its own spiritual head; each a government within

itself, though in harmonious confederacy with others; each watching with sacred care the valid descent of its episcopate from the only source of all spiritual authority: so has been always this primitive constitution of the Church, where it has been faithfully maintained, not only the wisest and strongest protection of her unity, but everywhere in proportion as it has been jealously guarded, has it held up the ensign of stern and victorious resistance to the usurping claims of him whom the [prophecy of the scriptures describes as "*sitting as God in the temple of God, showing himself that he is God.*"]* The grand scheme of that singular potentate has always been, while graciously permitting the name and show of bishops and dioceses, to reduce all into abject dependence on his own infallible will; he taking the place, as he calls himself the alone vicegerent, of Christ, the invisible Head; and thus seeking to reduce all office and citizenship, in the universal Church, into one consolidated mass of united confusion. It was this boasted expedient for the greater unity which produced on one part the revolt of Protestantism, and on all others is fast sinking the mass, by dead weight, as recently in atheistical France, into the gulf of an infidel and raging anarchy. Such is the scheme of Satan against which the Protestant ensign of our parent Church was lifted up, and the old dioceses of oriental Christendom have been for centuries contending. This it was that kindled the persecutions of the English Reformation, and burned to death those venerable bishops of Christ, Cranmer, and Latimer, and Ridley, and Hooper; not to mention the many confessors of lower place, but of equal faith and constancy. Had they only acknowledged the *supremacy of the Pope*, they might have died in their beds.†

* 2 Thess. ii. 4.

† It is very commonly supposed that because an Episcopal church has bishops, and the Romish church also has bishops, and the bishop of Rome is the Pope, therefore an Episcopal church, though Protestant, must be a handmaid to Popery. It would be quite as legitimate to say, that whereas the Pope relies upon *presbyters*, such as those of the monastic orders and of the society of Jesuits, as the main supporters of his claims of supremacy against the claims of diocesan bishops; and whereas *presbyters* are the only ministers of non-episcopal communions, therefore non-episcopal communions are handmaids to Popery. The truth is, that a primitive Episcopacy and the claims of Popery are absolutely irreconcilable. Nothing does the Pope more labour to destroy than an independent Episcopacy. No barrier stands so much in his way as the Protestant Episcopacy of England. In the famous Romish Council of Trent, the question was warmly debated whether bishops were of a distinct order from *presbyters*. The legates of the Pope did all they could to stop the debate. They wanted the question to be considered as undecided, lest it should bring bishops into unpleasant equality with him of Rome, whom they wished to be considered as *the only bishop by distinction of order*. It was long debated in the same council whether bishops held their office "*de jure divino*" or "*de jure pontificio*,"—from Christ or the Pope, through the *apostles* in general,—or only *St Peter*, as Christ's sole vicar on earth. The latter was strenuously maintained by the regulars or monastic orders, by the Jesuits, (the Pope's body guards), and the cardinal-legates of his holiness. Their doctrine may be seen from the following extracts from the speech of *Layne*, general of the Jesuits. He said, "the *apostles* were made *bishops*, not by Christ, but by *St Peter*;" that bishops "held their office and authority of *St Peter's* successor." He advised the council to beware, "lest, by making the institution of bishops of *divine*

Such is the argument which we desire to commend to the attention of Professor Hodge. Between him and us there are many points in this question which we hold in common. He believes as well as we that Christ did establish a particular ministry, and promised to be with that ministry, then and thus established, until the end of the world.

The question between us, and the only question, is, how that ministry was constituted? Was there an order of men who, after the apostles, and superior to the presbyters, were, through all time, to exercise the chief ministry of the Church? It is not at all a question of opinion or speculation. It is not a question whether one form of ministry seems to us more expedient than another; it is simply a question of fact. For ourselves, we do not believe there is room for the shadow of a doubt as to how that question must be decided. Neither do we doubt what the verdict of Professor Hodge himself will be, if he will give to the discussion that thorough examination of which we believe him capable.

We write the more earnestly because we see, in that portion of the Presbyterian body which Professor Hodge represents, a laying aside of prejudice even on points once regarded by them as of great importance, and a gradual return to the usages of the Catholic church. Liturgies they are already striving to introduce, and the growing evils of self-will and

right, they should take away the hierarchy and bring an oligarchy, or rather an anarchy." He censured those who held there is any power in bishops received from Christ, "because it would take away the privilege of the Roman church, that the Pope is the head of the church and vicar of Christ." "He said it was a mere contradiction, to say the Pope is head of the church, and the government monarchical, and then say there is a power or jurisdiction not derived from him, but received from others."

The discourse of the learned Jesuit was exceedingly extolled by the special advocates of the popedom. "The Papalins," says an historian of the council, "said it was most learned and substantial." The strenuous admirers of its doctrines were among the regulars, the Jesuits, the legates and cardinals. But who were the strenuous opponents of such doctrines? Bishops, and the divines whom they brought with them to the council. Of the former several spoke in defence of such doctrines as the following, from the speech of the Archbishop of Grenada: "Wheresoever a bishop shall be, whether in Rome or in Angubium, all are of the same merit, and of the same priesthood, and all successors of the apostles." "He inveighed against those who said St Peter had ordained the other apostles, bishops. He admonished the council to study the Scriptures, and observe that power to teach throughout the world, to administer the sacraments, and to govern the church, is equally given to all. And therefore as the apostles had authority, not from Peter, but from Christ, so the successors of the apostles have not power from Peter, but from Christ himself."

We see from the above that opposition to the divine institution of an independent diocesan Episcopacy did not originate with Protestants. It began long before the Reformation. It was the monastic doctrine in the 11th century, the Jesuit doctrine in the 16th. The inferior clergy maintained it in support of the high claims of the papal throne. The bishops opposed it in resistance of those claims. Then, as now, the shortest way to favour despotism was to preach levelism. It is curious to see in the debates of the Council of Trent how the special "Papalists," as the historian calls them, in trying to elevate the Pope by depressing the bishops, contended for parity of order between them and presbyters, with many of the same arguments which are now used for the same parity by Protestants, under the idea that in contending against diocesan Episcopacy they are really warring against Popery.

schism they are learning by sad experience to lament. As to Episcopacy, we are sure it can be shown to be apostolic; and the Professor must be constrained to confess, that in this country it is guarded by constitutional checks from those evils with which it stands reproached in the old world.

And yet, alas! we are reminded by past observation that with the great mass of men neither Scripture, history, nor sound reason, has a feather's weight in the scale against the force of whim, caprice, prejudice, or preconceived opinion.

ART. II.—*The Church Review and Register for October 1855.*

Art. VI. "Professor Hodge on the Permanency of the Apostolic Office."

As even the more important periodical publications of one denomination circulate only to a limited extent within the bounds of other churches, we may, without offence, state, for the information of some of our readers, that the *Church Review* is an Episcopal Quarterly, published in New Haven, Connecticut. It is ably conducted, and seems to represent the High-Church party in the Episcopal Church, as distinguished on the one hand from the Puseyites, and on the other from the Evangelicals.

In the last number of the *Review* there is an article on an address delivered in May last before the Presbyterian Historical Society. The object of the article is to present an argument, from the pen of Bishop M'Ilvaine, in favour of the permanency of the apostolic office. This argument the reviewer commends to our special notice. He pronounces it perfectly unanswerable; saying that a man might as well question one of the demonstrations in Euclid, as contest either its 'premises or conclusions. He predicts, with confidence, that the author of the address himself will be convinced, if he will give the argument a thorough examination.

We have never felt any inclination to engage in the Episcopal controversy, for two reasons. First, Because so far as the Scriptures are concerned, there does not seem to us to be any room for controversy; and secondly, Because when we go beyond the Scriptures, and get into the field of historical testimony, there is no end to controversy. The discussion cannot by possibility be brought to a satisfactory conclusion, not only

because the field is so extensive, but also because the testimony itself is so ambiguous or contradictory; and also because the parties are not agreed as to what is genuine, what spurious, and what interpolated in the writings quoted on the one side or upon the other. If, as was taught by the most eminent of the Christian fathers, and is conceded by the leading authorities of the Church of Rome, and was held by the great divines of the Church of England at the time of the Reformation, and is now strenuously insisted upon by the Anglican or Oxford party in that church, Episcopacy cannot be proved from Scripture alone, then the controversy must be left in the hands of those who have made historical research their special vocation. But when the advocates of Prelacy venture out of the jungles of patristic lore, and attempt to establish themselves on Scripture ground, then any man who can read the Bible may join the conflict, and strive to drive them back to the thickets whence they came.

As the argument to which our attention has been specially called purports to be a scriptural one, we feel bound to give it our serious attention. For if Prelacy be taught in the Bible, all men are bound to be Prelatists.

Before turning to the question concerning the perpetuity of the apostleship, the reviewer takes exception to the statement in the address, that, according to the prelatical theory, all church power is in the hands of the clergy. He says the writer could not have looked at the diocesan or general constitutions of the Episcopal Church in this country, without finding abundant evidence that the lay element has free scope for healthful and vigorous action. The reviewer, however, should have noticed that the address does not treat of the constitution of the Protestant Episcopal Church in America, but of the prelatical theory as it is known in history and in theological discussions. That theory teaches that all church power was originally given to the apostles, and by them transmitted to prelates, as their successors in the apostleship. To them alone it belongs authoritatively to teach, and to decide what is, and what is not, part of the revelation of God. They alone have the right to rule, to confirm, to ordain, and to depose. Priests and deacons are their delegates, deriving what power they have from them, and holding it at their discretion. This is the theory which underlies all the great historical churches of the east and west. It is the formative idea of which those churches are the development, and which has made them what they are.

This, however, is not the only form of Episcopacy. It was an opinion held by many of the fathers, retained by many in the Roman Church, and embraced by the leaders of the Refor-

mation in England, that presbyters and prelates were originally of the same order, and that, on the ground of expediency, one presbyter was by the church set over other presbyters with the title of bishop; as subsequently archbishops were set over bishops. This is held to be lawful, and in accordance with the liberty given to the church; which, the theory assumes, has the same right the state possesses to modify her organization at discretion. The general principle of this theory is, "Government is of God, the form of man." According to this view, bishops have no higher divine right than kings, and those who make, can unmake them; as Queen Elizabeth once profanely said to a refractory prelate.

Others go a step higher. They admit that the apostleship was temporary. Bishops are not apostles, but superintendents appointed by the apostles, and intended to be permanent. Some hold that this element in the organization of the church is essential, and adopt the maxim, "No bishop, no church." Others do not hold Episcopacy to be essential to the being of the church, though they regard it as a matter of divine appointment. They simply assert the fact that the apostles instituted a permanent office in the church, lower than their own, and higher than that of presbyters.

Advocates of all these theories are to be found among Episcopalians. In England the subjection of the church to the state has materially modified its organization; and in this country it has been greatly modified by the influence of Presbyterians. As Independents have borrowed from us their associations and consociations, so Episcopalians have borrowed from us their lay-delegates. This is a new feature, unknown to any episcopal organization in the old world. What degree of church power these lay-delegates really have, we shall not attempt to determine, lest we should betray an ignorance as gross as that betrayed by the reviewer when he speaks of Presbyterians. "If there is one ecclesiastical system," he says, "in our country from which the lay element is effectually excluded, that system is the Presbyterian. Professor Hodge must confess that it is the merest sophistry to pretend that the lay element is fairly represented by ruling elders. For the ruling elder, by becoming such by ordination, ceases to be a mere layman." Our ruling elders are merchants, farmers, mechanics, lawyers, physicians, men without theological training, engaged in secular pursuits, mingling with the people to whom, as a class distinguished from the clergy, they belong, having the same spirit and interests. Their ordination is simply a declaration by the proper authority, that they have the gifts to qualify them to represent the people in church

courts. That ordination has such magic power as to change the very nature of things, could never have entered the mind of any man not trained to take shadows for substance, and names for things. Our ruling elders are truly laymen, they belong to the people, and not to the clerical body; and yet they have real church power. No one can be received to the communion of the church, or excluded from it, without their consent. No minister can be ordained or deposed, acquitted or condemned on the charge of immorality or heresy, but with their co-operation. If the reviewer can say as much for the lay-delegates to Episcopal Conventions, we shall be glad to hear it. We warn him, however, that the revelation of the fact will go far to destroy the prestige of the Episcopal Church. The idea of priestly power has a great charm for the human heart, and great power over the imagination. Once convince men that there is no mystic virtue in a mitre, no grace of orders, and they will soon believe that Episcopalians are no better than other people.

This, however, is a subordinate matter. The main point is the perpetuity of the apostleship. This is the question on which the reviewer joins issue. He correctly remarks, that the whole force of the argument contained in the address, against the doctrine that bishops are apostles, lies in the syllogism: "If prelates are apostles, they must have apostolic gifts; they have not those gifts: therefore they are not apostles." This, he adds, is a "very convenient method to dispose of the prelatial theory." We think it is. It is convenient, because it is so short and so effectual. It is not new. It is the old scriptural method of disposing of false pretences. In the apostolic age, if a man claimed to be an apostle, he was asked to furnish "the signs of an apostle." If he claimed to be a prophet, he was asked to produce proof of his aspiration. It was not then the custom for a man to say, 'I have the office of an apostle, but not his gifts;' 'I am a prophet, but am not inspired.' In those days such language would have exposed any man to ridicule. The propriety of this convenient method of settling the question, whether a man was an apostle or not, was then universally recognised, except by pretenders. The genuine apostles and prophets cheerfully submitted to it. Paul said to the Corinthians, "If ye seek a proof of Christ speaking in me, I will give it to you." The reviewer objects to this method. He says, "The supposition that if the apostolic office was to be continued, the miraculous gifts originally appertaining to that office would have been continued also, is a mere *petitio principii*, or begging of the question." He is probably labouring under a misapprehension

of the doctrine which he opposes. He uses the expressions "miraculous gifts of an apostle," and "apostolic gifts," as though they were synonymous; and so does Bishop M'Ilvaine; whose argument he quotes. They are, however, very different. The former is generally and correctly understood to mean the power of working miracles. This is the sense in which the expression is used throughout this article, both by the reviewer and by the bishop whose discourse is included in it. The latter expression, "apostolic gifts," means those inward gifts which qualified their possessor to exercise the functions of an apostle. The power to work miracles was an evidence that a man possessed these gifts, if the miracles were wrought in confirmation of his claim to be an apostle. The gifts of an apostle were inspiration and infallibility; or, more correctly stated, such a measure of inspiration as to communicate to the recipient full knowledge of the gospel, and to render him infallible in the communication of it. It was this that made a man an apostle; working miracles only proved him one. The doctrine of the address is not, that if prelates are apostles, they must have the power to work miracles, but that if they are apostles, they must be inspired and infallible. It might be very reasonable to call upon those who claim to be thus the messengers of God, to work miracles in attestation of their claim; but that was not insisted upon. All the address asserts, is, that to claim to be an apostle without infallibility, is as absurd as to claim to be a prophet without inspiration, or to claim to be a man without a soul. The reviewer does not see fit to discuss this principle. He prefers presenting an independent argument, which he pronounces to be unanswerable, in favour of the permanency of the apostolic office. The argument is found in a discourse delivered by Bishop M'Ilvaine, on the occasion of the consecration of Bishop Polk, in 1838.

We have no recollection of ever having seen this discourse before. For its author we have the highest personal regard, founded not only on the associations of early life, but also on his elevated character and services. It is because we know that he sets Christ above the church, truth above form, regeneration above baptism, and the communion of saints above agreement in church polity, that we regard him as an ornament to his profession, and a blessing to the Church of Christ. We wish that some one other than a life-long friend had written the discourse we are called upon to review. We would much rather dwell upon the points on which we agree with such a man, than upon those on which we differ.

The proposition which Bishop M'Ilvaine undertakes to sus-

tain is, that the apostolic office is permanent, and that bishops are the official successors of the original apostles, clothed with "the same power and authority." As, however, he does not hold the prelatical theory, in the form in which it was stated above, he is forced to begin by an attempt to reduce the apostolic office to a minimum. He makes it a mere episcopate. The office which he claims to be perpetual is not really the office which Paul and Peter filled, but one essentially different, though agreeing with it in certain points, as is the case with the office of every minister of the Word. Unless we first come to an understanding as to what an office is, it is all lost time to dispute about its continuance. Something is perpetual. Some of the functions exercised by the apostles have been continued in the church,—the authority to preach, rule, and administer the sacraments. But these functions were not peculiar to the apostles, and therefore did not constitute their office as distinguished from that of other preachers. What is true of the apostles as such, and true of no other class of officers mentioned in the New Testament, is,—1. That their teaching was authoritative. It constituted for that age, and for every other, the rule of faith and practice. This is not true even of the New Testament prophets, whose inspiration was merely occasional, and whose instructions, except on those occasions, had no more authority than those of other teachers. If any epistle written by Timothy, Titus, Barnabas, or Silas, should now be brought to light, it would have no more authority than the writings of Clement, Polycarp, or Irenæus. But if any well-authenticated production of one of the apostles could be produced, it would bind the faith of the whole church. There is an impassable line between the apostles and all other teachers, as to the authority with which they taught. And it is this that constitutes one of the distinguishing elements of their office. It belonged to them as apostles, and to all apostles. If any man taught with divine authority in the church, he was an apostle; if his teaching was not infallible, he was no apostle. 2. It is equally plain that the apostles exercised a jurisdiction which had no limits, either as to its geographical sphere or as to its degree. An apostle was an apostle everywhere, because his authority arose out of his personal gifts. Peter had the same authority in Babylon as in Rome. Paul laid down the rule of faith as authoritatively to those churches which had not seen his face in the flesh, as to those which he had himself founded. All their ordinances and decisions were as binding as the express commands and decisions of Christ. 3. They had the power of communicating miraculous gifts by the imposition of hands.

These things the apostles had, and others had not. These

things, therefore, are the distinguishing functions of the apostolic office; so that to say the office is continued without these gifts is a simple contradiction. The consequence is, and ever has been, that those who claim to have the apostolic office, also claim these apostolic prerogatives. Romanists make the teaching of the bishops of any age the rule of faith for that age,—it is infallible and authoritative. They also hold that the institutions, ordinances, and decisions, of those bishops bind the conscience. And finally, they hold that the bishops, and they only, have power to give the Holy Ghost by the imposition of hands. There is some sense in this. But for a man to claim that bishops are apostles, and yet renounce for them every one of these distinguishing functions, is self-contradiction. We do not overlook the flaw even in the Romish theory. It attributes to the bishops collectively what belonged to the apostles individually. Bishops are not, even according to Papists, apostles; but the order of bishops has apostolic authority. Individually they are fallible, and may be heretical; but collectively they are infallible. This is a very lame apostleship. Still it keeps alive the office. It claims that true apostolic authority, in teaching, ruling, and discipline, exists in every age of the church. This, which is the only intelligible theory of a perpetual apostleship, no man can hold without being or becoming a Romanist. The Puseyites, therefore, who revived this doctrine in England and in this country, are going over in shoals to the Church of Rome. It is with profound regret we learn that Bishop M'Ilvaine has given his sanction to a proposition which contains the fundamental error and very formative idea of Romanism. It is true, he does not understand the proposition in the sense in which Romanists do. But their sense is the true one; it is the only sense the proposition will bear; and it is the sense which has always been put upon it. The simple and stringent logic of Rome is: "All men are bound, on pain of perdition, to submit to the teaching and authority of apostles; the bishops are apostles: therefore all men are bound, on pain of perdition, to submit to the teaching and authority of bishops." Bishop M'Ilvaine admits the first and second of these propositions, and denies the third. Romanists thank no man for admitting the third, if he will grant the first and second. That is all they want, and all they need ask. Bishop M'Ilvaine would, of course, say that the fallacy in the above syllogism is, that the word *apostle* is used in a different sense in the second proposition, from that in which it is used in the first; that is, that bishops are not apostles in the same sense as the original messengers of Christ. That, however, is saying they have not the same office, and,

therefore, is contradicting the very proposition his sermon is intended to demonstrate. If bishops have the same office that Peter and Paul had, they are entitled to the submission due to the official authority of Peter and Paul. For what is sameness of office, but sameness of functions and prerogative? Bishop M'Ilvaine cannot maintain his ground before Romanists. He has conceded everything, in conceding the perpetuity of the apostleship. With that concession they can lead any man, who follows his reason and conscience, to the feet of the Pope. They need ask no man to believe in transubstantiation, the priesthood of the ministry, the sacrifice of the mass, the supremacy of the Pope, purgatory, the worship of saints, or adoration of the Virgin; all these and other doctrines are included in that one concession. For if the apostleship is perpetual, apostles have taught these doctrines, and we are bound to submit.

That the Roman view of the nature of the apostolic office,—which is the view almost universally recognised as correct,—is the right view, is plain. First, From the fact that the apostles rested their claim to absolute and universal obedience, in matters of faith and practice, upon their office. It was because they were apostles they called on all men to acknowledge that what they wrote were “the commandments of the Lord.”—(1 Cor. xiv. 37.) Secondly, From the fact that submission to the apostles, in matters of faith and practice, was universally recognised as due to them in virtue of their office. Thirdly, From the fact that the New Testament is the standard of faith to Christians, because it was written by the apostles, or received their sanction. The argument for the inspiration of the New Testament is invalidated, unless infallibility belonged to the apostles as such. Fourthly, Because Christ, in constituting them apostles, promised to give the Holy Spirit in such measure as to render their teaching as authoritative as his own; and he forbade their entering on the discharge of the duties of their office until they had received the Holy Ghost. Fifthly, Christ authenticated their claim to be regarded as his immediate and infallible messengers, by signs, and wonders, and divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost. Sixthly, Paul, in claiming to be an apostle, disclaimed having derived either his knowledge or authority from men, and asserted that he had received the one by direct revelation, and the other by an immediate commission from Christ. He admits that had this not been the case, he would not be an apostle. Finally, we appeal to the maxim so much perverted and abused, that *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*, must be true. In every age and in every part of the church, infallibility in teaching and supreme authority in ruling have been

recognised as belonging to the apostles in virtue of their office. It is on this ground Rome claims this infallibility and authority, because she claims that the apostleship is continued in her prelates. It is the height of suicidal infatuation, therefore, in Protestant bishops, for the sake of exalting their order or strengthening their position, to claim to be apostles, with whatever explanations or limitations that claim may be presented.

As Bishop M'Ilvaine and ourselves differ so essentially as to the nature of the apostleship, there might seem to be no use in continuing the discussion. He admits that what we, in common with most other men, understand by the apostleship, was not continued. He only contends that the episcopal authority of the apostles has been perpetuated. There are, however, two points included in the proposition which he labours to sustain. First, That the apostolic office is perpetual. Second, That that office was an episcopate. But the danger of this method is, that in attempting to prove the divine origin and permanency of the episcopate, he proves fatally too much; too much for himself, too much for Protestantism, and too much for the truth of God. Suppose he succeeds in proving the first of these points, as he thinks he has beyond contradiction; and fails in proving the second, as beyond contradiction he has failed; what becomes of him and of Protestantism? Both are hopelessly engulfed. There is an unbroken succession of infallible teachers, and those teachers are the Romish prelates. Bishop M'Ilvaine has attempted to walk on a paper bridge over a sea of fire. Everything, therefore, is at stake, and it is surely worth while to examine what he says on both the points just indicated.

He takes the second first, and attempts to show that the apostleship was and is a simple episcopate. His proof is drawn from the commission recorded in Matt. xxviii. 19, 20; and from Acts i. 20, where the office from which Judas fell is said to be his bishopric or episcopate.

The commission is in these words: "Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptising them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe whatsoever I have commanded you; and, lo, I am with you always, *even* unto the end of the world." Whatever, says our author, is not contained in this commission, "expressly, or by necessary inference, must be considered as not pertaining to the characteristic duties and powers of the apostles." Nothing is here said of their having seen Christ after his resurrection; nor of an immediate appointment from Christ; nor of miraculous powers and endowments. All these must therefore be considered as unessential to the

office. What, then, is the office? Peter expressly styles the office which Judas "vacated, his bishopric, or his episcopate, as the original reads." But as the word *episcopate* means supervision in general, we must go, he says, to the commission to learn its nature. The commission reads, "Go teach all nations," &c. "Therefore, whatever powers their apostleship or episcopate embraced, were not limited to any particular congregation of the church, but extended to the whole church; in other words, the *bishopric* in the hands of the apostles was evidently general, as distinguished from congregational. What particular functions belonged to that general oversight or episcopate, their commission leaves no room to doubt. First, 'Go and teach all nations;' or, as the more accurate and universally preferred translation is, 'Go and make disciples of all nations.' Thus was given authority to propagate the gospel; 'Baptizing them,' &c. Here was authority to administer the sacraments of the church; and, by the sacrament of baptism, to open the doors of the church, and of its privileges, to disciples out of all nations. Finally, 'Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you.' These words conveyed to the apostles the authority to rule the church, after they had made disciples by preaching, and members by baptism. An essential part of the government of the church consisted in seeing to the succession of its ministry. That the authority to do this, to ordain successors in the ministry, was included among the powers of the apostles, is not only necessarily implied in their authority to govern, but also in those impressive words of the Saviour, 'As the Father hath sent me, even so send I you.' For as it was part of the office on which Jesus was sent, to institute the ministry of his church, so it follows, from these words, that it was part of the sending of the apostles, to continue that ministry, by the ordaining of others to its functions. The conclusion, then, with regard to the characteristic nature of the apostolic office, is, that it was one of a general supervision or episcopate; and embraced essentially, the authority to preach and propagate the gospel, to administer the sacraments of the church, to preside over its government, and, as a chief part of government, to ordain helpers and successors in the ministry. All these powers the apostles held, not as a collective body or college, but severally and individually."

There are two modes of defending Episcopacy, either of which is intelligible and worthy of consideration. The one is, to admit that bishops are not apostles, and endeavour to prove that an order of the ministry was instituted higher than that of presbyters, with the exclusive right to rule and ordain. The other is, to maintain that bishops are apostles, having their

gifts as well as their office. But this attempt to reduce the apostleship to a mere episcopate, shocks the common sense of every reader of the New Testament. It is so palpable that Peter and Paul held a higher position than a mere bishop, that our author attempts to account for this undeniable fact by a reference to their "extraordinary endowments and all that striking array of miraculous powers with which they were furnished for their enterprise. Such endowments were needed," he says, "for the first propagation of the gospel. They have not been needed since."

We have already adverted to the distinction between the gifts essential to the office of an apostle, and the miraculous powers by which the claim to those gifts was authenticated. A man might be an apostle without those powers, but not without the gifts. The high position of Peter and Paul was not due to their miraculous powers, but to their inward gifts. Their office was only a commission giving authority and command to exercise those gifts. Our author says we must distinguish between the "office of an ambassador and the force of mind or personal endowments with which he sustains his embassy." It is true that an ambassador may be more or less intelligent, but he must have intelligence. You cannot make a log of wood an ambassador. His embassy is only authority to exercise his intellectual gifts in the discharge of a certain duty. A man who has no eyes cannot be appointed a painter, nor a deaf man a musician, nor a dumb one an orator, nor an idiot a teacher, nor an uninspired man a prophet. Who then will believe that a man can be an apostle, one sent to prescribe the rule of faith and practice for all ages and for all nations, without plenary knowledge and infallibility? The principle that every office implies a gift suited to its nature, runs through the Bible, and applies to all cases from the lowest to the highest. If Jesus Christ is exalted to dominion over the universe, does not this imply the possession of divine perfections? Will it be said we have no right to infer he is God from the nature of his work, because we must distinguish between the office and the qualifications for it? He could not be clothed with the office of God, without possessing the attributes of God. Neither can a man be clothed with the office of an apostle, without possessing the inward gifts of the apostleship. The endowments and the office are, from the nature of the case, inseparable. Bishop M'Ilvaine confounds inward gifts or endowments with miraculous powers; and the distinction between the superior qualifications for an office, and the office itself, has no application to the case before us. What is meant by superior qualifications for infallibility?

Again, it is not only an arbitrary but an unreasonable as-

sumption, that we must confine ourselves to the original commission in ascertaining the nature of the apostolic office. There are several ways in which the nature of an office may be legitimately determined. One is, the instructions given to those who hold it. Another is, the powers which they actually exercised in virtue of it, and the kind and degree of authority which it conferred. Another is, the qualifications declared to be essential to the exercise of its functions. We know that a presbyter is a teacher, because he is required to be "apt to teach." Another is, the nature of the end the office was designed to accomplish. These are all legitimate sources of information as to the nature of the apostleship, and they all furnish abundant evidence that it was not a mere episcopate. The men selected by Christ for this office were instructed to make known the gospel which they had received by immediate revelation, to establish the church, to lay down rules for its organization and government. They everywhere exercised the powers of infallible teachers and supreme rulers. They claimed for their teaching the authority of God, and for their ordinances the submission due to divine commands. They were utterly unfit for the exercise of their office until they were endued with power from on high; and were forbidden to act as apostles until they had received the promise of the Holy Ghost. And finally, the design of their appointment was to lay the foundation of the church, and to furnish it with an infallible rule of faith and practice.

But suppose we ignore all these sources of information as to the nature of the apostleship, and confine ourselves to the commission. The commission does not contain a word about episcopal authority, either expressly or by implication. Every word it contains might be addressed to presbyters. In Mark the whole commission is contained in these words: "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature." How simple and sublime is this! but what does it say about Episcopacy? Our author argues that the first clause of the commission, as given in Matthew, "Go teach all nations," &c., gives authority to instruct; the second, "Baptizing them," &c., gives authority to administer the sacraments; and the third, "Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you," gives authority to rule the church! Since the world began was the claim to a divine right to rule ever rested upon such a foundation as this? Suppose the Emperor of the French should say to a company of schoolmasters, 'Go into all France, and teach the people to obey my commands;' would that confer on each of these teachers severally and individually the right to superintend the educational concerns of the nation, and to appoint successors to this educational Episcopacy? If

the command in the first clause, to teach, conveys only authority to instruct, how is it that the command to teach in the third clause, which is only a repetition of the first, conveys the episcopate? Again, if the authority to teach conveyed in the first clause, and the authority to baptize conveyed in the second, do not belong exclusively to bishops, how is it that the authority to rule the church, said to be conveyed in the third clause, belongs exclusively to them? Again, if the command to rule involves the right to ordain when addressed to bishops, why does not the same command involve the right to ordain, when addressed to presbyters? Here is a commission in three clauses; the first and second convey powers common to all ministers; and the third, powers belonging exclusively to a particular order of ministers. Why is this? Why is the right to rule claimed as an exclusive prerogative, when the rights to teach and baptize, all contained in one commission, and addressed to the same persons, are admitted to be common to ministers?

Conscious, as any sane man must be, of the insufficiency of the language of the commission to prove that the apostolic office was a mere episcopate, Bishop M'Ilvaine turns to two other passages for aid. The one is, "the impressive words of the Saviour, 'As the Father hath sent me, even so send I you.'" On this passage he argues thus: "As it was part of the office on which Jesus was sent, to institute the ministry of his church, so it follows from these words that it was part of the sending of the apostles, to continue that ministry by the ordaining of others to its functions." Then, by parity of reason, as it was part of the office on which Jesus was sent, to make expiation for sin, it is part of the sending of the apostles, and of the bishops exclusively, as their successors, to continue that expiation! The other passage outside the commission, to which appeal is made, is Acts i. 20, in which the office held by Judas is called a "bishopric or episcopate." From this it is inferred that the apostleship is in its specific nature an episcopate. The word, however, so translated, is in the margin rendered "*office or charge*." And in Ps. cix. 8, whence the passage is quoted, the expression is, "His office let another take." How then can the specific nature of the apostolic office be determined by a word which may express an office of any kind? It might just as reasonably be argued that the apostleship is a *deaconship*, because it is expressed by the general term *διακονία*. It is nothing less than humiliating to see good men catching at such straws as these, to prove themselves apostles. To men perishing with thirst, the mere sound of water is refreshing. We consider the argument for the supremacy of the Pope founded on the passage, "Thou art Peter, and on this rock I will build my church;" and the still stronger

passage, "Peter, lovest thou me? feed my sheep," (*i. e.*, be their shepherd,) a thousand-fold more plausible than Bishop M'Ilvaine's argument for Episcopacy.

The most extraordinary feature of this case, however, is still to be presented. Our author attempts to determine the nature of the apostolic office, and thence deduce the permanency of the episcopate, from a passage which has no reference to the apostles in their official capacity, nor even to the apostles as ministers of the gospel. The commission in question is neither the commission of the apostles, nor of the ministry, but of the church. This has been the common opinion of God's people from the beginning. It was not addressed to the apostles alone, but to a promiscuous assembly of believers,—probably to the five hundred brethren assembled to meet their risen Lord. The duty which it enjoins does not bind the apostles only, but the whole church. Who can believe that the command, "Go into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature," was meant for episcopal ears only? It sinks into the heart of every member of the church, man and woman, and makes all feel they belong to a body whose vocation it is to disciple all nations. The powers which the commission conveys do not belong to the apostles as such, but to the church as a whole. It is the essence of Popery to suppose and to feel that all church power inheres in bishops or in the clergy. Finally, the promise which the commission contains, "Lo, I am with you alway, even to the end of the world," was not made to the apostles in their official capacity, but is the promise on which the whole church has lived from that day to this. If this view of the matter be correct, then Bishop M'Ilvaine's structure is left standing on thin air. It is founded on the assumption that the commission was given to the apostles as such. If it was given to the church as a whole, he has no ground left to stand on.

The sum of what we have said of this argument, in proof that the apostolic office is a simple episcopate, is—First, That it is unreasonable to confine our attention to the commission alone, and ignore all other means of determining the nature of the apostleship. Second, That if we do confine ourselves to the commission, there is not a word nor a thought in it which has any reference to an episcopate; it might have been addressed to any company of ministers. Third, The commission was not addressed to the apostles, but to the whole church, and therefore neither defines their office nor enumerates their powers.

Having endeavoured to show that Bishop M'Ilvaine has misconceived the nature of the apostleship, we come to consider his argument in favour of the permanency of the office.

The permanence of the office, he says, "is undeniably evident from the promise, 'Lo, I am with you alway, even to the end of the world.' Now, if neither the persons of the apostles were intended to remain to the end of the world, nor their miraculous endowments, nor their distinguishing office, we are quite unable to comprehend how that promise has been fulfilled, or what it could have meant. But the persons of the first apostles do not remain. Their miraculous gifts have not been continued in the church. It follows, then, that their distinguishing office must remain; that it was to this office, and to those who should hold it in succession, that the Saviour promised his presence to the end of the world. No other sense can possibly be put on his words."

Our answer to this is: 1. That the promise was not made to the apostles, and therefore not to their successors. It has not been fulfilled in reference to bishops. According to the authoritative declaration of the Church of England, there was not a bishop on the face of the earth, at the time of the Reformation, who had not sunk into idolatry and heresy. Is this consistent with the presence of Christ? Would the promise to the church be fulfilled, if the whole body of those who name the name of Christ turned heathen? The only sense in which the promise in question has been fulfilled, and therefore the only sense in which it was intended, is, that Christ has never forsaken his church. He has always had a seed to confess and serve him; in the midst of persecutions and of corruptions he has preserved his living members, and in the end always brought them off victorious.

2. But if we grant that the promise was made to the apostles, it was made to them as teachers, and not as bishops; and therefore secures only the perpetuity of the ministry, and not the perpetuity of the episcopate. As we have already seen, the commission does not contain a word about Episcopacy. It reads, "Go teach; and, lo, I am with you alway." If it is addressed to the apostles, it must be to them as teachers.

3. If the promise secures the perpetuity of the apostleship, and if, as we have seen, the apostleship implies infallibility in teaching, it secures an uninterrupted succession of infallible teachers in the church. If Bishop M'Ilvaine's argument proves any thing, it proves Romanism. If any man wishes to see this argument in the hands of a master, let him read Bossuet, who urges it with a force which might make our author's heart quake, and force him to retract his dangerous concession of the perpetuity of the apostleship. Half-way measures and half-way arguments are always weak.

Bishop M'Ilvaine's first and great argument for the perpetuity of the apostleship is the one just considered. His next

is from the actual continuance of the office in the church in the order of bishops; for whom he claims "the same power and authority which they (*i. e.*, the apostles) had."

We have seldom felt more sad than when reading these words. So long as the clergy of the Episcopal Church in England and America were content to stand on the ground of Jerome and of their own reformers, and regard bishops as men lawfully appointed by the church over presbyters, or even to assume that the apostles instituted such an order, other Protestants, however much they differed from them, felt that the foundation had not been forsaken; but when they claimed that their bishops are apostles, clothed with "the same power and authority" as the original messengers of Christ, it was seen that the citadel had been given up, that the radical principle of Popery had been adopted, and that all the corruptions of that system must inevitably follow. Until recently the doctrine of apostolic succession, as involving the perpetuity of the apostleship, was confined to the Laudean faction in the Episcopal Church; but now it seems that the heads of the evangelical party have gone over to the enemy. There is no use of disguising the fact. The doctrine that bishops are apostles, clothed with "the same power and authority," is the very life and essence of the Romish system. We know Bishop M'Ilvaine does not mean what he says. Still he says it. He says the very thing Rome says, and all she says. He uses almost the very language of the Oxford Tracts when they present the beginning, middle, and end of their system.

Before prosecuting his argument to prove that bishops are apostles, our author stops to deprecate the charge of arrogance. "Nothing," he says, "is so humble and unpretending as truth." True, but nothing is so arrogant as falsehood. If bishops are really apostles, there is no harm in their claiming the authority and power attached to the office. But if they are not—what then? The claim is no trifle. Bishop M'Ilvaine says that bishops are the official successors of the apostles, having "the same power and authority;" which authority is episcopal supervision, including the authority "to rule the church," and the sole right to ordain: and that this authority was given not to the apostles collectively, but to each of them severally and individually; and that it extends over not a single congregation only, but over the whole church. According to this, our author claims to be an apostle—to be entitled as such to the supervision, not only over a single congregation, not over those only who choose him to be a bishop, but over the whole church, on the ground of a divine warrant. The church universal, therefore, is bound to recognise this claim; and all Christians within his diocese are bound to sub-

mit to it. He is the only man in Ohio who has the right "to rule the church," or to ordain. All Christians within that state, who do not submit to his jurisdiction, are in a state of rebellion against God. Venerable men here in New Jersey, such men as Drs. Alexander and Miller, have died in this state of rebellion, because they did not recognise the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of Bishop Doane over them, and submit to him as an apostle. This, without exaggeration, we understand to be included in the claim advanced in this discourse. It may appear to our author very humble and unpretending, but we assure him it appears to others in a very different light. We regard it as an insult to the common sense, and an outrage on the Christian feelings of men. And so long as Episcopacy insists on these claims, it will be an offence and a nuisance, which every good man is bound to do what he can to abate. If such be the character of these assumptions when the apostleship is reduced to a mere episcopate, what is to be thought of them, when the office is regarded in its true light? Then the arrogance of claiming to be an apostle is only short of the arrogance of the Man of Sin, in claiming to be the vicar of Christ, and setting himself as God in the temple of God. To claim the apostleship in this sense of the term, we hold to be an enormous wickedness; and to claim it in a sense in which the office has never been understood, we regard as a proof of such infatuation as portends a fall. With all our love and respect for Bishop M'Ilvaine, we cannot help thus speaking. We fully believe he is sincere,—that he does not mean to claim the apostleship for his order, but something very different under that name. This, though it may save the man, does not redeem the doctrine. The doctrine that bishops are apostles, with the same power and authority, is apostasy to Rome; and must be so, however innocently, through misconception of its meaning, the doctrine may in some cases be propounded.

His argument in proof of the assumption that bishops are apostles, is drawn, first from the fact that the word is used in the New Testament in application to others than the original immediate messengers of Christ; and second, from the assumed fact that such persons exercised apostolic functions.

We are ashamed to ask our readers to travel with us over a road as much beaten as Broadway or the Strand. It is impossible that either Bishop M'Ilvaine or ourselves should present any thing new, or even in a new form, on these topics. It is, however, with knowledge as with food: that millions of men before us have eaten to satisfy, does not satisfy our hunger; and that the testimony of Scripture on these points has been presented a thousand times before, does not prevent the necessity of considering it afresh, when it is afresh presented.

"That the office of the apostles did descend," says our author, "from them to successors, that it was communicated to others by the hands of those who received it from the Lord, is manifest. For, not to mention Matthias and Barnabas, who were apostles, Acts xiv. 14, we find Timothy, who was ordained by St Paul, 2 Tim. i. 6, not only called an apostle by that writer, as he is called bishop by the writers of the next century, but actually charged by St Paul with the exercise of all the authority we have mentioned as contained in the apostolic commission. The First Epistle to Timothy is the plainest evidence that he was put in trust with the government of the Church of Ephesus,—which at that time, as the Acts of the Apostles declares, contained a plurality of presbyters; that over those presbyters, as well as over the deacons and laity, he was invested with the personal charge of discipline and government; and that in discharging such government, the authority to ordain was distinctly in his single hands. The same is evident concerning Titus, from the Epistle of St Paul to him. It was his charge from St Paul, to set in order all the churches of the large island of Crete, and 'ordain presbyters in every city.' Thus we see the office of the apostles handed down by a succession of hands to one of the latest dates of which the Scriptures speak. It certainly continued in the world as long as the lifetime of the Apostle St John; and he lived to the hundredth year of the Christian era."

That the apostleship continued in the church as long as the Apostle John lived, we do not deny. For that would be to deny that John lived till he died; or that he lost his inspiration and became a fallible teacher before his death.

The conclusion to which these arguments would lead us, involves of course the official equality of Timothy and Paul. There is a preliminary difficulty in the way of this conclusion, which our author does not attempt to remove. It is just as evident from the New Testament that Timothy and Titus were officially subordinate to the Apostle Paul, as it is evident from other sources that a Russian colonel is officially inferior to the Russian Czar. They were ordered here and there, directed to do this and that. They were required to make Paul's teachings their rule of faith, and Paul's precepts their rule of life. While his teachings were thus authoritative, their teaching had no authority at all except what it derived from his. To say, therefore, that he and they had the same office, and "the same power and authority," seems to us nothing less than absurd. If the Bishop of London were to write to Bishop M'Ilvaine as Paul did to Timothy and Titus, we suspect the latter would think that the English prelate was assuming official superiority over him.

Let us, however, look at the arguments. The first is, that Timothy and others were officially apostles, because the title "apostles" is given to them.

Our answer to this is,—1. That neither Timothy nor Titus, whose cases are principally relied upon to prove the transmission of the apostleship, is ever called an apostle in the New Testament, in any sense. With regard to Titus, it is not pretended that he was ever so called. The proof that Timothy is called an apostle is supposed to be found in 1 Thess. i. 1, as compared with chap. ii. 6 of that epistle. In the former passage it is said, "Paul, and Silvanus, and Timotheus, unto the Church of the Thessalonians," &c.; and in the latter, "We might have been burdensome to you as the apostles of Christ." From this it is inferred that Paul, Silvanus, and Timotheus, were equally apostles of Christ. Every reader of the New Testament knows that Paul was accustomed to associate with himself any of his travelling companions who happened to be with him at the time, in his salutations to the churches. Every reader also knows that he was frequently in the habit, when speaking of himself, to say "we." To make every thing which he says of himself, in the use of that pronoun, apply equally to those associated with him in the salutations, would upset the authority of all those portions of Scripture. It would make Sosthenes as much the author of the First Epistle to the Corinthians as Paul. It would make him and Silas and Timothy inspired and infallible men. It would reduce the epistles to a mass of contradictions and absurdities. Thus, in this very instance, Paul says, 1 Thess. iii. 1, 2, "We thought it good to be left alone at Athens, and sent Timothy;" that is, Paul, Silvanus, and Timothy, thought it good to be left alone, and sent Timothy—Timothy sent Timothy! So low as this will even good men stoop to sustain a foregone conclusion. Paul associates his companions with him in his salutations, not in his epistles. They are his epistles, and not theirs, by the common faith of the church, and by the common sense of mankind. So far from Paul ever calling Timothy an apostle, he frequently and expressly says he was no apostle, but a brother, a minister, "Paul, an apostle of Jesus Christ, and Timothy our brother," by all the rules of grammar, as plainly declares that Timothy was not an apostle, as in the expression, "The apostles, elders, and brethren," it is declared that the brethren were not apostles. All this ground, however, has been gone over much more thoroughly in our pages years ago.

2. Admitting, as we cheerfully do, that the word "apostle" is sometimes applied to others than the original messengers of Christ, it proves nothing as to the transmission of the office.

Every one knows that all the terms of office used in the New Testament are significant, and may be used either in their primary sense, in which they may be applied to officers of all kinds, or in an official sense, when they designate officers of only one kind. Thus the word "apostle" means *one sent*, and is used of any messenger, as in John xiii. 16, "The servant is not above his master, neither he that is sent (the apostle) greater than he that sent him." In the same sense, Epaphroditus is called the messenger of the Philippians, Phil. ii. 25; which is explained by saying, "He ministered to my necessities." And in chap. iv. 18, Paul says, "I am full, having received of Epaphroditus the things which were sent from you." (2.) It is used of those sent on a religious mission,—*i. e.* missionaries; as Barnabas was the apostle or missionary of the Church of Antioch, having been sent by that church, Acts xiii. 1, 2. (3.) It is used of our Lord Jesus Christ, who is called "The apostle and high priest of our profession," because he was the messenger of God. (4.) It is used in its official sense of the original messengers of Christ; and in this sense it is never used of any but inspired and infallible men. No passage can be produced in which, from the context, or from any other source, it can be proved that the word is applied to any one who was not infallible, in the same sense in which it is applied to Paul. Unless, therefore, it can be proved that every messenger is a messenger of God, in the technical sense, it cannot be proved that calling a man an apostle establishes the transmission of the apostolic office. In like manner the word "bishop" means a superintendent, and may be applied to any kind of office, secular or religious; or it may be used in an official sense for an officer of a particular kind. "Presbyter" means an old man,—and hence Peter says, "I also am a presbyter;" officially, it means a particular class of church-officers. "Deacon" means follower, servant, or minister,—hence all the presbyters and apostles are called deacons; officially, the term is restricted to a particular class. Bishop M'Ilvaine's argument then is,—A man's being called bishop does not prove him to have been officially a bishop; a man's being called a presbyter, does not prove him to have been officially a presbyter; a man's being called a deacon, does not prove him to have been officially a deacon; but his being called apostle, does prove that he was officially an apostle. This is the total amount of the argument, and it is evidently entirely destitute of weight. Of this our author betrays a secret consciousness, for he says, "We go by office more than name."

The second branch of the argument above quoted, for the transmission of the apostolic office, is in effect this:—The powers conferred on Timothy and Titus, and the acts which

they were required to perform, prove their official superiority to presbyters; and their official superiority to presbyters proves that they were apostles.

Our answer to this argument is again twofold. First, There is no evidence that Timothy and Titus were officially superior to presbyters; and secondly, Admitting that fact, it does not prove that they were apostles.

The first assumption, by Bishop McIlvaine, in reference to Timothy, is, that he was ordained by Paul alone; from which he seems to infer that he was ordained to the apostleship. In proof of his ordination by the apostle, reference is made to 2 Tim. i. 6, "Stir up the gift of God that is in thee, by the laying on of my hands." Ordination, however, does not confer "the gift of God." It is a solemn recognition that that gift is already possessed, and gives authority publicly to exercise it. It is only on the supposition that ordination is a sacrament, or a rite conferring grace, that this passage can naturally be understood to have any reference to that ceremony. The gifts imparted by the laying on of the apostles' hands, were, the power of working miracles, speaking with tongues, healing the sick, prophesying, or some other form of miraculous power. When Peter and John laid their hands on certain converts in Samaria, they received the Holy Ghost. When Simon Magus saw this, he said to the apostles: "Give me also this power, that on whomsoever I lay hands, he may receive the Holy Ghost."—(Acts viii. 15–19.) It is evident that these gifts were something the possession of which was at once manifest to all. When Paul baptized certain disciples, and laid his hands on them, immediately "they spake with tongues and prophesied."—(Acts xix. 6.) The passage, therefore, in 2 Tim. i. 6, to say the least, has no necessary reference to ordination.

The second assumption in the argument is, that the powers conferred on Timothy and Titus were several, and not joint; that is, that they were authorised to exercise the powers of discipline, government, and ordination, individually, and not in connection with others. It is certain that all that is said to them may be naturally explained on the supposition that they were to act as members of a court. If the Secretary of War, in summoning a general court-martial, were to address the members severally, he might say to each of them just what Paul said to Timothy. He might say, 'You are not to take up a charge against a brother officer lightly; you are not to pass sentence on insufficient evidence; every specification must be proved by two or three witnesses, &c. Such language would not imply that every officer thus addressed had individually the right of judgment.

We are willing, however, to admit that Timothy was or-

dained by Paul, and that he, as well as Titus, had (as individuals) the right to ordain and to exercise discipline. Still nothing is gained. For the third assumption of our author, that the right of ordination implies official superiority, it is not only gratuitous, but palpably false. Bishop M'Ilvaine maintains that Paul ordained Timothy an apostle, and yet that they held the same office: one bishop ordains another bishop, and yet is not his official superior; then why may not one presbyter ordain other presbyters without being officially their superior? What kind of reasoning is this? To ordain apostles does not imply that the ordainer is more than an apostle; to ordain bishops does not prove that the ordainer is more than a bishop; but to ordain presbyters does prove that the ordainer is officially superior to presbyters! How could the ministry be continued on the principle that the ordainer must be officially superior to the ordained? Who, then, could ordain the highest? As the right to ordain presbyters does not prove official superiority over them, neither does the exercise of discipline. One bishop often sits in judgment on other bishops, one presbyter on other presbyters. A single bishop has often a whole province or kingdom under his jurisdiction, with authority to ordain or depose his fellow-bishops at discretion. In the early history of the Scottish Church, one presbyter was invested with all the powers attributed to Timothy and Titus, and yet he was nothing more than a presbyter. The superintendents in Germany are presbyters, and yet they are the organs of the church in the exercise of discipline over clergy and people. One colonel often has under his command other colonels, and is superior to them only in age, not in rank. How, then, can it be rationally inferred from the fact that Timothy and Titus exercised discipline over presbyters, that they belonged to a higher order in the ministry?

The plain fact is, that the apostles were the governing authority in the church; and they sent presbyters to organize churches, to ordain other presbyters, to exercise discipline, to set things in order; just as the Pope or council sends one bishop to correct abuses, to consecrate other bishops, or to depose them when necessary; and just as in the Presbyterian Church, as formerly in Scotland and still in Germany, one presbyter may be commissioned to exercise similar control over his brethren. In a settled, organized state of the church this is unnecessary. But there is nothing in this kind of jurisdiction of one bishop over others, or of one presbyter over other presbyters, which implies superiority of order. It is a settled principle, that mere jurisdiction does not imply official superiority. It has often happened in the Latin Church that a simple deacon, as *legate a latere*, has had a whole province under his

authority, with power to depose bishops at his pleasure. It is no use to cry out against this as one of the abuses of Romanism. It is simply acting on a principle recognised in all states and churches. The executive may take a civilian, and give him, as Secretary of the Navy, authority over all the officers in the service. In like manner Paul might take any presbyter and send him where he pleased, and give him what power he saw fit. It is, at all events, clear, that whatever authority Titus and Timothy had, they derived it all from him, and remained as inferior to him afterwards as they were before. To Titus he said, "For this cause left I thee in Crete, that thou shouldest set in order the things that are wanting, and ordain elders in every city, *as I had appointed thee.*" His commission was from Paul; and when he had executed it, he was required to be diligent to come to his master at Nicopolis, where he had determined to winter. To Timothy he gave a somewhat similar commission in reference to Ephesus; but commanded him, when he had done his work, to come to him at Rome. Admitting, therefore, all that is claimed from the New Testament in relation to Timothy and Titus, there is not the slightest evidence of their being anything more than presbyters. As to one being the bishop of Crete, and the other bishop of Ephesus, it is directly opposed to the scriptural record. For, as we have already seen, their commissions were merely temporary; they continued afterwards, as they had been before, the travelling companions, helpers, and servants, of the apostles.

We are willing, however, to concede still more. Let it be granted, what of course we do not believe, that Timothy and Titus were officially superior to presbyters, we are as far as ever from the conclusion that they were apostles. Prophets were superior to presbyters, and yet were not apostles. As we have already intimated, something more is necessary to prove that a Russian colonel is Autocrat of all the Russias, than that he is officially superior to captains. Still further, the official superiority of Timothy and Titus, even if admitted, is no step towards proving even Prelacy. First, Because they were not diocesan bishops; they were vicars apostolic, temporary officers appointed for a special purpose. This is as plain as day, so far as the New Testament is concerned; and it never could have occurred to any man to take any other view of the case, were it not that tradition had been allowed a voice in the matter. Men have held up the lantern lighted in after times, to throw back its coloured rays upon the New Testament, and read its pages under their misleading influence.

Secondly, Because the mere existence in the apostolic church of officers superior to presbyters, is no evidence that such officers were intended to be permanent; and, if not intended to be so,

they are not so. Nothing but a clear manifestation of the divine will that the church should always have certain officers, renders it obligatory that she should have them. That will may be expressed by an explicit declaration that certain officers were intended to be permanent; or by a command to appoint them; or by a specification of the qualifications to be required of those who sought the office, and directions as to the mode of their appointment; or by a clear intimation of the continuance in the church of the inward gift of which the office is the organ. In the absence of these, or similar decisive indications of the divine will, the mere fact that officers superior to presbyters existed in the apostolic age would no more prove that they were intended to be permanent, than the existence at that time of prophets and deaconesses proves that they were intended to be continued in all ages. The apostles did many things, to meet temporary emergencies, which they did not intend should be done afterwards. Few things have been productive of greater evils, to the church and the world, than the false principle that mere scriptural example is obligatory. It is on this ground that men so long contended it was the duty of the church and the state to put heretics to death. That Samuel hewed Agag to pieces, was considered a proof of the propriety and obligation that we should deal in the same way with idolaters. On the same ground it has been contended that civil magistrates are called upon to interfere in matters of religion, because the Hebrew magistrates were the guardians of both tables of the law. Hence, also, as Peter was called first to the apostolate, Romanists contend that there must be a visible head to the church in all times. Hence, too, because the apostles were supreme rulers, it is contended she is bound always to have such rulers, clothed with the same authority and power,—that is, with the power to give the Holy Ghost, and with the authority to make their teachings the rule of faith and practice to all mankind, and their decisions binding on the consciences of all men. This whole principle is radically false. It is a device of the devil to give to what is human, or worse, the authority of God, and thereby to turn off the allegiance of men from their true sovereign, the Lord Jesus Christ. Religious liberty consists in refusing to submit to any authority but that of God; and in refusing to receive, as of divine authority, any thing which cannot be proved from his word to have been intended to bind his people in all ages. It does appear to us, therefore, to be a most dangerous principle, that because the apostles did a certain thing, therefore the church is for ever bound to do it. This principle is so unreasonable, that no body of men act on it further than suits their convenience. Those who are loudest in their assertions, that because, as they

falsely assume, the apostles appointed a class of officers higher than presbyters, we are bound to have such officers, are as mute as mice about our obligation to have deaconesses. This whole thing is a humbug,—not episcopacy, but the doctrine of the divine right of bishops. The only sensible, manly course for Episcopalians to take, is either to assume the authority of tradition and the infallibility of the church, and say, that as the church has decided in favour of Episcopacy, it is obligatory; or to renounce all claim to divine right, and put their bishops and archbishops on the same ground; *i. e.*, the ground of expediency. The kindred doctrine of the divine right of kings is pretty generally abandoned, and Royalists are content to rest the authority of their sovereigns on the surer basis of the will of the people. It will be a happy day for all concerned, when bishops are brought to the same *σωφροσύνη* or saneness of mind.

The argument, then, in favour of the permanence of the apostolic office, derived from the case of Timothy and Titus, we consider utterly void of force. Neither they, nor any others, except the original, inspired, and infallible messengers of Christ, are ever called apostles, in the official sense, of the term. No distinctive apostolic function is ever attributed to them nor exercised by them. They were invested with no powers which prove their official superiority to presbyters. And if it should even be admitted that they were thus superior, in the absence of all intimation of the will of God that such officers were to be continued, the church is no more bound to have them than she is to have prophets or deaconesses. This claim to apostolic power without apostolic gifts, as we have before said, is not only a delusion, but a gross and wicked imposture. In this sentiment we doubt not Bishop M'Ilvaine fully concurs. He would revolt as much as we do at claiming for fallible bishops the authority of infallible apostles. We only deplore that he has been led to use language in a sense which it will not bear,—when he makes the apostleship to mean only episcopacy; and that thus, while he contends for the latter, he should appear to the world as contending for the former.

Having exhausted the case of Timothy and Titus, our author turns to the angels of the Apocalyptic Churches. “Who,” he asks, “were those angels, or messengers, of the seven Churches of Asia . . . called also ‘the seven stars,’ in the right hand of the Lord, held responsible for the whole church embraced within the limits of those several extensive cities with their suburban dependencies? Of one of them, Ephesus, we know, from Acts xx. 17, that some forty years before the book of Revelation was written, it had several presbyters, and, of course, congregations.” His answer to this question is, that

they were presidents, having jurisdiction over clergy and laity, and that they were called bishops and apostles by subsequent writers.

Bishop M'Ilvaine answers his own question with great confidence, as though that were the only answer the question admitted. He is well aware, however, that there is scarcely a point regarding which greater diversity of opinion exists, among writers of all classes, episcopal and non-episcopal, than as to what is meant by these Apocalyptic angels. It would seem, from the very nature of the case, somewhat adventurous to go among the majestic types and symbols, the visions and hieroglyphics of this mystic book, which opens heaven to our view, to learn the organization of the church on earth. No one has ever gone into that magic circle, and returned seeing things as others sees them. It is the opinion of some eminent men, that the seven Apocalyptic epistles were not addressed to the seven historical churches named, but are prophetic exhibitions of seven successive ages of the church; so that the prosaic view of the matter, on which Bishop M'Ilvaine's argument is founded, vanishes into thin air. The angels then would be the ideal representatives of the controlling powers of these successive periods of church history, according to the analogy of the other angels mentioned in this book, and not the presiding officers of cities of stone and brick, "with their suburban dependencies."

Another very common opinion, in harmony with the general character of the book, is, that the angels were guardian angels. Every reader of the Bible knows that the imagery of the Apocalypse is borrowed in large measure from the Old Testament, and especially from the prophecies of Daniel, where every nation is represented as having its ruling angel. Others, again, as Hengstenberg, think the term expresses the ideal or personified directorship or governing power in the church, "denoting a number of persons;" as under the Old Testament the priests or prophets are collectively called the angel of God.

We refer to these as a few of the opinions entertained on this subject, simply to show on what uncertain data these prelatival arguments are founded. Some, as we have seen, rest on sand; this rests on clouds. Here, however, as before, we are willing to concede every thing that can by possibility be asked. We are willing to admit that "angel" designates an individual, and that that individual was the presiding officer of the church—and what then? Why then, says our author, as at Ephesus, at least, there were many presbyters, this president must have been a diocesan bishop and an apostle. Here again we have a seven-league stride. If these presidents

were presbyters, elected by their brethren to preside over the one church to which they all belonged, (for there was but one church in Ephesus, Thyatira, or in any of these places), then he was not an apostle, nor even a diocesan bishop. Can any one say this was not so? Can any one pretend to prove that one of the presbyters, constituted by the Holy Ghost bishops of the Church of Ephesus, (see Acts xx. 28), had, by a new ordination, been constituted an apostle? Is not this a purely gratuitous assumption? Among the French Protestants, under the Empire, the Christians of each city, as in the early ages, constituted one church. They had (as Edinburgh so long had) but one session or consistory. All the ministers were members of that body. One, however, was the permanent president. He was the organ of communication with the government, and represented the church in all its transactions. He was written to if disorders prevailed; and was called to account and held responsible for the character of the whole body. Yet he was a presbyter, with no higher rank and no greater powers than his brethren. If this argument for diocesan Episcopacy be valid, it would prove every president of a French consistory, and every superintendent in Germany, to be a diocesan bishop. An argument which leads to such a conclusion must be false.

The most plausible plea for diocesan Episcopacy is its early origin, and its general prevalence in the church. Bishop McIlvaine does not fail to make the most of this argument. He says, "At the present day about eleven-twelfths of those called Christians in the world, are under the spiritual jurisdiction of an order of ministers called bishops, whose individual office embraces the essential particulars of that of the apostles, and whose succession they regard as derived by an unbroken chain from the apostolic times. It is quite notorious that from the sixteenth century to within a hundred and fifty years of the last of the apostles, the whole church, in all lands, was under such jurisdiction." He quotes Blondel as admitting that diocesan Episcopacy was introduced (not generally, as his remarks would seem to imply, but in certain places) within sixty years of the death of St John. "And within this short period, we have shown you," adds our author, "the testimony of writers who then lived, that bishops were then exercising the jurisdiction of the churches, and were considered, without the moving of a question, as having succeeded to the office of the apostles." If the original organization of the church was not prelatical, he argues that this great change would not have been introduced "so silently that history has preserved not the slightest trace of its beginning and progress; and so perfectly and universally, that though the Scriptures were daily read in the churches, and presbyters and laity were

made of the same materials they are now, none perceived the usurpation," pp. 420, 421.

We do not intend to waste time with the details of this argument. We take it as it stands. Our answer to it is, first, a distinct denial of the fact on which it is founded. We deny that Prelacy prevailed universally until centuries after the apostles. Its rise was gradual, and its progress slow. Of all the modern German historical critics,—probably the most learned, laborious, and untrammelled body of scholars the world ever saw,—not one, to our knowledge, admits this early and general prevalence of Prelacy.* As these writers reject any and every peculiarity of the churches to which they belong, it cannot be pretended that this unanimity of judgment arises from prejudice. The fact assumed, therefore, is contrary to the united testimony of the great body of the most competent and impartial witnesses.

Secondly, The delusion under which Bishop M'Ilvaine labours is easily accounted for. He assumes that the officer called a bishop in one age is the same as that called bishop in another. It is true that Episcopacy prevailed universally from the beginning; but in the early ages it was parochial, and not diocesan Episcopacy. It suits our author's purpose to borrow his idea of a bishop from the middle ages, and to transfer that idea to the bishops of the first century. He sees bishops everywhere, and therefore supposes he sees prelates. He admits, however, that bishops were not always prelates; those of the New Testament were presbyters. When did they become prelates? Bishop M'Ilvaine would have us believe that it was on the night the last apostle died. They all went to bed presbyters, and all awoke the next morning diocesan bishops. This is the greatest miracle ever wrought in behalf of a theory. Prelatists swallow this camel without even knowing it. They admit that as long as the apostles lived, bishops were presbyters; and assert that as soon as the apostles were dead, bishops were prelates. It is not merely a word which changes its meaning throughout Christendom in a night; but the thing meant by that word changes its nature. If it appear incredible that any one could adopt such a theory, let him bring the case before his mind, and judge if the representation given is not just. "Bishop," says our author, "was not a specific name of office until after the apostolic age. The highest rank of the ministry had then the title of apostle." p. 417. It follows from this

* Rothe cannot be fairly cited as an exception, although in his work entitled "*Anfänge der Kirche*," (a book which his countrymen say excited attention principally by its paradoxes,) he supposes the Apostle John introduced diocesan Episcopacy just before his death, as a remedy for disorders existing within the sphere of his labours; yet he repudiates all the arguments drawn from the New Testament in support of its apostolic origin.

that bishops were not prelates during the apostolic age, but simply presbyters; but during the immediately succeeding age, our author says, they were prelates. The change is instantaneous. In the last apostolic writing, bishops are presbyters; in the first non-apostolic writing, they are prelates. If any thing more wonderful than this has ever been assumed in the history of the world, we know not what it is.

Thirdly, Bishop M'Ilvaine argues that no great change in the organization of the church could take place suddenly and universally, without attracting attention. This we admit. The government of the church was always episcopal; that is, it was in the hands of men called bishops. The change from parochial to diocesan Episcopacy was gradual, protracted through centuries, was distinctly understood, and deliberately submitted to. The change was not only gradual, but it was very unequal in its progress in different parts of the church. The two systems long co-existed; diocesan Episcopacy prevailing in cities and centres of influence, and the parochial form in the country. The circle of influence of the city bishop was gradually extended, and his country brethren at last were deprived, though not until several centuries had elapsed, of their original title. It was a thing unheard of in the early ages, that one bishop should be subject to another. At first there were, at least in many cases, several bishops in one church, as at Ephesus and Philippi.* The first change as to title, was to confine the term bishop to the presiding officer of each church, as is now done by Presbyterians. Every church, however, had its own bishop. And the churches were then, to all appearance, just as numerous in proportion to the number of believers as they are now. There were to a late period often two or three hundred in a single province; and of course just as many bishops. There was, however, only one church in any one city. We never read of the churches of Jerusalem, Antioch, or Ephesus, but only of the church in those and other cities; whereas we read of the churches of Judea and of the churches of Galatia. The one church, however, in these several cities was very large—having many ministers, and officers of various kinds. The presiding presbyter or bishop of such city churches had the oversight or superintendence therefore of many presbyters; deacons, and laymen. But at the same time, every remote village had its presiding presbyter or bishop, independent of any other bishop. This state of things, apparent from the face of history, was very analogous to the organization of the French Protestants, as before remarked, under the Empire.

* Paul called together the presbyters of Ephesus, and told them the Holy Ghost had made them the bishops of that church. He addressed his Epistle to the Philipians to the "bishops and deacons" of the church in Philippi.—Acts xx. 28, and Phil. i. 1.

The Protestants of Paris, Rouen, Orleans, and other large cities, constituted one church, with many ministers, and one president, or presiding presbyter; while every village, containing a sufficient number of Protestants, had its own presiding officer. What more natural, what more in accordance with analogy, what more sure to be the result of "the leaven of iniquity" which dwells in the human heart, and that instinctive desire of men to rest on authority in matters of religion, than that these presiding presbyters or bishops of large cities should gradually exalt their claims, and extend their jurisdiction? What more natural than that they should first make their presidency perpetual, or for life; then, instead of being content with being *primi inter pares*, claim superiority of order; and then make that superiority of order a matter of divine right; and then claim that their jurisdiction extended not only over a city, but a diocese, and reduce their poorer and weaker brethren to the subordination of their own clergy? Soon one city bishop came to assert superiority over other city bishops, and thus became archbishop. In process of time, the heads of great centres of influence, as Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria, Constantinople, and Rome, became the patriarchs; and the system finally culminated in a universal bishop or Pope. This development of the hierarchy was greatly facilitated and controlled by political influences and events, but it is from beginning to end perfectly natural and intelligible, without assuming any divine right or apostolic authority or origin. The rise and spread of monarchical institutions is an event of much the same kind. Kings exist everywhere, as far back as history goes. We find them even in the book of Genesis. They were first elective and temporary, then for life, then hereditary, and then claimed divine right. An old French lady once said to us, "There is a king in France, a king in England, a King in heaven, and a king in hell,—a king everywhere but in America." This was her argument for monarchy; and we do not see why it is not as good as Bishop M'Ilvaine's argument for prelacy. It is surely quite as well put.

The *Church Review* called upon us to examine this discourse in favour of the perpetuity of the apostleship. We have done so, and express, as the result of that examination, the opinion that a more inconclusive piece of reasoning we never saw. We have the highest respect both for the abilities and character of its author. But no man can make a bad cause good, or a weak argument strong. He assumes without proof, and against evidence, that the commission recorded in Matt. xxviii. 19, 20, was addressed to the apostles, and not to the church as a whole. He assumes that the promise of Christ's perpetual presence, which that commission includes, was addressed to the apostles

as such, and not to the church as such. He assumes that the promise it made to the apostles was made to them as bishops, and not as ministers of the word. He assumes, contrary to the judgment of ninety-nine hundredths of the Christian world, that the apostleship was a mere episcopate, instead of the office of inspired and infallible men. He assumes, therefore, against the almost unanimous judgment of the church, that whatever proves the permanence of the episcopate proves the permanence of the apostleship. He assumes, contrary to the plainest dictates of reason, that authority in a single individual to ordain presbyters, implies official superiority to presbyters, while he admits that authority in a single apostle to ordain apostles, or in a prelate to ordain prelates, proves no such superiority. He assumes that the angels of the Apocalyptic churches were prelates, because they were presidents and representatives of those churches, though such presidency in other cases implies no superiority of order. He admits that so long as the apostles lived, bishops were presbyters, and assumes that immediately after, the world over, they were prelates. He assumes, contrary to the judgment of the great body of the most competent witnesses, that Prelacy prevailed universally during the first century after the apostolic age. He assumes that the prevalence of Prelacy is unaccountable on any other hypothesis than that of its divine origin, while the like prevalence of monarchy requires no such solution. His argument, therefore, is built on false assumptions from beginning to end. Further, if his argument proves any thing, it proves Puseyism and Romanism, and not simply diocesan Episcopacy. If the apostleship is perpetual, then a body of infallible teachers and absolute rulers is perpetual. Möller, the ablest modern defender of Romanism, defines, in his *Symbolik*, the church to be the people of God under the government of a perpetual apostleship. Bishop M'Ilvaine, in conceding the correctness of this definition, has conceded every thing. It is very painful to us to say this of a man who has done so much, and so ably, to defend evangelical truth against doctrinal Romanism. It is, however, a duty to say it. Bishop M'Ilvaine has, on this vital point, put himself in opposition to all the great authorities of his own church, and sided with the Laudean and Puseyite faction in that church. Men will take his premises and legitimately deduce from them conclusions which he would rather die than admit. Even his eulogist in the *Church Review*, we presume, is no advocate of his doctrinal views, and has no fellowship with his evangelical spirit. In the very article under review, he calls Congregationalists and Presbyterians "the sects," in distinction from the church. So Mahometans call Christians dogs. The spirit in both cases is the same. And this spirit

is the legitimate and inevitable fruit of the doctrine of the perpetuity of the apostleship; for by the clearest declarations of the Bible, those not subject to apostles are not subject to Christ.

We conclude our review of this discourse with the remark, that the author risks every thing on a single throw. The divine right of bishops is made to depend on the permanency of the apostolic office; and the permanency of that office is made to depend on its having been a simple episcopate. This is the filament on which the whole cause of diocesan Episcopacy hangs. As, by the plainest testimony of Scripture, and the general judgment of the church, the apostleship was more than an episcopate, the office was not continued; and therefore diocesan Episcopacy is of man, and not of God.

ART. III.—*A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive; being a connected view of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation.* By JOHN STUART MILL. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1855.

ACCORDING to the intimation given in the article on the Positive Philosophy, we now invite the attention of our readers to an examination of Mill's Logic. This is no ordinary book. False or true, pernicious or salutary, for better or for worse, it is, like the great work of Compté, to which it is auxiliary, of an order of which no single generation produces more than one. Indeed, while a rapid succession of treatises, from different hands, on logic as a whole, or on some of its controverted questions, has appeared since the memorable work of Whately, which, by universal consent, has done more than all else to restore this branch to its proper place in education, the whole put together do not, in our opinion, contain as much clear, close, and deep thinking, as the work under consideration. The six hundred formidable octavo pages, of fine closely set type, which this edition contains, are guiltless of vapid generalities, barren repetition, verbose diffuseness, or, with reference to the objects the author had in view, waste matter of any sort.

Having thus shown that we are neither unable nor indisposed to do justice to the ability of the work, we hope it will appear that it is in no captious or narrow spirit that we find ourselves constrained to condemn some of its leading and characteristic doctrines. If these should be found to brand it with

the stamp of positivism, as we have before hinted, this is the fault not of us, but of the book itself. We find, however, that we are not alone, nor the first, in attributing this character to the book. This is freely done, as if it were a matter of course, by Christian apologists, who find themselves under the necessity of combating its principles. While we rejoice in whatever truths the book contains, this pleasure is more than neutralized by the monstrous system of error into the support of which these truths are impressed.

There has, indeed, been great dispute as to the proper subject-matter of logic. A large share of the controversies relative to the science, are traceable to a radical difference on this point. Dr Watts' treatise, which has probably been studied more than any other in the English language, extends the compass of the science so far as to make the object of it the "right use of reason." It is quite clear that this opens a field broad enough to enable one, under the colour of a treatise on logic, to advocate any opinion or theory he chooses, on any subject whatever. It was, doubtless, the amiable design of Watts, in thus ampliating the sphere of the science, to obtain a licence for stringing together, under the title of logic, a collection of useful rules,—whether pertaining strictly to it, or to mental and moral philosophy, or rhetoric,—for the assistance of young persons in the culture of their minds. Nor is it to be denied that some of the more celebrated treatises on logic have given some countenance to this latitudinarian view, by appending to their unfoldings of it useful suggestions more properly belonging to the adjacent sciences. On the other hand, it is our conviction that Whately is guilty of a reverse and radical error, when he teaches us that logic is "entirely conversant about language." It is so wide of the truth, that he himself contradicts it in the first sentence of his book, where he says, "Logic may be considered as the science, and also the art of *reasoning*." It can scarcely be doubted that, of these seeming contradictions, the latter is nearer the truth. Logic undoubtedly has a primary respect to the reasoning process, and the laws thereof; but inasmuch as language is the vehicle of thought, and is the ordinary instrument of the mind in reasoning, it has a secondary and incidental respect to that also, as Hamilton has well observed. But under no stretch of meaning which the word has hitherto borne, had we a right to look for what amounts to an ingenious plea for the positive philosophy under the title of logic. But the Trojan horse is still serviceable, and keeps up with the "most advanced thinkers." We would not complain of the relation of the title of the book to its subject-matter, were it not a type of the author's general manner of approaching subjects of infinite moment to us,

and of undermining the first principles of a faith which is dearer to us than worlds. We are not insensible to the gravity of these implications, or the wrong of making them without sufficient grounds. But we submit whether they are unreasonable, when an author, in a treatise on logic, in setting forth "the ground of induction," elaborately argues against the doctrine of efficient causation,—of our possible knowledge of any thing but phenomena in their relations of "similitude and succession;" against any intelligible property in matter, except that it is the unknown antecedent of certain sensations in ourselves; against will as the cause of any, much more as the ultimate cause of all, phenomena: when, more especially, he brings an encyclopædiac review of the proper methods, and the present state of investigation in the sciences, to a climax, in an elaborate article on "Sociology," which closes with the following announcement, made for the first time in a long work, in the whole of which he had been cautiously laying the foundations for it:—

"I cannot, however, omit to mention one important generalization which he (M. Comte) regards as the fundamental law of the progress of human knowledge. Speculation he conceives to have, on every subject of human inquiry, three successive stages; in the first of which it tends to explain the phenomena by supernatural agencies; in the second, by metaphysical abstractions; and in the third, or final state, confines itself to ascertaining their laws of succession and similitude. This generalization appears to me to have that high degree of scientific evidence which is derived from the indications of history, with the probabilities derived from the constitution of the human mind. Nor could it easily be conceived, from the mere enunciation of such a proposition, what a flood of light it lets in upon the whole course of history, when its consequences are traced, by connecting with each of the three states of the intellect which it distinguishes, and with each successive modification of these states, the correlative condition of all other social phenomena."—(Pp. 586, 587.) When the drift and aim of a book is to prepare the mind for such a doctrine as this, to attract the student towards the great work of which it is the beginning, middle, and end, to train his modes of thinking so that he shall meet the bold and persistent avowal of this doctrine without that instinctive recoil which, to unsophisticated minds, would be inevitable, is it quite fair to give him to understand that he is studying logic, and nothing but what properly belongs to it, till the fell work has been accomplished? Had the title of the work been, "The Logic of the Positive Philosophy;" or, "A System of Logic, being an Introduction to the Study of Positive Philosophy, by M. Comte,"

it would have been a true description of its real character and purpose.

And yet Mr Mill, we conceive, has set forth the true province of logic with uncommon precision and accuracy. He says, "Truths are known to us in two ways; some are known directly, and of themselves; some through the medium of other truths. The former are the subject of intuition, or consciousness; the latter, of inference. The truths known by intuition, are the original premises from which all others are inferred. The province of logic must be restricted to that portion of our knowledge which consists of inferences from truths previously known, whether those antecedent data be general propositions, or particular observations and perceptions. Logic is not the science of belief, but the science of proof, or evidence. So far forth as belief professes to be founded upon proof, the office of logic is to supply a test for ascertaining whether or not the belief is well-grounded. With the claims which any proposition has to belief on its own intrinsic evidence, that is, without evidence in the proper sense of the word, logic has nothing to do."—(Pp. 3-5.)

The foregoing seems to us a true statement, in so far as it restricts the subject-matter of logic to the process of inference, of deducing the unknown or the uncertain from truths previously known. It is clearly the science which develops the rules and methods for doing this in a sure and reliable manner; and it is nothing else. But, then, when it is said that intuitive truths are "without evidence in the proper sense," nothing can be more false. They have the highest of all evidence, even self-evidence. Besides, Mr Mill justly makes them the "original premises"; *i. e.*, the evidence of all deductive truths. But if they are not evidence of themselves, how can they be evidence of any thing besides themselves? Such a theory gives us a chain without a staple. Although, then, Mr Mill assures us that logic has nothing to do with intuitive truths, yet when he also tells us that "logic is the science of the operations of the mind which are subservient to the estimation of evidence," (p. 7), he opens what would be the widest door for inquiry into the validity of our belief in self-evident truths, if he had not, in the same paragraph, closed it by the false assertion that self-evidence is no evidence. But notwithstanding this; notwithstanding he so often relegates "any ulterior and minuter analysis to transcendental metaphysics, which in this, as in other parts of our mental nature, decides what are ultimate facts, and what are resolvable into other facts," (p. 8); notwithstanding his protestation, "that no one proposition laid down in this book has been adopted for the sake of establishing, or with any reference to its fitness for being employed

in establishing, preconceived opinions in any department of knowledge or inquiry on which the speculative world is still undecided," (p. 9);—it is yet undeniable that some of his most toilsome chapters are occupied with proving that phenomena, in their relations of similitude and succession, are the *omne scibile*; that we can know nothing of matter but the sensations it produces in us; that there is no objective perception of it or its qualities; that we have no warrant for attributing to it either substance or qualities, further than to regard it as the unknown cause of creative sensations in ourselves; that the doctrine of causality, as involving efficiency, or any thing else besides invariable antecedence, is baseless; that the doctrine of the existence of any necessary truths is a delusion; and much more of the like,—to say nothing of the sciences of ethology and sociology which he introduces. The foregoing involve, directly and indirectly, most of the leading questions of mental philosophy and the higher metaphysics. The author's disposal of them clears away the great obstructions to positivism. And when they all culminate in removing from "every subject of human knowledge," "supernatural agencies," "metaphysical abstractions," every thing but their mere "relations of similitude and succession," we submit whether the end of the book does not give us more than we bargained for in the covenants at the beginning.

This book studiously avoids those unguarded extravagancies of M. Compté, which would have been fatal to its favourable introduction to the British mind. Thus, had he spoken with the same contempt of searching after causes of phenomena as M. Compté, he would have revolted his readers. He, however, subserves the end in view far better by retaining the name and denying the thing. But let him speak for himself. He says, "It seems desirable to take notice of an *apparent*, but not a *real* opposition between the doctrines which I have laid down respecting causation, and those maintained in a work which I hold to be far the greatest yet produced on the philosophy of the sciences, M. Compté's '*Cours de Philosophie Positive*.' I most fully agree with M. Compté, that ultimate, or in the phraseology of the metaphysicians, efficient causes, which are conceived as not being phenomena, nor perceptible by the senses at all, are radically inaccessible to the human faculties; and that the constant relations of succession or of similarity which exist among phenomena themselves, (not forgetting, so far as any constancy can be traced, their relations of co-existence,) are the only subjects of rational investigation. When I speak of causation, I have nothing in view other than those constant relations. Nor do I see what is gained by avoiding this particular word, when M. Compté is forced,

like other people, to speak continually of the *properties* of things, of *agents* and their *action*, of *forces* and the like."—(Pp. 209, 210.)

This passage is a pregnant one, and proves several things within a very brief compass.

1. That, although retaining the word *cause*, he agrees entirely with Comte in rejecting the thing indicated by it, as it is generally understood and believed by men. He goes all lengths with his master in placing this beyond the reach of human knowledge or inquiry.

2. He explicitly rejects "efficient causes which are not conceived as phenomena, nor perceptible by the senses at all, as radically inaccessible to the human faculties." How could language more explicitly rule out the possibility of the knowledge of God as First Cause and Creator of superhuman, or even human spirits, "not perceptible by the senses"? What room does such a system leave for believing "that the worlds were made by the word of God, and the things which are seen were not made of things which do appear"?

3. It is impossible for these men, who reason away the intuitive convictions of the soul, to proceed far without being forced to recognise them. They may abjure causality, or resolve it into mere antecedence, but they cannot write a dozen pages without recognising "agents, action, forces," and the like, all which imply efficient causality. Men who deny all morality, will soon show that they have not utterly extinguished the self-evidencing light of conscience, when they suffer insult or injury from others.

Again, in place of the scorn which Comte expresses for psychology, we find Mr Mill vindicating it against his aspersions, and exposing the fallacy of confounding it with physiology or phrenology. He shows that the faculties and laws of the mind can be learned only from the inspection of consciousness, (which Comte utterly scouts as impossible,) and that such knowledge is a *sine quâ non* of ascertaining any supposed relation of these faculties to the cerebral or other corporeal organs.—(P. 531.) We do not notice any other difference of opinion of any moment between these authors. And the essence of this, we take to be, that the one fancies that mental philosophy can, the other that it cannot, be turned to the account of positivism.

Another feature of this treatise is, that instead of treating the terminology and formulas of the school logicians with contempt, after the style of Comte, it scrupulously preserves and honours them, taking due care to surround them with discussions and explanations, which make them serviceable to the author's scheme. This method has the advantage not only of

violating no prejudices, but of investing old formulas with a fresh and vivid import. And in all these ways, as well as by habitual caution and moderation, the author escapes the disadvantage which would arise from imitating the audacity of Comte, or appearing as the servile follower of his opinions. Yet we think we have shown already, that he adopts whatever is most vital, or rather deadly, in those opinions; and by these small and immaterial variations, contributes more effectually to promote them on British and American soil.

After the manner of the logicians, he begins with the consideration of language, as employed in the reasoning process, and pursues the subject at great length and with great ability. No portion of the work, if we except those relating to the methods and tests of valid inductions in physical science, are more satisfactory than those which relate purely to language. If we except the metaphysical and other passages bearing a special outlook towards his peculiar philosophy, (some of which we shall speedily notice,) his observations are profound and just, full of suggestive educating power. As an eminent example, we refer to his luminous chapter on connotative and non-connotative words. Notwithstanding its formidable length, we cannot refrain from quoting an extract in reference to preserving intact the formulæ which record the past beliefs of men, not only because we love to fortify severely contested principles of our own from so unexpected a source, but also because it is a pleasure to present to our readers a bright side of a book, obnoxious, on other accounts, to the strongest reprobation. It is all the more unexpected and welcome, when, on another page (515) we find the following answer to the question, "Why are we bound to keep a promise at all? No satisfactory ground can be assigned for the obligation, except the mischievous consequences of the absence of faith and mutual confidence to mankind. We are therefore brought around to the interests of society as the ultimate ground of the obligation of a promise." Here is sheer utilitarianism set up as the ground of moral obligation. There is then no intrinsic obligation to speak the truth and keep plighted faith. We apprehend, that if men ignore all ground of obligation but utility, they will think that utility to themselves creates a more stringent obligation than utility to others. Still, this theory offers the only possible basis of morals left by a purely sensational and phenomenal philosophy, which rules out all intuitive, *a priori* truths and ideas, and therefore the idea of morality. But to our proposed extract, which is in pleasing contrast with this and much else in the book:—

"Considering, then, that the human mind, in different generations, occupies itself with different things, and in one age is

led, by the circumstances which surround it, to fix more of its attention upon one of the properties of a thing, in another age upon another, it is natural and inevitable that in every age a certain portion of our recorded and traditional knowledge, not being continually suggested by the pursuits and inquiries with which mankind are at that time engrossed, should fall asleep, as it were, and fade from the memory. It would be utterly lost, if the propositions or formulas, the results of the previous experience, did not remain, and continue to be repeated and believed in, as forms of words it may be, but of words that once really conveyed, and are still supposed to convey, a meaning : which meaning, though suspended, may be historically traced, and when suggested, is recognised by minds of the necessary endowments, as being still matter of fact or truth. While the formulæ remain, the meaning may at any time revive ; and as, on the one hand, the formulæ progressively lose the meaning they were intended to convey, so on the other, when this forgetfulness has reached its height, and begun to produce consequences of obvious evil, minds arise which, from the contemplation of the formulæ, rediscover the whole truth, and announce it again to mankind, not as a discovery, but as the meaning of that which they have long been taught, and still profess to believe."

"There is scarcely any thing which can materially retard the arrival of this salutary reaction, except the shallow conceptions and incautious proceedings of mere logicians. It sometimes happens that towards the close of the downward period, when the words have lost part of their significance, and have not yet begun to recover it, persons arise whose leading and favourite idea is the importance of clear conceptions and precise thought, and the necessity, therefore, of definite language. These persons, in examining the old formulas, easily perceive that words are used in them without a meaning ; and if they are not the sort of persons who are capable of rediscovering the lost signification, they naturally enough dismiss the formula, and define the name without any reference to it."

"An example may make these remarks more intelligible. In all ages, except where moral speculation has been silenced by outward compulsion, or where the feelings which prompt to it have received full satisfaction from an established faith unhesitatingly acquiesced in, one of the subjects which have most occupied the minds of thinking men is the inquiry, What is virtue ? or, What is a virtuous character ? Among the different theories on the subject which have, at different times, grown up and obtained currency, every one of which reflected, as in the clearest mirror, the express image of the age which gave it birth, there was one brought forth by the latter half of the

eighteenth century, according to which virtue consisted in a correct calculation of our own personal interests, either in this world only, or also in the next. There probably had been no era in history, except the declining period of the Roman empire, in which this theory *could* have grown up and made many converts. It could only have originated in an age essentially unheroic. It was a condition of the existence of such a theory, that the only beneficial actions which people in general were much accustomed to see, or were therefore much accustomed to praise, should be such as were, or at least might, without contradicting obvious facts, be supposed to be, the result of the motive above characterised. Hence the words really connoted no more in common acceptation than was set down in the definition; to which, consequently, no objection lay on the score of deviation from usage, if the usage of that age alone was to be considered.

“Suppose, now, that the partisans of this theory had contrived to introduce (as, to do them justice, they showed themselves sufficiently inclined) a consistent and undeviating use of the term according to this definition; suppose that they had succeeded in banishing the word *disinterestedness* from the language,—in obtaining the disuse of all expressions attaching odium to selfishness or commendation to self-sacrifice, or which implied generosity or kindness to be any thing but doing a benefit in order to receive a greater advantage in return; need we say that this abrogation of the old formulas, for the sake of preserving clear ideas and consistency of thought, would have been an incalculable evil? while the very inconsistency incurred by the co-existence of the formulas with philosophical opinions which virtually condemned them as absurdities, operated as a stimulus to the re-examination of the subject; and thus the very doctrines originating in the oblivion into which great moral truths had fallen, were rendered indirectly, but powerfully, instrumental to the revival of those truths.

“The doctrine, therefore, of the Coleridge school, that the language of any people among whom culture is of old date, is a sacred deposit, the property of all ages, and which no one age should consider itself empowered to alter, is far from being so devoid of important truth as it appears to that class of logicians who think more of having a clear than of having a complete meaning; and who perceive that every age is adding to the truths which it had received from its predecessors, but fail to see that a counter-process of losing truths already possessed is also constantly going on, and requiring the most sedulous attention to counteract it. Language is the depository of the accumulated body of experience to which all former ages have contributed their part, and which is the inheritance of all

yet to come. We have no right to prevent ourselves from transmitting to posterity a larger portion of this inheritance than we may ourselves have profited by. We continually have cause to give up the opinions of our forefathers; but to tamper with their language, even to the extent of a word, is an operation of much greater responsibility, and implies, as an indispensable requisite, an accurate acquaintance with the history of the particular word, and of the opinions which, in different stages of its progress, it served to express. To be qualified to define the name, we must know all that has ever been known of the properties of the class of objects which are, or originally were, denoted by it. For if we give it a meaning according to which any proposition will be false, which philosophers or mankind have ever held to be true, it is at least incumbent upon us to be sure that we know all which those who believed the proposition understood by it."—(Pp. 411–414.)

But in portions of the preliminary exercises on language, the author labours out certain metaphysical and psychological principles, which must now receive attention.

Under the questions, "What do names denote? what are nameable things? what are substances and attributes?" the author avails himself of the opportunity to throw out such views relative to psychology, metaphysics, and ontology, as suit his purpose. The following is his enumeration and classification of all nameable things:—

"1st, Feelings or states of consciousness.

"2d, The minds which experience these feelings.

"3d, The bodies or external objects which excite certain of those feelings, together with the properties or powers whereby they excite them; these last being included rather in compliance with common opinion, and because their existence is taken for granted in the common language, from which I cannot prudently deviate, than because the recognition of such powers or properties as real existences appears to me warranted by sound philosophy.

"4th and last, The successions and co-existences, the likenesses or unlikenesses between feelings or states of consciousness. Those relations, when considered as subsisting between other things, exist in reality only between the states of consciousness which those things, if bodies, excite; if minds, either excite or experience. . . . These, or some of them, must compose the signification of all names."—(P. 52.) "All we know of objects, is the sensations which they give us, and the order of the occurrence of those sensations. . . . It may therefore be safely laid down as a truth, both obvious in itself, and admitted by all whom it is necessary at present to take into consideration, that of the outward world we know and

can know absolutely nothing, except the sensations we experience from it. Those, however, who still look upon ontology as a possible science . . . must not expect to find their refutation here.”—(Pp. 40, 41.) Conformably to all this, he proceeds to define *body* as the “hidden external cause to which we refer our sensations,” and to contend for “the essential *subjectivity* of our conceptions of the primary qualities of matter, as extension, solidity, &c., equally with those of colour, heat, and the remainder of what are called secondary qualities.”—(P. 41.) “We may say, then, that every objective fact is grounded on a corresponding subjective one; and has no meaning to us, (apart from the subject fact which corresponds to it,) except as a name for the unknown and inscrutable process by which that subjective or inscrutable psychological fact is brought to pass.”—(P. 52.)

Upon all this we remark,—

1. That there is an obvious purpose in this whole analysis of the modes and matter of our knowledge. That purpose is to reduce all that is knowable to phenomena under the relations, succession or co-existence, likeness or unlikeness. Hence the persistent denial of any knowledge of the objective properties of matter; for this would be granting that we can know more than such relations. Hence the reduction of succession and similitude themselves to mere states of consciousness; for if we could assert these as existing objectively in aught else besides the mind, we could, with the same propriety, assert the existence of other properties of matter. The author's purpose, then, is palpable,—all his protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.

2. We utterly deny that all we know of body is, that it is the hidden cause of sensations in ourselves. Such a definition contains simply the fallacy of putting a part for the whole. Like all other things, matter is known to us in some respects, but not in others. It is known by its qualities, some of which are more, some less, perfectly understood. It is an intuitive conviction of the mind, that these qualities belong to something which we call substance. Now that we know of this substrate *that* it is, while, at the same time, we do not know *how* or *what* it is, is readily conceded. Whatever objections Mr Mill may raise against the recognition of the *existence* of a substance which is in its nature unknown, lie with full force against his doctrine of matter as the “unknown cause of our sensations;” nay, on his philosophy, which ignores all knowledge of any thing but phenomena, they bear with a greater, an absolutely annihilating force, against this assumption of an occult cause. On the other hand, on our scheme, this substrate, though not explicable in itself, is manifested both by

the sensible and by the *a priori* qualities which are seen to belong to it objectively, which are more than mere subjective sensations having no correspondent reality in the object producing them. We are here brought to face the whole question of the primary and secondary qualities of matter, the relation of which to the very foundations of faith and of sceptical idealism, must be our justification for dwelling further on the subject. This distinction, though not first noted, was signalized by Locke, strenuously maintained by Reid and the most distinguished modern philosophers, British and Continental, and has been developed in a singularly clear, exhaustive, and conclusive manner by Sir William Hamilton.*

Whence comes our notion or knowledge of matter, and in what does it consist? All knowledge implies a subject knowing, and an object known. The object so known may be either the mind, the *ego* knowing,—*i. e.*, it may know itself or some affection of itself, and thus become subject-object; or it may know something as separate and distinct from itself. On the possibility and reality of this latter knowledge depends the possibility of escaping absolute egoism, or idealism, which simply resolves the universe into a mode of the thinking-self or mind. If we are called on to show how the mind can know any thing beyond its own acts and states, we are no more obliged to solve the problem, provided our consciousness testifies to such acts of intelligence, than to show how it can know itself or its own states. Each fact may be, and, to our present faculties, doubtless is, alike ultimate and irreducible to any simpler facts.

Now, in the exercise of the senses of sight and touch, especially the latter, there is not merely a subjective sensation, but a perception of a something that is seen to be not-self. As surely as there is a consciousness of the *ego* perceiving, there is a consciousness of the *non-ego* perceived. Both are equally asserted in one indivisible act of consciousness, or of our intelligent faculty. Is this witness to be believed when it asserts the *non-ego*? So all mankind, except a few philosophers and sceptics run mad, have believed. So we must believe, unless we make consciousness a false witness. And if it is false in affirming the *non-ego*, why not in affirming the *ego*? *Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus*. And so we are given over to absolute scepticism.

Thus the mind comes to the knowledge of matter, as an objective reality existing in space. And as surely as it knows this, it knows matter, as having *in itself*, not in the mere sensations of the knower, extension, figure, hardness, divisibility, to say no more. By the senses, the mind perceives these qua-

* Hamilton's Reid, Note D, p. 825.

lities in all matter. Not only so; but no sooner does it cognise matter, as substance occupying space, than it knows, *a priori*, that it *must* have extension, form, incompressibility, divisibility, &c. The existence of matter is indeed contingent on the will of the Creator. But being once given, these are its necessary attributes, whose non-existence the mind cannot conceive, whoever may undertake to explain them away. Being thus universal and necessary, they are justly styled primary qualities; known, perceived directly and objectively through the senses; and also discerned, independently of all sensation and external perception, by the reason.

There is another set of properties in matter, such as odours, heat, &c., which differ from the foregoing in the following particulars: (1.) They are contingent, not necessary. They belong to some bodies, but not to others. (2.) They are known, not objectively in themselves, but only through the sensations they produce in us, and are named chiefly from those sensations. The sweetness of the rose is only that occult quality in it which gives us the sensation of sweetness. (3.) The co-existence of these qualities is not known directly, but by inference, from the sensations which their presence is found to produce. (4.) Had we not the direct perception of matter in its primary and secundo-primary qualities, as an objective reality, there would be no ground nor possibility of inferring that it possesses those which are the secondary qualities. (5.) Mr Mill's definition of matter only holds good with respect to these its secondary qualities. By one audacious leap in definition, designating matter from its occasional and incidental, instead of its essential and universal properties, he has prepared the way for boundless confusion and scepticism in relation to the whole subject. Gathering now to a focus the distinctions between the primary and secondary qualities, we find that the one sort are necessary, the other contingent; the one universal, the other occasional; the one originally matters of intelligence, the other of feeling; the one objective, the other subjective in the mind's first relation to them; the one are objects of perception, the other simply causes of sensation; the one of immediate intuition and perception, the other of inference from our sensations.

Besides these, Hamilton has marked a third class, such as gravity, cohesion, repulsion, and inertia, which he denominates secundo-primary, because they partake partly of the primary and partly of the secondary characteristics,—*e. g.*, they are universal but not necessary, in part known by perception, and in part by sensation, &c. But upon these it is unnecessary for us now to dwell.

3. If the theory that our knowledge of matter consists

wholly of sensations is groundless, no less so is the correlate theory that similitude and succession are exclusively between sensations. It is doubtless from within the mind that the ideas of similitude, identity, succession, &c., arise. But the things of which they are true are as really objects without as within us. Similarity is as much an objective reality between the water that flows in a stream to-day and that which flows to-morrow, as between any subjective sensations connected therewith.

4. What is sensation? According to Reid, it is an act of the mind which "has no object beyond itself;" according to Hamilton, a "mere apprehension of affection of the *ego*." What is perception? It is an act of the mind which goes beyond itself to the cognition of an external object—not of an idea, image, sensation, or representation of an object, but of the object itself. It is therefore a higher energy of intelligence than mere sensation. Upon it, and upon a true view of the reality of the knowledge it gives, rests our whole security against infinite subjectivity, utter idealism. But Mr Mill confounds the two, or rather negates perception altogether.—(Pp. 35, 36.) This is in fact the abnegation of all knowledge of the external world. And therefore,—

5. We remark, finally, that this attempt to lay the basis of positive materialism terminates in absolute idealism. We in reality know nothing beyond our own sensations: "Every objective fact is grounded on a corresponding subjective one." To concede that phenomena themselves are known as objective realities, as any thing more than modifications of the sentient self, would be conceding too much. If we concede this degree of knowledge, we must concede a great deal more, which would be fatal to this scheme. Therefore we know nothing but sensations or modifications of self. All that we recognise beside, is a "hidden external cause" of these sensations. But how know we this? What can we know besides phenomena? Even this assumption is in denial of this whole philosophy. It is impossible to put the different parts of this scheme together without making an end of all knowledge of any thing beyond ourselves. Its phenomena, of which it professes to give us knowledge so certain and positive, evaporate in sensations. For certain knowledge of phenomena, their very existence outside of ourselves is put in doubt. So the extremes of idealism and materialism meet.

We now turn to Mr Mill's doctrine of causation. We have already seen that he makes cause mean mere uniformity of antecedence. Of efficient causes, since the causal efficiency is not a phenomenon, we can have no knowledge. Yet he tells us the principle, "That what happens once, will, under a sufficient de-

gree of similarity of circumstances, happen again, and not only again, but always, is an assumption involved in every case of induction.”—(P. 184.) Now, we ask, what warrant have we for such an assumption? Is not that something more than the knowledge of phenomena in their mere relations of similarity and succession? If the mind may lawfully superinduce this “assumption” upon observed phenomena, why may it not fully superinduce that of a *causal energy* producing these phenomena, and sure, in like circumstances, to produce them again? Is not this the actual and only legitimate form which this assumption takes spontaneously among all men who have not speculated away their innate convictions? What can be gained, then, by substituting for the native causal judgment, the “assumption” of Mr Mill? Plainly nothing, except that the very basis of the argument for “supernatural agents,” and a divine First Cause, is thus removed. Moreover, we deny that the causal judgment is restricted to the mere case of uniform antecedence and consequence. This exemplifies merely a single form of this judgment, viz., that like causes produce like effects. The causal judgment proper is, that every event *must* have a cause, a cause efficient for its production. The universal language and conduct of men prove this to be a native and universal judgment of the race. The futility of the notion that causality consists in mere uniformity of antecedence, is made conspicuous by Mr Mill himself, in his notable attempt to meet the great example of uniformity in the succession of day and night, adduced by Reid. He says, “We do not believe that night will be followed by day under any imaginable circumstances, but only that it will be so, *provided* the sun rises above the horizon. . . . Invariable sequence, therefore, is not synonymous with causation, unless the sequence, besides being invariable, is unconditional. There are sequences as uniform in past experience as any others whatever, which yet we do not regard as cases of causation, but as in some sort accidental. Such, to a philosopher, is that of day and night.”—(P. 203.) Clearing away these misty and evasive circumlocutions, can it be denied that the real reason why we judge the sun’s radiance, and not night, to be the cause of day, is that the one is an illuminating agency, efficient to dispel darkness, while the other is not? Besides, Mr Mill is obliged to concede that the mind recognises something more in cause than mere invariable antecedence, viz., “unconditionality.” But this is virtually surrendering the whole. If it must discern some element in cause besides mere observed uniformity of sequence, why not that which mankind have always intuitively believed it to be,—i. e., efficiency?

We have before seen that M. Comte holds that the laws

of phenomena are reducible to a few, but not to any one original law or force. Mr Mill says, "There exist in nature a number of permanent causes, which have subsisted ever since the human race has been in existence, and for an indefinite and probably enormous length of time previous. . . . But we can give, scientifically speaking, no account of the origin of the permanent causes themselves. . . . The co-existence, therefore, of primeval causes ranks, to us, among merely casual occurrences." (Pp. 206, 207.) No such views could be entertained by any one who believes in One First Almighty Cause of all things.

Of course it is indispensable to this scheme to deny the existence of any necessary truths. To concede it, would be to concede the knowledge of non-phenomenal entities. As mathematics present the most abundant, signal, and unquestioned examples of necessary truths, Mr Mill tasks his ingenuity to remove this difficulty. He goes into a minute analysis of mathematical axioms, postulates, and definitions, to prove this science purely empirical and inductive. He therefore begins by pronouncing the character of necessity, and even of peculiar certainty, (with some reservation,) attributed to mathematical truths, "an illusion." "There exist no points without magnitude; no lines without breadth, nor perfectly straight. . . . A line as defined by geometers is wholly inconceivable. We can reason about a line as if it had no breadth; because we have a power, which is the foundation of all the control we can exercise over our minds,—the power, when a perception is present to our senses, or a conception to our intellects, of *attending* to a part of that perception or conception, instead of the whole. But we cannot conceive a line without breadth; we can form no mental picture of such a line. . . . The peculiar accuracy, supposed to be characteristic of the first principles of geometry, thus appears to be fictitious."—(Pp. 148, 149.)

We cannot but admire the boldness of a thinker who thus ventures to contradict the whole educated world in regard to subjects, all the facts pertaining to which are equally and fully before every attentive mind. It remains to be seen whether it is the boldness of superior insight or of blind desperation. When Mr Mill says we cannot conceive of a line without breadth, this is true of lines made of material particles, however dilute; for it results from the very nature of matter as extended. But all such lines are mere symbolic imitations of the true geometric line, designed to assist the attention and memory in holding it before the mind in some given situation. Mr Mill's conception of a line is not that of extension in one direction, but in three; of volume, in short, circumscribed by

lines and surfaces. But, with marvellous inconsistency, he tells us we can reason about a breadthless line, though it be inconceivable. How? The mind can attend to a "part of its perception or conception instead of the whole." What is this *part*? An inconceivable nonentity. How then does the mind attend to and reason about it? This imposing onset upon the certainty and necessity of mathematical truth staggers and falls at the very first move. Mr Mill himself is obliged to have recourse to what he calls "mental pictures" in defending his own theories. What is this but the admission that mathematics are based on ideas and principles that are super-sensuous, and originate in the mind itself?

"Axioms," says Mr Mill, "are experimental truths, generalizations from observation. The proposition, Two straight lines cannot enclose a space is an induction from the evidence of our senses."—(P. 152.) To the argument, that we cannot bring before our senses the whole length to which two such lines may be drawn, he answers, that the mind can frame "diagrams" within itself, "imaginary lines," which, to whatever length it extends them in thought, it sees cannot enclose a space; and that we "do not believe this truth on the ground of the imaginary intuition simply, but because we know the imaginary lines exactly resemble real ones, and that we may conclude from them to real ones with quite as much certainty as we could conclude from one real line to another."—(P. 155.) But, we ask, how do we know all this, if we never have seen any two actual straight lines meeting and extended illimitably? Or even if we had seen them, how could we know not only that it is true of these, but *must* be true of all other pairs of straight lines meeting each other, drawn at whatever angle, and to whatever length? Is not this character of necessity an *a priori* truth, self-evident from the very constitution of the mind, and not derived in any manner through the senses? To this Mr Mill replies, that the advocates of necessary truths mean, by the attribute of necessity, simply, that the "opposite is not only false, but inconceivable." Here every thing depends on the definition of "inconceivable." A thing may be inconceivable *simpliciter*, or *secundum quid*. I can *conceive* or form the mental conception of the absence of a person who is present; but I cannot *conceive it to be true*, that at the moment of his presence, he is at the same time, and in the same sense, absent. Again, with regard to concrete and contingent facts, I may conceive them possible on one supposition and impossible on another; because one supposition brings them athwart some necessary truth, while another does not. And the various degrees of knowledge in different persons, therefore, may make *certain contingent things* conceivably true to some minds, and

the reverse to others. Thus, to one who, from insufficient information, is ignorant of the rotation of the earth, and believes that it stands still, it may be inconceivable that the sun is motionless. Still further, men are very apt to call or think inconceivable, the contrary of what they firmly believe. From this ambiguity of the word "inconceivable," Mr Mill makes a plausible argument, by citing some striking instances of things once thought inconceivable, which later scientific discovery has proved both conceivable and true.—(Pp. 157, 158.) But what of all this? Because Newton could not conceive of a force in bodies acting beyond themselves, on account of some false antecedent theory, does that go to prove that there are no necessary truths about which there is no contingency whatever, the reverse of which no sound mind can conceive to be true under any circumstances? Is it not a necessary truth, that a proposition and its contradictory can never both be true; that no two bodies can occupy the same space at the same time; that equals of the same are equal to each other; that two straight lines cannot enclose a space; that we cannot conceive of space as non-existent, and much more of the like?

We will only add, on this topic, a few instances from this book, out of many, in which he inadvertently recognises the existence of those necessary truths which he so strenuously impugns. He says, "We do not conclude that all triangles have the property (of being equal to two right angles) because some have, *but from the ulterior demonstrative evidence* which was the ground of our conviction in the particular instances."—(P. 176.) "All things which possess extension, or, in other words, which fill space, are subject to geometrical laws. Possessing extension, they possess figure; possessing figure, *they must possess some figure in particular, and have all the properties which geometry assigns to that figure.*"—(P. 194.) "The mere contemplation of a straight line shows that it *cannot* enclose a space."—(P. 363.)

As the author denies all axioms and first principles of reason on all subjects, of course the normal type of all reasoning, in his view, is induction; *i. e.*, reasoning from particular facts to other similar facts, or inferring the existence of general laws or uniformities from finding them in all, amounting to a sufficient number of observed parallel cases. Hence the syllogism which involves the inference of the less general from the more general, plays quite a secondary part in this treatise. He, however, does not utterly discard it, like some positivists, who would fain regenerate logic by destroying it. He goes through with the development of the syllogism, reproducing the substance of what is found in Whately on the subject.

But in treating of its function and value, he assigns it a secondary office. It is not with him a form of reasoning, or rather the form to which all reasoning may be reduced, and according to whose rules it may thus be tested; but it is chiefly a contrivance for trying the validity of the induction expressed in the major premise. It does not, as in the received theory of it, so much represent the process by which the mind deduces the unknown from the known; it is rather a mode of showing whether that process has already been done aright by induction,—according to Mr Mill, the only process by which it can be done. Thus, as we have seen, in his view, the axiom, Things equal to the same thing are equal to each other, is an induction. Taking this for the major premise, and a and b each equal c , for the minor; the conclusion $a=b$ serves, if true, to verify the major, if false, to overturn it. It is not a discovery from, but an interpretation and verification of; not a thing proved by, but one of the proofs of the premises. Now, that this is an incidental service, sometimes rendered by the syllogism, is certainly true. It is true that, if the conclusion has been legitimately derived from the premises, in violation of no logical rule, then the falsity of that conclusion proves the falsity of one or both of the premises, and that we are to look there for the flaw in the argument. It is no less true that if there have been a violation of any of the rules of the syllogism, it is unnecessary to look as far as the premises; for in this case, be they true or false, the conclusion does not flow from them. But then the fallacy of a false premise, like that of an irrelevant conclusion, is not, strictly speaking, logical; it has not occurred in the process of inferring the conclusion from the premises, but it is, as the logicians justly say, a “non-logical or material fallacy.” It lies either in the falsity of the premises evinced by the falsity of the conclusion; or in *ignoratio elenchi*, the irrelevance of the conclusion to the point the reasoner has undertaken to prove.

Mr Mill, of course, repeats some of the staple objections to the syllogism, regarded as a means of eliciting truth by truly proving a conclusion from the premises, on the ground that the conclusion gives nothing not previously contained in the premises. This may impose on such as have never reflected that the whole science of mathematics is but the logical unfolding of what was contained implicitly in a few self-evident axioms,—that in the single precept of love to God and our neighbour is contained implicitly all the law and the prophets,—that men are constantly drawing false conclusions from true premises,—that not a controversy occurs in which one or the other of the controvertists does not perpetrate the fallacy of putting terms in the conclusion that are not in the premises, or of ambiguous

or undistributed middle, or illicit process of the major and minor terms. It will be time enough to decry the logic which teaches how to reason accurately from generals to particulars, when we find that men are superior to all mistake in the process, or that they have no success in thus unfolding clearly and undeniably what was before either unrecognised or disputed. One of the fundamental arguments of Mr Mill's school may be stated thus:—

Phenomena follow uniform laws of sequence ;

Will acts capriciously and variably :

Therefore phenomena are not the product of will.

If we grant these premises, the conclusion does not follow : for in the conclusion will is distributed, *i. e.*, taken for all wills in all their modes of action ; in the premises it is undistributed, *i. e.*, taken only for some wills in some of their actings,—a vice which logic technically styles *illicit process of the major*.

Moreover, even induction itself is essentially syllogistic. It has for its major premise, the intuitive conviction that like causes produce like effects in like circumstances ; or, as we have seen, what Mr Mill calls an “assumption,” essentially equivalent. But call it assumption, or what we will, our inductions could never proceed a step beyond the mere phenomena we have inspected without this first principle. And the inference that the law extends at all beyond phenomena which we have witnessed, to other like phenomena, has not a whit higher certainty than belongs to that first principle or “assumption.”

Of course Mr Mill puts his chief strength upon developing the logic of the inductive sciences, so far as his work treats primarily of logic. This part of the work is valuable, not only for the knowledge it gives of the state of the physical science, but especially for the conditions, requisites, and criteria of sound induction, which it so fully and clearly lay down. But upon this we cannot dwell.

The author's treatment of fallacies corresponds with his treatment of the science in chief. His *animus* is nowhere more apparent. Amid many acute and valuable observations, among *a priori* fallacies he notes such as these : “That matter cannot think ; that space or extension is infinite ; that nothing can be made out of nothing, *ex nihilo nihil fit*.”—(P. 462.) The bearing of this, and much more of the like, for which we have no space, is obvious.

Nor is it necessary to follow the author through his speculations on ethology, and social statics, and dynamics, in which, with far greater caution, and therefore greater plausibility than M. Comte, he finally adopts his main conclusion, and

enunciates the atheistic dogma for which he had been preparing the reader by his long and astute disquisitions. This dogma is, that "phenomena" are no more to be explained by "supernatural agencies." This is enough. It is because the book is designed as a gymnastic to prepare the mind for such principles, while it has enough that is valuable to win for it high consideration, that we have performed the unwelcome duty of signalizing its dangerous characteristics and tendencies. It is quite time for us to understand the great features of this new philosophy, and the agencies employed for its promotion. It is little else than the sensational scepticism of Hume arrayed in the plumage of modern science, and striving with bold assumption, and desperate ingenuity, to turn that science into a handmaid of irreligion and atheism.

This is none the less so, although he intimates in some places that our "knowledge may be conceived as coming to us from revelation;" or that Hume's argument against miracles is good only for him who did not, before the alleged miracles, "believe the existence of a being or beings with supernatural power; or who believed himself to have full proof that the character of the being whom he recognised is inconsistent with his having seen fit to interfere on the occasion in question." But observe, he never announces his own belief in such revelation; or in any superior being with whose character it is consistent to give it. He speaks of such belief as possible. He never implies that it is reasonable. All this can be of little account, when weighed against the positive opinions and reasonings which we have quoted from the book.

ART. IV.—*The Gospels: with Moral Reflections on each Verse.*

By PASQUIER QUESNEL. With an Introductory Essay by the Rev. DANIEL WILSON, D.D., Vicar of Islington, now Bishop of Calcutta. Revised by the Rev. H. A. BOARDMAN, D.D. In two volumes. Philadelphia: Parry & M'Millan, 1855. 8vo, pp. xli. 648, 646.

PROTESTANTS have never been slow in acknowledging the excellencies of good books produced by men within the pale of the Romish Church. In some of these cases, indeed, the authors have fallen under the animadversion of popes and councils, for the very works which edify and delight us. Jansenius, Pascal, Nicole, Arnauld, and Quesnel, have, in various degrees, received the affectionate praise of evangelical Christians. Our own pages, in more than one instance, have been largely occupied with the writings and fortunes of the Port

Royalists; and we are glad of this new occasion to acknowledge our debt in the same quarter.*

In a former instance, we drew largely on the labours of Dr Reuchlin; to whose elaborate history of the Port Royalists, the celebrated article under that rubric in the *Edinburgh Review*, by Sir John Stephen, is likewise greatly indebted. We give full notice that, in what follows, we have borrowed freely from the same copious magazine of recondite facts. The sources on which Reuchlin chiefly relies are indeed beyond our reach, comprising a literary history of Port Royal, by Clemencet, in manuscript, and sundry others in the archives of Paris.

Quesnel was born at Paris, July 14, 1634. He was descended from a Scotch family of rank; and when we reckon backwards, and consider the religious state of the upper class in Scotland, and their close connection with France, in the days of Knox, Buchanan, and Welch, we are ready to conclude that it was the prayers and teachings of some Eunice or Lois, which resulted in the eminent piety of the young Parisian. His grandfather was a painter, and his father a bookseller. After classical and theological studies at the university, he entered the Congregation of the Oratorium Jesu, or Oratoire, in 1657, and took priest's orders in 1659. Two of his brothers, Simon and William, were also Oratorians. These religious persons followed the rule of St Augustine, but without monastic vows, and comprised some very learned men among their number, such as Malebranche, the philosopher; Morin, the linguist; and Richard Simon, the liberal critic. Young Quesnel seems to have been early led to the use of the pen; and under the generalship of St Marthe, was intrusted with the preparation of important religious writings. Thus, with Juhannet, he produced, in 1677, a *Précis de Doctrine*, or theological syllabus for the Congregation. When, in 1685, the court demanded of all Oratorians subscriptions to the formula against Jansenism, Quesnel was found by the inquisitorial visitor, Camoin, at Orleans, whither he had retired, because, in 1681, the Archbishop of Paris had banished him from that diocese. The archbishop had a grudge against him, partly because Quesnel had not dedicated to him the works of St Leo, and partly because he had declined to enter upon some controversies in which that prelate had looked for his aid. Quesnel refused signature, and stated his reasons in writing; but the archbishop announced to the fathers of the Oratory that such signature was the king's express command. Meanwhile, Quesnel had sought refuge in Brussels, where he joined the great Arnauld; and from this

* See *Princeton Review*, 1830, p. 170, art. "Provincial Letters;" 1834, p. 471, "Jansenius;" 1845, p. 239, "Jesuits;" and p. 252, "Pascal;" 1849, p. 457, "The Arnaulds."

place he sent his answer of February 13, 1685. During his residence in the Spanish Netherlands, he maintained perfectly amicable relations with the Oratorians of the country. In 1684, the deputies from these religious houses had attended a general convention of the order held at Paris. Conformably to views here expressed, Picquerry, superior of the Flemish houses, declared, in 1687, that he would not dishonour his king by subscribing instruments proceeding from another sovereign. He complained also, that the influence of the Jesuits was impairing the strength of the Augustinian doctrine in France.

We have spoken of the edition of St Leo's works.* It was one of several labours which entitled Quesnel to a place among the learned. For the basis of his text he used an old Venetian manuscript, which, after being the property of Cardinal Grimani, was now possessed by the Oratoire. The notes upheld the Gallican doctrines concerning church-liberties. The work appeared in two quartos in 1675, and in July 1676 was condemned by the Congregation of the Index; and this, as a French cardinal who was present says, without taking time so much as to peruse the volumes. Quesnel prepared a defence, which Arnauld persuaded him to suppress, lest he should still further embitter his relations with Rome. In 1700, a second edition, in folio, appeared at Lyons.

But the work of which we have prefixed the title to our remarks is that by which Quesnel will be remembered. He began to prepare it at Paris, as a spiritual help to young Oratorians. At first it consisted only of devotional observations on the words of Jesus; and it was occasioned by a rule of the house, according to which every inmate was obliged to digest a collection of our Lord's sayings. Father Nicholas Jourdain also published a book of the same sort, which Quesnel translated into French, at the instance of Count Brienne. The Marquis d'Aigues, and some other pious persons, urged him to treat the four Gospels in the same manner. It appeared at Paris, in 1671, in duodecimo.† Vialart, bishop of Chalons, upon the recommendation of the marquis, read the work, and recommended it in a pastoral letter to his clergy and the Christian public. A third edition, in three volumes, appeared in 1679; and in 1694 there was a Latin version at Lyons. Before his retirement at Orleans, he had been advised by the celebrated Nicole to prepare similar reflections upon the Acts

* S. Leonis Magni Papæ I. Opera omnia, nunc primùm epistolis triginta tribusque de gratiâ Christi opusculis auctiora, secundùm exactam annorum seriem accuratè ordinata, appendicibus, dissertationibus, notis, observationibusque illustrata. Accedunt S. Hilarii Arelatensis episcopi opuscula, vita et apologia. Paris, 1675. 2 vols. 4to.

† "Abrégé de la Morale de l'Evangile; ou Pensées Chrétiennes sur le texte des quatre Evangelistes, pour en rendre la lecture et la méditation plus facile à ceux qui commencent à s'y appliquer."

of the Apostles, and the Epistles; and he worked at this both at Orleans and Brussels. The result was a volume of notes on the whole New Testament, printed in 1687. This, however, led to some alteration in his original *Morale*; for as the remarks on the Gospels were brief compared with those which followed, they were expanded in the following editions to a proportional length, so that the entire work, as re-wrought, appeared in 1687 at Paris, in two duodecimo volumes, and again in 1693-1694, and repeated reprints at Paris and in Holland, till at length it filled eight volumes, and contained an exhortation, by the author, to the study of the Scriptures. Urfe, bishop of Limoges, recommended to him the preparation of a manual upon those scraps called the "epistles" and "gospels" by Romish and other churches; and Quesnel complying, added also reflections on the Old Testament passages used in the Missal. But as the copy of this latter part was lost between Brussels and Paris, the former was issued by itself. It is not a little significant that so many dignitaries should have approved these pious labours. We have spoken of Vialart; Noailles, his successor in the see of Chalons, was no less favourable, for when he had read the book, and observed its influence among the priesthood, he also recommended it in a pastoral letter of date June 23, 1695, being the very year in which he was preferred to the archbishopric of Paris. In his new post he published, the year following, an instruction on Predestination and Grace. At this juncture appeared the fatal *Problème Ecclésiastique*, which was condemned to the flames, in 1699, by a decree of parliament, as also at Rome.

The archbishop caused a theologian of learning, not connected with the author's party, to prepare for the press a corrected edition; which came out in 1699 at Paris. Though Quesnel was privy to this, he took no part in it. It ought not to be omitted that, at this stage of the affair, Bossuet interested himself on the side of Quesnel's writings, and defended them against opponents, in the *Justification des Réflexions*, printed in 1710. There is a current anecdote, that even his holiness, Pope Clement XI., gave the Reflections a reading; by which, as he declared, he was "singularly edified." A person of quality expressed his surprise that Père la Chaise should be found reading Quesnel; to which this wily persecutor replied, that he had done so daily for two years, and that the contents of the book made a deep impression upon him.

But this good opinion was so far from being universal, that Humbert de Precipiano, archbishop of Mechlin, feeling disturbed by the controversies which had begun to agitate his diocese, took advantage of an ordonnance which the Jesuits had procured to be issued by the king, and on the 30th of May

1703 caused Quesnel to be arrested and brought to his palace at Brussels. He was thrown into three prisons, of which the last was only four feet square. One of these was so damp and noisome that hundreds of fungi started out of the mouldering walls. He lay in duress for some months before he was acquainted with the offence alleged, or had a hearing. Such were the modes of the old regime,—such is the contrast with our blessed Anglo-Saxon and Protestant liberties. Trinity Sunday came round,—a great day among ritualists; but he was forbidden to assist at mass, being considered as, to all intents and purposes, excommunicated. The reasons were, first, that he had said mass without the archbishop's leave; secondly, that he had done the like in his domestic chapel; and thirdly, that he had books in his possession which were forbidden by Rome. All his papers were attached. No doubt monseigneur was aggrieved by one of the daring Oratorian's publications,* as well as by Arnault's book on Frequent Communion. On receiving tidings of these events, William Quesnel, at this time a priest of the Oratory, set measures on foot for his brother's enlargement. But though he hastened to Flanders, he was not permitted to see Pasquier. William, proceeding in due form of law, notified the archbishop, July 6, 1703, of his *acte de recusation*, repeating the same on August 6 and September 4; he also appealed to the king, as in his sovereign council of Brabant. All this proving fruitless, William proceeded to exchange methods of law for stratagem; and on the 13th of September attempted to promote his brother's escape from prison. In this he received valuable aid from the Marquis d'Aremberg, who, at an earlier day, had been rescued from great straits by William. The conduct of the hazardous undertaking was intrusted to Count Salazar, a Spaniard, to whom d'Aremberg promised his daughter in marriage if success should crown their efforts.

The roof of an inn was contiguous to the prison wall; upon this roof the Spaniard mounted with a dexterous workman. The first night their operations were interrupted. The prisoner had been aroused, and trembled in every limb; he threw himself on his knees, and offered up his freedom as a sacrifice to God. But the stillness of death ensued, and he was left in uncertainty for many hours. About eleven o'clock the following night the work was resumed, and about one a practicable breach was effected, through which the emaciated priest thrust himself, after he had pushed through his Breviary, Missal, and crucifix. It must be recorded, with pain, that this good but misguided man ascribed his escape to Mary, whom

* "Très humble Remonstrance à M. l'Archevêque de Malines sur son décret du 15 Janvier 1695, pour la prohibition de plusieurs livres."

he had passionately besought to help him. His absence was first remarked about two o'clock in the afternoon, when some one came to bring his dinner. The city gates were immediately closed, and remained so for three days. Although the news were conveyed to the archbishop with much precaution, by his confessor, he is said to have swooned. The French Oratorians found it necessary, in consequence of this adventure, to debar William Quesnel from residence in their communities. Pasquier lay in hiding at Brussels until October 2. In Namur he was arrested by Ximenes the governor, under a general order of the King of Spain, forbidding any one to pass through the place; but he remained unknown. A respectable burgher became his security, and he was let free; but was again intercepted in Holland. Here he was not so easily disentangled. In reply to the archiepiscopal warrant of caption, we find his *motif de droit* of date February 13, 1704; in which are set forth his reasons for dreading the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Mechlin, who had charged him with several crimes. What are called in French law the *raisons de suspicion et de recusation*, are, the illegality of his imprisonment, since the church allows a priest to be imprisoned only in case of gross and notorious delinquencies; the archbishop is himself a party concerned; the whole proceeding is prompted and directed by the grand vicar, Henry Van Susteren, of Amsterdam, a pupil and tool of the Jesuits, for, adds he, "None can be the friend of the Jesuits without being their slave." He recalls to mind, in this reclamation, the fact that Ernest Ruth d'Ans, the excellent canon of St Gedula, had been pursued into exile by the Jesuit rancour, because he was Arnauld's companion and secretary. "And I also," says he, "had pronounced my own condemnation if I had acknowledged this partial jurisdiction, inasmuch as for nine years it was my distinguished happiness to be the table companion of that famous doctor. So fanatical is the archbishop against Jansenism, that to be accused of it before his tribunal is the same as to be condemned. He has given the printer a dispensation to employ even festivals in printing such libels as *Le Jansenisme Destructeur de toute Religion*."

As might have been expected, the prelate, nevertheless, pronounced sentence upon the case, on November 10, 1704. Upon the invitation of Coddés, archbishop of Utrecht, a man himself compromised with Rome, Quesnel now betook himself to Holland. The truly French and equally Jansenian vivacity of his temper under persecution showed itself in the critiques to which he subjected the prelate's sentence.* After the death

* 1. "Idée générale du libelle publié en Latin sous ce titre, 'Motif de droit pour le Procureur de la cour ecclésiastique de Malines.'" 2. "Anatomie de la sentence de M. l'archevêque de Malines."

of the archbishop, in 1711, Quesnel presented a petition to the high council of Brabant, not so much that they should investigate the case, which properly belonged to the canonists, as that they should pronounce the foregoing violent proceedings against him to have been unlawful, and therefore null. But Van Susteren, in the spirit already attributed to him, prevailed on the states' council to stay this proceeding.

We must now follow our careful authorities to the contemplation of the persecuting storm, as it rises in another quarter. In 1703 and 1704, beginnings of process against the *Reflections* made themselves known in France. Pamphleteers denounced Quesnel as a heretic, and disturber of ecclesiastical peace. It has been observed that the propositions cited are very much the same with those condemned by the Bull *Unigenitus*. M. Adry informs us that Noailles incurred the pontifical displeasure, by maintaining episcopal rights, according to the Gallican doctrine, in a convocation of clergy in 1705. Clement XI. made the cardinal feel this by means of briefs, addressed to the king and bishops in 1706. This emboldened the enemies of Jansenism to make a fresh assault on our author. Several French editions were now before the public. For six and thirty years the book had been read in France with manifest blessings. It had been translated into Latin and English. Yet at this late day a decree was procured from the pope, dated July 13, 1708, which condemned the work in severe terms, yet without citing particular passages. This decree was replied to, the year after, in a very lively production, which was generally ascribed to Quesnel.* As to the decree itself, it could not be published in France without royal approbation; such was the remnant of state freedom for which the Gallican party contended. But prelates were in the meantime eagerly condemning the work; so did the bishops of Luçon, Rochelle, and Gap, in 1710 and 1711, without reference, however, to the pope's doings. But the Jesuits busied themselves in various parts of the kingdom in circulating ingenious caveats against Quesnel.

All this was, however, only a preliminary laying of the train. A number of bishops were getting up a letter, subscribed by high names, and requesting of the king to interfere against Jansenism. The mine was at one time discovered before it exploded; for the rough draft of a letter, which the Abbé Bochart de Saron was carrying from Teller to the Bishop of Clermont, fell into the very hands of those whom it was meant to destroy. The wishes of the anti-evangelical party were nevertheless conveyed to Louis XIV.; and in 1711, he

* "Entretiens sur le Décret de Rome contre le Nouveau Testament de Chalons, accompagné de Réflexions Morales."

wrote to the pope, requesting from him a formal constitution, which should condemn the book, with specifications. What the see of Rome desired was now granted, namely, assurance that Louis would earnestly enforce its decision; so, in 1712, a congregation of cardinals, prelates, and theologians, was called to sit upon the matter. Upon being informed of this summons, Quesnel lost no time in writing to the Pope. There was no reply.

The result of all was the famous bull, *Unigenitus Dei Filius*, a translation of which is found in the appendix of the Philadelphia reprint. It is named, as is usual, from its first words, and bears date September 6, 1713. There are few more signal days in the history of Romish error and apostasy from truth. One hundred and one propositions alleged to be in the book, were extracted and condemned; and every vindication of the same, past or present, was also condemned.

Dr Wilson extracts an interesting passage from one of Matthew Henry's prefaces, which shows how the Protestant world regarded the constitution.

"The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ is the effectual principle of all manner of good, is necessary for every good action; for without it nothing is done, nay, nothing can be done: That it is the effect of a sovereign grace, and the operation of the almighty hand of God: That when God accompanies his Word with the internal power of his grace, it operates in the soul the obedience it demands: That faith is the first grace, and the fountain of all others: That it is in vain for us to call God our father if we do not cry to him with a spirit of love: That there is no God, nor religion, where there is no charity: That the catholic church comprehends the angels, and all the elect and just men of the earth of all ages: That it has the Word incarnate for its head, and all the saints for its members: That it is profitable and necessary at all times, in all places, and for all sorts of persons, to know the holy Scriptures; and that the holy obscurity of the Word of God is no reason for the laity not reading it: That the Lord's day ought to be sanctified by reading books of piety, especially the holy Scriptures; and that to forbid Christians from reading the Scriptures, is to prohibit the use of light to the children of light:"—Mr Henry adds, "Many such positions as these, which the spirit of every good Christian cannot but relish as true and good, are condemned by the pope's bull as impious and blasphemous. By this it appears that Popery is still the same thing that ever it was—an enemy to the knowledge of the Scriptures, and to the honour of divine grace."

To this summary we take the liberty of adding a few of the condemned propositions, which have not been made prominent

by Dr Wilson:—1. “In vain, O Lord, thou commandest, if thou thyself dost not give that which thou commandest.” This will be recognised as scarcely differing from the famous saying of Augustine, which rang through the whole Pelagian campaign.—10. “Grace is an operation of the almighty hand of God, which nothing can hinder or retard.”—27. “Faith is the first grace, and the fountain of all others.”—32. “Jesus Christ gave himself up to death, that he might, by his blood, for ever deliver his first-begotten, or the elect, out of the hand of the destroying angel.”—76. “There is nothing more spacious than the Church of God, because it is composed of the elect and just of all ages.”—80. “The reading of the holy Scriptures is for every body.”

Such was Jansenism; such, in other words, was the approach to the reformed faith of a party not yet excluded from the title of Catholicity, and honestly attached to the communion of Rome. Though a majority of bishops at the convocations of clergy in 1713 and 1714 agreed in approving the bull, Noailles and a few others protested; and when, after the death of the tyrant, the persecuting force was somewhat remitted, it became apparent that in several universities and theological faculties it was only the arm of government which had enforced the condemnatory acts.

In Amsterdam, a city honoured beyond all others as an asylum for persecuted faith, our author passed the last fifteen years of his life, in great retirement. He commonly ventured abroad only when on Sundays and holidays he went to church, or visited the clergy. His home was with good Dubois, who had been his fellow-prisoner in 1703, and was now driving a little trade in books, that he might help Quesnel. For a long time Fouillou and Petitpied, refugee doctors of the Sorbonne, were also with him, assisting him in works, which their host printed. Both had been expelled from France in consequence of the *Cas de Conscience*. The bad air of Holland gave poor Fouillou a phthisic which vexed him long. At the time when they were struck by the fulmination of the Unigenitus, the three men were meditating a history of these great controversies. The two Sorbonnists wrote notes to a work on part of the subject.* In 1718 Petitpied was allowed to return to France, and was reinstated in the faculty; but in 1728, after the death of MM. de Bayeux and de Lorraine, he was put in prison. He escaped at a happy moment when his guard was playing with a cat. So in 1729 he fled once more to hospitable Holland, and was received by his brother exiles with open arms. Five years after, a certain Marchioness Vieuxbourg obtained per-

* “*Histoire du Cas de Conscience* par J. Louail et Francoise Marg. de Joncour,” 8 vol. in 12. Nanci, 1705-1711.

mission from Cardinal Fleury for Petitpied to return to his native country; but his right hand was already crippled with much writing, and he was preparing for his end, which took place, January 7, 1747, at the age of eighty-two.* This leads one to observe the great age to which sedentary scholars and persecuted exiles sometimes drag out their threatened lives. Besides these pious companions, Quesnel enjoyed likewise the society of many travellers, who sought him out for the sake of his cause and his virtues.

In the latter part of November 1719, Quesnel was taken with an inflammation of the lungs, violent stricture of the chest, and high fever, of which he died on the second day of December, at the age of eighty-five years and some months. As the termination was foreseen, he received the Romish sacraments on the second day of his illness. In these hours we discern both the firmness of his superstitious adherence to ascetic usage, and the humble sincerity of his heart. When the officiating priest was ready, Quesnel insisted upon getting out of bed,—a practice very common with moribund Catholics. Notwithstanding his debility, he dressed himself, knelt while the celebrant read prayers, and received extreme unction as he lay on the foot-mat of his room. Amidst those uncommanded and unnecessary penances, we doubt not his soul was fixed on that Jesus, to exalt whom he had lived and suffered; for he was dissolved in tears, so that all present were deeply moved. When he was again put into bed, he signed a confession of his faith, in the presence of two apostolical notaries. He had done the same thing before, in his appeal to a future general council, and in his spiritual testament. In this instrument he declares it to be his purpose to die in the bosom of the Catholic Church, in which he had always lived; that he believed all the truths which she teaches, and condemned all the errors which she rejects. He further acknowledges the pope as first vicar of Christ, and the apostolic see as the centre of unity. "I abide," says he, "in the belief, that in my Reflections, and in my other writings, I have taught nothing but what is perfectly conformable to the faith of the Church. If, against my will, aught that goes to the contrary has ever escaped from me, I revoke and abhor it; and submit myself beforehand to whatsoever the Church may determine respecting my writings and my person. I renew my protestations against the manifest injustice of those who have condemned me unheard. I persist in my appeal from the pope's constitution to a future general council, in regard to all the matters of complaint in which I have cried to the Church for justice; while I abhor every spirit

* His last words were, "*Ne tradas bestiis animas confitentes tibi, et animas pauperum tuorum ne obliviscaris in finem.*"

of schism and separation." This act, like similar ones in the history of Pascal, Fénelon, and others, suggests many sad reflections; among others, it reveals the stupifying influence of Romish training on even great intellectual powers, and at the same time enhances the wisdom, faith, and courage, of the great Reformers. Admire and love as we may, we must still admit, with sorrow, that the gulf is immense between a Pascal, an Arnauld or a Quesnel, and a Luther, a Calvin, or a Knox.

Fouillou, with pious consideration, noted the chief traits of the venerable sufferer. The Psalms were his principal consolation. Letters were written to friends, to seek their intercessions for the old man now dying. He gave his benediction to the whole family of exiles, holding out the crucifix to be kissed by them; and when the physician said that any moment might be his last, he cried, "*Benedic, Domine, hoc sacrificium tuo sancto nomini præparatum.*" His remains were taken to Warmond, a village near Leyden, and interred in the Van der Grast cemetery, where repose the ashes of Codde, Steenhoven, Baarchmann, Van der Croon, archbishops of Utrecht, and of other Dutch Romanists.

By those who form their judgment of Quesnel's muscle and nerve from the "Moral Reflections," he would be judged as imperfectly as if we should conclude from Pascal's Devotions, from Nicole's Treatise on Peace, or from the mighty Arnauld's Logical Exercises, that these men were capable only of meek submission. Each of them was a mighty man of valour, and a man of war from his youth. As we shall have occasion to show in the sequel, our author wrote voluminously. When Le Tellier came into possession of his private papers, the wily courtier believed that he should now be able to ruin the officious Jansenist. Many a closet-council was held with the faithless Maintenon, once herself not far from the kingdom of God; and the great lady is said to have read passages to the king, in the evenings of several years. Shortly after his breaking prison, Quesnel addressed a keen letter to Van Susteren, the vicar general. In this he demands restoration of his books and manuscripts, which had for the most part been perfidiously delivered to the French Jesuits. "But I doubt not," says he, "that the Jesuits, who have a bull for every thing, have one for retaining other people's goods." He uses fiery scorn in treating of the treachery with which they ransacked and exposed the writings in which were recorded his family and personal affairs, and the most secret exercises of his soul before God. He reminds the Jesuits of the undaralleled treachery of their manœuvres in regard to his friend and master, Arnauld; how they had meanly sought to make

him odious with every prince and court within their reach,—accusing him to the pope of holding one opinion, and to the king, then embroiled with Innocent XI., of holding exactly the opposite.

Growing warmly vehement, he adds: “But since our friends are among our richest possessions, I have a right to demand of you the restoration of my friend, as properly my own. I speak of M. De Brigode, as you well understand. Give me back this friend then; give him back to himself, to his family, to a pious widow, whose very vitals you lacerate, renewing in her the pangs of a mother by your inhuman treatment. For six months you have kept him in prison, notwithstanding the public dissatisfaction. That you might always have in your fiery furnace the mystical number of *three* children of Israel, you have on my account, and as if to be my substitute, incarcerated one of the holiest and most laborious men of the diocese, Verschoven, vice-pastor of St Catharine’s. You have torn him from the chosen vineyard to make him rot in gaol, till he shall fall down before Nebuchadnezzar’s image. Sorrow pierces my heart when I behold how you have wasted this part of the Lord’s heritage. *Singularis feras depastus est eam.*”

Père la Chaise, as French story abundantly relates, was one of the marvels of that age. A quarter of a century before, this creeping Jesuit had been made confessor to the king. A long step upward was taken when he advised and directed the marriage with Madame de Maintenon. In old age he had the court at his feet; and when on his death-bed, he was consulted by the old monarch about the choice of his successor. La Chaise had made great ado over a case of Quesnel’s papers. Whoever came in, it was, “Voilà tous les mystères d’iniquité du père Quesnel.” He cackled over the nest of memoirs, letters, sketches, and especially the “jargon,” the cipher, in which were contained treasons against state and king. There is a letter of Quesnel to la Chaise, without date, in which he dares him to make public the contents of this incendiary escrutoire, or else to sit down with the reputation of a quack-salver crying his wares. The use of a cipher, he says, is no certain proof of any black art; princes, and even his holiness, keep people whose business it is to write in cipher, and to decipher what is thus written by others. The Jesuits are not wholly ignorant of the art; though, to say truth, it was condemned at Rome. And he attacks the Jesuits, in regard to the villanous disguises which they were known to have assumed in their missions.

It is agreed among most Protestants, that there have been instances of true piety among persons still remaining in connection with the Church of Rome, and maintaining many of her

errors. If a catalogue were made of the exceptional names admissible to such favourable judgment, it would be found, we think, that most of the modern ones are those of Frenchmen. Few English Papists, we are sure, would come into such a record; of Italians and Spaniards there would be none; and of other continental ecclesiastics, little is known among us. We do indeed suppose, that among those German scholars and poets who, in revulsion from the rationalism of Paulus, and the pantheism of Fichte and Schelling, threw themselves into the bosom of Rome, when Stolberg and his companions went over, there were some who knew the truth. We have ourselves seen spectacles in the Catholic worship of Germany which taught us that under that horrible superstition there is much earnest and tender experience. Still the fact remains, that we look chiefly to the Church of France for instances of vital religion. The Gallican doctrine tended to liberty of investigation. The presence of the Huguenots, in high places, including some of the greatest families of the kingdom, whetted the wits of ecclesiastics as long as toleration lasted, and even after the Revocation, since the assault was kept up from the Low Countries and the Palatinate. Above all, the followers of Baius and Jansenius, and the entire reaction against the Jesuits, with such literary auxiliaries as the Racines, Boileau, and Pascal, preserved the minds of thousands in a state of wakefulness. Since the days of the old Pelagian and semi-Pelagian wars, we may safely say, the works of Augustine were never so studied as by Jansenius and his followers and opponents. The doctrines of predestination and unconditional election, of total depravity, of human inability, of vicarious atonement, and of justification by faith, stand out prominently in the writings of Quesnel and his friends. When the foundation of their hope is expressed, it is always discovered to be the righteousness of Christ, and not any works or observances.

And here we may take occasion to correct what is a prevalent and injurious error with regard to the purity of subjective religion as found among French Catholics. Careful distinction must be made between parties equally claimed as eminent for holy devotion; and our judgment, if pronounced with due understanding, will not award indiscriminate praise with one hand to the upholders of sovereign grace, and with the other to the abettors of a scheme of self-righteousness and justification by mean of our own merits. Ascetic devotion and mystical rapture have always existed in the Church of Rome, in connection with some of the crudest errors and foulest crimes. Protestant zealots for a sort of refined quietism have sometimes culled from surrounding impurities, frenzies, and even

horrors, the less loathsome parts of such experiences as those of St Francis Borgia and St Teresa; but equal self-annihilation and equal soaring of pure love can be found in the rhapsodies of St Ignatius of Loyola. These are infinitely remote from the elevations of Arnauld, St Cyran, Nicole, and Quesnel; with whom the great procuring cause of justification, the work of Christ, is made to fill the field of vision. Such men had their raptures also, just as Welch, and Rutherford, and Boston had theirs; but raptures warranted by a sound and explicit theology in regard to the ground of the sinner's acceptance. As we consider it untranslatable, we must omit a paper of Pascal's, which was found after his death sewed up in his clothes, as a testimony of marvellous revelations.* The Tridentine dogma of justification, framed as it was expressly to counteract and annul the Lutheran and Reformation tenet on that head, must, if intelligently and consistently carried out, lead to its own school of experience,—a school showing no higher products in its best estate than the beautiful figments of a Sales, a Bourdaloue, or a Fénelon. For if justification is "*et sanctificatio et renovatio interioris hominis per voluntariam susceptionem gratiae et donorum,*" then the whole regards of the soul seeking to be justified must be necessarily directed towards the bettering of its own subjective condition; a process which we observe honestly carried on by the mystical Romanists and their imitators.

These remarks seem necessary, in order to guard those readers who come fresh to these studies against the mistake of classing such piety as that of Pascal and Quesnel with the vague devotion and dangerous enthusiasm of Guion and Fénelon. For native temperament sweet beyond all words, for elegance of lettered accomplishment, for clear spiritual insight, for mastery of language, and the magic of high persuasive eloquence, as well as for self-control and resolved meekness, we may travel over the world of history and find no second Fénelon. Yet these qualities must not blind us to the enormous errors of his creed. We would draw a keen line of demarcation between him and the Jansenists. He would have drawn it himself; for when poor Quesnel was to be made an example, Fénelon joined in the persecution. This whole affair of Fénelon and the Quietists demands a careful re-investigation. The public has been accustomed to draw its information from garbled extracts of his writings. Let us have them as they lie in his own works; and let us carefully weigh the momentous burdens which he hurls upon Calvinism and evangelical faith. As in the case of a Barclay or a Channing, let not the loveli-

* "*Ravissement et Profession de Foi,*" *Pensées de Pascal*, ed. Faugère, vol. i. p. 239.

ness of the man cause us to accept his peculiarities of belief; such a method would lead us to the adoption of creeds diametrically opposite to one another; as, for instance, are those of Quesnel and Fénelon on the matter of grace. If an angelic charm of person, and a witchery of style never surpassed, could make us Pelagians, we should surrender to the Archbishop of Cambray; but his tenets are unscriptural.

It is remarkable, in the writings of the French mystics, how little is founded on the word of God; and how fantastically the text is perverted, in a good part of the scanty citations. It is still more remarkable how seldom the person and work of the Lord Jesus Christ are brought into prominence, in the voluminous correspondence of Madame Guion and Fénelon, and in the publications of both. It is startling to find this whole school floating away in an elysian contemplation, and delicious death to self and worldly entities, in which the very notions of sinfulness and pardon seem at length to be left far behind. There is not in literary history a phenomenon more curious than the private correspondence of Madame Guion and Fénelon, in its earlier stages. We wish, for the sake of candour, that more of this had been revealed by the biographers of both. For unction and impassioned eloquence, Guion was not inferior to her spiritual son; for such she entitles Fénelon again and again. The anile dreams which she now and then announces to him, and which he humbly receives and investigates as divine messages, indicate the mighty priestess. If she had been a divinely commissioned Deborah, she could not have found a more deferential Barak.* But the complete examination of this misapprehended and entangled affair, may well occupy an entire article. Suffice it now to say, that while, as Bossuet seems to have conceded, the connection between Madame Guion and Fénelon was above all suspicion of earthly taint, it was on her part enthusiastically absurd, and on his part weakly credulous. It would be lamentable confusion to mistake this type of religion for that of the Port Royal; even the superstitions of the latter, and they were many, are of a widely different order.†

When we say of Jeremy Taylor, of Massillon, or of Neander, that he is grossly erroneous in some of his theological opinions, we do not thereby signify his exclusion from the kingdom of

* "*Lettres Chrétiennes et Spirituelles sur divers sujets qui regardent la vie intérieure, ou l'esprit du vrai Christianisme. Nouvelle édition, enrichie de la correspondance secrète de M. de Fénelon avec l'Auteur.*" A Londres, 1767, 1768. Vol. v.

† A mortifying chapter in their history is the affair of the Abbé Paris; the dear good man was dead before those horrors were enacted which are spread in the text and plates of such books as "*La Vérité des Miracles opérés par l'Intercession de M. de Paris; par M. de Montgeron, Conseiller au Parlement.*" Utrecht, 1637, quarto. This infatuation and mental *ramollissement* may be studied in connection with the modern cases of Judge Edmonds, Robert Owen, and Dr Hare.

grace; let the same interpretation be given to our criticism of the pure and elegant archbishop. A thorough knowledge of the scheme of free redemption, as founded on God's sovereignty, would have saved him from many of his wanderings. His Latin treatise, *De Summi Pontificis Auctoritate*, impugns the Jansenists by name, in regard to the pope's indefectibility in matters of faith; and his own submission, beautiful as it is for consistency, is a monstrous apostasy from reason and individual faith. The *Lettres Spirituelles*, matchless for the perspicuous and elegant exhibition of a certain mystical experience, teach a most unscriptural doctrine concerning perfection of holiness in this life. His Letters to a Benedictine Father, on Predestination, are, from beginning to end, a denial of the Augustinian and Pauline doctrine of decrees. In a word, while his fascinating treatises are, in a certain sense, spiritual, they are not in any high sense evangelical; there is much of devotion, of pure love, of rapture, and of interior death; but little of the atoning sacrifice of Christ, or of communion with him as "the Head of every man." And this resembles very closely a sort of poetical religion, which is common in German pulpits, and which is rapidly becoming familiar to us, by means of the winning and scholar-like, but vague and uncandid rhapsodies of Maurice and his school. In the same degree is it opposed to the distinct gospel utterances of Jansenists such as Quesnel.

We have been led to dwell on this contrast between two classes of amiable French Catholics, partly because we often find them confounded by negligent students, and partly because the contrast itself is articulately set forth in the contemporary history of doctrine. We have seen how Fénélon, forgetting the wounds of persecution, joined in the clamour against Quesnel. He addressed the long-harassed old man in 1711, accusing him and his fellow Jansenists of virtual defection from Catholicity, joined to a cowardly hypocrisy. The editor of Madame Guion's correspondence grows warm beyond all quietistic decorum, in speaking of M. Phélipaux, author of the *Rélation du Quietisme*. "Observe," says he, "who this man is, who repeats all these rumours in his book—a Jansenist! In that word I have said all. *O tempora! O mores! O inconsistency, duplicity, pharisaism, pushed beyond all that could be imagined. A Jansenist criticises and blames the submission of M. Cambray; that is, he finds it not complete, and would have it inward as well as outward! A Jansenist! Let all the world judge. Where is shame? or how could audacity go so far? Jansenists,—those who, as is universally known, not only do not submit themselves inwardly, but are outwardly indocile towards the decrees of the Court of Rome; are schismatics; refuse the bulls, are constantly appealing from them as*

an abuse, stun the universe with the noise of their refusals, and are a monstrous member in the Roman Church, for which they are preparing ruin, and venturing at length to undermine its constitution,—a Jansenist!”* The school of Quesnel had indeed given some great provocation to the school of Guion. We have often wondered that the eulogists of that amiable devotee and accomplished poet should have paraded before the world the colloquy in which she is logically torn to pieces by “the eagle of Meaux.” The reader melts into commiseration at the inequality of a combat between a sensitive woman and the magnificent Bossuet; but this was a conversational defeat, not admitting of thorough attack or defence. He who would see the dogmas of the Quietists searched out to their foundation, and that foundation utterly subverted, must go to a Jansenist argument, and peruse the cogent polemic of Nicole. His Treatise upon Quietism was just through the press in 1695, when the old man breathed his last. The reader will find the principal points between the parties discussed in his work on Prayer. This was he on whom Pascal called in the hour of need, and whose subtle analysis added a new force to the links of steel which glitter in the *Provinciales*. The first, second, eighth, thirteenth and fourteenth letters, were revised by him; and of the fourth, ninth, eleventh, twelfth, sixteenth and seventeenth, he furnished the material. It was he who, lying *perdu* on the Rhine, and under the name of Wendrock, translated the *Provinciales* into Latin, and afterwards fortified the same with formidable notes. He is said to have got up the requisite latinity by a sedulous study of Terence. It must be owned that Nicole had not the spirit of martyrdom. As he fled from city to city in Germany and the Low Countries, wearing a variety of aliases, his timid nature led him to think himself continually pursued by the Jesuits; and when, by Harlay’s intercession, he was permitted to return to Paris, he seldom went abroad for fear of accidents. For a long period he made his abode in the remote suburb of St Marcel, saying, “The enemies who menace Paris will, probably, enter by the gate St Martin, and will have to traverse the whole city to reach me. This want of nerve unfitted him for oral controversy; and he used to say of one of his friends, “Tréville beats me in the chamber, but before he is down stairs I have confuted him;” yet this same shrinking creature was a Titan in written debate. Amidst some characteristic sneers, Bayle designates him as “*l’une des plus belles plumes de l’Europe*.” In composition he sacrificed every thing to perfect transparency of thought and words, and to perfect sequence of ratiocination;

* Lettres Chrétiennes, &c., vol. v. Introduction, pp. cxxiii, cxxiv.

† Traité de la Prière. Paris, 1724; vol. ii. pp. 197, et seq.

hence he failed in panegyric, in descriptive painting, and in amplificatory eloquence. We disagree with Palissat when he says, "The reader quits these essays without pain, and returns to them without pleasure; for readers require to be flattered." And we agree with two better judges, namely Sévigné and Racine; of whom one says, in her joyous way, "I read M. Nicole with a pleasure which carries me away"—"There is not a word too much or too little;" and the other classes him with Pascal. Dryness should not be ascribed to writings which have so exquisite a finish. Those Essays on Morals, which so fascinated Madame Sévigné and the wits, were composed during the author's closing retreat at Paris, and fill twenty-five volumes. The edge of his scalpel was turned against playhouses, and this for a time threw off Racine; but the great poet returned to the dying bed of his master, bringing medicine (*gouttes d'Angleterre*,) which revived him for a little.

The way in which these theological disputes worked themselves into the coteries of Paris may be understood from a lively piece of contemporary gossip. "Apropos of Corbinelli," writes Madame de Sévigné, in 1690; "he wrote me a very pretty note the other day, giving me an account of a conversation and a dinner at M. de Lamoignon's; the actors were, the host, M. (the bishop) de Troyes, M. (the bishop) de Toulon, Father Bourdaloue (a Jesuit), his companion, Despréaux (Boileau), and Corbinelli. The talk was of the works of the ancients and the moderns. Boileau stood up for the ancients; making exception, however, in favour of a single modern writer, who, as he judged, surpassed both old and new. Bourdaloue's associate, who gave attention, and was near to Boileau and Corbinelli, asked what that book might be which was so marked with genius. Despréaux hesitated to name it. Corbinelli said to him, 'Sir, I conjure you to tell me it, that I may spend the night reading it.' Despréaux replied, laughing, 'Ah, sir, you have read it more than once, I am certain.' Here the Jesuit interposed with an air of disdain, *un cotal riso amaro*, and pressed him to name an author who was so marvellous. Despréaux said to him, "Mon père, do not press me." The father persisted. At length Despréaux took him by the arm, and clenching it strongly said, 'Mon père, vous le voulez; hé bien! morbleu, c'est Pascal.' 'Pascal!' exclaimed the father, all red and astounded; 'Pascal is as fine perhaps as falsehood can be.' 'Falsehood!' rejoined Despréaux, 'falsehood! know that he is as true as he is inimitable; and he has been already translated into three languages.' 'That,' replied the father, 'does not make him any the more true.'

"Despréaux, who was now heated, cried out like a madman, 'What! my father, dare you deny that one of your (Jesuits)

has said in print that a Christian is not bound to love God? Dare you say that this is false?' 'Sir,' said the father, all in a rage, 'one must distinguish.' '*Distinguish*,' answered Despréaux, '*distinguish, morbleu*, distinguish, distinguish whether we are bound to love God!' and taking Corbinelli by the arm, he retired to the other end of the room; then returning on the run, like one crazed, he would by no means go near the Jesuit, but joined a group that was still in the dining-room. Here ends my story,—the curtain drops."*

Let us be allowed, in this connection, to adduce a proof of Boileau's love for men on both sides, by citing from his lines on Bourdaloue's portrait, given him by Madame Lamoignon, this closing couplet:—

"Enfin, après Arnauld, ce fut l'illustre en France,
Que j'admirai le plus et qui m'aima le mieux."

The timidity of Nicole unfitted him to accompany his bolder companions to the fair conclusions of the system of grace. Jansenius was too high for his somewhat Erasmian mind. He wrote against the Calvinists; and in his later years supported a half-way doctrine of general grace, which dissatisfied his more manly acquaintances. Arnauld, in the seventh volume of his Letters, speaks sternly of it; and Quesnel complained warmly to Nicole himself of his defection. The fear of being considered Protestants at heart betrayed too many of the Jansenists into officious attacks upon Claude and other Calvinistic divines. This pusillanimity is charged upon them by the partisans of Fénelon. But our astonishment reaches its height when we find our excellent Quesnel condescending to say to his Jesuit adversaries, "I will say nothing of the intercourse which you have had with the reformed minister, Claude, the most formidable enemy of the church in our day."†

We have met with no account of the writings of Quesnel which seems so complete as that of Reuchlin; and to this we refer in what follows. The works are these:—

1. "Tradition de l'Eglise Romaine sur la prédestination des saints et sur le grace efficace." Cologne, 1687. 4 vols., 12mo. This is upon the church authority concerning predestination and efficacious grace. Under the name of Germain he here gives an analysis of the Epistle to the Romans, and then the history of the church-dogma till Trent; the dogma of Trent itself, the history of the famous *Congregatio de Auxiliis Gratiæ*, a part of their original acts, and the principal canons on this head. The third volume is chiefly taken up in answering a similar catena of the Jesuit Deschamps on the other side. This book appeared at Frankfort the same year. The

* Lettres, ed. Didot, 1844, vol. vi. p. 96.

† Reuchlin, Gesichte von Port Royal, ii. 812.

fourth volume of Quesnel did not come out till 1696, and then at Liège; and bibliographers will recognise a characteristic of the age, in this migration of imprints from kingdom to kingdom, which belongs to the suggestive curiosities of literature. It occurs also as a separate work, entitled, "A Defence of the Church of Rome and the Sovereign Pontiff against Melchior Leydecker, theologian of Utrecht." Leydecker is a name greatly honoured in the reformed theology of Holland. Quesnel had another controversy with him concerning the sovereignty of kings. The volume appeared at Paris in 1704.

2. "*Apologie historique des deux censures de Louvain et de Douay sur la matière de la grace.*" Cologne, 1688. 12mo. The pseudonym here was Gery.

3. "*Coram.*" A publication so called from its first word; being a new edition of the *Sermons* of Augustine.

4. "*La Discipline de l'Eglise tirée du Nouveau Testament, et de quelques anciens conciles.*" Lyons, 2 vols. quarto, 1689.

5. "*Règles de la Discipline Ecclésiastique, recueillis des conciles, des synodes de France, et des saints pères de l'église, touchant l'état et les mœurs du clergé.*" This work on church discipline and clerical morals, was originally written by Darcis, another father of the *Oratoire*; but the edition of 1679 is much enlarged by Quesnel.

6. "*Causa Arnoldiana,*" 1699. A collection of Latin pieces, in vindication of his friend and patron, Arnauld. These were almost all written by himself and Nicole.

7. "*Discours historique et apologetique.*" This is contained in the third volume of the "*Justification of M. Arnauld against the Censure of 1656;*" a work which appeared at Liège, in 1702. The first and second volumes are chiefly by Arnauld; the former half of the third comprises Arnauld's life, and some letters of his and St Cyran's.

8. "*Avertissement sur deux lettres de M. Arnauld à M. Le Feron,*" &c. 1700. The two letters of Arnauld were addressed to Le Feron in 1687, about a book of one Bourdaille on the Ethics of St Augustine, and formed part of the great casuistic controversy, and is a defence of Port Royal against certain charges.

We shall throw together, in the margin, a description of numerous minor and fugitive writings, as diligently collected by Reuchlin.*

* Letter to M. Van Susteren, Dec. 5, 1703.—"*Motif de Droit,*" 1704; already alluded to, and directed chiefly against the Archbishop of Mechlin.—"*A Problem, moral and canonical,* proposed to M. Malo, canon of Mechlin, and sometime official of the archbishop; to wit, which is the more probable, first, that M. de Precipiano has been for twenty years in contumacy and rebellion against the apostolic see, under four popes, for being, in spite of them, dean and pastor of the metropolitan chapter of Besancon; or, secondly, that the apostolic see and four popes have unjustly persecuted M. de Precipiano."—"Letter to the King against the Jesuits," 1704.—"Letter to the Chan-

It is time we should say something of the reprint which has just been issued by the Philadelphia press. Clearness and beauty of typography have certainly been secured. In comparing this with Collins's three-volume Glasgow edition, of 1830, which is a sightly book, we give the preference to the American copy.

As pruned of those popish errors which hung about certain parts, but which lay chiefly in unessential phrases, the "Moral Reflections," are eminently fitted to be useful in our day and country. As Doddridge said of Leighton, we may say of Quesnel,—that we never read even a few pages of his writings without elevation of mind. Bishop Wilson's commendation of the work is justly cited by Dr Boardman. We may add of another Bishop Wilson, of Sodor and Man, not only that he caught much of the good Jansenist's spirit, but that he again and again borrowed from him in his well-known *Sacra Privata*, a manual of devotions, which is highly valuable when purged of those passages which inculcate the doctrine of merit.* It is not our purpose to quote from the volumes before us. They contain passages so fraught with genuine gospel truth, and such assertions of the sovereignty of the divine choice, the efficacy of grace, the inability of the sinner, the justification of the ungodly by faith, and the loveliness of the Lord Jesus Christ, as make us forget, during the perusal, that the author acknowledged any allegiance to Rome. Such truth and such holiness, from whatever pen they come, should be welcome to every Christian mind.

ART. V.—1. *Dr Wordsworth on the Canon and Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures.*

2. *Mr Lee's Donnellan Lectures on Inspiration.*

WHAT are called Christian Evidences grow naturally out of the circumstances and conditions under which Christianity exists in the world. At the very beginning it was subject, of

cellor."—"Letter of Father Quesnel to Port Royal de la Chaise."—"Letter to an Archbishop."—"Letter of a private person to a friend."—"Letter to a friend touching what is abroad in the name of His Catholic Majesty," 1704.—"Declaration and Protestation against the Placard of the Archbishop of Mechlin."—"General Idea of the Libel of the Fiscal of Mechlin," 1705.—"Letter concerning the Process or *Motif de Droit*," 1705.—"Anatomy of the Sentence of the Archbishop,"—"Memoir in Vindication of Father Quesnel's Resort to the King," 1702.—"Father Bouhours, Jesuit, Convicted of his old calumnies against the Port Royalists, 1700."—"Answer to Two Letters of Archbishop Fénelon," 1711.—Numerous other titles are preserved, but of publications less concerning our general subject.

* We refer to the original folio edition of Bishop Wilson's works, or to some unaltered reprint, as, for instance, that of Oxford, (John Henry Parker), 1853, 12mo.

course, to the attacks of unbelievers, and it had to meet doubts and questionings on the part of those whose assent it challenged to itself. "It was placed by its founders on an argumentative basis; *i. e.*, it was to rest its claims on proofs and evidences addressed to the reason. It is not meant, of course, that all individuals alike could comprehend the force of these proofs, or were bound to examine them in detail, before they received the gospel. All that is meant is, that the gospel was provided with rational evidences of its truth."* And these arguments and proofs, addressed to the reason, were brought by the early Christian apologists to bear with great force upon the three systems which in the outset opposed the Faith, namely, —Philosophy, Heathenism, and Judaism. The line of defence is unbroken, from the Apology of Justin Martyr down.

As the ages rolled along, these attacks on Christianity changed their form, indeed, and proceeded from different quarters, but they neither diminished in number nor became less violent; while all periods of mental activity were characterised by their abounding presence. In our own day these attacks are multiform. Some are direct, and others indirect. Some strike at one point, others at another. While in addition to direct denial and unbelief, we are in the midst of at least three systems which clearly destroy that whole ground of rational proof on which the great doctors of the ancient church rested the defence of Christianity. Romanism destroys it, by substituting, as the ground of our belief, the infallible authority of the *existing* church; thus cutting under, not only all appeals to the reason, but also all direct individual responsibility. So that nothing is more absurd than for a Romish writer to attempt to argue for the truth of Christianity as the ancient apologists argued. He has no logical basis for any such position. Rationalism destroys it, by asserting that no man is bound to accept, on any evidence whatever, any doctrine as revealed by God which his own reason does not recognise; and by rejecting as *empirical* all arguments from facts, it thus thrusts evidence to one side, and employs itself at once on the substance of the Revelation. Mysticism destroys it, in superseding all rational examination of proofs by some inner sense or inspiration, which it makes the sole arbiter of truth. This, let us observe in passing, is a perversion, or an imitation, of a most dear and cherished principle, to which we shall have occasion hereafter to refer.†

Such, then, has been the case in all past times; such it is now; and such, doubtless, it ever will be, in reference to the evidences of Christianity. The time never has been, and pro-

* Palmer on Development, p. 5, c. i, sec. 3. In a previous section he draws out the proof from the New Testament.

† See Palmer on Development, c. ii., iii., iv.

bably never will be, when all subtilty of logic, and all power of rhetoric, have not been employed against the faith. Whence it follows, as matter of course, that counter forces must be employed in its defence. But it appears to us that on this important subject several errors have more or less prevailed, the tendency of which has been greatly to weaken the Christian cause, and to place its defenders on false, and therefore dangerous ground. To two of these we shall venture to call attention.

There have been those, and especially within the last century, who have seemed to entertain the idea that it was the duty of all Christians to make themselves masters of the whole field of Christian evidences. Sometimes, indeed, the position has apparently been assumed, that thus much must be done before a man could honestly be received into the Christian fold, and participate in Christian privileges! And then, on the other hand, revolting from one extreme only to rush into another, there have been those who have decried the study of these evidences by any body, even by persons who were in training for the sacred ministry; as if any cultivation of the logical faculty, in connection with Christianity, were so far forth destructive of a simple faith. Now, each of these extremes contains elements of truth; but because they are not held in conjunction with, and as modified by other truths, because they are pushed into an undue prominence, and are thereby disturbed, they cease to be living truths, and therefore become errors. The correct view, doubtless, is, that while there does exist this vast body of Christian evidences, to which all who choose may have access, and with which, to some considerable extent at least, all those who are ambassadors for Christ are bound to make themselves acquainted; still inasmuch as Christianity was not intended to be a philosophy for the learned, but a religion for all, there will be many who cannot, and who ought not to be expected to give any logical account of their belief. On various grounds, for various reasons,—it matters very little what,—they have a belief in Christianity, which has been confirmed to them by the progress of their Christian life and experience. To use the words of Athenagoras, “They could not, by reasoning, demonstrate the usefulness of their profession, but they exhibit it in practice and by works; they do not recite words, but are examples of good works.” Indeed, it must not be forgotten that logic can be no substitute for the Christian life; though the Christian life—not, let it be observed, the pietistic persuasions of mysticism, but the actual, living, working, struggling life of obedience, securing the seal of the Holy Ghost—does stand very sufficiently in place of logic. But all this does not destroy the fact, that Christianity *has* a vast body of rational evidence on

which it stands; which they especially who are pledged to be its defenders are bound to know, and at proper seasons and in proper methods to employ.

We add the *caveat* of proper seasons and proper methods, because we do not wish to be understood as recommending that any great amount of preaching should be devoted to Christian evidences. The Romish confessional has suggested probably more sins than it ever put a stop to. And sermons on Christian evidences often present to the minds of people doubts of which they never dreamed before; and in dwelling on which they forget or do not hear the answer. It is related of a living English prelate, that while a curate, being desirous to try his hand at extempore preaching, he selected for his topic, the existence of God. He argued the matter as he would have done in a prelection in dogmatic theology, and entirely to his own satisfaction. On his way home from church, however, he questioned a plain man among his hearers as to the impression his discourse had made; and received the somewhat startling reply: "A very good sermon, parson; but *somehow* I do think there *be* a God, for all you said against it." The moral is obvious and pregnant.

Again: Christian evidences constitute a sort of science in themselves. They are not properly a part of the science of theology, for theology rather presupposes them. They are in the nature of *propaedeumata*; but not on that account any the less necessary to a well-instructed theologian. Now, a science, or any thing of the nature of a science, implies, of course, the possibility of an arrangement of topics, which shall settle and adjust them, in due order and proportion. It implies, also, that the science may, and indeed ought to be studied in view of this arrangement, else it will be studied at hap-hazard, and with the loss of that completeness, connection, and unity, which it possesses, and which ought to be preserved. Herein lies the second error to which we alluded above; namely, in treating the evidences in a disjointed and unscientific way. Its results have been specially mischievous in the case of those who, being expected to be the guides of others, ought to have these topics at hand, in an orderly arrangement.

Our idea, then, is, that all this body of Christian evidences, arguments, proofs, facts, has been long enough in the world to admit of a scientific arrangement of its topics. New facts, new proofs, new arguments, will doubtless, from time to time, be discovered and developed. But these are matters of specific detail, not of generic arrangement. They will be relegated as they come up, to their several and proper positions, under the topics to which they belong. And then, over and

above all this,—and the neglect of this patent fact has led, we think, to a good deal of confusion,—there are a great many valuable, but subsidiary lines of thought which lie outside of the science itself. Such are ethnological, geological, and physiological inquiries, designed to examine and refute conclusions in these several sciences, which are at variance with fundamental principles, or specific declarations, of revealed religion. Every science has these outlying regions of subsidiary inquiry and investigation, which do not form a portion of her direct and proper domain.

It is necessary, however, to declare, that we by no means intend to intimate that an arrangement of the topics of Christian evidences can be made adapted to *all* occasions and circumstances. In every science, arrangement and classification vary, according to the point of view from which it is surveyed, and the purposes with which it is approached. This must plainly, in the nature of things, be so. But then, over and above these specific arrangements, which men make for themselves when they have specific objects in view, there is always, in any science, some general arrangement, which they employ for purposes of study, examination, and instruction. And it is this latter that we propose to consider.

Now, a careful examination of facts bring us to the conclusion, that in this matter of Christian evidences, men's minds have on the whole run in three great lines. Some have dwelt not only mainly, but even entirely, on the internal witness of the Spirit. Others have rested on the existence and authority of the church. And others still have insisted on the critical, historical, and other proofs of the genuineness and authenticity of the New Testament Scriptures. Thus the individual, the institution, the sacred book, have all been made, severally and in turn, the stand-points whence this vast subject has been surveyed. In all these lines, moreover, important trains of thought and argument have been developed, which must enter into every sufficient and well-connected view of the evidences. We do not mean that these lines should be kept distant from each other, and separately worked out; but that they should all be recognised, and their separate principles incorporated.

Starting, then, from the positions here laid down, namely, that Christianity rests on a body of rational proof, which they who are specially intrusted with its defence are bound to make a subject of study, while its study is open to all, and challenges the attention of all; and that this body of proof is susceptible of being scientifically arranged on the principles and in the way noted above; we shall next proceed, even at the risk of incurring the charge of presumption, to offer some suggestions in reference to that arrangement, and to enter on a detailed

consideration of some of its topics, with their subdivisions. We trust that what we have to say may be found of some use, at least, to our readers among the clergy and students in theology.

In studying, then, or treating the evidences of Christianity, the very first topic to be considered, is the genuineness of the text of the New Testament Scriptures. And the reason why we thus assign a position in the fore-front to this topic, is, that it is the ultimate point of possible infidel attack. Could the attack be successful, then obviously the whole matter would be decided. Could it be proved that we have not the genuine text of the New Testament, there would plainly be no room whatever for any further argument. At least argument would be forestalled, until it had been settled what, if any, of the present text was genuine; and where, if any where, the rest of the genuine text was to be found. The subtle mind of Strauss undoubtedly supposed that he had developed the ultimate form of infidel attack on Christianity, when, accepting the genuineness of the text, he, in his "*Life of Jesus*," brought forward his mythical theory, to destroy the historic truth of the Gospels. But the subtler mind of Baur discovered a point beyond, whence an assault might come, which would cut under all the ingenious labours of Strauss, and render them needless for the purposes of disbelief. And this point he found in the denial of the genuineness of the text. This line, then, of attack is ultimate; and here, according to the rule of Aristotle, we first take our stand, in considering Christian evidences as a science.

We are thus introduced to a wide field of study; so wide, indeed, that on surveying it the very physical frame sinks with a feeling of prostration at the thought of the weary labours which have been expended on it. Nor is that all. These labours of collecting, and collating, and editing MSS., gathering quotations from the fathers, comparing versions, and, in short, amassing all that wonderful amount of proof which has resulted in the triumphant vindication of the integrity of the text of the New Testament Scriptures, have been less cared for and appreciated than almost any labours that stand connected with theology. They who have devoted themselves to them have had every kind of contumely poured upon them; have been called drones, and accused of eating the bread of idleness; have been told that they were wasting their lives on petty nothings, and might as well be out of the world as in it. Well may they have been contented to bear these bitter words. In the ultimate assault of infidelity upon the sacred records of our faith, it is in the armories which their labours have stored that we must look for weapons wherewith to re-

pel the foe. It is, of course, aside from our purpose, as it would be beyond propriety, for us to indicate sources of information on the various subjects mentioned, and we therefore proceed to our second topic.

The genuineness of the text of the New Testament having been considered and established, the next question naturally relates to the authorship of the various books. The question is, of course, in the main an historical one, though there are antecedent considerations of a general nature which will help to clear the way. Michaelis lays down six general reasons, which may induce a critic to regard a book as spurious.*

"1. When doubts have been made from its first appearance in the world, whether it proceeded from the author to whom it is ascribed.

"2. When the immediate friends of the pretended author have denied it to be his production.

"3. When many years have elapsed after his death in which the book was unknown; and yet, had it been in existence, must have been quoted.

"4. When the style is different from his other writings; or if no such exist, from what might reasonably have been expected.

"5. When events are recorded which happened later than the time of the pretended author.

"6. When opinions are advanced which contradict those known to be his in other writings;—though he does not consider this last as a sufficient single ground for a positive conclusion."

Now this gives a wide range to an argument for spuriousness,—as wide, indeed, as can well be given; and yet it can be shown that not one of these reasons applies to the New Testament Scriptures: so that not only is the way cleared of a great deal of difficulty, and a strong *a priori* argument that they were really written by those whose names they bear, worked out; but the conclusion to which we come amounts to a direct argument in their favour: and when, starting from this vantage ground, we proceed, as we should, to consider (1.) the impossibility of a forgery, from the nature of the case; (2.) the testimonies of (a) Heathen, (b) Jewish, and (c) Christian writers on the subject; and (3.) the internal evidence; we have certainly an amount of proof as to authorship which no other works in the world can show.†

Still, while all this is true, it should be borne in mind that a failure to establish an authorship to a book of the New Testament, would be a very different and a much less important thing, than a failure to establish the genuineness of the text. A book may be perfectly authentic, though its author is not

* Marsh's Michaelis, vol. i. p. 27.

† Bishop Marsh seems to think that while Michaelis' argument is very clear as to the Homologoumena, it by no means applies to the Antilegomena. We cannot agree with his view; the same course of arguments, and series of tests, hold throughout the New Testament.

known; and therefore where, as in the Epistle to the Hebrews, no author's name appears, there is fairly room for diversity of opinion; not that we ourselves entertain the slightest doubt that the epistle was written by St Paul.

Having advanced thus far, the student should next consider what we may call the credibility of the things contained in the books, the genuineness of the text and the authorship of which have been established. And here, of course, we at once meet the claim that these books contain a revelation. But in order to avoid a blinding, and, indeed, a confounding error, a plain distinction is to be made. Says Mr Lee, "Certain portions of the Bible are, strictly speaking, revelations; that is, such as from their supernatural character, or the circumstances of the writer who records them, could not have been known to him without a special communication from heaven. Other portions again are not of this nature. The historical incidents, for instance, recorded in both the Old and New Testaments, were such as must frequently have been familiar to the sacred writers, either from their own observation or from other sources."* It is important to bear this in mind, because it gives us a perfect right to say, most unhesitatingly, that were minor mistakes and errors proved to exist in those historical narrations which the writers of the New Testament make from their own personal observation and knowledge,—*and here, be it observed, is uniformly the point against which infidel attack is mainly directed*,—this would not, *of itself*, vitiate the claim that the New Testament contains a revelation. Of course, if the *whole* history were proved to be untrue, that result would be reached, but not otherwise. In saying this we do not mean to intimate that we believe any such errors to exist—far from it; we are only supposing a case to illustrate the shallowness of infidel attack. Such errors would not directly disprove the reality of the revelation, as infidels always seem to imagine.†

What we should be concerned with here would be, first, the possibility, and, next, the probability of any revelation from God. These two points it need not take long to settle; our only embarrassment would arise from the very abundance of material and of guides. The way being thus cleared, and the question fairly opened as to the credibility of the contents of the books of the New Testament, our next step must be to consider what these contents are,—what, in other words, it is with which we have to deal. Now, these accounts are made up of (1.) historical narrations; (2.) laws and rules of morality; (3.) doctrines; and (4.) prophecies. The credibility, how-

* Inspiration of the Scriptures, p. 26.

† What such errors would affect, if they existed, would be the *inspiration* of the writer. This question we have not yet reached.

ever, of all depends on the credibility of the historical narratives. There may be, and there are, special considerations connected with the last three divisions; but the basis on which they rest is the authenticity of the history. On this, therefore, the chief labour and consideration must be expended.

Now, that special portion of the New Testament history on which all the rest depends is the history of our blessed Lord. For Christianity, and all its parts and portions, rest on him; not on a doctrine, not on an act, but on him, a person. This, then, is the part of the historical narrative to be specially considered; if it is established, all the rest stands with it; if it should fall, all else falls with it. The ordinary processes of historical verification will of course establish the fact of the existence of such a person as our Saviour upon earth; and the only real point of attack from disbelief, and therefore the only point where it is necessary to be armed, will be the supernatural facts of the narrative of the evangelists. And here too much careful thought and labour cannot be expended.

Let us set out with the recognition of the strong antecedent probability, putting the matter as yet on the very lowest grounds, that if God designed to make a revelation to his creatures by the agency of any being, there would be something supernatural about the history of such a being. The common sense of mankind acknowledges this, just as clearly and universally as it does the existence of some Deity. From this antecedent probability, we should pass to the witness of prophecy in the Old Testament, the date and character of which would be established on its own separate grounds, as pointing forward in the same direction, only specially indicating the precise character of our Lord's life. And then, overleaping for a time the actual subject of our consideration, the life of Christ, we should consider the witness of the Christian institution, the church, commemorating that which prophecy foretold, and built on that which the evangelists narrate. Here, then, we find a harmony of antecedent probability, of pre-existing prophecy, and continuous commemoration, with the actual narrative which nothing else can show. And now, when we come to take into view what is urged in any ordinary treatise on the evidences, the circumstances under which the narrators wrote, the opportunities for information, the absence of any motives for misrepresentation, the undesigned coincidences, whether in one part or another of the New Testament history, the confirmations of secular history, and the admissions of adversaries, we have, it is believed, the argument for the historical truth of the New Testament narrative, and specially for our Lord's life, pretty fully before us.

Advancing now from this historical basis to the consideration of the doctrines and moral precepts which Jesus Christ and the apostles preached, the first question which presents itself is, whether these doctrines or precepts contravene any acknowledged truth or precept in natural religion; and whether any difficulties attach to them different *in kind* from those which attach to natural religion? - But here the wonderful argument of Bishop Butler has left nothing to be done. All difficulties from this cause are completely cleared away; while, if we choose, it is an easy matter to carry the argument on, and show that natural religion, whether in its doctrines or precepts, is (not here taking at all into view its inefficiency in regard to motive power), without the complement of Christianity, incomplete and fragmentary. At this point, then, properly and effectually, comes in the argument from our Lord's miracles, established, be it remembered, as historic facts on other and previous grounds, to conclude and clinch the proof for doctrine and moral law. It could not, properly, come in at any previous point. Indeed, we think the greatest possible mischief has arisen from giving an undue prominence, and an improper position in the scheme of Christian evidences, to the miracles. It is a profound remark of Pascal, "We are to judge of doctrine by miracles, and of miracles by doctrine. The doctrine shows the nature of the miracle, and the miracle shows the nature of the doctrine."*. The doctrines and laws of Christianity, then, being found not to contravene those of natural religion, an antecedent argument, favourable to the miracles professedly wrought in their defence, is gained. From this we should advance to the consideration of the miracles themselves, remembering that we are not now examining the testimony there is to them as facts, but the value of the witness they bear—being established as facts—to doctrine and precept.

This value can only be appreciated by a consideration of the miracles themselves. Now, miracles may be plainly viewed from three points,—first, in reference to their instant effects on the beholder; secondly, in their relations to him who works them, as the claimant of certain powers; and, thirdly, in the same relation as he who performs them proposes to accomplish a certain work in men's souls. Hence Scripture appropriates to miracles three names,—*τεράτα*, wonders; *δυναμεις*, powers; and *σημεια*, signs. The wonder indicates the instant effect of the miracle on the beholder; the power has relation to the claim of power made by our Lord; and the sign has reference to the doctrine declared by him. Now, in the case of supposititious miracles, as those of the Romish Hagiology, or the

* Thoughts on Religion, c. xxvi.

apostles of Irvingism, or any impostors whatever, the *τερας* is the only thing regarded: gaping wonder is the test,—the power and the sign are disregarded. Not so in our Lord's miracles. An examination of them will show that in the relation indicated by the name "powers," they exhibit, when taken together and classified, powers over matter, men, spirits, devils, and death, which are commensurate with those of God; and that in the relation indicated by the word "signs," they exhibit the great purposes and plans of Christ in reference to human souls. Now, this has a special value in the way of proof of the reality of our Lord's miracles. For it is impossible to suppose that an ingenious forger could have so accurately defined in his mind these delicate distinctions, and then so completely have provided for them; while if the writer had been amusing himself with so many *myths*, it would have been the height of folly to have bestowed such labour on so useless a task; if, indeed, which we do not believe, human wit could, under any circumstances, have contrived or executed such a plan. Still, the special force of these considerations is the value and the place they give the miracle in connection with the doctrines and precepts of the gospel. For having found these not to contradict but to complete natural religion, and, if we choose to carry out the argument, the Jewish dispensation also; and having considered the miracles, always established as facts on separate grounds, under the views now indicated,—when we join the two together, they fit and harmonise, the conditions alluded to by Pascal are satisfied, the argument is so far forth complete, the true position of the miracle is shown, and the doctrine and precept stand firm.

We cannot, however, dismiss this matter of the miracles without a word. Many later writers have assigned to them a position utterly untenable on any principles of right reason or common sense; and have thereby given a most fearful and destructive advantage to the antagonists of our holy religion. They take the broad ground, that a miracle considered nakedly and by itself alone, without taking into view its character as a sign or a power, without any reference to the doctrine in support of which it was wrought, is a sufficient and complete ground of conviction. And so ingrained is it now in the popular mind that this is the only formula which Christian advocates can employ in connection with the miracles, that we have no doubt many, who are accustomed to no other than this view of them, will suppose that if it is given up, the whole ground is relinquished to the sceptic. So far, however, is this from being true, that the truth really is, that they who rest the defence of Christianity on this ground, put into the hands of its adversaries a weapon equally available for the aggressions

of infidel denial, or Popish or other corruption. The great fathers of the church, the early defenders of Christianity, men like Augustine and Chrysostom, took no such ground as this. Our own great earlier divines, men like Field and Jackson, knew nothing of it. It was developed in the first commencement of continental infidelity, and it was imported among us by that stall-fed school of theology of the last century, which from St Paul's text preached a morality scarcely up to that of Epictetus, and wrote on the evidences of that to which, in many cases, its own life gave a continuous lie. And it is a general law, which it is sufficient to enunciate, that when any thing in truth or morals is wrested from its proper place, and placed where it should not be, it becomes a source of wretched evil.

In connection with this view of the doctrines and precepts of Christianity will naturally be considered what are known as their internal evidences. And here the line of examination is twofold,—first, the character of these doctrines and precepts, considered in themselves, and in their general effects on society at large; and, secondly, the witness of the Spirit on those, as individuals, who make them the rule of their faith and their practice. In this way, and by this arrangement, are combined, we believe, the several lines of thought which take their rise from considering the individual, the institution, and the sacred book.

The prophecies of the New Testament, which constituted the fourth division of its contents, yet remain to be considered. We have only room, however, for a single observation. The establishment on a basis of rational evidence of the three divisions which precede them, would afford ground enough for their acceptance, had none of them been fulfilled; while the fulfilment of those prophecies of our Lord that relate to the destruction of Jerusalem, and of those in the Apocalypse which refer to the earlier ages of the history of the church, are a sufficient warrant for all the rest.

The next great topic which challenges attention is the canon,—the question, that is, why the books which compose the New Testament do compose it? and why no others are found in it? This naturally follows the ascertainment of the integrity of the text of the New Testament, its authorship, and the credibility of the things contained in it, whether they be historical narratives, doctrines, moral precepts, or prophecies. Perhaps it is not too much to say, that at this moment the question of the canon is the most important topic connected with Christian evidences, unless we except the subject of inspiration, which we have not yet reached.

Now, in the main, three modes have been adopted of set-

ting this question of the canon. The Romish theory is, that the authority, judicially exercised, of the existing church, is the ground on which it rests; and by the church is meant, as always so here, the Church of Rome. The theory of most of the reformed communions on the continent, and of some English divines, as stated by the learned dissenter, Jeremiah Jones,* is, "that there are innate or inward evidences in the Scriptures, which, applied by the illumination or testimony of the Holy Spirit, are the *only true proofs* of their being canonical." The theory of the great Anglican divines is, that the testimony of the successional church, from the early ages, is the primary ground on which the canon of the New Testament rests. These divines do not indeed deny that there is a witness of the Holy Ghost which accompanies the devout reading of the canonical Scriptures, and confirms and establishes the faith of the individual; but they do not hold that this is either the sole or the primary ground on which the canon rests. And this view precisely agrees with the language of Art. VI., as to what constitutes canonical Scriptures. Thus Hooker says,† "And by experience we all know, that the *first* outward motive leading men so to esteem the Scriptures, is the authority of God's church. For when we know *the whole church of God*" (note the difference from the Romish view) "hath that opinion of the Scripture, we judge it, even at the first, an impudent thing for any man, bred and brought up in the church, to be of a contrary mind without cause. Afterward, the more we bestow our labour in reading or hearing the mysteries thereof, the more we find that the thing itself doth answer our received opinion concerning it." And Bishop Burnet,‡ to the same purpose, says, "I will not urge the testimony of the Spirit, which many have had recourse to; this is only an argument to him that feels it, if it is one at all; and therefore it proves nothing to another person."

By our church, then, the canon of the New Testament Scriptures is rested primarily on a basis of historical testimony. Our inquiry is, what books were received by the church from the early ages as written by the apostles, and those who were associated with them in their labours? Not that these books were all received at once. Not that the canon came into being, as Minerva sprang from the head of Jupiter. This could not be in the nature of things. Books which were not written at once, could not be received at once. Books which were written for churches widely separated, with small means, few occasions, and no instant motives for intercourse, must work their

* Jones on the Canon, vol. i. p. 46. His examination and answer are specially valuable.

† Polity, book iii., viii. 14. Compare also book ii. vii. 3.

‡ On Art. VI.

way to universal acceptance slowly. And yet it is wonderful to what contracted limits the question as to books about which there can be any dispute is brought; and more wonderful still, perhaps, what a mass of testimony, even to those books, has been collected.

It does not come within our present purpose to enter into specific arguments. Our humbler duty is only to suggest an arrangement of topics, with such details as may seem to explain their connections, and bring out the views concerning them that we desire to urge. One great question yet remains, the question supplementary and concluding in Christian evidences, the question of inspiration. Our limits, however, and the importance of the subject, alike forbid us to enter on it here. We have placed it where we have, because we do not regard it as so directly a question between believers and unbelievers. The credibility of the Scriptures must first be settled, and then the question as to their inspiration is answered by themselves, leaving open for consideration, and, so to speak, theory, not the *fact*, but only the *modus*. In another number we shall endeavour to justify the position we have assigned to this great question, to show that it does not involve any reasoning in a circle, and to consider at some length the question itself.

Meantime we cannot but thank God that the church to which we belong recognises alike the historic testimony of the church, and the inward witness of the Spirit of God; that she does not change the first into a judicial and plenary authority, nor pervert the latter into a mere piece of mystical enthusiasm; and that while she allows all due weight to the researches of the intellect, and the varied erudition of the scholar, she yet makes the full and final seal of the verity of the Scriptures and the faith, the work of the Eternal Spirit in the heart and its fruits in the life.

ART. VI.—*The Words of the Lord Jesus.* By RUDOLF STIER.
Vols. I., II. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.

SHALL we be censured as uncharitable if, in a modest, tremulous, hesitating spirit, we venture to suggest to any one of our Scottish divines the questions—Is there any Greek in the Greek Testament?—Is the expounder of the Old Testament required in conscience to know more of Hebrew now than was

sufficient to float him safely round the rocks of Kal, or help him to shoot the cross-currents of Niphal, in his trials for licence to preach the gospel?

Most distressing would it be to all our ecclesiastical *esprit de corps*, most baffling to our best diplomacy in persuading the world of our pre-eminent and boundless erudition, if either our past antecedents in Biblical scholarship, or our personal consciousness, when honestly interpreted, were to shrink from a manly confession on these points.

Let us try the facts of the case. Most cheerfully do we allow that in the work of Dr Campbell on the Gospels, there is no lack of shrewd guesses, much wholesome interpretation, with manifold indications of that robust cognisance of the worth of grammatical investigation which is worthy of the author of the "Philosophy of Rhetoric." With no less gratitude than respect is Dr Gerard's "Institutes of Biblical Criticism" at all times to be mentioned. Its claims to such republication as would meet the wants of the best scholarship now are so manifest, that only on one ground, equally mortifying to ourselves and degrading to the times more immediately subsequent to its original appearance, can we explain the fact of its not having taken its proper and a high place as a text-book in our theological institutions.

In confining our respect to the names of Gerard and Campbell as our best writers on the theory and practice of the grammatical exegesis of the Bible for many a long day, do we overlook the legitimate claims of other scholars? We believe not. In looking across the thirty years that terminate in our 1856, and endeavouring, with every patriotic desire, to vindicate the honour of our country in the matter of sacred philology immediately prior to that period, we see nothing but empty space. In entering into one or other of our national seminaries of theological instruction, what was the position of the student? It was indeed assumed that, in having decorously emerged one or two years before from the class-room of the professor of Greek, he ought to know the ordinary constructions of the New Testament; and that no great injury could be sustained by any one when required, as part of an exercise and addition, to parse a few verses with some small measure of acceptable propriety. It was moreover assumed that, at the end of a six months' optional course of as lean and withered orientalisms as may even, by the wildest flight of fancy, be imagined, he would walk forth, all-erect and serene, into the sunlight of the most erudite presbytery in the land, an exceedingly fat and well-favoured rabbi.

Assumptions less valid or more disreputable never existed in the mind of any of our presbyteries, professors, or

students, in the most ignorant and prejudiced periods of our Presbyterian history. To tread in anxious fear, after a palpitating teacher, the strange, most obscure mountain-passes of the first chapter of Genesis, or painfully pierce the shaggy thickets of the history of Joseph,—to write the Hebrew alphabet in characters as large as those of an ordinary sign-board, no hook being omitted, and no momentous divergency of limb being palpable,—to articulate distinctly the oriental charm-words of *casus constructus*, or *vav conversive*,—this, in the case of many a student, was almost his entire Hebrew equipment. Than this, scarcely more was thought requisite to fit him for doing creditably the work of expounding the ancient Scriptures. Nor, as may be easily supposed, did the cognate dialects, Chaldee, Syriac, Arabic (in the absence of an intelligent knowledge of which no valid means whatever exist, because there is no adequate standard of comparison, whereby to penetrate the Syro-Arabian genius and structure of Hebrew forms of thought and expression), venture to intrude on even the most accomplished reader of the first chapter of Genesis, with unpleasant hints of oriental deficiency. We violate no man's confidence save our own, in acknowledging that, even at a somewhat later date, our single scrap, our solitary crumb of Arabic learning, in those pristine, awful days of eastern conquest, consisted of the authoritative assurance (in which we found the most boundless consolation) that fifteen years at least were necessary to master its grammar; while, as regards Syriac, we enjoyed the singular good fortune of acquiring, in a few days, from the pages of an octavo volume—in its stratification almost as thin as thin can be—all (of a language that even now is far from being well understood) then deemed requisite for the erudite student of the Bible.*

Nor, in recording the emphatic disadvantages of our earlier oriental days and works, would we rudely censure the once living masters of our little lore. Doubtless they did all that they believed themselves called upon by the church to do. Beyond all controversy, they industriously endeavoured to do what small things they could. Their implements of self-culture were, in so far as they had been advised, but rudimentary; their instruments of tuition were, in their view, the best of their kind. They lived and laboured amidst the golden hours of a time when what is now serenely termed scholarship, however it might be regarded as fitted to adorn the more prominent parts of the ecclesiastical structure, was in no way requisite to uphold its existence, or render its common uses more widely serviceable. Where the weekly sermon was but an easily tolerated repetition of ethical trivialities, or, as might be in

* See Note at the end of the Article.

rather happier circumstances, the acceptable assertion of the stiff theology of the grand Dutch divines, with all its imposing array of logical distribution and diata, no need of skilled grammarians in the Greek and Hebrew tongues, or indeed in any other tongue on earth, was at all felt; nor did any very sweet or strong sense of the blessed potency of the individual words which God's wisdom teacheth, greatly disturb the heart either of the preacher or the hearer.

At the same time, it is worthy of notice, that in the minds of a few more inquiring students of this period (men not confined to any one Christian denomination), and within whose hearts the vague uncertain methods of trying to decipher divine Scripture, which had been so long in use, had excited a painful feeling of disappointment and unrest, the faint hope of a more intelligent and valid philology in application to the words of God became gradually apparent. Such men, however, were but few in number, and no more than feeble pioneers in the vast wilderness. Scarcely one scholar was there, in all the churches, so learned, acute, safe, and apt to teach, as to be a sure guide to them in their dark and perilous way. Thus, accordingly, we may have some sort of notion of what the state of Biblical exegesis in this part of the kingdom at that time really was.

If there are *now* some symptoms of improvement, the friends of divine truth have reason to rejoice. Various causes, the adequate account of which would interfere with our present purpose, may have conspired to produce a wiser feeling. To the growing intelligence of the nation at large,—one important effect of which is to be met with in the active scrutiny of original data in every department of knowledge,—we are in some degree indebted for more earnest and painstaking inquiries, by one or two native divines, into the fundamental materials of our doctrinal systems of Christianity. Nor, in briefly adverting to the exciting causes of the awakening of a better scriptural philology in their minds, can we, without treachery to the cause of truth and uprightness, refuse to acknowledge their manifold and great obligations to the laborious and minute scholars of Germany. For even where severely frigid, as the elder Rosenmüller in his valuable *Old Testament*, or painfully aberrant from truth, as are De Wette and Meyer, in their treatment of the New they have conferred, by their fine linguistic sense, their adequate learning, strong, serene, assuring presence in coping with philological difficulties, most invaluable benefits on the universal church.

Encouraging, however, as, in some degree, the signs of growing amelioration may be, and more or less definitely marked in the history of our own day by such works as those of Dr John

Brown of Edinburgh, Dr Eadie of Glasgow, Dr Patriek Fairbairn of Aberdeen, and Messrs Paterson and Bonar, it is greatly to be feared that we have advanced but a very little way towards a sound, safe, independent, and irreproachable condition of things. Is it not the stern and most uncomfortable fact, that in the interpretation of the Old Testament, yea, more in the fluent reading of it, we are painfully, deplorably awanting? Of Greek or Hebrew synonymy,—a branch of philology the adequate theory and applications of which are pre-eminently important in the use of all languages, but especially in those where, either from the refinements in words originating in the wants created by a subtle metaphysic, or the special expression of an intensity of individual passion, many similar yet different meanings of the same word occur,—we have apparently no definite conception whatever. And thus is it not uncommon to hear men rudely driving at distinctions in public exposition of Scripture which have no basis whatever in the original language; or beating together, as in a mortar, words that, on every consideration of grammar, common sense, and reverence, ought to be carefully distinguished.

While, moreover, disposed gratefully to acknowledge the very faintest symptoms of a more intelligent feeling, a more earnest purpose, on the side of a scientific treatment of the words of Scripture, it will be our wisdom not to mistake the earnest zeal of but a few isolated scholars, as if that were any thing like a hopeful index of the growth of sounder opinion and more exact skill among our divines generally. Even in those works where the results of a deeper process of research than can ever meet the public eye of any church may be more or less popularly stated, and in regard to which there may be, in the public mind, an honourable acknowledgment of the labours of their authors, a not unwilling appetite for the pleasant fruits of their secluded toil, there may, at the same time—such is the contradictoriness of our fallen nature—be something, in point of adverse feeling as regards the worth of their philological organon, even more positive than secret aversion. Indeed, we need not be greatly startled, especially in feverish and distempered times, if we should meet with men, in the main both wise and good, who, while in one breath highly lauding some successful scholar (who, with an intellect sharpened by the critical discipline of years, and having a sound heart towards the Word of his Lord, has been able to rescue successfully some vital truth from the hands of the heretic), may, almost in the next moment, keenly exclaim against a special grammar or lexicon of the New Testament Greek, as if these were but the too ready engines of a spirit of malignant rationalism and disbelief.

On the whole, therefore, we cannot but think there is still

great need of special urgency in inviting our Scottish churches to consider gravely and well, to ponder calmly yet promptly, the duty of ascertaining what the best means may be in order to a steady promotion of this most vital department of theological learning. Nor ought we to be loath to perceive and confess the peculiar responsibility in this matter of the more influential members of any church, which, by symbolic and customary profession, holds prominently forth as an article of its creed the verbal inspiration of the Word of God. For if they believe the original words of the books of Scripture to have been words not only sanctioned but prescribed, not merely tolerated but required by the Holy Ghost,—to whatever dialect or dialects of human speech such words belong,—they cannot be guiltless if they should refuse or slight any instrument whatever of Biblical interpretation, any thing especially within the sphere of scientific logic in its relation to grammar and exegesis. For in this manner alone can they hope to reach the sweet and soothing consciousness that the knowledge of the revealed mind and heart of God is not dependent on mere guesses, however shrewd, but is a glorious gift, within the reach of all who, in a spirit of calm faith and reverence, intelligently and truthfully wait to receive it.

Are there not, besides, signs of the times strongly suggestive of the marked seasonableness of every present effort to quicken the Christian mind of Scotland on this vital theme? Is there not a growing demand (which is destined to wax stronger among us in proportion as an improved system of common education and the rapid spread of varied knowledge produce their congenial results in the public mind),—a demand for that fresh life and individuality in pulpit ministrations, to which we can only attain by coming into intelligent contact with the individual words of Scripture, in their true historical and dogmatic connections? And is not this a condition of things which, if faithfully met by the disciplined use of all the lights of real knowledge in chasing away the old uncertainties of our Biblical interpretation, may be fairly expected, in an important degree, to calm down any feverish impatience of a logical creed which occasionally appears, and, by shedding abroad the corrective influences of a true historical sense, induce a wiser estimate of the natural origin and proper character of our time-honoured confessions?

Nor, in our opinion, is our responsibility in this matter diminished, but on the contrary very greatly enhanced, by the pleasing fact, that all who will acquit themselves faithfully in regard to it are now more than ever in the way of being supplied with many most important aids. Not to do more than simply mention the decided impulse that has been given, by a

variety of causes, within the last twenty years, to the study of German, and a more ample acquaintance with its vast and ever-enlarging wealth of scholarship,—or the rapid growth of a higher style of purely classical philology, especially in the two great English universities and the University of London, but which is by no means confined to the scholars within their walls,—as all who have been at all observant of the noble example set by our own Professor Blackie, in his efforts to introduce a more exalted philosophy into the treatment of Greek in the University of Edinburgh, are fully aware,—we would, though briefly, yet with especial emphasis, make honourable mention of one or two works more immediately bearing on an improved exegesis that have of late years appeared in the Church of England.

In the volumes of Mr Trench on the Parables and Miracles of our Lord, there are, as is known to all who are familiar with his name, many valuable elucidations of important words, a delicate perception of their more recondite meanings, with many valuable hints regarding the proper spirit of exegesis. His little work on the "*Synonymes of the New Testament*" is not more a proof of the special value of the study of that branch of sacred etymology, than of the charming skill with which he himself has directed the rich resources of his mind towards its elucidation. Though little more than a specimen of what a judicious treatment of the ample field of New Testament synonymes is fitted to produce, it abounds in illustrations of the power of divine words, when closely apprehended, to meet seasonably, and suitably to deal with, all the sins, fears, and tribulations of the heart of man, by discovering, in manifold and minute detail, the marvellous freeness and fullness of the grace that is in Christ Jesus.

As expository alike of the principle and method of Mr Trench's books, with the spirit of their application, we give the following extracts:—

"I have never doubted that, setting aside those higher and more solemn lessons which in a great measure are out of our reach to impart, being to be taught rather by God than men, there are few things which we should have more at heart than to awaken in our scholars an enthusiasm for the grammar and the lexicon. We shall have done much, very much for those who come to us for theological training, and generally for mental guidance, if we can persuade them to have these continually in their hands, if we can make them believe that with these, and out of these, they may be learning more, obtaining more real and lasting acquisitions, such as will stay by them, such as will form a part of the texture of their minds for ever,—that they shall from these be more effectually accomplishing themselves for their future work, than from many a volume of divinity studied before its time, even if it

were worth studying at all, crudely digested, and therefore turning to no true nourishment of the inner man.

"But having now ventured to challenge for these lectures a somewhat wider audience than at first they had, it may be permitted to me to add here a very few observations on the value of the study of synonymes, not any longer considered in reference to our peculiar needs, but generally, and on that of the synonymes of the New Testament in particular; as also on the helps to this study which are at present in existence.

"The value of this study as a discipline for training the mind into close and accurate habits of thought, the amount of instruction which may be drawn from it, the increase of intellectual wealth which it may yield, all this has been implicitly recognised by well-nigh all great writers,—for well-nigh all, from time to time, have paused themselves to play the dividers and discerners of words,—explicitly by not a few, who have proclaimed the value which this study had in their eyes. And instructive as in any language it must be, it must be eminently so in the Greek,—a language spoken by a people of the finest and subtlest intellect; who saw distinctions where others saw none; who divided out to different words what others often were content to huddle under a common term; who were themselves singularly alive to its value, diligently cultivating the art of synonymous distinction, and sometimes even to an extravagant excess; who have bequeathed a multitude of fine and delicate observations on the right distinguishing of their own words to the after world.

"And while thus, with reference to all Greek, the investigation of the likenesses and differences of words appears specially invited by the characteristic excellences of the language, in respect to the Greek of the New Testament plainly there are reasons additional inviting us to this study. If by it we become aware of delicate variations in an author's meaning, which otherwise we might have missed, where is it so desirable that we should not miss any thing than in those words which are the vehicles of the very mind of God? If it increases the intellectual riches of the student, can this anywhere be of so great importance as there, where the intellectual may, if rightly used, prove spiritual riches as well? If it encourage thoughtful meditation on the exact forces of words, both as they are in themselves, and in their relation to other words, or in any way unveil to us their marvel and their mystery, this can nowhere else have a worth in the least approaching that which it acquires when the words with which we have to do, are, to those who receive them aright, words of eternal life; while out of the dead carcasses of the same, if men suffer the spirit of life to depart from them, all manner of corruptions and heresies may be, as they have been, bred.

"The words of the New Testament are eminently the *στοιχεῖα* of Christian theology, and he who will not begin with a patient study of these, shall never make any considerable, least of all any secure, advances in this; for here, as everywhere else, disappointment awaits him who thinks to possess the whole without possessing the parts of which that whole is composed."

And if any practical instances were necessary to test or

confirm the truth and wisdom of these general views of the value, to the professional student of the sacred records, of an exact appreciation of the differences and resemblances of words, Mr Trench's volume will amply supply them. We select the following remarks on the words *κύριος* and *δεσπότης*, which have presented themselves to us in *apertura libri*:—

"The distinction which the later Greek grammarians sought to trace between these words was this: a man would be *δεσπότης* as respects his slaves (Plato Legg. 756, c.), and therefore *οικοδεσπότης*, but *κύριος* in respect of his wife and children, who, in speaking either to him or of him, would use this title of honour: "As Sara obeyed Abraham, calling him *lord*," (*κύριον αὐτὸν καλοῦσα*, of 1 Pet. iii. 6; 1 Sam. i. 8; and Plutarch, De Virt. Mul. s. vv. *Μίμκα καὶ Μεγιστώ*.) There is a certain truth in this distinction. Undoubtedly there does lie in *κύριος* the sense of an authority owning limitations,—moral limitations it may be,—and the word implies that the user will not exclude, in its use, their good over whom it is exercised; while in *δεσπότης* is implied a more unrestricted power and absolute domination, confessing no such limits or restraints. He who addresses another as *δέσποτα* puts a far greater emphasis of submission into his speech than if he had addressed him as *κύριε*. It was out of a feeling of this that the free Greeks refused this title of *δεσπότης* to any but the gods (Euripides Hippol. 88: *ἄναξ, θεοὺς γὰρ δεσπότας καλεῖν χρεών*); and the sense of this distinction of theirs we have retained in our use of 'despot,' 'despotic,' 'despotism,' as set over against our use of 'lord,' 'lordship,' and the like; the despot is one who exercises not only dominion but domination.

"Still, there were influences at work whose tendency was to break down any such distinction as this. Slavery, however legalised, is so abhorrent to men's inborn sense of right, that they seek to mitigate, in word at least, if not in fact, the atrocity of it; and thus, as no southern planter speaks of his slaves, but prefers some other term, so in antiquity, as far as any gentler or more humane view of slavery can be obtained (and it was not merely contemplated in the aspect of one man's unlimited power over another), the antithesis of *δεσπότης* and *δοῦλος* would continually give place to that of *κύριος* and *δοῦλος*. The harsher antagonism would still survive, but the milder would prevail side by side with it. So practically we find it; one language is used as freely as the other; and often in the same sentence both terms are employed. (Philo, Quod Omn. Prob. Lib. 6.) We need not look further than to the writings of St Paul to see how little, in popular speech, the distinction of the Greek synonymists was observed. Masters are now *κύριοι* (Eph. vi. 9; Col. iv. 1), and now *δεσπόται* (1 Tim. vi. 1, 2; Tit. ii. 9; 1 Pet. ii. 18), with him.

But while all experience shows how little sinful man can be trusted with absolute unrestricted power over his fellow, how certain he is to abuse it,—a moral fact attested in our use of 'despot,' as equivalent with 'tyrant,' as well as in the history of the word 'tyrant' itself,—it can only be a blessing for man to think of God as the absolute Lord,

Ruler, and Disposer of his life, since with him power is never disconnected from wisdom and from love; and as we saw that the Greeks, not without a certain sense of this, were well pleased to style the gods *δεσπόται*, however they might refuse this title to any other; so, within the limits of revelation, we find *δεσπότης*, no less than *κύριος*, applied to the true God. In the Old Testament, 'Adonai' is occasionally rendered by the two words joined together, as at Gen. xv. 2, 8; Jer. i. 6, iv. 10. No doubt *δεσπότης* realised to their minds who used it, even more than *κύριος*, the sense of God's absolute disposal of his creatures, his autocratic power; and that when he worked, none could let him. That it did so present itself to Greek ears is plain from a passage in Philo (Quis Rev. Div. Haer. 6), where he finds an evidence of Abraham's *εὐλάβεια*, of his tempering, on one great occasion, boldness with reverence and godly fear, in the fact that in his approaches to God he leaves the more usual *κύριε*, and instead of it adopts the *δεσπότα*, in which there was implied a more entire prostration of self, an ampler recognition of the omnipotence of God. The passages in the New Testament where God is styled *δεσπότης* are those which follow: Luke ii. 29; Acts iv. 24; Rev. vi. 10; 2 Pet. ii. 1; Jude 5. In the two last it is to Christ, but to Christ as God, that the title is ascribed. Erasmus, indeed, with that latent Arianism of which, perhaps, he was scarcely conscious to himself, denies that in the words of Jude *δεσπότην* is to be referred to Christ; giving only *κύριον* to him, and *δεσπότην* to the Father. The fact that in the Greek text, as he read it, *Θεὸν* followed and was joined to *δεσπότην*, no doubt really lay at the root of his reluctance to ascribe the title of *δεσπότης* to Christ. It was with him not a philological, but a theological difficulty, however he may have sought to persuade himself otherwise."

Of Mr Trench's little volume, the admirable method and practical contents of which have by these extracts been indicated, we have spoken as a most trustworthy specimen of sacred synonymy. So valuable, indeed, is it as a specimen of his philosophical insight into the soul and substance of words, that it cannot but inspire every thoughtful reader of the sacred records with an anxious desire that he may be led to produce some more extensive work on this interesting and instructive branch of exegesis. Combining, in the applications of his rare mastery alike over his own mother-tongue and the original languages of Scripture, a well-defined poetical feeling, with a simple faith in all the varied forms of human speech as the results of divine agency, he can confer no more blessed boon on the deep readers of the divine record, than by so working out, in the analysis of all New Testament words, his method of synonymy, as shall secure for it what Doederlein has done so successfully for the Latin tongue. And were it not that we know how the hand even of a master must fail, amidst the pressing engagements of life, to perform all that the promptings of his genius may demand, or the liberal heart of the disciple of Christ may require, we would anxiously suggest to Mr

Trench, that in doing for some of the leading words of the Old Testament what, as we have already seen, he has in part accomplished for those of the New, he would be hailed by every scientific reader of Hebrew as a large benefactor to the Christian church. It has not often happened, in any age, that verbal interpretation has seized, as with the power of a passion, on the activities of a mind so happily constituted by nature as that of the author of the "New Testament Synonyms." Nor in his case is the power of penetrating to the heart of words, and tracing outward their finer and more flexible ramifications, confined to Greek or his familiar mother tongue. It extends to several other languages, Semitic and Indo-European.

Of a still later date than Mr Trench's work on New Testament Synonymy, though of no less exegetical value, especially as suggestive of the special difficulties which the student of the Attic Greek may expect to encounter in the idioms of the New Testament, is Mr Ellicott's "Critical and Grammatical Commentary on St Paul's Epistle to the Galatians."

The fruit of many years of earnest thought, elaborated by the exercise of a scholarship equally adequate in its results, and conscientiously used, we do not hesitate to recommend its careful study to the theological student.

In relation to the best methods of sacred interpretation, it has, by its carefulness in judgment, and precision in grammatical inferences, more than once reminded us of Mr Percival Frost's "Sixth Book of Thucydides;" in the preface to which, the author, whose views of the scientific interpretation of words are equally applicable to the idioms of the Greek Testament, thus states his purpose and plan:—

"I have attempted in these notes to facilitate the attainment of accuracy in translation. All who are engaged in classical tuition, are aware how little of this quality is found in the rendering of the majority of translators. Particles are conveniently omitted as troublesome; compound verbs dwarfed to the proportions of simple; the distinctions of tenses slighted; the due balancing of the clauses in complex sentences thought unnecessary. Yet, if the study of Greek is to serve any purpose of intellectual discipline, a mere loose acquaintance with some of its words and forms will never produce the desired result upon the mind. Something more is requisite; and in this, painstaking accuracy must form a main ingredient. I have, consequently, in this edition aimed at helping to this correctness those who care to acquire it; those who do not, will consider me to have wasted my pains. With this end in view, I have not treated Thucydides historically, nor politically, but grammatically. I have, to the best of my power, carefully explained the usual particles, defined constructions, accounted for compounded verbs, and so on, wherever I thought, and indeed know, mistakes are likely to occur."

Inspired by a similar grammatical philosophy, Mr Ellicott follows a similar exegetical practice. He examines the forms of Greek speech, which are characteristic of the New Testament, according to the maxims and facts of their own proper grammar. Acknowledging his obligations to various cognate writers, he especially mentions the name of Winer,—whose masterly exposition of the general principles, and also of the special exotic turns of Hellenistic thinking, has so largely contributed to rescue the language of the New Testament from its former equivocal position, some divines at one time regarding it as above all law, while others treated it as if any scientific principle were much too good for the interpretation of any thing so anomalous. Mr Ellicott is, at the same time, in the independent use of manifold resources of his own, a truly serviceable auxiliary to the critical study of the apostle's style.

One or two extracts from his valuable preface may interest the reader. And, in the first place, his remarks on the linguistic character of the New Testament dialect are entitled to our best consideration. They are not only intended, but also well fitted, to bring into strong salient relief the special preparation requisite for its fruitful study,—a preparation which is especially necessary in those who shrink from an exposure to the charge of staggering blind-fold across the threshold of the temple of divine truth:—

“The very systematic exactitude,” he remarks at p. iii. of his preface, “of his (*i.e.* the student's) former discipline in classical Greek, is calculated to mislead him in the study of writers who belonged to an age when change had impaired, and conquest had debased, the language in which they wrote. His exclusive attention to a single dialect, informed, for the most part, by a single and prevailing spirit, ill prepares him for the correct apprehension of writings in which the tinge of nationalities, and the admiration of newer and deeper modes of thought, are both distinctly recognisable. His familiarity with modes of expression, which had arisen from the living wants of a living language, ill prepares him to correctly and completely understand their force when they are reproduced by aliens in kindred and customs, and strangers, and even more than strangers, in tongue. Let all these diversities be fairly considered, and then, without entering into any more exact comparisons between biblical and classical Greek, it will be difficult not to admit that the advanced student in Attic Greek is liable to carry with him prejudices which may, for a time at least, interfere with his full appreciation of the outward form in which the sacred oracles are enshrined. No better example of the general truth of these observations could be adduced than that of the illustrious Hermann; who, in his disquisition on the first three chapters of this very epistle, has convincingly shown how even perceptions as accurate as his, and erudition as profound, may still signally fail, when applied without previous exercise to the interpretation of the New Testament.”

In true consistency of purpose, Mr Ellicott, emphatically insists on the duty of giving a prominent place, in the special preparation demanded by the peculiar idioms of the New Testament, to the principles of universal grammar, as preliminary to the work of special exegesis :—

“My own studies,” he remarks at p. vi. of his preface, “have irresistibly impelled me to the conviction, that, without making unnecessary distinctions between grammar and exegesis, we are still bound to recognise the necessity,—of, first, endeavouring to find out what the words actually convey, according to the rules of language; then, secondly, of observing the peculiar shade of meaning that the context appears to impart. Too often this process has been reversed: the commentator, on the strength of some ‘received interpretation,’ or some dogmatical bias, has stated what the passage ought to mean; and then has been tempted, by the force of bad example, to coerce the words, ‘per Hebraismum,’ or ‘per enallagen,’ to yield the required sense.”

In making the above selection of exegetical names and works, we have been, for the most part, influenced by the desire of giving broader and more authoritative prominence than has been commonly allowed, in this northern part of the kingdom, to the obligation of producing the meaning of the original text of the divine Word, on definite, stable, secure principles of translation. We have also sedulously abstained from every thing like a spirit of negative criticism; choosing rather to dwell with some little enthusiasm on the extensive sagacity, the genial love and reverence, with which the authors of whose exegetical worth we have spoken approach the important work of scriptural interpretation, than, by indulging in any impertinent strictures on points which do not fairly come before us, to incur the reproach conveyed in the snarling words of the Dean of St Patrick’s,—“They are pragmatistical enough to stand on the watch-tower; but who assigned them the post?” Being desirous to promote the diffusion of what we believe to be sound views of the importance of a thorough philological training in the theological student, as his only complete discipline in order to a safe exegesis of the sacred volume, we have made free use of the recorded experience of men who, in the practised eye, the cautious judgment, the ready information, the spirit of reverence for words, engendered by their early training in the right use of their own language, as well as the sound methods of classic learning, are, as often as they speak to us, pre-eminently deserving of an earnest hearing. Nor can we abandon what some of our readers may perhaps regard as a too wayward current of reflection, without briefly touching, even at the risk of tediousness, on one or two special weaknesses in the work of translation, arising from the want

of sound initiation in the fundamental reasons of the English language, which has, until within the last few years, almost universally prevailed in Scotland:—

“There are two maxims of translation,” as is wisely and conclusively said by Goethe; “the one requires that the author of a foreign nation be brought to us in such a manner that we may regard him as our own; the other, on the contrary, demands of us that we transport ourselves over to him, and adopt his situation, his mode of speaking, his peculiarities.”

Wherever, accordingly, from inveterate slowness of nature, or the disadvantages of intellectual training, there be wanting among us the sharp apprehension necessary to a logical treatment of the English sentence, or the refined vision of the plastic power of the English word, what can result from our most conscientious efforts to transfer the foreign mind of any truly valuable author into English, but many painful instances of the truth of the words of the poet:—

“And he who now to sense, now nonsense leaning,
Means not, but blunders round about a meaning.”

What a noble contrast, for example, does a passage from some old Greek master, or modern German critic, done into such English as is spoken and written by a thoroughly trained and expert classical scholar, as Connop Thirlwall, the present bishop of St David's, present to some of those exercises in translation equally rude and effete, which, most painfully characterised by such an ignorance of Greek or German as sharply reminds one of Shakspeare's “Darkling stands the varying shore of the world,” are also no less distressingly suggestive of their authors having still to acquire a knowledge of the great leading landmarks of English etymology and syntax.

And if, as we believe, a well-grounded knowledge of the English language be, (in order to a more ready apprehension of the classical tongues,) to a large extent, a desideratum even among such students as, born and bred in the Anglo-Saxon districts of our country, were from the first introduced to the life of thought encumbered by no foreign influences, how much more desirable must it be to promote an exact knowledge of the English idiom, in those who, naturally thinking in a language like the Scottish Celtic, have to contend with the formidable disadvantage of being compelled to commute their natural forms of thinking into English—so greatly to them a foreign tongue—ere they can intelligently approach the critical study of the languages of Scripture. Nor can either Saxon or Gael ever hope to tread, with firm and free steps, such magnificent accesses to the rich, wide domains of truth, wisdom, and beauty, as are contained within the English of Hooker,

Jeremy Taylor, Burke, Hall, or Sir William Hamilton, in their respective spheres of thought, by means of any other education, than an earnest, painstaking, minute, and consistent study of classical philology.

For as yet, unhappily, as regards an exact knowledge of the English language, it is not in *immediate* connection with its special grammar that such accessible helps to its analytic study, to a sound knowledge of its *rationes dicendi*, exist, as should supersede the mediate use of Madvig or Winer. Under all circumstances, indeed, must that special education of the eye for words, the elementary facts of language; that cautious investigation of their radical forms with their more or less elaborate inflexions; accurate estimate of their complex notation, as either rising above or falling below their simple meanings; nice, rigorous balancing of clauses,—all of which are so constantly demanded of the conscientious philologist, and of which he must be all the more aware, that the subject of his investigation is so widely different in many most vital respects from his own native modes of thought,—prove a most salutary training, alike for the better knowledge of his own tongue, and his more easy and successful acquirement of the more arduous ideas conveyed in others.

The more fully have we dwelt on these points, because of their influential bearing on the most exact methods of special preparation for the sober and severe interpretation of the sacred volume. And greatly will we rejoice, if—even though some of our readers should be tempted to say of us, with old sarcastic Glanville, “Those grave contenders about opinionative trifles, look like aged Socrates upon his boy’s hobby-horse”—others, sympathising in the views we have expressed of the importance of classical philology as an instrument of true initiation, not only in the sacred tongues, but also in our own (the sound knowledge of which is, in its own place, so obviously necessary to a faithful approach to the translation of the inspired records), should allow us, in extenuation of the rather discursive amplitude of these remarks, to plead the apology,—

“A true devoted pilgrim is not weary
To measure kingdoms with his feeble steps.”

We are now, according to the promise implied in the title of this paper—a promise which we may seem in some measure to have overlooked—to give some account of the first two volumes of “Die Reden des Herrn Jesu,” by Dr Rudolf Stier, of Schkeuditz; which, under the auspices of Messrs T. and T. Clark, Foreign Booksellers, Edinburgh, have been produced in an English version.

Nor can it be thought at all foreign to our entire purpose in this paper,—in which we are anxious not only to commend the earnest study of the methods of a wholesome exegesis of Scripture, but also to indicate, in subserviency thereto, some of the most accessible aids to its successful prosecution,—if we gratefully record the important services which have been for many years rendered by the Messrs Clark.

Every reason have we to believe, that in any valid increase of interest in the grammatical interpretation of the Divine Word that has arisen in Scotland during the last twenty-five years, the works issued from their press have had a most sterling influence. By the admirable translations by Mr Menzies of Hoddam of several of Tholuck's works, and especially of the "*Philologisch-theologische Auslegung der Bergpredigt Christi nach Matthäus*," and many other valuable works of German authorship, forming their Cabinet Library, while holding forth the promise of supplying a want which had been, for a considerable period, more or less consciously felt by our more reflective students of theology, they almost originated a new impulse of thought amongst them.

Nor will we be supposed to abate, in any measure, the thankful tribute due by every earnest scholar to the publishers of the Cabinet Library, if, in still more ardent terms, we acknowledge our obligations to them in their production of the first and commencement of the second series of their Foreign Theological Library.

Many of the volumes forming the first series are of lasting worth. We especially refer to those of Olshausen, in their scientific development of the text of Scripture, to Havernick's "*Introduction to the Pentateuch*," and Neander's great work, which has infused a new life into the treatment of Church History. Of one or two of the volumes, indeed, viewed merely as translations, we cannot but regret that we do not even venture to allege—"There are greater depths and obscurities in an elaborate and well-written piece of nonsense, than in the most abstruse tract of school divinity;" as we too greatly fear, that whereas, in consequence of a most afflicting absence of the English language, there seems to be, in some of them, no divinity of any kind, we are, at the same time, excluded from every opportunity of being suitably refreshed with any thing like "elaborate and well-written nonsense." On the other hand, we cannot but regard such translations as that of Olshausen's *Romans*,—not to mention some others which have been executed nearer home,—as fully entitled to occupy a very high place among the best versions of German that have been produced in this kingdom.

Of the second series, so far as it has gone, we are encour-

raged to form such an opinion as warrants us in strongly commending it, not only to the theological profession, but to all others who are, in any degree, desirous of knowing more exactly, than at second hand, the best fruits of German thought and scholarship.

In the first volume of Hengstenberg's Christology, translated by the Rev. Messrs Meyer and Laing of the Free College, Edinburgh; the first two volumes of Ullmann's Reformers before the Reformation, by Mr Menzies of Hoddam; and Stier's Words of Jesus, by Messrs Pope and Fulton, (Vols. I. and II.); a vast storehouse of the richest treasures, apologetic, historical, and exegetic, is most intelligently thrown open to the student. Nor can the promise of Dr Dörner's "Entwickelungs-geschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi" (in which learning the most trustworthy is moulded with skill equally dexterous and delicate into august shapes of thought, and consecrated by a spirit of earnest truth and reverence), if duly fulfilled in honest English, fail of being cordially welcomed. So great, indeed, is our trust in the progressive success of this continued effort of the Messrs Clark, that we hope, at no distant date, to be able, in a calm and assured mind, to suggest to them the importance of their giving a translation of that valuable work, the "Real-Encyclopädie für Protestantische Theologie und Kirche," which is now in course of publication at Stuttgart, under the editorial auspices of Dr Herzog of Erlangen.

Let us now speak, however, of Stier's volumes. Nor can we generally express our admiration of them in too high terms of praise. Excellent though Olshausen be as an exegete, in a prompt scholarship, ample knowledge of opinion, and that warm spirituality of heart that so unequivocally marks the progress of the believer when earnestly struggling upward into the broader and ruddier sunlight of evangelical truth; Dr Rudolf Stier, as an acute, profound, exhaustive, and highly spiritual interpreter, is still more remarkable. Nor, generally speaking, is there any characteristic of his exegetical capacity more strongly marked than his power of detecting the most subtle germs and nerves of thought; while, at the same time, he leaves in the mind of his reader a much more definite consciousness of broad, palpable effects, than results from the interpretations of more than one of the most skilful of his countrymen. We know not, indeed, that there is any work of any ecclesiastical age that contains, within any thing like the same compass, so many pregnant instances of what true genius, in chastened submission to the control of a sound philology, and gratefully accepting the seasonable and suitable helps of a wholesome erudition, is capable of doing in the spiritual exegesis of the sacred volume. Every page is fretted and

studded with lines and forms of the most alluring beauty. At every step the reader is constrained to pause and ponder, lest he should overlook one or other of the many precious blossoms, that, in the most dazzling profusion, are scattered around his path. The heart and hand of a master in Israel is everywhere manifest. The freedom of sanctified intelligence is everywhere at work, earnestly searching for, and wisely disclosing, springs of fruitful and satisfying thought. Nor can we greatly err, if,—while simply regarding Dr Stier's method and spirit, his child-like faith in the depth and spirituality of the Redeemer's words, his mastery in interpreting his own more recondite consciousness, and his easy access to the finer relations of intelligence, opened up to him in his familiar acquaintance with the original languages of Scripture,—we venture to predict that his "Words of Jesus" are destined to produce a great and happy revolution in the interpretation of the New Testament in this country. Everywhere in these volumes are we reminded of what one of our most artistic thinkers has said of the power and worth of words:—

"A difference in words," he remarks, "is a very awful, important difference. A difference in words is a difference in things. Words are very awful and wonderful things, if they come from the most awful and wonderful of beings, Jesus Christ, the Word. He puts words into men's minds. He made all things, and he makes all words to express those things with. And woe to those who use the wrong words about things! For if a man calls any thing by a wrong name, it is a sure sign that he understands that thing wrongly, or feels about it wrongly. And therefore a man's words are oftener honest than he thinks; for as a man's words are, so is a man's heart,—out of the abundance of our hearts our mouths speak: and therefore, by right words, by the right names which we call things, we shall be justified; and by our words, by the wrong names which we call things, we shall be condemned."

We shall now endeavour to give some explanation of the special features of that excellence of which we have already spoken generally, giving such large extracts as may, in some measure, justify the terms we have used regarding it.

The preface, though containing much salutary truth, is of a rather desultory character. Awanting in the compactness and density congenial to the gravely didactic in writing, it exemplifies a blemish which, especially to the eye of the English reader, who cannot be familiar with local allusions, or consistently mindful of foreign impulsiveness, more or less sullies the entire work. Dr Stier sets out in it with an explanation of his design. He at once proclaims his faith in the Incarnate Word, as alike the source, centre, and substance of all the discoveries that have been made of the Godhead in the person of the Father; and he also unhesitatingly assumes, that but for

Jesus Christ the fact of Godhead in the Father's person must have been for ever inaccessible and incomprehensible.

2 Speaking of revelation *as such*, he uses the following words:—

“Discourse—the revelation of the inner man by utterance to others—admits of a wide variety of gradation and method; and one kind of revelation may be more direct and distinctively such than another.”—(P. 1.)

Then significantly adverting to the πολυμερῶς—the divers times and parts, and πολυτρόπως—the various methods and degrees, of the miraculous discoveries made of God by the universal and everlasting Prophet, ere he became incarnate, to the Old Testament church; in contrast to which, as betokening an incomparably superior finish and fulness of divine discourse to man, he speaks of the appearance on earth of that Prophet himself,—God manifest in the flesh,—

“The human exegesis,” he says, “of the λόγια τοῦ Θεοῦ has received its ultimate and highest task. It can propose to itself no loftier aim than to repose with John, the eagle of the church of the last times, upon the full assurance, Θεὸν ὁρθεὶς ἑώρακε πῶποτε· ὁ μονογενὴς υἱὸς, ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κλῆρον τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκείνου ἐξηγήσατο.”—(P. 1.)

Feeling strongly, because seeing clearly, the pernicious character of the many unbridled and lawless efforts made by the merely historical synoptists of the gospels to bend the facts of our Lord's life together with the words which he uttered into harmony with a merely logical solution of minor difficulties, he boldly proclaims the vital truth, that “no historical and psychological ἐπίλυσις of ours may ever avail to empty or invalidate for us one single יְהוָה אֱמַר בָּה, or יְהוָה אָמַר;” but, on the other hand, whatever is recorded in the inviolable γραφή, though without this preface, is regarded by us, who discern the word of God in such scripture, as “ἐξηθὲν ὑμῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ.”—(Matt. xxii. 31.)

And, in giving its own legitimate pre-eminence as a revelation to the incarnate disclosure of God to man in the person of the Son, as the great mystery of godliness, Stier does not at all depreciate the true value of Old Testament truth. On the contrary, receiving the ancient Scriptures as a gracious gift from the hands of Him who, from the earliest times, spake in his church as the predestined and predicted Incarnate One, he uses them as the adequate and peremptory evidence of the personal reality and infinite sufficiency of the Giver in all his fulness of grace and truth. Not merely in strong recoil from that sceptical spirit which contemptuously treats the Hebrew Scriptures as if they were little more than a shell left empty of its tenant and cast out on the beach, a dead memorial of bygone life; but, at the same time, quickly shrinking from

that spurious sentimentalism, in the native action of which the Old Testament is brought into sharp contrast to the New, as of a thing which is carnal as compared with that which is spiritual,—he honours the ancient words, as “words of Jesus.” To him the Old Testament is rich in forecastings and foretellings of the coming revelation of God in the nature of a living man. In its many historical tones of feeling, even where most prophetic,—in the strangely august overshadowing by the past of the glorious future,—he welcomes the augury of its everlasting power of instruction, as having no other or higher solution than in the living presence and gracious dominion of the Messiah—the Eternal Word—the Son of the Virgin Mary; who is also the Eternal Son of the Eternal God. He thus speaks of his Lord, when prophetically making himself known in the Old Testament, as combining in his own person the great Promiser and the long Promised—the Word and the Fact; in regard to whose visible advent there is, amidst manifold predictions, a marked progress, issuing in a most simple yet sublime result. All things, in his view, tend in an orderly and serene method alike to magnify the ancient records, as direct foreshadowings of the Crucified to come; and to expand, by their varied historic teachings, our best conceptions of his grace and glory, ere ever he appeared on earth.

“In the very centre,” says Stier, at page i. of his preface, “and heart of the revelations of God by Isaiah, which are yet waiting for their true interpretation,—that, namely, which shall accord with the word of Christ and his apostles,—the God of Israel promises (Is. lii. 6) that when his people’s true and everlasting redemption shall come, *he himself who spake would be there*, and evidence his presence by a new, then first openly proclaimed, עֲמָנִי אֵל (comp. ver. 7, with ch. xl. 9.) But the perfect theophany thus promised was to be accomplished, according to the uninterrupted testimony of Isaiah—a testimony which grows in clearness from that first אֵל גִּבּוֹר, and עֲמָנִי אֵל, shining out of the darkness like a faint star of hope, to the very end of his closely connected and ever-soaring predictions—by him who is at once the servant of the Lord, and the Lord himself.”

And, in the further evolution of this interesting course of reflection on the steady growth of the Messianic vision in Old Testament predictions, the author urges with great effect the importance of our duly receiving all such, to whatever past age of the church they more specially belong, as the manifold voices of the Lord himself regarding his own person and work, as the living Word of the Father. It is, he thinks, in the steadfast contemplation of our Lord’s announcing himself to the Church, from the beginning, as the Eternal sent of the Eternal, that we may most hopefully expect to reach, though it may be as with but tremulous steps, and teach, yet as with

stammering lips, the divine unity of counsel amidst the infinite variety of God's revelations. Nor in our study of this unity are we to suppose that it differs in essence from that of visible nature, which grows almost imperceptibly upon the eye and heart of the thoughtful man, when, humbly and reverentially avoiding premature theories regarding final causes either in nature or grace, he quietly commits himself to the secret promptings of that Eternal Word. For it is he who, in the supernatural disclosure of himself to man, divinely works out the facts of his own unity of nature, and our knowledge of it, in the manifold growths alike of natural and spiritual life.

Most pleasant it is to us, when gratefully thinking of Christ as the living centre of all truth and grace, to meet with a passage like the following, where the author's careful notice of an emphatic suffix, and his profound apprehension of the same Glorious Presence in revelations of widely different and distant ages, contribute to the more distinct illustration of the fact of the Revealed and Revealer being one and the same:—

“The emphatic suffix in הַיּוֹתֵהָ (he refers to Isa. xlviii. 16) “refers back to the creation of heaven and earth, ver. 13, (comp. ch. xlv. 18, 19); and the proper antithesis of מַעֲרָה is the anticipatory עֲתִידָהּ and הַיּוֹנִי of the revelation in the flesh. ‘I, the self-same אֲנִי הוּא, (ver. 12,) who was present at the beginning of the existence of all things, at that first יְהִי וַיְהִי, when the Eternal Word was with God, (Prov. viii. 27 has also אֲנִי שָׁם), come now as sent, and also as הַיּוֹנִי, (אֲנִי הוּא, ver. 17. Thus he is truly תַּמְרִידָר, the Eternal Word, he that speaketh, not merely here by the prophets, but in the most absolute sense from the beginning and from eternity. To both these places in Isaiah the Lord refers in John xviii. 20 and viii. 25. The sublime and mysterious answer, in the latter passage particularly, to the Σὺ τίς εἶ; of the Jews, is only rightly understood when we regard the Lord as asserting himself in the absolute, ἐγὼ εἰμι, אֲנִי הוּא, to be the ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι, and as referring to his words, which all must hear.”—(P. 2.)

Having thus, with unhesitating purpose, defined his own judgment of the real character and position of our Lord, as the source and substance of all divine revelations, Stier goes on to remark, in especial reference to the Redeemer's personal words, that his “λογος are the most expressive out-beamings of the λόγος.” He then refers, in a style of treatment so ardent as almost to approach, in some parts, to invective, to several of the questions affecting the integrity of the gospels, which having, during many years of unrest and scepticism, been vehemently stirred in his own country, have also been the subject of no little discussion in certain quarters in England.

He starts with the postulate, that all who believe in an actual revelation of the Son of God, are required to admit that his words cannot have fallen to the ground. He assumes,

that alike in the fact of a divine Revealer having been personally revealed, and in order to the suitable working out of that fact toward all the purposes of redemption, provision is divinely made for his having personal intercourse with man, by means of speech as well as acts. He also avows his unshrinking faith in our actual possession of our Lord's words; asserting explicitly, that the words of one whose appearance as a Revealer of the mind and heart of the Godhead is an admitted fact, "cannot have dropped and been lost through the sieve of erring human composition."

"Yes," he remarks (p. iii. of the preface), "we possess that which He spake. Not, indeed, in the letter of the *verba ipsissima*, but through the mediating witness of the evangelists, elevated in the Spirit. Yet are they truly and essentially the *ipsissima*, as his teaching for the world and the church. Thou shalt know them to be such, if the same Spirit under whose influence the gospels were written shall explain to thee, and illustrate their letter. John, the fourth evangelist, who adheres with the least tenacity of all to the literal, original expression, gives us, nevertheless, as is manifest to every one, the words of the WORD in their most spiritual and living reality. Each evangelist has his peculiar gift from the Lord; but, through the combination of all, the Holy Ghost has so wrought out one wonderful scheme, that the whole of what these four evangelists present to us as the utterance of the Son of God incarnate, carries with it its own evidence in its own perfect harmony."

Inclined in some measure, Stier may be, if we have not failed to enter into his views, to dwell unduly on the power of the critical sense as a test of the divine origin of the gospels; as, for example, when he says, "that he reads the Bible as written through the Holy Ghost, because this word approves itself with ever-increasing force as inspired to my reason." At the same time, also, in common with not a few able and admirable men, both in Germany and England, who, trembling at the "Word of God," receive it thankfully in its grand results as a divine product, he seems to shrink from the fact and philosophy of a miraculous inspiration of the words as at first communicated by the Holy Ghost to the evangelists. "I read," says he, "the canonical text of the Bible, as written through the Holy Ghost; but I so read it, not because I have framed for myself beforehand any inspiration dogma, or have devoted myself as a bond slave to the old dogmatic."

We, on the contrary, are almost instinctively led, by our own apprehension of the metaphysic of language, (its organic relations to thought as thought; its intricate connotations of the personal element in man as the co-ordinate result of reason, volition, and spontaneous obligation, with its wondrous expressiveness of the more delicate impulses of individual emotion,) to regard it as the necessary organ of all in man which

constitutes him the creature of "such large discourse, looking before and after." We would, nevertheless, most sensitively recoil from the perplexing issue of requiring the faith of any man in the plenary inspiration of Scripture, on grounds that may appear to many in no small measure abstruse, if not altogether resolvable into an excess of linguistic theory. In, moreover, scrutinising the elements of our own conviction of plenary inspiration as a fact, we cannot but feel that it rests on a preternatural interposition of God in nature; on that law of miracles which, appealing in its own abstract nature to our wide sense of possibility, is also, in its practical relations to what is probable in revelation, to be tested and measured by the ordinary rules of historical evidence. Nor can we see that this miracle, even when viewed in its most rigid form, is, as a historical fact, in any degree more exposed to logical difficulties than is any other of the universal and everlasting instances of the interaction of the divine and human wills. We, nevertheless, would shrink from the pain, the confusion, the calamity, of suspecting any devout man who is baffled by intricate questions regarding the mode of inspiration, as though he could not be assured of the fact of God's Word being in the Bible.

But, more especially, while realising stringently, in our own consciousness, the difficulties in the way of a divine inspiration of words as being but few and feeble, when compared with those which seem to be felt in some degree by Dr Rudolf Stier; we feel as if we would most presumptuously reject, as of no value, the most positive results of our most precious knowledge of many men, eminent alike in natural and preternatural gifts, and especially falsify all our instinctive sympathies with the high-toned Christianity of such works as the "Words of Jesus," were we at liberty to do more than merely express our unfeigned regret at others not seeing even as we see.

What can be more significant of the faith of a child of God in the reality of the divine origin and nature of the Bible, than the following words of our author at page iv. of his preface?—

"We must assuredly read, as men, what the Lord has humanly spoken and consigned to human record. But to every man who reads, *as of the truth*, (John xviii. 37), it is given to *hear* and to *see* the glory of the Incarnate Word; for in these gospels His manifestation, his life, his teaching, are truly transfigured into an ever-living and life-giving *Spirit-word*. It was of necessity that the Word should first be made flesh, but equally so that the flesh should become Spirit again; and it is as such that the Word now speaks to the world. This is the essential principle of life, from which, as an incorruptible seed, the faith and the church derive their being."—(P. iv.)

Having indicated his assumption of the certainty of Christ's words, Dr Stier also proclaims, as we have already stated, not his escape from, but his opposition to, the artificial attempts to consolidate them in the form of a harmony. He refuses to allow that it is permissible for any one, with whom the historical reality of Immanuel's life on earth is a practical conviction, to handle his divine words with any thing like the freedom with which a comparative anatomist, having here the fragment of a pelvis, or there the minutest process of a vertebra, engages to complete the idea of the skeleton of which it once formed a part. Our author's exegetical position is then, as next in order of importance, more fully explained.

And having assumed that he *has* the words of his Lord—not that he has yet to seek and find them—he, in the following brief sentences, touches the deep key-note of his whole work:—

“All sound exposition of the divine word of salvation must, at least, have a hortatory element, for that word itself is hortatory throughout; in these pages there is not the smallest paragraph which simply ministers food to our critical curiosity. Nothing seems to us more unnatural than a certain *dead, dry* handling of the Word of Life—never speaking from the heart to the heart—which is called the purely scientific.”

Gratefully admiring the miraculous awakening, in the sinner's soul, of new views of God, new sympathies with Christ's own righteousness as his Father's servant, with Christ's own blessedness as his Father's Son, which constitute the grand, ultimate end in man, of saving sovereignty and grace, Stier then gives his estimate of a grammatical inquest into the meaning of Scripture. In his view, its value is merely that of an instrument for bringing out into the light of intelligence and duty those manifold springs and motives of a renewed life—heavenly aspirations, free self-denial, the faith, gratitude, and reverence, of which the living Christ is the all-sufficient source and minister.

It is of Christ, as both the living and the life-giving one, that he designs to speak. And thus, when he speaks of Christ, he does not regard him almost at all as the subject of a logical creed; but, on the contrary, as the living, personal origin of a life-giving faith. “For,” says he, “the Bible is not, once and for all, a mere old document for the learned, but a text for the preacher to the church and the world, ever and inexhaustibly new.”

Proceeding to examine the divine records under the sway of the sure conviction of a living Christ, (who, as we believe, is not, and cannot be, in his personal life, destructively opposed to

scientific symbols of his own revelations, but, on the contrary, is sanctifying and keeping them alive in the hearts of his people, as exponents of his past methods of vindicating the life-giving power of his presence in the church,) our author thus more fully indicates his method of investigation and teaching:—

“The great and fundamental deficiency of nearly all learned exegesis, with which mine must for ever differ, is its misapprehension of the depth and fulness of meaning which, in accordance with its higher nature, necessarily belongs to every word of the Spirit. Though believed to be the Word of God, it is treated superficially, and on principles of partial and one-sided deduction, just as if it were the word of man.”

Most pregnant words! most full of searching and rebuke to all, especially whose function in life, whose business in time, is to unfold the riches of the Messiah's truth and grace to the church and the world!

For, alas! how often is the preacher satisfied with but a mere fitful glance at the true meaning of the words, provided he can but arrange his suppositions regarding them in something like decorous consistency with his stereotyped doctrinal opinions. And to what a painful extent in mischief, as regards the fruitful life of the simple believer, has this more than frivolous disregard of divine words, in union with an idolatry of human forms, prevailed among us, it is not needful here to define or illustrate. Even though there were, from this cause, no such distaste for ecclesiastical formularies as is deeply felt and often expressed now, by many of the most earnest minds of the times, in all classes of life, nothing can be more prejudicial to personal Christianity than anything tending to foster a habitual disposition to treat superficially the words of Scripture. For, in withdrawing the mind of the believer from earnest inquiry, it arrests the healthful action of his heart. In fetters to set forms of thought, which have been familiar to him from his childhood, he can have no very acute sense of that growing freedom of conviction and peace which wait on the advancing steps of those who receive the words of Christ directly and simply as the words of one who is not only a tender-hearted human friend, but who also, in the same person,—in the very same works, and words, and tones,—is the God of inflexible righteousness and boundless compassion.

Nor, in making these remarks, do we, in the smallest degree, abate our thankful reverence for a Confession of Faith. On the contrary, earnestly grasping the conviction of all history, so far as it is truthfully recorded, being a register of divine acts, we deeply feel the value of a scientific confession of personal beliefs, viewed simply as a *historical* document, designed and destined to transmit the knowledge of what men have visibly

thought and felt—how they have struggled and suffered—in relation to God and the great life of eternity. Still further, in thankfully recording our sense of the *doctrinal* value of a public symbol, such as that which, in the good providence of God, the Westminster divines were enabled to prepare, we feel the obligation of that faithful regard to it which arises from the fact of its being the consenting voice of men who received and handed down the deep spiritual consciousness of lives spent in the presence of the enemy, and of what great things God had done in their vindication and support. And, in pleading for a more scientific interpretation, our sympathies are not at all with those who seem to regard the dogmatic and exegetic principles as antagonistic and unfriendly. On the other hand, we are persuaded, alike from observation and experience, that, in a well-ordered creed, in the presence of so large a body of historic truth as we find in the Westminster Confession, there are both preventives of undue license, and preservatives of due reverence of spirit, in the purely scientific study of the words of Scripture. Persuaded also are we, that no greater calamity could befall the important interests of scriptural exegesis in this country, and in this age of the world, than that any great number of those who ardently follow after it should find themselves cut off from a historical sympathy with the faithful in past times,—thrown loose from those hereditary moorings to truth, by means of which the saints, in times of scorching and sifting, were kept steadfast in their attachment to the faith and worship of the Son of God.

Nor in the fact of the public teachers of religion being constantly overshadowed by a hereditary standard of beliefs, or restrained from using their position in proclaiming errors, in repudiation of which that standard has been, and is, upheld in the church, is there, we fondly believe, any thing which prevents or incapacitates them from drawing forth all its cardinal truths into greater breadth of detail, deeper analytic definition, and more lively personal relations. On the contrary, we believe there is no man who, with the grammar and lexicon (grammars so impregnated with the spirit of earnest fact as are Ewald's and Bernhardt's, or the lexicons of Pape and Gesenius) as his daily companions in exploring the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures, who will not, unless of peculiarly weak doctrinal ties, confess that, quickened and invigorated by the healthful exegesis of Scripture, he has felt a depth of meaning in his Confession, especially in its orderly antagonism to errors regarding the person and work of Christ, such as he had never before been aware of.

Nor in any wide deviation from the spirit of these remarks, though he speaks with an almost exclusive reference to the

superficial treatment of the Word of God, have we reason to understand the following words of Stier:—

"In the endeavour to understand it," (the Word of God,) "that depth is not explored, where, from the one root of the 'sensus simplex,' the richest fulness of references spring up and ramify, in such a manner, that what, upon the ground and territory of its immediate historical connection, presents one definitely apprehended truth as the kernel of its meaning, does, nevertheless, expand itself into an inexhaustible variety of senses, for the teaching of the world in all ages, and especially in the church, where the Holy Spirit himself continues to unfold his germinal word, even to the end of their days. While this applies to every word of the Spirit in its several measure, to the *words of the Word* it applies without measure, to an extent which eternity only will disclose. Many of Christ's utterances make, upon the most obtuse mind, the overpowering impression of a mysterious, super-abounding amplitude of meaning. If others, even the most part of them, appear in their slight drapery of proverbial, rabbinical, parabolical, forms of language, so humanly simple, yet, approach them closely, contemplate them in their ever new applications to various times, until they will be so transfigured before you, that you will cease to deem it incomprehensible that the church, through the process of centuries of reading and preaching, has never grown weary of them, or that this Word, in its unchangeable might, has triumphantly lived down all the fleeting words of men."—(P. 12.)

Having thus, in some measure, explained Stier's method, with its leading postulates—having also indicated the momenta of his mind as an interpreter—we shall now set before the reader such extracts from the work itself as will enable him to compare his exegesis with its rules.

Turning to page 18 of Vol. I., we have an exposition of the first words of Christ to his parents concerning his Father.—(Luke ii. 49.)

"Solitary floweret out of the wonderful, enclosed, garden of the thirty years; plucked precisely there, where the swollen bud, at a *distinctive crisis*, bursts into flower. To mark that, is assuredly the design and meaning of this record. The *child* Jesus sought to know himself; and his whole life of childhood was this seeking. Here he begins to find out his own mystery; and it is not merely a *first word* to his parents and to us, but also a first word of the Eternal Spirit, in the human spirit of the person of the God-man. This is attested in verse 50, which signifies that this was the first 'My Father,' which had fallen from the lips of the child."

His conception of what the spiritual position of our Lord was at this early period being thus announced, having also most significantly referred to the personal history immediately connected with his first "My Father," and to his careful acquiescence in the divine order of human life, by his sitting among the doctors, not as a *teacher*, but as a learner, hearing them and asking questions, the author proceeds as follows:—

"Shortly, indeed, and properly, asking as one who as yet knew not, but whose progress and learning went on into ever increasing wisdom, verses 40-52, his questions were the pure-light questions of innocence and truth, which keenly and deeply penetrated into the confused errors of the rabbinical teaching. Rightly to question, is the highest wisdom which the learner, as such, can possess. For one genuine question of him who seeks in the right direction, already contains more realised truth than a thousand disjointed answers of the false wisdom of books and words. Thus does the Galilean youth, in his Divine-human simplicity, *confound* the masters in Israel, sitting in the loftiest chairs of the erudition of the age, and the seat of the learner predicts the future throne of the teacher. His light shines forth upon the world now at the first with such simple convincingness, that many of those who were susceptible, were astonished at the understanding displayed in his *questions*; and in the *answers* which he gave, when, as would naturally enough follow, he was questioned in return. At least all who *gave heed to him*—which many, who were scandalised, might not as yet, shortly speaking, be disposed to do."—(Vol. I., p. 19.)

Truly admirable is all this! How fully and clearly is the general conception of Christ in the presence of rabbinical ignorance and prejudice—yet as nevertheless doing honour, by his sincere and lowly heart, to the authorised teachers of his nation—presented to us! and presented as by a single touch!

Can any thing be more impressive, (not only of the historical tact so characteristic of our author's genius, as with artistic skill—higher far than the most practised efforts of the merely plodding grammarian—he selects his exegetical position, and unfolds his message; but also of the ardent penetration of a sanctified heart, mastering, in humble submission to the Spirit's teaching, some of the deeper secrets of his Lord's youthful consciousness,) than the manner in which he moves onward in his impassioned work?

"Jesus brings with him a knowledge and understanding of the written Word of God derived from the school of home: he finds this, to some extent, reproduced in Jerusalem, but only as falsified and overlaid by the errors of human teaching. This contradiction, which at the first so glaringly manifests itself, stirs mightily his truth-seeking spirit. He had innocently expected to receive from the masters, in the house of God, the full and much-desired answer to his accumulated questions, and nothing but truth and wisdom; but he finds it otherwise, and detects the disparity by that sense of truth which from the beginning recoiled from every error. He *could* already have taught, but it enters not his mind that He could. He rather *asks questions*. And what questions, did we but know them! Many a pre-intimation, we may suppose, of his after-manner of asking. 'How is it written, then, in this or that scripture?' Thus, by Holy Writ, he presses hard upon the precepts of men, even as babes and sucklings have done by His Spirit in all ages since; and thus, without designing it, or being even conscious of doing so, He opens out the meaning of the Scriptures.

The main subject of their communications is the Messiah and his kingdom. This theme arouses most fully the ready presentiment with which he came there; and in the course of this questioning, (which is but the asking after himself,) he finds that great answer which the Spirit alone can give him. He makes the discovery of himself, in the first consciousness, not yet mature, but now fully commencing—*I am He!* This he conceals in deep and pure humility, from the astonished ones around him; but this first reproof of his parents, now least expected, extorts from its profoundest sanctuary this great utterance.”—(Vol. I., p. 20.)

How well it is in these unquiet times, how sweetly ominous in these self-willed days of ours of a coming rest, as often as our Lord bestows the gift of any one on his church, who, by the reconciling strength of a loving heart alone, or by the prophetic fervour of genius consecrated to his service, is enabled to show Christ to us as he really is! For is there not, in every heart—that, escaping from an almost destroying sense of loneliness, has found a refuge in the ever-present Son of God—a most victorious conviction that he is not removed from our sympathy; that he is not almost hidden from the eye beneath the mummy cerements of a dry and repulsive scholasticism, but is clothed in our nature, a present Lord, and ever-helpful friend, of whom, when recalling some sad hour of desertion and dreariness, we can think and say—

“He went
Invisible, yet stayed; such privilege
Hath omnipresence”?

Now of the capacity for thus vividly representing our Lord—his words, his works, his divine method of teaching and being taught, his understanding of himself, and his hallowed scrutiny of others, his coming close to man, and leaving behind him a deep strong sense of what such nearness is and what it means—the author of these volumes is an impressive instance.

For example, of the Virgin mother's reproof, and its divine reception by her Son—who, so simple and natural in all his ways, yet invested even those most near and dear to him with a strange sense of an unearthly presence—when she found him in the midst of the doctors in the temple, we have the following exposition at page 20, Vol. I:—

“It was the first reproof which he received. They had all along addressed him as ‘child,’ with many a direction and admonition, but had never found any thing to rebuke. The foster-father even now remains standing, as ever, at reverent distance; the mother alone ventures, with a mother's right, to speak,—yet at the same time, in the father's name. She only, indeed, ventures upon a question, appealing to his tested integrity as a child; as if she would say,—‘What thou hast now done I understand not, for the first time!’ Done *to us*—this gave an unanswerable pathos to her question, for he had never given them pain before. ‘Thy father’—thus had Joseph till now been spoken of. Never,

indeed, had Mary's lips as yet been bold to say to the 'Son of the Highest,' (Luke i. 32,) concerning the Most High, 'Thy Father!' Yet are her words not *we*, thy parents, but, *Thy father and I*,—a most exquisitely delicate expression of that sacred secret which had almost faded away in her soul, but the consciousness of which is already prepared to anticipate the great Word which her son is about to utter.

"And he said unto them, *How is it that ye sought me? Wist ye not that I must be about my Father's business?* Instead of acknowledging any error, or uttering any regret for their sorrow and anxiety, he gives them a kind and earnest lesson, though without appearing to do so, concerning their whole parental relation, especially in time past. There are two counter-questions in answer to the two questions of his mother. First of all he puts another *wherefore* against her's, as he becomes conscious of the feeling with which they had *sought him*. It had been so natural to him to be and to abide where he was, that he had not thought of their seeking him at all; and shows that he regards it as quite needless, at least to seek him *sorrowing* in grief and anxiety, as if it were possible for him to be in wrong or in danger. The reproof is thus given back, and in such a way, that the blame (as is too often the case, alas! in the human education of children of sin) is reflected upon the parents. But he speaks without any design to shame or correct them; he innocently *asks the question* of his parents, as he had done before of the doctors, and all the shame lay in the circumstance itself. Incomparably and inconceivably *artless*, as elevated as it is childlike, is that *Wist ye not?* That which he here now, while he utters it, begins for the first time to conceive and understand clearly, becomes, at the same time, so natural to him, that it is as if he had ever known it; as if it could not be otherwise than it was; as if it must be equally self-explained to every one else."

Already we have spoken of the author's spiritual sagacity in scanning the deeper lineaments of his Lord's growing consciousness of his Messiahship. Dwell we would for a little, at this point, on the important help thus contributed to a true apprehension of the mental experience of Christ, considered in its highest aspect, as a valid sacrifice for sin, during his whole life; as being, during his whole life, an absolute model of self-denial and devotedness.

In our view, nothing is more certain than that no scheme of moral recovery can ever meet the deep, strong necessities of our fallen and estranged life, which in its essence is not the redemption of a forfeited inheritance, and the moral resurrection of a corrupt and dead heart. Nor is it less the fact, in regard to Christ's saving work, that, alike in those material shapes by which the warm life-blood of bullock and lamb be-tokened to the spiritual eye in ancient Israel the sacrificial virtue of the Lamb slain before the foundation of the world; in the rich, resplendent imagery of prophets, gathered from the history of national redemption, and triumphantly foretelling the King of Zion; and also, in broad historical fact—it is a method whereby man's alienated inheritance, as a child of

God, may be redeemed, and the deep degradation and dishonour of spiritual death may be for ever repealed.

Emphatically in sacrifice—in sacrifice which was most distinctively prescribed by, and in all its action referred to, the laws of Jehovah as a righteous governor, are the life and strength of redemption. Nor can we overlook the fact, that alike in the philosophical interpretation of conscience, as a ceaseless postulating of law on the part of its divine Creator; and in the historical theory of types, (that, except it embody the recognition of judicial rectitude, is but an idle mystery); there is a foundation laid for the atoning virtue of our Lord's once offering of himself for sin.

Nor is it less the fact that Christ's personal experience of his Father's law, has, more clearly now, less clearly then, as a valid expiation of human sin, the violation of the universal laws of right—as a penal ransom of the lost inheritance of man as a child of God—been always recognised by the church as a first principle of its testimony. And every attempt to discharge the penal element from it, has been justly regarded as tantamount to its emasculation of all remedial virtue.

That our author is quite decided in his views on this point, we are not distinctly prepared to say. Even among the most devout and faithful divines in Germany, there is no little vagueness of thought in regard to the predestined vicariousness of the Saviour's work. As, however, it is not in one day that men, having to grope out their way from the darkness of an age of disbelief, escape into the full light of truth; so it is well that we see them steadily ascending, amidst lets and hinderances that we have never known, towards the unclouded orb of everlasting day.

Most gratefully then, notwithstanding, do we welcome Stier's deep study of our Lord's daily obedience. Because, while cordially submitting to the high generalization, by the departed sages of the church, of the essential unity of the Divine and human volitions in the God-man, we have sometimes endured a most afflicting perplexity in our efforts to reduce our personal belief to a practical account. Too often has the logic of our most exact theology, in regard to the active relation of the Divine to the human mind in the living Christ, been as a sudden, sharp, painful interruption to our every-day realization of his affectionate presence. We have sometimes felt as if our practical sense, when compared with our scientific knowledge of the Redeemer's truth and grace, in his present life, were almost as apart as is the consciousness of life and enjoyment amidst the warm airs and fragrant vegetation of an intertropical climate, when compared with the effects of the intensely frigid and withering sunlight of the Arctic regions.

While, therefore, desirous of a more certain expression of the

fact in Christ's life of a penal sacrifice as a satisfaction to divine justice, than we can definitely find in the words of Dr Stier, we cannot but welcome, in a grateful spirit, his expositions of the spirit that animated and controlled our Lord's heart amidst present duties and trials.

Because we deeply feel that his expositions, while arresting the eye of the thoughtful reader of our Lord's life upon its more minute details, the connected words of his simple, familiar sayings, the natural beginning, and the not more artificial ending of his discourses, together with what at first sight appear but incidental acts of self-denial, strongly tend to impart a definite conviction of his whole life (from the hour in which he appeared, as an infant of days, in the manger of Bethlehem, to his disappearance from the earth as a crucified and dead man in Joseph's tomb) having been a true sacrifice, in an earnest, steadfast surrender of his holy human will, amidst unparalleled penalties, to the will of God his Father, as the righteous Lord of the earth.

"What," he asks, "is this, in fine, and *how does the Lord fulfil the Law and the Prophets?* He fulfils the Law as its first perfect teacher and performer (ver. 19); who releases the spirit, which though in it was bound in it, by the confirming testimony of a spiritual interpretation, and the living exhibition of it in word and work; who, as man, made of a woman, and made under the law, as minister of the circumcision, bound to all the ordinances of Israel, (Gal. iv. 4, v. 3), fulfils, in perfect obedience, all righteousness, and satisfies every righteous obligation which human nature and the creature sustains in relation to God, (τὰ πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, Heb. ii. 17.) But, because this obedience, which was freely undertaken in the incarnation of the Eternal Son, is fully accomplished in his sacrifice for us, sinners, who could not render it—an obedience not merely imputed to us, but implanted in us, through our actual union with his humanity—therefore, Christ, in his entire obedience, suffering in doing from the beginning, and doing in suffering to the end, is the one meritorious and living sacrifice, finally and fully presented in death, the true object of the whole typical law, which testified of the necessity of such a sacrifice between God and man on account of sin."—(Vol. I., p. 13.)

In drawing these remarks to a close, we would solicit the reader to make himself thoroughly acquainted with these admirable volumes. Not entirely acquiescing in all Dr Stier's doctrinal views, nor implicitly subscribing to every word in his exegesis,—for at some points of his implied theological system he seems to reject what in our view is the function of a legitimate and safe logic, while, in his interpretation, words occasionally appear as if beneath a too high pressure,—we, at the same time, do most clearly and cordially recommend him as a Master in Israel.

Space permitting, we would gladly extract a few more

specimens of his best mind and manner from these volumes ; we might perhaps, also, exhibit a methodical series of striking sayings,—gems of the purest texture and most steady ray. Most pleasantly, indeed, would we rest for hours together gazing rapturously downward on these lustrous depths of consecrated wisdom, earnestly seeking to penetrate their rich, solemn recesses of divine knowledge, and gratefully listening to the many voices of surpassing compass and sweetness, that, calmly rising to the steadfast heavens, must ever render this work most precious, and which cannot fail to make the author's name memorable and blessed in all days to come.

“ How often, from the steep
Of echoing hill, or thicket, have we heard
Celestial voices, to the midnight air,
Sole or responsive, each to other's note,
Singing their great Creator ! ”

* It is very instructive, and very humbling, to contrast with the existing arrangements for theological education in the Scottish churches, the theological curriculum prepared by Andrew Melville for the New or Divinity College in St Andrews, and formally approved and adopted by the Scottish Parliament in 1579. It is thus described by the late Dr M'Crie, in his *Life of Melville*, vol. ii., c. xi., pp. 358–362:—

“ St Mary's, or the New College, was appropriated entirely to the study of theology, and the languages connected with it. The course of study in it was to be completed in four years, under the tuition of five professors. The first professor was to teach the elements of Hebrew during six months, and of Chaldee and Syriac during the remainder of the first year. During the subsequent eighteen months, the students were to prosecute the study of these languages under the second professor, who was to explain the Pentateuch and historical books of the Old Testament critically, by comparing the original text with the Chaldee Paraphrases, the Septuagint, and other ancient versions. The third professor was to explain the prophetic books of the Old Testament after the same manner, during the last eighteen months of the course. During the whole four years, the fourth professor was to explain the New Testament, by comparing the original with the Syriac version. And the fifth professor, who was Principal of the college, was to lecture, during the same period, on the common places, or system of divinity. All the students were bound to attend the lectures of three professors every day during the continuance of their theological course ; by which it was expected that they would, ‘ with meane diligence, become perfite theologians.’ Public disputations were to be held every week ; declamations once a month ; and, at three periods during the course, a solemn examination was to take place, at which ‘ every learned man shall be free to dispute.’ ”

“ The method of study prescribed for the theological college was well calculated to realise the hopes expressed in the act. It appointed a greater number of teachers of the Old Testament than either was necessary or could easily be obtained ; and one of them might have been employed with more advantage in reading lectures on ecclesiasti-

cal history, according to an arrangement which was subsequently introduced. But the attention paid to the sacred languages, and especially to the oriental tongues, is entitled to the highest commendation, and shows that the author of the plan had conceived correct ideas of the importance of this branch of literature for forming able and judicious interpreters of Scripture. Indeed, it proceeds upon the very principles which have since been laid down, and recommended by the best writers on Biblical interpretation. I would not, however, be understood as intimating, that the benefits which actually resulted from this change in the university were proportioned to its merits. The wisest plans, and the most salutary enactments, will prove nugatory, if proper measures are not taken to carry them into execution, or even if they go much beyond the degree of illumination which the age has reached. There is reason to think that, in the present instance, this was the case to a certain extent."

When will Scotland reach such a "degree of illumination" as to be qualified to appreciate the views and plans of her ancient worthies in regard to theological education?

ART. VII.—*Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Ralph Wardlaw, D.D.* By WILLIAM LINDSAY ALEXANDER, D.D.
Edinburgh: A. & C. Black.

IT is a very precious truth, that all who are united to the Lord Jesus Christ are united also to one another in love, and have communion in each other's gifts and graces. This communion is so far universal, that it is unlimited and illimitable by any thing in itself. What one holy soul communicates to another cannot be arrested, but may be transmitted and diffused to countless millions, throughout all time and space; and may, for what we can tell, enter with immortal spirits into eternity. Nor is such communication of gifts and graces limited to direct lines of living transmission. Each generation can take up all the collected records of all the past, so that all the recorded gifts and graces of all good men combine to form the common treasury of a spiritual communion, embracing alike the past, the present, and the future. The writings of a great and good man form a portion of the ever-expanding communion of gifts and graces, the increasing heritage of mankind. In no department is this heritage more valuable than in that of Christian biography; both because in this we see truths and principles alive, embodied, and in action; and because, by becoming acquainted with, and interested in the author of important works, we peruse these works with a degree of intense and vivid warmth, which carries them glowing to the

heart, and stamps them on the character. For these reasons, while we regard every good man as a benefactor to the human race, by his life and his writings, we are not less grateful to those who bring us into personal contact with such men, and thereby prolong the vitality, and increase the influence of all their gifts and graces.

That we regard Dr Lindsay Alexander's *Life of Dr Wardlaw* as a work of this character, our readers will readily conclude, otherwise we should certainly not have assumed so high a position and principle as our starting point; and we feel confident, that every intelligent and candid reader of it will arrive at the same conclusion. During a period of not less than forty years, Dr Wardlaw occupied a very distinguished position among theological writers, not merely as the foremost man of his own denomination, nor as in the first rank of Scottish theological authors, but as a learned and able divine, whose productions were destined to exercise extensive influence for good in the church of Christ throughout the world. From the time when he published his work on the Socinian Controversy, till the very verge of his decease, Dr Wardlaw was almost incessantly engaged in the production of works on important religious subjects; so that the history of his life and writings is almost a history of the religious characteristics of the period. It is not, of course, meant that all his efforts were equally valuable, or that we approve of all his opinions; but that he early took, and long maintained, a prominent position in the Christian authorship of a period very remarkable for Christian activity; so that a well-executed life of Dr Wardlaw cannot fail to have peculiar and extensive value. Dr Alexander has shown that he clearly perceived the nature and importance of the task which he undertook; and the memoir which he has produced gives ample proof of his ability for its adequate achievement. He has laid before the public a work which must inevitably at once take and maintain its place in the very foremost rank of Christian biography.

There is one peculiar aspect of Dr Alexander's work, regarding the propriety of which differences of opinion will be entertained. He not only states, with great clearness in each instance, the principles held by Wardlaw on the important subjects on which he wrote, with a succinct statement of the arguments used in their defence; but he also, in almost every instance, gives his own opinion on these subjects, expressing, without any hesitation, his difference from Wardlaw, and pointing out, what appears to him, the fallacy by which Wardlaw's judgment had been misled. The indiscriminate admirers of the earlier author may be somewhat displeased with the biographer for the liberty he has thus taken; but, unless we

greatly mistake, the public generally will approve his adoption of a plan by means of which they have obtained a much more full and free discussion of important topics, and a larger amount of well-balanced thought, than would otherwise have been possible. Those who were already acquainted with the manly independence of Dr Alexander's character, will not be in the least surprised by this characteristic of his work; and those who read the explanatory statements of the preface, will see that no person has any right to be seriously offended, though some may, perhaps, think that the liberty so claimed might have been more sparingly used. But, quitting this topic, we shall attempt to give our readers some idea of the work itself; and, in doing so, we shall follow Dr Alexander's example, and express our own judgment, with equal freedom, on the opinions of both the subject and the author of this very important work.

"Ralph Wardlaw," to use the words of his biographer, "was the son of William and Ann Wardlaw, and was born at Dalkeith, in the county of Mid-Lothian, on the 22d of December 1779. By his father's side he was connected with the ancient Anglo-Saxon house of Wardlaw of Pitreavie, in Fife. By the mother's side his descent may be said to be illustrious both in a religious and in a worldly point of view. She was the daughter of the Rev. James Fisher, and grand-daughter of the Rev. Ebenezer Erskine, one of the founders of the Secession Church. The Rev. Ebenezer Erskine was connected with the noble family of Mar; and, through his mother, Margaret Halero, he counted a still higher lineage,—a lineage connecting him, on the one side, with the royal blood of Scotland, and, on the other, passing up into the fabulous antiquity of Scandinavian genealogy." Mr Wardlaw removed to Glasgow when his son Ralph was about six months old; so that, although Dalkeith was his birth-place, Glasgow was the spot where he grew up from infancy to manhood. In Glasgow, after passing through the ordinary school training, he attended the University, where he enjoyed the advantage of being taught by such eminent professors as Richardson, Young, and Jardine; having as one of his class-fellows Thomas Campbell, the poet. Throughout his academic career, Ralph Wardlaw manifested a decided love of learning, an elegant and refined taste, considerable mental power, and great propriety of conduct, giving rich promise of future eminence, both by his character and by his acquirements.

After completing his course at the University, Mr Wardlaw was sent to the Theological Hall of the Burgher Synod, at that time conducted by Dr Lawson of Selkirk, a man of extensive acquirements, and not a few eccentricities, but an ad-

mirable trainer of students. Under his charge Mr Wardlaw continued for the prescribed term of five sessions, and appears to have both made good progress, and to have acquired those habits of regular and systematic study which he afterwards turned to such account. During Mr Wardlaw's residence as a student at Selkirk, some discussions arose relative to a reconciliation between the two bodies into which the Seceders had been divided previously, under the designations respectively of Burghers and Anti-Burghers. About the same time both of these bodies began to be agitated by internal controversies regarding the doctrine of the Confession of Faith, as to the relation of the civil magistrate to the church. Dr Alexander gives his opinion on these early discussions with his usual frankness, but, as we think, without an adequate acquaintance with the subject. He quotes, though not fully, the noble principle stated in the twentieth chapter:—"God alone is Lord of the conscience, and hath left it free from the doctrines and commandments of men, which are in any thing contrary to His Word, or beside it in matters of faith or worship;" and then adds, "Yet this is so explained as to admit of its being, at the same time, most plainly and unequivocally affirmed, that it is the duty of the civil magistrate, as such, and by the use of force, to take order for the prevention of heresy, and the maintenance of orthodox belief." After quoting a few sentences from other parts of the Confession, he says, "Such statements very clearly assert, that not only has the civil magistrate much to do *circa sacra*, but also that he has not a little to do *in sacris*;"—a conclusion which the framers of the Confession certainly never meant to convey, which they very distinctly meant to repel, and which the Long Parliament, anxious as they were to possess and use such power, never ventured to claim on the authority of the Confession. Further, it is contrary to all the rules of sound and fair reasoning, to assume that the leading term, expressing the principle of any compound proposition, can be explained away by any subsequent and subordinate term; but, on the contrary, in all sound and fair reasoning, the subordinate terms must be understood in conformity with the leading term and principle, and explained by its obvious meaning. We cannot here afford space to argue this point; but we take the liberty of saying, that, by adhering to this rule of fair reasoning, the Confession of Faith may be triumphantly vindicated from the stale and groundless accusation of containing intolerant and persecuting principles. Dr Alexander will scarcely, we think, attempt to prove that the Westminster divines were such bunglers in logic as to frame compound propositions, the leading term of which clearly defined the power of the civil magistrate *circa sacra*, while the subordinate terms glided away into

allowing him power *in sacris*; but until he do, his assertion deserves no other answer than a simple denial, or a demand of proof,—such proof as he has not yet attempted to give.

Dr Alexander explains that he entered into these details because he believed that this controversy exercised no small influence upon the future influence of Dr Wardlaw; and that the discussion concerning the power of the civil magistrate in sacred things, had carried him to a point beyond that at which the majority of the Associate Synod thought proper to stop. This remark introduces a brief account of the rise of the Congregational system in Scotland, of which Dr Wardlaw became such a distinguished ornament and support. The account which Dr Alexander gives of the dreary reign of Moderatism in the Church of Scotland during the last century is brief, but accurate and true so far as it goes. The recently published *Memoirs of the Haldanes*, and other similar works, have contributed greatly to the enlightenment of the public mind with regard to that dismal period of spiritual death; but there is still room for a History of Moderatism, such as should not only describe the condition of the church and kingdom during its dominancy, but state and explain the lethal principles from which that pernicious system arose. It was the entire abnegation of every thing truly spiritual, morally great, mentally noble, warmly generous, and manfully free. Its tendency was to reduce Scotland to the condition of a country conquered, enslaved, and degraded,—a despised yet turbulent province of England, bereft of dignity, independence, and liberty, civil or sacred,—its church the thrall of patrons, and these patrons the Anglicised sycophants of intriguing politicians. But the wild outburst of the French Revolution impelled all earnest men to inquire by what means the probability of a similar convulsion might be averted; and while mere politicians thought only of strengthening the executive, that it might be able to repress all insipient commotions by force, wiser and better men, taught by the sacred Scriptures, saw more profoundly into the heart of the great evil, perceived its true nature, and employed the moral and religious remedy which God had graciously given—the preaching of the gospel to every creature.

The men by whom this remedial process was begun, had not, at first, as Dr Alexander admits, the least thought of forming a separate church. Their movement was not in consequence of any departure from the doctrines of the Established Church, nor from any speculative preference of a different form of church polity. Neither did they protest against the National Church as having swerved from the faith or practice to which, by its standards, it was pledged, and claim themselves to be the true and genuine church, as vari-

ous bodies have done. Like Methodism in England, the movement which they headed had its source chiefly in a craving for more life, more energy, more spiritual freedom and diffusiveness, than they could find in existing systems. They sorrowed most of all for the multitudes that were living around them in ignorance and sin, misled by unsound teaching, or left to perish without teaching of any kind. If they could have found the remedy of those evils, and the securing of the benefits for which they longed, in religious communities with which they were already connected, they would not have thought of forsaking these to form a new denominational body. Their choice of Congregationalism arose partly out of the circumstances in which they were placed, and partly out of the advices received from English ministers of that denomination, who came to assist them in their evangelistic efforts.

It was not surprising that men of such boundless energy and determined zeal as the distinguished brothers, Robert and James Haldane, broke through all the cold restraints of Moderatism, and despised its pithless censures. But we cannot help regarding it as a very great and unfortunate mistake on their part, when they resolved to form a separate system of church polity in Scotland. For although they had no sympathy with Moderatism, and could expect no countenance from that negation of truth and life, while it should retain its domination, they had full sympathy with the evangelical party in the Scottish Church, and received from them every degree of countenance and support which it was in the power of that reviving party to bestow. Had the Haldanes and their followers not formed a separate body, but continued their noble evangelistic labours, regardless of the fulminations of waning Moderatism, they might have proved most important auxiliaries of the rapidly increasing evangelical party, and might, ere long, have been among the most honoured leaders of the third reformation of the Church of Scotland. But, by the course which they adopted, they were inevitably plunged into the restless whirlpool of ecclesiastical controversy, their evangelistic labours were arrested, and they speedily crystallised into another among the many denominational communities in Scotland.

The movement begun by the Haldanes was still in the freshness and fervour of its young life when Ralph Wardlaw, whose special attachment to the Burgher Synod had been loosened by its doctrinal controversies, directed his attention to the active and zealous Congregationalists; and, after a short period of hesitation and inquiry, he joined that body, and became a member of the church recently formed in Glasgow under the pastoral care of the Rev. Greville Ewing. This event

took place in the year 1800 ; and from that period his ministerial life may be dated, as he devoted himself at once to itinerant preaching, and to the occasional supply of settled stations in the process of being formed into congregations, till he received a call to Glasgow in February 1803. For some years the time and attention of the young pastor were fully occupied with the arduous exertions required in the formation of a new congregation. In these he appears to have been extremely zealous and active; and though his progress was not extremely rapid, yet it was sure. He was much more anxious to secure purity of communion, so far as might be practicable, than to collect together a crowd, without due regard to their principles and practice. This caution would, no doubt, retard the growth of his congregation; but that growth would be greatly more satisfactory, and more to be depended on, than any rapid agglomeration could have been. During these early years of his ministry he was also acquiring increased facility and power both in preaching and in writing, in consequence of the careful and conscientious earnestness with which he pursued his studies and prepared his sermons.

But the time was at hand which drew him from his comparative privacy, and led him to appear as an author. We have already said, that when the zealous and earnest brothers, Robert and James Haldane, and their followers, resolved to form a separate church polity, they plunged inevitably into controversy. They had to construct and defend a system; and they had to do so out of materials sufficiently intractable,—hard-headed and strong-willed Scotchmen, suddenly set free to do as they pleased. Unfortunately, they started with the assumption of two principles which were certain to produce and perpetuate discord. The one of these is, that Christians are *religiously bound* to conform their ecclesiastical usages, in the most minute particular, and under all circumstances, to what is supposed to have been the practice of the primitive churches; the other is, that it is the *imperative duty* of every man who has embraced an opinion, to make use of all means in his power to bring every person else over to that opinion. Acting on these principles, the Congregational churches began at once to contend, and contended incessantly, about forms and modes, and other matters of equally slight importance; such as,—Whether collections should be made at the church-door on Sabbath?—Whether the Lord's Supper may be observed by the church without elders?—Whether that ordinance should be observed once a-week or once a-month?—Whether the mutual exhortation of the brethren, by means of public speaking, be not a binding duty?—Whether church discipline should not be exercised only on Sabbath?

These questions, and such as these, disturbed the churches, and marred their usefulness from the very first. But a more important question arose,—the question relative to baptism, especially as to its administration to infants. The agitation of the Baptist controversy gave occasion to Dr Wardlaw's making his first appearance before the public as an author. Early in 1807 he published a small volume under the following title:—"Three Lectures on Romans iv. 9-25; Designed chiefly to Illustrate the Nature of the Abrahamic Covenant, and its Connection with Infant Baptism. With an Appendix on the Mode of Baptism. By Ralph Wardlaw, Glasgow." This work was afterwards greatly enlarged and improved in subsequent editions, to meet the requirements of new controversial writings opposed to it; but even as it at first appeared it attracted great attention, was highly esteemed, and placed its author in an advantageous position for increased public usefulness.

From this time forward Dr Wardlaw was one of the most important men and ministers in Glasgow. The time and circumstances of Glasgow both needed, and were favourable to, the appearance of such a man. For a long period Dr Balfour had almost alone maintained the cause of evangelical truth against cold and fallacious Moderatism, in that large and rapidly increasing city. The University contained several professors of high celebrity; and among its commercial men, of the higher standing, there were not a few who were familiar with literary and scientific pursuits, and possessed a decided taste for intellectual cultivation and classical refinement. To such men the society of Dr Wardlaw was a decided acquisition. He was not only "a scholar, and a ripe and good one," but his person, manners, conversation, preaching, and writings, were all those of a polished, refined, and courteous Christian gentleman. When to these attractive qualities and acquirements, all distinctive of the man, we add the immeasurably higher qualification of gospel truth, spiritual elevation, sound principle, and a pure and holy life and conversation, it will at once be seen that such a man must have early acquired, and steadily exercised, a most beneficial influence in Glasgow. Even at a later period, when the irresistible impulse of the mighty Chalmers poured a glowing torrent of vital energy into Glasgow, the influence of the calm, reflective, and refined eloquence of Wardlaw, continued to exercise a large and beneficial sway over the minds of the cultivated, and also cool and calculating, merchant princes of that vast commercial community. Each of these distinguished men, so different in many respects, had his own special sphere; in which he was more useful than the other would have been; so, without attempting to institute any

comparison between them, let it be frankly admitted that Dr Wardlaw was a man of whom Glasgow had need; and that his influence there was of great value to the interests of religion, for many years, and over a wide circle of wealthy and cultivated men.

Some dissensions between Dr Wardlaw's congregation and that of Mr Ewing, disturbed both pastors for a period, but never interrupted their warm and generous personal friendship to each other, nor shook their mutual confidence and affection. Into such points we need not enter, having no pleasure in relating the contentions of sister churches; although it might be shown that such contentions, without any superior authority to which both are amenable, such as exists in the Presbyterian system of superior church courts, seem to point out the central element of weakness inherent in the Congregational system, and impairing its efficiency. Soon after these disturbances had been allayed between the two congregations at Glasgow, the leading men there, and in other parts of the country, began to devise some measure for the training of young men for the work of the ministry, which had become necessary in consequence of the course adopted by the Haldanes. The result was the formation, in 1811, of an institution called The Glasgow Theological Academy, to be conducted by Dr Wardlaw, as Professor of Systematic Theology, and Mr Ewing, to whom the department of Biblical Criticism was assigned. "Thus," says Dr Alexander, "was Mr Wardlaw placed in a position in which his mind was officially directed to those peculiar studies in which he was so eminently fitted to excel, and in which his labours have been productive of such extensive benefit to the church."

In a short time after Dr Wardlaw had been placed in this influential position, he was called again into the field of controversy, on a subject of the utmost general importance. During the latter half of the last century, and while Moderatism was passing through its darkest and coldest phase, a species of Socinianism pervaded the west of Scotland. The *name* was not avowedly held, because such an avowal would have been an open denial of the doctrinal standards of the church, and might have led to deposition; but the extreme Moderates, or New Light ministers,—by whom the poet Robert Burns was misled and corrupted, and whom he in turn praised in some of his most irreligious poems,—secretly held opinions in no degree better than those of the avowed Socinians. Of course the avowed Socinians, or Unitarians, as they fallaciously termed themselves, were very greatly encouraged and strengthened by such a state of matters. In Glasgow they were becoming alarmingly numerous, and their pernicious tenets were spread-

ing throughout the community. Dr Wardlaw's duty, as a theological professor, led him to study carefully the Scripture evidence in support of the supreme divinity of the Lord Jesus Christ. He chose the same subject on which to deliver a course of monthly Sabbath evening lectures in his own place of worship. These soon attracted attention. Mr Yates, the Unitarian minister, attended those lectures, and attempted to answer them on subsequent evenings in his own chapel. This increased the interest felt in the course; and at its conclusion Dr Wardlaw received numerous and urgent applications to publish his lectures. With this request he complied. They appeared in an octavo volume in the spring of 1814, and were immediately welcomed by the public, both in Scotland and England, as a most seasonable, lucid, and convincing defence of the fundamental doctrines of the Christian system. This work is, in our opinion, the most valuable of all Dr Wardlaw's productions. We so entirely concur in what Dr Alexander has said respecting it, that we cannot do better than transcribe his opinion:—

“Of a work so generally known, and which has now attained the rank of one of the standard books of British theology, it is unnecessary to offer here any analysis; and any but the shortest critique upon it would be out of place. Suffice it, therefore, to say, that while it is more popular in its cast, and has less of learning and force than the nearly contemporary works of Horsley and Magee, it is inferior to neither of them in clearness and cogency of reasoning, and is greatly superior to both in suavity of manner, fulness of scriptural illustration, and depth and unction of spiritual feeling. At the time it appeared, it was very much the work that was wanted in this country, no less than in America, to counteract the effect on the popular mind of such writings as those of Priestley, Lindsay, and Belsham. If the different ground now assumed by Unitarians,—who no longer make a fashion of appealing to Scripture as an objective standard of religious truth, but would draw all from within, and submit all to a purely subjective test,—have rendered it less important in a polemical point of view than formerly, yet, to the scientific theologian, who is concerned to estimate all the forms of religious opinion that have prevailed among men by their relation to the written Word of God, and to the practical Christian, who is desirous to possess clear and correct conceptions of revealed truth, both in its principle and in its application, the book will continue to possess a more than common value.”

In the last sentence of this extract, Dr Alexander alludes to the peculiar aspect of modern Socinianism. To this, certainly, Dr Wardlaw's work could not furnish a direct reply. But there will always be a Socinianism like that to which it does reply, because that phase of error is natural to one condition of the human mind; and to people in this incipient stage of humanised Christianity,—if Christianity it ought to

be called at all, even in courtesy,—Dr Wardlaw's work will be the best antidote that could be given. For that reason it will never lose its value, and will carry his name, and convey his gifts and graces, to the latest ages. The modern philosophic, or mystic Socinianism, may either be allowed to run to seed and then die,—as in the case of Ralph Waldo Emerson, and as soon will be the case with Theodore Parker, James Martineau, and their followers,—or there must be written a very different work, meeting them on their own ground, grappling with their philosophisms, plucking out the heart of their absurdity, and making their wild and empty folly apparent to all the intelligent world. To do this adequately would require a man with mental characteristics somewhat different from those possessed by Dr Wardlaw—different, but not necessarily higher; and we have no doubt it will be done, if the continued pretentious arrogance of that set of men seem to render it necessary for the sake of our common Christianity.

Many interesting notices of Dr Wardlaw's public life, now full of honour from all Christian churches,—of his preaching, with regard to its style, manner, and effect,—and of his personal character, especially as seen in the sweet privacy of domestic life, and among friends loving and beloved,—fill up a considerable portion of the memoir, and are executed with great delicacy and skill. But these we can only recommend to the readers of the volume, and advance to topics not more agreeable, but of greater public importance. The position which Dr Wardlaw had early taken in the Baptist controversy almost constrained him to keep the field when any new antagonist appeared. The publication of a work by Mr Cox, in which Dr Wardlaw's opinions were directly controverted, he could not but regard as a challenge to resume the conflict. With this he was by no means reluctant to comply, and early in 1825 he issued a work bearing the title, "A Dissertation on the Scriptural Authority, Nature, and Uses, of Infant Baptism." At a considerably later period, in 1846, a third edition of this work appeared, with a long appendix, containing strictures on Dr Halley's recent work on baptism. Dr Halley replied soon afterwards; but Dr Wardlaw's remaining time and energies were so much exhausted, as well as pre-occupied, that he did not find leisure and strength for the further prosecution of the controversy.

In recording these passages of Dr Wardlaw's life and writings, Dr Alexander takes the opportunity of intimating that he differs in opinion on some material points from Dr Wardlaw, and states briefly, but strongly, the reasons why he so differs; stating also, that to him "Dr Halley's book seems quite unanswerable." We regret this very deeply; both be-

cause we regret that such laxity of opinion should be held by any one, and because it is doubly painful when that laxity is countenanced by such a man as Dr Alexander, whose sentiments cannot but have great weight with many. Dr Wardlaw's argument is very well stated, in a condensed form, by Dr Alexander, a part of which we here extract: "This dissertation consists of three parts. In the first of these the author considers, 'the divinely instituted practice previously to the New Testament dispensation, and the absence of all evidence authorising a departure from that practice under it.' Here his aim is to sustain the following position: 'Before the coming of Christ, the covenant of grace had been revealed; and under that covenant there existed a divinely instituted connection between children and their parents. The sign and seal of the blessings of the covenant was, by divine appointment, administered to children; and there can be produced no satisfactory evidence of this connection having been done away.' In the second part, he adduces 'evidence of the fact that, instead of such departure being authorised, the children of converts to the faith of the gospel were actually baptised along with their parents in the time of the apostles.' And, in the third part, he elucidates 'the important truths and duties which the baptism of infants exhibits and impresses upon our minds; and the perfect consistency of the administration of this ordinance to them with all that the Bible teaches respecting them, as subjects of salvation and of the kingdom of heaven.'" Of these three sections, Dr Alexander adds, "The first is probably that to which the author would have pointed, as the most important in an argumentative point of view." No doubt he would, and so would every other reasoner. But it is this very section, against which Dr Halley directs his argument, of which Dr Alexander says, "It presents itself to my mind as fallacious;" and against which he thinks Dr Halley's argument is unanswerable. We entertain a very different opinion. Dr Wardlaw's argument from the Abrahamic covenant, in favour of infant baptism, has always appeared to us perfectly conclusive. It might be stated thus:—The Abrahamic covenant can be proved to be identical with that of the gospel. Under its Abrahamic aspect God instituted infant admission, by a special mode. What God has instituted none but God may abrogate or change. Under the gospel form of that covenant he changed the mode of admission; but there is no evidence that he changed the time. Circumcision, therefore, has been changed into baptism, but infant admission remains, and must remain, until divine authority can be shown for the change. The nature of Dr Halley's argument is sufficiently indicated in the title of his reply to Dr Ward-

law,—“Baptism the Designation of the Catechumens, not the Symbol of the Members of the Christian Church.” This very title would suggest the inquiry, Does Dr Halley regard baptism as a sacrament, or not? We should like to have from Dr Halley a grave definition of a Christian sacrament. Another inquiry might also be suggested by Dr Halley’s title-page: If baptism be only the designation of the catechumens, would it not seem to follow that it should not be administered to children till they are able to receive catechetical instruction? But the subject is far too extensive and important to admit of being discussed at present, and in the small space at our disposal. Our sense of duty to the public constrained us to express our dissent from Dr Alexander’s statements; and having done so, we must return to the work before us.

Dr Wardlaw had scarcely completed his revised and enlarged reissue of his Dissertation on Infant Baptism, when he again entered the field of controversy with a more famous antagonist than any he had hitherto encountered. In 1825 Henry Brougham was inaugurated as Lord Rector of the University of Glasgow; on which occasion he delivered a splendid oration, but gave utterance to one very pernicious sentiment regarding man’s responsibility for his belief. This sentiment Dr Wardlaw thought it his duty to controvert, that he might guard the public mind against the evil consequences deducible from the distinguished statesman’s fallacious and daring assertion. In this instance, also, the able and independent biographer, after giving a condensed statement of his author’s argument, disputes its soundness, and expresses his regret that Dr Wardlaw took lower ground than he was entitled to take in the discussion of such a question as that mooted by Lord Brougham. We feel strongly tempted to make a copious extract from this part of the work, in which Dr Alexander himself takes up the question, discusses it in a very masterly manner on that higher ground which, as he intimates, Dr Wardlaw ought to have taken, and completely demonstrates the fallacy of Lord Brougham’s assertion.

A few years later we meet Dr Wardlaw again on the controversial arena, but in the discussion of subjects more directly theological than that which he had to maintain against Lord Brougham. The views of the late Edward Irving, of Thomas Erskine, Esq., advocate, and others, had produced considerable excitement in various parts of Scotland, particularly in the West, and lax opinions became rife on such topics as the assurance of faith and the extent of the atonement. This called forth Dr Wardlaw, who, in 1830, published two essays, one on each of these topics. Here again Dr Alexander finds reason to express some difference of opinion from Dr Wardlaw, par-

ticularly with regard to the essay on Assurance. The biographer has again the advantage, as we think, in clearness of conception regarding the real point to be discussed; as also in soundness of thought and cogency of reasoning. But when he expresses greater approbation of the essay on the Extent of the Atonement, and again approves of Dr Wardlaw's views on the same subject in a subsequent controversy, we think him wrong,—we think both Wardlaw and Alexander wrong, very specially in their conception of the primary idea in accordance with which such a lofty theme must be discussed, so far as it can be discussed by man. Let the idea of the necessarily infinite sufficiency of the Saviour's atoning work be fully conceived, and then any such thing as the notion of an exact equivalence with the punishment due to atone for any finite amount of sin and sinners, becomes an impossible notion, because there can be no relation between infinity and finity. Or let the idea of the necessary and eternal identity of will and purpose in the triune God be fully conceived,—as fully as man can conceive it,—and then the human notion of double objects and double destinations in providing and applying the atonement, must also be seen to be at least absurd, if not something like a profane application of human modes of thought to the eternal mind. But on this subject, also, our limits forbid us to enter.

In the beginning of 1832, Dr Wardlaw published a volume entitled "Discourses on the Sabbath." The number of discourses is nine, of which the first four are devoted to the argumentative defence of the Sabbath, as a divine institution of universal and permanent obligation. On this work also Dr Alexander expresses his difference in opinion from that adopted by Dr Wardlaw on one very important topic. The remarks of the able biographer are so valuable that we must lay them before our readers:—

"In the concluding discourse in this volume Dr Wardlaw discusses the delicate and difficult question of the province of the civil magistrate in relation to the Sabbath. The position he assumes here is, that as the Sabbath has a twofold aspect, a secular and a sacred, the legislature, though precluded from enforcing its observance on the ground of the latter, may, on the ground of the former, enforce it so far as to prohibit all traffic, to secure from all unnecessary annoyance and interruption those who choose to devote the day to religious service, and to regulate the amusements of the people so far as to prevent all noisy and obtrusive modes of recreation. This part of the work appears to me not worthy of the rest; and betrays indications, I think, of having been written hastily, or perhaps under the depressing influence of feeble health. The author's reasoning is singularly inconclusive. Obviously his premises are too narrow, or his conclusions too wide; for if the magistrate be restricted to the mere *secular* bearings of the Sabbath,—that is, its advantages to the

health of the community,—he has clearly no right to make the infraction of it a *crime*, to be repressed by penalties ; and it is clearly a mere piece of tyranny to dictate to the people within what limits their amusements are to be kept, so long as they do no injury to person or property. And with regard to the protection of those who choose to spend the day in religious exercises, that applies to all days as well as Sunday ; for every society which meets peaceably, for lawful purposes, is entitled to the protection of law, on whatever day they may choose to assemble. Nothing seems more certain, than that if you abstract from the *sacred*,—that is, the religiously imperative character of the Sabbath,—you must place it legislatively on the same level with any other civil holiday ; and in that case, all that the legislature can do is to name the day for a holiday, leaving the community to observe it as such or not as they please, and to spend it in any recreations that shall be most agreeable to them. When the magistrate, professing to stand on purely secular ground, attempts to do more,—attempts to do as much as Dr Wardlaw says in this discourse he ought to do,—no wonder that the people should become rebellious. Their common sense tells them that his reasoning is unsound—that his premises do not legitimate his conclusion ; and therefore they cry out against his interference as unjust and tyrannous. If the cricket club of parish A shall see meet to challenge the cricket club of parish Z to a match next Sunday, that shall decide in the face of all England the comparative merits of these illustrious rivals ; or if John Stubbs thinks nothing so refreshing, after a hard week's work, as a game at bowls or skittles on the Sunday ; or if the grocer's wife, with her marriageable, but not married daughters, thinks there is nothing on earth so pleasant as a Sunday visit to Greenwich or Vauxhall ; is it not most unreasonable in the legislature to step in and say, 'It is true we appointed this day to be observed purely on secular grounds, as a day of relaxation and recreation, but, nevertheless, we cannot allow you to amuse yourselves on this day as you may on other days ; and therefore all such noisy and obtrusive amusements as these must be prohibited.' This sort of legislation plainly will never do. Either the magistrate must not meddle with Sabbath observance at all, or he must take his stand on the *religious* character of the day ; and just as he forbids polygamy, or the marrying of one's sister, or the holding of slaves, or perjury, or many things besides, on the ground that God has denounced them, he must forbid, under such penalties as he shall see meet, all open violation, by traffic or amusement, of a day which God has said shall be kept as a day of rest for man and for beast. When the legislator takes his ground on this principle, he will have the conscience of the nation on his side ; and if his enactments be wise and just, he will find public feeling support him ; but if otherwise, he is only likely to produce confusion and riot by his interference. With these convictions, I cannot but regret that Dr Wardlaw should have lent the sanction of his high authority to a doctrine which, if acted upon by our legislature, and embraced by the community, would soon deprive us of all the blessings of the Sabbath as a day of religious rest."

These are true and noble sentiments, fearlessly and powerfully expressed by a man whose opinion none can affect to

despise; and we have great pleasure in giving to them all the additional publicity which our efforts can secure. It must have given Dr Alexander great delight, when, on a very recent occasion, the religious observance of the Christian Sabbath was successfully vindicated and maintained in the British Parliament. But although the victory has for the time been gained, it may be regarded as absolutely certain that the conflict will be renewed; and therefore it is well that sound principles should continue to be held forth on the subject. The "enmity of the carnal mind against God," as Scripture designates the natural condition of fallen man, will never cease to dislike the religious character of the Sabbath, and the divine authority on which that religious character rests; but, following the devices of cautious worldly-wisdom, it may abstain from further agitation for a time, with the design of resuming its attempts on some future opportunity, especially should the opinion appear to be becoming prevalent that the civil magistrate has no right to guide his procedure by regard to religious principles:

It seemed to have become almost a matter of necessity, that in every controversy which arose Dr Wardlaw should take a prominent part. His own mental endowments, and their strongly dialectic and logical bias, the deep interest he felt in every thing that affected the public welfare, and his position as the foremost man in the religious denomination with which he was connected, all concurred to render it, in a great measure, a matter of duty for him to give public expression to his sentiments on all matters of public importance. This, and not any special delight in mere controversy, we regard as the reason why he took such a prominent part in all the controversies of his time. That time was also, in a very peculiar manner, one of incessant controversy. The torpor of the preceding century had been succeeded by a period of unexampled excitement; and that excitement impelled the vast energies of the aroused public mind to throw aside all regard for ancient and time-honoured institutions and opinions, to inquire anew into the grounds and reasons of everything, however thoroughly settled it might have previously appeared, and to sweep on in something like the wild career of a great mental and moral revolution. "Never, perhaps," to quote from Dr Alexander, "had such a season of debate and question been known before in Scotland. On every hand discussions,—keen, acute, sometimes violent, always earnest,—prevailed. The Apocrypha controversy had not yet quite raged itself to sleep. The controversy about assurance and universal pardon was still going forward. The controversy about the humanity of Christ, about miracles, and gifts of

tongues, was at its height. The anti-slavery controversy was becoming every day more vehement and absorbing. And, in the midst of this already crowded arena, a new controversy suddenly arose, more intense and bitter than any of the others, —one which outlived all the others, and which has left its mark on the frame-work of Scottish society too deeply to be soon obliterated. I refer to the voluntary controversy which sprang up in 1830, and in which Dr Wardlaw took so prominent a part for many years."

Into any discussion of the voluntary controversy, we are not disposed at present to enter. That controversy may now be regarded as an extinct volcano; or, if not wholly extinct, its fires, by which the entire kingdom for a period was convulsed, are now nearly burned out; and we have no special desire to rekindle the smouldering embers. Its general character has been succinctly, clearly, and fairly stated by Dr Alexander; and the part taken in it by Dr Wardlaw is also very candidly related, and with sufficient fulness. We might be inclined to estimate Dr Wardlaw's exertions in the controversy considerably lower than is done by his biographer; but into the subject, as already said, we do not mean to enter. There is, however, one portion of Dr Alexander's closing comment on that controversy from which we think it right to give an extract:—

"The one point on which I crave permission to reserve favourable judgment, is that touching the province of the civil magistrate in religion. On this point Dr Wardlaw had abstained, in former publications, from attempting any discussion, resolved, as he says in a letter to a friend, to keep himself to the Scripture argument against establishments. To this resolution it was, of course, impossible for him to adhere when summoned to appear as respondent to Dr Chalmers; but that such a necessity should have been laid upon him, I cannot but regret; as what he has written on the subject of the civil magistrate's office in relation to religion, is by no means equal to the other parts of this volume. The conclusion at which he arrives is the extreme one of voluntarism, viz., 'That the true and legitimate province of the magistrate, in regard to religion, is to *have no province at all*,'—a conclusion so startling and unwelcome, that it had need to be founded on very cogent reasons to command our assent. On what grounds, then, has Dr Wardlaw rested this conclusion? In the first instance, on the assertion that Scripture has confined the magistrate's functions within the sphere of civil matters. But has not the lecturer stumbled here, at the very threshold? If the magistrate have no province in regard to religion at all, with what consistency can he be appealed to the Bible, the standard of religious truth and duty, to determine what his proper province is? or, if he may be summoned legitimately, as a magistrate, to learn his functions from the Bible, how can it be justly said that he has nothing whatever, as a magistrate, to do with religion?

"But waiving this, let us come to the question, What saith the Bible

in regard to the functions of the civil magistrate? On this point Dr Wardlaw is far from being explicit. He asserts the *incompetency* of the civil magistrate to decide for his subjects what is religious truth, and constantly affirms that all that is properly religious lies between God and the conscience. I presume that no modern advocate of civil establishments of religion will deny or question either of these positions. All he will plead for is, that the magistrate may lawfully, for the great ends of civil government, provide the means of religiously educating the people,—a claim which neither interferes between the conscience of the people and God, nor assumes to determine for the people what is truth in religion. It would not be fair to represent men of Dr Chalmers's way of thinking on this subject as if they contended for the right of magistrates to compel men to believe, or pretend to believe, a given set of dogmas, when all they assert is the right of the magistrate to make provision for the religious instruction of the community, leaving it free to all to accept that instruction or not as they please. On this point I frankly confess I cannot see how the negative can be maintained, as an abstract general proposition, without reducing the functions of the civil magistrate to those of a mere policeman, set up to enforce the will of the majority. If governments are to proceed on the recognition of moral distinctions; if they are bound to enact only what is consistent with moral truth; if, above all, they are to receive and obey the Bible, and recognise its declarations in their enactments; then they not only have a province in regard to religion, but it very greatly concerns them that their subjects should be instructed in those principles which can alone enable them to appreciate aright such legislation. Moreover, if government is to be regarded in the light of a trust reposed in the hands of the magistrate for the welfare of the community,—not merely their protection from robbery and wrong, but their *welfare*, in the healthy development of all their faculties of social improvement,—it is surely most unreasonable to forbid the magistrate to use the only means by which such a result can be certainly attained. Of all tyranny, the most exorbitant is that which ties a man to an end, but refuses to him the means by which alone that end can be reached,—not only commanding him to make bricks without supplying him with straw, but forbidding him to use the straw even when he has managed to procure it. Of this worse than Egyptian tyranny, are those theoretically guilty who would bind the magistrate to secure the order and well-being of the community, and yet forbid him, under any circumstances, to provide that education by which alone this end can be effectually secured.

“It is usual with those who take the extreme views adopted by Dr Wardlaw, to lay stress on the question, Who is to determine what is to be taught for religious truth to the community? There is no doubt a difficulty here; but it is one which surely has been immensely exaggerated, both theoretically and practically. In this country, the omniscience of parliament is as much a principle of government as its omnipotence,—in the modified sense, of course, in which alone such language can be used by any human institution. We proceed continually on the assumption that there is nothing on which parliament may not arrive at full and accurate knowledge. On all questions of science, of art, of business, of diplomacy, of warfare; on questions of

medicine and metallurgy, of engineering and education, of manufacture and painting; on every subject, in short, that concerns the welfare of the community, parliament is continually called to pronounce decisions involving the assumption of all but infallible capacity for determining the truth. It will not be easy to show why a body, in whose powers of ascertaining truth in all other departments of knowledge the community implicitly confides, should be pronounced helplessly incompetent in the department of theological truth. It is, no doubt, possible that parliament may err in the opinions it may authorise to be taught to the people; but the probability of this is not so great as to render it incompetent for parliament to make the attempt; and if liberty be left to all who choose to dissent from the opinions taught by the government teachers, every freedom seems to be secured to the community which, on grounds of general policy, can be required.

"The only sure and consistent line of argument on this subject seems to be that of those who admit that the magistrate, as such, *has* to do with religion; who, on the ground of this, summon him to the Bible, that he may learn there what true religion is, and what he may legitimately do in regard to its interests; who admit his obligations to provide for the moral and religious education of the community, but who stipulate that, as in this the Bible is his authority, so he shall scrupulously refrain from infringing upon any of its prescriptions, or on any of the rights conferred by it on the people of Christ, in the scheme and apparatus of religious education he sets to work. To those who are agreed on these principles, the only further question of any moment is, What saith the Scripture on the subject of establishments and endowments of Christianity as a mode of promoting the religious education of the community? And in answer to this question, the reasoning of Dr Wardlaw, in the earlier lectures in this volume, confirmed as they are by the facts of the concluding lectures, will be found most valuable, as showing that such institutions cannot be set up without doing violence to express injunctions of Scripture, superseding chartered rights of the followers of Christ, and entailing innumerable evils on the Christian cause."

With the last sentence of the preceding extract we do not agree, viewing it as an abstract proposition; for we are convinced that it might be shown, on grounds of abstract truth, that there could be a civil establishment of Christianity without any of the evil consequences which are there stated as inevitable, and in full harmony with Scripture injunctions, the rights of Christians, and the advancement of true spiritual religion. But as we are also convinced that no existing religious establishment complies with the conditions which would be required, or is free from the evils which have been mentioned, and as the only point we ever really cared to maintain was the right and duty of the civil magistrate in regard to religion,—which Dr Alexander concedes as fully as we could desire,—we are not inclined to deal further with the question, delighting rather to view the voluntary controversy as an extinct volcano. This only we beg to add, that if such views

regarding the relation of the civil magistrate to religion as those which Dr Alexander has so well and ably expressed should become generally prevalent, there might soon exist a truly evangelical alliance of all the true churches of Christ throughout a truly evangelical Christendom.

When the Congregational churches in England adopted the very important resolution to found a Congregational lectureship, by which encouragement and opportunity might be given to the production of valuable works on subjects which could not well be discussed in the pulpit, Dr Wardlaw was selected to begin the course. This led to the composition of his work on Christian Ethics. Dr Alexander gives some statements of his own opinions on the main topics of this work, so valuable that we feel it to be a duty to extract a considerable section of his brief but admirable disquisition on the subject of moral obligation:—

“The work, as published, consists of nine lectures (the eighth in the delivery having been divided into two in the publishing), besides a considerable body of notes, to which extensive additions were made in subsequent editions. The author's main design is to maintain the supreme authority of the Bible as the only infallible rule of moral action; and, with this view, he not only contends for submission to the Bible on all points on which it gives judgment, in preference to every other source of moral decision, but asserts that no other source is valid or can be trusted, in consequence of the depravity which the Fall has introduced into the soul of man. He is thus led to examine the different theories of moral obligation, and to apply to them the test furnished by this fact in man's moral history. The theories which he examines are the Aristotelian, the Stoical, the Epicurean, that of Cudworth, Clarke, and Price, that of Adam Smith, that of Hutcheson, that of Brown, that of Hume, and the Utilitarians, and (with especial minuteness) that of Butler. Against all these he maintains that they are vitiated, even when in other respects most correct, by the radical error of assuming that a depraved mind, investigating a depraved nature, can arrive at any certain and fixed principles of right and wrong. Such principles, he proceeds to show, can be found ultimately only in the Divine Nature; and, as this nature can become knowable by us only through revelation, he argues that it is in the Bible alone that we can obtain a certain guide to moral truth. In the three concluding lectures he shows the identity of morality and religion, inquires how far *disinterestedness* is an essential quality in legitimate love to God, and illustrates the peculiarities of *Christian* obligation and duty.

“A second edition of this work was speedily called for; and not long after this appeared, it was noticed in an article in the *Edinburgh Review*, vol. lxi., p. 59. The reviewer, whilst admitting it to be ‘one of the ablest and most plausible’ of the class of publications among which he places it, animadverted somewhat sharply on the views it contains, as to the influence of depravity on our capacity for ascertaining moral truth. These views, he thinks, involve the conclusion, that ‘we are deprived of all assurance respecting those fundamental truths

which natural theology has been supposed to teach; whilst, on the other hand, 'if we be referred,' he says, 'to *faith* in confirmation of their reality, still the *evidences* of that faith have no power of affecting our minds, except through the medium of those very powers whose authority has been previously thrown aside; so that,' he adds, 'this absurd endeavour to thrust Christianity into the room of philosophy, ends in the palpable triumph of scepticism over both.' To these strictures Dr Wardlaw thought it proper to reply; and this he did in a lengthened preface to the third edition of his work, which came out in 1836. Besides some skirmishing on minor and collateral points, he offers a full answer to the objections above cited; the substance of which is, that he has nowhere affirmed that *reason itself* is so depraved, that it is physically impossible for man to discover or to appreciate the grounds on which the truths of natural religion rest, otherwise man would not be accountable; but only, that reason is so impeded in its operation by depravity as to conduct to false and dangerous conclusions. This is true, he affirms, whether the subject of investigation be the principles of natural or the evidences of revealed religion. Man is intellectually capable of ascertaining the truth in both cases; the evidence in both is sufficient; but evil influences, arising from depravity, are apt to warp reason in its exercise, and pervert it in its decisions. The question Dr Wardlaw holds to be one simply of *fact*. Is it not true, that men, left to themselves, have invariably misread the lessons of natural religion? Now, how is this to be accounted for? If we say the evidence for these lessons is insufficient, or that man is incapable of discerning it, we destroy his responsibility, and make his ignorance excusable; and if, on the other hand, we hold the evidence to be sufficient, and man capable of apprehending it, his failing to do so can result only from some perversity of inclination interfering with, or preventing the due exercise of his reason in the matter. In maintaining, therefore, this latter hypothesis, he contends that he not only does not 'thrust Christianity into the place of philosophy,' but simply borrows from Christianity the only adequate explanation of a fact which philosophy must admit, but cannot explain.

"This seems a sufficient reply to the somewhat superficial strictures of the reviewer. In making it, however, Dr Wardlaw, I cannot help thinking, has unconsciously laid bare the weak point of his whole book, and of the theory of moral science it is designed to uphold. For it appears from this reply, that all he intended to assert was, that natural reason and conscience are *liable* to be perverted in their decisions on moral questions. But if this be all he means to teach, then we may observe, in the first place, that his doctrine is one which the adherents of nearly all the theories of morals on which he has animadverted would at once admit as perfectly compatible with their principles; and, in the second place, that as the alleged liability affects our reason and conscience only in the way of perverting their decisions, this can have no bearing upon the *foundation* of moral distinctions, but will operate exclusively on our practical determination and application of the *standard* or *rule* of morals. In objecting, therefore, to all the moral systems which he has examined, that they are vitiated by a radical error arising from their not taking into account human depravity, Dr Wardlaw has applied to them a test which, from his own

subsequent assertion of the doctrine he meant to teach regarding the influence of depravity on the operations of the natural reason, may be shown to be irrelevant.

"I do not conceive that it would be proper to drag the reader of this volume into a lengthened disquisition on the subject of moral obligation; but I cannot, without disrespect to Dr Wardlaw, pass on without endeavouring, as briefly as may be, to make good the remark which I have just ventured to make as to a defect in the doctrine of this work.

"The moral judgment is either the result of a process of reasoning, or it is given immediately as a product of intelligence. On the former hypothesis, the basis of moral distinctions and the standard of moral discrimination are both without us; on the latter hypothesis they *may* be both within us, and the latter *must* be so: in other words, on the former hypothesis, right and wrong are alike determined and indicated by something that is not part of our own mental being; on the other, it is in virtue of our being constituted as we are that we know what is right and what is wrong, just as we know the qualities of bodies; and, for aught we can tell, this may be the only reason why one thing is right and another wrong. This diæresis of opinion has separated ethical writers into two great sections; to the former of whom moral distinctions have an objective validity, while to the latter they are only subjectively valid. The two comprise within them all the varieties of ethical speculation as to the foundation and standard of morals.

"Now, on neither of these hypotheses does it appear that the fact of human depravity can be adhibited either as an element of speculation or as a test of validity. Not on the first, because there the basis and the standard of morality being both assumed to be without us, cannot possibly be affected by any change that may have passed over us since man was first made: Not on the second, because if morality, theoretically or practically, depend on the constitution God has given us, to affirm that that constitution is fatally vitiated, *quoad* this very thing, is virtually to pronounce morality an impossible thing for us. On either hypothesis, then, it seems that to apply this fact as a test of moral systems is irrelevant.

"On turning to Dr Wardlaw's own theory of moral obligation and prescription, the remark occurs, that if the objection he urges from the present condition of human nature were applicable to any of those who, like himself, attach an objective validity to moral distinctions, it would be applicable no less to him than to them. For on his theory as well as theirs, (seeing in neither can the basis or the standard of morals be affected by the state of man's nature,) the only place where depravity could possibly have any effect, would be in the *application* of the standard to actual occurrences. But if depravity make a man read the revelation of nature wrong, will not the same influence operate to make him read Scripture wrong? In the former case the lesson may be less full and clear than in the latter; but that is not the question: the question is, Can a man, whose mental eye is so disordered that he will certainly read the former lesson imperfectly or erringly, hope, without a cure of his disorder, to read the latter correctly and savingly? If the question were one of *natural capacity*, of course the plainer the lesson the more likely would the learner be to acquire it; but Dr

Wardlaw has strongly repudiated this supposition, and has rested his case entirely on man's *moral* disorder. Well, the point I would press is: If moral disorder unfit a man for ascertaining aright the truths unfolded by the hand of the Creator in the constitution of the moral universe, will it not equally unfit him for ascertaining aright the truths unfolded by the word of the Creator in the Scriptures?

"I have dwelt the longer on this, because I consider it the main defect of Dr Wardlaw's book; and because, but for the influence of this idea, he would not only have avoided a certain confusion of representation, singularly unlike his usual style of thinking, but would have presented his own theory of morals with more of completeness, cogency, and interest, than he has done. Nothing, I think, can be more admirable and convincing than his proof that the only foundation of moral truth is to be sought in the Divine Essence; and if he had contented himself with affirming the effect of depravity in leading men to set aside the dictates of conscience, whether instructed by the law of nature or by the written law of the Bible, instead of asserting man's inability to read the one law, while he admits his ability to read the other, his moral system would, in my humble judgment, have been complete and unassailable. As it is, there are many passages in his "Christian Ethics," which every competent judge will regard as affording most valuable contributions towards the just settlement of the great fundamental questions of ethical science."

With Dr Alexander's disquisition we entirely agree, so far as he has thought proper to prosecute the subject; but we regret that he has so strictly confined himself to the point between Dr Wardlaw and the reviewer. The whole important question of the possibility of producing a sound natural theology, rises out of, or may be deduced from, the position brought under consideration. And when we advert to the exceedingly daring speculations and loose theories promulgated on the subject of natural theology in the present day, we cannot but wish that Dr Alexander had taken occasion to give a condensed view of his own, as he so very well can, with reference to the dangerous use that might be made of Dr Wardlaw's untenable position by a dexterous antagonist. Taking Dr Alexander's own position, however, and making it the amended basis of Dr Wardlaw's work, the danger may be avoided; and then the criticisms on other systems, contained in the work, will be found very instructive.

Many of our readers will remember the excitement which arose fifteen or twenty years ago, among religious people, relative to the subject of divine influence in regeneration, and kindred topics, which began to be known by the term Morisonianism, although but the resuscitation of an old and often refuted heresy. The theory was attractive to young, ill-informed, and shallow minds, and to people of ardent and emotional temperaments. It was found by Dr Wardlaw that these heretical opinions had begun to spread among the stu-

dents in the Theological Academy; and as many of them continued to retain their errors, notwithstanding all his attempts, he was constrained to dismiss them, in the due exercise of discipline. But it was soon discovered that several ministers both countenanced the expelled students, and shared with them in their heresy. Discipline had been exercised upon the students, and it was thought that consistency required that the ministers should not escape. But how could discipline be exercised, on the principles of Congregationalism? The Glasgow churches entered nominally into a correspondence with certain other churches in the vicinity, whose pastors were charged with holding these heretical opinions; the result of which was, that the Glasgow churches withdrew fellowship from those in Hamilton, Ardrossan, Bellshill, Cambuslang, and Bridgeton. The correspondence which had preceded this result was published as an appeal to the Congregational Union; but this procedure was not generally approved, as not expedient in itself, and not very reconcilable with the idea of Congregationalism. Dr Alexander thinks the course adopted was injudicious, and says that, in his opinion, "Had Dr Wardlaw and his brethren conferred with the erring pastors in their own name; and had they, on finding them persistent in their error, withdrawn from all *ministerial* fellowship with them; their course would have been unimpeachably correct, and might have been followed with most beneficial results." We take leave to doubt whether any beneficial results could have followed from a course which would have necessarily left the erring pastors in the complete and unquestioned possession of every opportunity of diffusing error in their congregations, without even the semblance of a public remonstrance against their unsound teaching. If the course adopted by Dr Wardlaw and his supporters was a violation of the strict Congregational theory, it was at least an open attempt to condemn and discountenance error, with a full statement of the reasons why it was condemned, which might well lead men to reflect gravely on the nature of opinions so publicly repudiated by the most able and learned divines in the denomination; while the departure from Congregationalism, which it was thought to imply, might have led many to question whether the Congregational system were indeed the best fitted to preserve and protect the truth, the purity, and the power of gospel doctrines. Dr Alexander says, "As it was their sanction" (the sanction of the pastors of the body) "which first gave him the status of an orthodox minister of their body, so they are the only parties competent to deprive him of that status if he shall afterwards swerve from his orthodoxy." This reads very like a statement of the method by which a presbytery might proceed to depose

a minister who had been convicted before their court of unsoundness in the faith; and we should be very glad to think that such a course was competent to Congregational pastors. But instead of directing further attention to this great difficulty, of exercising due discipline among Congregationalists, which has always seemed to us a serious flaw in their system, we shall present our readers with Dr Alexander's strictures on Dr Wardlaw's work, entitled "Congregational Independency, in Contradistinction to Episcopacy and Presbyterianism, the Church Polity of the New Testament:"—

"This work had been so long promised and expected, that many of those who desired its appearance, falling into the natural mistake of imagining that it had been undergoing an equally long preparation, seem to have indulged themselves in unreasonable expectations as to what it should contain. They anticipated I know not what new discoveries of reasons in support of Congregational Independency, and could hardly be restrained from sounding the trumpet for victory over other systems of church polity before their champion had struck his blow. The result was an equally unreasonable feeling of disappointment, when it was found that the book contained nothing positively new—that the argument, however ably put, was substantially the same as every previous writer on the same side of the question had unfolded—and that the very clearness and simplicity of Dr Wardlaw's ratiocination had only made it more apparent, that, whilst it may be convincingly proved that neither Episcopacy nor Presbyterianism, as seen actually to exist, is the church polity of the New Testament, the evidence that Congregationalism, in its extant form, is entitled to that honour is painfully slender. This, to people who had been waiting for years for something which should, as they hesitated not to say, for ever demonstrate the apostolicity of the Congregational form of church polity, was mortifying enough; but the fault lay with those who had formed the expectation; for a little consideration would have taught them, that on a question which had been thoroughly discussed by the giants of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there could be nothing left for any subsequent writer to advance that was new; and a little acquaintance with such discussions might have showed them that what they complained of as a deficiency in Dr Wardlaw's book is inseparable from all works on such questions. These are all more or less potent in attack, feeble in defence. An Episcopalian writer has no great difficulty in showing that neither Presbyterianism nor Congregationalism is the church polity of the New Testament; but it is not so easy for him to show that Episcopacy is. A Presbyterian marches triumphantly to overthrow Episcopacy and Congregationalism as pretended reproductions of the primitive polity; but when he comes to prove this of Presbyterianism, the evidence he is able to adduce is feeble indeed. The fate of the Congregationalist is much the same; he can prove his brethren of other denominations not to be apostolic in their peculiar usage and polity, but he makes only a feeble show of evidence when he attempts to prove that he and his fellows are. The lesson which a calm and unsectarian mind would naturally learn from this is, to cease

from the attempt to prove any existing system of church polity identical with that of the apostolic churches; to give up the principle that we have in the churches of the apostolic age, the authoritative model after which all other churches are to be constructed; and to be content with eliciting from the New Testament the great living principles of Christian order and fellowship, and embodying these in such forms as shall seem best adapted, amid existing circumstances, to give them free and legitimate scope. So long as our information regarding the apostolic churches is so very imperfect as it is, and so long as we can arrive at a conclusion only by arguing from premises, one of which is invariably an assumption of the very thing to be proved,—viz., that all churches are to be on one model (for only by assuming this is it possible to argue that what we find recorded in the New Testament of one church was true of all then, and so is binding on all now),—the controversy will be an endless one, and as profitless as endless.”

There are several topics in this extract on which we feel strongly inclined to offer some remarks, but our disposable space is so nearly exhausted that we must leave our readers to exercise their own judgment on Dr Alexander's peculiarly calm, frank, and candid statement.

We should utterly fail in doing justice either to the work before us or to Dr Wardlaw's character, if we did not select a few passages that enable us to see him as he lived, especially in the bosom of his own happy family, himself the very heart of its happiness; for Dr Wardlaw was no mere controversialist, though much of his literary life was spent in that department, but a mild, kindly, cheerful, warm-hearted, loving, and loveable man, as a friend, a husband, and a father. But in presenting some pictures of his domestic life, we give our readers the means of judging for themselves:—

“It may be convenient at this stage to pause in our narrative of Dr Wardlaw's public life, and to turn for a little to contemplate him in the domestic circle. As the scenes of his subsequent history become more crowded with incidents of public interest, we may not have so favourable an opportunity of presenting to the reader this essential phase of his character.

“Dr Wardlaw was eminently fitted to grace and to delight the family scene. In him the domestic affections were very strongly developed. Naturally affectionate and home-loving, the kindly influences amid which his own early life had been spent tended to deepen and strengthen his fondness for fireside association, festivities, and occupations. When, accordingly, he himself became a husband and a father, it was from no mere frigid sense of duty that he devoted himself to his household; his heart was with his wife and his children, and he found the serenest of his earthly enjoyments in their society. No fire burned so brightly in his estimation as that which shed its warmth around his own hearth; no voices sounded so sweet in his ears as those of the little prattlers who welcomed him to his wonted seat at his own board. Without, there was stir, there was excitement, there was applause, there

was, it may be, flattery; but what were these to the charm of home and to the interchange of domestic affection? And as he delighted in his home, so was he found to be the delight of all who there were gathered around him. The sweetness of his temper, the cheerfulness of his manners, the sympathetic kindness of his affections, the vivacity of his intellect, combined with the high moral tone and truthfulness of all his words and deeds, conspired to draw to him the love, confidence, and veneration of all his children and dependants. Love, purity, dignity, elegance, and cheerfulness, reigned around the hearth at which he presided, and made his the very model of a well-ordered Christian household—than which earth has no lovelier or more blessed object to offer to our view.

“But scenes of this kind are best described by those who have been privileged to enter them and participate in them. I shall, therefore, give place here to two whose descriptions are inspired by personal recollections such as I had no opportunity of enjoying.

“I quote first from the *Reminiscences of Dr Morison*, to whom the reader has already been indebted for a faithful and vivid sketch of certain passages in Dr Wardlaw's earlier life:—

“It was after I had become a settled pastor for some years that it fell to my lot to meet Dr Wardlaw in his own hospitable dwelling. I had seen him often, south and north, on public occasions, and exchanged letters of friendship, of which I have very many in my possession, breathing the most affectionate confidence; but till I saw him in the bosom of his own family I may truly say I never fully appreciated the exquisite symmetry and loveliness of his character.

“My first visit to the house of my friend was in 1824, when he was in the height of his popularity; and what I then saw in the midst of his domestic circle, as I marked the sunny brightness of his ‘piety at home,’ made an impression that can never be effaced. It seemed almost too perfect to be a reality, and yet a blessed reality it was, exhibiting in sweet combination all that nature and grace can accomplish for the union and bliss of a Christian household. Without a particle of stiffness or formality, the every-day life of the house, both late and early, seemed expressly adjusted so as to give full scope to all the domestic virtues, and to make religion a lovely and attractive thing, especially to the young.

“Though the doctor's study-toils scarcely knew of remission for a single day or hour, it was truly delightful to perceive how instantaneously he could lay aside his pen and his books, and relax into the most cheerful freedom and facetiousness of familiar conversation, which made even children gather around him and listen to his discourse. So absolute was the rule of love in his happy home, that it acted with all the uniformity of a physical law; while in the sweet circle of smiling faces and bounding hearts it created, it presented a spectacle the very opposite of mechanical control. There was authority, indeed, and lodged too where it ought to be, but it was the authority of love and generous sympathy, which needed little or nothing of formal restraint, and which was felt rather as an impulse than obeyed as a command.

“I was struck with astonishment with the power which Dr Wardlaw possessed of disentangling himself from severe study by a number of minor interruptions, and then of resuming the thread of his subject

as if nothing had happened. He told me that he could in general do this with but slight damage to his train of thought. This said much for the fine discipline of his associating principle, but much more for the power of benevolent habit, which had never suffered him to become a literary autocrat or recluse in his own family.

“ ‘His powers of conversation were equally rich and varied. He could discuss a controverted point with great acuteness, logical force, and ready eloquence. His current criticisms upon men and things were in general such as no intelligent listener would wish to forget. He had boundless stores of that kind of ready wit which, when free from all asperity, as it was in him, tends exceedingly to refine and enliven conversation, and to quicken the powers of fancy and observation. It was impossible to spend a dull or unprofitable evening in company with Dr Wardlaw.

“ ‘His accomplishments as a divine of the strictly biblical class, caring but little for the schools, were seen in two ways—in the lucid and pungent remarks which dropt from his lips in ordinary conversation upon theological subjects, and in the amazing readiness and copiousness with which he could reply, at any given instant, to biblical questions of the profoundest character, involving some of the greatest difficulties connected with revealed religion.’

“ ‘To this sketch I am happy to be able to add the following still more full and minute analysis of Dr Wardlaw’s domestic life, from the pen of one whose opportunities of observing were the best possible, and who in mind and spirit so closely assimilated to the object of his eulogy that it is his prerogative to be heard on such a theme,—I mean the Rev. J. S. Wardlaw of Bellary, the second son of Dr Wardlaw :—

“ ‘No heart ever found more fully than my dear father’s a centre of attraction in the circle of domestic joys. He was wont to speak of these as in themselves ‘the purest and best’ that had ‘survived the fall ;’ and when hallowed by divine grace,—each member of the family being one with the other, as a child of God and an heir of glory,—home was in his view the most appropriate and attractive emblem of heaven. And his own spirit, ever ‘true to these kindred points,’ found its sweetest pleasure in communion with God, and in the free and happy interchange of all the fond ‘charities of father, son, and brother.’ He was gifted in no ordinary degree with all the qualities most fitted to render home the happiest spot on earth ; and a happier home there could not be than ours, when we were all gathered around him, enjoying his society, loving and being loved. His heart overflowed with affection. It beamed from his eye, it played on his lips, it was heard in every word, and was marked by a peculiar depth and tenderness. There is one—for fifty long years the partner of his life, whose widowed heart, feeling in his loss a void which never can be filled, ‘knoweth its own bitterness’—who, in sadly sweet remembrance of the past, and with tearful eye, bears ample testimony to the fact that *as a husband* he was all that could be desired ; and those who mourn his loss *as a parent* will, each one more eagerly than another, acknowledge that there never was a father to whom children were more deeply indebted, or one more entirely deserving of their best and warmest love.

“ ‘There was nothing in his manner towards us to inspire *dread*, but every thing to win and captivate the heart. In his presence we all felt

the utmost *freedom*. There was no restraint, no reserve; but an easy and playful familiarity—a familiarity at the same time associated with the most profound respect. *Fear* was unknown except when a fault had been committed, and then it was the fear, not of ‘hard words and harder stripes,’ but the fear of encountering that look of mingled grief and displeasure which went so keenly to the heart. In earlier years the rod of correction was at times required—for we were not angels more than others; and when such chastisement was needed it was not withheld, for his affection had in it nothing of that foolish kindness which spares the rod at the expense of the child. Still ‘the rod’ was seldom used, and only on the failure of *moral* means; and the child, as he saw the tear in his father’s eye, could not but be sensible that the correction—however much his rebellious spirit might for the moment spurn it—was inflicted with deep and unfeigned reluctance, and was a cause of heartfelt sorrow to him who administered it. With the elders of the family a word or a look was sufficient to keep them in subjection. His aim was to *rule by love*, and none ever accomplished his end more fully. No parent ever gained a more entire ascendancy over the minds of his children. Kindly indulgent as he was, it cannot be said that he erred by *excessive* indulgence; for he never lost his control, or failed to secure implicit obedience to his will. Without yielding to undue anxiety, he cherished a deep and earnest longing for the spiritual welfare of his children; and it was his increasing aim by faithful instruction, by tender counsel and solemn warning—judiciously administered, and associated with a most attractive exhibition in his own conduct of the nature and influence of true piety—to bring their hearts under its holy and happy and life-giving power. He was wont to say, ‘My cup of bliss would be full did I but see *all* my children within the fold of Christ—all loving and serving him.’ And in answer to his efforts and prayers, and the efforts and prayers of another, whose heart in this respect beat in unison with his own, this crowning joy was vouchsafed.”

After tracing with affectionate tenderness the natural decay, the repeated attacks of illness, and the closing scenes of Dr Wardlaw’s long, honourable, and useful life, Dr Alexander gives a very able, and, so far as we can judge, discriminatingly correct outline of the character of that eminent Christian man and minister, with which we conclude our extracts from this admirable biography:—

“Dr Wardlaw was about the medium height. His frame was firmly knit; his limbs were symmetrically formed; and his whole figure bespoke vigour and activity. His head, which was not very large, was principally developed in the superior and anterior regions; his forehead was smooth and high, though not remarkable for breadth; and the general contour was graceful, and indicated refinement and intelligence rather than force or massiveness. The features of the countenance were regular, and their prevailing expression was benign and serious. Unusually bushy eyebrows cast a slight tinge of severity over the face, which only modified without destroying its general graciousness. The lips presented a striking and characteristic expression of combined sauvity and firmness.

"In early life he was said to be handsome, and this those who knew him only in advanced life can easily believe. Many portraits of him have been engraved, but only three are in the least degree deserving of being referred to. These are one by Paillou, published in 1822; one by Bonnar in 1838; and one by Macnee, taken in the latest years of his life. The last, which was painted for the Theological Academy, is a noble portrait, admirable as a likeness, and illustrious as a work of art.

"Providence, which had assigned him originally a sound and healthy body, had placed in it an equally sound and healthy mind. His was eminently what he himself used ever to hold up as a blessing of the last importance, the '*sana mens in corpore sano.*' His natural endowments, both of mind and of manner, were of no ordinary kind. His mental development was at once large and symmetrical. He united strength and grace in a degree seldom exemplified. His faculties were diversified, but all acted in harmony, and under excellent control. He was master of them—not they of him. Even those powers which were most largely developed in him, and which he was most fond of indulging, were never permitted to carry him off into excess or irregularity. Over all there ever presided a calm but regal will that had respect to principle and purpose. Hence he could at any time bring all his powers to bear upon his subject with a singular concentration and intensity. He had no occasion to wait for the afflatus or inspiration of genius. The whole man with all his powers was there, ready to apply himself with full force to the work in hand. From this arose at once his power to do so much, and the fact that he always did his work well. Whilst another man might have been labouring to bring himself to the point of beginning, Dr Wardlaw was already in full work, his whole mind concentrated on what was before him, and his facile pen speeding in graceful and uniform characters across the page. I do not know that he was ever behind with any work which he had undertaken to do: he might often be hard pressed to accomplish it, but he always did it, and that in a manner worthy of himself. There was nothing eruptive, nothing fitful in the action of his mind. It was not the volcano bursting after long intervals of repose into tempests of flame, and shaking the earth with its thunder; it was the quiet and steadfast star that always shines in the same place with the same lustre, and to which men learn to look as to a guide that never is unsteady, and never disappoints.

"The most prominent feature of Dr Wardlaw's mind lay in his rare powers of analysis and ratiocination. His intellect was eminently dialectic and diacritical. Those faculties which lead men to be historians, or naturalists, or men of science, he either did not largely possess or did not care to cultivate. He was not given to the minute observation or careful collection of mere facts. His mind did not readily occupy itself with deductive processes, whether exercised upon concrete phenomena or on the abstract relations of number and space. He had little of the creative faculty, and was at all times more disposed to note the distinctions of things than to trace their analogies or resemblances. His peculiar walk was that of the philosopher and the critic. The qualities that go to furnish men for these departments he possessed and had cultivated to a high degree. His power of analysis was great: he could

separate an entangled mesh of thought with marvellous perspicacity, and discriminate conceptions from each other with a fineness of perception that was sometimes too acute for ordinary faculties to follow. He had no pleasure in seeing things hazily or merely in the mass; it was needful for him to ascertain them with precision, and to mark clearly both their individual proportions and their relative bearings. On this he thought no pains too great to be spent; and when he was satisfied that the subject was one on which no amount of penetration or research that he could put forth would secure for him clear and definite conceptions regarding it, he judged it better to let it altogether alone than to have only a confused, illogical, and incogitable notion of it. To this power and this love of analytical investigation he added comprehensiveness of survey and sagacity of decision. There are men whose acuteness is wonderful, but whose mental eye is merely microscopic: men who can make great discoveries among the *infusoria* of thought, but for whom the field occupied by the larger objects is too extensive to be included within their survey. It was not so with Dr Wardlaw. His view was penetrating, but it was also extensive. He deliberated as well as analysed, and calmly contemplated the whole field of observation before he ventured upon a decision. His induction was wide, no less than discriminating. With patient diligence he collected all that could be ascertained upon any subject, weighed the whole in the scales of a nicely balanced judgment, and refused to come to a conclusion until he was satisfied that every thing that ought to have entered into his estimate had received due attention. And in coming to his decision he was aided by strong native sagacity and shrewdness, which prevented his being easily imposed upon by the mere appearances of things, or being readily drawn into the error of over-estimating the premises on which his conclusion was built. Hence the logical accuracy which formed such a marked characteristic of his reasonings, and the solidity and soundness which usually recommend his judgments.

“A mind thus endowed was naturally fitted for the investigation and exposition of moral and religious truth; and to this department Dr Wardlaw from an early period devoted his best energies. He found peculiar delight in the exercise of his reasoning powers upon those questions which are to be determined by a weighing of probable evidence; and it was beautiful to see the skill with which he apportioned to each scale its proper contents, and the steadiness with which he held the balance that was to determine which had the preponderance. Had he been led to devote himself to the legal profession he would undoubtedly have risen to high distinction, and his name might have gone down to posterity with those of Mansfield or Denman, as one of the most perspicacious and at the same time most refined of judges. But he had chosen another and, in the most weighty respects, a higher sphere of labour, where there was also ample scope for the exercise of his peculiar abilities. Here he shone with few to rival him. When some difficult or intricate question in which he was interested came to be handled by him, his treatment of it was sure to be such as to afford to all who could enter into it a logical treat; and though this in itself was a tendency capable of being used for evil as well as for good, there were certain moral qualities associated with it in the mind of Dr Wardlaw,

which made its operation in him ever lean to the better side. He had a sincere love of truth for its own sake, and an honest desire to apprehend it. He was calm and candid in his estimate of opposing probabilities. He exercised great caution in coming to a conclusion, and was almost timid in expressing an opinion where he had not enjoyed the fullest opportunities of judging. By these influences, combined with his strong religious sense of responsibility, he was, though a singularly dexterous controversialist, and disposed to find peculiar gratification in the exercise of his reasoning powers, preserved from that mere intellectual gladiatorship, and that craving for victory rather than love of truth, which too often ensnares the expert disputant, and leads to a mischievous abuse of his powers.

"But whilst the ratiocinative and critical faculties constituted the main strength of Dr Wardlaw's mind, there were other qualities which lent grace and refinement to all his intellectual exercises. He was gifted with an exact and elegant taste. His sense of the becoming and the beautiful both in reality and in sentiment was quick and just. His fancy, if not rich or copious, was lively, natural, and refined. Like many men of acute intellectual powers he possessed also a felicitous and playful wit, the exercise of which, however, he reserved for moments of social hilarity; never using it as an instrument of assault, never indulging it for mere purposes of display, never making any use of it when business of serious import was in hand, and never, in his most unrestrained moments, allowing it to trespass beyond the limits which the strictest propriety of taste and feeling imposed.

"To a character thus strong and graceful by natural endowment were added those advantages which education and religion confer. In all those branches of knowledge which are usually studied at our Scottish schools and universities, Dr Wardlaw had made respectable proficiency, and in some his attainments were greatly beyond the average. Without pretending to be a profound scholar, he was familiar with the learned tongues; and though his natural tastes and tendencies did not lead him to pay much attention to natural science, he was not indifferent to the importance of that department of knowledge, nor ignorant of the splendid advances which the genius and methods of its votaries have of late years enabled them to make. In philosophy and polite literature, however, he was most at home; and with nearly all the great English writers in these departments he was well acquainted. I believe Cowper was his favourite among our poets, and Dugald Stewart among our philosophers. All our great ethical writers had been carefully studied by him; but with none of them was he fully satisfied, for which he has himself stated his reasons in one of his published writings. In theology his reading, if not very extensive, had been carefully selected, and every part of the field minutely and anxiously surveyed. The writings of Dr Edward Williams, Andrew Fuller, Archibald M'Lean, and some of our older Scottish divines, such as Ricaltoun, he held in peculiar estimation; and upon them many of his own opinions were formed. But his tastes were not contracted in this department, he was ready to receive further light from whatever quarter it might come, and to the last was fond of seeing whatever new accessions had been made to the stores of biblical or theological learning."

In concluding our review of this very valuable work, with a few remarks on its special merits, we revert to that aspect of it to which we have already directed some attention. It is more like the conjoint production of two very able men, offering freely their opinions on the important controversies of half a century of a peculiarly controversial age, than like a common biography. Dr Alexander gives us a full, clear, fair, and well-condensed statement of his elder friend's opinions, with a warm expression of his approbation, where he approves; and then an equally full, clear, and fair statement of his own opinions, with a frank expression of his disapproval, where he disapproves. In all instances the criticism of the biographer is not only eminently fair, but displays the subdued tone which deep respect and love for his departed friend called forth in his own generous heart. We are enabled to trace the mental characteristics of both men in the one volume. Dr Wardlaw, as a controversialist, was logically clear, calm, earnest, candid, and honourable to a very remarkable degree, very rarely permitting a single expression of asperity to escape him, even when greatly provoked; and never descending to the use of disingenuous artifices to gain an apparent advantage. His mind was analytic and inductive, not synthetic and deductive; better adapted to follow a course of reasoning than to perceive and state first principles. His failures, when he failed, are always to be found in his premises; rarely, if at all, in his logical inferences. Dr Alexander is considerably similar in his mental characteristics; but with a greater power of perceiving and stating first principles. By the honest and manly exercise of this power, he was able to detect a considerable number of latent fallacious assumptions in the primary positions of Dr Wardlaw, by which his conclusions were vitiated; and his candour and love of truth have constrained him to state frankly what he perceived to be erroneous in the writings of his revered friend. While he has done so in the language of an able, clear, and vigorous thinker, fairly putting forth his strength with compressed energy and eloquence on topics of importance, he has always made it evident that his statements were drawn forth by his love of truth, and by an earnest desire that men of weaker minds might not, in their indiscriminating admiration of Dr Wardlaw, adopt and follow erroneous opinions to their own injury. Dr Wardlaw's writings, read in the light of Dr Alexander's criticisms, may be and must be a precious heritage to the church of Christ, and may continue long to convey invaluable instruction to distant generations.

ART. VIII.—*Vindication of Luther against his recent English Assailants.* Second Edition, reprinted and enlarged, from the Notes to "The Mission of the Comforter." By JULIUS CHARLES HARE, M.A., Rector of Herstmonceux, Archdeacon of Lewes, Chaplain in Ordinary to the Queen. London: John W. Parker & Son, West Strand. 1855. Pp. 308.

Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform, chiefly from the "Edinburgh Review." Corrected, vindicated, enlarged, in Notes and Appendices. By SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart. Second Edition, enlarged. London: 1853.

It is admitted by all Christians that the church is, in some sense, the organ and the representative of Christ upon earth. This principle, true in itself, is very liable to be abused and perverted. It is perverted grossly in the hands of Romanists, when it is represented as implying that the church, as a visible society, has virtually the same power and authority, the same rights and prerogatives, as its Master in heaven. The general principle about the church, understood in this sense, and combined with the assumption that the church of Christ upon earth is the church which acknowledges the authority of the Bishop of Rome as Christ's vicar, is the foundation of the Papal claims to supremacy and infallibility. The same principle is also employed largely to defend or palliate some of the more offensive consequences of these claims, and some of the more offensive modes of enforcing them. On the ground of this identification of Christ and the church, the opponents of the church come to be regarded as the enemies of Christ, and his vicar is held to be entitled to deal with them, so far as he can, just as Christ may deal with those who continue finally obstinate and impenitent enemies to his cause. In this way Papists come to subordinate every thing, in the mode in which they regard and deal with their fellow-men, to the fancied honour and interests of the church, and to look upon the opponents of the church not as their fellow-men, whom they are bound to love, but simply as the enemies of Christ, whom they are entitled to injure. It is deeply engrained on the minds of Romanists, that those who are beyond the pale of the true church forfeit the ordinary rights of men and members of society; and that, especially when they take an active and prominent part in opposing and injuring the church, they ought to be treated as outlaws, or as wild beasts.

It is this identification of the church and its visible head,

the Pope, with Christ himself, that produces and accounts for that extraordinary subordination of every thing to the interests of the church which is so remarkable a feature of Popery; and that explains, and in some sense palliates, the persecutions which Romanists have at all times been quite willing to perpetrate. All this may be regarded as exhibiting the natural and appropriate result of Popish principles, and as, in some sense, rather helping, when viewed in connection with certain tendencies of human nature, to palliate the cruelties which have disgraced the history of the Church of Rome. But there is an abuse of the principle which has been often acted upon by Papists, though not often openly avowed, and which is altogether destitute of any appearance of excuse; it is that of acting as if it were held that men who oppose and resist the Church of Rome not only forfeit thereby the ordinary rights and privileges of men, of neighbours, and of relatives, but lose all right even to claim that the ordinary rules of integrity and veracity should be observed in regard to them. It has been no uncommon thing for Papists to act as if not only the social and domestic affections, and the duties connected with them, but even the laws of immutable morality were to be subordinated to the interests of the church. This is the principle involved in the decision of the Council of Constance, and often acted upon in the Church of Rome, about keeping faith with heretics. That decision was intended to sanction the doctrine that heretics, the open enemies of the church, have no right to demand the fulfilment of engagements and promises, and that no pledges given to such persons should ever be allowed to stand in the way of any scheme for promoting any of the church's objects. These notions exert a constant and abiding influence upon the minds of most Romanists, even of many who would shrink from embodying them in formal propositions. The consummation of what is most discreditable in this matter is to be found in the fact, that some Jesuit writers have openly proclaimed the lawfulness of putting forth deliberate and intentional slanders for the purpose of injuring their enemies,—a fact established by Pascal in the fifteenth of his Provincial Letters, and one that ought to be remembered and applied in judging of the reliance to be placed upon the statements of Romish controversialists.

With such views and impressions prevailing among Romanists, it was not to be expected that the Reformers, who did so much damage to the Church of Rome, would be treated with justice or decency. Accordingly we find that a most extraordinary series of slanders against the character of the leading Reformers, utterly unsupported by evidence, and wholly

destitute of truth and plausibility, were invented and propagated by Romish writers. Luther and the other Reformers were charged, in Popish publications, with heinous crimes, of which no evidence was or could be produced; and these accusations, though their falsehood was often exposed, continued long to be repeated in most Popish books. With respect to the more offensive accusations that used to be adduced against the Reformers, a considerable check was given to the general circulation of them, by the thorough exposures of their unquestionable falsehood which were put forth by Bayle in his Dictionary, a work which was extensively read in the literary world. Papists became ashamed to advance, in works intended for general circulation, allegations which Bayle's Dictionary had prepared the reading public to regard, without hesitation, as deliberate falsehoods, though they continued to repeat them in works intended for circulation among their own people. Scarcely any Romish writers who pretended to any thing like respectability, have, for a century and a half, ventured to commit themselves to an explicit assertion of the grosser calumnies which used to be adduced against the Reformers. Some of them, however, have shown a considerable unwillingness to abandon these charges entirely, and like still to mention them as accusations which were at one time adduced, and which men may still believe if they choose.

But while Romanists have now ceased wholly or in a great measure to urge the grosser charges which they used to bring against the Reformers, yet their general principles and spirit continue unchanged: the outward improvement in their conduct being owing solely to fear or policy, and not to any real advancement in integrity and candour. It is emphatically true of almost all the defenders and champions of Popery, that they fear nothing but a witness and a judge, and do not scruple to misrepresent and slander their enemies, so far as they think they can do this with impunity to themselves and benefit to their cause. They confine themselves now, in a great measure, to charges of a less heinous nature than those which before Bayle's time they were in the habit of adducing, and to charges which have some appearance at least of evidence to rest upon. But these lighter and more plausible accusations are in general almost as unfounded as the others. Protestants, of course, do not regard the Reformers as either infallible or impeccable. They believe that most of them held views, upon some points, more or less erroneous, and that all of them gave abundant evidence that they were stained with the common infirmities of humanity. But they regard them as men who were specially qualified and raised up by God for the advancement of his own cause, for bringing out the buried

truth and reforming the corrupted church, who were guided by God's Word and Spirit to views, in the main accurate, of the leading principles of Christian doctrine, and who, in the habitual tenor of their lives, furnished satisfactory evidence of acting under the influence of real religion and genuine piety. Believing this concerning the Reformers, Protestants feel it to be both their duty and their privilege to defend them from the assaults of adversaries, and especially to refute any thing that may seem to militate against the truth of the statement now given, of what they believe as to the general character and position of these illustrious men.

The great general position which Rómanists are anxious to establish by all they can collect against the Reformers, from their writings or their lives, from their sayings or their doings, is this, that it is very unlikely that God would employ *such* men in the accomplishment of any special work for the advancement of his gracious purposes. In dealing with this favourite allegation of Romanists, Protestants assert and undertake to prove the following positions:—1st, That the allegation is irrelevant to the real merits of the controversy between us and the Church of Rome, which can be determined only by the standard of the written word; 2d, That the allegation is untrue,—in other words, that there is nothing about the character of the Reformers as a whole which renders it in the least unlikely that God employed them in his own special gracious work; and, 3d, That the general principle on which the allegation is based can be applied in the way of retort, with far greater effect, to the Church of Rome. Protestants, by establishing these three positions, effectually dispose of the Romish allegation. It is with the second of them only that we have at present to do, and even on it we do not mean to enlarge.

Romanists have taken great pains to collect every expression from the writings of the Reformers, and to bring forward every incident in their lives, that may be fitted—especially when they are all presented nakedly and in combination—to produce an unfavourable impression as to their motives and actions. In the prosecution of this work, they are usually quite unscrupulous about the completeness of their quotations and the accuracy of their facts, and in this way they sometimes manage to make out, upon some particular points, what may appear to ignorant or prejudiced readers to be a good case. In dealing with the materials which Papists have collected for depreciating the character of the Reformers, and thus establishing the improbability of God having employed them as his instruments in restoring divine truth, and in reforming the church, there are three steps in the process that

ought to be attended to and discriminated, in order to our arriving at a just and fair conclusion:—1st, We must carefully ascertain the true facts of the case as to any statement or action that may have been ascribed to them or to any one of them; and we will find, in not a few instances, that the allegations found in ordinary Popish works on the subject are inaccurate, defective, or exaggerated,—that the quotation is garbled and mutilated, or may be explained and modified by the context,—or that the action is erroneously or unfairly represented in some of its features or accompanying circumstances.

2d, When the real facts of the case are once ascertained, the next step should be to form a fair and reasonable estimate of what they really involve or imply, taking into account, as justice demands, the natural character and tendencies of the men individually, the circumstances in which they were placed, the influences to which they were subjected, the temptations to which they were exposed, and the general impressions and ordinary standard on such subjects in the age and country in which they lived.

3d, There is a third step necessary in order to form a right estimate of the common Popish charges against the Reformers, and of the soundness of the conclusion which they wish to deduce from them, viz., that we should not confine our attention to their blemishes and infirmities, real or alleged, greater or smaller, but take a general view of their whole character and proceedings, embracing, as far as we have materials, all that they felt, and said, and did, and endeavour in this way to form a fair estimate of what were their predominating desires, motives, and objects, of what it was that they had really at heart, and of what was the standard by a regard to which they strove to regulate their conduct.

A careful application of these obviously just and fair principles will easily dispose of the materials which Papists have so assiduously collected for the purpose of injuring the character of the Reformers, and convince every intelligent and honest inquirer, that there is not one of the leading men among them who has not, with all his errors and infirmities, left behind him sufficient and satisfactory evidence, so far as men can judge of their fellow-men, that he had been born again of the Word of God through the belief of the truth, that he had honestly devoted himself to God's service, and that in what he did for the cause of the Reformation he was mainly influenced by a desire to promote the glory of God, to advance the prosperity of Christ's kingdom, and to secure the spiritual welfare of men.

But Romanists are not the only persons who have misrepresented and calumniated the Reformers. Many have sympa-

thised with and abetted the efforts of Romanists to damage the character of the Reformers, who had not the palliation, such as it is, which they can plead of avenging the damage done to their church, and who seem to care nothing about Popery and Protestantism as such. What Dr M'Crie said of John Knox holds equally true of the other Reformers, and has been perhaps more fully realised in the case of those of them who exerted a still wider and more commanding influence:—

“The increase of infidelity and indifference to religion in modern times, especially among the learned, has contributed in no small degree to swell the tide of prejudice against our Reformer. Whatever satisfaction persons of this description may express or feel at the Reformation from Popery, as the means of emancipating the world from superstition and priestcraft, they naturally despise and dislike men who were inspired with the love of religion, and in whose plans of reform the acquisition of civil liberty and the advancement of literature held a subordinate place to the revival of primitive Christianity.” —(Life of Knox, new edition, p. 285.)

There has scarcely ever been an infidel or semi-infidel declaimer against bigotry and intolerance, however insignificant, who has not attempted something smart about “Calvin burning Servetus.” Both Lord Brougham and Mr Macaulay have sunk to the level of rounding off a sentence in this way. And Luther, from his peculiar position and history, and from his special weaknesses and infirmities, has furnished very copious materials to so-called Protestant, as well as to Popish, calumniators. A combination of circumstances has had the effect of late years of bringing out in this country, from different classes of writers, a good deal of matter fitted and intended to damage the character of the Reformers. Those who laboured long to un-Protestantise the English Church before they left it to join the Church of Rome, were, of course, anxious to depreciate the Reformers; and Newman and Ward, who are now both Romanists, did what they could in this way. Moëhler, a Romish divine of learning and ability, whose Symbolism has been much commended and read, has laboured skilfully to excite strong prejudices against the theological views of the Reformers, and has succeeded all the better because of the appearance of candour and moderation which he presents, as compared with the generality of Popish controversialists. Mr Hallam, in his “History of the Literature of Europe during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” was naturally led to speak of the writings of the Reformers, but having only a very partial acquaintance with their works, and not being able, as he candidly enough admits, to understand much of their theology, he very seriously misrepresents them, and especially Luther. Hallam’s great learning, accuracy, and

impartiality upon general and ordinary topics, are universally admitted; but he was very imperfectly acquainted with the writings of the Reformers; and experience seems to afford abundant evidence that men may be candid and impartial on most questions of a historical, political, and literary kind, and yet be strongly prejudiced on religious subjects. This we believe to be the case with Mr Hallam, while, as might be expected, his depreciatory criticisms upon the Reformers and the Reformation are now triumphantly quoted by Popish controversialists as the concessions of "an eminent Protestant authority." And, lastly, Sir William Hamilton, whose reputation stands so deservedly high as a philosopher and a man of erudition, has thought proper to go out of his way in order to indulge in some reckless and offensive attacks upon the character of the Reformers, first in an article in the *Edinburgh Review* (vol. 60), for 1834, on the Admission of Dissenters to English Universities; and again, in 1843, in a pamphlet on the controversy about the appointment of pastors, which produced in that year the Disruption of the Church of Scotland.

In consequence of these things, the late lamented Archdeacon Hare undertook the defence of Luther in a very elaborate and admirable dissertation, bearing the form of a note to his work on the "Mission of the Comforter," published in 1846. In this note, marked by the letter W, which extended to above 300 pages, Mr Hare, with great ability, with admirable scholarship, and a thorough knowledge of the subject, defended Luther from the misrepresentations of Hallam, Newman, Ward, Moehler, and Sir William Hamilton. Soon after, Sir William published his still incomplete edition of the works of Reid, with notes and supplementary dissertations, and subjoined to it an advertisement, dated November 1846, in which he promised to publish soon, and previously to any other work, a production entitled, "Contributions towards a True History of Luther and the Lutherans. Part I., containing notice of the Venerable Archdeacon Hare and his Polemic." These "Contributions" have not yet appeared, but in 1852, Sir William gave to the world "Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform," in which, in republishing the article from the *Edinburgh Review* containing his original attack upon Luther, he added to it some notes, taking "notice of Archdeacon Hare and his Polemic." Mr Hare had been requested by many, who were satisfied and delighted with his defence of the Reformers, to publish his note as a separate work, and accordingly, after the publication, in 1852, of his "Contest with Rome," which we regard as upon the whole the ablest, and, in some respects, the most valuable of his works, his time, we believe, was chiefly occupied, amid the in-

terruptions of declining health, in preparing materials for subjoining to his defence of Luther abundant proofs and illustrations, with an exposure of Sir William's recent notes.

It is a great loss to theological literature that Mr Hare's health and life were not spared to enable him to complete this work. The "Vindication of Luther," published nearly a year ago, soon after his death, and now lying before us, is merely a revised republication of the note W in the "Mission of the Comforter," though forming by itself a goodly 8vo. All that was available of what had been preparing for the new edition is the mere references to above 80 notes, which we have no doubt would have contained a treasure of interesting and valuable materials. Sir William's notes to his Discussions do not contain, or profess to contain, the evidence of his most offensive charges against Luther,—charges made nine years before,—evidence which he has been repeatedly challenged to produce. With the exception, indeed, of a grand theological display, abounding in blunders, on the doctrine of Assurance, to which we shall afterwards advert if we have time, Sir William's new matter consists chiefly of a very coarse and reckless attack upon Mr Hare,—a specimen of the treatment which every one must expect to receive who presumes to question his infallibility. Mr Hare might very easily have repelled and retorted Sir William's charges against him, without producing any great amount of valuable matter; but from the number and character of the references which have been preserved and published, there is every likelihood that the notes would have been an enduring monument of his talents and scholarship, and of his many noble and beautiful qualities of character. We, therefore, deeply lament that he was not spared to complete this work, while we estimate very highly what he has done, and regard his "Vindication of Luther" as a very valuable contribution to theological literature, and an important service rendered to the cause of that Protestant evangelical truth which Luther was honoured to be the great instrument of reviving.

We believe that on some important points Mr Hare's doctrinal views were defective and erroneous; but he had certainly imbibed very thoroughly both the general spirit and the specific theology of Luther. He was firmly established, both theoretically and practically, in Luther's great article of a standing or a falling church,—the doctrine of justification by faith alone. His cordial appreciation of this great doctrine, and his hearty love and esteem for Luther, whose qualities as a man were in many respects so very different from his own, are among the things which satisfy those who know him only from his writings, that he lived by faith on the Son of God, that he had a claim to the love of all Christ's people for

the truth's sake that was in him, while he combined, in no ordinary degree, almost all those claims to respect and affection which are inferior only to this one. We are convinced that Mr Hare's reputation, like Dr Arnold's, will grow and extend after his death, and that even those who differed most widely from some of his doctrinal views, will be more and more persuaded that his early death was, humanly speaking, a serious loss to the cause of Christ.

Mr Hare's thorough knowledge of Luther, and cordial affection for him, admirably fitted him for defending the Reformer from the numerous attacks which have recently been made upon him from a variety of quarters. We do not say that all that he has written in vindication of Luther is characterised by strict impartiality and by rigid accuracy. Love may operate in perverting men's judgment as well as hatred. But still love is the right state of mind to cherish in forming a judgment of our fellow-men, and its presence will pervert the judgment much less widely, and much less injuriously, than the opposite feeling. In regard to many subjects, indeed, it may be said that the prevalence of love in the heart is necessary to forming a sound and accurate judgment; and the character of the Reformers is one of the subjects to which this observation applies. Mr Hare's love to Luther has on one or two occasions led him to judge more favourably, or rather, less unfavourably, of Luther's conduct than perhaps a review of the whole circumstances would warrant, and to soften or slur over some of his rash and offensive expressions. But while this may be conceded, it is not the less true that his representation of the character and opinions of Luther is immeasurably more just and accurate than that given by his opponents; and that in his "polemic" with them, he has established a most decided superiority.

There is a great deal about Luther's character and history to call forth admiration and love; while there is also a good deal about him to afford an excuse to those who, from whatever cause, whether as Papists or on some other ground, are disposed to regard him with opposite feelings. With many high and noble endowments, both from nature and grace, both of head and heart, which in many respects fitted him admirably for the great work to which he was called, and the important services which he rendered to the church and the world, there were some shortcomings and drawbacks both about his understanding and his temperament; the results and manifestations of which have afforded many plausible handles to his enemies, and have occasioned corresponding annoyance and difficulty to his friends.

Luther occupied a position, and exerted an influence in the

history of the church, and altogether manifested a character, well fitted to secure for him the admiration of all who are interested in the advancement of Christian truth, or qualified to appreciate what is noble, magnanimous, fearless, and disinterested. We have abundant evidence of his continuing to retain the common infirmities of human nature, aggravated in some respects by the system in which he had been originally educated, by the condition of society in the age and country in which he lived, and the influences to which, after he commenced the work of Reformation, he was subjected; but we have also the most satisfactory evidence of his deep piety, of his thorough devotedness to God's service, of his habitual walking with God, and living by faith in the promises of his word. No one who surveys Luther's history and writings, and who is capable of forming an estimate of what piety is, can entertain any doubt upon this point.

The leading service which Luther was qualified and enabled to render to the church, in a theological point of view, was the unfolding and establishing the great doctrine of justification, which for many ages had been grossly corrupted and perverted; and bringing the truth upon this subject to bear upon the exposure of many of the abuses, both in theory and practice, that prevailed in the Church of Rome. His engrossment to a large extent with this great doctrine, combined with the peculiar character of his mind, led him to view almost every topic chiefly, if not exclusively, in its relation to forgiveness and peace of conscience, to grace and merit; and thus fostered a certain tendency to exaggeration and extravagance in his doctrinal statements. Besides this defect in Luther's theology, giving it something of one-sidedness, he had some features of character which detract from the weight of his statements, and from the deference to which otherwise he might have appeared entitled, and which we feel disposed to accord to such a man as Calvin. He was naturally somewhat prone to indulge in exaggerated and paradoxical statements, to press points too far, and to express them in unnecessarily strong and repulsive terms. And this tendency he sometimes manifests not only in speaking of men and actions, but even in theological discussions. He was not characterised by that exact balance of all the mental powers, by that just and accurate perception of the whole relations and true importance of things, and by that power of carefully and precisely embodying in words just what he himself had deliberately concluded and nothing more, which, in some men, have so strong a tendency to persuade us to give ourselves up to their guidance, under a sort of intuitive conviction that they will not lead us often or far astray from the paths of truth. In Luther's works, with a great deal to admire,

to interest, and impress, we often stumble upon statements which remind us that we must be on our guard, that we must exercise our own judgment, and not follow him blindly wherever he may choose to lead us. The leading defects of his character may be said to be,—1st, The impetuosity of his temperament, leading often to the use of exaggerated and intemperate language both in conversation and in writing; though, as has been frequently and truly remarked, very seldom leading him into injudicious or imprudent *actions*, amid all the difficulties in which he was involved: and, 2d, A certain species of presumption or self-confidence, which, putting on the garb of better and higher principles, sometimes made him adhere with great obstinacy to erroneous opinions, shutting his understanding against every thing that could be brought forward in opposition to them; and made him indulge sometimes in rather ridiculous boasting. The result of all these qualities was, that he has left many statements of an intemperate and exaggerated description; which have afforded a great handle to his enemies, and which, when collected and set off by being presented in isolation from accompanying statements and circumstances, and in combination with each other, are apt to produce a somewhat uncomfortable impression.

And then consider how this extraordinary man, of so peculiar a mental character and general temperament, was tried and tested. He occupied a very singular position, and was subjected to very peculiar influences. He was tried in a very unusual measure, with almost every thing fitted to disturb and pervert, to elevate and to depress, with fears and hopes, with dangers and successes. Let it be further remembered, that of this man, who was so constituted and so circumstanced, there have been preserved and published no fewer than about 2,300 letters, many of them private and confidential effusions to his friends; and that a great deal of his ordinary conversation or table-talk has been recorded and transmitted to us, without our having any good evidence of its being accurately reported.

It is surely not to be wondered at that it should be easy to produce many rash, extravagant, inconsistent, and indefensible sayings of Luther. And if, notwithstanding the tests to which he has been subjected, he still stands out as unquestionably a man of high religious principle, of thorough and disinterested devotedness to God's service, and of many noble and elevated qualities,—all which most even of his depreciators, except the Popish section of them, will probably concede,—how thoroughly base and despicable is it in any man to be grasping at opportunities of trying to damage his character and influence, by collecting and stringing together (perhaps exaggerating and

distorting), his rash and inconsistent, or it may be extravagant and offensive, sentiments and expressions. Papists of course are labouring in their proper vocation in trying, *per fas aut nefas*, to damage Luther's character. Popish controversialists are ever ready to sacrifice conscience, and every manly and honourable feeling, to the interests of the church; and Tractarians, following in their footsteps, have imbibed a large portion of their spirit.

Of Mr Hare's "Vindication of Luther," about 90 pages are devoted to an exposure of the Tractarian attacks upon him by Newman and Ward, who have since joined the Church of Rome; about 40 to an exposure of a Popish attack upon him by Moëhler; and the remaining 170 pages are occupied with an answer to the assaults of "the great Protestant authorities," Mr Hallam and Sir William Hamilton.

Newman had attacked Luther only incidentally, and somewhat cautiously, in his book on "Justification;" and though he is convicted of several misrepresentations of Luther's opinions, he is upon the whole let easily off. Newman had spoken slightly of Luther, as not being, like Augustine, a Father of the church, but merely the founder of a school. This has given occasion to Mr Hare to indite the following very fine and striking passage:—

"But though Luther was not what was technically termed a *father*, and could not be so, from the period when, for the good of mankind, it was ordained that he should be born, yet it has pleased God that he, above all other men since the days of the apostles, should, in the truest and highest sense, be a father in Christ's church, yea, the human father and nourisher of the spiritual life of millions of souls, for generation after generation. Three hundred years have rolled away since he was raised, through Christ's redeeming grace, from the militant church into the triumphant; and throughout those three hundred years, and still at this day, it has been and is vouchsafed to him,—and so, God willing, shall it be for centuries to come,—that he should feed the children of half Germany with the milk of the Gospel by his Catechism; that he should supply the poor and simple, yea, and all classes of his countrymen, with words wherewith to commend their souls to God when they rise from their bed, and when they lie down on it; that in his words they should invoke a blessing upon their daily meals, and offer up their thanks for them; that with his stirring hymns they should kindle and pour out their devotion, both in the solemn assembly and in the sanctuary of every family; that by his German words, through the blessed fruit of his labours, they should daily and hourly strengthen and enlighten their hearts, and souls, and minds, with that Book of Life in which God's mercy and truth have met together, his righteousness and peace have kissed each other, and are treasured up for the edification of mankind unto the end of the world. If this is not to be a father in Christ's church, I know not what is. Nay, more, his spiritual children are not confined to his own country. The word of truth, which he was sent to preach, has sounded from land to land, and was heard in our land also, coming

as it did from the home of our forefathers, for the purification of the church, and for the guiding of numberless souls away from a vain confidence in the works of the flesh, to a living trust in their Saviour." —(Pp. 83, 84.)

Mr Ward's assaults, originally published in the *British Critic*, and afterwards collected in his book entitled "Ideal of a Christian Church," are likewise based chiefly upon Luther's doctrine of justification, which is grossly misrepresented, in order to afford materials for accusing him of Antinomianism. Mr Ward is conclusively convicted of gross incompetency and unfairness, nay, of bitter spite. But, really, the allegation that Luther was an Antinomian is so thoroughly contradicted by the whole tenor of his writings, and by the whole course of his life, and is so utterly destitute of all evidence, except some rash, unbecoming, and exaggerated statements about the law, the real meaning of which is evident enough to every candid inquirer, that we do not think it necessary to dwell upon this topic.

Mr Hallam's attack upon Luther rests chiefly upon the same general ground, and is directed to show that he has made statements of an Antinomian tendency. His mode of dealing with this subject has more the appearance of honest ignorance than Mr Ward's. He is certainly, as Mr Hare has proved, and as indeed he himself acknowledges, very imperfectly acquainted with Luther's works. He is also, from whatever cause, pretty strongly prejudiced against him. He plainly enough indicates that he had been somewhat influenced, in judging of Luther, by the representations of Bossuet; and as this is a topic to which we shall have occasion afterwards to advert, in pointing out Sir William Hamilton's obligations to the great Popish champion, we quote an interesting passage from this section of the *Vindication*:—

"An explanation, however, of this, and of much more, seems to be afforded by the first sentences in Mr Hallam's remarks on Luther: 'It would not be just, probably, to give Bossuet credit in every part of that powerful delineation of Luther's theological tenets, with which he begins the History of the Variations of Protestant Churches. Nothing, perhaps, in polemical eloquence, is so splendid as this chapter. The eagle of Meaux is there truly seen, lordly of form, fierce of eye, terrible in his beak and claws. But he is too determined a partisan to be trusted by those who seek the truth without regard to persons and denominations. His quotations from Luther are short, and in French. I have failed in several attempts to verify the references.' Mr Hallam, who here and elsewhere expresses such fervent admiration for Bossuet's eloquence, says of Luther's Latin works,—'Their intemperance, their coarseness, their inelegance, their scurrility, their wild paradoxes that menace the foundations of religious morality,

are not compensated, so far at least as my slight acquaintance with them extends, by much strength or acuteness, and still less by any impressive eloquence.' To me, I own, in the face of this mild verdict, Luther,—if we take the two masses of his writings, those in Latin and those in his own tongue, which display different characters of style, according to the persons and objects they are designed for, in the highest qualities of eloquence, in the faculty of presenting grand truths, moral and spiritual ideas, clearly, vividly, in words which elevate and enlighten men's minds, and stir their hearts, and control their wills,—seems incomparably superior to Bossuet; almost as superior as Shakespeare to Racine, or as Ullswater to the Serpentine. In fact, when turning from one to the other, I have felt at times as if I were passing out of a gorgeous, crowded drawing-room, with its artificial lights and dizzying sounds, to run up a hill at sunrise. The wide and lasting effect which Luther's writings produced on his own nation, and on the world, is the best witness of their power. -

"I should not have touched on this point unless it were plain that Mr Hallam's judgment on Luther had been greatly swayed by the '*Histoire des Variations*.' It is somewhat strange, to begin one's account of a man with saying that '*it would not be just, probably, to give credit in every part*' to what a determined, able, and not very scrupulous enemy says of him, writing with the express purpose of detecting all possible evil in him and his cause. In truth, what could well be less just than this supererogatory candour? In no court of law would such an invective be attended to, except so far as it was borne out by the evidence adduced. Mr Hallam says he had failed in several attempts to verify the references. If he had succeeded, he would probably have found that the passages cited are mostly misrepresented. How far the misrepresentation is wilful I do not take upon myself to pronounce. Bossuet's mind was so uncongenial to Luther's, so artificial, so narrow, sharing in the national incapacity for seeing any thing except through a French eye-glass; his conception of Faith, as I have had occasion to remark elsewhere, was so meagre, so alien from Luther's; and the shackles imposed upon him by his church so disqualified him for judging fairly of its great enemy; that we need not be surprised at any amount of misunderstanding in him when he came forward as an advocate in such a cause. Still, however fiercely the '*eagle of Meaux*' may have desired to use his beak and claws, he might as well have pecked and clawed at Mount Ararat as at him whom God was pleased to endow with a mountain of strength, when He ordained that he should rise for the support of the church out of the flood of darkness and corruption.

"Here, as the assertion I have made concerning Bossuet's misrepresentations should not be made unsupported by proofs, I will cite two or three examples, showing how the quotations from Luther, which in his pages seem very reprehensible, become innocent when viewed along with the context in their original home. Nor shall these examples be culled out from the six books employed in the attack on Luther. They shall be taken from the first sections of that attack; thus they will better illustrate the manner in which it is carried on."—(Pp. 12-14.)

This is followed up by what is certainly very conclusive proof that both Bossuet and Mr Hallam have put forth some gross misrepresentations of Luther's sentiments.

Mr Hallam and Mr Ward are about equally incompetent to form a correct estimate of Luther's theological views; but Mr Hallam is much the more fair and honest of the two. Mr Ward labours to collect evidence from all quarters against Luther, and Mr Hare gives the following summary of the results of his researches:—

“The evidence which Mr Ward's learning has collected in this matter, is a quotation taken from the English translation of “Audin's Life of Luther;” two quotations from the English translation of “Moëhler's *Symbolik* ;” a quotation from an article of his own in the *British Critic*, which appears there to have been borrowed from the French translation of Moëhler; and certain extracts from an article in the *Edinburgh Review*, and from a pamphlet on the recent schism in the Church of Scotland. Verily, a formidable array of witnesses, picked out with a due recognition of the judicial maxim, that secondhand testimony is to be rejected? To one point, however, they do bear conclusive testimony, which is confirmed by all the rest of the volume, namely, to Mr Ward's utter incompetency for pronouncing an opinion on any question relating to the German Reformation.”—(P. 165.)

The quotations from Audin are not of much importance; but Mr Hare subjects to a thorough scrutiny the materials which Ward has borrowed from Moëhler and Sir William Hamilton; and the investigation of these things forms the most important portion of his Vindication. Moëhler's *Symbolism* has been so much praised of late, having been even pronounced to be the most formidable attack on Protestantism since the time of Bossuet, that it may be interesting to our readers to know something of the general character of this work, and of the answers it has called forth. On these points Mr Hare writes as follows:—

“Here,—as Moëhler's work has been translated into English, as it has been much bepraised by our Romanisers, and has evidently exercised a great deal of influence among them, and as it is well calculated to foster most delusive prejudices against the Reformation, and in favour of the Church of Rome, in readers prepared by visions about the glories of the middle ages, and who are ready to regard the Protestant Churches as outcasts from the pale of Christianity, because, through whatever cause, they have adopted a different form of government,—let me be allowed to remark, that, able as the *Symbolik* certainly is, considering the cause it has to maintain, and plausible as it must needs seem to such as have nothing more than a superficial acquaintance with the topics which it discusses, still, in addition to the errors already spoken of, its value in the service of truth is destroyed by two prevailing fallacies. In the first place, while the author's professed object, as is intimated by his title, is to compare the Protestant Symbo-

lical Books with those of the Romish Church, in order to ascertain and examine the doctrinal antitheses between them, he soon finds out that if he confines himself to these deliberate dogmatical expressions of doctrine he shall not be able to make out a case; therefore he scrapes together all sorts of passages, not merely out of professedly dogmatical treatises—which, under certain restrictions, would be allowable—but out of occasional pamphlets, out of sermons, out of private letters, nay, even out of Luther's 'Table Talk,' to kindle and fan an odium which he cannot otherwise excite. Yet it is plain that such a procedure can only mislead and dupe the reader with regard to the great subject-matter of the controversy; which is not, whether such and such individual Protestants may not at times have written extravagantly or unadvisedly, but is instituted to determine the relative value of the body of truth set forth by each church in the solemn confession of its faith. Strange, too, it may seem, that the thought of the 'Lettres Provinciales' did not come across him, and warn him of the tremendous retribution he might provoke. Moreover, after he has thus craftily shifted the whole ground of the contrast, so that, while it is nominally between the symbolical declarations of doctrine recognised by the opposite churches, in lieu of the Protestant symbolical declarations, he is continually slipping in whatever errors he can pick up in the most trivial writings of the Reformers, and these too not seldom aggravated by gross misrepresentations,—even this does not content him: a like trick must be played with the other scale. As the one side is degraded below the reality, the other is exalted above it. The fallacy spoken of above, in p. 32, runs through the whole book. The opposition of the Reformers is represented as having been directed not against the gross corruptions and errors which prevailed when they began the conflict, but against the modified exposition of Romish doctrine, drawn up with such singular adroitness at the semi-reformation of Trent: nay, even this is often refined and spiritualised by the interpolation of views belonging to the theology and philosophy of the nineteenth century. Hence it is not to be wondered at that Moëhler's work should impose on such readers as do not see through these fallacies, but suppose his representations of the opposite parties to be correct.

"Yet its influence ought to have been exploded long ago. For never, in the history of controversies, was there a completer victory than that gained by the champions of Protestant truth who replied to it. Indeed, the attack, instead of being injurious, was eminently beneficial to the German Protestants. It led them to examine the foundations of their strength,—to bring out the divine armour of truth stored up in the writings of the Reformers. Among the answers which Moëhler called forth, some, which are highly spoken of,—for instance, Hengstenberg's and Marheineke's—I have not seen; but the two that I have read are triumphant. That by Nitzsch is a masterly assertion and vindication of the great Protestant principles which Moëhler assailed; and its calm and dignified tone and spirit, its philosophic power and deep Christian wisdom, render it one of the noblest among polemical works. Baur, on the other hand, takes up his Herculean club and smashes Moëhler's book to atoms. Immeasurably superior to his ad-

versary, through his vast learning and dialectic power, he pursues him through sophism after sophism, unravels fallacy after fallacy, and strips off mis-statement after mis-statement, till he leaves him at last in a condition of pitiable nakedness and forlornness. In several of Baur's other works, the Hegelian predominates over the Christian, to the great disparagement and sacrifice of Christian truth; and his criticism has of late years become extravagantly destructive: even in his answer to Moëhler his philosophy at times is too obtrusive. But his vindication of the doctrines of the Reformation, and his exposure of the Tridentine fallacies, as well as of Moëhler's, is complete."—(Pp. 169–172.)

Moëhler has produced and given prominence to what is certainly the worst and most offensive passage that has yet been found in Luther; and Mr Hare has carefully considered it, and conclusively defended it,—not certainly from the charge of great rashness, extravagance, and offensiveness, in point of phraseology, but from that which the words, taken by themselves, seem at first view to suggest, viz., of embodying a deliberate exhortation to the practice of immorality. As this will probably continue for some time to be a favourite topic of invective with Romanists and Romanisers, we would have liked to have laid before our readers Mr Hare's discussion of it. But we really have not space for so long a quotation as would be necessary for this purpose. It is proper, however, that we should give some general idea of the point, while we must refer to the Vindication for particulars.—(Pp. 178–194.) The passage from Luther, as given in the English translation of Moëhler's Symbolism (vol. i. p. 183), is this: "Sin lustily (*pecca fortiter*), but beyet more lusty in faith, and rejoice in Christ, who is the conqueror of sin, of death, and of the world. Sin we must, so long as we remain here. It suffices, that through the riches of the glory of God, we know the Lamb which taketh away the sins of the world. From him no sin will sever us, though a million times in a day we should fornicate or commit murder." The question here naturally occurs, To whom was this startling statement addressed? And it is no unimportant point in Luther's defence, that these words form part of a letter addressed to Melancthon, in 1521, when Luther was living in concealment in the Wartburg. Mr Hare refers to this topic in this way:—

"Verily it does seem here as though hell were casting up its spray into heaven. Still, after our ample experience of the manner in which words may be misrepresented, and after the thousand thousand proofs afforded by Luther's writings and life that he did know something of the gospel, we will not be disheartened. At all events, we will try to make out what these awful words can mean,—to whom they can have been said,—for what purpose. Were they said to Simon de Montfort when he marched against the Albigenes? or to Alva when he entered

on his government in the Netherlands? or to Louis XIV. when he revoked the edict of Nantes? or to poor Mary, when she mounted the throne after the death of her brother Edward? Were they a dram administered to Charles IX. and to Catherine of Medicis on the eve of St. Bartholomew? or a *billet doux* sent to Charles II. during the progress of his conversion? or were they a motto written up in the halls of the Inquisition? or can it be that Luther was once engaged in a friendly correspondence with Munzer? or with Alexander VI.? No; but to Melancthon, of all men that ever lived! Not to Munzer; not to Alexander VI.; not to Leo X.; not to Clement VII.; but to Melancthon! A strange person, truly, to choose as the confidant of such a doctrine,—as the recipient of such an exhortation! The tempter, against whom Luther so often battled, must for once have gained complete possession of him, and turned him into an instrument for destroying the soul of his younger friend.”—(P. 179.)

Mr Hare then proceeds to show, from a careful consideration of the circumstances in which, and the objects for which, the letter was written, and from an accurate analysis of the train of thought that runs through it, how it was that Luther came to use such words, without, of course, having had the remotest intention of teaching that sin was a light matter, or encouraging Melancthon to commit it. We must refer to the Vindication for the details of all this, but we will quote the concluding passage:—

“Now in the passage of Luther which we are considering, the real offensiveness lies in the monstrous exaggeration of the language. The indignation bestowed upon him might, indeed, have been bestowed most deservedly upon the truly atrocious and blasphemous proposition whereby the venders of indulgences, whom he assailed, tried to hire purchasers for their trumpery,—*Venias papales tantas esse, ut solvere possint hominem, etiamsi quis per impossibile Dei Genitricem violasset.* Such a proposition is indeed an abomination in the sight of God and man; yet this doctrine, which Mr Ward might well call *too bad for the devils*, the flagitious hierarchy encouraged; or at least they would not repress and condemn their emissaries for proclaiming it, even when called upon and earnestly implored to do so. Luther’s proposition, on the other hand, is fundamentally true; his words render it probable that he was thinking of David’s crimes; the addition of *millies, millies*, as everybody acquainted with his writings will recognise at once, is a mere Lutheranism. Most readers will remember his answer to Spalatin, with regard to the advice of his friends, who would have dissuaded him from venturing to Worms, that *even if there were as many devils in Worms as there were tiles on the house-tops, still he would go thither.* So, again, in his grand letter to the Elector from the Wartburg, when he declares his resolution of returning to Wittenberg, he says he will not be withheld by fear of Duke George. *This I know full well of myself, if affairs at Leipsic were in the same case as now at Wittenberg, I would ride thither even though (your Electoral Grace must forgive my foolish speech) it were to rain pure Duke Georges for nine days,*

and each one of them were nine times more furious than this. These instances are notorious; a multitude of similar ones might be cited from Luther's writings, especially from those belonging to this critical period of his life, when all his powers were stretched beyond themselves by the stress of the conflict. To our nicer ears such expressions may seem in bad taste. Be it so. When a Titan is walking about among the pigmies, the earth seems to rock beneath his tread. Mount Blanc would be out of keeping in Regent's Park; and what would be the outcry if it were to toss its head and shake off an avalanche or two? Such, however, is the dulness of the elementary powers, they have not apprehended the distinction between force and violence. In like manner, when the adamantine bondage in which men's hearts, and souls, and minds had been held for centuries, was to be burst, it was almost inevitable that the power which was to burst this should not measure its movements by the rules of polished life. Erasmus did so; Melancthon did so: but a thousand Erasmuses would never have effected the Reformation; nor would a thousand Melancthons, without Luther to go before him and to animate him."—(Pp. 191, 192.)

We now proceed to consider Sir William Hamilton's attacks upon Luther and the other Reformers; by far the most reckless and offensive of them all. These Mr Hare has exposed fully and with severity—great, but not greater than they deserve. Sir William entered upon the work of assailing the character of the Reformers spontaneously and without call,—without any apparent motive except a hearty liking to the work. In an article in the *Edinburgh Review* for 1834, on the admission of Dissenters to English universities, he eagerly laid hold of an excuse for making the averment (vol. lx., p. 225), "That there is hardly an obnoxious doctrine to be found among the modern Lutherans (the Rationalists) which had not its warrant and example in the writings of Luther himself;" and proceeded to establish this position by what he calls a "hasty anthology of some of Luther's opinions, and in his own words, literally translated." He then gives quotations from Luther, under the three heads of speculative theology, practical theology, and biblical criticism. Under the first head, his quotations consist only of four short passages upon the one subject of the procedure of God in regard to sin and sinners. Under the second, he merely gives some extracts from a single document, setting forth the grounds on which Luther and Melancthon gave their consent to the Landgrave of Hesse marrying a second wife, while, at the same time, he continued to live with the first. He has thus brought forward only one topic under the head of speculative theology, and only one topic under the head of practical theology. And on neither of these two topics can it be said that the modern Lutherans follow the "warrant and example in the writings of Luther himself," though it was *professedly to establish this*, that Sir William

collected his "hasty anthology." Nine years afterwards—at the era of the disruption of the Church of Scotland—Sir William published a singularly foolish and offensive pamphlet on the election of pastors, entitled, "Be not Schismatics, be not Martyrs by Mistake; a Demonstration that the principle of non-intrusion, so far from being fundamental in the Church of Scotland, is subversive of the fundamental principles of that and every other Presbyterian Church Establishment." In this pamphlet he again, without any provocation, assailed the character of the Reformers with increased recklessness and ferocity, though this had nothing more to do with the election of pastors than with the admission of Dissenters into English universities. In this pamphlet, indeed, he retracted the charge which, nine years before, in the *Review*, he had brought against the Reformers in connection with the Landgrave's second marriage, that they were guilty in that affair of a "skulking compromise of all professed principle." But he retracted this charge only to substitute another in its room,—viz., that they approved of polygamy as good and lawful, nay, that they wished to have polygamy sanctioned by the civil law, and did something, though unsuccessfully, in order to bring about this result. And to this new form of the charge under the head of practical theology, he added the offensive allegation, that Luther publicly preached in recommendation of incontinence, adultery, and incest. As some of these charges against Luther had not been broached before by any of his opponents, it will be proper to give the very terms in which they were, for the first time, promulgated to the world, by Sir William Hamilton, at Edinburgh, in the year of grace 1843:—

"Look, then, to the great author and the great guide of the great religious revolution itself,—to Luther and Melancthon; even they, great and good as they both were, would, had they been permitted by the wisdom of the world to carry their theological speculations into practice, have introduced a state of things which every Christian of every denomination will now confess, would not only have turned the Reformation into a curse, but have subverted all that is most sacred by moral and religious law.

"Among other points of Papal discipline, the zeal of Luther was roused against ecclesiastical celibacy and monastic vows; and whither did it carry him? Not content to reason against the institution within natural limits and on legitimate grounds, his fervour led him to deny explicitly, and in every relation, the existence of chastity, as a physical impossibility,—led him publicly to preach (and who ever preached with the energy of Luther!) incontinence, adultery, incest even, as not only allowable, but, if practised under the prudential regulations which he himself lays down, unobjectionable, and even praiseworthy. The epidemic spread,—a fearful dissolution of manners throughout the sphere of the Reformer's influence was, for a season, the natural result.

The ardour of the boisterous Luther infected, among others, even the ascetic and timorous Melancthon. Polygamy awaited only the permission of the civil ruler to be promulgated as an article of the Reformation; and, had this permission not been significantly refused (whilst, at the same time, the epidemic in Wittenberg was homœopathically alleviated, at least, by the similar but more violent access in Munster), it would not have been the fault of the fathers of the Reformation if Christian liberty has remained less ample than Mahometan license. As it was, polygamy was never abandoned by either Luther or Melancthon as a religious speculation; both, in more than a single instance, accorded the formal sanction of their authority to its practice, —by those who were above the law; and had the civil prudence of the imprudent Henry VIII. not restrained him, sensual despot as he was, from carrying their spontaneous counsel into effect, a plurality of wives might now have been a privilege as religiously contended for in England as in Turkey.”—(Be not Schismatics, &c., pp. 7, 8.)

“I do not found merely or principally upon passages known to Bossuet, Bayle, &c., and, through them, to persons of ordinary information. These, I admit, would not justify *all* I have asserted in regard to the character of the doctrine *preached* by Luther.

“I do not found my statement of the general opinion of Luther and Melancthon in favour of polygamy, on their special allowance of a second wife to Philip the Magnanimous, or on any expressions contained in their Consilium on that occasion. On the contrary, that Consilium, and the circumstances under which it was given, may be, indeed always have been, adduced to show that, in the case of the Landgrave, they made a sacrifice of eternal principle to temporary expedience. The reverse of this I am able to prove, in a chronological series of testimonies by them to the religious legality of polygamy, as a general institution, consecutively downwards from their earliest commentaries on the Scriptures and other purely abstract treatises. So far, therefore, was there from being any disgraceful compromise of principle in the sanction accorded by them to the bigamy of the Landgrave of Hesse, that they only, in that case, carried their speculative doctrine (held, by the way, also by Milton) into practice; although the prudence they had by that time acquired rendered them, on worldly grounds, averse from their sanction being made publicly known. I am the more anxious to correct this general mistake touching the motives of these illustrious men, because I was myself, on a former occasion, led to join in the injustice.”—(Ibid., p. 59 of 3d edition.)

It was in these circumstances, and with such a case before him, that Mr Hare prepared and published, in 1846, his elaborate and most valuable Note in defence of Luther in the second volume of the “Mission of the Comforter,” and revised it for republication in a separate form previously to his death in 1855, notwithstanding Sir William’s threat of an answer in 1846, and his attempt at self-defence, or rather, at retaliation, in the notes to his “Discussions,” published in 1852. When a man in Sir William’s position comes forward ultroneously, and without call, except his unmistakable liking to the work,

adduces such charges as these against Luther and his fellow-reformers, he must lay his account with his allegations being narrowly scrutinised, and his evidence, if he produce any, being carefully sifted. He may reasonably expect to be treated, from the first, without any superfluous ceremony; and if he should fail in establishing his charges, especially any of them that may have been for the first time promulgated by himself, he will have no right to complain if he should be held up to scorn and indignation. Sir William's acknowledged eminence as a philosopher and a man of erudition, gives a certain influence to any thing he may choose to aver, and makes it the more necessary that such statements as those we have quoted from him should be scrutinised with care, and, if found erroneous, exposed with all plainness.

The facts, that Sir William brought forward such charges, couched in such a tone and spirit, first in an article in the *Edinburgh Review*, on the admission of Dissenters to English universities, and then again, nine years after, in a pamphlet on non-intrusion, or the election of pastors, indicate very plainly a certain *animus* with respect to the men so assailed: which is not disproved by his calling Luther and Melancthon "great and good men;" and by his assuring us (*Discussions*, 2d edit., p. 506) that, "so far from disliking Luther, we admire him, with all his aberrations (for he never paltered with the truth), not only as one of the ablest, but as one of the best of men." On the same page where this profession occurs, Sir William has made the following statements about the Reformer,—statements, it should be noticed, published for the first time in 1852:—"Luther was betrayed into corresponding extravagances by an assurance of *his personal inspiration*; of which, indeed, he was no less confident than of his *ability to perform miracles*. He disclaimed the pope, he spurned the church, but, varying in almost all else, he *never* doubted of his own *infallibility*." The man who made these statements knows, and every man who has ever read any thing concerning Luther knows, that in 1545, the year before his death, the great Reformer wrote a preface to a collected edition of his works, which began with these words:—"I have long and earnestly resisted those who wished my books, or rather the confusions of my lucubrations, to be published; both because I was unwilling that the labours of the ancients should be covered up by my novelties, and the reader hindered from reading them; and because now, by God's grace, there are many methodical books, among which the *Commonplaces* of Philip excel, by which the theologian and the bishop may be beautifully formed, especially since the sacred Scriptures may now be had in almost every language; while my books, as the want of method in the events occa-

sioned and necessitated, are, indeed, but a rude and indigested chaos, which it is not easy now even for myself to bring into order. Induced by these considerations, I wished all my books to be buried in perpetual oblivion, that there might be room for better ones ; ” and that this preface also contains the following statements :—“ But, before all things, I beseech the pious reader, and I beseech him for our Lord Jesus Christ’s sake, that he would read these productions with judgment, nay, with much compassion ; ” “ I narrate these things, excellent reader, for this reason, that, if you are about to read my little works, you may remember that I have been one of those who, as Augustine writes of himself, have made progress by writing and teaching, and that I am not one of those who from nothing suddenly become great, though they have done, or tried, or experienced nothing, but with one glance at Scripture exhaust its whole spirit.” Sir William knows, that in the same year, 1545, Melancthon, with Luther’s consent, published a collection of the “ Disputations or Propositions,” put forth and discussed by him in the theological school at Wittenberg, from 1519 to 1545 ; and that Luther wrote a preface to them, which began with these words :—“ I permit these ‘ Disputations, or Propositions ’ of mine, handled from the beginning of my cause in opposition to the Papacy and the kingdom of the Sophists, to be published, chiefly in order that the greatness of the cause, and the success therein divinely granted to me, may not exalt me. For in these is clearly shown my ignominy,—that is, my weakness and ignorance, which led me at first to try the matter with the greatest fear and trembling.”

Sir William knows, and even “ persons of ordinary information ” know, that innumerable statements, similar in substance and spirit to what have been quoted from these two Prefaces, are found in Luther’s writings ; and yet, knowing all this, he ventures to assert, that Luther had “ an assurance of his personal inspiration,” and “ never doubted of his own infallibility.” Every one knows, that on some occasions Luther showed a dogged obstinacy in maintaining errors, and an unwarranted confidence that they were truths, and that he occasionally talked about himself in a style that somewhat resembled presumptuous, self-complacent, boasting. Sir William, we daresay, could easily produce a copious anthology of this sort. But this would be no sufficient proof of the truth of the charge, that Luther was “ assured of his personal inspiration,” and “ never doubted of his own infallibility,” even though it were not contradicted by the passages we have quoted, and by many others of similar import. These passages conclusively disprove the charge, unless, indeed, it be alleged that they were altogether hypocritical, and expressed feelings which Luther never enter-

tained; and no human being but a thorough-bred Papist could be base enough to believe this.

The adduction of this baseless charge against Luther, and the adduction of it for the first time in 1852, six years after Mr Hare had exposed the charges of 1834 and 1843, must satisfy every honourable man, that Sir William's statements about the character of the Reformer are entitled to no weight or deference, and ought to be received with the strongest suspicion. We have not the slightest desire to detract from Sir William's well-earned reputation as a philosopher, and a man of extensive erudition. We published in our last number, from the "*Princeton Review*," an elaborate and enthusiastic panegyric upon his philosophy, although we regarded it as somewhat extravagant in its eulogy. But Sir William is fond of dabbling in theological and ecclesiastical matters; and whenever he enters upon this field, he lays aside every thing like philosophic calmness and modesty, abjures all doubt of his own infallibility, and treats every one who ventures to express doubt upon that point with offensive and contemptuous insolence.

Sir William has turned over a good many books, and picked up a good deal of information of a miscellaneous and superficial, though often recondite, description, upon some theological subjects, and evidently thinks that he is entitled to treat with sovereign contempt all the existing professional cultivators of theological literature. The eminence he has reached in his own department, the confidence with which he dogmatizes on theological and ecclesiastical topics, and the real extent of his knowledge regarding them, though it is much less than he claims credit for, are fitted to give weight to his statements with a certain class of the community; while, at the same time, as we are persuaded, and think we can prove, he has blundered and gone astray in almost all the instances in which he has meddled with that class of subjects. Sir William resembles Bayle in many respects,—in the vigour and versatility of his intellect, in the variety and extent of his erudition, and in his propensity to deal with ecclesiastical questions; but he is greatly inferior to that famous sceptic in love for historical accuracy, in patient and deliberate investigation of the materials of proof, and, above all, in that sound judgment, strong sense, and practical sagacity, which, in dealing with historical evidence, are far more valuable than metaphysical depth or subtilty. Sir William has some of Bayle's bad qualities, without his good ones; and this furnishes an explanation of the position which we do not hesitate to lay down, viz., that in all the leading instances in which he has taken up theological or ecclesiastical questions, he has exhibited not only blundering and inaccuracy,

but a *malus animus*, a state of mind and feeling offensive to the real friends of truth and righteousness. We think the time has come when this position should be openly and explicitly laid down and pressed upon public notice, in order to prevent the mischief which the influence of Sir William's name is fitted to do, in matters in which no deference whatever is due to him, and which no man must be permitted to misrepresent; and we willingly avail ourselves of the assistance of Mr Hare's admirable Vindication, in order to establish this, so far as concerns his reckless and offensive attack upon Luther and his fellow-reformers.

We have already mentioned that Sir William's original attack upon Luther, published in the *Edinburgh Review* for 1834, and repeated in the "Discussions" in 1852, consisted chiefly of an ascription to him of erroneous and dangerous opinions; 1st, On speculative theology; 2d, On practical theology; and, 3d, On biblical criticism; and that he promised to give Luther's opinions "in his own words literally translated," thereby professing to have himself translated Luther's words from a personal examination of the original. The whole of what he produces as a specimen of Luther's speculative theology, consists of four short sentences, amounting in all to eight lines, and bears upon the one point of the purposes and procedure of God in regard to sin and sinners. Now Mr Hare has proved that these eight lines, given originally in the *Review* without any references, and as if they were one continuous extract, are made up of four scraps from different parts of the treatise, "*De Servo Arbitrio*;" and that they were taken not from the original, but from Bossuet's "*History of the Variations of the Protestant Churches*," where they are given with some deviations from the original that are fitted to make them rather more offensive. Mr Hare's proof that Sir William's extracts had been taken mediately or immediately from Bossuet was so perfectly conclusive, that it could not possibly be answered or evaded, and Sir William was under the necessity of having recourse either to confession or to silence. He chose the former and more honourable alternative; though to a man of his peculiar temperament such a confession must have been very painful and mortifying, especially as in the interval between the commission of the offence and Mr Hare's public exposure of it, he had haughtily disclaimed founding "upon passages known to Bossuet, Bayle, &c., and through them to persons of ordinary information." As confession is not an exercise in which Sir William often indulges, and as our readers, who are probably more familiar with his boastings, may be anxious to see how he performs it, we give it in his own words:—

"In regard to the testimonies from Luther under this *first* head,
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but under this *alone*, I must make a confession. There are few things to which I feel a greater repugnance than relying upon quotations at second-hand. Now those under this head were not taken immediately from Luther's treatise, 'De Servo Arbitrio,' in which they are all contained. I had indeed more than once read that remarkable work, and once attentively, marking, as is my wont, the more important passages; but at the time of writing this article, my copy was out of immediate reach, and the press being urgent, I had no leisure for a reperusal. In these circumstances, finding that the extracts from it in *Theoduls Gastmahl* corresponded, so far as they went, with those also given by Bossuet, and as, from my own recollection, (and the testimony, I think, of Werdermann,) they fairly represented Luther's doctrine; I literally translated the passages, *even in their order*, as given by Von Stark, (and in Dr Kentsinger's French version.) Stark, I indeed now conjecture, had Bossuet in his eye. I deem it right to make this avowal, and to acknowledge that I did *what I account wrong*. But, again, I have no hesitation in *now, after full examination*, deliberately saying, that I do not think these extracts, whether by Bossuet, or by Stark and Bossuet, to be unfairly selected, to be unfaithfully translated, to be garbled, or to misrepresent in any way Luther's doctrine; in particular his opinions touching the divine predestination and the human will."—(Discussions, 2d edit., p. 506.)

Sir William's defence, in substance, is, that he, or rather Bossuet, had not really misrepresented Luther; and that the statements as they stand in the original are as strong and startling as in Bossuet's French or in his own English. This of course has nothing to do with the matter, in so far as it involves a question of scholar-like and high-minded acting. But as, in this aspect of the affair, Sir William has frankly confessed that he acted wrong, we shall say nothing more about it, provided he henceforth abandon boasting about himself and insolence towards others. We cannot, however, concede that Bossuet and Sir William have correctly exhibited Luther's actual statements. Mr Hare has proved their incorrectness, though perhaps he has somewhat overrated the magnitude of the differences in point of substance between the original and the translations. There is only one of the four scraps to which Sir William in his defence refers specifically or with any detail; and a brief notice of what he says about it will prove that even in what he says "now, after full examination, deliberately," he has not reached complete accuracy. The second of the four sentences given in the *Review*,—and given as if it were part of one and the same passage along with the other three, this of itself being fitted to convey an unfair impression, even though the whole had been correctly translated,—is in these words: "All things take place by the eternal and invariable will of God, who blasts and shatters in pieces the freedom of the will;" and he now, "after full examination," gives it in his "Discussions" (pp. 507, 508) in

the same words, except that he substitutes "which" for "who." Bossuet's French—Sir William's original—is this, (Liv. ii. sect 17): "Que sa prescience et la providence divine fait que toutes choses arrivent par une immuable, eternelle, et inevitable volonte de Dieu, que foudroie et met en pieces tout le libre arbitre." Sir William's remark upon this passage is as follows: "I must not, however, here forget to acknowledge an error, or rather an inadvertence of mine, which has afforded a ground for Mr Hare to make, as usual, a futile charge against Bossuet. In the second of the above extracts, not having Luther's original before me, I had referred the relative pronoun to 'God,' whereas it should have been to 'the will of God.' In the versions of Stark and Bossuet it is ambiguous, and I applied it wrongly."—(P. 512.) Now it is not true, as Sir William here asserts, that it was his error or inadvertence in translating Bossuet's "que" by "who," while it might equally mean, "which," that led Mr Hare to charge Bossuet with misrepresenting Luther's meaning. Mr Hare has said nothing suggesting or implying this, and he has made statements plainly precluding it. But the strange thing is, that while Sir William's statement necessarily implies that in Luther's original there is a relative pronoun, on the right application and translation of which the sense somewhat depends, the fact is, *that no such relative pronoun exists except in Bossuet*; that Sir William has not yet, "after full examination," fulfilled his promise to give us "Luther's opinions in his own words literally translated;" and that the difference between what Luther said and what Sir William *continues* to ascribe to him is not wholly unimportant. The original passage in Luther consists of two sentences as follow: "Est itaque et hoc in primis necessarium et salutare Christiano nosse, quod Deus nihil præscit contingenter, sed quod omnia incommutabili et æterna, infallibilique voluntate et prævidet et proponit et facit. Hoc fulmine sternitur et conteritur penitus liberum arbitrium. Ideo qui liberum arbitrium volunt assertum, debent hoc fulmen vel negare, vel dissimulare, aut alia ratione à se abigere."—(Luther's Latin Works, Jena, 1557, tom. iii. folio 170. We have added the *next* sentence, to exhibit the meaning more fully.)

Now there is no relative pronoun here, to connect the crushing of the free-will either with the *Deus* or the *voluntas*, as Bossuet and Sir William represent it. Sir William originally ascribed it to the *Deus*, he now ascribes it to the *voluntas*; whereas Luther *ascribes it to neither*, but breaks off from them into a new sentence, and ascribes it to *hoc fulmen*. What this *fulmen* was must be ascertained from the general scope of the passage; and when this is taken into account, it becomes perfectly manifest, that the crushing of free-will is

ascribed neither to the *Deus* nor to the *voluntas*, strictly speaking, but to the great truth or fact, that God certainly foresees and governs all things. Even if this difference were more insignificant than it is, this would be no excuse for giving so garbled an extract from Luther, and so incorrect a translation of his words. Bossuet did not promise to translate literally, and yet he has given Luther's words more fully and correctly than Sir William, who did. Bossuet has acted unfairly, indeed, in overleaping the barrier of the sentence, in extinguishing the *fulmen*, and in ascribing the crushing of the free-will directly to the *voluntas*, if not to the *Deus*. Sir William adopts this inaccuracy and unfairness from him, and he continues to adhere to it even "after full examination" of the original; while he also perpetrates the *additional* unfairness of leaving out the first part of the sentence, by the introduction of a portion of which even Bossuet indicated, that it was the foreknowledge and providence of God about which Luther was here discoursing.

This is a very curious specimen of obstinate and reckless blundering. But its importance, we admit, lies chiefly in its bearing upon Sir William, and the question of the reliance to be placed upon the accuracy of his statements. That rash and exaggerated sentiments and expressions may be produced from Luther's writings upon a variety of subjects, is quite well known, and no intelligent Protestant would think of disputing this. That statements of this sort are to be found in his treatise "*De Servo Arbitrio*," in reference to the decrees and providence of God, has always been abundantly notorious. That some of the statements quoted by Bossuet and Sir William, do, even as they stand in the original, express Calvinistic doctrines in an unnecessarily and unwarrantably harsh and offensive form, we do not hesitate to admit. Indeed, it is a very remarkable fact, that not only the rash and impetuous Luther, but also the cautious and timid Melancthon, did, in their earlier works, make more unwarrantable and startling statements about the decrees and the agency of God, in their bearing upon men's actions, than Calvin ever uttered. When the Lutherans in the next generation abandoned the Calvinism of their master, they were very much at a loss what to make of his treatise "*De Servo Arbitrio*," which, in its natural and obvious meaning, seemed to be the production of one who, as was said of Beza, was Calvinio Calvinior. The most devoted admirers of the *Megaland*, as they usually called him, admitted, of course, that there are some rash and exaggerated statements in the work. But that is very little to their purpose; for Calvinists, too, admit the truth of this, and contend that, even abstracting from every thing that might rank under

this head, the treatise plainly and explicitly asserts the fundamental principles of the Calvinistic system of theology. In the year 1664 Sebastian Schmidt, an eminent Lutheran divine, and professor of theology at Strasburg, published an edition of Luther "De Servo Arbitrio," copiously provided with annotations, "quibus," as is set forth in the title-page, "B. Vir ab accusatione quasi absolutum Calvinianorum, vel durius aliquod Dei decretum in libro ipso statuerit, præcipue vindicatur." The annotations, of course, are utterly unsuccessful in effecting the object to which they are directed, viz., proving that Luther did not, in this work, teach Calvinistic doctrines. No amount of straining or perversion is adequate to effect *that*. Schmidt's annotations resemble very much a Socinian commentary upon the beginning of John's Gospel; and it is rather a curious coincidence, that those scraps which Sir William has paraded are duly provided by Schmidt with annotations, intended to show, not that they present Calvinism in a harsh and offensive form, but that they do not go so far as to teach Calvinism at all.

The compelling Sir William to confess publicly, that, in giving a view of Luther's opinions on speculative theology, he had got his whole materials at second-hand, was an offence not to be forgiven; and accordingly he brings out, in connection with this topic, an assault, or rather a series of assaults, upon the archdeacon, of the most reckless and offensive description, evidently intended to be murderous. This great philosopher, when he engages in theological controversy, exhibits *odium plusquam theologicum*. Our readers, we are sure, will not wonder at any little severity we have exhibited in dealing with him, when they read the following choice specimens of invective, culled from a few pages of the notes to the "Discussions."—(2d edit., pp. 508–524.) "Mr Hare's observations under this head of speculative theology exhibit significant specimens of *inconsistency, bad faith, and exquisite error*. I shall adduce instances of each. But his baseless abuse—that I shall overpass." "He is only a one-sided advocate, an advocate from personal predilection and antipathies; and even as such, his arguments are weak as they are wordy." "Lord Bacon says of some one, '— has only two small wants; he wants knowledge and he wants love.' But with the Archdeacon, we cannot well restrict his wants to two; for he lacks logic besides learning and love; and a fourth—withal a worse defect—is to be added, but a defect which it is always painful to be forced to specify." "Mr Hare is not the champion for Luther; and if he be effectually counselled, the farrago will not again see the light," (this refers to Mr Hare's intimated purpose to republish Note W, —a purpose accomplished in the volume now lying before us,)

“for it is simply a verbose conglomeration of what I shall refrain from characterising; the author making more mistakes or misrepresentations than the note—however confessedly prolix and garrulous—exhibits paragraphs. But the Archdeacon of Lewes neither learns nor listens. He is not content to enjoy his ecclesiastical good fortune in humility and silent thankfulness. He *will* stand forward; he *will* challenge admiration; he *will* display his learning; he *will* play the polemic; and thus exposes to scorn not merely himself,” but also, as Sir William goes on to assert, with some detail, the church of which he was a dignitary. Now what is the cause, and what the ground of this violent outbreak, of this alarming exhibition of a philosopher in a fury? The cause of it is simply this, that Mr Hare has laid before the public conclusive proof that much, we do not say all, of what Sir William has here alleged against his antagonist, is true of himself. And the ground of it is nothing more than this, that Mr Hare’s work, when carefully scrutinised, exhibits a few instances of the oversights, errors, and partialities, which may be pointed out, more or less, in nineteen twentieths of the most respectable controversial works that ever were produced, and in which Sir William’s polemic specially superabounds. No man with a sound head and a sound heart can read Sir William’s onslaught on Mr Hare, of which we have given some specimens, without seeing that the charges are grossly exaggerated, and have really no solid foundation to rest on,—that they are a mere outpouring of rage and ferocity. We would not go so far as to allege that *all* that Sir William charges upon Mr Hare is true of himself; but we have no hesitation in saying, that any one who might choose to allege this, could, without difficulty, produce a much more plausible piece of pleading in support of his allegation than Sir William has done. This is so manifestly the true state of the case, that we do not think it necessary to go into detail to defend Mr Hare against an assault which was evidently intended to destroy him, but which, from its very recklessness, has proved perfectly powerless.

It was very natural that Sir William should take under his protection Bossuet, to whom, in common with “persons of ordinary information,” he had been indebted for his specimen of Luther’s speculative theology; and, accordingly, he says of him, “In this note I have spoken of Bossuet, signifying my reliance upon the accuracy of his quotations; and I am as fully convinced of his learning and veracity as of his genius.” —(P. 508.) As Mr Hare had adduced satisfactory evidence of Bossuet’s unscrupulous unfairness, Sir William could scarcely do less than guarantee his veracity; and he could do this the more easily, as, in all probability, he never had carefully investi-

gated the subject. But the truth is, that Bossuet's character for veracity was conclusively settled, in the estimation of all intelligent and competent judges, before the publication of his "History of the Variations of the Protestant Churches," by the tremendous exposures made of him by Dr Wake, afterwards Archbishop of Canterbury, in his "Exposition of the Doctrine of the Church of England," and his two Defences of it. We have no doubt that in these works, which have been republished in Bishop Gibson's "Preservative against Popery," Wake has conclusively convicted Bossuet of deliberate lying, in repeated instances; and these not bearing merely on the primary subject of controversy between them, viz., the original publication of Bossuet's "Exposition of the Doctrine of the Catholic Church," but also on several other topics unconnected with it. And in regard to the "History of the Variations," though it is characterised by extraordinary skill and dexterity, and is indeed in all respects one of the most plausible and effective pieces of special pleading ever produced, and though it generally avoids gross and palpable falsehoods, yet it, too, has, we think, been proved to be utterly destitute of fairness and candour. We think it scarcely possible for any man to read with care and discrimination Basnage's "Histoire de la Religion des Eglises Reformées," (last edition, 2 vols. 4to, 1725,) without being satisfied of the truth of this statement, without being compelled to abandon all confidence in Bossuet's veracity, and without being convinced that he had no scruples of conscience about saying or doing any thing that might be fitted to benefit the Church of Rome, and to damage its opponents. Papists still boast of his "History of the Variations" as unanswerable. We believe that it has been most thoroughly answered by Basnage in so far as it is argumentative, that every thing like argument in it has been completely demolished, and that its author has been sadly exposed; while we cannot but admit, that even when every thing needful to satisfy the understanding has been provided, the admirable skill and adroitness of the advocate of error has not only made the best of a bad cause, but may probably have left some painful doubts and uncertainties upon the minds of a considerable class of readers.

The argument of Bossuet's work lies within a very narrow compass. It is this. Variations in doctrine afford an evidence of error; Protestants have from the first been constantly varying in the doctrines they professed to hold: and, therefore, their views are erroneous. In opposition to this, it has been proved, 1st, That the maxim about variations proving errors is not true, or is only partially true, in the sense in which alone it can serve Bossuet's purpose in argument; 2d, That some of the variations

which he ascribes to Protestants are produced, and that many more are greatly swelled in importance and magnitude, by his own misrepresentations; and, 3d, That the argument, in so far as it has any weight, may be retorted with far greater force upon the Church of Rome. These positions have been proved by Basnage in the most satisfactory and conclusive manner; so that, so far as argument is concerned, the book has been thoroughly demolished. But Bossuet's great art throughout the whole work is, that he has contrived to bring in, in the most skilful and dexterous way, a great deal that is fitted to damage the characters of the Reformers, and thus to leave an uncomfortable impression upon men's minds, even when his argument, properly so called, is seen to be wholly untenable. Bossuet's want of integrity, so far as this work is concerned, is exhibited chiefly in producing and magnifying variations, by misrepresenting the views of the Reformers and other Protestants; and we think it scarcely possible for any one to read Basnage carefully, without being convinced, that it was only policy, and not conscience, that restrained him from practising the grosser and more palpable frauds in which most Popish controversialists indulge, and that with admirable skill he has systematically carried his misrepresentations just as far as he thought, upon the whole, to be safe or expedient.

We have really no pleasure in making such statements about Bossuet, who, in spite of his want of integrity in matters in which the interests of his church were concerned, was not only possessed of splendid mental endowments, but even of something like a certain elevation and nobility of general character. Integrity in matters in which the interests and reputation of the church are concerned, it is hopeless to expect of almost any Popish controversialist. Arnauld and Nicole, the famous Jansenists, were the two other great contemporary champions of Popery; and they have certainly furnished far better evidence that they were really men of religious and moral principle than can be produced in favour of Bossuet. And yet we have great doubts whether they held fast their integrity. We greatly admire all these men, though we do not put them in the same category; and while we would not pervert or explain away any matters of fact as to what they said or did, we feel strongly disposed to palliate their aberrations, by laying a portion of the responsibility upon the demoralizing and conscience-searing system to the influence of which they were subjected. It always deepens our indignation against the Man of Sin, the Mystery of Iniquity, when our attention is called to any thing which reminds us that that system reduced a man so noble in many respects as Bossuet was, to the level of a common liar,—a

vulgar knave; and imperiled, at least, the integrity of such men as Arnauld and Nicole. We dismiss this subject with the following admirable remarks of Mr Hare on the famous "History of the Variations," which we believe to be just and sound:—

"Indeed, if any thing were surprising among the numberless *παράλογα* of literature, one should marvel at the inordinate reputation which the 'Histoire des Variations' has acquired, not merely with the members of a church glad to make the most of any prop for a rotten cause, but among Protestants of learning and discernment. One main source of its celebrity may lie in that spirit of detraction which exercises such a baneful power in all classes of mankind, ever since Cain slew his brother on account of his righteousness; in the eagerness with which all listen to evil-speaking and slander, finding little diminution of their pleasure though it be strongly seasoned with lying; in that want of sympathy with heroic and enthusiastic spirits which is so prevalent among men of the world, and the great body of men of letters, and their consequent satisfaction at seeing what towers beyond their ken cast down to the ground. Able as the 'Histoire des Variations' doubtless is, if regarded as the statement and pleading of an unprincipled and unscrupulous advocate, it is any thing but a great work. For no work can be great unless written with a paramount love of truth. This is the moral element of all genius, and without it the finest talents are worth little more than a conjuror's sleight-of-hand. Bossuet in this book never seems even to have set himself the problem of speaking the truth, as a thing to be desired and aimed at. He pretends to seat himself in the chair of judgment, but without a thought of doing justice to the persons he summons before him. He does not examine to ascertain whether they are guilty or not. His mind is made up beforehand that they are guilty; and his only care is to scrape together whatever may seem to prove this, that he may have a specious plea for condemning them. Never once, I believe, from the first page to the last, did he try heartily to make out what the real fact was. He is determined to say all possible evil of the Reformers, to show that they went wrong at every step, in every deed, in every word, in every thought: to prove that they are all darkness, with scarcely a gleam of light. Hence his representation of Luther is no more like him than an image made up of the black lines in a spectrum would be like the sun. Bossuet picks out all the bad he can find, and leaves out all the good. But as even this procedure would poorly serve his purpose, the main part of his picture consists of sentences torn from their context; which, by some forcible wrench, some process of garbling, by being deprived of certain limiting or counterbalancing clauses, by being made positive instead of hypothetical, or through some of the other tricks of which we have seen such sad instances in these pages, are rendered very offensive. With regard to the Landgrave's marriage, his treatment of Luther is more like the ferocity of a tiger, tearing his prey limb from limb, and gloating over it before he devours it, than the spirit which becomes a Christian bishop."—(Pp. 272–274.)

This leads us to advert to Sir William's charges against

Luther under the head of practical theology. We have already mentioned, that the only materials originally produced under this head were extracts from the document in which Luther, Melancthon, and some other divines of that period, gave their permission or consent to the Landgrave of Hesse marrying a second wife while his first wife continued to live with him. This story is, of course, a great favourite with Popish controversialists. It is an especial favourite with Sir William. He produced it in the *Edinburgh Review* in 1834; and again, a second time, nine years later, in his pamphlet in favour of the intrusion of ministers, though he now changed materially the nature of the accusation which, in connection with this matter, he adduced against the Reformers. In the notes to the original article, as republished in the "Discussions" in 1852, he has not brought forward much additional matter, so far as Luther and Melancthon are concerned; the chief fruits of his continued researches into this apparently congenial subject being, that he is at last able to boast (p. 515)—whether truly or not, we do not know—that he is now acquainted, he believes, with all the publications relative to this story, and that he has collected a considerable quantity of additional filth, (certainly unknown before to "persons of ordinary information,") in order to blacken the character of Melander and Lening, two Protestant ministers who signed the document about the marriage along with Luther and Melancthon, and who might, without any detriment to the public, have been left in the obscurity from which Sir William's *extraordinary* information has dragged them.

It is unpleasant to have to discuss such a subject as this, and it is not easy to see what benefit the public can derive from the discussion of it; but if Sir William Hamilton persists in dwelling upon it, and in pressing it upon public attention, and if he is resolved to employ it for unjustly damaging the character of the Reformers, he thereby imposes upon others a necessity of dealing with it, instead of leaving it wholly in his hands, and allowing him to use it for purposes which many believe to be unjust and injurious. Sir William may probably allege that he is merely bringing out what is true, and that all truth ought to be proclaimed and made known. We do not admit that all that he has put forth upon this subject is true; and if it were, we would still take the liberty of regarding it as not creditable to any man to manifest a special anxiety to press such truths upon public attention without any apparent call to do so, and to labour to bring them out in their most offensive and aggravated form. Circumstances may occur in which any thing that is really true may be brought out and proclaimed without impropriety, by parties

concerned in, or called to meddle with it; but it is not the less true that we are entitled to judge of men by the *selection* they make of the topics which they seem most anxious to press upon our notice. Sir William, no doubt, will claim to himself the credit of having been influenced in all he has done in this matter by pure love of truth; but we think we can venture to assure him, that his character would have stood much higher this day in the estimation of honourable men, if he had never meddled with the second marriage of the Landgrave of Hesse, and had left it to be handled by Romanists and Romanisers. We do not mean to go into details upon this painful subject. We can merely suggest a few hints, as to what ought to be thought of this affair, and of Sir William's mode of dealing with it.

Luther's conduct in this matter has not been approved of by Protestants, but, on the contrary, has been given up as indefensible. They have differed somewhat in the severity of their censures, and in the grounds on which they rest their condemnation of his conduct, but they have not undertaken to vindicate it. Basnage, in his reply to Bossuet's "*History of the Variations*," at once admits that Luther's conduct was wrong; and so does Seckendorff, in his great work, "*De Lutheranism*." This, undoubtedly, is the right and honest course to pursue in the matter; though it is no doubt quite fair to see that the case is fully and correctly stated, and not exaggerated or perverted. Mr Hare has successfully exposed several unfair and malicious misrepresentations of Bossuet in his commentaries upon this subject; and has also pointed out the unfairness of the selection of the passages by Sir William from the principal document connected with this affair. Upon this last point he says:—

"When we compare them with the whole body from which they are torn, they who admire ingenuity, in whatsoever cause it may be displayed, will be struck with the dexterity shown in garbling the opinion of the divines, so as to render it as offensive as possible. The main part of it, wherein they perform their duty of spiritual advisers honestly and faithfully, telling the Landgrave of the evils likely to arise from his conduct, and of the divine wrath which he was provoking by his sinful life, is wholly left out; so that it seems as if they had had no thought of their pastoral responsibility, but readily consented to do just what the Landgrave wished, and were solely deterred by fear of the shame it might bring on themselves and on their cause."—(P. 241.)

The proper antidote to this unfairness of Sir William's, is to give the document in full. This Mr Hare has done, and to his pages we must refer for it—(pp. 235–241.) Mr Hare has brought out fully the leading features of this transaction, and has suggested almost every thing that could be said in pallia-

tion of the conduct of the Reformers in this matter. He goes rather farther than we are prepared to do in palliation of what they did. We cannot but admit that his love for Luther has somewhat perverted his judgment,—has made him judge rather too favourably. At the same time he has proved conclusively, that there were some material palliations of their conduct; and has shown that it involves gross ignorance or injustice to judge of the bare facts of the case by the notions and feelings of our own age and country, without taking into account the views that prevailed on such subjects in the sixteenth century, and the way in which they were then often discussed. This is of itself sufficient to establish the injustice and unfairness of the course which Sir William has pursued in the matter. But let us briefly advert to his more formal charges, based upon this transaction. Originally he accused them of the “skulking compromise of all professed principle;” meaning, of course, that in giving their consent to the Landgrave’s bigamy, they sanctioned what they knew to be sinful, under the influence of selfish and secular motives, connected with the general interests of the Reformed cause, to which the good-will and the support of the Landgrave were very important. This is the view usually given of the transaction by Popish controversialists. But Sir William, in his pamphlet in favour of intrusion, withdraws this charge, and substitutes another in its room; alleging that they approved of polygamy as lawful and warrantable, and, of course, acted in the matter in accordance with their own convictions,—their anxiety for the concealment of the marriage arising, on this second theory, not from the belief that it was sinful, but merely from prudential considerations to avoid scandal. He adheres to this latter view in his “Discussions.” According to the former view of the matter, the conduct of the Reformers in consenting to the Landgrave’s second marriage was a sin, being produced by the operation of sinful motives, and tending directly to bring about the commission of sin. According to the latter view, it was an error of opinion, or what, from its heinous and offensive character, might be called a heresy. But though the charge as originally put involved a sin, and in its second form was merely an error, most people in modern times will probably regard it as being quite as damaging to the character of Luther and Melancthon to have inculcated the lawfulness of polygamy, as to have been tempted, upon a particular occasion, to have given consent to the doing of what was sinful.

Mr Hare concurs in the general idea involved in Sir William’s second deliverance upon the subject, viz., that the conduct of the Reformers is to be regarded rather as an error than as a sin, though he reaches that conclusion by a diffe-

rent course, and maintains the incorrectness of several of Sir William's positions, especially of his leading one, which ascribes to Luther and Melancthon a belief in the lawfulness of polygamy under the Christian dispensation. The leading features in his view of the case are exhibited in the following quotations:—

“When we examine the whole opinion connectedly, we are compelled to reject the excuse which Sir W. Hamilton so kindly proposes in order to rescue Luther from the fangs of the Edinburgh Reviewer. For, from first to last, it is plain that the license, which the divines declare themselves unable to condemn, is meant by them to be regarded as a dispensation, and not as authorising or sanctioning polygamy; and this is the main reason why they are so earnest in requiring that the second marriage, if entered upon, should be kept secret, lest it should be looked upon as the introduction of a general practice. Polygamy, as a general practice, they altogether condemn; because they conceive that our Lord's words in the passage referred to re-establish the primary, paradisiacal institution of monogamy. At the same time, while they see that polygamy, though contrary to the original institution, is sanctioned in the Old Testament, both by the practice of the patriarchs, and by the express recognition of it in the Book of Deuteronomy, they do not find any passage in the New Testament directly and absolutely forbidding it. Here we should bear in mind what their rule, especially Luther's, was. When the Word of God seemed to him clear and express, then every thing else was to bow to it: heaven and earth might pass away, but no tittle of what God had said. On the other hand, where no express scripture could be produced, he held that all human laws and ordinances, and every thing enjoined by man's understanding on considerations of expediency, however wide that expediency might be, is so far flexible and variable, that it may be made to bend to imperious circumstances in particular cases.

“Thus the document itself forces us to decline Sir W. Hamilton's plea, that Luther was merely giving his sanction in a single instance to that which he desired at heart to establish generally, the patriarchal practice of polygamy.”—(P. 242.)

Then follows a careful investigation of Luther's general views on the subject of polygamy, as indicated in his writings, and in his presumed concurrence in the suggestion which Melancthon made to Henry VIII. of England, that it would be less objectionable to take a second wife than to divorce his first; after which he states thus the ground on which he thinks Luther acted in sanctioning the Landgrave's second marriage:—

“But though we must reject the plea that the advice given to the Landgrave is an instance of the predilection which the Reformers on principle entertained for polygamy, the evidence adduced abundantly proves, that, in sanctioning a dispensation in what appeared to them a case of pressing need, they were not acting inconsistently, but in thorough consistency with the principles which they had avowed for

years before. To us, indeed, the notion of such a dispensation will still be very offensive; but we must beware, as I have already remarked, of transferring the moral views and feelings of our age to Luther's. The canon law admitted the necessity of dispensations; which, in matrimonial cases, were especially numerous. One of the main objects of the scholastic casuistry was to determine under what limitations they are admissible, as may be seen in our own authors on this branch of practical theology, such as Taylor; and the great importance of casuistry is beginning to be recognised anew by recent writers on ethics. The ignorant prater may cry, that Luther ought to have thrown all such things overboard, along with the other rubbish of Romanism. But it was never Luther's wont to throw things overboard in a lump. His calling, he felt, was to preach Christ, crucified for the sins of mankind,—Christ, of whose righteousness we become partakers by faith. Whatever in the institutions and practices of the church was compatible with the exercise of this ministry, he did not assail unless it was flagrantly immoral. The sale of dispensations, the multiplication of cases for dispensations in order to gain money by the sale of them, he regarded as criminal; and the abolition of such dispensations, where they have been abolished, the reprobation they lie under, are owing in no small measure to him. But the idea of law which manifested itself to him, convinced him that positive laws can only partially express the requirements of the supreme law of love, for the sake of which they must at times bend; and when he consulted his one infallible authority, he found that his heavenly Master's chief outward conflict during his earthly ministry was to assert the supremacy of the law of love, which the Pharisees were continually infringing, while they stickled pertinaciously for the slightest positive enactment."—(Pp. 256, 257.)

He sums up the matter in this way:—

"Such, then, is the amount of Luther's sin, or rather error,—for sin I dare not call it,—in this affair, in which the voice of the world, ever ready to believe evil of great and good men, has so severely condemned him, without investigation of the facts; although the motives imputed to him are wholly repugnant to those which governed his conduct through life. He did not compromise any professed principle, as the reviewer accuses him of doing: he did not inculcate polygamy, as the pamphleteer charges him with doing. But inasmuch as he could not discover any direct, absolute prohibition of polygamy in the New Testament, while it was practised by the patriarchs and recognised in the law, he did not deem himself warranted in condemning it absolutely, when there appeared in special cases to be a strong necessity, either with a view to some great national object, or for the relief of a troubled conscience. Here it behoves us to bear in mind, on the one hand, what importance Luther attached, as all his writings witness, to this high ministerial office of relieving troubled consciences; and it may mitigate our condemnation of his error,—which, after all, was an error on the right side, its purpose being to substitute a hallowed union for unhallowed license,—if we remember that Gerson had said openly, a century before, expressing the common opinion of his age, that it was better for a priest to be guilty of fornication than to marry. Such was the moral degra-

dation of the church under the Egyptian bondage of ordinances, that even so wise and good a man could deem it expedient to sacrifice the sacred principles of right and purity, the sense of duty, and the peace of the soul, for the sake of upholding the arbitrary enactment of a tyrannical hierarchy. Indeed, the clamour which has been raised against Luther for this one act by the Romish polemics, is perhaps, among all cases of the beam crying out against the mote, the grossest and the most hypocritical.

“Nor should we forget what difficulties have in all ages compassed the settlement of special matrimonial cases. They may perhaps be less now in England than in other countries, notwithstanding the grievous scandals which attend them even here; and there is always a prejudice inclining men to suppose that their own condition is the normal one for the whole human race: but if we compare the laws of marriage which prevail in the various branches of Christendom, and know any thing of their moral effects as manifested in family life, we shall perceive how hard it is to lay down any one inviolable rule. What the obscurity and uncertainty of the law was in Luther’s time, we may estimate from the conflicting answers which were returned to the questions mooted with reference to Henry VIII.’s divorce. On the other hand, we should try to realise what the Bible was to Luther,—the source of all wisdom, the treasure-house of all truth, the primordial code of all law, the store-room from which, with the help of the Spirit, he was to bring forth every needful weapon to fight against and to overcome the world and the devil,—how, if the Bible had been put in the one scale, and all the books of all the great thinkers of the heathen and Christian world had been piled up in the other, they would not have availed, in his judgment, to sway the balance so much as a hair’s breadth. It was not much the practice of his age—least of all was it Luther’s—to estimate the lawfulness and propriety of an act by reference to its general consequences. He did, indeed, bethink himself of the evil that would ensue, if the dispensation were regarded as a precedent, and therefore did he insist on its being kept secret: but he did not duly consider how impossible it was that such a step, taken by a man of so impetuous a character, should be kept secret; nor how terrible the evils would be if every pastor were to deem himself authorised to give similar counsel; nor how perilous it is to take the covering of secrecy for any acts, except such as are sanctioned by the laws of God and man, while the moral feeling of society throws a veil over them.”
—(Pp. 269–271.)

Since it is necessary to discuss such painful and delicate topics, in consequence of Sir William’s offensive recklessness in forcing them upon public attention, we prefer employing the words of another to our own. We are very thankful to Mr Hare for vindicating Luther so well, and we shrink from enlarging upon the subject. But justice demands one or two observations.

Sir William alleges that Luther maintained the lawfulness, or as he says, “the religious legality,” of polygamy, even under the Christian dispensation; and he has been threatening the world for nearly thirteen years with the publication of what he

calls "an articulate manifestation," "a chronological series of testimonies," in support of this charge. There is nothing new, certainly, in this allegation. It was brought forward by Bellarmine (*De Matrimonii Sacramento*, c. x.), who has been followed in this by the generality of Popish controversialists. It has also been adduced by the defenders of polygamy, that they might have some respectable countenance to their abominations, as may be seen in the famous, or rather infamous, "*Polygamia Triumphatrix*" of Lyser. We do not suppose that Sir William's "articulate manifestation," if it ever see the light, will contain any thing but what has been known and discussed before. There is, indeed, some difficulty in ascertaining precisely and certainly what Luther's views were on some points connected with polygamy. There is some confusion and inconsistency in his statements. At one time he certainly drew somewhat wide and incautious inferences from the practice of the patriarchs in this respect, extending to polygamy what our Saviour said of divorce, that, under the old economy, God permitted it because of the hardness of men's hearts. But he seems at length to have become quite settled in the conviction, that under the Christian dispensation polygamy was forbidden by the authority of our Saviour; and if so, Sir William's allegation that "polygamy was never abandoned by Luther as a religious speculation," is unfounded.

But it must be noticed and remembered that Sir William has gone farther than this, and asserted (see quotation, pp. 444, 445) that Luther and Melancthon wished polygamy to be sanctioned by the civil authorities, and did something, though unsuccessfully, directed to bring about this result. All this is fairly implied in the language he has employed; and this involves a new charge, one which, so far as we know and remember, has not before been advanced against them either by papists or polygamists. This point specially needs to be proved; and when Sir William produces his "articulate manifestation," this special discovery of his own must be duly commended and established, by an exhibition of the proof which has eluded the researches of all previous depreciators of the Reformers.

We are not quite satisfied, as we have hinted, with some of the grounds on which Mr Hare has based his vindication of Luther in this matter. We do not see that any thing short of Sir William's position, that Luther believed in "the religious legality" of polygamy, is altogether adequate to take his conduct out of the category of a sin, and to invest it with the character of an error. We believe that the transaction involved both an error in judgment and a sin in conduct, the error, indeed, somewhat palliating the sin. Luther and Melancthon held, as Mr Hare has shown, that this was a matter

on which dispensations might sometimes be granted for special reasons, on extraordinary emergencies. And this belief may be said, in a sense, to have palliated their conduct, by bringing the subject of a dispensation before them as what might be lawfully entertained. But even if this opinion had been true, instead of being erroneous, the question would still remain, whether or not this was a case for a dispensation to marry a second wife; and, at this point, we fear it must be admitted that the element of direct and palpable sinfulness comes in. Even supposing that dispensations may be lawful in some cases of this sort, there seems to be no fair ground for holding that the Landgrave's was a case warranting a dispensation; and what is specially pertinent to the point in hand, *there is no sufficient ground to believe that Luther and Melancthon really believed it to be a case warranting a dispensation.* We cannot but conclude, from a deliberate survey of the whole case, that Luther and Melancthon were substantially satisfied that the Landgrave, in marrying a second wife, was guilty of sin; and that, therefore, in giving their consent to his doing this, they were themselves sinning. It was a solitary offence, with much to palliate it on a variety of grounds, but still it was a sin, committed under the influence of temptation; and as such it ought to be condemned.

It is an interesting and instructive circumstance, that one spot, in some respects similar, stains the character of John Knox; and we could not possibly find words that would, in our judgment, describe Luther's conduct in this matter more correctly than those in which Dr M'Crie has described a transaction in the life of our own Reformer:—

“In one solitary instance, the anxiety which he felt for the preservation of the great cause in which he was so deeply interested, betrayed him into an advice, which was not more inconsistent with the laws of strict morality, than it was contrary to the stern uprightness, and undisguised sincerity, which characterised the rest of his conduct.”—(Pp. 287, 288.)

The third head of Sir William's original attack upon Luther, was Biblical Criticism; and under this head he collected, *chiefly from the Table-Talk*, some rash and offensive statements ascribed to Luther, in which he is represented as speaking disparagingly of some of the books of Scripture. Mr Hare has here again convicted Sir William of several blunders or unfairnesses; and one of them Sir William has been constrained to confess in the notes to his “Discussions.”—(P. 517.) But this topic is not worth dwelling upon. To collect and parade an “anthology” of rash and exaggerated statements from Luther, and especially to take materials for doing this from the “Table-Talk,” is about as unfair and as despicable an occupation as can

well be conceived; and if Sir William had confined himself to this, we would not have thought it worth while to have given him any disturbance, beyond denouncing his conduct in the terms it deserved.

But it must not be forgotten that there is one other very gross and heinous charge which Sir William has brought against Luther, a charge never, so far as we know, adduced before, and of which, though it was fabricated by himself, and published to the world nearly thirteen years ago, he has not yet attempted to produce any evidence. It is stated and disposed of by Mr Hare in the following brief extract:—

“The other charges, that Luther ‘publicly preached incontinence, adultery, incest even, as not only allowable, but, if practised under the prudential regulations which he himself lays down, unobjectionable, and even praiseworthy,’ cannot be refuted in the same summary manner. I might cite a number of passages against incontinence from his writings: I might show that he often expressed a wish that adultery were punished capitally. But I will not waste words upon such accusations, proceeding from a witness whose testimony has been proved again and again to be utterly worthless. When a dear friend, whose faith and righteousness have been approved during a long life, under many severe trials, is said to have committed unheard-of enormities, without any specification of when, where, how, or what, one is fully warranted in replying that the assertions cannot possibly be true. Therefore, I will merely defy Sir W. Hamilton to bring forward evidence in support of these atrocious charges. Should he attempt to do so, and adduce any passages beyond those which have been satisfactorily explained by Harless in the seventh volume of his *Journal*, I shall deem myself bound to use my best endeavours to set them on a right footing. At the same time let me remark, that I trust he will not have the assurance to quote certain sayings, which explicitly refer solely to cases of impotence, as substantiating his allegations. Should he shrink from this test, finding that he cannot stand it, what can a generous, nay, what can an honest man do in his place, but come forward with a humble recantation and a humble acknowledgment of the wrong he has done to one of the noblest pillars of Christianity, one of the greatest benefactors of mankind?”—(Pp. 286, 287.)

Sir William has certainly brought himself under very peculiar obligations to prove, if he can, his own special charges against Luther, viz., that he wished to have polygamy sanctioned by the civil authorities, and that he recommended, under certain restrictions, incontinence, adultery, and incest. And these, after all, are the most important points involved in this controversy, whether as affecting the character of Luther or Sir William Hamilton. If Sir William cannot conclusively establish these charges, there are no words too strong to characterise his conduct in adducing them. And yet we do not suppose that his friends will advise him to at-

tempt to establish his accusations. He is sure to fail in the attempt. We do not pretend to possess a very thorough acquaintance with Luther's writings; but, from what we do know of his works and of his character, we are very confident that these odious charges cannot be established; while we are well aware that, if the attempt is made, this will involve the bringing forward of a great deal of matter most unsuitable to be made the subject of public discussion. Sir William, indeed, has placed himself in such a situation that he can neither speak nor be silent, without justly incurring discredit and reproach. He has been much better employed since 1843 than in defending his extraordinary pamphlet of that year. He has, since that time, rendered most important services to the world in the highest departments of philosophical speculation. He has yet much to do in developing and promulgating his philosophical views; and we trust he will be spared to do this. We are not in the least afraid of him. We have perfect confidence in the goodness of our cause, and in the reckless imprudence of our opponent. We have exposed, with all plainness, his attack upon the character of the Reformers, unterrified by the warning which the very peculiar complexion of his assault upon Archdeacon Hare seems fitted and intended to convey; and we have done so because we believed this to be the discharge of an important public duty. But we would rather avoid incurring, unnecessarily, the responsibility of calling him out again on theological and ecclesiastical questions; *because* we are very certain that this is a field where he can gain no credit to himself and confer no real benefit on his fellow-men, and where he might exhaust time and strength that may be employed more honourably for himself, and more beneficially for the world.

When we began this article, we intended to have passed over more lightly some of the painful and delicate topics which Mr Hare's "Vindication of Luther" brought before us; and we expected to have had space for discussing another grand theological display which Sir William has made, in the shape of a sort of history of the doctrine of Assurance, thrust into the middle of his violent attack upon Mr Hare. It is this:—

"Assurance, Personal Assurance, Special Faith (*the feeling of certainty that God is propitious to me,—that my sins are forgiven, Fides Plerophoria Fidei, Fides Specialis*), Assurance was long universally held in the Protestant communities to be the criterion and condition of a true or *saving Faith*. Luther declares that 'he who hath not Assurance spews Faith out;' and Melancthon, that 'Assurance is the discriminating line of Christianity from Heathenism.' Assurance is, indeed, the *punctum saliens* of Luther's system, and an unacquaintance with this, his great central doctrine, is one prime cause of the chronic

misrepresentation which runs through our recent histories of Luther and the Reformation. Assurance is no less strenuously maintained by Calvin; is held even by Arminius; and stands, essentially, part and parcel of all the Confessions of all the churches of the Reformation, down to the Westminster Assembly. In that Synod *Assurance* was, in Protestantism, for the *first*, indeed *only* time formally declared, ‘*not to be of the essence of faith*’; and, accordingly, the Scottish General Assembly has subsequently, once and again, condemned and deposed the holders of this, the doctrine of Luther, of Calvin, of all the churches of the Reformation, and of the older Scottish church itself. In the English, and more articulately in the Irish Establishment, Assurance still stands a necessary tenet of ecclesiastical belief. (See *Homilies*, book i., number iii., part 3, specially referred to in the eleventh of the *Thirty-nine Articles*; and number iv. parts 1 and 3; likewise the sixth *Lambeth Article*.) Assurance was consequently held by all the older Anglican churchmen, of whom Hooker may stand for the example. But Assurance is now openly disavowed without scruple by Anglican churchmen, high and low, when apprehended; but of these, many, like Mr Hare, are blissfully incognisant of the opinion, its import, its history, and even its name.

“This dogma, with its fortune, past and present, affords, indeed, a series of the most *curious contrasts*.—For it is curious, that this cardinal point of Luther’s doctrine should, without exception, have been constituted into the fundamental principle of all the churches of the Reformation, and as their common and uncatholic doctrine have been explicitly condemned at Trent. Again it is curious, that this common and differential doctrine of the churches of the Reformation should now be abandoned virtually in, or formally by, all these churches themselves. Again it is curious, that Protestants should now generally profess the counter doctrine, asserted at Trent in condemnation of their peculiar principle. Again it is curious, that this most important *variation* in the faith of Protestants, as in fact a gravitation of Protestantism back towards Catholicity, should have been overlooked, as, indeed, in his days undeveloped, by the keen-eyed author of “*The History of the Variations of the Protestant Churches*.” Finally, it is curious, that though now fully developed, this central approximation of Protestantism to Catholicity should not, as far as I know, have been signalled by any theologian, Protestant or Catholic; whilst the Protestant symbol, (‘*Fides sola justificat*,—‘*Faith alone justifies*,’) though now eviscerated of its real import, and now only manifesting an unimportant difference of expression, is still supposed to mark the discrimination of the two religious denominations. For both agree, that the three heavenly virtues must *all* concur to salvation; and they only differ, whether Faith, as a word, does or does not involve Hope and Charity. This misprision would have been avoided had Luther and Calvin only said, ‘*Fiducia sola justificat*,—‘*Assurance alone justifies*’; for on their doctrine Assurance was convertible with true Faith, and true Faith implied the other Christian graces. But this *primary* and *peculiar* doctrine of the Reformation is now harmoniously condemned by Catholics and Protestants in unison.”—(Discussions, second edit., pp. 508, 509.)

We are prepared to prove, that this pompous and preten-

tious historico-theological exercitation on the subject of assurance, about which Sir William, as usual, evidently thinks that nobody knows any thing but himself, exhibits a large amount of blundering and inaccuracy, and furnishes another good proof that no reliance can be placed upon his statements on theological subjects. But our space is, for the present, exhausted, and "the articulate manifestation" of the correctness of these averments we have made, must be postponed.

We have been, of necessity, so much engrossed in this article with the weaknesses and infirmities of Luther, with the defects of his character, that it would be an act of injustice to him if we were to conclude without reminding our readers of his strong claims to our esteem and affection as a man, and of the invaluable services which he was made the instrument of rendering to the church and the world. The first of these points is beautifully touched upon by Mr Hare in the conclusion of his "Vindication:"—

"To some readers it may seem that I have spoken with exaggerated admiration of Luther. No man ever lived whose whole heart, and soul, and life, have been laid bare as his have been to the eyes of mankind. Open as the sky, bold and fearless as the storm, he gave utterance to all his feelings, all his thoughts: he knew nothing of reserve: and the impression he produced on his hearers and friends was such, that they were anxious to treasure up every word that dropped from his pen, or from his lips. No man, therefore, has ever been exposed to so severe a trial: perhaps no man was ever placed in such difficult circumstances, or assailed by such manifold temptations. And how has he come out of the trial? Through the power of faith, under the guardian care of his heavenly Master, he was enabled to stand through life; and still he stands, and will continue to stand, firmly rooted in the love of all who really know him. A writer quoted by Harless (vii. 2) has well said, 'I have continually been more and more edified, elevated, and strengthened, by this man of steel, this sterling soul, in whom certain features of the Christian character are manifested in their fullest perfection. His image, I confess, was for some years obscured before my eyes. I fixed them exclusively on the ebullitions of his powerful nature, unsubdued as yet by the Spirit of the Lord. But when, on a renewed study of his works, the holy faith and energy of his thoroughly German character, the truth of his whole being, his wonderful childliness and simplicity, revealed themselves to my sight in their glory; then I could not but turn to him with entire, pure love, and exclaim, *His weaknesses are only so great, because his virtues are so great.*'"—(P. 293.)

These are the feelings which every rightly constituted and adequately informed mind will cherish towards Luther as a man; and the services which he was enabled to render to the church and the world were such as to entitle him to be ever regarded with the profoundest admiration and gratitude. His great leading service, in so far as the highest of all in-

terests are concerned, was the entire destruction of the doctrine of human merit, and the thorough establishment of the great scriptural truth of a purely gratuitous justification, through faith alone as the means or instrument of uniting men to Jesus Christ, and of applying to them all that he did and suffered in their room; together with the vigorous and unshrinking application of these great principles to the exposure of all the mass of erroneous doctrines and of unauthorized and sinful practices, by which the Church of Rome had been leading men, formally or virtually, theoretically or practically, to pervert the gospel of the grace of God, and to build their hopes for eternity upon a false foundation. Under this general description may be comprehended, more or less directly, most of the theology which the writings of Luther contain. This was the work which God raised him up and qualified him to achieve; and a more important work, one more fraught with glory to God and benefit to man, was probably never committed to any one who had not been endowed with the gift of supernatural inspiration. Luther's previous training and experience before he appeared publicly as a Reformer, were manifestly fitted and intended to lead him to understand practically the true way of a sinner's acceptance and deliverance from guilt and bondage; for, after being awakened to some sense of divine things, and of his own relation to God, he went long about to establish his own righteousness, before he was brought into the glorious liberty of God's children. This was evidently the best preparation for the work to which he was destined. He had tried all other methods of obtaining deliverance and peace with the utmost earnestness, and in circumstances in many respects favourable. He had been driven from every refuge of lies, and shut up to an absolute submission to the righteousness of God,—the righteousness which is of God by faith. He had been compelled, and he had been enabled, to fight his way through all the formidable obstacles which the current doctrines and practices of the Church of Rome interposed to men's rightly discerning and appreciating their true condition as helpless sinners, and the scriptural method of their deliverance; and was thus eminently fitted for opening up to the miserable victims of Romish delusion the danger to which they were exposed, and the only sure way in which deliverance and enlargement were to be obtained. This object he zealously and faithfully prosecuted during the remainder of his life, keeping it principally in view in his exposition of divine truth, and in his interpretation of the Word of God.

The doctrine of justification, notwithstanding the peculiarly full, formal, and elaborate exposition which the Apostle Paul was

guided by the Spirit to make of it, became very soon involved in obscurity and error; and though some, no doubt, in every age—apparently decreasing, however, in number in every succeeding century—were practically, and in fact, led by God's grace to rest for their own salvation upon the one foundation laid in Zion, yet it is, to say the least, somewhat doubtful whether, after the age of the men who had held personal intercourse with the apostles (from none of whom have we anything like detailed expositions of Christian doctrine), any man can be produced who has given, or who could have given, a perfectly correct exposition of the whole of Paul's doctrine upon this vitally important subject. Confusion and error upon this point continued to increase and extend,—even Augustine giving the weight of his deservedly high authority to views defective and erroneous regarding it,—until, by the admirable skill with which the doctrines and practices of the Church of Rome were adapted to foster and satisfy those notions upon this subject to which depraved men are naturally disposed, all scriptural views of the method of justification had, for many centuries before the Reformation, disappeared from the world; and while there was still a vague, unmeaning, and inoperative acknowledgment of Christ as a Saviour, the great body of his professed followers were practically and in reality relying upon their own works and merits, and upon the works and merits of other sinful creatures like themselves, for the salvation of their souls.

This was the condition in which Luther found the professing church in regard to theology and religion. He was guided, by the work of the divine Spirit upon his own understanding and heart, through the word, to appreciate aright men's utter helplessness and inability to do any thing to merit or deserve the forgiveness of their sins and the enjoyment of God's favour; to see that salvation and all its blessings are purchased for men by Christ, and are freely imparted to them individually by God's grace through the instrumentality of faith; and to feel that the practical reception of these doctrines is the only sure provision for producing holiness of heart and peace and joy in believing. And his life was mainly devoted to the exposition of these fundamental principles of Christian truth, and the application and enforcement of them in opposition to all the corruptions and abuses, theoretical and practical, of the Church of Rome. He was enabled to bring out his views on these subjects so clearly and convincingly, and to establish them so firmly upon the basis of scriptural authority, that in substance they were adopted by all the other Reformers, embodied in the confessions of all the Reformed churches, including the Church of England, and that they were always held

with peculiar clearness and steadiness in the Lutheran Church, until the rationalism of last century swept away all regard to the authority of God's Word, and all right conceptions of men's actual relation to God and the gospel method of salvation. There is little else in Luther's theological works than what may be said to be involved more or less directly in the exposition and application of these great truths; but there is all this set forth with much clearness and vigour, and applied with much energy and success. He scarcely seems ever to have proposed it to himself as an object, to open up the whole system of scriptural truth in its connection and details, and to unfold it in its various aspects. Human merit and ability on the one hand, and on the other full and purely gratuitous justification, as indispensably necessary for men, and actually provided and offered by God through Christ, are at once the points from which he ever starts, and the centres around which he ever moves; and by thoroughly establishing the one upon the ruins of the other, he has thrown a flood of light upon the most fundamental articles of Christian truth, and upon the interpretation of the most important portions of the Word of God.

This was the great, the inestimable, service which Luther, as the instrument in the hand of God's Spirit and providence, was enabled to render to the church and the world. The boon is to be referred to the mercy and grace of Him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will, and whose time to favour Zion had come. But it is right that we should pay due honour to one whom the Lord was pleased to honour so highly, that we should cherish his memory with veneration and affection, and protect it as far as we can from contumely and insult.

After all, however, the great lessons which the survey of this whole subject is fitted to impress upon us, are just these most familiar and most fundamental truths,—that the only infallible standard of truth and duty, of doctrine and morality, is the Word of God, which liveth and abideth for ever; and that the only perfect exemplar is the life of Him, who is at once the eternal incarnate Word and at the same time a partaker of flesh and blood like ourselves, “who did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth.”

CRITICAL NOTICES.

Christ and other Masters ; an Historical Inquiry into some of the chief Parallelisms and Contrasts between Christianity and the Religious Systems of the Ancient World : with Special Reference to Prevailing Difficulties and Objections. By CHARLES HARDWICK, M.A., Fellow of St Catherine's Hall, Divinity Lecturer of King's College, and Christian Advocate in the University of Cambridge. Macmillan and Co., 1855.

THE office of "Christian Advocate" in the University of Cambridge is understood to impose upon the holder of it the duty of keeping a wakeful eye on the progress of theological and philosophical speculation,—of marking the incipient tendencies, as well as the confirmed habitudes of public opinion,—and of interposing, from time to time, with a seasonable refutation of prevailing errors, and a suitable vindication of maligned or neglected truths. This duty was ably discharged by the late Dr Mill, who brought to bear upon it the energies of a powerful mind, and the stores of a vast and varied erudition ; and it promises to be still discharged with equal ability and zeal by his successor, Mr Hardwick.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of an office such as we have described. It demands high qualifications ; but these, if faithfully devoted to the work, should be generously appreciated and liberally rewarded. It was not, therefore, without a sense of disgust, mingled with a feeling of indignation, that we read the following remark of the Royal Commissioners for the University of Cambridge with reference to this office :—"Objections have justly been made both to the name and to the office of Christian Advocate ; for if the Christian religion requires defence, such defence should be a spontaneous act, not a *hired service*." That the terms in which this singular opinion is expressed are needlessly offensive,—that they represent the labours of the Christian Advocate as having more the character of a *mercenary* than of a spontaneous service,—and that they brand the office with a stigma which is held to have been *justly* affixed to it, is clear. It is not equally clear on what intelligible principle their opinion can be said to rest, unless it be the inexpediency or unlawfulness of all endowments for any religious object. The Hulsean, the Boyle, the Bampton, and the Donellan lectureships, which have contributed so much to the maintenance and elevation of a high standard of theological acquirement, must all, for the same reason, be discountenanced and

condemned ; or, should it be said that there is a difference between the two cases, since these lectureships were founded by private bequest, and are not supported by public funds, we ask the Commissioners, and the Government who appointed them, to apply their principle to the college of Maynooth before they lop off a single branch from our venerable Protestant universities. They must be strangely ignorant of the crisis which is impending in the religious history of the country, and utterly blind to the most alarming signs of the times, if they imagine either that the Christian religion requires no defence, or that any public provision for its maintenance may now be safely dispensed with.

But the noblest vindication of the office must arise from the faithful and effective discharge of its duties ; and judging from the specimen now before us, we have formed a very favourable opinion of Mr Hardwick's qualifications for the task. The work promises, when completed, to exhibit a very comprehensive view of Christianity in its relations, both of resemblance and contrast, to the religious systems of former times ; and, by means of these, to illustrate the origin, and test the character, of the various religious tendencies of the present age. The author proposes to take the lamp of history as his guide in exploring the mazes of modern opinion,—to inquire what fragments of primeval truth lay imbedded in the various forms of ancient superstition, and with what heterogeneous elements they were incrustated, by what accretions they were overlaid and concealed ; to investigate those leading facts, and to analyse those fundamental ideas of heathenism, which exhibit a resemblance to what is found in Scripture, and which have been applied by modern sceptics to prove either that Christianity borrowed largely from Paganism, or that the same absolute religion has ever existed in a variety of forms as the natural and inevitable product of the sentiments of the human heart ; and to show that, while these points of resemblance may be satisfactorily explained in perfect consistency with the peculiar claims of revelation, by tracing them to their origin, partly in the felt wants of the human spirit, and partly in the primeval traditions transmitted from the cradle of the race,—the points of contrast between the Jewish and Christian schemes on the one hand, and all the historical varieties of heathenism on the other, cannot be accounted for without admitting the reality of a divine supernatural revelation imparted from the mind of God to the mind of man. In the execution of this comprehensive plan, Mr Hardwick proposes to examine, 1st, Those groups of religions which arose and prevailed in spheres external to the range of Hebrew influence ; such as those of Hindostan, Mexico, China, and the Southern Seas. 2dly, Those which may be supposed to have modified the development of thought among the Hebrews ; such as the religions of Egypt and Persia, which came into contact with the Jews during their residence in Egypt and their captivity in Babylon. 3dly, Those of Greece and Rome, which came into conflict with Christianity in the first five centuries of the present era ; and, 4thly, The religions of the Saxon, Scandinavian, and Slavonic tribes, which withstood the influence of Christianity long after the mythology of Greece and Rome had disappeared before her triumphant progress.

The *first* part of the work, extending to 160 pages, does not em-

brace the discussion of any of these systems, but is entirely introductory. It consists of three divisions; the first exhibiting a rapid but comprehensive sketch of the "Religious Tendencies of the Present Age," in which the different varieties of modern speculation are brought under review, with the design of indicating those phases of opinion to which the results of the historical survey may afterwards be applied; the second offering a summary statement of the evidence in favour of the "Unity of the Human Race," with the view of laying a solid groundwork for his method of accounting for traditions which were afterwards diffused through all the human family; the third illustrating the "Characteristic Features of the Old Testament Religion, and its Vital Connection with Christianity."

Our limits will not permit us to quote several passages which we had marked. The following must suffice as specimens of the general character of the work, and the spirit in which it has been conceived and executed. Referring to the kindred treatise of Mr Maurice, Mr Hardwick says:—

"The only recent treatise which professes to grapple with exactly the same class of difficulties, is a volume published in 1848, by Mr F. D. Maurice, with the title, 'The Religions of the World, and their Relations to Christianity.' Like other writings of that gifted author, it has naturally attracted a large circle of admirers, offering, as it does, some very choicest reflections on the spirit that pervaded the religious systems of antiquity. Still it seems to me, at least, that Mr Maurice's treatment of the subject would have proved far more successful, had his method been more rigorously historical. He rather helps us to philosophise on what may possibly have been the attributes of those religions, as viewed by the more elevated minds of heathendom, than to determine the precise complexion of the popular belief, and its true relation to the doctrines of the Gospel. I feel, moreover, that the growth and permanence of such systems are always traceable quite as much to their accordance with the lower and depraved tastes of humanity, as to supernatural influences exerted on their constitution by the ever present Logos, or to fragments of primeval truth they are supposed to have retained. I hope that no assailant of revealed religion, with whom it is my duty to contend, will ever find his arguments misrepresented; and if, in any case, I manifest what seems to him a needless warmth of feeling, my apology must be the strong conviction which I entertain as to the sacredness of Christianity, and the exceeding blindness of those persons who, having once embraced it, turn away from all its central doctrines with irreverence, coldness, or contempt."—*Preface.*

Referring again to German works on the subject, he says,—

"It is remarkable that not a few of the objections ventilated by the English 'Deists,' found their way across the Channel, and, in Germany, communicated a fresh impulse to the rationalistic movement. They are now returning home, etherealised indeed, and moulded into more fantastic shapes, although substantially the same objections as before. England, once the master, has become the ardent, apt, and credulous disciple; and when numbers of our brethren on the continent are just emerging from the fogs of scepticism, and welcoming the earliest dawn of better days, it seems as though the English were resolved to venture out again into the same dreary regions, only to be taught again the utter fruitlessness of all endeavours to solve the arduous problem of humanity without the aid of holy writ. Impelled by the necessity of coping with these wild and retrogressive tendencies, the Christian Advocate has never shrunk from the encounter, and has seldom found his labours altogether unsuccessful. He feels that to reduce our blessed Lord into the category of human seers, is practically to dethrone

him. Christianity will tolerate no rival. They who wish to raise a tabernacle for some other master, be it even for the greatest worthies of the old economy—a Moses or Elias—must be warned that CHRIST, and CHRIST ALONE, is to be worshipped. They must hear *Him*.”—(P. 37.)

In *such* labours we heartily bid him God-speed !

Reformers before the Reformation, principally in Germany and the Netherlands. Depicted by Dr C. ULLMANN. The Translation by the Rev. ROBERT MENZIES. Vol. II. Clark's Foreign Theological Library. New Series. Vol. VIII. 1855.

THE first volume of this work we had occasion to notice in a former number.—(No. XIV., Oct. 1855.) We have now before us the second volume, in the excellent translation through means of which Mr Menzies has introduced Ullmann so favourably to the British public. This volume, as might have been expected from the character of the materials, is much more interesting than its predecessor. It is a hard, and nearly a hopeless task, to attempt to write up the minor celebrities of history, to make greater men of them than they really were in their day. In history, as in actual life, men will find their own level. Say what we will, the relentless ploughshare of time will cover up the smaller hillocks, leaving only the loftier eminences within sight. We fear that even Dr Ullmann's investigations, profound and subtle as they are, will not succeed in elevating John of Goch or John of Wesel much higher than they formerly stood in the ecclesiastical landscape. In the present volume, however, he comes to names which stand out prominently on the church's map,—to persons regarding whom many know little more than the names, but of whom all desire to know something. After speaking a little of the Beghards and Beguines,—wild sects of male and female mystics in the dark ages, who landed in pantheistic views and immoral practices,—the first person presented to us is John Ruysbroek, who was born near Brussels in 1293, a transcendental mystic, who carried out his notions of sequestration so far that he would not admit his own mother, when, attracted by the fame of her son's sanctity, she came to see him; and in whom “the fervour of divine love” blazed forth with such unusual strength, that he cried out, “I know for certain that I am ready to endure all that God allots to me, even the torments of hell.” This self-devoted mystic, whose writings, though less extravagant than those that preceded him, still led in the same pantheistic direction, originated the society known as the Brethren of the Common Lot. That society, however, was more fully organised by his disciple, Gerhard Groot, or Great, who is the next person introduced. Originally gay and luxurious, Groot was all at once transformed into an ascetic. Dressing himself in a long coarse garment of hair-cloth, totally abstaining from the use of flesh and other lawful things, and passing his nights in watching and prayer, he forced his feeble body into complete subservience to his spirit. Under his management the Brethren of the Common Lot assumed the form of a regular association, akin to Monachism, but more free, open and practical. Combined for the cultivation of piety, they procured a simple livelihood, partly by manual labour, partly by donations, wore a distinctive dress, and acted on the principle of a community of goods. They were neither monks

nor priests, were under no vow of obedience, and sought to accomplish their great object, the promotion of practical piety, by the simplicity of their lives, religious conversations, mutual confessions, lectures, and social exercises of devotion. Groot insisted with earnestness on the study of the Holy Scriptures, and exerted himself in multiplying and diffusing copies of them. "But in the Scriptures he chiefly sought that which is vital and efficacious, viz., Christ, as delineated in the Gospels, the root and mirror of life, the sole foundation of the church." This mystic died of the plague in 1384, and was succeeded by Florentius Radewin; who resembled his master in self-denying zeal, and was held in high veneration by all his pupils. He sometimes fasted so long as to lose all appetite and taste. He carried simplicity in dress so far that he is said on one occasion to have inquired of a tailor, greatly to the man's astonishment, whether he could make an old coat. He considered no occupation too humble for him,—not even that of cook in the kitchen; which service, indeed, all the brethren used to undertake in their turn. Under Florentius the Brethren of the Common Lot continued to make progress. The principle of unity which prevailed in this singular society, was the spirit which pervaded the whole corporation,—the spirit of love, humility, and obedience; obedience, however, which proceeded from love, rather than the constraint of monastic rule. A Brother-house consisted generally of twenty individuals, who lived together, having a common fund, and taking their meals at one table. The customary dress was a grey cloak, coat, and breeches, without ornament. A cowl of the same colour covered the head, from the crown of which the hair was shaved. In some points they resembled the Moravian Brethren, in others the Society of Quakers. But the most useful service which they seem to have performed for their age, was the instruction of youth, and the introduction of the mother tongue into religious services. In these respects, as well as in the freedom they maintained, Dr Ullmann considers them the precursors of the Reformation.

The most important personage, however, who appears in the present volume, is the famous Thomas à Kempis, whom Dr Ullmann designates as "the blossom of the practical mysticism of the Brethren." The original name of this person was Thomas Hamerken. He was born at Kempen, not far from Cologne; and for that reason is commonly called Thomas à Kempis. His father was a mechanic, but his mother was distinguished for piety, and sent Thomas at an early age to a school taught by the Brethren; where, as they were in the habit of supporting their scholars, he received a gratuitous education. His life affords few incidents, as he retired at an early age to the convent of St Agnes, near the town of Zwoll, where he passed the whole of his days. Our author has given a full exhibition of the sentiments and system of 'a Kempis, not concealing those points in which he rises at one time into the heights of transcendental mysticism, and at another descends into the depths of mediæval monasticism. He does not conceal his Mariolatry,—the story of his praying to the Virgin about the lost book, till he heard her voice, like an inspiration, "Search below the straw of the bed!"—his precept in his Claustral discipline, "*Quicquid habere desideras, per manus beatæ Mariæ humiliter roga*,"—his using the scourge while singing the hymn *Stetit Jesus*,—and his warnings against taking

a walk, as calculated to disturb and distract the mind. On the other hand, his religious system is laid open as one of pure mysticism. "To enter into fellowship with God, the chief good and fountain of blessedness, and to become one with him, is the basis of all true contentment." But how can God and man be brought together? Man must die to and deny himself, and wholly renounce self-love. When he has emptied himself of all created things, God will replenish him by his grace. "The farther man recedes from the consolations of earth, the nearer he draws to God; and the deeper he descends into himself, and the more vile he becomes in his own sight, the higher does he rise towards God." With regard to the religious exercises prescribed by Thomas, the private are, solitude, silence, fasting, prayer, submission to the direction of a ghostly confessor, and repeated recollection of God and eternal things; the public are, regular attendance on divine worship, a zealous observance of all sacred rites and seasons, the faithful adoration of Mary and the saints, and a frequent participation of the holy supper. Thus, as Dr Ullmann shows, "Thomas's religious views pass through the intermediate stage of asceticism, and at last end in monachism. He shares the notion of almost the whole mediæval period, in reckoning monachism the highest stage of the Christian life, and the monk the perfect Christian." He admits also that "not justification by faith, but reconciliation by love, constitutes the centre of his whole religious system." After this exposé, Dr Ullmann had good reason to say, "The reader may now ask with astonishment, Shall this quiet mystic, wholly immersed in the contemplation of divine things; this recluse, obedient, rigidly Catholic monk, shall he be placed in the ranks of those *who paved the way for the Reformation*?" To this question the Doctor "boldly answers in the affirmative;" and a large portion of his work is occupied with showing the relation in which Thomas à Kempis, with his brother mystics, stood to the Reformation.

After the most careful perusal of Dr Ullmann's speculations on this point, and the evidence which he has adduced in their support, we adhere to the opinion which we formerly expressed,—that he has failed to show that the mystic theology had any influence in paving the way for the Reformation. Asserting the prevalence of the objective above the subjective in the Church of Rome, evinced in the infinite worth ascribed to holy services, and the mere *opus operatum* of the sacraments, he speaks of the reaction produced by the mystics, who elevated the subjective above the objective, and pointed more decidedly from works to faith, love, disposition; and, in short, did every thing possible to make inward Christians out of mere outward ones. In all this, he argues, they unmistakably cleared the way for the Reformers, as the restorers of internalism and subjectivity in Christianity.—(Pp. 254–257.) But is it not certain that, from a very early period, both the objective and subjective elements were at work in the Church of Rome, and that they are so to the present day? Rome, it is true, rests much of her weight on the authority of the church, and the virtue of her external rites, but she has also made ample use of the mystic element. In what other light are we to regard the whole system of monachism, according to which, from the days of Origen's school, silence, sequestration, self-inspection, self-mortification, and all the other features of mysticism, have been studiously inculcated, as the means of reconciliation and conformity to

God? If the mystic theology had been calculated to pave the way for reformation, how came it about that the way never issued in reform, though the paving continued from the sixth century downwards? The truth, we believe, is, that the mystical element is essential to the entire spirit and working of the Romish system. It is not only perfectly compatible with its dogmatic and ecclesiastic forms, but, as in the case of 'A Kempis, it natively ends in them. In its general character, Popery is the perversion of Christianity. Viewed in its outer life, that perversion is seen in substituting the priest in place of Christ. Viewed in its inner life, the same perversion appears in substituting the devotee in the place of Christ. Let any one study the well known work of 'A Kempis, "*The Imitation of Christ*," in its original and un mutilated form, and he will be satisfied on this point. The imitation of Christ for which he pleads, is not what we Protestants understand by that term,—the following of his virtues and graces. It is an attempt to imitate, not his humility merely, but his humiliation,—not his purity only, but his passion. The Son of God is exhibited as a model-saviour, and all true devotees may, by following the directions of 'A Kempis, become so many imitation-saviours. Every one may, to use an expression which Ullmann employs in summing up his views, "repeat Jesus in his own person." Indeed, as Ullmann grants, in Thomas's "*Imitation*" "no express mention is made of Christ's *person*." Christ is merely viewed as a mirror, ("the root and mirror of life,") in which the soul may dress itself in the image of God, until at length, by dying to himself as Christ died, suffering as Christ suffered, "he is wholly dissolved and swallowed up in the divine love, and God within him is one and all." The spiritual pride engendered by this falsetto style of devotion, swelled in proportion to the degree in which the ascetic succeeded in his frantic efforts to mimic the condescension and self-denial of the Saviour. Such a spirit, so morbidly subjective, revolving through all its phases on the pivot of self-righteousness, and carrying forward a trade of competition with the merits of Christ, could never be regarded as hostile to the interests of the Romish Church. To this day, accordingly, the "*Imitation*" of Thomas à Kempis is one of the most favoured classics of the cloister; and it is among the first books that are put by wily priests into the hands of young ladies whom they have inveigled into their snares.

What could be less akin to the sickly sentimentalism of 'A Kempis, than the brave, hearty, life-loving, world-moving religion of Martin Luther? The starting-point of the Reformation, as Ullmann grants afterwards, (p. 479,) was the doctrine of justification by faith,—a doctrine taught not merely to be received, but realised as a privilege in the experience of the believer; and which, when realised, works inwardly by love, and outwardly in the fruits of holy living. This was, in reality, the point of divergence from the mystical system, and the separating lines widened in distance the farther they went on. True, Luther found something congenial to his awakened spirit in the works of Tauler and 'A Kempis; not, however, till it had been awakened by another genius than that of mysticism. He relished the fervent piety and close converse with God which appeared in them, as a man who has partaken of a substantial meal may relish the dessert: but long before that he had tasted the bitter medicine of conviction, had been

relieved from the pangs of a guilty conscience at the cross of Christ, had found peace with God in the atoning blood, and had feasted on the rich provision of the gospel; so that he was now prepared to refresh himself with the delicacies which, following a very different process, these mystics had manufactured for their own especial use. And yet, according to Dr Ullmann's theory, we must suppose that Luther's mind passed through mysticism on its way to the Reformation; that he commenced with the dessert and ended with the dinner! The mystics were unquestionably the best men of their time; but this is saying little in their favour. Their system, shadowy and unreal as it was, may have ministered comfort and peace to many a sincere and unconscious disciple of the truth in his narrow cloister. But it was unfitted for the world at large, and at the dawn of the Reformation, its fantastic forms vanished out of sight, or sought a retreat among the shivered ruins of monastic devotions.

The latter part of the volume is occupied with a detailed account of the life and the theology of John Wessel, whom the author traces from his youth to manhood and old age. Wessel died in October 1489, at the age of sixty-nine or seventy. "His lot was cast in a transitional and intermediate period. His life, as it were, fills up the interval between Gerson and Luther: between the great French theologians who negotiated with the Papacy, and attempted a reform of the hierarchical institution, and the still greater theologians of Germany, who wholly repudiated Rome, and laid a new foundation for ecclesiastical life. And who can deny that he both understood and worthily fulfilled the vocation of his age? With more strength of character than Erasmus, he possessed sufficient originality, steadfastness, and determination, to apply the hand of reform to existing abuses. Less bold and forcible than Luther, he had also benignity and prudence to avoid an open breach, which at the time could only have done harm and produced a powerful reaction. In this way he laid the basis for a change in religion and theology, without too eagerly precipitating it, and was exactly such a reformer as the intermediate period required." On the peculiarities which marked the theology of Wessel we cannot now enter. Suffice it to say, that, with a considerable advance in point of scriptural and evangelical sentiment on both the scholastic and the mystic schools, it partook of many of the features of both. In his views of justification, and more especially of the function of faith in the appropriation of the blessings of salvation, he is decidedly erroneous. He confounds faith with charity, and identifies it with divine fellowship; speaks of the works which Paul opposes to faith as the works of the unregenerate man, and of our being justified by Christ *infusing* into the soul a new righteousness and life. At the same time, it is impossible to peruse the able and elaborate analysis of his theology laid before us by Dr Ullmann, without perceiving that the minds of men were gradually *preparing*, or rather *being prepared*, in different quarters of the world, and altogether independently of each other, for the change at the Reformation. Luther never saw Wessel's work till he had, by following out his own train of thought, suggested by the perusal of Scripture and the counsels of Staupitz, come to embrace some of the very views which Wessel had broached in the preceding century; and then he found them breathing so much of his own spirit, that he says,

"If I had read them before, my enemies might have said that Luther had borrowed every thing from Wessel." The thinking minds of Europe had reached such a stage in the advancing process of human progression, that the same ideas struck them much about the same period, as the same new star may be discovered about the same time by astronomers in France, Germany, and England. Viewed under this aspect, we grant the *reformatory* character of Wessel's theology. It was the symptom of a change which had been gradually progressing, but which it can hardly be said to have influenced. Various causes contributed to the result. But however we may trace its secondary causes, we cannot overlook the agency of divine truth, accompanied by divine influence, in the actual catastrophe; and whether we view the Reformation as contrasted with its antecedents, or as illustrated by its sequences, we are compelled to say, "This is the Lord's doing: it is marvellous in our eyes."

The Home School; or, Hints on Home Education. By the Rev. NORMAN MACLEOD, author of "The Earnest Student."

THE home school and home education which the author of this excellent little work recommends, is the instruction and training, direct or indirect, which parents cannot but give to their children in the family circle in the course of their every-day domestic life. It is quite impossible to overestimate the importance of this home education; but we fear it is comparatively rare that its importance is duly felt, and receives that degree of attention which it pre-eminently deserves. There can be no doubt that a bias is given to the young mind in its very earliest years which may give a special direction to its entire future life,—a stamp impressed on its susceptible character then which it may bear for ever. There can be as little doubt that this is often done by parents without the slightest consciousness on their part, and without the least intention of doing so. But all the more necessary is it that they should be made intelligently aware of the even tremendous importance to their children of their own character and conduct, which constitute the mould into which the infant mind is cast, and stamped for future good or evil, happiness or misery. To give them this intelligence, to make them fully aware of its importance, and to instruct them how to use it, is the design of Mr Macleod's little volume; and the design is admirably executed.

Mr Macleod apologises for the aspect of these "Hints," as having been contributed at different periods to the *Edinburgh Christian Magazine*, and delivered as addresses to meetings of parents, saying, "Had they been written continuously for publication, they would have had more unity of design, and been better proportioned in their several parts." We are not sure that we agree with him. They seem to us to have sufficient unity of design, and to be far more natural, fresh, and freely applicable to all the varieties of character and circumstance than they could have been had they been cast into a more elaborate and regularly proportioned form. Each chapter may be read by itself, in any order, and without the necessity of reading the preceding chapter to get introduced to the subject; and yet they may be read continuously with great advantage. This can be shown by giving a list of subjects

treated of in the chapters successively; by which means also our readers may form some conception of the general character of the treatise itself. These chapters are: "1. A few words to parents on the importance of their own children. 2. The earthly and heavenly parents. 3. Christian baptism and Christian education. 4. A few words on training. 5. Christian education in right feeling towards God. 6. Habits,—right feelings towards parents,—obedience,—self-sacrifice,—industry,—perseverance,—truth,—honesty,—Mrs Wesley's training of her family. 7. Training by example and precept. 8. Training with love,—firmness,—perseverance,—and watchfulness. 9. Prayer. 10. Results,—encouragement to Christian parents,—difficulties and objections,—conclusion."

Our readers will, we are persuaded, readily admit that any thing like an adequate discussion of these topics cannot fail to produce a work of great value. And we venture unhesitatingly to add, that so far as the limits within which the rev. author has been pleased to confine himself would admit, they are adequately discussed. This is, as we intend it, high praise, for the topics are all of extreme importance. They very evidently have come fresh and warm from the sagacious mind and loving heart of an able, accomplished, and earnest Christian father and minister, who has known and felt in his own youth, and knows and feels in his own manhood, what he teaches, and who wishes to convey similar lessons to his own flock, to his native country, and to all mankind, so far as the publication of this little volume may enable him to do so. The style is easy, natural, vivid, graphic, impressive. The illustrations are apt and striking; and there are many passages of apparently undesigned, but real eloquence. Our limits in a mere notice would not admit extracts; nor could any extracts do justice to the varied character of the work. But we give it our most cordial approbation; and we should be delighted if a copy of it would be placed in each family throughout the kingdom, for the regulation of all home education.

The Inspiration of Holy Scripture. Five Sermons preached before the University of Cambridge. By the Rev. LORD ARTHUR HERVEY, M.A. Cambridge: Macmillan & Co.

IN the course of the searching discussion which the question of the Inspiration of Scripture is at present undergoing throughout the church, there are some symptoms which give token of the likelihood of a wiser and sounder judgment being come to in regard to it, than a short time ago might have been apprehended. Those mutilated theories of inspiration with which many, in times of less earnest religious feeling and inquiry than the present, were wont to rest contented, are very generally felt to be unsatisfactory and insufficient. The theory of divine inspiration which attributed to the Word of God different measures and varieties of supernatural influence, and distributed to each page its due per centage of divine superintendence or suggestion, is hardly now advocated with the same dogmatism and confidence as it was by such men as Pye Smith and Henderson formerly. The more modern theory of the German school, which partially or wholly ignores the objective element in inspired revelation, and

confines itself to the subjective elevation and enlightenment of the rational or religious consciousness in its apprehensions of truth, has, indeed, found more general favour in recent times, ushered in and advocated as it has been by Coleridge and his disciples among ourselves. But even this theory has manifested, to the conviction of not a few with whose habits of thought and speculation it harmonised, its own vanity and defectiveness, when in the pages of Morell and Maurice it was seen to be a theory which did away with all real distinction between the inspiration of apostles and prophets moved by the Holy Ghost, and that of men under the ordinary teaching of the Spirit, and when it left to us nothing which we could specifically and strictly call a supernatural communication from God, contradistinguished from a human discovery and exhibition of truth. The longer and more narrowly it is examined, it will appear the more clearly, that to deny the objective element in inspiration, and to substitute an exclusively subjective inspiration in its place, even although this latter is dependent on the Spirit for its development, is in reality to deny a supernatural revelation altogether.

Some recent publications that have appeared among us would seem to indicate a reaction as having begun against the felt and inherent defects of such a theory. Mr Westcott, in his "Elements of the Gospel Harmony," when treating of the subject of inspiration, has strongly and ably advocated the doctrine of the equal and co-ordinate presence of the objective and subjective elements in inspired Scripture as necessary to explain the facts of a supernatural revelation supernaturally inspired, and as demanded by the express statements of the sacred volume. The recent work of Mr Lee on the "Inspiration of Holy Scripture," is a learned and elaborate discussion of the question, occupying substantially the same ground of argument, and forming a very valuable contribution towards the right settlement of the controversy. Both these works, more especially the latter of them, are deserving of very high praise. They approximate more closely than many of the works of preceding writers on this subject to what we believe to be a sound and scriptural solution of the problem of inspiration, arguing as they do for the necessity of recognising in Scripture the presence both of an objective communication of truth from God, and a subjective reception and expression of that truth, on the part of the inspired man who records it. The question of *how* the objective and subjective elements in inspired Scripture are to be reconciled with each other,—how the divine and the human are made to meet without limiting or neutralising one another in the sacred page,—is one of those which are placed beyond the reach of our understanding to answer, and baffle all attempts to explain. The Scriptures do not profess to explain to us the process through which they are inspired; they only assert the fact that they are inspired.

The work of Lord Arthur Hervey on inspiration is a seasonable and valuable contribution to the argument of those who plead for a Bible in the strict sense of the words infallible and divine in all its announcements. It is no unfavourable token of the progress of sound opinions on this vexed question, that these discourses were delivered before the University of Cambridge, and have been published at the request of many who heard them, and were interested in the views

propounded. They indicate, on the part of the author, an earnest and devout feeling of regard for the sacred volume; the argument for the inspiration of Scripture is for the most part conducted in a satisfactory manner; and the various objections that have been brought against this doctrine are sometimes ably as well as satisfactorily met. We are not at all sure that the author, in some cases, has risen to the level of his own argument, or seen the extent of the principles he advocates; and that he has not sometimes yielded up to the adversary points which had better have been defended against him, under the influence of that bugbear which has frightened so many—the dread of what has been called mechanical inspiration. But taking these discourses as a whole, they are to be regarded as a step in the right direction towards a sound view of the inspiration of the Word of God; and, viewed in connection with other works which have recently been devoted to the same question, seem to indicate that healthier and more scriptural opinions on the subject are beginning to prevail.

The Hebrew Text of the Old Testament Revised from Critical Sources; being an attempt to present a purer and more correct Text than the received one of Van Der Hooght, by the aid of the best existing materials. By SAMUEL DAVIDSON, D.D.

London: Bagster & Sons.

THE criticism of the Old Testament text has for a considerable period remained almost stationary; and while learning, ingenuity, and talent have been lavishly devoted to the elucidation of the Greek text of the New Testament, and we see the fruit in such editions as those of Lachmann and Tischendorf, little comparatively has been done for the Old Testament since Van Der Hooght published his edition in 1705. That edition has ever since been recognised as the *textus receptus*; and although defects more or less have been generally acknowledged in it, and various emendations proposed,—although the labours of Kennicott and De Rossi have amassed a store of materials from which criticism might develop a purer text,—yet nothing of moment has been done towards the production of a critical edition of the Old Testament suited to the demands of the age. Compared, indeed, with the criticism of the New Testament, and the rectification of the Greek text, the task to be performed in connection with the Hebrew text is far more difficult and delicate. In the first place, the MSS. of the Hebrew text are few and modern in comparison with those of the New Testament; and being, as it is generally believed, very much of the same family or recension, it is extremely difficult to classify them with a view to assign their comparative value as witnesses for the various readings, or to lay down any rule or principle beyond that of mere numbers by which their evidence may be calculated; and, in the second place, in the absence to a considerable extent of any guiding principle, derived from the external evidence of MSS., as to the readings, there is larger room left for the use of internal evidence in the determination of the text, and perhaps greater necessity for the application of critical conjecture with a view to its emendation. On both these accounts, more especially on the latter ground, it becomes a task of the utmost difficulty and

delicacy to do for the Old Testament what has been so fully done for the New, and to produce a good critical edition of the Hebrew text.

Dr Davidson is well known by his learned and successful labours in the department of Biblical literature; and the works which he has already published have procured for him no small regard as a diligent, devoted, and erudite student of the sacred volume. The present work cannot fail to be accepted as a valuable contribution towards the great desideratum of a new and critical edition of the original text of the Old Testament Scriptures. It is evidently the fruit of much labour, and time, and study, spent upon the task. It gives the results of much learned research and patient investigation into the critical materials gathered together by scholars for the elucidation and rectification of the Hebrew text. It presents in a compact and distinct form those readings deemed to be most authoritative and best, according to the estimate formed by the author of the evidence in their favour; and these readings are followed by a brief indication of the authorities which support them.

It did not, apparently, fall within Dr Davidson's aim to explain the principles of evidence by which he has been guided in his selection of the readings preferred by him, or to lay down any general canons of criticism by which the value of the proof in each case might be tested. He has no Prolegomena explaining the principles on which his selection proceeds; but in those cases where he differs from the received text, he confines himself to the statement of the reading he prefers, together with the briefest possible indication of the authorities that sanction it. We have no doubt that to many who study his volume this will be felt to be a defect. To a superficial glance it looks as if he had numbered his authorities rather than weighed them; and however unjust such a charge might be, it will be felt to a considerable extent that, notwithstanding the value of Dr Davidson's work, he has left unfinished, or rather unattempted, the still more arduous task of establishing those principles of critical evidence applicable to the Old Testament, by which the various readings might be estimated at their proper worth, and the text scientifically rectified. Of course this could be done only by an endeavour to ascertain those general principles by which the value of the different MSS. and other authorities might be determined, and by some attempt to define the extent and laws of the higher criticism in its application to the text in the absence of external evidence. In the case of the Old Testament, this is an attempt which it would require the highest gifts of critical learning and sanctified wisdom to undertake with the hope of success.

The Symmetrical Structure of Scripture; or, The Principles of Scripture Parallelism, exemplified in an Analysis of the Decalogue, the Sermon on the Mount, and other Passages of the Sacred Writings. By the Rev. JOHN FORBES, LL.D. Edinburgh: Clark.

BISHOP LOWTH has undoubtedly the credit of being the first to explain and illustrate the true character of Hebrew poetry, as constructed not on the principle of the regular recurrence of syllables, similar in number and quantity, but upon a certain parallelism or correspondence of ideas,

answering to each other according to a definite rule or measure. That such a principle is exemplified to a large extent in the poetical parts of the Old Testament is very generally admitted. To some degree, indeed, it is founded on the very nature both of human thought and human language; ideas and words being naturally associated together on the principle of resemblance or contrast, and therefore having a tendency to range themselves in a certain parallelism either of correspondence or antithesis over against each other. We see this in the poetry and oratory of all nations. Men, under strong emotion, or moved by powerful imagination, speak, unconsciously to themselves, in a certain measure or rhythm in which word and idea are found parallel to word and idea. And what to some extent is common to all, is more especially congenial to the Hebrew language and the Eastern type of mind. There is a foundation in nature, then, for that parallelism of ideas and expressions which constitutes the characteristic feature of Hebrew poetry; and more especially in the poetical portions of the Old Testament, the skill of the writer may be expected to be employed in increasing the impression of his writings, by extending and multiplying artificially these parallelisms beyond even what the natural laws of thought and language would of themselves involve. The general principle illustrated by Bishop Lowth must, to some extent, commend itself to every scholar as a help to the interpretation of Scripture, and as calculated to throw light on many passages of the sacred volume.

The studies of Dr Forbes have led him to attach great importance to the symmetrical structure of Scripture; and he endeavours in the volume before us to extend the application of the principle much farther than the original advocates of it contended for. Since the publications of Lowth, and of his immediate disciple Bishop Jebb, little has been done by Biblical scholars in the way of adding to their researches; and the principle of Scripture parallelism has been found less fruitful in the advantages it has rendered to the interpretation of the sacred volume than it at first promised to be. We are glad, therefore, to see such a man as Dr Forbes directing his attention to the subject. His work is the production of a competent scholar, a sound theologian, and an ingenious critic. It is not at all necessary that a student adopt to the full extent the many and most ingenious applications which he has made of his favourite principle to passages of Scripture the symmetrical structure of which was not dreamt of before, in order that he may derive both instruction and edification from this volume. While none can reasonably deny, within certain limits, the general doctrine of scriptural parallelism, many will reckon as rather fanciful and artificial than real and natural some of the illustrations given of it, in the case more especially of the narrative and argumentative portions of the New Testament. Whether the laws of a sound and sober criticism sanction the extensive application which he has made of it, may admit of reasonable doubt. But whatever difference of opinion there may be as to the extent and merits of the principle he contends for, there will be few who can rise from the perusal of Dr Forbes's work without feeling a sincere respect for his scholarship, and talent, and spirit as a Biblical critic, and without being constrained to confess that new and interesting questions have been opened up as to the meaning and structure of not a few passages of the Word of God.

We may add that there is a valuable chapter towards the close of the volume on the plenary inspiration of Scripture, in which Dr Forbes deals with some of the recent heresies on that subject of Mr Maurice and Mr Alford.

Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation. By Rev. JAMES M'COSH, LL.D., and GEORGE DICKIE, A.M., M.D. Pp. 539. Edinburgh: Thomas Constable & Co.

IN opening this valuable and most suggestive volume, we almost instinctively exclaimed, "Why no preface?" Often before in the history of book-genesis has a prelude been felt to be a desideratum in order to explain an author's purpose. In regard, however, to the prevailing object, with its legitimate issues, of the work of Drs M'Cosh and Dickie, we cannot plead any sense of ambiguity, whatever may be our hesitation as to their success in proving them. These are adequately palpable. In their thorough knowledge of their own views we can have no doubt. Nevertheless, our sense of curiosity—which is supposed to be an important stimulus to all active inquiry—is entirely at fault. We anxiously regret the want of a preface, not as an auxiliary to our comprehension of the book, but as a clue to the distinct apprehension of the respective shares in the authorship.

On the title-page appear two names not unknown to the reading and studious world. The one has for several years been most legitimately associated with arduous and most influential speculation; the other is that of a painstaking and accomplished naturalist. *Where* and *when*, however, either one or other member of this instructive duality distinctly addresses us in this volume,—the fruit of their conjoined efforts,—is in no small measure a mystery. To our ears, the voice that speaks throughout its pages seems to be but one, even in those details of zoological fact where we might naturally expect to hear a second. On the one hand, the minute vigilant observer of facts appears for the time to have had his reflective personality ingeniously swamped in his sympathetic translation into logical form by his cordial fellow-labourer, while, on the other, the logician seems occasionally, in an enthusiastic regard for large, strong inferences, to become in some measure either weary or ashamed of a special definition of fact.

The materials of this most interesting work are arranged in Three Books, in the full course of which the authors, with great ability,—the presiding spirit of which is leavened and sanctified by the presence of an earnest, manly religion,—expound and illustrate the two leading principles of Order and Special Adaptation, which seem to them to run through the structure of the Cosmos.

In the First of these, containing two chapters, their attention is given in five sections to the general character of that Order and Special Adaptation. They announce the structural principles of creation, giving also an analysis of its order; they state the need of such special adjustments as shall promote the kindly action of natural forces, showing, at the same time, that no such element as chance or the casual in act can have any place in such adjustments, and also expounding the obvious and complete character of the special fitness of things.

In the thirteen chapters of Book II. (which, with the exception of the ninth and tenth, are subdivided, so as to present twenty-two sections), their facts, in a co-ordinated series, are explained as indicating, throughout the whole of visible nature, unmistakeable marks of combined order and adaptation.

Starting from the cell—the aboriginal form of life—in plants and animals, the authors speak of its general structure and special modifications; explaining, as next in natural sequence, the traces of Order and Special Fitnesses which are developed in the organs of the plant, with the relation of form and colour in the flower, and the suitableness of vegetable colours to gratify man's natural tastes.

In chapter fourth they enter on that ample domain of safe, yet in some respects perilous, speculation which is embraced by the homologies and homotypes of the vertebrate skeleton, with its special adaptations; and having given, in chapter fifth, their views of the teeth of Vertebrates, under the categories of number, form, and structure, they proceed in the three following chapters to the Mollusca, Articulata, and Radiata, as embodying typical forms, and presenting many interesting special harmonies.

Having thereafter expounded their views of the place and function of nerve, vessel, and muscle in the animal system, and also of the development of organic bodies, as exemplifying a community of plan, with special modifications, their attention is given, in the last three chapters of Book II., to geological organisms, crystals, numerical proportions, and the heavenly bodies, as affording tokens of order and special adjustment.

In the Third Book they interpret their facts, giving, in three chapters, the argument from combined order and adaptation, an explanation of the correspondence between the laws of the material world and the faculties of the human mind, and also a view of the typical systems of nature and revelation.

The reader will thus be made aware of the large store of interesting points and questions, in relation to many most important facts in natural science and vital theological doctrine, which has been amassed and elaborated for his benefit by Drs M'Cosh and Dickie.

Different opinions there will doubtless be among such naturalists as specially delight in hard facts, as to the certainty of some of their instances, while the metaphysician and divine will be tempted to dwell on the want of caution and clearness that occasionally invests the interpretation of the facts with an air and feeling of exaggeration. Of the work as a whole, however, there can be but one candid estimate. Rich in solid fact, shrewd in inference, weighty in cumulative application, and of a healthy and happy spirit, it is deserving of wide circulation and earnest regard.

At the same time, we earnestly trust that in proceeding, in one or two sentences, to indicate one or two difficulties of which we are conscious, both in regard to some of the facts and the manner in which they are scientifically decyphered, we shall not be regarded as captious in spirit, or arrogantly questioning their authors' just privilege and prerogative as public teachers.

With their conviction of creation as the development in *fact* of a divine *plan*, we entirely and without hesitation concur. No man with

his eyes open, unless bewildered by the prejudices of unhallowed passion, can *believe* otherwise. In the testimony of Mr Swainson we earnestly acquiesce, when he remarks, "No one who believes in the existence of an omnipotent Creator can suppose for a moment that the innumerable beings which he has created were formed without a *plan*,"—a plan in regard to the details of which, as exemplified in all animal species, we also entirely concur in using this great naturalist's words: "An animal is beautiful in itself; but it is only when we attain some glimpse of the station it occupies with its fellows, and of the manner in which it is combined with others into one great *whole*, that we see this beauty in its true light."

From the authors of this work, however, we differ, not as to the fact of a plan in the Cosmos, but as to the true method of approaching and discovering that plan.

Shall we avoid the reproach of inaptitude for metaphysics, or of ignorance of structure and collocation, if we modestly suggest to Drs M'Cosh and Dickie that their valid position as witnesses to the final cause of unity in creation is when verifying an attained belief, not in translating a supposition into a proof?

On the one hand, that there is throughout creation a divine oneness of purpose, we freely admit; on the other, we as fully accept the evidence of our consciousness in attestation of our necessary expectation and assumption of an universal unity. *One* in our instinctive self-recognition, we are prepared to meet with unity everywhere. In the active exercise of the unifying tendency of our minds, we look out upon creation as, however characterised by manifold differences, being essentially one in method and end.

In like manner, accordingly, having realised a phenomenon *once*,—for example, the solemn, sweet rising of the new moon,—we have an expectation of its appearance for ever, an expectation in harmony with which, as it needs no proof, but simply correction and verification, we are, in obedience to our mental frame, impelled to seek and wait for the instances of one plan and method of fact everywhere.

We cannot, with all deference to the riper intelligence of our authors, regard unity in creation as an effect of design. We, on the contrary, gratefully welcome it as the natural expression of the divine unity. There is everywhere in creation the stamp of what Coleridge, coining a new word, terms *unicity*; and that, in our view, is but the spontaneous result of the unity of God in all his special adaptations of means to ends; so that as regards the divine ground-plan of the Cosmos, we do not require so much to eluce proofs, as to verify, chasten, and limit our own expectations and beliefs.

And thus, while shrinking from any thing like a dogmatical assertion of our estimate of the scientific judgment of final causes, we cannot but feel that, in verifying an instinctive belief, which is not the same as the inductive confirmation of an inference, we are more likely to exercise due vigilance and restraint of our natural love of theory when called upon to interpret individual facts.

For example, in recalling our own impressions of the different colours in the expanded corolla and long stamens of the *Echium vulgare*, or of the red and blue to be met with occasionally in the *Veronica chamædrys*, we would, in some degree, hesitate before all at once homologating

the following statement, which occurs at the bottom of page 20:—"Seldom or never, for example, are the two primary colours, blue and red, found in the same organ, or in contact with the same plant."

Nor could we all at once find any special adjustment of animal safety in the fact of the young turbot resembling "the same colour as the sand on which it lies," when recalling the other fact, that the common trout (*Salmo fario*), amidst the curves and wimples of the dark-brown streamlet that runs through the moss, assumes a corresponding hue; while, on the contrary, in the more translucent reaches of the same water, its sides become tinged with the most brilliant orange and gold.

Nor, moreover, when remembering the prevailing colours in the genera, *Vulpes*, *Mustela*, and *Martes*, are we prepared all at once to conclude, that, in the similar hues of the red grouse, there is a provision made for its protection against such foes as have, in order to their own livelihood, an instinctive thirst for the flesh of game birds.

Not without considerable hesitation have we made these remarks. Having no difficulties whatever about the general principle of final causes, we at the same time feel a considerable recoil from a too hasty assertion of them. We have, nevertheless, the utmost pleasure in commending this volume to our readers, as entitled, by reason both of its own merits and the high standing of its authors, to their most earnest perusal.

Commentary on the Greek Text of the Epistle to the Colossians.

By JOHN EADIE, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Biblical Literature to the United Presbyterian Church. Griffin: 1856. 8vo. Pp. 308.

WE can scarcely say more in commendation of this commentary of Dr Eadie, than that it is superior to his former one on the Epistle to the Ephesians. There is the same fulness of grammatical investigation, which is rightly regarded as the only satisfactory basis of a sound exegesis; the same attention not only to the leading ideas, but to the fibres of thought in each statement of the text; the same range of scholarship, and the same manly independence of judgment; the same soundness in the faith, and the same glowing diction; the same love of evangelical and experimental Christianity. Mr Ellicott, in his recent valuable philological commentaries on Galatians and Ephesians, while commending the exegetical department of Dr Eadie's "Ephesians," throws out something like an indirect reflection on his grammatical scholarship. We regretted this at the time it appeared. The manipulation of men bred in the cloisters of Cambridge may possibly show an artistic finish which the sad want of academic endowments renders difficult to Scottish students. But in the substantial of grammatical scholarship, and thorough appreciation of the most recent investigations, Dr Eadie's attainments are abundantly manifest in both his commentaries. Our only regret is, that he has to "bespeak indulgence on account of the continuous and absorbing duties of a numerous city charge." That a body which, though far from wealthy, contains members whose wealth would, we had almost said, build and endow a theological college twice over, should, in the present state of

theology, require its professors to hold pastoral charges along with their divinity chairs, is perfectly amazing. We have heard intelligent and devoted members of that body descant on the benefits of this system to the professors themselves. But the only effect of such pleas is to produce a smile. The preservation of the practical element in the minds of divinity professors may surely be otherwise provided for than by putting them on the treadmill of a plurality each of the constituents of which requires a whole man.

The Epistle to the Colossians, like that to the Ephesians, though not distinctively doctrinal and argumentative, like Romans, Galatians, and Hebrews, is yet rich in the expression of the loftiest doctrines and most distinctive principles of Christianity, which, being designed as a preservative from certain subtle and intoxicating errors with which the churches of that region were infested, have all the value, without the form, of polemic statements of divine truth; while its more practical parts have a depth and a richness which have proved meat and drink to myriads of humble Christians.

Dr Eadie's commentary on this epistle contains forty-six pages of full preliminary matter on the "literature" of it, the freshest portion of which is the section on the genuineness of the epistle, in reply to Mayerhoff's posthumous attack on its internal evidence. Dr Davidson, in his Introduction, declines to take these up in detail, as the Tübingen view of the Pauline epistles is "never likely to be adopted by any one in this country." In an Introduction to all the books of the New Testament, this may be right enough; but, in a special Introduction to the Epistle to the Colossians, Dr Eadie has done well to show the feebleness of all the allegations of un-Pauline phraseology which can be adduced against the genuineness of this epistle; and this he has done to good purpose.

Our author has some judicious remarks on the much-disputed questions, What are the errors pointed at in this epistle? are they of Jewish or Gentile origin, or partly both? The predominantly Gentile theory is, in this country, ably espoused by Messrs Conybeare and Howson; the Jewish, by Mr Stanley, in his "Sermons and Essays on the Apostolical Age," though slightly modified in the last edition, in deference to the strong objections of the fore-mentioned gentlemen. Dr Eadie inclines to this latter view,—that the errors in question sprang up with the Jewish converts, who, in the excitable region of Phrygia, meeting with oriental tendencies, both gave and took; but this compound was then only in germ, and the apostle is to be viewed as combating no organised system of error, but only tendencies to that extraordinary school of speculation which a century later threatened to supplant Christianity altogether.

It is not the province of a brief critical notice to take up in detail the criticism and exegesis of a commentary like this. Nor is it easy, by mere quotation, to give a fair specimen of it, as the best passages are too extended for our pages. We can but give fragments of passages. The magnificent statements of the epistle on the Person and Work of Christ are most worthily treated, both in substance and tone. How salutary to students, for example, are the following reflections, on approaching the loftier passages of the first chapter:—

"(Ver. 15.) *Ὁς ἵσταν εἰκλὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου.* 2 Cor. iv. 4. The clause

dazzles by its brightness, and awes by its mystery. We feel the warning—'Draw not nigh hither, for the place is holy ground.' One trembles to subject such a declaration to the scrutiny of human reason, and feels as if he were rudely profaning it by the appliances of earthly erudition. . . . We must worship whilst we construe; and our exegesis must be penetrated by a profound devotion."—(P. 43.)

There is a little indefiniteness in the expression of Christ's Sonship in the exposition of the clause, "Son of his love" (verse 13); and what it does not mean, in opposition to two unwarranted deductions from the words, is made more evident than the positive sense of the term Son, as applied to Christ, so far as Scripture gives light on the subject. But that it expresses an essential relation seems implied in our author's language. We entirely agree with him, however, in his interpretation of the next clause, "the image of the invisible God," as relating to the mediatorial manifestation of God by his Son, as "the Angel of his presence" (מַלְאָכִי הַפְּרִיט) in creation, in his dealings with the Church before his incarnation, and especially in redemption:—

"In his incarnate state he brought God so near us as to place him under the cognisance of our very senses—men saw, and heard, and handled him—a speaking, acting, weeping, and suffering God; he was, as Basil terms it, *εἰκὼν ζῶσα*,* a living image. He held out an image of God in the love he displayed, which was too tender and fervent, too noble and self-denying, to have had its home in any created bosom,—in the power he put forth, which was too vast to be lodged in other than a divine arm,—and also in his wisdom and holiness, and in those blessed results which sprang from his presence. When he moved on the surface of the billows, did not the disciples see a realization of the unapproachable prerogative of Him 'who treadeth upon the waves of the sea?' When the crested waves were hushed into quiet, as he looked out upon the storm and spoke to it, his fellow-voyagers felt that they had heard the voice of Divinity. When the dead were evoked by his touch and word from their slumbers, the spectators beheld the energy and prerogative of Him who says of himself, 'I kill, and I make alive; I wound, and I heal.' When the hungry were satisfied with an immediate banquet in the desert, the abundance proved the presence of the Lord of the seasons, who, in the process of vegetation, multiplies the seed cast into the furrow, 'in some thirty, in some sixty, and in some an hundred fold.' In those daily miracles of healing, was there not manifest the soft and effective hand of Him who is 'abundant in goodness?' and in those words of wondrous penetration which touched the heart of the auditor, was there not an irresistible demonstration of the divine omniscience? Still, too, at the right hand of the Majesty on high, is he the visible administrator and object of worship. Thus, 'the Son of his love' is a visible image of the invisible Father, not the 'copy of an image,'†—distinct from him, and yet so like him, making God in all his glorious fulness apparent to us,—showing us in himself and his works the bright contour and likeness of the invisible Jehovah. This glory is not merely official, but it is also essential,—not won, but possessed from eternity. Oh the grandeur of that redemption of which he is the author, and the magnificence of that kingdom of which he is the head!"—(Pp. 45, 46.)

Our author is very happy in his amplifications of those brief but pregnant clauses of the text, whose mighty sense is apt to escape us from their extreme terseness. Thus:—

"(Ver. 16.) "Οτι ἡ αὐτοῦ ἐκτίσθη τὰ πάντα, τὰ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, ("For by him were created all things, both which are in heaven

* Contra Eunom., p. 28.

† Παράδειγμα σικόνος, Epiphanius, Haeres. lxxv. See also Dorner, *Lehre von der Person Christi*, &c. Berlin, 1852.

and which are on earth.") The phrase, τὰ πάντα, means 'the all,'—the universe, the whole that exists.—*Winer*, § xvii. 4. The aorist characterises creation as a past and perfect work. Creation is here in the fullest and most unqualified sense ascribed to Christ, and the doctrine is in perfect harmony with the theology of the beloved disciple, John i. 3. The work of the six days displayed vast creative energy, but it was to a great extent the inbringing of furniture and population to a planet already made and in diurnal revolution, for it comprehended the formation of a balanced atmosphere, the enclosure of the ocean within proper limits, the clothing of the soil with verdure, shrubs, trees, and cereal grasses,—the exhibition of sun, moon, and stars, as lights in the firmament,—the introduction of bird, beast, reptile, and fish, into their appropriate haunts and elements,—and the organization and endowment of man, with Eden for his heritage, and the world for his home. But this demiurgical process implied the previous exercise of divine omnipotence, for 'in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.' It is not, therefore, the wise and tasteful arrangement of pre-existent materials, or the reduction of chaos to order, beauty, and life, which is here ascribed to Jesus, but the summoning of universal nature into original existence. What had no being before was brought into being by him. The universe was not till he commanded it to be. 'He spake and it was done.' Every form of matter and life owes its origin to the Son of God, no matter in what sphere it may be found, or with what qualities it may be invested. 'In heaven or on earth.' Christ's creative work was no local or limited operation; it was not bounded by this little orb; its sweep surrounds the universe, which is named in Jewish diction, and according to a natural division, 'heaven and earth.' Every form and kind of matter, simple or complex—the atom and the star—the sun and the clod,—every grade of life from the worm to the angel,—every order of intellect and being around and above us,—the splendours of heaven and the nearer phenonema of earth, are the product of the First-Born. τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ τὰ ἀόρατα—'The visible and the invisible.' This distinction seems to have been common in the Eastern philosophy: the latter epithet being referred to the abode of angels and blessed spirits. The meaning is greatly lowered by some of the Greek fathers, who thought the term was applicable to the souls of men, and by not a few of the moderns, who include under it the souls of the dead. The meaning is, what exists within the reach of vision, and what exists beyond it. The object of which the eye can take cognisance, and the glory which 'eye hath not seen,' are equally the 'handiwork' of Jesus. The assertion is true, not only in reference to the limited conceptions of the universe current in the apostle's days, but true in the widest sense. The visible portion of the creation consisting of some myriads of stars, is but a mere section or stratum of the great fabric. In proportion as power is given to the telescopic glass, are new bodies brought into view. Nothing like a limit to creation can be described. The farther we penetrate into space, the luminaries are neither dimmer nor scarcer, but worlds of singular beauty and variety burst upon us, and the distant star-dust is found to consist of orbs so dense and crowded as to appear one blended mass of sparkling radiance. Rays of light from the remotest nebulae must have been two millions of years on their inconceivably swift journey to our world. The nearest fixed star is twenty-one billions of miles from us, so that between it and us there is room in one straight line for 12,000 solar systems, each as large as our own. From the seraph that burns nearest the throne, through the innumerable suns and planets which are so thickly strewn in the firmament, and outwards to the unseen orbs which sentinel the verge of space—all is the result of Christ's omnipotence and love."—(Pp. 52–54.)

We could like to have given more of the admirable passages in which the work abounds; as also to illustrate certain features of the criticism which we think worthy of commendation—such as the resistance to that flat system which resolves those heaps of concurrent

substantives, which form so marked a feature in the Pauline style, into a jejune *hendiadys*; for example, "the word of the truth of the Gospel," to which belong such phrases as "the grace of God in truth," "your love in the Spirit." But we must devote our little remaining space to one or two small points of exception.

In the criticism and exegesis there is very little to which we should object. On the relation between *circumcision* and *baptism* in chap. ii. 12, we think there is more than "a close connection, the spiritual blessing symbolised by both being of a spiritual nature."—(P. 153.) When the author adds that "*probably* it would be straining this connection to allege it as a *proof* that baptism has been, *in all points*, ordained for the church in room of circumcision," there is that vagueness in the words which we have printed in italics, which leaves one in doubt whether at all, or at least in what respect and with what firmness, he regards the one ordinance as the analogue of the other.

The observations on the "image of God," to which believers are renewed (chap. iii. 11), in opposition to Julius Müller, lack that breadth of argumentation and clearness of statement which characterise the work generally, though we agree with the author's views.

There is a note, p. 227, in reply to a view of Dr Donaldson's, in his disgusting work published last year under the title of "Jashar," which we must at least query. While we utterly repudiate Dr Donaldson's interpretation of ἀπεκδυσάμενος (chap. ii. 15), we cannot agree with his opponent, Mr Perowne, that it is "sheer nonsense," and we greatly doubt the validity of Dr Eadie's reply to it, that God, and not Christ, is the subject of the verb, as, in his commentary on the place, he maintains that He is also to the two following verbs; in other words, that it was God, not Christ, who "spoiled principalities and powers," who "made a show of them openly," and who "triumphed over them in it," (the cross). No doubt, it is God who is the subject of the actions mentioned in the two preceding verses. But other instances of a change from the one divine agent to the other, where the action is sufficient to determine to which it is to be referred, are to be found in the writings of Paul. So that this argument is scarcely sufficient to hang any thing upon, and certainly it is not required in answer to Dr Donaldson's criticism.—On the word *πράξης*, in its biblical sense, we agree with Trench and Ellicott rather than with our author.

We observe that there is in this commentary less of what some critics on the former work remarked on as too superabundant a display of learning. Perhaps there may be still some room for improvement in this particular, though it is needless to do more than call the author's attention to it. As to the language, while it has a rich copiousness and a glowing eloquence, it in a few instances degenerates into turgidity. Thus, in one paragraph the author speaks of angels "mourning over the tarnished brightness of their lost and *exiled natures*, placed in a *jeopardous crisis*, the flashing majesty of the throne *stilling the pulse of the universe*, or *causing it to throb in subdued and solemn alarm*" (pp. 75, 76); in another place, of "the spirit *dying in delirious agony* by too much of heaven coming in upon it on earth" (p. 98); in another, of the apostle's anxiety that the churches should not be "*shivered into repellent fragments*."—(P. 110). He speaks of the

Christian's *emigration* from guilt (p. 40); of the apostle's earnest *exhortitude* (p. 107); and by a most disagreeable misuse of the ordinary sense of the term, he speaks of "the Logos yet *unfleshed*," for unincarnate. An occasional Scotticism may be observed, as *would* for *should*.—(P. 49, second paragraph, line 2.) But these are things which, in the energy and fluency of the author's pen, have only escaped here and there, and would be pruned away, we have no doubt, had he occasion to revise the work.

On the whole, we have no hesitation in saying that, for full criticism and interpretation, as a repository of the views of nearly all critical interpreters, ancient and modern, on the text of this precious Epistle, as well as for sound judgment of his own, for felicitous amplification, evangelic expression, and devout illustration of the sense thus patiently ascertained, this is, for critical students, the best commentary on the Colossians in our language.

The Whole Works of Dr Owen. Complete in 24 vols. Edinburgh: Johnstone & Hunter.

THIS great work is now finished, being fully completed in all its parts. The Miscellaneous Works of Dr Owen were published several years ago in sixteen volumes, and we have now eight volumes more, containing the whole of his Exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews in seven volumes, and an additional volume containing the Theologoumena and some sermons and notes of sermons not before published. We have thus a very correct and a very handsome edition of the whole works of one of our greatest theologians put within our reach at a very reasonable price. The price of the whole twenty-four volumes is £6, 10s., just about five shillings a volume. And what a treasure does the pastor—or the student of theology, whether he be a pastor or not, at present or in prospect—get for this small outlay? A perfect library and storehouse of doctrinal and practical theology, the whole products of one of the strongest, soundest, and best furnished minds, and of one of the most deeply exercised and thoroughly sanctified hearts, that God has ever given to his church for its instruction and edification. Such, certainly, was Dr Owen, and God in giving such a man to the church, and in so guiding the course of events in providence as to lead him to write much and to write upon a great variety of most important subjects, intended, no doubt, to confer through him important benefits upon a succession of generations. These benefits have now been placed much more fully within the reach of Christian ministers than ever they have been before; and we hope and trust that this, through God's blessing, may contribute to promote the interests of sound doctrine and of earnest piety. Johnstone & Hunter's edition of this great theological classic has throughout, and in all respects, been admirably executed. The life of Dr Owen in the first volume, by Dr Andrew Thomson, is an able, judicious, and elegant memoir, peculiarly well fitted to introduce Dr Owen to the notice of the men of the present day, and to assist them in forming a right estimate of him, and of the value of his works. The editorial department, in the hands of Dr Goold, has been all along conducted in a very superior and most creditable way. Dr Goold, by his ability and scholarship, is thoroughly competent for this

work, and indeed for work of a much higher description. The editing of the seven volumes of the Exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrews has afforded an opportunity of calling forth more fully his learning and scholarship. This is, in some respects, the most valuable and important of all Owen's works; but it is also perhaps the one of which a modern edition would most need something in the way of supplement and correction. There is no department of theological literature which has received greater improvements in modern times than exegesis, viewed as including both the settlement of the true text of Scripture,—a subject to which many now-a-days restrict the term biblical criticism,—and also the exact interpretation of scriptural statements. In saying that this department has received considerable improvements in modern times, we do not of course mean that any great discoveries have been made and established, either as to the text or the interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures. The actual results of any additional information and research that have in modern times been brought to bear upon these subjects, have not produced any change in the doctrines which a right use of Scripture should lead men to adopt. We believe that the whole system of doctrine which Dr Owen so ably defended has not only not been shaken in its scriptural evidence by modern improvements in the department of the criticism and interpretation of Scripture, but has been more firmly established by them. The improvements, consequently, to which we refer are, comparatively speaking, unimportant, though it is not on this account the less *obligatory* that they should be known and attended to. It is our duty to ascertain as accurately and as certainly as we can even the minutiae bearing upon the true reading and the exact meaning of every portion of the inspired Word of God. And there can be no doubt that since Dr Owen's time, materials have been provided which throw a good deal of additional light and certainty upon these points. Dr Gould, in notes, brief, indeed, but numerous and useful, has shown his familiarity with these materials, and has applied them to excellent purpose in supplementing and correcting Dr Owen's statements on the details of exegesis. We would only again commend, in the strongest terms, this great work to the attention of all who are interested in theological study, and in the prosperity of the Church of Christ. We would heartily rejoice to see permanent arrangements made for putting every student of theology in possession of a copy of this great treasure; and we have no doubt that the publishers would deal in a liberal spirit with any proposals directed to this object.

THE notice of the German theological and ecclesiastical journals has been unavoidably postponed, as have also several critical notices of works recently published in this country. We intended, but have found it impracticable, to republish, from the *Christian Review*, the leading organ of the American Baptists, a highly laudatory notice of that remarkable and very promising book, Bayne's "Christian Life," which has been republished in the United States.

BRITISH AND FOREIGN EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

JULY, 1856.

- ART. I.—1. *Lectures on Certain Difficulties felt by Anglicans in Submitting to the Catholic Church.* By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, Priest of the Oratory of St Philip Neri. London: 1850. Pp. 325.
2. *Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England, Addressed to the Brothers of the Oratory.* By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, D.D., Priest of the Congregation of St Philip Neri. London: 1851. Pp. 388.
3. *The Contest with Rome: A Charge to the Clergy of the Arch-deaconry of Lewes, delivered at the Ordinary Visitation in 1851, with Notes especially in Answer to Dr Newman's recent Lectures.* By JULIUS CHARLES HARE, M.A.

“CAN it indeed be, that such men as Dr Newman and his fellow-apostates from the Church of England, can really, with open eyes, and through the force of honest conviction, have joined the communion of Rome? Is their so-called conversion a reality, or merely some deep and subtle deception of the enemy? Have they been indeed the victims of some strange and wildering infatuation; or have they not rather been, from the first, Jesuits in disguise, and now only thrown off the mask when the plot was ripe, and the fell work of secret treachery had been effectually done? Is it to be believed that at this day, and here in England, there *can* be *bona fide* converts, by conviction, to an illiberal and childish superstition, the adherents of which, all the world knows, are the one half conscious deceivers, and the other blind besotted dupes? That these—at least some of

them—are not weak men, we know full well; it is very hard, in all the circumstances of the case, and with all the facts before us, to avoid attributing to them a far graver character, and a darker name.”—Such are the thoughts which have been working in the minds of many during these few years past, and which have ever and anon been finding utterance more or less in the free intercourse of daily life. They are only the rough expression of a problem which we imagine has been, at the same time, exercising the thoughts of many a deeper and more searching mind. The phenomenon in question forms a difficulty, not only to the superficial mind of the ordinary Protestant world, but to the most profound and earnest thinkers. The very wildness of the suggested explanation,—an explanation which every one who knows any thing of the history of the persons in question knows to be utterly untenable,—only shows the more strikingly the deep mystery that hangs around a question, of which no more tangible and plausible an account can easily be given. That such men,—some of them of high intellectual gifts, earnest spirit, and rich and varied learning,—several of them occupying influential and dignified positions in the church,—men too of very various natural tendency and cast of mind, some theoretic and speculative, some practical, some contemplative,—should, one by one, after long pondering, and through the force, apparently, of a gradual and ever-growing conviction, have been brought, at the sacrifice of all, to quit the pale of the Reformation, and throw themselves into the arms of the mediæval apostasy, is surely, with our current views of Romanism and Protestantism, a phenomenon as startling as it is ominous and grave. Nor does the mere fact of the secessions referred to express the full amount of the difficulty in question. *These men have left us, and they have not returned.* They have entered the Roman pale, and they remain in it. They have sought rest and satisfaction within her bosom; and that rest they have, or at least dream that they have, found. The reaction so confidently predicted by their quondam associates and friends as likely to result from a personal discovery of the hollowness of the system they have embraced, has not as yet taken place; nor have they betrayed by word or act the faintest sign either of uneasiness or disappointment. The charm which originally bewitched them, whatever it may have been, still retains its power; the fond dream remains unbroken. Of those hundreds who, one by one, have passed before our eyes through the gates of the seven-hilled city, scarce one has as yet returned to tell of the abominations he has seen within; only now and then has one been seen, not flying in horror from the infected ground, but standing aloft on some high tower on the walls, and with bright, triumphant

smile, beckoning to former friends to follow him to the same bright "land of angels, saints, and martyrs." It seems certain, then, in point of fact, that here in England, in the noontide of the nineteenth century, amid all the lights of philosophy and science, and from among the ranks of highly cultured and earnest men, there may be, and there are, converts, by conviction, to the Church of Rome. This is the problem which we are now compelled to look in the face, and, if possible, to explain.

The question now before us is one, it will be seen, essentially distinct from a kindred topic discussed in these pages some time ago.* The problem then in hand might be thus briefly stated:—Given, the Anglo-Catholic system of the Oxford tracts fully developed and grown to seed, to demonstrate the inevitable transition in the case of earnest and thorough-going minds to Romanism proper. The solution of that problem was comparatively an easy matter. Let a man once fairly renounce the Bible as the one final standard of truth, and substitute a vague, indefinite rule, half Scripture and half tradition, in its place; let him renounce private judgment and embrace authority as the divine interpreter and judge in matters of faith; let him barter the moral and spiritual power of the Word and Spirit of God for the magical influence of sacramental grace, and his transition to the full mediæval system is not so much a matter of irresistible tendency merely, as of stern and invincible logic. He has already embraced the very essence of a system which has never yet been fully realised on earth, and never can be, save in that communion toward which he is manifestly tending, and on the very threshold of which he even now stands. Our business, however, at present, is with a previous and far more difficult question—Whence the Anglo-Catholic system itself? Given, the previously existing state of the Protestant world, together with its antecedent history since the Reformation, to explain the rise and rapid development in the very heart of it, and at this particular time, of a system identical in spirit and in principle with Rome, and in its consequences inevitably leading to it. To the solution of this problem we can only hope to offer a very small contribution; there are, however, certain circumstances to which we can point our hand, which we cannot but think do shed important light on the matter, and which must enter more or less into any full and adequate explanation of it. These are connected with the general state of Protestantism, with the Church of England in particular, with the prevailing tendencies of theological speculation in our time, and with certain weaknesses and defects in the current evangelical systems. We shall glance at each of these with as much brevity as the subject will admit of.

* "*Oxford and Rome,*" &c., vol. ii., p. 894.

I. As to the GENERAL STATE OF PROTESTANTISM, its main element of weakness, as an effective antagonist to the aggressive efforts of Romanism, it is not difficult to see. That weakness lies in its want of internal coherence and organic unity. It is essentially more or less loosely compacted and fragmentary. It is rather an aggregate of disjointed members, than one indivisible and organic whole. From the nature of the case this must be so. Its very fundamental principle,—the right of private judgment, and the supremacy of the free conscience over all the dogmata of authority and prescriptions of human ordinances,—necessarily issues, in the present state of human nature, in a certain amount of denominational diversity, even amid essential unity. Where there is freedom of thought, there will and must be a diversity of judgment, and consequent divergence in action. It may, indeed, be a question, *to what extent* such difference is unavoidable. In particular, it admits of serious doubt, whether the present actual amount of difference among the various sections of the Reformation Church—the present medley of contending sects and parties—is to be regarded as its normal state, and inherent in the very conditions of its existence. For ourselves we are disposed to cling to a better hope. We sanguinely anticipate a time when, through the clearer and more commanding realization of great fundamental principles of faith and discipline, and the due subordination of lesser points of detail, the various branches of the great evangelic body shall, to a far greater extent than now, see eye to eye, and gradually coalescing into far fewer and larger masses, present at once to the world a more impressive image of Christian unity, and to the common enemy a more compact and unbroken front. Even at the best, however, a certain and even large amount of difference and division is, in the present state at least, inevitable. The law of the kingdom of God, alike in its reformation state as in its primitive and apostolic, is unity in diversity, not uniformity by the suppression of all difference; and such, we believe, will continue to be the condition of its existence more or less to the close of its militant state. Her great strength lies, not in a unity of organization, but in a unity of faith and life. This circumstance, however, while in one respect her strength and glory, infers in another point of view a certain disadvantage in the contest with her ever-watchful and aggressive enemy. It imparts a certain weakness both for aggression and defence. Such a loosely-compacted body at once less easily combines its strength for action, and more easily falls asunder within itself. It has less concentration in assault, and less consolidation in resistance. It may be likened to the comparatively loose array of an allied army drawn together by the urgency of a great

crisis, and held together by the force of a momentous common cause, when set against the solid and concentrated strength of a single giant power. Such an army, fired with high enthusiasm, and sustained by the might of a great principle, may prove invincible for the moment; and in a single battle, or a brief campaign, the power of mind vindicates its supremacy over the brute force of legions. But in a lingering warfare its effective strength becomes less and less. The crisis and the cause were the very breath of its life; and as the power of these dies away, its strength departs, and disorganization and dissolution supervene. Sectional differences and jealousies arise; mutual confidence and unity of action are destroyed; it is no more an army, but a crowd. Meanwhile the adverse power slowly but surely rallies and concentrates its force, and prepares for a fresh and now irresistible advance. So it is, in like manner, that while Protestantism is invincible in a crisis, Romanism profits by time and by delay. The strength of the one is in the storm, of the other in the calm. Romanism can afford to wait. It can bide its time. It can yield to-day, that it may the more surely advance to-morrow. It can bend before the blast, that it may lift up its head again when the storm is over. It is of this generation, and the next, and the next; and the points it has been compelled to surrender to-day, it may seize again uncontested in the days of our children or our children's children. Protestantism, on the other hand, is impulsive and explosive. Its combined action is spasmodic, not constant. Now, at the loud call of God and of events, it arises in its strength, and shakes itself, and the armies of the aliens flee before it; and then anon it becomes quiescent and goes to sleep again. So was it of old in the great contest between the vast Persian despotism on the one hand, and the free states of Greece on the other. In quiet times the solid mass and concentrated energy of the great barbaric power advanced steadily onward; one by one the outlying settlements of the Hellenic race and the free cities succumbed beneath its power; and still with irresistible might it moved forward, nearer and nearer, to the central and sacred citadel of freedom itself. Meanwhile the parent states were at war among themselves; endless jealousies and rivalries held them asunder; Sparta strove with Athens, and Athens with Sparta. Thus the whole nation was dissolved into its elements, and seemed rather a multitude of separate tribes than one free and mighty people; till all at once, at the sound of the invaders' footsteps on their own common soil, the whole of the Hellenic race arose as from the dead, and were as one man, and the glories of Marathon and of Salamis remain to tell to all time how mighty in the hour of crisis is the power of mind over the mere brute force of numbers and of external,

mechanical organization. Such, we believe, is substantially the relation in which Protestantism stands, and must ever stand, towards the great Roman power. The strength of the one lies in organic unity, the other in free thought. The one prevails through its agencies, the other through its principles. The one deals subtly with the individual, the other appeals openly to the common reason and common conscience. The one advances stealthily and in secret, the other courts a fair fight and an open field. The one, in fine, thrives best in the calm, the other in the storm. It was, therefore, *a priori*, most probable that Romanism would recover in course of time much of the ground it had lost during the great Reformation struggle; and in particular, in the course of a long peace of nearly two hundred years, its revival might be regarded, humanly speaking, as a question simply of place and of time. As the strength of Protestantism lies in its principles, without which it is weakness itself, it was inevitable that those points where those principles were but feebly held or practically denied, should in time give way before the concentrated assaults of the great antagonist power. They become, so to speak, in a military point of view, untenable. Romanism, it should never be forgotten, has its own peculiar elements of strength, and these must ever prove irresistible when not met by antagonist principles mightier still. What has happened, then, in our day is nothing more than might beforehand have been predicted as probable; nor has it come a moment sooner than might have been expected. Indeed, but for the deep torpor of the eighteenth century, adjourning all serious religious questions, and the intense national antipathy which, till a few years back, refused the agents of Rome even a hearing on English ground, the portentous phenomenon which has startled our age might have come several generations sooner.

Hitherto we have been speaking of the advantage which the organic unity of the Roman system gives for combined, concentrated action; but it must be remembered, also, that the very *spectacle* of such a unity, considered in itself, has a powerful, almost irresistible fascination for some minds. Tossed on a sea of doubt, and distracted amid the strife of conflicting parties and creeds, and with no sure personal grounding on the immutable rock of truth, men even of keen speculative intellect, but of feeble moral strength, will naturally feel powerfully the attraction of a system holding out the prospect of perfect unity and absolute certainty,—of a quiet asylum, on whose very threshold all doubt shall end, and the din of controversy die away, and may thus be willing to escape from the perplexities of their own reason in the abnegation of all reason at the foot of a blind unquestioning authority. Such

has been the course of many an earnest, and in some respects gifted spirit, in our day; and such, doubtless, will be the course of many another, as this great struggle proceeds.

II. If the Protestant body, as a whole, is deficient in organic unity and compact coherence, the CHURCH OF ENGLAND in particular is scarcely less so. It is scarcely more at one with itself, than the most diverse actions of evangelic Protestantism are among each other. Nominally one, it is in reality many. We do not now refer alone to that which is so palpable to every one, in the strife of parties, and the extreme diversity of opinions and views tolerated within her pale; but to the total absence of any central and controlling power, or any one pervading and binding principle, in its constitution and frame-work. It is rather, in fact, an assemblage of distinct and independent powers and agencies, bound together by an artificial tie, than one corporate and living whole. Without any proper head of life and action, without proper subordination of members, without any power of united action, either deliberative or executive, it obviously cannot, in any strict sense, be said to possess either corporate existence or organic life. It has, indeed, a nominal head of authority and administration; and the form, at least, of a great representative assembly. But the convocation is as yet but a ghost of the past, and the primacy of all England little more than a name. The metropolitan seat of Canterbury is a pre-eminence rather of dignity and precedence merely, than of real authority,—the mere impersonation of the majesty of the church, rather than the central and influential organ of its activity. Beyond the limits of his own diocese, where he executes the usual functions of an ordinary, the actual authority of the metropolitan is in a great degree nominal. Each diocese forms by itself a separate unity, and the suffragan bishop reigns within his own domain in practical independence of his canonical superior. Within this narrower sphere, again, the same practical disorganization prevails. The diocese, secure from external control, presents within its own borders the same medley of separate powers. The bishop, the dean and chapter, the episcopal courts, the incumbents, and patrons of each parish, each move at large in their prescribed sphere, and discharge their statutory functions, apart from, and independent of, each other. The episcopal function itself is in large measure a matter of pageantry and form. Limited on every side by statute law, hedged around by separate and independent powers, with little discretionary authority of any kind, without any means of gathering the effective energies of the diocese into one, and wielding its manifold agencies toward any one definite purpose, the bishop's power is confined, in great measure, to the

moral influence of his position, and his labours are mainly limited to a stately routine. For the rest, things take their course, and the diocese governs itself.

Thus from age to age the vast and complex machine goes on, not through the impelling force of any one moving power, but by the separate action of the individual and co-ordinate parts. The life is in the members, rather than in the body as a whole. The bishops perform their visitations, hold ordinations, confirm children, deliver charges, consecrate churches, license curates and institute incumbents, preside at public meetings, patronise societies, sit in parliament. Deans and chapters hold their statutory courts, manage or mismanage cathedral trusts, execute *cong   d'elire*, and chant the choral service. The universities assemble their convocations, and grant degrees, and send forth from all their colleges their annual streams, either of fervent Evangelism or rampant Puseyism, or latitudinarian laxity, or mere lifeless inanity, as the case may be, without let or hinderance from any quarter. The ecclesiastical courts drag on from year to year their drowsy existence, unnoticed and unregarded by the world at large, save when now and then some notable case disturbs the dust of Doctors' Commons, and the din of it rings from the Bishops' Court to the Arches, and from the Arches to the Privy Council, till its echoes die away amid the dingy courts and halls of the Exchequer and Queen's Bench. The great societies hold their anniversaries, adopt their reports, pass resolutions, and circulate their vital agencies throughout the world, while bishops and archbishops sit the while simply as members. In fact, each individual parish is in great measure a separate principality, and the character of the Church's ministrations in any place depends far more on the will of the irresponsible patron, or the fortunes of the auction room, than on the united power of the whole episcopate, the whole clergy, and the whole public opinion of the Church, put together. And such is the strange, complex, unwieldy, unmanageable abstraction called by a certain laxity of language the Church of England.

Now we do not for a moment deny that this state of things has its own peculiar and very important advantages. In particular, it secures to the individual the largest amount of personal liberty of thought and action compatible with any degree of church organization. It shuts out irresponsible power. It precludes undue centralization. It renders an oppressive and stifling despotism impossible. Men have free air to breathe, and full scope and liberty to do their duty, if they have any mind to do it, as in God's sight, and answerable alone to him. Above all, it is an all-sufficient recommendation to the practical English mind, that, on the whole, it works well. With much waste, much abuse, and many anomalies, still the Church of

England as she is, has been and is the source of an untold amount of good. She has been, he knows, the main bulwark and glory of the Reformation, and has conferred more blessings on England and the world than any one other institution; and therefore with all her faults he loves her still. There are, besides, many minds of deep philosophic cast, who, resting far less faith in abstract theories of perfection, whether in church or state, than on what has actually grown up and become a living existence among men, are disposed to acquiesce in the present state of things, just because it is, and has been, and so has come to form almost a part of the national and religious life of the people.* They would not, indeed, defend any thing which was distinctly wrong in itself, or deprecate the cautious and gradual removal of proved abuses and defects;—still they would hold it as no sufficient objection to the system as a whole, provided it manifested real life and energy for good, and in large measure fulfilled its end, merely that it was irreconcilable with any abstract theory of perfection. There are others, however, who cannot be thus satisfied. At once of a fervent spirit and of a theoretic cast of mind, their very element is a theoretic perfection. They are votaries of an ideal. Hence, that which they fondly seek in the Church of England is precisely that in which the Church of England is most glaringly wanting. She realises no theory. She satisfies no ideal. She sets at defiance all abstract principles of fitness and perfection. She abounds with anomalies and contradictions of all kinds, which at once baffle theory and stagger common sense. Bishops invested in theory with almost unlimited authority, yet in practice shorn almost of all real power; deans and chapters gathered in solemn assembly to “elect another bishop in the Church of God,” yet bound under the heaviest penalties of law to elect only one; the faithful solemnly summoned in the public congregation to offer objections, if they have any, to the confirmation of the bishop-elect, yet debarred by all the terrors of a *premunire* from uttering a word; convocations assembling only to look at each other, and then dissolve; the Church defined to be a “congregation of faithful people,” yet in practice identical with the British nation; solemn and affecting rites, from their very language manifestly belonging only to those who die in the faith, yet the vested right of every English subject;—these, and other such like anomalies and contradictions, not only form a terrible stumbling-block to the class of minds we are now referring to, but impart to the whole system to which they belong a certain aspect of hollowness and unreality in deep dissonance with the earnest and searching spirit of the age. Men of theory, men of scrupulous conscience, men of strong bias toward general principles, and

* E. g., Archdeacon Hare and his class.

men simply breathing the pervading spirit of the time, which clamorously demands that things shall be what they seem and answer to their names, are alike staggered by it. No wonder, then, that some ardent spirits, thus baulked of their fond ideal, should be tempted to seek the realization of their hopes elsewhere, and be fain, at last, in the very desperation of disappointment, to bow almost before any system which should seem to be in harmony with itself, and which they can at least believe in as a reality, and not a mere shadow and make-believe.

It is, in fact, the peculiar infelicity of the Church of England that she awakens expectations which she does not satisfy. She is not what she at first sight seems. She contradicts her own ideal. In theory she is one thing; in fact another. Presenting to the eye and to the imagination all the aspect of a complete and imposing hierarchic system, in reality she is a loose and incoherent mass. Apparently the most completely organised of all the Reformed Churches, in point of fact she is the least so. In name and in idea she is a body; in practice she is but a congeries of disjointed members. Her parts, instead of fitting into and living in each other, each separately hangs by and lives in the state. Their functions are regulated not so much by their place in the body and their living relation to the other members, as by the mere force of legal obligation and statute law. In fact, if a real, it can scarcely be said to have any *distinct* existence at all. She is part and parcel of the constitution and law of the land, and moves forward and rests with that vast and complicated machine of which she forms a part. She has thus no mind, no will, no independent action of her own,—scarcely even the semblance of organic life apart from that general system, half civil, half ecclesiastical, to which she belongs, and on which all her functions and agencies depend. We have, in short, not so much a church and a state, as one indivisible constitution in church and state; and the altar and the throne are but the two crowning towers of one ancient, venerable, and undivided pile.

It was, accordingly, not without a portion of truth, though with something also of the exaggeration of personal disappointment, that Dr Newman wrote the following strong and almost bitter words. We quoted in a former paper a few sentences of the same passage, but we now give it entire, for the sake of the connection:—

“We must not indulge our imagination in the view we take of the National Establishment. If we dress it up in an ideal form, as if it were something real, with an independent and a continuous existence, and a proper history, as if it were indeed, and not only in name a church, then indeed we may feel interest in it, and reverence towards it, and affec-

tion for it, as men have fallen in love with pictures, or knights in romance do battle for high dames whom they have never seen. Thus it is that students of the fathers, antiquarians, and poets, begin by assuming that the body to which they belong is that of which they read in times past, and then proceed to decorate it with that majesty and beauty of which history tells, or which their genius creates. Nor is it an easy process or a light effort by which their minds are disabused of this error. It is an error, for many reasons, too dear to them to be readily relinquished. But at length, either the force of circumstances or some unexpected accident dissipates it; and, as in fairy tales, the magic castle vanishes when the spell is broken, and nothing is seen but the wild heath, the barren rock, and the forlorn sheep-walk: so is it with us as regards the Church of England, when we look in amazement on that we thought so unearthly, and find so commonplace or worthless. Then we perceive that aforetime we have not been guided by reason; but biassed by education, and swayed by affection. We see in the English Church, I will not merely say no descent from the first ages, and no relationship to the Church in other lands, but we see no body politic of any kind; we see nothing more or less than an establishment, a department of government, or a function or operation of the state,—without a substance,—a mere collection of officials, depending on, and living in the supreme civil power. Its unity and personality are gone, and with them its power of exciting feelings of any kind. . . . We regard it neither with anger, nor with aversion, nor with contempt, any more than with respect or interest. It is but one aspect of the state, or mode of civil government; it is responsible for nothing; it can appropriate neither praise nor blame; but, whatever feeling it raises, is, by the nature of the case, to be referred to the supreme power whom it represents, and whose will is its breath. And hence it has no identity of existence in distinct periods, unless the present legislature or court can affect to be the offspring and disciple of its predecessor. Nor can it, in consequence, be said to have any antecedents, or any future; or to live, except in the passing moment. As a thing without a soul, it does not contemplate itself, define its intrinsic constitution, or ascertain its position. It has no traditions; it cannot be said to think; it does not know what it holds, and what it does not; it is not even conscious of its own existence. It has no love for its members, or what are sometimes called its children, nor any instinct whatever, unless attachment to its master, or love of its place, may be so called. Its fruits, as far as they are good, are to be made much of while they are present; for they are transient, and without succession. Its former champions of orthodoxy are no earnest of orthodoxy now; they died, and there was no reason why they should be reproduced. Bishop is not like bishop, more than king is like king, or ministry like ministry; its Prayer-Book is an act of Parliament of two centuries ago, and its cathedrals and its chapter-houses are the spoils of Catholicism.” *

We repeat, there is a manifest and extreme exaggeration both of thought and feeling in the above representation. It

* Lectures to Anglicans, &c., pp. 6-8.

is a caricature, not a picture; the produce at once of imbittered feeling, and of a mind strongly prone to half truths and broad rhetorical effects. There is manifestly much serious and sober truth in what he says, but as plainly immensely less than what he represents. It is an obvious mis-statement, to say that the very existence and substantive being of the Church of England is merged in the civil government; that she is a department of state, like the Woods and Forests, or the Committee of Council on Education. It is incorporated *with* the state, not absorbed *in* it. It is itself a real and distinct power in the constitution; a power co-ordinate with, and influentially not inferior to, the civil administration with which it is bound up,—insomuch that it were almost as correct to say, that the state is a department of the church, as that the church is a department of the state. Neither is a department or function or creature of the other, but both alike are essential elements of one semi-civil and semi-ecclesiastical constitution, in which the various powers, spiritual and temporal, intimately blend and mutually interpenetrate each other. The church, in short, is like an old ivy tree clinging to an ancient sheltering wall, into which it grows, and from which it becomes, in course of years, more and more inseparable, while yet it has its own living root and stem, and branches spreading far and near;—not, as Dr Newman would suggest, a mere vast lichen, or parasitic plant, growing on its surface, and drawing from it its life. Still, even the amount of truth which his charge contains is sufficiently serious. It involves the confusion of the church with the state, not the free alliance with it. It implies the loss of separate existence and of independent action. It silences its voice, binds up its hands, and fetters all its movements, and must prove a serious stumbling-block to any serious mind, who, after any ideal—scriptural, patristic, or mediæval—has conceived of the Church of God as a distinct spiritual society, having her own laws to obey, her own message to declare, and her own work to do in the world. It is not easy entirely to reconcile the Church of England, as she is, with the idea of such a society; and it is not therefore strange if many, according to the particular bias that otherwise leads them, should in various paths seek it elsewhere.

In short, it is an age, earnest, critical, searching, groping after realities, impatient of fictions and hollow forms of every kind, and bent on bringing every thing in heaven and earth to the rigid test of reason and first principles; and the Church of England, with all her undoubted excellences and manifold gifts of God's grace, is, unhappily, but ill prepared to stand the ordeal of such a test. It were devoutly to be wished, both for her own sake and for the world's, that she were timely

setting herself in readiness for the great struggle which is only as yet begun.

III. But if there is much in the external state of Protestantism, both in this country and elsewhere, to lay it open to the assaults of Romanism, there is still more in certain internal TENDENCIES OF THEOLOGICAL SPECULATION which are more or less characteristic of our times. After all, the real strength of Protestantism lies in its theology. It was this alone that called it into being; and it is this, too, that has sustained its existence from age to age. Its creative and constitutive principle is the Bible and Bible truth. Without this, it is nothing,—a mere *caput mortuum*, without breath or action, and doomed sooner or later to fall asunder and go to pieces of itself. What fire is to the hearth, what the life-blood is to the body, such is the living Word and truth of God to the Apostolic and Reformation Churches. It was the voice of that Word pealing through the valley of the dry bones that at the first called the great army of Reformed Christendom as from the dead; and the same Word is still the rallying cry that keeps it together. The Mediæval Church without the Word was a dark and idolatrous church,—a synagogue of Satan, and cage of every unclean bird, rather than the holy house of God, the pillar and ground of the truth; the Protestant Church without the Word and the living faith of it, is simply nothing. Here, then, is our strength. The Word is the true counterpoise of the church,—a living biblicism of a false ecclesiasticism. It is obvious, accordingly, that it is only in proportion as this principle is faithfully maintained and livingly held fast, that we can expect either to hold together among ourselves, or to hold our own against our adversaries. We must overcome, if we overcome at all, by the blood of the Lamb, and by the word of our testimony, being found faithful therein to the death; this sacred ark alone, with its heavenly treasure, will make the enemy flee before us. In short, its plenary authority and all-sufficient completeness must be firmly believed and maintained, its saving doctrines vitally held, its holy precepts and divine spirit live within us; or we shall be weak as other men, and our congregations become but common crowds, not churches of the saints. And yet, it is just on this very point that at present our great weakness lies. In our day the Bible itself has been put on its trial. That critical, searching age which is sifting and trying every thing else, has thrown the pure gold of the sanctuary itself into the crucible. By every conceivable test is its divine authority and infallible truth being tried anew,—the test of history, the test of science, the test of philosophy, the test of ancient monuments, the test of philology and scientific criticism. It stands the test; it lives amid the flames;

it will, as heretofore, come forth scathless and triumphant from the fire. Yet, meanwhile, the hearts of many are more or less shaken. The very thought that the eternal Word is again on its trial,—on trial not alone among professed unbelievers, but in some respects also among professing Christians,—has necessarily an unsettling tendency. “If the foundations be destroyed, what can the righteous do?” is the confession even of faith itself; and timid hearts quiver and tremble at the very thought. When the ground quakes and heavens beneath us, it seems as if the very rocks and eternal hills were not safe. Then, while a deadly rationalism has utterly destroyed the faith of many, it has in great measure eaten out the life of many more, and diffused throughout the world of thought a certain uneasiness or vague anxiety, that extends far beyond the sphere of its direct influence. The very wildness and ferocity of the revolutionary spirit is itself startling. Even the sacred name of Jesus—that divine image of incarnate grace and truth, which shines out from the breathing canvass of the evangelic history, and which is itself an infinitely greater miracle than any other which that history records—has not been safe from its impious hand; and at its touch the imperishable annals of the Truth itself have been transmuted into a legendary fable. The serpent, indeed, has been destroyed,—destroyed almost as soon as hatched; and yet, doubtless, it has left some traces of its foul slime on some once untainted hearts, as well as in the general thoughts of the reading, thinking world. The total result is, that there are in our day, and have been for some time past, a considerable number of minds in some sort earnest and religious, who yet have not, and never have had, any sure grounding on the rock of truth; to whom the authority and infallibility of the eternal Word has been a matter merely of opinion or traditional belief, more or less firmly held, rather than a strong, deep, personal, unshakable conviction. It is a tenet merely, a persuasion,—not a divine, home-felt certainty. How much all this must tend to weaken the life of Protestantism,—to weaken it at the very heart,—is sufficiently manifest. Men, and especially in an age like this, must have something firm to lean on. The human soul, like nature, abhors a vacuum. It cannot exist on a negation or a fiction. The weight of its infinite cares is too great for any mere theory, or opinion, or traditional creed, to sustain; and when these frail props give way, it will look eagerly round for some other and surer support. Some will look in one direction, some in another, each according to the special influence or personal bias which may otherwise determine his course. Failing the revealed Word, there are but two other stays on which faith can lean: the one

is simple reason, the other is authority; the one the infallibility of the inward consciousness, the other the infallibility of the external church. Accordingly, in the general wreck of faith, some will grasp at the one phantom, and some at the other. Washed away from the rock of truth, and tossed to and fro on a sea of doubt, men will be fain to seize on every floating fragment, that may for the moment preserve them from sinking, and hold out the faintest hope of bringing them at last safe to land.

That this is no fancy picture, but describes the actual course of many a bewildered spirit in these our times, might, we think, be shown by copious extracts from the writings of Dr Newman and his friends. The very fact which they again and again proclaim, that there was in their own deep feeling and conviction no alternative for them but either an abyss of utter scepticism, or a flight for refuge to Rome, clearly proves this. Men never could have felt, never could have spoken so, who had ever felt the rock beneath their feet,—who had ever, in any adequate measure, known the experience of him who said, “Thy word was found, and I did eat it, and it was the rejoicing of my heart.” These men have sought their faith from Rome, because they felt that without Rome they had no faith, and yet trembled to have none. The following sentences from Dr Newman, a passage surely of real history, strikingly illustrates this; and are valuable besides, as affording the key to the main circumstance which, in such a crisis of the spirit, will go to determine the choice of the individual soul in the one direction or the other:—

“Sometimes two friends live together for years, and appear to entertain the same religious views: at the end of that time they take different courses; one becomes an unbeliever, the other a Catholic. How is this? Some latent and hitherto dormant first principle, different in each, comes into play, and carries off one to the east, the other to the west. For instance, suppose the one holds that there is such a thing as sin; the other denies it,—denies it, that is, really and in his heart, though at first he would shrink from saying so, even to himself, and is not aware of denying it. At a certain crisis, either from the pressure of controversy or other reason, each finds he must give up the form of religion in which he has been educated; and then this question, the nature of sin, what it is, whether it exists, comes forward as a turning point between them; he who does not believe in it becomes an unbeliever; he who does, becomes a Catholic.”—(Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics, &c, pp. 273, 274.)

These at least are true and pregnant words. That two men thus born and bred together, and reared in the same ancestral creed, may be thus separated in a terrible crisis of their spiritual history, Dr Newman knows too well. It is important, then,

to learn from him what those circumstances are which occasion such a crisis. He tells us:—"Each finds, either from the pressure of controversy or other reason, that he must give up the form of religion in which he has been educated," and that there is nothing for it but unbelief or Rome. They must, then, have already lost all faith in the Bible as a sure and all-sufficient guide, else why the necessity of the supposed alternative? why no middle course between the absolute submission to an external authority, and the total wreck of all belief? In both alike the very ground and foundation of their old faith is gone. Their religion has become a total wreck, and they cling only to a floating spar, while they look eagerly for help, now in this direction, and now in that. In which way, then, shall they turn? What circumstance shall mainly tend to decide their course? Our author tells us this too, and tells us, we think, truly and well. It is the existence or the non-existence, in the individual in question, of a sense and conviction of sin. The one, deeply feeling his soul's wound and the need of a better healer than the world and himself, carries his burdened conscience and bleeding heart where there is, at least, the promise and the possibility of that healing; the other, being whole and not needing a physician, is content to commit himself to a guide that tells of no such healing, seeing that it knows of none.

This same utter bankruptcy of all true faith in the Bible and revealed realities, betrays itself in many casual expressions and modes of thought, which are peculiarly characteristic of this party. Such, for instance, are the representations, that according to the doctrine of private judgment, "each man may believe *what he chooses* for himself,"—"that each man *is safe*, while he believes what is accepted by all,"—that this or that dogma is to be believed on simple authority, on pain of perdition, and the like; as if a man could believe any thing just *because* he chose, or because it is safe, or because he must do so or perish, or indeed for any other reason whatever, except that it is true, and commends itself to his soul in the light of its proper evidence as such. The bare notion of believing, or refusing belief, on mere *motives* of any kind, instead of the commanding force of appropriate evidence, shows surely a woful ignorance of the very nature of true belief, as well as the total hollowness and unreality of the system to which such notions belong. Motives, indeed, of interest or duty may induce me to listen and give due weight to the grounds of belief, and thus prepare the way for the reception of the truth; but no motives whatever, not the fear of hell or the hope of heaven, can make me really believe that which I do not see to be true. On this subject there are many striking thoughts

in the admirable work of the lamented Mr Hare, which we have placed along with Dr Newman's volumes at the head of this article. We must content ourselves, however, with one pregnant passage, and with it appropriately close this part of our subject:—

“I cannot but regret that Archdeacon Wilberforce, in the same sermon (on ‘The Principle of Church Authority’), should have given his sanction to the hankering, the morbid hankering, as it seems to me, after leading-strings, which has been beguiling so many persons of late to listen to every bold pretender, whether he would lead them to Rome or to the land of the Mormons. His sermon being on St Paul's declaration, that ‘he who is spiritual judgeth all things, yet he himself is judged by no man,’ he warns us that these words must be received with great caution, inasmuch as ‘they are a favourite text with enthusiasts and impostors;’ and then, after citing the analogous verses of St John,—‘Ye have an unction from the Holy One, and ye know all things: the anointing which ye have received from him abideth in you; and ye need not that any man teach you:’—he adds, ‘Such expressions harmonise with that longing for some principle of guidance, which is deeply rooted in the heart. We can classify and catalogue the material treasures of mankind. And is the higher region of thought and intellect to be vexed for ever by unsatisfying contentions? Are systems of belief to follow one another like the waves of the deep, without umpire and without end? Is there no test of moral and religious truth,—no criterion for interpreting God's Word?’

“This umpire, and test, and criterion, he bids us seek and find in the authority of the church. Yet the more I examine the passages here cited, along with the context, the clearer it seems to me, that both St Paul and St John are not speaking of the authority of the collective body, or of the church, but of the personal, individual illumination vouchsafed by the Spirit to every faithful Christian, who seeks his holy communion. This is the *prima facie* meaning of these passages; and it is confirmed by the whole tenor of St Paul's epistle, one main topic of which relates to the various gifts of the Spirit bestowed on individuals: ‘To one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom;’ and so on. . . . I cannot admit, therefore, that these texts refer, as Archdeacon Wilberforce contends, ‘not to the individual, but to the collective Christian.’ Assuredly, they do refer to the individual Christian; not, indeed, in his frail, sinful, erring individuality, but as some would say, to the ideal Christian, to that ideal Christian who is one and the same with the real Christian,—to the individual, so far as he avails himself of his Christian privileges, and fulfils his Christian character, so far as he lives, not by his own selfish, insulated life, but by the Spirit of Christ dwelling in him.”

But, says Archdeacon Wilberforce, St Paul surely “does not mean that each man may believe what he chooses for himself.” To this flimsy sophism our author replies in the following keen and pointed words:—

“But who ever did mean this? Who can ever have asserted any

thing so grossly and glaringly absurd? The wonder is, that anybody should ever have set up such a man of straw to knock down,—that anybody should ever have identified this absurdity with the claim to the exercise of private judgment. No one in his senses can ever have maintained, ‘that each man may believe what he chooses for himself’ in theology, any more than in any other branch of knowledge. In all branches, our conception must be regulated and determined by their objects. Nor is such a proposition implied in the denial of our being bound to believe what others choose for us. Will and choice have nothing to do with the matter; except so far as the will may be needed to suppress the interference of personal likings and prejudices, and to make us submit our minds obediently to that which is appointed for our belief by the various laws of thought.

“But though St Paul does not mean that ‘each man may believe what he chooses,’ he is just as far from meaning, what Archdeacon Wilberforce imputes to him, ‘that each man is safe while he holds that which is accepted of all.’ This is a miserable modern notion, a miserable modern anxiety, this vexing and worrying ourselves about what it is *safe* for us to believe or to think. This phrase (for surely it is nothing else,—even those who make use of it cannot really mean what they say) is brought forward perpetually now-a-days, even by those who talk grandly about an objective system of truth, and boast of having set up this to supersede the merely subjective views of the last generations. Yet, if the divinity of our fathers was too apt to pass by many of the deepest truths of Christianity, and to fix its attention too exclusively on those which bear immediately on our own personal salvation, it was left for their successors to make this the test of truth. When St Paul exhorted us to meditate on whatsoever things are true, and honest, and just, and pure, and lovely, and of good report, he omitted to mention whatsoever things are safe. This omission must seem unaccountable to our new divines, who, passing over all the other grand and glorious objects of contemplation, set whatsoever things are safe before us, as the one class we are to think on. Yet, assuredly, if we seek what is true, honestly and earnestly, with such helps as God has given us, and if we believe and act up to the truth which we may thus find, we shall be safe. Whereas, if our main purpose is merely to find out what we may believe with safety to our own puny selves, we shall miss the truth and our safety along with it. In no point of view is it more certain, that he whose anxiety is to save his life will lose it, and that he alone who is ready to lose his life will save it. When we read St Paul’s stirring account of the manifold perils he had passed through, we then see how he saved his life and won it. Had he shrunk from them, he would have lost it. To us, indeed, it is not granted to walk in the footsteps of that great apostle, who trod, so to say, from pinnacle to pinnacle, from mountain-top to mountain-top, in the spiritual world; but the rule of our walk ought to be the same as his.”—(“Contest with Rome,” pp. 158-162.)

These are noble words,—too noble, alas! for the poor-spirited, faint-hearted temper of those to whom they were addressed. That erect and manly course of earnest inquiry and rational conviction of the truth was too great for them. They shrunk

at once from the responsibility and the labour of digging for the hidden treasure. They had too little faith either in its reality or in the power of God's grace to guide them to it, to induce them to endure the toil. So "they wanted an authority to tell them what they were to think, an infallible authority, lest they should have the trouble of examining the rectitude of its decisions. *Bind my eyes, and lead me, or drag me along, that I may not have to exercise my private vision in deciding where I shall walk:* so cries the Romanizing fledgeling. *How can I find out my own way, when there are so many paths, and so many puddles in the paths, and so many ditches and pitfalls beside them, into which I may slip; or my feet may get wet and I may catch cold! What a pity it is that God gave us eyes to see for ourselves with! How happy shall I be when I get where there are no puddles, and no mud, and no ditches or pitfalls, and where an unerring priest will carry me on his back into heaven!*" *

At the time to which these remarks apply, Archdeacon Wilberforce was still a member of the Church of England. Since then, "his hankering after leading-strings," and his shallow, mechanical notions of faith, have naturally led him to that congenial region, where one may have religious certainty without rational conviction, and a creed ready made without the toil and the travail of earnestly seeking and finding out the truth.

IV. Hitherto our remarks, as regards the internal state of Protestantism, have had reference exclusively to the domain of doctrine. Let us now, however, consider it for a moment under another aspect, that of a MORAL AND SPIRITUAL DISCIPLINE, or system of church life. In estimating the vital energy of the Reformation Church, and its consequent power to withstand the antagonist system, it is obviously necessary to inquire into its capacity not only as a teacher of the truth, but as a guide and educator of souls. What means does it supply, and what scope does it afford, for the full training and maturing of the spiritual life, and the unfolding of man's whole being in the service and enjoying of God? She guides her children to the springs of truth—does she in due measure also exercise them in the discipline of holiness? She indoctrinates them with saving knowledge—does she *train* them also in self-denial, in self-sacrifice, and in all the work and warfare of the faith? She instructs—does she also lead, and in the true and full sense *educate* her children? Now, in a general view of the subject, the vast superiority of the reformed system over the old is sufficiently manifest. Romanism, throughout all her elaborate discipline, ministers to the lower principles of man's

* Contest with Rome, p. 143.

spiritual nature, to the ignoring and suppression of the higher. She puts out the eye of reason and chains the will, while she skilfully touches all the springs of feeling, sentiment, imagination, taste, and selfish hopes and fears. Hence her discipline is rather that of children and women than of men; and her greatest saints, accordingly, have excelled rather in the virtues of the weaker sex, than in those of sterner and firmer mould. Their very heroism, bright with high enthusiasm and long-suffering endurance, has been feminine, not masculine. The spirit of Protestantism is totally different. With clear trumpet voice it rouses conscience from its sleep, and summons the mind to think and the will to resolve. It calls upon men to arise, to stand erect, to quit themselves like men, to be strong. Thus the key-note of the one system is obedience; of the other, responsibility. Yet it may be a question whether in this respect the better system has not hitherto been in some degree one-sided. In bending its main strength to the greater things, has it not, to an undue extent, neglected or ignored the less; and thus, while making its appeal to the higher principles, yet failed to take full possession of the whole man? *A priori*, this was manifestly not unlikely to be the case. From the first, and from the very nature of the case, the Reformation movement was mainly negative. It consisted essentially in a protest against certain great and glaring corruptions in the existing state of things, rather than in a complete and matured system in itself. Its work was (of course in a good sense) destructive rather than constructive, purifying rather than organising. The great spirits of that age, amid the throes of that tremendous spiritual revolution, had enough to do in doing battle with the gigantic forms of evil that stood immediately before them, and, amid the general wreck of traditionary belief, saving the essential elements of the faith, without pausing for the consideration and mature settlement of subordinate details. Hence many questions of no small importance, relating especially to the right constitution of the church, and the proper development of church life, were necessarily left over, and adjourned for the consideration of quieter times. Some of these have since been taken up and thoroughly canvassed; such, for instance, as those which relate to the proper relation of the church to the state, and the duty of the civil magistrate in regard to holy things. Others still stand over, and remain in abeyance to this day. The due place, for instance, and right use of the æsthetic element in Christian worship; the ascetic principle in its healthy exercise and due guards and limitations;* the means to be provided for dealing

* The asceticism of which Paul speaks in such passages as these, 1 Cor. ix. 27; Col. iii. 5; Gal. v. 24, &c.

with the individual soul, and maintaining a living, personal connection between the Christian pastor and the flock committed to his care; the proper combination of Christian ethics with Christian principles in the instructions of the sanctuary, so as the more effectually not only to rouse, but to educate and refine the conscience; and in fine, the organization of the lay members of the church, and especially the female members, and the drawing out of their manifold gifts and graces in works of piety and usefulness;—these are matters which have not only never been settled in the different branches of the Reformation Church, but have scarcely been ever raised for serious and deliberate consideration. For the most part, these problems have either been wholly ignored, or left to the random solution of time and circumstance. Romanism has *her* clear theory and practice on all these matters; Protestantism hitherto has none. Æsthetics she has for the most part left to the caprice either of a blind prejudice or a mere *dilettanti* taste; the “rule and exercise of holy living,” the true *ασκησις* of the spiritual life, has been handed over to the formalist and the Pharisee; the sleepless and almost omniscient confessional has found as yet no effectual substitute in the ordinary methods of the pastoral care; Christian doctrines are inculcated, and the details of Christian duty too often left to be inferred; Evangelism, in fine, has her Dorcas and her Phœbes still, as in the days of old,—more, we rejoice to think, every day; yet who can doubt of the immense materials of like precious quality that lie over the surface of the Christian community all unused, while sisters of charity and mercy in thousands and tens of thousands occupy the ground? These questions are surely worthy of serious consideration. Some of them, indeed, may admit of satisfactory solution, and some of them possibly of none; but they at least deserve the serious pondering of our deepest and wisest minds. Certainly whenever a real principle lies at the bottom of any part of our great adversary’s system—any genuine human want to be met, or aspiration to be satisfied—we shall weaken, not strengthen, our position, by the practical ignoring of it. *The pernicious abuse is to be counteracted and exorcised not by the disuse but the use of the thing abused.* Thus, to take the two most obvious and presently practical instances, it is not by the scandalous neglect of the pure and solemn music of the sanctuary, that we shall counteract the fascination of a gorgeous ritual worship; nor shall we by mere denunciations of sisterhoods and nuns dispel the charm which meek self-denial and unwearied works of mercy ever wield. Our real strength lies at once in contending against that which is evil in our adversaries, and outdoing them by the better use of that which is true and good. On the latter of

the two special points referred to, we gladly quote the following excellent remarks of one whose name is deservedly held in honour in all the churches, and whose venerable age and ripe experience give peculiar weight to his words:—

“But the finishing stroke which Christianity gives in elevating the condition of women, is, by *inviting and employing their energies and influence in promoting the spread of religion in the world*; and thus carrying out through them, also, the great purposes of God in the redemption of the world by the mission of his Son. To them, in common with others, the apostle says, ‘That ye also may have fellowship with us; and truly our fellowship is with the Father and with his Son Jesus Christ.’ The honour so liberally bestowed upon the pious women of antiquity, in ministering to the personal wants of the Saviour, and in being so constantly about his person, was the least of those distinctions designed for them by our holy religion. They bear an exalted place in those acts and offices which were carried on for the setting up of Christ’s kingdom in the world. How instructive and impressive is it to hear an apostle say, ‘Help those women which laboured with me in the gospel!’ What a register of names and offices of illustrious females do we find in Romans xvi. Priscilla, Paul’s helper: ‘Mary, who bestowed much labour upon us;’ ‘Tryphena and Tryphosa, who laboured in the Lord;’ ‘Phœbe, the servant of the church at Cenchrea,’ who was sent to the church at Rome, and intrusted with so momentous a commission as to bear to that community of Christians the Epistle to the Romans; which, if we may lawfully compare one portion of Scripture with another, is the most precious portion of divine revelation. In addition to all this, there can be but little doubt that in the primitive church not only were women occasionally endowed by the Spirit with the miraculous gift of prophesying, but were also employed in the office of deaconesses. The Christian Church in modern times has gone backwards in the honour put upon the female character. The primitive age of Christianity was in advance of ours in the respect thus paid to the female sex, by officially employing them in the service of the church, and in the wisdom which made use of such available and valuable resources. It has been said that the usages of society have somewhat changed since that time, so as to render the services of women less necessary now than they were then. The friendly and social intercourse of the sexes was more limited, and females were kept in greater seclusion. Some truth, no doubt, there is in these assertions, but perhaps not so much as by some imagined. Both general and sacred history present them to us mingling in the society and sharing in the occupations of the other sex.”*

Many illustrations of the principle here recognised might be given from the history of the Church of Christ, both in ancient and modern times. In our own day, for instance, we have seen a whole religious community, of large extent and great influence in our own country, in great measure sustained, so far as its outward frame-work is concerned, during the thirteen

*“Female Piety; or, the Young Woman’s Friend and Guide,” &c. By John Angell James. Second edition. Hamilton, Adams, & Co.

years of its existence, by the patient, unwearied, and self-denied labours of some thousands of her daughters.* A still more impressive spectacle of female devotion and self-sacrifice has just passed before the eyes of Europe. In the loathsome hospitals of Scutari and Balaclava has it been seen what the calm energy of gentle natures, inspired by Christ-like love, can do at once to assuage the anguish of suffering bodies and to awe and subdue the rude hearts of men. To use the words of an eloquent preacher, on a late solemn occasion,† “In the desertion of their rich and luxurious homes by well-born women; in the exchange by delicate and tender maidens of the pure, sunny, flower-embalmed atmosphere of their chambers and saloons, for the damp, sickly, sultry air of the hospital; in confronting the danger, that most appalling danger to a modest mind, of all the coarse, repulsive manners and habits of the rudest and hardest of mankind,—a danger, wonderful as it might seem, awed down at once, and absolutely and without exception subdued, by the unanswerable appeal to the better feelings, by the majesty of goodness, by the tenderness which made kindness more kind, and added a grace even to Christian charity;”—in spectacles like these we read a lesson which the Christian Church, we trust, will not soon forget. “These ministrations were of heaven, and what noble lessons may we not have learned from that rude instructress, war! How vainly had Christianity been urging the right way of reaching the heart of man! How long had it been preaching in pulpits, tolling its bells for gorgeous ceremonies, to deaf ears and disdainful hearts! But so soon as it had ‘gone about,’ like its Divine Author, ‘doing good,’ with wisdom and singleness of purpose, how profound an impression was made,—not merely on the sick-beds it had visited, the eyes it had closed, the fainting hearts it had cheered, but what a wide and untraceable influence might not these best of Christian missionaries exert upon Europe, upon Christendom, upon mankind! God may thus have made war and human misery his most effective preachers!” But surely it is not in war alone that such ministers of love, those true sisters of mercy, may find abundant field and urgent call for their labours. There is a war, a war far more terrible, going on among us day by day, and which is waxing hotter every hour,—the war against

* We refer to the Free Church of Scotland, whose Sustentation Fund, but for such an agency, humanly speaking, could scarcely have existed, or could not exist for any length of time. We believe the same remark applies in great measure to the Mission Fund of the Wesleyan body, and to the practical carrying out of many other works of charity and mercy. It is remarkable that it is in large towns that this kind of agency works best,—the very sphere where the organization and full development of all the Church’s available energies is most urgently required.

† Dr Milman on the late Thanksgiving for the Restoration of Peace, in St Paul’s Cathedral, as reported in the *Times*.

ignorance, against crime, and against social misery and degradation of every kind; and it is precisely in such a warfare as this that the agency we speak of is at once most available and most precious. There are scenes where the gentle voice of love may be mightier far than the loudest threats of authority; and the calm look of virgin purity more terrible than all the terrors of conscience and of law; and it is there that the heroines of charity may win at once their noblest triumphs and earn their richest rewards.

We have dwelt thus long on this branch of the subject, because we are satisfied that it is in this direction, more perhaps than any other, that the weakness of Protestantism, as opposed to her great antagonist, lies. In this we are disposed to seek the main cause, not perhaps of the original secession, but of the subsequent satisfaction of some of the choicest spirits who have sought refuge in the bosom of Rome. It is not, we are persuaded, so much the dogmas of Rome, or even the gorgeous pomp of her ritual worship, as some elements of her ascetic discipline and church life, that fascinates and holds them. Originally of a gentle and contemplative, rather than strong spirit, they have been drawn towards it, not so much by the force of reason as by the cords of the heart; and they have been so far satisfied that they have really found much that they fondly dreamed and pined after. They have found within her pale a certain provision for the training of the weak and timid spirit, as well as for the development of some of the highest and noblest virtues, such as they had sought, and sought in vain elsewhere. True, free thought is stifled and reason is quenched, but the springs of feeling are sedulously fed; their new mother teaches not her children indeed to think, but she trains them to do and to bear; she is weak in the contests of the schools, but she is strong at death-beds, in hospitals, in lazaronis. They thus feel at last at home; they are at least cared for—cared for by a mother who is at least watchful and unwearied, if not truthful or wise. An atmosphere of calm repose is around them, and images of saintly grace, and meek, self-denying devotedness, meet their eye on every side. Winking hard at the grosser corruptions of the system, and most probably coming but little in contact with them, they see only the bright and the fair side, and dream that they have indeed found the glorious land of angels and of saints at last. Thus the cunning enchantress has so far fulfilled her promise; and they find it not hard to believe that she who is the mother of so many saints and saintly virtues, is indeed the mother of the churches and the immaculate spouse of Christ.

We have thus laid our hand on what we regard as the main springs and co-operative causes of the recent revival of

Romanism in England. The considerations suggested, if not affording a complete explanation of the problem in question, may at least suffice to render it somewhat less inexplicable than it might at first sight appear. They may, at all events, enable us to see how men of a certain temperament, and under the influence of certain predisposing causes, may even in our day become converts to the mediæval system, without in any degree invalidating the essential principles on which Protestantism is based, or abating a jot of our true quarrel with Rome. The Reformation Churches may be weak where they ought to be, and might be, strong; and Romanism, hollow as it is at the heart, may have her strong points in the very direction where we are weak; and yet the essential elements of the great struggle between the one system and the other remain precisely as they were. The line of remark into which we have been led is not the less instructive and healthful that it has led us to throw stress rather on our own weaknesses and shortcomings, than on the glaring corruptions and absurdities of our great adversary. It is in the remedying of these evils in ourselves that our great strength must lie. We shall conquer in the day of battle, not so much by the controversial confutation of error, as by the practical carrying out and living embodiment of the truth. We need not alone to strengthen our assault, but to repair and fortify our defences. How this is, with God's blessing, to be done, is sufficiently manifest. The correct diagnosis of the disease points at once to the needed remedy. If the main weakness of Protestantism lies in the broken and divided state of its forces, in the anomalies and abuses which disfigure some of its fairest portions, in the unsettled and uneasy state of religious belief within her bosom, in the narrow and imperfect development of her church life,—then the appropriate correctives lie immediately before us. They may be summed up in four words,—unity, purity, rational faith, and a complete and living congregational life. Let us draw faster the cords of Christian brotherhood, and thus close in our line of defence against our common enemy; let us each in our several spheres strive for the removal of every remediable abuse and stumbling-block; let us hold the living Word in a firmer grasp, at once of an intelligent and an assured faith; let us increase our instrumentalities and mature our methods of spiritual discipline, both for the guiding of weak souls and drawing forth the virtues and holy energies of all; let the church, in short, be united, and pure, and believing, and wisely fervent and diligent at once in her pastoral and missionary work, and she will be again, as in the days of her first baptism and early prime, “fair as the moon, clear as the sun, and terrible as an army with banners.”

As regards Dr Newman himself, the problem we have been handling does not, in his case, assume by any means its most difficult form. Brilliant and vigorous as his mind is in some respects, it is by no means of that profound and solid cast which bespeaks confidence in the security of its judgments. It is acute, subtle, inventive,—rich alike in varied learning and in fresh and striking thought; but withal neither cautious nor well-balanced. He is at once keenly theoretic and morbidly ingenious. Commanded for the moment by the peculiar idea which for the time possesses him, his teeming fancy furnishes illustrations from every quarter, and his marvellously constructive genius marshals all into a harmonious system around it. Facts and truths seem to move at his bidding, and, as if by magic, fall into their proper places in his system. Subject to his ruling principle, he has a marvellous power over his individual opinions and convictions. Facts and truths do not so much command him, as he them; he summons them to come and do homage to his system, and they come. His system is Joseph's sheaf, and all other truths must do obeisance to it. He looks broad or winks hard, brings truths into strong relief or throws them into the shade, as the urgency of the ruling thought requires; and he is deaf to every sound that does not chime in harmony with his own key-note. Thus, truth to him is not so much the eternal temple of God, earnestly and painfully sought, and dimly seen, as the quarry out of which he builds his own. He is not the disciple of history, but its artificer. Hence it is that at different periods of his life he has, out of the same identical materials of fact and doctrine, built up systems totally diverse, and triumphantly reached conclusions diametrically the reverse of each other. Now he compels the Thirty-nine Articles to speak his meaning, now the Tridentine decrees; now the fathers and the councils are all for Anglo-Catholicism, now for ultramontane Rome. The "Lectures on Romanism," and the "Essay on Development" are both the creation of the same brain, and both built up out of the same quarry. In the one, the Nicene Church demolishes infallibility; in the other, bears witness to it. His, therefore, if one of the brightest and most striking minds of the age, is at the same time one of the most perilous both to others and to himself. Its qualities are those which make the most consummate advocate and the unsafest judge. Give him his brief and a certain theoretic faith in the goodness of his cause, and his vast stores of thought and learning, and his constructive and rhetorical skill, will make out a case for anything under heaven. Let us give a specimen of this kind of historic architecture. It is only one out of many, and selected almost at random from the volume which stands second on our list. We

regret that our limited space will compel us considerably to abridge a passage which, to be fully appreciated, must be read at length. Here, then, is his account of the origin and establishment of what he calls "The Protestant Tradition in England;" that is to say, the deep, ineradicable, inextinguishable faith of the English people in the great principles of the Reformation, and heart-hatred of Papal despotism and superstition. In his view it is the mere creature of state policy and court intrigue; the fiat of the Virgin Queen called it into existence, and perpetuates it from generation to generation:—

"The Virgin Queen rose in her strength; she held her court, she showed herself to her people; she gathered round her peer and squire, alderman and burgess, army and navy, lawyer and divine, student and artisan. She made an appeal to the chivalrous and the loyal, and forthwith all that was noble, powerful, dignified, splendid, and intellectual, touched the hilt of their swords and spread their garments on the way for her to tread upon."

Thus she gave the word, and all England re-echoed it, and proclaimed it aloud, and handed it down as a legacy of faith to their children's children, that Protestantism was true, and Catholicism an immoral lie. This was the secret of the whole affair. Latimer's preaching, Tindal's Bibles, the Smithfield burnings, had nothing to do with the matter. The whole sprang, like Minerva of old, full grown and full armed, from the brain of the Virgin Queen!

"And first," our author continues, "she addressed herself to the Law; and that, not only because it was the proper foundation of a national structure, but also inasmuch as, from the nature of the case, it was her surest and most faithful ally. The law is a science, and therefore takes for granted afterwards whatever it has once determined; hence it followed, that once Protestant, it would be always Protestant,—it could be depended on; let Protestantism be recognised as a principle of the constitution, and every decision to the end of time would but illustrate Protestant doctrines and consolidate Protestant interests."

The thing was done. The courts of law were tuned. Elizabeth had willed it that the faith of the nation should be Protestant, and Justice, in her ermined robe and in all her solemn tribunals, endorsed the royal will. But a more powerful influence still was yet in reserve:—

"Elizabeth had an influence with her other and even greater than the authority of the law. She was the queen of fashion and of opinion. The principles of Protestantism rapidly became the standard generally, to which genius, taste, philosophy, learning, and investigation, were constrained and bribed to submit. They are her legacy to the nation, and have been taken for granted ever since, as starting-points in all discussions and in all undertakings. In every circle, and in every rank of the

community,—in the court, in public meetings, in private society, in literary assemblages, in the family party, it is always assumed that Catholicism is absurd. No one can take part in the business of the great world, no one can speak and debate, no one can present himself before his constituents, no one can write a book, without the necessity of professing that Protestant ideas are self-evident, and that the religion of Alfred, St Edward, Stephen Langton, and Friar Bacon, is a bygone dream. No one can be a Catholic, without apologising for it. And what is in vogue in the upper classes, is ever, as we know, ambitiously aped in the inferior. The religious observances of the court become a reigning fashion throughout the social fabric, as certainly as its language or mode of dress; and as an aspirant for distinction advances from a lower grade of society to an upper, he necessarily abandons his vulgar sect, whatever it is, for the national Protestantism. All other ways of thought are as frightful as the fashions of last year; the present is the true and the divine; the past is dark because its sun has set, and ignorant because it is dumb, and living dogs are worth more than dead lions. As to Catholicism, the utmost liberality which can be extended towards it, is to call it pretty poetry, bearable in a tragedy, intolerable in fact; the utmost charity towards its professors is to confess that they may be better than their creed,—perhaps believe it, and are only dupes,—perhaps doubt it, and are only cowards. Protestantism sets the tone to every thing; and to have the patronage of the wealthy, the esteem of the cultivated, and the applause of the many, Catholics must get its phrases by heart. It is the profession of a gentleman; Catholicism of under-bred persons, of the vulgar-minded, the uncouth, and the ill-connected.”

All very true so far. The religion of the court is the religion of fashion, and of high life in England, as everywhere else. The high give their tone to the low, the few to the many. The frivolous and worldly crowd will ever follow where the stream leads, and the “religion of a gentleman” will tell with many for far more than the religion of the Bible or their early faith. But what then? Does this prove that the nation got its religion from the court, or the court from the nation? Elizabeth fostered the Protestant faith by the prestige of the royal name and the establishment of it by law; granted: does that prove that she created it? The “Protestant tradition” lived and thrived in the royal smile; did it live nowhere else? did it droop its head and die everywhere save where it could catch inspiration from the royal breath? Was Catholicism the only faith that pined under the reproach, of not being the religion of a gentleman—of being the creed of fanatics or fools? Were there no Nonconformists, no Puritan confessors, no pilgrim fathers? or did the fire of Reformation principles burn less ardently in the breast of an Owen or a Howe, than in that of a Parker or a Sanicroft? Did Protestant zeal languish in the days of the commonwealth, and kindle up anew on the return of the royal Charles? Did it live in the favour of the throne in England,

and expire beneath its ban in Scotland? And what has come of it in America, where there is neither queen nor court, nor national recognition nor established faith, and yet the "Protestant tradition" thrives mightily, and Romanism can barely breathe? All these things our author ignores. He winks hard at them. He simply does not see them. They have no place in his theory, and therefore no place in his field of view. His cloud castle is complete without them, and, accordingly, he leaves them aside as useless rubbish. Grave and pregnant truths they assuredly are, and most relevant to the question in hand; but then, they are not to him "present truths." He will need them, perhaps, to meet the exigencies of some new theory another time.

But what the while of the literary class? the men of thought, of learning, of philosophic depth, and historic research? Did they too, one and all, learn their lesson from the royal lips, and accept their new faith as a simple tradition on trust? Surely, at least, at a time so near the period of that great spiritual revolution, or actually in the midst of it, thoughtful men would take some trouble to examine into the grounds of it, and into the truth of the monster indictment which the world had drawn up against the tyranny and corruptions of Rome? By no means. The Virgin Queen stamped with her foot, and straightway a whole host of poets, philosophers, statesmen, orators, divines, rose around her, ready to receive the "Protestant tradition" at her lips, and to do battle for it against the world. The many-minded Shakespeare, the vast soul of Milton, the judicious Hooker, the immortal Bunyan, either at the time or afterwards, arose at her call, and endorsed and re-echoed the royal dogma. The whole world of British thought then and since has done nothing else than sing chorus to the key-note of its Virgin Queen:—

"The same age gave birth to some of the greatest masters of thought and composition, in the most various departments of authorship. Shakespeare, Spenser, Sidney, Raleigh; Bacon, and Hooker, are its own; and they were, withal, more or less the panegyrists of Elizabeth and her religion, and moreover, at least the majority of them, adherents of her creed, because already clients of her throne. The mother of the Reformation is, in the verses of Shakespeare, a 'fair Vestal throned by the West;' in the poem of Spenser, she is 'the fairy Queen,' 'Gloriana,' and 'the fair huntress,' 'Belphebe;' while the militant Christian is rescued from the seduction of Popery, Duessa, by Una, the true Church, or Protestant religion. The works of these celebrated men have been but the beginning of a long series of creations of the highest order of literary merit, of which Protestantism is the intellectual basis, and Protestant institutions the informing object. What was wanting to lead the national mind a willing captive to the pretensions of Protestantism, beyond the fascination of genius so

manifold, and so various? What need of controversy to refute the claims of Catholicism? what need of closeness of reasoning, or research into facts, when under a Queen's smile this vast and continuous tradition had been unrolled before the eyes of men, illuminate with the most dazzling colours, and musical with the most subduing strains. . . .

"Nor was it court poets alone, as time went on, who swelled the torrent of the Protestant tradition. Milton from the middle class, and Bunyan from among the populace, exerted an influence superior to Shakespeare himself, whose great mind did not condescend to the direct inculcation of a private or a sectarian creed. Their phrases, their sentiments are the household words of the nation; they have become its interpreters of Scripture, and, I may say, its prophets,—such is the magical eloquence of their compositions. . . . There is a saying, "Give me the framing of a nation's proverbs, and I shall have my own way with it;" this has been strikingly fulfilled in the Protestantism of England. What, indeed, could possibly stand against the rush and vehemence of such a tradition, which has grown fuller and fuller, and more and more impetuous, with every successive quarter of a century? Clarendon and the statesmen, Locke and philosophy, Addison and the essayists, Hume, Robertson, and the historians; Cowper and the minor poets; the reviews and magazines of the present era;—all proceed upon the hypothesis, which they think too self-evident for proof, that Protestantism is synonymous with good sense, and Catholicism with weakness of mind, fanaticism, or some unaccountable persuasion or fancy. Verse and prose, grave and gay, the scientific and the practical, history and fable, *all is animated spontaneously, or imperiously subdued, by the spirit of Henry and Elizabeth!!*"*

Such, then, is historical architecture. We must find room, however, before we close, for an instance of a somewhat different kind; one of simple creation. See what a vision of glory his magic wand calls up from amid the rough times of the Saxon Heptarchy:—

"The fair form of Christianity rose up, and grew and expanded like a beautiful pageant from north to south; it was majestic, it was solemn, it was bright, it was beautiful and pleasant, it was soothing to the griefs, it was pleasant to the hopes of man, it was at once a teaching and a worship; it had a dogma, a mystery, a ritual of its own; it had an hierarchical form. A brotherhood of holy pastors, with mitre and crosier, and hand uplifted, walked forth and blessed and ruled the joyful people. The crucifix headed the procession, and simple monks were there with hearts in prayer, and sweet chants resounded, and the holy Latin tongue was heard, and boys came forth in white, swinging censers, and the fragrant cloud arose, and mass was sung, and the saints were invoked; and day after day, and in the still night, and over the woody hills, and in the quiet plains, as constantly as sun and moon and stars go forth in heaven, so regular and solemn was the stately march of blessed services on earth, high festival, and gorgeous procession, and soothing dirge, and passing bell, and the familiar even-

* Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England, pp. 67, *seq.*

ing call to prayer ; till he who recollected the old pagan time, would think unreal what he beheld and heard, and conclude he did but see a vision, so marvellously was heaven let down upon earth, so triumphantly were chased away *the fiends of darkness to their prison below.*" *

Well might Archdeacon Hare, after quoting this strange rhapsody, exclaim, " This page out of a della-cruscan novel,—who could suppose that it was intended to describe a portion of real history ? Who, remembering what he may have read in other books concerning the Anglo-Saxon Heptarchy and Monarchy, would imagine that this could be a representation of that period ? To be sure, it will do for that period as well as for any other, and seems rather designed for the Elysian fields, or the island of the blessed." In such examples as these we have the true key to the theory of theological development. By such a process of intellectual alchymy, any thing may be brought out of nothing, or rather every thing in the world of fact and reality dissolved and sublimed away into airy nothings. " Take a sentence or two here and there from this father, and a couple of expressions from another, add half a canon of this council, a couple of incidents out of some ecclesiastical historian, an anecdote from a chronicler, two conjectures of some critic, and half a dozen drachms of a schoolman, mix them up in rhetoric *quant. suff.*, and shake them well together,—and thus we get at a theological development. But who, except the prescriber, can tell what the result will be ? And may not he produce any result he chooses ? Yet this is held out as the method by which we are to be preserved from drawing false inferences from the words of Scripture !" †

Surely it is not strange that a mind like this,—having pursued a fond ideal for years in vain, and at last found that which bears at least the semblance of its fulfilment ; wearied out with its own airy creations, and longing for something substantial to lean on, something solid and real without itself ; distracted by the very activity of its own speculative power, and so glad to listen to any voice that will speak in the tones of authority and of command,—should easily persuade itself that in Rome it has found the truth, and bring all history to confirm the welcome belief : and then, gilding and glorifying the object of its homage in all the light of its own gorgeous fancy, should surrender to it its heart, and fall down and adore.

* Sermon on the Establishment of the Romish Hierarchy.

† Contest with Rome, p. 90.

ART. II.—*The Elements of Psychology: including a Critical Examination of Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, and Additional Pieces.* By VICTOR COUSIN. Translated from the French, with an Introduction and Notes, by Caleb S. Henry, D.D. Fourth improved edition, revised according to the Author's last corrections. New York: Ivison & Phinney, 321 Broadway. Chicago: S. C. Griggs & Co., 111 Lake Street. Buffalô: Phinney & Co. 1856. Pp. 568.

IN 1839, there appeared in the pages of this Review* an article entitled "Transcendentalism." It consisted of two parts: the one, a general survey of the modern philosophy of Germany; the other, an examination of the philosophical system of Cousin. That article was reprinted in a pamphlet form in Boston, under the auspices of the late Professor Norton; it was subsequently included in a volume containing selections from the *Princeton Review*, published without any suggestion or co-operation of the conductors of this journal; and recently, the article in question has been reprinted in a handsome volume in Edinburgh, under the superintendence of the Rev. Patrick Fairbairn, D.D., of Aberdeen. Of this article, thus abundantly honoured, Caleb S. Henry, D.D., the translator of the Lectures of Cousin on Locke, which was one of the works therein reviewed, spoke with great contempt in the preface to the third edition of his translation, published in 1841. He says,—

"I have never taken any public notice of it, because, for those who thoroughly understand the subject of which it treats, the article itself is its own best refutation; while to candid and sensible persons, less familiar with philosophical studies, though its numerous untruths and calculated appeals to the prejudices of the ignorant, may not be equally apparent, yet its flippancies, personalities, and bad temper, (at variance alike with the true philosophical and Christian spirit,) are sufficiently obvious to produce the reverse of the intended impression, (I may add, that from both these classes of persons, and from various quarters, I have received numerous testimonies to this effect;) and as to the remaining portion of the public, coming within the limited sphere of the journal in question,—persons, namely, with whom ignorance of the subject and religious associations would make that journal an authority,—I certainly felt no call to argue philosophical questions before such a tribunal.

"A few words will suffice for all that is necessary to say to the reader of this volume. The article represents Cousin as a Pantheist, denying the personality of God, as denying also the essential difference between right and wrong, and as maintaining a scheme of Fatalism. I should do wrong to content myself with simply saying that these representations are totally false. Not only are they entirely destitute

* The Princeton Review.

of just foundation, and contradictory also to the system of Cousin ; but, on each and every one of these points, Cousin *strenuously maintains doctrines precisely the reverse of those imputed to him !* The statements of the article are as laughably untrue as it would be to call Athanasius an Arian, Bishop Berkeley a Materialist, or Jonathan Edwards a believer in the self-determining power of the will ! It seems to me, therefore, incredible that any person of ordinary good sense, assuming to pass a public judgment on such subjects, should fall into an honest misconception of Cousin's doctrines on these points. I confess I can scarcely in my own mind acquit the writer of the article of deliberately imposing on his readers representations which he knew to be not only unjustifiable as towards Cousin personally, because contradictory to his express and repeated official declarations, but also unjust in themselves, because not involved in his fundamental principles, but contrary to his principles, to his system, and to the whole strain of his systematic teaching. This impression is rendered the more difficult to resist, by the mode in which the writer has endeavoured to support his representations,—his logic being of that pleasant and effectual sort sometimes called the method of proving *aliquid ex aliquo*. The only supposition upon which the writer can be freed from the imputation of deliberate bad faith, is, that his predetermination to make out a case destroyed for a time his capacity to perceive any thing that made against his purpose. Why he should have wished to have made out a case, is not hard to be conceived in this community, and is apparent enough from the face of the article.* For proof of the utter falsehood of the charge of Fatalism, the reader need only turn to the tenth chapter of the present volume, and to the notes connected with the fifth chapter."

As to the charge of denying the essential distinction between right and wrong, he says, among other things,—

"Cousin is one of the most decided advocates of the principles of essential and immutable morality that ever wrote; Cudworth, Butler, and Price, have written nothing stronger, nothing clearer. It would not be a grosser falsehood, nor a more laughable blunder, to assert that the systems of Hobbes and Jeremy Bentham recognise disinterested virtue and essential difference of right and wrong, than has been committed by this person in asserting that Cousin denies them.

"So likewise with respect to the charge of Pantheism; apparently the writer of the article in question had no precise conception of the meaning of the term. Certain it is, that Cousin is no Pantheist in any of the senses in which the word is ever used by persons entitled to speak on the subject."

After stating what he regards as different forms of Pantheism, he adds,—

"Now, Cousin not only does not teach Pantheism in either of these forms, but, on the contrary, clearly and abundantly confutes them all.

* What he means by this, we learn from a subsequent part of his remarks. He imputes to the reviewer a desire to injure his reputation, with the view of deterring parents from sending their children to the institution in which he was a professor, and of inducing them to patronise the college at Princeton.

He maintains the substantial existence of God, and the substantial existence of the universe of mind and matter : of God as distinct from the universe ; of God as the cause, and the universe as the effect ; of God as superior to the universe by all the superiority of an infinite, uncreated substance and cause, over all finite and created substances and causes. Yet all that Cousin says expressly and directly on this subject is kept out of view by the writer of the article, and some speculations respecting the relation of the creation to God, and some expressions concerning the all-pervading presence of God, are paraded as proofs of Pantheism.

"I repeat, then, summarily, that the person who wrote the article in question has imputed to Cousin doctrines directly the opposite of those which he explicitly and positively teaches,—doctrines which he distinctly and strenuously opposes ; and the mode in which he endeavours to justify his imputations, involves a perversion of thought and language scarcely less incredible. A parallel argument might be constructed to prove Cudworth an Atheist, Bishop Butler an Infidel, and Mr Thomas Paine a Christian believer !

"A professed exposition of modern German philosophy is also given in this article, putting it in as odious a light as possible, for the sake of casting accumulated odium upon Cousin, and (perhaps chiefly) upon myself. Not adopting any of those German systems, nor sympathising with their theological spirit and tendency, I do not here feel concerned to correct the mistakes of this exposition. Besides, no thinker, tolerably well informed on the subject, needs be told what a superficial and insufficient account it is. It has every appearance of being an assemblage of scraps gathered at second and third hand from encyclopædias, reviews, and incidental notices. A moment's glance is sufficient to satisfy any competent judge that it was never formed by a discriminating, philosophical mind, from a careful examination of the original sources.

"These are the leading and the only material points in the article. Almost every page of it, however, abounds with particular instances of bad spirit and deficient capacity. Its arrogant and flippant personalities, its numerous perversions and blunders, both in logic and fact, taken in connection with the falsehood of its leading positions, form a combination equally pitiable and ludicrous. But I have said enough, and perhaps more than enough, respecting an article so little entitled, either for its matter or its spirit, to the respect of any true philosopher ; and whose only value to the genuine Christian, who is, at the same time, thoroughly acquainted with its subject, is in the example it furnishes, how far from truth and propriety one may be led who attempts, under the banner of religion, to excite the *odium theologicum* against another, by presuming on the ignorance and appealing to the prejudices of those whom he addresses."

All this, and much more to the same effect, was written in 1841, and is republished in 1856,—the writer congratulating himself, at this late day, on his moderation. Not satisfied, however, with what he had accomplished, he adds nearly forty pages of similar matter in the preface to the recent edition of

his work ; and, so great is his feeling of animosity towards an article which he cannot find terms adequately to depreciate, that he has published, or at least distributed, that preface in a pamphlet form. This is certainly putting himself to a great deal of unnecessary trouble. If our article is so false, feeble, malicious, and silly, as he represents it, it does not call for such violent efforts to counteract its influence. It is strange that the writer does not see that he only makes himself ridiculous, by speaking with such contempt of a review whose influence he finds it necessary to counteract half a generation after its publication. So far from time having moderated his irritation, the recent portion of his rejoinder is more reckless and atrocious in its abuse than that written fourteen years ago. He charges the writer of the article in our Review with "point-blank slander," with committing "an outrage on the decencies of any kind of public debate, such as upright and honourable men everywhere look upon with reprobation, such as they expect to see only in the lowest organs of political party rancour." In another place he says : "That any man of ordinary capacity and ordinary intelligence of the subject, with merely that before his eyes which the volume I put forth contained, should be able, from detached and garbled passages out of the volume translated by Mr Linberg, to pronounce such a judgment on Cousin's views of moral distinctions ; that he should be able to do it in good faith, or at least without perceiving such a contradiction between his representation and the official systematic utterances of Cousin on the point, as ought to make an honest man pause ;—this is to me inconceivable, and I frankly say I do not believe it. I think the man guilty of slander ; and I think that, in the clear-sighted judgment of our Lord God, there are many inmates of the state prison less morally guilty than the slanderer."

He complains that our review holds him up as "a contemptibly vain-glorious meddler with matters beyond my reach ; for whose guilt, indeed, the only excuse is to be found in the vanity that blinded me, and the stupidity that incapacitated me from knowing what I was doing." Such was not the impression of Dr Henry's character which our review of 1839 was designed to produce ; but it is the impression which this rejoinder of his will not only make, but render indelible. In the conclusion of his long preface, he says, "My main purpose has been to signalise the spirit and temper of the article in its contrast with that of Sir William Hamilton ; and bad as the impression I have conveyed may be, I assure the reader it is not one half so bad as the reading of the whole article itself will produce. Something also of the character of the article as a philosophical discussion, and of the writer's competency to

engage in the criticism of such questions, I have incidentally shown ; but how bad, how very bad the article is, as a whole, in these respects, I have not attempted to show. Nothing can adequately show it, but the whole article itself,—nor that except to a true thinker, accurately acquainted with Cousin's system, and with the history of philosophy in all its great systems."

As we had no hand in the article thus characterised, we may be allowed to speak of it freely. Not having looked at it since its first publication, and never having seen Dr Henry's preface to the third edition of his book, we were a little startled by his unmeasured contempt and reprobation. With some anxiety, therefore, we took down the *Review* ; and having reperused it, we do not hesitate to say, that we regard it in both its parts, (both in the sketch which it gives of German philosophy, and in its examination of Cousin's system,) for scholarship and ability one of the best reviews which has ever appeared in an American periodical. The outline given of German Transcendentalism is just what it pretends to be. In the compass of thirty pages no reasonable man would expect a thorough exposition of three or four systems of philosophy. It was not the purpose of the writer to examine the fundamental principles of any one of those systems ; but his professed and real object he thoroughly accomplished. That object was, to present a general view of the leading principles and of the theological tendencies of the systems in question. This was done with a copiousness of reference to original and authentic sources of information which betrays the scholar on every page. We do not know where a better view of German philosophy can even now be obtained in so small a compass.

It is, however, against that portion of the review which relates to Cousin's system, that Dr Henry's denunciations are principally directed. The writer of that part of the article in question has been in his grave more than ten years. He is now publicly accused, not only of incompetency and of ridiculous blunders, but also of falsehood and slander, and pronounced worse than a felon. It is impossible to repress the indignation excited by these charges. The publicity given to them imposes a solemn obligation on the surviving friends of the writer to vindicate his memory. So far as these charges rest on Dr Henry's assertions, (which are their main foundation,) they may be fairly met by a counter-assertion. We pronounce them, therefore, one and all, to be false. We assert that the charge of Pantheism, Fatalism, and the effectual subversion of moral distinctions, made against the system as it was at that time exhibited, is fairly made out ; and that the whole impression of the article is such as to commend it to the moral approbation of every competent reader.

There are two things which, in justice to all concerned, should be borne in mind. The one is, that every man who holds a false system of philosophy, must of necessity have an esoteric and exoteric faith. We can no more feel and act in opposition to the laws of our own constitution, than we can live independently of the laws of nature. If a man is theoretically an Atheist, he will still acknowledge God in his hopes and fears. If he is an Idealist, he will not the less speak and act on the assumption of the existence of matter. If he is a Fatalist, he will nevertheless take all available means to secure his own welfare. If he denies the essential distinction between right and wrong, he will manifest in his feelings and judgments the operation of conscience. It may, therefore, be perfectly true that Cousin's system is liable to all the charges brought against it, though his ordinary language and life be governed by the principles of moral and religious truth. There is also a very great difference as to the degree in which those who advocate false doctrines reduce their theory to practice. The very same system in one man becomes the source of the grossest immoralities, while in another it is merely a theory,—a field for the exercise of thought. The Hegelian philosophy produced Heine, though Hegel himself is said to have been as pure as Plato. We take pleasure in saying, that the impression produced on us by Cousin's writings is, that he is a man of refined and elevated tastes. Many of his lectures abound with noble sentiments and with correct principles. In contrast with the scoffing mockery of Voltaire, the whole spirit of Cousin appears to great advantage.

The other remark, which justice to all parties requires us to make, is, that Cousin has openly retracted some of his doctrines, as leading to Fatalism; and he has endeavoured to modify others so as to obviate the objections brought against their religious tendencies. In his last work, "*The True, the Beautiful, and the Good*," the preface to which is dated November 1853, he has taken special pains to reconcile his doctrines, or at least the statement of them, with the fundamental principles of Theism. We do not think that he has succeeded. The system is essentially what it was before. It is just, however, that he should be judged by his latest utterances; and it is no less just that our review, written in 1839, should be judged by his writings as they then stood. Those familiar only with the forms of statement adopted in his last revision of the lectures just referred to, might think our former representations overstated; but if they are compared with the whole course of his instructions, and even if judged by the extracts which Dr Henry, in his infatuation, has just published in the appendix to the *Lectures on Locke*, we are confident

they will be fully sustained. We propose to endeavour to make this appear, for the purpose of vindicating the memory of a friend, whom Dr Henry has so grossly assailed, and for the still higher purpose of doing what we can to set the public on its guard against the system set forth in Cousin's Lectures with all the attractions of genius and eloquence, but which is, as we thoroughly believe, subversive of all religion. This is the more necessary, because the system is not presented in the scholastic form. It is not couched in dry technicalities. It is not buried under an uncouth nomenclature, intelligible only to the initiated. His doctrines are presented in the form of history. One principle is brought out here, another there; first in one form, then in another, surrounded with a brilliant haze, which conceals while it adorns. The writings of Kant, or Hegel, might circulate among our people for a generation, and not be read by a hundred persons, or understood by a dozen. It is very different with the popularised Germanism of Cousin. A poisonous stream may flow under ground and do little harm; but if its waters are thrown up in brilliant jets from a fountain in the midst of a populous city, they will excite general attention and be drunk by thousands. This is just the service Cousin has rendered the pantheistic philosophy of Germany; and it is this that renders his writings so peculiarly dangerous. Many a youth,—and it seems even some doctors of divinity,—who would never think of sinking a shaft a thousand feet deep to reach the waters of Hegel, will drink them without knowing what they are, as they are cast up in rainbow tints by the genius of Cousin; or, to use a more homely illustration, many a man, and especially many a young lady, (for we understand that Cousin's Psychology is taught to girls,) who would revolt at the clammy white of an egg, will delight in the same substance when beaten into froth, coloured and sweetened, and called by some appetising name. Such is the transformation which the insipid albumen of German philosophy has undergone in the hands of Cousin.

The charges against Cousin's philosophy, of Pantheism, Fatalism, and the denial of moral distinctions, we do not propose to consider separately; the first includes the others. Every pantheistic system is of necessity fatalistic, and, by a like necessity, precludes the idea of sin.

Before presenting the evidence in support of this comprehensive charge of Pantheism, we wish to notice the way in which Dr Henry has attempted to refute it. In the first place, he pronounces it ridiculous. "The statements of the article" [in which this charge of Pantheism was made], he says, "are as laughably untrue as it would be to call Athanasius an Arian, Bishop Berkeley a Materialist, or Jonathan Edwards a believer

in the self-determining power of the will." He says it is incredible to him that "any person of ordinary good sense" could honestly bring such an accusation against Cousin's system; that an argument equally valid might be constructed to prove Cudworth an Atheist, or Bishop Butler an Infidel. This, if it means any thing, means that to accuse Cousin of Pantheism was as much an unheard-of folly as to accuse Athanasius of Arianism. Yet Dr Henry, when he made that assertion, knew that the charge in question had been made publicly and earnestly in France, England, and America. Nay, he himself publishes, in the appendix to the book in the preface to which he has the hardihood to make this assertion, Cousin's own declaration of the fact. The charge was so generally made that Cousin found it necessary to defend himself. He says, "It has found so many echoes even beyond the sensual school, that I have written a special dissertation on the Eleatic school, in which I fully explain myself on the subject of Pantheism." Was Athanasius ever called to defend himself against the charge of Arianism? This is not all: Dr Henry refers to some remark of Professor Hickok, in his "*Rational Psychology*," on the doctrine of necessary creation, in which that distinguished writer says that Cousin's Eclecticism is "as really fatalistic and pantheistic" as any of the systems which it has assumed to supplant.* He knew, therefore, that Dr Hickok had pronounced this judgment, and yet he represents our lamented associate as a fool for saying the same thing! Still further, he lauds Sir William Hamilton's review of Cousin's system to the skies, and yet that first of living philosophers brings and substantiates the same charges. He does this in the cool, dispassionate way in which an anatomist dissects a corpse; still he does it, and does it effectually. Dr Henry had read Sir William Hamilton's review; he knew that he asserted that Cousin made the universe the mere phenomenon of God, and that he destroyed liberty by divorcing it from intelligence. He praises Sir William, and dedicates his book to him, and denounces our reviewer as a felon for saying in 1839 what Hamilton had already said in 1829! Worse still, if any thing can be worse, he publishes in the appendix of the very book which contains his atrocious abuse of this journal, for saying Cousin's system is pantheistic, the clearest possible proof of the justice of the charge. He publishes the "Preface to the first edition of *Philosophical Fragments*," in which Cousin advances step by step through thirty odd pages of concatenated speculation, until he arrives at the conclusion that "God is every thing"! What is to be thought of such a man? We can think of no theory to account for such conduct. We

* See Hickok's *Rational Psychology*, p. 71.

cannot understand why a man should voluntarily build a pillory, and then place himself upon it. We have not built it. We did not even place the ladder for him to ascend. It is all Dr Henry's own doing.

2. Dr Henry attempts to show that the charge of Pantheism rests on a few "fervid and exaggerated expressions." "As to the expressions," he says, "relating to the all-pervading presence and energy of God in the universe, they are the same sort of expressions as those in which all elevated meditation on the Divine Being naturally utters itself; and the charge of Pantheism would lie equally against nine-tenths of the most accredited devotional poetry, and against the Holy Scriptures themselves, which speak of God as 'all in all,' and of creatures as 'living, moving, and having their being in him.'" It might as well be said that the conclusion of a demonstration in Euclid was a rhetorical flourish. Pantheism is the conclusion arrived at by a laborious process of argument. The charge is not made to rest on casual declarations; it is founded upon his principles, his arguments, his conclusion, and the application which he makes of the conclusion thus arrived at. Dr Henry makes no effort to meet the real grounds of the charge. There is no show of examining the principles of Cousin's system, or of proving that they do not necessarily lead to Pantheism, or that his arguments do not go to sustain that system, or that the conclusion is not actually carried out and applied. We do not suppose he is capable of any such process, but he surely ought to have attempted it, and not contented himself with assertion and abuse.

3. He places great reliance on the fact, that Cousin often and earnestly denies that he is a Pantheist. This we admit. He declares Pantheism to be Atheism. He says, "To accuse me of Pantheism, is to accuse me of confounding the First, Absolute, Infinite Cause with the universe; that is to say, with the two relative and finite causes of the me, and of the not-me, of which the limits and the evident insufficiency are the foundation from which I rise to the knowledge of God."—(P. 446.) Again, "Human nature raises its voice against Pantheism. All the talent in the world can never justify this doctrine, or reconcile it with the feelings of mankind."—(P. 448.) He is fairly entitled to the full benefit of these denials; but what do they amount to? Simply to this, that he is not what *he calls* a Pantheist. He gives a limited definition of Pantheism, which excludes his system, and then says he is no Pantheist. This is said by the whole school. There are comparatively few German writers of repute who admit themselves to be Pantheists, while there are multitudes who by the common judgment of other men are justly so regarded. Cousin defines

Pantheism to be the doctrine which "ascribes divinity to the All, the grand whole, considered as God, the Universe-God, of the greater part of my adversaries,—of Saint Simon, for example." In this sense, there are no Pantheists, at least among philosophers. Hase says, that "The doctrine that the universe is God, or that God and the universe are one and the same, is properly no philosophical conception at all; even the popular religions of the East have got beyond that point."* He quotes Hegel as speaking with contempt of the notion of a Universe-God; Cousin, therefore, is not alone in his denunciations of Pantheism. With one consent the doctrine is repudiated in the form in which he presents it, by those who are really Pantheists in the true, and perhaps the worst sense of the word. Pantheism is the doctrine which makes God the only real being, of which nature and the soul are the phenomena. It denies all dualism. God and the universe are not two. They are one. The waves and the ocean are not two, they are one; but it would be absurd to say that the waves are the ocean. So these philosophers say it is absurd to assert that the universe is God. The ocean is not exhausted in its waves; neither is God exhausted in the universe. The ocean however, constitutes its waves, and God constitutes the universe. God is both Finite and Infinite. The Finite (*i. e.*, the universe) is God—but not the whole of God. It would be wrong to confound the thoughts of a man with the man himself; yet the sum of a man's thoughts at any one time makes up his whole consciousness for that time. So it would be wrong to confound the universe with God, though the sum of things finite is for the time being the whole consciousness of God. God, in the language of Cousin, "is every thing." God is man, God is nature, God is thought, God is truth, God is light and heat, sun, moon, stars: "God is every thing or nothing." Hence the famous aphorism of Hegel, "*Alles wirklich ist vernünftig*"—"All that is, is divine." Modern Pantheism, therefore, does not merge God in the universe, but it merges the universe in God. If this is Pantheism, then we presume that no competent judge will deny that Cousin is a Pantheist. Without at all questioning his sincerity, we say that his repudiation of the doctrine amounts to nothing; because what he repudiates is not what his opponents mean. He denies that the finite is the Infinite,—that the universe is God; but he does not deny that the Infinite is the finite,—that God is the universe. "All that is, is God," is Pantheism. It is the deification of man and nature, while it degrades God as to his consciousness and life, for any given time, to the limits of the creature.

The universe, according to modern Pantheism, is the son of

* Hase's *Dogmatik*, page 118.

God. All that the Bible says of the relation of the Father to the Son, is true in reference to the relation of God to the universe. The world is consubstantial and coeternal with God. It is his image, his thought, his reason, his life. It does not exhaust him, because there is a constant development of God in the world,—just as the existing flora of our globe does not exhaust the principle of vegetable life. There is an indefinite succession of plants and trees, and an endless multiplication of genera and species. But there is no vegetable life without vegetable products, nor apart from them; and there is no God without the world, or out of it. Dr Henry has produced no denial from the pen of Cousin of the doctrine of Pantheism in its philosophical form; nor has he produced any affirmation of the opposite doctrine, except in forms of expression freely employed by the most open advocates of the systems of Schelling and Hegel. “Cousin,” he says, “is no Pantheist. We have his explicit condemnation of it. He does not confound God with the universe. And to say that he is a Pantheist in the improper sense in which the word is sometimes used,—to say, that is, that he confounds the universe with God,—is equally at variance with hundreds of explicit utterances of his. It would be suicidal to his system; it would be in palpable contradiction with the numerous critical confutations he has constructed against every form of resolving the universe of mind and matter into mere phenomena. It is the very scope of his philosophy to establish the objective reality and the substantial existence of the universe of mind and matter, as distinct from God.” We wish this paragraph to be remembered. It brings the matter to the true issue. The question is not whether Cousin affirms or denies Pantheism. That depends on the meaning of the word. The real question is, Does he reduce “the universe of mind and matter into mere phenomena?” If he does not, then we concede that he is no Pantheist. If he does, then, by Dr Henry’s own showing, he is a Pantheist, and Dr Henry stands self-convicted of the most atrocious abuse of our reviewer, for calling that Pantheism which he here acknowledges to be such; self-convicted also of incapacity to understand the first principles of a system which for thirteen or fourteen years he was engaged in teaching; and self-convicted of assiduously labouring to introduce and inculcate a system utterly subversive of religion and morality. Though our responsibility in this matter is great, it is as nothing compared to his. For if we are mistaken, what harm is done? We, in common with the majority of his readers, have misconceived and misrepresented the doctrines of an illustrious man; and if convinced of our mistake, we shall be glad to make every atonement. But if Dr Henry is mistaken,

then he has been, and still is, labouring to poison the very fountain of life.

4. The great ground of Dr Henry's confidence, the fact to which he constantly appeals in proof not only of stupidity, but of wilful perversion, on the part of our reviewer, is that Cousin "strenuously maintains doctrines precisely the reverse of those imputed to him." This sentence he prints in capitals, to give it the greater emphasis. The proof of the assertion which it contains he finds in the fact, that Cousin discourses largely not only of God, but of his personality, and, therefore, he cannot be a Pantheist; he discourses largely of liberty and spontaneity, and, therefore, cannot be a Fatalist; he writes with eloquence and pathos on morals, and, therefore, cannot deny the foundation of moral distinctions. This mode of argument seems to us to betray the most profound ignorance of the nature of the question at issue. The most notorious Pantheists do all that Cousin does. They speak largely of God, liberty, and virtue. They not only teach that God is a person, but they prove it. They tell us wherein personality consists, what are its necessary conditions, and how God becomes a person. They discuss all the theories of liberty, and often decide in favour of the right one. They examine every department of natural and moral science, and write about them very much as other men. Does this prove any thing? Does the fact that Berkeley wrote a treatise on "Tar-water" prove that he was not an Idealist? May not an Idealist write a dissertation on mechanics? If a Pantheist may write discourses on chemistry or astronomy, why may he not write on liberty or virtue? The controversy between Theism and Pantheism lies back of all these questions. These questions all relate to phenomena, and phenomena are admitted by both parties. The facts of consciousness are the same for both. Both, therefore, may examine, classify, and explain them. The properties and the laws of matter are the same for the advocates of the atomic theory, and for the advocates of the dynamic theory, as to the ultimate principle of matter. It is, therefore, perfectly consistent with the assumption that Cousin is a Pantheist, that he discusses all the phenomena of nature and of the mind; that he examines the theory of beauty, and proves that it cannot be resolved into the agreeable or the useful. With equal consistency he may discuss the facts of consciousness as they bear on the question of liberty, and show the difference between spontaneity and deliberation. So also he may, as he actually does, examine the different theories of virtue, and prove that it is not founded on utility or sentiment, or on the arbitrary will of God; that the Good is good in itself, and ought to be pursued whatever be the consequence; that neither regard for our own happiness,

nor for the happiness of others, is the ultimate motive in doing right. We very readily acknowledge that there is much that is pure and elevating in what Cousin has written on these subjects, and that he occupies much higher grounds than the Epicureans or followers of Paley. But what does all this amount to? Just nothing at all, so far as the real point at issue is concerned. Yet it is mainly on this ground that Dr Henry allows himself to use the unpardonable language, in relation to the writer of this review, which we have quoted above. As it makes no difference whether a man is a Materialist or Idealist, when he comes to discuss the phenomena of nature; so it makes no difference whether he is a Theist or a Pantheist, when he comes to discuss the phenomena of consciousness. This is not saying that there is no difference between Materialism and Idealism, or between Theism and Pantheism. It is merely saying that the difference does not appear in the discussion of phenomena. The world, as it addresses itself to the senses, is the same to the man who thinks it all matter as it is to him who thinks it all mind, or to him who thinks it all God. The one would be just as loath to put his hand into the fire as either of the others. How futile then it is to argue that a man does not think the fire is God, because he talks and acts about it just as other men do; or that he does not think the soul God, because he discusses its phenomena just as they are discussed by others. We honestly think that Dr Henry is the most incompetent man in this whole sphere, whom we have ever encountered, in print or out of it.

We come now to the main question: Is Cousin's philosophy pantheistical? This is the most important question in itself, and also as it concerns the reputation of our lamented friend. If an affirmative answer to this question is proved to be the correct and only one, then our friend stands acquitted, and his accuser stands condemned. It will be remembered that we do not understand by Pantheism the doctrine that the universe is God; we do not charge Cousin with holding or teaching that doctrine, which he expressly repudiates. We mean by Pantheism the modern German doctrine, that God is the only real existence of which the universe of mind and matter is the phenomenon. That this is truly Pantheism, we have the concession of Dr Henry himself. "Pantheism," he says, "in the strict sense of the term, is the confounding of God with the universe,—denying his distinct substantial existence, and making him merely the collective ALL of things. It may be of two sorts: *material*, when the substantial existence of spiritual being is denied, and matter is made the only substance of which the collective all of the universe is composed; or *ideal*, when the substantial existence of matter is denied, and spiritual

being made the only substance. Pantheism, in the less proper meaning of the word, is the confounding of the universe with God,—making God the sole substantial existence, and the universe of mind and matter merely phenomena, thereby destroying human personality, freedom, &c. Now, Cousin not only does not teach Pantheism in either of these forms, but, on the contrary, clearly and abundantly exposes and confutes them all.”—(P. xviii.) That form of Pantheism, then, which makes God the only substantial existence, of which the universe of mind and matter is the phenomenon, destroys human personality and freedom. The whole question, therefore, is whether Cousin teaches that mind and matter are phenomena of which God is the substance. Having reduced the controversy to this single point, we shall endeavour to show, first, that as a historical fact Cousin adopted more or less fully the modern philosophy of Germany; secondly, that modern German philosophy involves the doctrine of Pantheism in form above stated; and thirdly, that Cousin's system, as unfolded by himself, involves the same doctrine.

The first of these points rests on the testimony of competent witnesses. In 1817–18 Cousin visited Germany. He met Hegel at Heidelberg, whom he speaks of as being at that time known only as a distinguished disciple of Schelling. In 1818 he spent a month with Schelling in Munich; and was thus, as he says, introduced to a clearer knowledge of his philosophy. In 1821, he dedicated one of his works to Schelling and Hegel, as *Amicis et Magistris, philosophiæ præsentis ducibus*. In 1826, he spent some time in Berlin with Hegel and his principal followers, and was more thoroughly indoctrinated in his system. From this time he was in correspondence with the now acknowledged head of the German school, whom he was wont to address as Mon Maître. In one of his letters he says to him, “J'attends votre Encyclopédie. J'en attraperai toujours quelque chose, et tacherai d'ajuster à ma taille quelques lambeaux de vos grandes pensées.” In another letter he says, “Je veux me former, Hegel; j'ai donc tant pour ma conduite, que pour ma publication d'avis austère, et je l'attends de Vous. Sous ce rapport, Vous me devez de temps en temps une lettre sérieuse.” Again, he says, “Parlez, parlez, mon ami; mes oreilles et mon âme Vous sont ouvertes. Si vous n'avez pas le temps de m'écrire, dictez à d'Henning, Hotho, Michelet, Gans, Förster, quelques pages Allemandes en caractères Latins; ou, comme l'Empereur Napoléon, faites rédiger Votre pensée, et corrigez en la rédaction, que Vous m'enverrez.”

In 1833 Cousin published, in the preface to the third edition of his “Philosophical Fragments,” an account of his intercourse with Schelling and Hegel, and gives in many points the

preference to the former. This disconcerted the friends of Hegel, who attributed the change in Cousin's estimation of these two great leaders, which took place between 1828 and 1833, to Hegel's having refused to review Cousin's "Fragments," and Schelling having done him that favour. This they felt the more, because that article was made the vehicle of Schelling's first open assault against his former associate and friend. The facts above stated, however, abundantly prove that Cousin avowed himself, what every one knew he was, the disciple of the leaders of the German Pantheistic school.* They were his recognised masters.

That he became a disciple of Schelling, and enamoured of his system, is also stated by Sir William Hamilton, in his examination of Cousin's theory, originally published in the *Edinburgh Review*. Sir William Hamilton says, "If we compare the philosophy of Cousin with the philosophy of Schelling, we at once perceive that the former is a disciple, though by no means a servile disciple, of the latter. The scholar, though enamoured of his master's system as a whole, is sufficiently aware of the two insuperable difficulties of that theory. He saw that if he pitched the absolute so high, it was impossible to deduce from it the relative; and he felt, probably, that the intellectual intuition—a stumbling-block to himself—would be arrant foolishness in the eyes of his countrymen. Cousin and Schelling agree that as philosophy is the science of the unconditioned, the unconditioned must be within the compass of science. They agree that the unconditioned is known, and immediately known; and they agree that intelligence, as competent to the unconditioned, is impersonal, infinite, divine. But while they coincide in the fact of the absolute as known, they are diametrically opposed as to the mode in which they attempt to realise this knowledge,—each regarding as the climax of contradiction the manner in which the other endeavours to bring human reason and the absolute into proportion. According to Schelling, Cousin's absolute is only a relative; according to Cousin, Schelling's knowledge of the absolute is a negation of thought itself. Cousin declares the condition of all knowledge to be plurality and difference; and Schelling, that the condition under which alone a knowledge of the absolute becomes possible, is indifference and unity. The one thus denies a notion of the absolute to consciousness; while the other affirms that consciousness is implied in every act of intelligence."†

The differences between Schelling, Hegel, and Cousin, all lie

* See Rosenkranz's *Leben Hegel's*, pp. 368-373.

† See *Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, &c.*, by Sir William Hamilton, Harper's edition, p. 30.

outside of the doctrine which we wish to show is common to them all. They all agree in making the finite the phenomenon of the Infinite. They differ in their methods of arriving at the knowledge of the Infinite, and in their mode of explaining how the one passes into the other. The only object for which we cite the testimony of Sir William Hamilton, is to prove that Cousin was regarded as a disciple of Schelling, and as having adopted his system as a whole, not as distinguished from that of Hegel, but as distinguished from those of Kant and other theistical philosophers.

The difficulties attending Schelling's method, rather than dissatisfaction with his results, seem to have inclined him, for a time, to the special school of Hegel, though he appears to have subsequently returned to his first love. Michelet (not the French historian, but the Berlin professor) says, "That after Cousin, subsequently to his visit to Berlin, in 1826, carried to France the principles of Hegel's doctrine, which Von Henning, Hotho, and myself, had systematically discussed with him, and especially after he had found such favour with the French public by means of Hegel's views of history, the Hegelian philosophy ceased to be confined within the limits of Germany, and obtained a European reputation. This is one of the most important of the services of Cousin." * On a subsequent page, he says that Cousin had given "universality and a European reputation to the Hegelian philosophy;" and a little farther on he adds, that although Cousin "took so much doctrine from Hegel, he still adhered to the stand-point of psychology, and to its method, which he had derived from the Scottish philosophy, and from the doctrines of Royer-Collard." Here, again, the difference between Cousin and his German masters is confined to method, and not to results. That Cousin introduced the Hegelian philosophy into France is the fact attested. This we consider sufficient, so far as the first point is concerned. It is, indeed, a matter of common fame,—a fact all but universally recognised,—that the wonderful success of Cousin as a public lecturer, was due not more to his genius and eloquence than to his having popularised the abstruse philosophy of Germany,—for the reception of which, with its intoxicating doctrines, the youth of France were fully prepared. Nothing stood in its way; there was no reigning philosophy; the Materialism of the revolutionary period had died out; the doctrines of Reid had gained but slight hold of the public mind; and, therefore, when Cousin appeared, teaching a new system, apparently original,† and recommended by a mode of

* *Geschichte der Letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel.* Von Dr Carl Ludwig Michelet, vol. ii. pp. 685, 687, and 689.

† It must strike every reader of Cousin's Lectures with surprise, that while he so

presentation perspicuous and captivating, his success was without parallel in modern times.

If Cousin adopted the German philosophy, it becomes necessary to inquire what that philosophy is. Cousin says truly, that it is impossible to understand the doctrine of Plato without understanding the systems which precede and follow it. It is no less impossible to understand Cousin without understanding something of those systems whence his own, as to all its great principles, is derived, and of which it is merely a modification. The comparative anatomist is enabled to determine the genus, the species, and often even the variety, to which an animal, whether extant or fossil, belongs, from a single bone, and much more readily from the whole skeleton. This, however, could not be done without a previous knowledge of the various cognate types of animal nature. So it is easy for any reader, tolerably conversant with the history of philosophy, to determine from a few pages of a writer, with what school he stands affiliated; though, without that knowledge, he would be as much in the dark as a man ignorant of anatomy in the presence of the bones of some unknown animal. We propose, therefore, to give a brief statement, as perspicuous as we can make it, of the modern German philosophy, as indispensable to any proper apprehension of the true character of the system of Cousin. Strauss, the famous author of the *Life of Christ*, in the introduction to his *Dogmatik*, says that all the modern systems of philosophy may be divided into two classes; the one, the theistic philosophy of Leibnitz and Wolf; the other, the pantheistic philosophy of Spinoza, Schelling, and Hegel. It is not the peculiar doctrine of Spinoza, as distinguished from that of Schelling, nor the doctrine of Schelling as distinguished from that of Hegel, that we propose to endeavour to state; but the leading features of the system common to them all, which, unless we are entirely mistaken, will be found to include that of Cousin also.

The distinctive title of this system is Monism,* as distinguished on the one hand from Pantheism (in one of its forms), and on the other from Theism. It is the doctrine of one Being. God is, and beside him there is nothing. God is every thing. He is the one existence, of which nature and mind are the movements; the one substance, of which they are the phenomena; the absolute reason, of which all things are the ideas.

frequently mentions Kant to praise and to refute him, he seldom or never says any thing of Schelling or Hegel, from whom the staple of his philosophy is so largely drawn. He seems to his readers to have taken up the subject as it was left by Kant, and worked out his results without any intervening steps.

* This is the most recently adopted designation. It is the Greek equivalent to the German *Alleinheitslehre*, *all-oneness*; or *Identitätslehre*, *the doctrine of Identity*, employed by Schelling. Hegel calls his system "Absolute Idealism," which amounts to the same thing.

This is the result to which this philosophy has arrived. How has this result been reached?

The end of all philosophy is to give a rational solution of the problem of being. Whether it adopts the *a priori* method to the exclusion of the *a posteriori*, whether it starts from reason or experience, or whether it attempts to combine the two methods, the thing which philosophy proposes to do, is to explain how things are. God, nature, and man, are the elements of the problem which philosophy undertakes to solve. Of the two latter, we have, by common consent, in one sense or another, immediate knowledge. But as they do not contain within themselves the solution of their own existence, we cannot stop with them. Whatever it may be called, there must be some Being, either distinct from nature and mind, and the cause of them, or which includes them as the manifestations of itself.

The first point, therefore, to be determined is, what that Being is; the second, in what relation he stands to the universe of nature and of mind; and the third, the consequences of the solution thus arrived at.

It is a principle of the philosophy under consideration, that intelligence implies consciousness, and that consciousness supposes a difference between the subject and object. Every act of consciousness necessarily supposes that we distinguish the self from what is not-self—the ego from the non-ego. Consciousness, therefore, implies limitation. We limit ourselves by distinguishing ourselves from what is not ourselves. But limitation is, by the very force of the word, inconsistent with the Infinite. The Infinite or Absolute (terms used as equivalent by the German school, though distinguished by Sir William Hamilton) is the unlimited. Consciousness, therefore, cannot be predicated of the Infinite; nor can intelligence, for intelligence implies consciousness. Suppose we abstract from matter all its properties,—its extension, resistance, weight, its chemical affinities, &c.,—what remains? Nothing that is knowable; that is, nothing of which any thing can be affirmed or denied. Or suppose we abstract from mind all thought, sensation, emotion, affection, &c., and what remains? Again nothing of which any thing can be affirmed or denied. So if you abstract the finite from the Infinite, you leave nothing but a mere potentiality, a cause, power, substance,—call it what you will, it is still an unknown quantity. In order to know itself, or to be known, it must become finite,—it must become objective to itself. The Infinite thus passes into the finite; *i. e.*, into the universe of nature and mind. God has no *existence* out of the world, any more than life exists out of things living.

This determines the second point above mentioned, viz., the

relation of the Infinite to the finite; or, if you please, of God to the universe. It is a relation of identity. The universe is consubstantial and coeternal with God. Still, the latter is not exhausted in the former, any more than the mind is exhausted in its acts. The universe is finite, God is infinite. The universe is effect, God is cause. Nevertheless, the universe is God in the sense that it is, for the time being, the whole life, intelligence, and consciousness of God. Take from God the life, intelligence, and consciousness of the universe, and you leave an unknown quantity. The universe, therefore, is the self-revelation of God; *i. e.*, the revelation of God to himself. It is the life of God. All that is in God is in the universe, not as a dead or stagnant pool, but as an ever-flowing stream. The water of a river is the river; but the water which fills its banks is not always the same water. It is constantly varying its course, its current, its eddies, its form, its contents. Thus the universe is the ever-flowing stream of the life of God; now this, now that; now in one form, now in another; inexhaustible in its source, and endless in its flow. The universe, therefore, and all that it contains, are mere moments in the life of God. All acts are his acts, all feeling is his feeling, all thought is his thought, all consciousness is his consciousness. God is the only being, of which the universe is the manifestation; he is the only substance, of which the universe is the phenomenon.

The third point to be considered, is the consequences which flow from this theory, or the applications made of it. These reach very far.

1. As to the nature of God. Although he may be said to be a person, in so far as he comes to self-consciousness, the indispensable condition of personality in man, yet he is not a person as distinguished from other persons. He comes to personality as he comes to consciousness. He is a *Werdende Persönlichkeit*, or all-comprehending person. The finite and Infinite together constitute God; and it is only of the Infinite as realised in the finite we can predicate intelligence, moral excellence, or knowledge. The moral excellence of God is the goodness of his creatures; his omniscience is the sum of their knowledge; his omnipotence is the causality of all that is and that is to be,—and nothing more. There is nothing in God which is not in the universe, and in its progress. God is just as much an object of knowledge as nature or the soul. We know God as fully as we know ourselves.

2. As the Infinite is the substance of which the finite is the phenomenon; and the Infinite being spirit, and the essence of spirit being thought, the Infinite and finite are resolved into thought. The latest designation of the system is therefore Absolute Idealism, a name chosen by Hegel himself.

God and man are identical. The Infinite in becoming finite becomes man; and as this is an eternal process, without beginning and without end, man is eternal. God *is* in himself, but he *exists* only in man. Nature is unconscious, it does not know itself; and therefore God is unconscious in nature. His real existence as a conscious intelligence is in man. And as man exists in very different degrees of development, God is in some men in a much higher sense than in others,—just as reason is in a higher state in a man of science than in an infant. And as spirit is only what it knows itself to be, it is only those who know themselves to be God who are really divine. It is the “Thinker,” as Dr Henry calls him, “who, penetrating into the depths of consciousness, finds God, and is aware of the identity of divinity and humanity, who is the true God-man. This is that self-deification which the holy Neander so abhorred, and which made this whole system to him the abomination of desolation. This is the philosophy which American divines and professors are peddling about by the thimble-full, to boys and boarding-school girls!

3. If consciousness is necessary to intelligence, and limitation to consciousness, and if intelligence is necessary to the *existence* of spirit, then the Absolute Spirit must limit itself to become spirit; that is, the Infinite must pass into the finite,—the one supposes the other, they coexist, and cannot exist apart. Creation, therefore, is necessary. An inoperative cause is no cause. Mind without thought is no mind. God without the world is no God. It is, therefore, by the strictest necessity of nature that God creates, as it is by a necessity of nature that mind thinks. As, however, the mind is spontaneous, and not coerced in thinking, so God may be said to be free in creating. This, however, does not alter the case. The necessity remains absolute. If there is no world, there is no God. Hence the elder Fichte said that the doctrine of creation in time is the fundamental error of all false religions. Necessary creation is fundamental to this whole system, and necessary creation is Fatalism; for creation is a process as continuous as thought. If you choose to make a distinction between the necessity by which a heavy body falls to the ground, and the necessity by which mind thinks, you may make a distinction between the Fatalism of the Stoics and the Fatalism of this philosophy. It is a distinction without a practical difference. It is inexorable fate in both cases.

4. History is the self-evolution of God; it is a necessary process,—that is, a process governed by necessary laws. As the Infinite develops itself in one form in the stars, in another form in plants, in another in sentient creatures, so he develops himself in man. Cosmology, zoology, anthropology, are only

different branches of theology. The history of man is the history of God. One idea is embodied in one epoch or nation, another in another. As this self-evolution is a process, and in its ultimate nature a process of mind, and as mind is developed by the conflict of truths (for error is only imperfect truth), so history is carried on by conflicts. Wars are the conflict of ideas in the concrete. They are the necessary means of progress. Without discussion there would be stagnation of mind; and without war there would be a stagnation of society. In the conflict of ideas the true and right always prevail. So in war the conqueror is always in the right. He is always more moral than the vanquished. He that is beaten ought to be beaten. It is time philosophy put its foot on the neck of philanthropy. Success is the sole criterion of the true and good. The triumph of heathenism over Christianity under the persecuting emperors; the predominance of the Arians for centuries over the Trinitarians, of the Mussulmans over the Christians in the East, of Romanism over Protestantism in Italy and Spain, of Atheism in France, of Rationalism in Germany, of despotism throughout Europe, is all right. The successful are always right. ALLES WIRKLICH IST VERNUNFTIG is the motto on the banner of this philosophy.

5. There is no sin. This does not mean (as poor Dr Henry seems to think) that there is no difference between the sentiment of approbation and disapprobation, between right and wrong, or that no moral difference can be predicated of human acts. This would be as absurd as to say, there is no difference between pleasure and pain, between one sensation and another; that all things look alike, smell alike, and taste alike. Philosophers, *i. e.*, οἱ φάσχοιτες εἶναι σοφοί, are, according to Scripture, pre-eminently the fools of the world (we trust they will not throw on us the responsibility of that judgment), but they are not fools after that sort. When they say there is no sin, they mean that sin, like pain, is a form of good; it is the negative quantity in mathematics; the negative pole in magnetism. You cannot have the one without the other; there cannot be a north without a south; strength without resistance; virtue without vice. Sin is only the sweat on the brow of labour, the travail that attends the birth of virtue. Sin (may the Infinitely Holy forgive us for writing such blasphemy) is as much a form of God as virtue. Reason is reason in the vagaries of a child, and in the speculations of Plato. Water is water in the muddy pool, in Niagara, and in the ocean. God is God in the insect and in Arcturus, in Nero and in John the apostle. If God is every thing, every thing is God. The sublime consolation which these philosophers offer to the sinful and the suffering is, that God is no better off than they. Their con-

sciousness is his; *i. e.*, it goes to make up the sum of his experience. It is he that is struggling and suffering; it is he who is in travail from eternity to eternity. Suffering men have only to lift themselves to the height of this great argument, and recognise themselves as a moment in the life of God,—a form in which the Infinite manifests itself,—in order to lose the sense of their degradation and misery in the consciousness of their godhead.

6. Philosophy is the highest form of religion. All religions are forms more or less perfect, in which certain ideas in the Absolute Spirit develop themselves; or rather, they are conceptions which the people form of ideas, or the forms under which phenomenal reason (reason in man) apprehends the Absolute Reason. There is a constant progress in this development, and, therefore, the last religion is the best. This is the advantage of Christianity; it is the highest form of religion for the masses; philosophy is something higher, to which "thinkers" have attained, and they kindly offer their assistance to raise the gospel to their own level. There are different views, however, entertained by the advocates of this system, as to its relation to the gospel. Some of them regard Christianity as obsolete as heathenism; others say, it is still good enough for the people; and others, as at times Hegel himself, say that it is the absolute religion, identical with philosophy. These are, however, only different modes of stating the same thing. The Christianity which some of the school pronounce obsolete, is repudiated by those who pronounce the gospel the absolute religion; and that which the latter thus pronounce to be true, the former also receive, under the name of philosophy. What Christians in all ages have regarded as the gospel of the grace of God, is spurned by all alike. The point of contact between Christianity and Monism is assumed to be the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation. Both systems teach a triplicity in unity, and both teach that God became man. The triplicity in unity of Monism is the Infinite, the finite, and their relation. The Absolute Substance is both infinite and finite, and remains one, or constitutes the unity or identity of the two other members of the formula. The Infinite, as such, is the Father; as manifested in the finite, he is the Son; the identity of the two is the Spirit. As in the finite (the universe of nature and mind), man alone is self-conscious, it is man that is properly the second person in this philosophic Trinity, the consubstantial and coeternal Son of God. The scriptural form of the doctrine of Incarnation is defective in two points. First, in making God incarnate in an individual man, Jesus of Nazareth, instead of in the race; and, secondly, in teaching that the divine and human are two dis-

tinet natures, whereas they are one and the same; still, it is to this approximation to the truth that Christianity, according to these philosophers, owes all its power.

The Fall, in this instance, is the Infinite becoming finite; and Redemption is the return of the finite into the Infinite. These are processes necessary and eternal. As God is the world, here is hereafter, earth is heaven. This world is no longer a vale of tears leading to a heavenly land, but it is the eternal theatre of the life of God, and the judgment is the process of history.

We give this outline of modern Pantheism, or Monism, without a line of authentication. Should any one take the trouble to point out that this or that important principle has been omitted, that Spinoza held this peculiarity, Schelling another, and Hegel another, we have only to say that we did not undertake to give the essence of a hundred volumes in half a dozen pages. We merely profess to present the outline of a system common, in all its essential features, to the Pantheistic writers of the German school. If any proposition contained in the above outline is called in question, we stand ready to sustain it by abundant citations from the accredited expounders and advocates of the doctrine, or freely to acknowledge our error. We have great confidence, however, that the view here given of this portentous system will commend itself as just to the mind of every competent reader.

We come now to the third point which we proposed to establish, viz., that Cousin's system is identical with the German doctrine which we have just unfolded. By this we do not mean that he holds every principle of German Pantheism in detail, for it would be difficult to find any two German philosophers who are so completely in accord. But we do mean, that he holds the system as a system, and that he traces it out to substantially the same results. The relation of Cousin's philosophy to that of Germany is analogous to the relation of the English alphabet to the Greek. The Greek has some letters which are not in the English, and the English has some which are not in the Greek. No one, however, can read the one after reading the other, without perceiving their substantial identity. If a country schoolmaster, or even a professor, should undertake to show that the Anglo-Saxons invented their own alphabet, that it is distinguished from the Greek, and all others, "by fundamental principles," he would do just what Dr Henry has ventured to do, in asserting the essential difference between the Philosophy of Cousin and the Pantheism of Germany. We shall endeavour to show, first, that Cousin avows the result to which the German philosophy has arrived, —i.e., that he avows Monism, or that God is every thing.

Secondly, that his principles, as traced out by himself, lead inevitably to that conclusion. And, thirdly, that he deduces from the doctrine thus consciously elaborated, substantially the same conclusions.

First, Cousin avows Monism, or that form of Pantheism which makes God every thing.

We have seen that the fundamental idea of German Pantheism is triplicity in unity—the Infinite, the finite, and their relation; God, nature, and humanity are one. This idea is presented by Cousin, not merely hundreds of times, but, from the popular character of his lectures, it comes up so constantly, and in such various forms, as to constitute the burden of his instructions. Sometimes it is unity, plurality, and identity; sometimes it is substance, phenomenon, and their relation; sometimes it is absolute cause, relative cause, and their common ground; sometimes it is the primitive, the actual, and their identity; sometimes it is the infinite, the finite, and their relation. In every form of language the idea is presented, affirmed, illustrated, and defended, that the sum of being is to be resolved into this unity and multiplicity. Man, with him, is a microcosm. What is true of reason in us, is true of the Eternal Reason. In our consciousness there are these three ideas—the finite, the infinite, and their identity. So there are in the Eternal Reason. We have in consciousness, the *ego*, the *non-ego*, and their common basis, which constitute the unity of our consciousness. So in God, or the Absolute Reason, there are the same elements.

“Reason,” he says, “in whatever way it may occupy itself, can conceive nothing except under the condition of two ideas, which preside over the exercise of its activity: the idea of the unit and of the multiple, of the finite and of the infinite, of being and of appearing, of substance and of phenomenon, of absolute cause and of secondary causes, of the absolute and of the relative, of the necessary and of the contingent, of immensity and of space, of time and of eternity. Analysis, in bringing together all these propositions, in bringing together, for example, all these first terms, identifies them; it identifies equally all the second terms; so that of all these propositions, compared and combined, it forms a single proposition, a single formula, which is the formula itself of thought, and which you can express, according to the case, by the unit and by the multiple, the absolute being and the relative being, unity and variety, &c. Finally, the two terms of this formula, so comprehensive, do not constitute a dualism in which the first term is on one side, the second on the other, without any other relation than that of being perceived at the same time by reason. . . . These three terms are distinct, but inseparable, and constitute a triplicity and an indivisible unity. Having attained this height, we have lost sight of land, and it becomes us to see where we are.”*

* History of Modern Philosophy, translated by O. Wight, vol. i. p. 83.

The finite, and infinite, and their relation, then, constitute a triplicity in unity :—

“There are in human reason two distinct elements, with their relation ; that is to say, three elements, three ideas. These three ideas are not an arbitrary product of human reason ; far from that, they constitute this reason. Now that which is true in reason, humanly considered, subsists in reason considered in itself ; that which is the basis of our reason is the basis of Eternal Reason ; that is, a triplicity which resolves itself into a unity, and a unity which develops itself in triplicity. The unity of this triplicity is alone real, and, at the same time, this unity would entirely perish if confined to one of the three elements which are necessary to it. They are, therefore, all of the same value, and constitute an indecomposable unity. What is this unity ? Divine Intelligence itself.” *

“I have shown how variety springs from unity, the finite from the Infinite, relative being from Absolute Being ; I have shown that unity, the Infinite, being in itself absolute substance,—being cause, also, and absolute cause,—could not [but] have produced variety, the finite, the relative ; so that true unity and veritable infinity being given, you have already in the germ variety and the finite ; that is, finite and varied causes, a world animated and full of forces, and a humanity which is itself an active and productive power.” †

“The ideas of the finite, of the Infinite, and of their necessary connection as cause and effect, meet in every act of intelligence, nor is it possible to separate them from each other ; though distinct, they are bound together, and constitute at once a triplicity and a unity.” ‡

“The first term [the Infinite], though absolute, exists not absolutely in itself, but as an absolute cause which must pass into action, and manifest itself in the second [the finite]. The finite cannot exist without the Infinite, and the Infinite can only be realised [*i.e.*, become real] by developing itself in the finite.” §

We could fill a volume with equally distinct avowals of the fundamental principle of modern Pantheism.

It is not, however, merely by asserting that the Infinite becomes real only in the finite, that Cousin avows Monism. That avowal is involved in the constantly recurring statement, that God is the one absolute substance, of which the universe is the phenomenon. Dr Henry admits that this is a form of Pantheism, and that it destroys human personality and freedom ; yet he himself makes his master teach this doctrine in the most explicit terms. He tells us that Cousin teaches that “the fundamental fact of consciousness is a complex phenomenon composed of three terms ; first, the *me* and the *not-me*, limited and finite ; then the idea of something different from these,—the unlimited, the infinite ; and, third, the relation of the finite to the infinite, which contains and unfolds it. These three terms universally and necessarily meet in every act of

* History of Modern Philosophy, translated by O. Wight, vol. i. p. 83.

† Ibid, p. 158. ‡ Cousin's Psychology, by Henry, first edition, p. xviii. § Ibid.

consciousness. We find there the consciousness of self, as distinguished from the not-self, and of both as *finite*; but, at the same time, we are, and must be, conscious of something *infinite*, of something *substantial*, as that is *phenomenal*; and, finally, connecting the two terms, infinite and finite, under the principle of causality, we do and must regard the former as a cause, and, consequently, in its nature an infinite cause. That is God.* Can any thing be plainer? The Infinite is substance; the finite—*i.e.*, the universe of nature and mind—is phenomenal. It is a great trial of one's patience and meekness, to see a man professing to be a teacher of philosophy, denouncing and upbraiding the *Princeton Review* for saying that Cousin taught the doctrine which he himself thus expressly declares he did teach.

Sir William Hamilton, whom Dr Henry so highly lauds, and to whom he attributes so just a comprehension of Cousin's system, says that, according to that system, "in every act of consciousness we distinguish a *self* or *ego*, and something different from self, a *non-ego*,—each limited and modified by the other. These, together, constitute the finite element. But, at the same instant, when we are conscious of these existences,—plural, relative, and contingent,—we are conscious likewise of a superior unity in which these are contained, and by which they are explained; a unity, absolute as they are conditioned; *substantive as they are phenomenal*; and an infinite cause, as they are finite causes. This unity is God."†

"The great division of ideas at present established," says Cousin himself, "is the division into contingent ideas, and necessary ideas. This division, in a point of view more circumscribed, is the foundation of that which I have just presented to you, and which may be expressed under the different formulas of unity and multiplicity, of *substance and phenomenon*, of absolute cause and relative causes, of the perfect and the imperfect, of the finite and the infinite. Each of these propositions has two terms,—the one necessary, absolute, single, essential, perfect, infinite,—the other, imperfect, phenomenal, relative, multiple, finite. A wise analysis identifies all the second terms among themselves, as well as all the first terms among themselves; it identifies, on the one hand, immensity and eternity, the absolute substance and the absolute cause, the absolute perfection and the absolute unity; and, on the other hand, the multiple, the phenomenal, the relative, the limited, the finite, the bounded, the imperfect. Behold, then, all the propositions which we have enumerated reduced to a single one, as vast as reason and the possible, to the opposition of unity and plurality, of substance and phenomenon, of *being and appearance*, of identity and difference, &c."‡

* Cousin's Psychology, by Henry, first edition, p. xxi.

† *Edinburgh Review*, October 1829. See the reprint of the article in "Discussions on Philosophy and Literature." By Sir William Hamilton. Harper's edition, p. 17.

‡ Hist. of Philosophy. Wight, p. 78.

"The human race has believed with equal certainty in God and in the world. They believe in a world as a real effect, firm and enduring, which they refer to a cause; not to a cause powerless [who ever heard of a powerless cause?] and contradictory in itself, which, forsaking its effect, for that very reason would destroy it; but to a cause worthy of the name, which, producing and reproducing without cessation, deposits, without ever exhausting them, its force and its beauty in its work. They believe, as it were, in a *combination of phenomena which would cease to be at the moment in which the eternal substance should cease to sustain them*; they believe, as it were, in the visible manifestation of a concealed principle which speaks to them under this cover, and which they adore in nature and in consciousness. Behold in what the mass of the human race believe. The honour of true philosophy would be to collect this universal belief, and to give it a legitimate explanation."*

According to this, mankind believe in an Eternal Substance of which all things are the phenomena—a Being of which the universe is the ever-varying appearance; they believe that nature and humanity are moments in the ceaseless flow of the life of God; and it is the business of philosophy to explain and authenticate this grand conception.

We shall not multiply citations on this point. The idea that the Infinite is alone substantial, and the finite phenomenal, is so inwrought in Cousin's system, that it will come up at every step as we advance.

There is still another form in which Cousin gives in his adhesion to German Pantheism. So far as modern forms of thought are concerned, there are but three general systems of philosophy. The one is the theistic, which assumes the existence of an eternal, self-conscious, extra-mundane God, existing independently of the universe, and creating it in time by the word of his power, out of nothing. The other is the doctrine that the universe is God, that God is nothing but the universe; and as the universe is finite, God is finite. This the Germans call false Pantheism. This they reject. The third system is a medium between the others, and is sometimes called by its advocates the true Pantheism, sometimes the doctrine of Identity, sometimes Monism. Nothing is more common than to find these German philosophers repudiating Pantheism (as above explained) on the one hand, and Theism (or the scholastic doctrine of God, as they call it) on the other; and claiming to occupy the true *via media*. Cousin does precisely the same thing:—

"If I have not confounded," he says, "God and the world, if my God is not the Universe-God of Pantheism, neither is he, I confess, the abstraction of absolute unity, the lifeless God of the scholastic theology. As God is made known only so far as he is absolute cause, on this account, in my opinion, he cannot but produce; so that the

* History of Philosophy. Wight, p. 121.

creation ceases to be unintelligible, and God is no more without a world than a world without God."*

"Is God to be considered as a substance purely, and which is not a cause, as Spinoza will have it; or at most a cause of himself, which is not a true cause? We thus destroy his power, we destroy the possibility of humanity and that of nature; we have, like the Eleatics, the infinite in itself, but without any relation to the finite, the absolute without any relation to the relative, unity without diversity. On the other hand, do we plunge into the exclusive idea of the cause operative, that is, in the relative, the contingent, the multiple; and do we refuse to go beyond it? We stop, then, at the form of things, and fail of their essence and of their principle. We can thus end only in a chimerical Theism, or an extravagant Theism. True Theism is not a dead religion, that forgets precisely the fundamental attribute of God, namely, the creative power, action, and what is derived from it. Pantheism is in possession of all observable and visible reality, and of its immediate laws; but it misconceives the principle even of this reality, and the first and last reason of its laws. Thus, on all sides, diverse methods, diverse systems in psychology, in logic, and in metaphysics; on all sides opposition and contradiction, error and truth, altogether. The only possible solution of these contradictions is in the harmony of contrarieties, the only means of escaping error is to accept all truths."†

We have thus shown that Cousin avows Monism, 1. By making triplicity in unity the fundamental principle of his system, as it is the fundamental principle of Monism. 2. By making the Infinite the only substance; and the finite, *i. e.*, the universe of nature and mind, its phenomenon. 3. By rejecting Pantheism (in one of its forms) on the one hand, and Theism (in its ordinary sense) on the other, and taking a middle ground; which is, and can, under the circumstances, be no other than Monism.

The second point which we proposed to establish is, that Cousin's principles not only logically lead to this result, but that he consciously traces them out to this conclusion.

There are several causes which enhance the difficulty of getting a clear view of Cousin's system. One is, that being professor not of philosophy, but of its history, his writings are devoted rather to expounding the opinions of others than to developing his own. Another is, that as his instructions were delivered in the form of lectures, addressed to large and promiscuous audiences, they are rhetorical, repetitious, and often declamatory. Still another is, that his views are rarely presented in a concatenated form; one principle comes up here, and another there. Besides all this, his nomenclature is not fixed; he uses the same word in opposite senses, and therefore frequently affirms and denies the same proposition.

* Cousin's Psychology, by Henry, p. 447.

† Hist. of Philosophy, translated by Wight, p. 259.

Thus, he sometimes says that *ego* is a substance, and that *non-ego* is a substance; and then again, he not only denies this, but argues to prove that neither the one nor the other can be substantial. Perhaps the greatest difficulty, after all, arises from the fact, that he was not sure of his own ground. He had not gained fully his own consent to the system which he had embraced; his better nature no doubt often revolted against it; and he had a wholesome and praiseworthy apprehension that the public mind in France was not prepared for the full development and inculcation of German Pantheism. Hence the vacillations, the saying and unsaying, the inculcations of Pantheism and the avowals of Theism, with which his writings abound.

The most connected view anywhere given by Cousin himself of his whole system, so far as we know, is to be found in the preface to the first edition of his "Philosophical Fragments." The greater part of that preface Dr Henry has translated, and printed in the appendix to the recent edition of Cousin's "Psychology," pp. 406-440. We propose to analyse that exhibition of his doctrine, and to show that it is an elaborate argument in support of Monism, or of that form of Pantheism which merges the universe in God.

After proving that philosophy must be founded on observation, he says, that the facts of consciousness, though our point of departure, are not the limits of our investigations. Though we must begin with psychology, we must end with ontology.

When we inspect our consciousness, we find there three orders of facts, due respectively to reason, sensibility, and the will. We have many notions which cannot be referred to sensation as their source; such, for example, as those of cause, substance, time, space, the good, the beautiful.

There is one characteristic common to the facts of reason and to those of sensibility: they are necessary; they do not depend upon the will; we do not create the phenomena either of reason or sense; they are entirely independent of our volitions. We cannot will a thing to be hard or soft, true or false, good or evil; we cannot will two and two to be six. Our whole power, or causative being, is in the will; the will, therefore, is the person: reason is impersonal; it does not belong to us, nor to humanity; it is universal and necessary. Reason presents itself in our consciousness under two forms, spontaneity and reflection. We have a spontaneous apperception of the truth, which it is the office of reflection to analyse. There can be nothing in reflection which is not in spontaneity. God, nature, and man, are all included in the spontaneous apperceptions of reason, and are therefore included in consciousness, and even in every act of consciousness. Those only, however, who have

the skill, and who take the necessary trouble to analyse their consciousness, are aware of its contents.

The two laws of reason, which "are reason itself," are those of causality and substance. Every effect supposes a cause, and every quality a substance; but as these laws are not subjective, as they do not belong to us, or to reason in its reflective form, as it appears in our consciousness, but are necessary and universal, we are forced, by the laws of thought, to refer them to a necessary and absolute substance. But absolute substance is of necessity one. There cannot be two absolutes; nor can there be any substance which is not absolute; otherwise the absolute would be limited,—that is, it would not be absolute. "Relative substance contradicts the very idea of substance." Finite substances (so called) are, therefore, phenomenal. "Unity of substance is involved in the very idea of substance." Finite reason is, therefore, a phenomenon of which the Absolute Reason is the substance. Such is the analysis of reason. It is resolved, as it appears in our consciousness, into a form of the Absolute Reason,—that is, of God. Thus one, and that the most essential element of our being, is lost in the Infinite.

The second element in consciousness is will, or causality. To will, to cause to exist for ourselves, are synonymous expressions. Will and person are therefore identical.

The will presents the following elements: 1. To decide upon an act to be performed. 2. To deliberate. 3. To resolve. The first and second of these elements, however, belong to reason, and to reason in its reflective form. To conceive an end and to deliberate, involve the idea of reflection. Every voluntary act is, therefore, a reflective act; but a reflective act cannot be primitive. To will is to deliberate, and to decide on an act. This supposes the knowledge that we have the power to resolve and act; and this again supposes that we must have previously acted without deliberation. Activity which precedes deliberation is due to spontaneity. Spontaneity and reflection include all the forms of activity: both are causes; both spontaneity and will are sources of action. The spontaneous includes all that is in the reflective.

What, then, is the power which has this twofold manifestation? To answer this question, we must remember that all personal acts, whether spontaneous or voluntary, have this in common, viz., they are referred to a cause which has its point of departure in itself; that is, they are free. The true notion of liberty is that of a power which acts from its own energy. Liberty, however, is distinct from free phenomena. Liberty is not a form of activity, but activity itself. On the other hand, the ego, or personal activity, is not activity, but merely

represents it. It is "liberty in action, not liberty in power; it is a cause, but phenomenal, and not substantial; relative, and not absolute." In respect to activity, therefore, we reach the substantial only "beyond and above all phenomenal activity, in power not yet passed into action, in the undeterminate essence which is capable of self-determination, in liberty disengaged from its forms, which limit while they determine it,"—that is, in God.

"We have thus arrived," says Cousin, "in the analysis of the *me*, by the way of psychology still, at a new aspect of ontology, as a substantial activity, anterior and superior to all phenomenal activity, which produces all the phenomena of activity, survives them all, and renews them all, immortal and inexhaustible in the destruction of its temporary manifestations." Thus our activity, as well as our reason, is merged in God. All our acts are the acts of God. The ego, or personal activity, is only a "temporary manifestation" of the activity of the Absolute Cause!

The third phenomenon of consciousness is sensation. We do not produce our own sensations, and therefore refer them to a cause out of ourselves. As our sensations are various, we refer them to various causes or qualities, "for qualities are always causes." The external world is, therefore, an assemblage of causes. These causes or forces act according to law. But law supposes reason; and, therefore, nature resolves itself into reason and activity. Reason and activity, however, are the constituent elements of humanity; therefore nature is, as Cousin expresses it, "of the same stuff with man." "There is nothing material in forces;" therefore there is nothing material in nature. (Idealism.)

Let us go farther. We have seen that it is a law of reason to refer every phenomenal cause and every phenomenal law to something absolute,—that is, to a substance. This absolute substance must be cause, in order to be the subject of external causes; and must be intelligence, in order to be the subject of laws, which, as we have seen, are forms of reason. This substance is, therefore, "the identity of intelligence and activity,"—that is, God. The external world, then, is an assemblage of phenomenal forces and laws. These phenomenal forces and laws suppose an Absolute Cause and Intelligence, of which they are the manifestations. Thus the external world has followed reason and activity (*i. e.*, humanity) into the abyss of the Absolute.

We have now shown that Cousin, by a strict process of argument, merges all reason, whether spontaneous or reflective, all activity, whether spontaneous or voluntary, all external nature, whether force or law, into God. The conclusion of

this deduction is expressed by Cousin himself in the following words:—

“The God of consciousness is not an abstract God, a solitary monarch exiled beyond the limits of creation, on the desert throne of a silent eternity, and of an absolute existence which resembles even the negation of existence. He is a God at once true and real, at once substance and cause, always substance and always cause, being substance only so far as he is cause, and cause only so far as he is substance,—that is to say, being absolute cause, one and many, eternity and time, space and number, essence and life, indivisibility and totality, principle, end, and centre, at the summit of being and at its lowest degree, infinite and finite together; triple, in a word,—that is to say, at the same time God, nature, and humanity. In fact, if God be not everything, he is nothing!”

No sane man will now say that the charge of Monism, or modern Pantheism, is made against Cousin's system on the ground of isolated passages, or fervid expressions. It is the doctrine which he not only avows, but which he labours to prove.

The third point which we proposed to establish is, that the doctrine thus avowed and proved is carried out by Cousin to its legitimate conclusions.

1. The first and most obvious, and perhaps the most thoroughly destructive consequence of this doctrine is, the denial of the personality of God. This consequence Cousin avows, adopts, and affirms. He argues it out, and attempts to establish it as the basis of a new and harmonious comprehensive philosophy. As, however, he constantly, at the same time, professes to believe in a personal God, it is necessary to state, first, what is meant by God's being a person, in the ordinary scriptural sense of the terms; secondly, that in this sense, the only true and proper sense of the words, Cousin denies the doctrine of a personal God; and, thirdly, what it is he would substitute in its place under the same name. By a personal God, is meant by the church and by all mankind a Being to whom we can say, Thou; a self-conscious, intelligent, and infinite Spirit, existing independently of the world, extra-mundane and eternal; a God to whom the world is not necessary, who has consciousness and intelligence independently of the world; and who, therefore, is over it as its creator, preserver, governor, and judge, to whom as a person distinct from ourselves, we are responsible for our character and conduct. This doctrine, which is the foundation of all religion and morality, and without which religion and morality are empty words, Monism and Cousin as its advocate deny. This is what he calls chimerical, or extravagant Theism—a scholastic God—a God on a barren throne, &c.

That Cousin does deny this doctrine of a personal God is proved, first, because that denial is inseparable from the system which he labours to establish. He endeavours to prove that God is at once God, nature, and humanity; that God is man, God is nature, God is every thing. If humanity is a form of God, if nature is a form of God, if God is every thing, then God is not a person distinct from his creatures. Secondly, consciousness is necessary to intelligence, and intelligence to personality; but God, according to Cousin, has no consciousness, and therefore no intelligence or personality, out of the world. "Take away," he says, "my faculties, and the consciousness that attests them to me, and I am not for myself. It is the same with God; take away nature and the soul, and every sign of God disappears."* Take away from me my consciousness, and I am not for myself; take away from God the universe (nature and humanity), and he is not for himself. This is one of those revealing sentences and illustrations which are worth pages of philosophical jargon. What can be predicated of a soul without consciousness? How can such a soul think or act, or be addressed as a person? An unconscious soul is no soul, and an unconscious God is no God. If, then, God comes to self-consciousness in the world; if taking away nature and the soul from him, leaves him without consciousness and intelligence, it leaves him without personality. This idea is wrought into the very substance of his system. What does he mean by triplicity in unity, and unity in triplicity, of which his writings are full, but that it is a law of rational life, the fundamental condition of reason, that in consciousness there should be the three elements, the ego, non-ego, and their relation; and that one of these cannot exist without the others; if you take away one, you destroy all; and that this is true of the Absolute Reason, as it is of our reason? In God there are, and must be, the finite, the infinite, and their relation. If you take away one, you destroy all. Take away the infinite, and the finite is gone; take away the finite and the infinite is gone; that is, take away the universe and God no more exists, than a cause without effects, or a soul without consciousness or faculties, exists. The denial of the personality of God in the theistic sense of the terms, is, therefore, involved in the very essence of this whole system. Reason in itself is impersonal. It comes to personality only in man. The Absolute in itself is undetermined, unlimited; but consciousness is limitation: therefore the Absolute, as such, is unconscious and impersonal. The Infinite must become finite, in order to know itself; but self-knowledge is essential to personality: therefore the infinite, as such, is impersonal. If you eliminate these ideas from Cousin's

* Lectures on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. Appleton's edition, p. 365.

writings, you leave his system in the condition in which matter is left if you take away all its properties; or mind, if you take away all its thoughts.

How then are we to understand Cousin's frequent declarations, that he believes in a personal God? Precisely as similar declarations are to be understood from the lips of Hegelians. God comes to self-consciousness in the universe, and thus becomes a person. God, humanity, and nature, considered as one, is their personal God. The true doctrine "concerning God's personality," says Michelet, "is not that God is a person, as distinguished from other persons, neither is he simply the universal or absolute substance. He is the eternal movement of the Absolute constantly making itself subjective, and in the subjective alone comes to objectivity or to a true existence;" that is, as Cousin expresses the same idea, the Infinite becomes real in the finite. Michelet goes on to say, "God is the only true personal being;" and further, "As God is eternal personality, so he eternally produces his other self, viz., nature, in order to come to self-consciousness."*

But Cousin sometimes says he believes in a personal God distinct from the world. How is this to be understood? Precisely as he believes in matter without properties, and the soul without consciousness. The soul knows itself only in its acts. But it is not exhausted in its acts. Take away its acts, and you take away self-knowledge, but you leave a potentiality of action. The soul apart from its acts and consciousness, may be said to be potentially a person; but it is a real, self-conscious, intelligent person, only as active. So with God. Take away the universe, and you leave a potential, but not a real person. If there is no consciousness and no intelligence in God without the universe, then there is no personality in God apart from the world.

The fact is, the advocates of this system believe in a personal God just as they believe in the doctrine of the Trinity. They profess to be Trinitarians. If any honest man ventures to say they do not hold the doctrine of the Trinity, some Dr Henry starts up, and exclaims, 'That is "point-blank slander;" it is contrary to the "official utterances" of these philosophers; the slanderer is worse than a felon,' &c., &c. When we ask, however, what they really mean, they say, "We believe the Infinite is the Father, the universe the Son, their relation is the Spirit; therefore we are Trinitarians." So their personal God is not the God of the Bible, but a being in whom all personality centres—who is the only person, as he is the only substance, of which mind and nature are the ever-flowing phenomena. They are Theists just as they are Trinitarians. No form of

* *Geschichte der letzten Systeme*, &c., vol. ii., p. 647.

atheistic Pantheism more destructive of all religion than this ever entered the mind of man. TO MAKE GOD EVERYTHING, IS TO MAKE HIM NOTHING.

2. Monism unavoidably leads to the doctrine of a necessary creation; and this consequence Cousin accepts and avows in every variety of form. Dr Henry makes him say:—

“Creation is comprehensible and necessary; for creation is nothing else than the necessary development of the Infinite in the finite, of unity in variety, and that in virtue of the third element, which binds the two terms together, and in which both are realised. God being substance and cause,—being substance as cause and cause as substance, that is, being absolute cause as well as intelligence,—cannot but manifest himself. This manifestation is creation, the development of the Infinite in the finite, of unity in plurality. Creation is necessarily implied in the idea of God; and the world, the universe, is the necessary effect of the divine existence and manifestation.”*

Sir William Hamilton says, Cousin teaches that “God, as he is a cause, is able to create; as he is an absolute cause, he cannot but create. In creating the universe he does not draw it from nothing, he draws it from himself. The creation of the universe is thus necessary; it is a manifestation of the Deity, but not the Deity absolutely in himself. It is God passing into activity, but not exhausted in the act.”†

We have already quoted so many explicit declarations from Cousin himself on this point, that it is hardly necessary to multiply citations. Speaking of the relation of the Infinite and the finite, the one being necessarily implied in the other, he says:—

“The first term of the formula is cause also, and absolute cause; and as absolute cause, cannot avoid developing itself in the second term —[i. e., in] multiplicity, the finite, the relative, &c.”‡ “As God is made known only so far as he is absolute cause, on this account, in my opinion, he cannot but produce; so that creation ceases to be unintelligible, and God is no more without a world than a world without God. This last point has appeared to me of such great importance, that I have not hesitated to express it with all the strength that I possessed.”§

His familiar illustration on this subject is derived from voluntary action in man. “We create,” he says, “every moment,” and “divine creation is of the same nature.”|| Creation to God is, therefore, as necessary as voluntary action to man. We can no more conceive of God without creation, than of mind without thought, or of will without volition.

The fatalistic consequences of this doctrine are too apparent

* Introduction to the first edition, &c., xix.

† Review of Cousin, p. 16.

‡ History of Philosophy, Wight, p. 84.

§ Psychology, p. 447.

|| History of Philosophy, p. 93.

to escape notice. Creation is not, according to this theory, a transient act. It is defined to be "the development of the Infinite in the finite." This is a continued process, going on perpetually in the universe of nature and mind. If, therefore, creation is necessary, this whole process of development is necessary; all the processes of nature, all the operations of mind, all the progress of history, is the unfolding of God in the world. This was made so obvious, that Cousin was constrained to say:—

"Upon reflection, I feel that this expression [the necessity of creation] is scarcely reverential enough towards God, whose liberty it has the appearance of compromising; and I have no hesitation in retracting it. But in retracting it, I ought to explain it. It covers up no mysterious Fatalism; it expresses an idea which may be found everywhere, in the writings of the holiest doctors as well as the greatest philosophers. God, like man, acts, and can act only in conformity with his nature, and his liberty itself is relative to his essence. Now, in God, above all, the power is adequate to the substance, and the divine power is always in act; God, therefore, is essentially active and creative. It follows from that, unless we despoil God of his nature, and of his essential perfections, we must admit that a power essentially creative could not but create, just as a power essentially intelligent could not but create intelligently, or a power essentially wise and good could not but exercise its wisdom and goodness in creating. The word *necessity*, here, expresses nothing else. It is inconceivable that from this word anybody should have been disposed to derive, and impute to me, universal Fatalism."*

This is no retraction. It is a reassertion of the doctrine in the only sense in which it was ever understood. God being a creative power, cannot but create, just as mind cannot but think; but as mind thinks spontaneously, so God creates spontaneously, not by coercion. This is precisely the doctrine of necessary creation, as taught elsewhere in his works, and which he here teaches. There is no retraction, and there can be none, for the idea is essential to the system. The Hegelians say every thing which Cousin says in this recantation:—

"To say God created the world freely, does not mean that the necessity of creation does not exist in the divine nature; but since this necessity is in God himself, he is still free. To regard liberty in God as arbitrary, is to overlook the identity of liberty and necessity. God must create, but that must is in his will; and the continuance of the world is due to the continuance of that will. The world, therefore, as to its being, is coeternal with God."†

3. Monism denies the incomprehensibility of God. On this point Cousin says:—

* Advertisement to Philosophical Fragments, third edition, in the appendix to Psychology, p. 561.

† Rosenkranz Encyklopädie, p. 53.

"His incomprehensibility is for us his destruction. Incomprehensible, as a formula and in the school, he is clearly visible in the world which manifests him, for the soul which feels and possesses him. Everywhere present, he returns to himself, as it were, in the consciousness of man, of which he indirectly constitutes the mechanism and phenomenal triplicity by the reflection of his own nature, and of the substantial triplicity of which he constitutes the absolute identity."*

As God returns to himself in our consciousness, we know him just as we know our consciousness. As God is nature, we know him as we know nature. Besides, Cousin often says that ideas constitute the nature of God; but of ideas, he says, "They have but one characteristic, viz., to be intelligible. I add, there is nothing intelligible but ideas."† According to this system, God exists only so far as he is known. The incomprehensible is the non-existing.

Sir William Hamilton represents Cousin as teaching that "the divine nature is essentially comprehensible. The three ideas constitute the nature of Deity; and the very nature of ideas is to be conceived. God, in fact, exists to us only so far as he is known."‡

"Every man," says Cousin, "if he knows himself, knows all the rest, nature and God at the same time with himself. Every man believes in his own existence; every man, therefore, believes in the existence of the world and of God. Every man thinks; every man, therefore, thinks God, if we may so express it. Every human proposition, reflecting the consciousness, reflects the idea of unity and of being; that is essential to consciousness; every human proposition, therefore, contains God [for it contains an idea]. Every man who speaks, speaks of God, and every word is an act of faith and a hymn."§

Cousin, however, teaches that God is incomprehensible. How is this? Precisely as the soul is incomprehensible. The soul is not exhausted by its acts, though it knows itself and is known only in its acts. So God is not exhausted in the universe, though he knows himself and is knowable only in the universe. As there is phenomenal power in the soul for a constant succession of acts, so there is substantial power in God for a constant succession of worlds. Still the soul *exists* only so far as it is known; and God *exists* only so far as he is known. The Infinite is real only in the finite.

4. Intimately connected with the doctrine of necessary creation and of the comprehensibility of God, is another feature of this system. It makes history the self-development of God. History is one, and that the principal, part of the process by which the Infinite unfolds itself in the finite; and by which

* Psychology, p. 435.

† Review of Cousin, p. 16.

‡ History of Philosophy, Wight, p. 25.

§ Psychology, p. 435.

the ideas which constitute the manner of God's existence are realised. This is specially true of man. One idea is realised in one epoch, another in another. One nation brings out one thought, another a different one. Most especially is this true of the history of philosophy, which being the history of reason, is the history of God. History is determined by necessary laws. There is nothing contingent. "The dice are loaded." These ideas are reproduced by Cousin in his peculiar way. His lectures are so filled with these Hegelian principles, that the citation of particular passages is, for those who have read them, unnecessary. For those not familiar with his writings, it will suffice to point out a few significant indications of his views on this subject. If creation, as we have seen, is, according to his system, a process of development, and if creation is necessary, it involves the view of the nature of history just referred to. Apart from this general consideration, his language on this particular point is sufficiently explicit:—

"History reflects not only the whole movement of humanity, but as humanity is the summary of the universe, which is itself a manifestation of God, in the last resort history is nothing less than the last counter-stroke of divine action. The admirable order which reigns there is a reflection of eternal order, and its laws have for their last principle God himself. God, considered in his perpetual action upon the world and upon humanity, is Providence. It is because God or Providence is in nature, that nature has its necessary laws; it is because Providence is in humanity and in history, that history and humanity have their necessary laws. This necessity, which the vulgar accuse, which they confound with external and physical fatality, and by which they designate and disfigure the divine wisdom applied to the world, this necessity is the unanswerable demonstration of the intervention of Providence in human affairs, a demonstration of a moral government of the world. Great events are the decrees of this government, promulgated by the voice of time. History is the manifestation of God's supervision of humanity; the judgments of history are the judgments of God himself.*

"If history is the government of God made visible, every thing is there in its place; and if every thing is there in its place, every thing is there for good, for every thing arrives at an end marked by a beneficent power. Hence this historical optimism which I have the honour to profess," &c.†

"Upon what condition does Providence exist? Upon the condition that God, without, it is true, exhausting his being, passes into the world and into humanity, and, consequently, into history; that he there deposits something of himself; that he establishes there wisdom, justice, order—an order as invariable as its author. Providence is involved in the question of the necessity of the laws of history. To deny the one is to shake the other, it is to reverse and obscure the moral and divine government of human things. If, therefore, any

* *History of Philosophy*, translated by Wight, p. 159.

† *Ibid.* p. 160.

one should dare to give our system the name of Pantheism and of Fatalism,—that is, indirectly, or rather very directly, to accuse us of Atheism,—it would be necessary, in order to defend ourselves, to throw back in our turn this amiable accusation on those who make it," &c.*

"If a nation does not represent an idea, its existence is simply unintelligible. . . . If every nation is called to represent an idea, the events of which the life of this nation is composed aspire to, and end at, a complete representation of this idea; whence it follows that the order in which these events follow each other is a true order of progression," &c.†

"War has its roots in the nature of the ideas of different nations, which, being necessarily partial, exclusive, are necessarily hostile, aggressive, conquering; therefore, war is necessary. Let us see what are its effects. If war is nothing else than the violent encounter, the concussion of the exclusive ideas of different nations, in this concussion the idea which shall be the most feeble will be destroyed by the strongest; that is, will be absorbed by it. . . . Again, if ideas are the prizes in war, and if that which wins is necessarily that which has the most future, it is necessary that that should win, and for this end that there should be war,—unless you wish to retard the future, to arrest civilization,—unless you should wish that the human race might be immobile and stationary. . . . Thus a nation is progressive only on the condition of war. . . . A war is nothing else than the bloody exchange of ideas; a battle is nothing else than the combat of error with truth; I say with truth, because in an epoch a less error is a truth relatively to a great error, or to an error which has served its time; victory is nothing else than the victory of the truth of to-day over the truth of yesterday, which has become the error of the following day.‡

"The hazards of war and of the diverse fortunes of combats are spoken of without cessation: for my part I think there is very little chance in war; the dice are loaded, it seems, for I defy any one to cite me a single game lost by humanity. . . . I have proved that war and battles are, first, inevitable; secondly, beneficial. I have vindicated victory as necessary and useful; I undertake, nevertheless, to vindicate it as just in the strictest sense of the word. We usually see in success only a triumph of force, and an honourable sympathy draws us toward the vanquished: I hope I have shown that, inasmuch as there must be a vanquished party, and inasmuch as the vanquished party is always that which ought to be vanquished, to accuse the vanquisher and to take part against victory, is to take part against humanity, and to complain of civilization. It is necessary to go farther, it is necessary to prove that the vanquished party deserves to be vanquished; that the vanquishing party not only serves the cause of civilization, but that it is better and more moral than the vanquished party. . . . Virtue and prosperity, misfortune and vice, are in necessary harmony. . . . Feebleness is a vice, and therefore it is always punished and beaten.§

* History of Philosophy, translated by Wight, p. 164.

† Ibid. pp. 182, 183.

‡ Ibid. p. 175.

§ Ibid. pp. 186, 187.

"When we speak of victims, let us understand that the sacrificer whom we accuse is not the vanquisher, but that which has given victory to the vanquisher; that is, Providence. It is time the philosophy of history set its foot on the declamations of philanthropy. War is action on a great scale, and action is positive proof of what a nation or an individual is worth. The soul passes altogether with its powers into action. Would you know what a man is worth? See him in action; so all the worth of a nation appears on the field of battle.*

"In the last lecture I defended victory; I have now defended power; and it remains to me to defend glory. We never attend to the fact that whatever is human [permanent?] is made so by humanity, were it only in permitting it to exist; to curse power, I mean a long and durable power, is to blaspheme humanity; and to accuse glory, is simply to accuse humanity which decrees it. What is glory? The judgment of humanity upon one of its members; and humanity is always right."†

If any one does not see how all this flows from the doctrine that God and humanity are one,—that history is merely the self-development of God,—we have nothing further to say; and if any one does not see that these views are to the last degree immoral,—that they suppose an utter denial of moral distinctions, in the proper sense of the term,—he must have a standard of judgment peculiar to himself. To resolve all virtue into power, to make feebleness a crime, success the only criterion of goodness, the conqueror always more moral than the vanquished, is equivalent to denying that there is any real distinction between right and wrong. It is to resolve right into might, as a philosophical and moral principle. It is, however, the unavoidable conclusion from the doctrine which we have been unfolding.‡ If the universe is God, manifesting himself to himself, evolving one form after another, the last always more perfect than those which preceded it, of course the truth of yesterday becomes the error of to-day, and the truth of to-

* History of Philosophy, translated by Wight, p. 189.

† Ibid. p. 201.

‡ Spinoza says: "Quo magis unusquisque—suum esse conservare conatur et potest, eo magis virtute præditus est; contra, quatenus unusquisque—suum esse negligit, eatenus est impotens."—(Ethic, p. iv. propos. xx.) In the demonstration of this twentieth proposition he makes the idea of power and that of virtue identical.—(See Müller's Lehre von der Sünde, vol. i. p. 332.) In Hegel's system the principle that whatever is, is right—that every thing real is God—is carried so far that even one of the most lingering of his disciples said, "Satan is, therefore he is good, in God and with God; Satan is evil, therefore he is not." And Rosenkranz says,—what we will not print in English, and hardly dare to print in German,—"Die dritte Consequenz endlich ist die, dass Gott der Sohn auch als identisch gesetzt ist mit dem Subject, in welchem die religiöse Vorstellung den Ursprung des Bösen anschaut, mit dem *Satan*, *Phosphorus*, *Lucifer*. Diese Verschmelzung begründet sich darin dass der Sohn innerhalb Gottes das Moment der Unterscheidung ist, in dem Unterschied aber, die Möglichkeit der Entgegensetzung und Entzweiung angelegt ist. Der Sohn ist der selbst-bewusste Gott." How is Cousin, or his miserable apes in this country, to escape this consequence? If God is every thing, then if there be a Satan, God is Satan. Rosenkranz says, "The understanding is horrified at this, because it does not recognise the intimate connection between good and evil,—that evil is in good, and good is in evil. Without evil there is no good."—*Encyklopædie*, p. 51.

day the error of to-morrow; every thing is progress; the last is best; that which succeeds is the right. Ye murderers, who stained the Alpine snows with the blood of saints, and "rolled mother with infant down the rocks," ye were the true saints, more moral than your victims! This is the philosophy which American Christians are hiring men to teach their sons and daughters!

5. Monism destroys the idea of sin. This consequence also flows from the system of Cousin.

Sin is the want of conformity to law. Where there is no law there is no sin. There can, however, be no law where there is no lawgiver; and there can be no lawgiver, if God is himself the universe. If, therefore, this system excludes, as we have already shown that it does, the idea of a personal God distinct from the world, it must of necessity exclude the idea of sin. The law to which sin stands related is not the law of reason, it is not the idea of the Good, it is not expediency, it is not self-respect,—it is the law of God. It arises from the very nature of a creature, that the moral law which binds the conscience should assume in consciousness the form of the will of God; that is, of a Being to whom we are responsible. None but God is above law and a law to himself. In the consciousness, therefore, of every human being, sin assumes the form, not merely of something hateful, or degrading, or injurious to others, but of alienation from God. It is therefore always attended, not only by a sense of demerit, but by a sense of guilt; that is, of just exposure to the wrath of God. This cannot be got rid of. We cannot throw off our allegiance to God, and substitute in his place the True, the Beautiful, and the Good—mere ideas. We cannot place his sceptre in the hands of reason, or clothe "being in general" with his authority. Our allegiance is to God; and if there be no God, then there can be no sin. This, any man who chooses to examine his own heart, cannot fail to discover. An Atheist may see some things are expedient and some inexpedient; some things elevating and some degrading. He may be amiable, honest, beneficent; he may recognise the rights of his fellow-men, and if he injures society, he may feel responsible to its laws; but he cannot have a sense of guilt for sins of the heart, for pride or malice. The only idea of sin of which the Bible, the infallible interpreter of consciousness, takes any cognizance, is want of conformity to the law of God. "Against thee, thee only, have I sinned," is the language in which the sense of sin everywhere expresses itself.

If this view of the nature of sin be correct, it requires no argument to show that it is excluded by this system. If God is at once God, humanity, and nature; if the reason in us is

God's reason; if our intelligence is his, our activity his activity; if God is the only substance, of which the universe is the phenomenon; if we are moments in the life of God;—then there can be nothing in us which is not in God. Sin in this view becomes mere limitation. It is undeveloped good, just as error is partial truth. If the universe and history are the self-evolution of God, then every thing is a form of God, and every thing is good. But all, as remarked above, is progress. And in progress, the imperfect precedes the perfect, as infancy precedes manhood. Thus as the imperfectly true is error, and the imperfectly beautiful is the deformed, so the imperfectly good is evil; but absolutely all is good. Hegel says, even sin is something unspeakably higher than the law-abiding motion of the planets and the innocence of plants.

There is another way in which Cousin's system subverts the foundation of morality. It makes reason impersonal, and teaches that our personality resides exclusively in the will. The will, however, gets all its light from reason. It is necessarily determined by the intelligence; if it is not, and so far as it is not, it is irrational. We never attribute will to brutes, because they have no reason. If, therefore, our reason is not our self, volition is not self-determination. The very idea of liberty is *libentia rationalis*, will determined by reason; and, consequently, if reason is impersonal, we have no rational liberty, and are incapable of responsible action. We presume this is what Sir William Hamilton means, when he says that Cousin's system destroys liberty, by divorcing it from intelligence. Hamilton asserts that Cousin's doctrine is not only inconsistent with Theism, but with morality, which, he says, cannot be founded on "a liberty which only escapes necessity by taking refuge with chance."*

6. In relation to revealed religion, we have seen that Monism subverts its very foundation. It makes reason the highest conceivable authority, and perverts the doctrines of Christianity into mere philosophical figments. All this is faithfully reproduced by Cousin.

"Philosophy," he says, "is the light of all lights, the authority of all authorities. Those who wish to impose upon philosophy and upon thought a foreign authority, do not think that of two things one must be true: either thought does not comprehend this authority, and then this authority is for it as

* Morell, a eulogist of Cousin, and a man not to be suspected of any stringent orthodoxy, says, that according to Cousin, "God is the ocean,—we are but the waves; the ocean may be one individuality, and each wave another, but still they are essentially one and the same. We see not how Cousin's Theism can possibly be consistent with any idea of moral evil; neither do we see how, starting from such a dogma, he can ever vindicate and uphold his own theory of human liberty. On such theistic principles, all sin must be simply defect, and all defect must be absolutely fatuitous."—(*History of Modern Philosophy*, p. 660.)

though it were not; or it does comprehend it, forms of it an idea, accepts it for this reason, and thereby takes itself for measure, for rule, for highest authority." * Philosophy "destroys not faith,—it illuminates it and promotes its growth, and raises it gently from the twilight of the symbol to the full light of pure thought." "Happy in seeing the masses, the people—that is, nearly all—in the arms of Christianity, it is contented to offer gently its hand to Christianity, and to aid it in ascending to a higher elevation." † Cousin is willing to aid Jesus Christ to ascend to a higher elevation!

Reason, he says, "is the sole faculty of all knowledge, the only principle of certainty, the exclusive standard of the true and the false, of good and evil; which can alone perceive its own mistakes, correct itself when deceived, restore itself when in error, call itself to account, and pronounce upon itself the sentence of acquittal or of condemnation." ‡ Man is completely his own God; he owes allegiance to nothing higher than himself. Reason in him is declared to be the eternal Logos. Cousin, therefore, frequently says, "humanity is inspired," "humanity is infallible." The only revelation or inspiration possible on his system, is that which, in different measures, is common to all men. "What is God? I have told you he is the first substance and the first cause of the truths which man perceives. When, therefore, man does homage to God for the truths which he is able to refer neither to the impressions which the world gives to his senses, nor to his own personality, he relates them to their true source; and the absolute affirmation of truth, inspiration, enthusiasm, is a veritable revelation. Thus, in the cradle of civilization, he who possessed in a higher degree than his fellows this gift of inspiration, passed for the confidant and the interpreter of God. He is so for others, because he is so for himself; and he is so, in fact, in a philosophic sense. Behold the sacred origin of prophecies, of pontificates, and of modes of worship." §

Cousin subjects the most sacred doctrines of religion to precisely the same transmutations into philosophical formulas, or "pure thought," as he calls it, as his German masters. After having expounded for the hundredth time the triplicity in unity of reason, and taught that this triplicity in unity is the basis of absolute reason, in which the Infinite, the finite, and their relation, as necessarily co-exist as the ego, the non-ego, and their relation, or common ground, in human consciousness, he asks, "Do you know what is the theory I have stated to you? It is nothing less than Christianity. The God of Christians is threefold, and at the same time one; and

* Cousin's *History of Philosophy*, p. 26.

‡ *Psychology*, p. 441.

† *Ibid.* p. 27, 47.

§ *History of Philosophy*, p. 129.

the accusations which would be raised against the doctrine which I teach would extend even to the Christian Trinity." * He quotes from the Catechism of Meaux the definition of the Son of God: "Le Fils de Dieu est la parole intérieure de son Père, sa pensée éternellement subsistante et de même nature que lui;" and from the Catechism of Montpellier: "Le Père ne peut pas subsister un seul moment sans se connaître: et en se connaissant il produit son Fils, le Verbe éternel. Le Père et le Fils ne peuvent subsister un seul moment sans s'aimer, et en s'aimant ils produisent le Saint Esprit." In Cousin's system, therefore, the finite—that is, nature and humanity—occupy the place which belongs to the eternal Son of God in the Christian Trinity. The universe is God to Cousin as truly as the Son of God is God to us. Thus he says, though the form is different, "the contents of religion and philosophy are the same."

Dorner gives the following view of Schelling's doctrine on this subject:—

"The finite is the necessary form of divine manifestation. The eternal, divine Idea, cannot in itself be manifest; to that end it must become finite. But, as it cannot present itself in any one finite form, the divine life is manifested in a multiplicity of individuals, in historical development, in which each moment exhibits some particular aspect of the divine life, and in each of which God is as the absolute. Hence the finite is not simply finite, but it is that in which God lives. The finite is the necessary form of manifestation, or of God as manifest. It is God in the process of development, or the Son of God. All history thus obtains a higher significance. Humanity does not exclude divinity, but includes it; history is the birth-place of the Spirit [*i.e.*, of God], the theatre of Theogony. Hence the idea of God becoming man is raised to the principle of all philosophy; and, since that idea is the essence of Christianity, Christianity and philosophy are reconciled. Every thing is to be explained by this idea of God becoming man." †

If a b g d have any relation to α β γ δ , then is Cousin's philosophy a reproduction of the Pantheism of Schelling and Hegel. It is the same tune with variations. It is German in French idiom. We have shown, first, that he avows the result to which his German predecessors had arrived,—*viz.*, that "God is every thing;" at once "God, nature, and humanity;" secondly, that he consciously and elaborately traces out his principles to that great conclusion; and, thirdly, that he applies the result thus obtained to the illustration of all the great questions of philosophy and history. We have made this exposition, at no small expense of time and labour, for the double purpose of vindicating the memory of a friend whom we loved and honoured while living, and of contributing

* History of Philosophy, p. 90. † Dorner's Christologie, first edition, p. 342.

our mite to open the eyes of the Christian community to the true character of that German philosophy which is percolating by a thousand dribblets through our literature, and even our theology. Hardly a discourse on history, or on its philosophy, has come before the public of late years, which has not been more or less imbued with pantheistic principles. No inconsiderable portion of the recent expositions of the nature and doctrines of theology exhibits the same character. Unitarians now speak freely of the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation as primary truths. A certain class of our New-School brethren find no formulas so suited to express ideas borrowed from this philosophy, as the time-honoured phrases of Old-School orthodoxy. We must not allow ourselves to be deceived "by vain words." The end of these things is death. Since the world began, there never appeared a more Protean, insidious, seductive, and destructive form of error, than that from which we have endeavoured to withdraw the mask.

We conclude this long review by repeating a remark already made. We have spoken of Cousin's system, not of his abiding personal convictions. We know not what they may be. We give him full credit for learning, genius, and eloquence. We acknowledge the elevated sentiments which characterise many of his writings, which are strangely at variance with the spirit and principles of other of his publications. These things do not lessen our abhorrence of his system, nor do they furnish the slightest evidence that our exhibition of that system is incorrect. Hume, in his "Treatise on Human Nature," labours to prove that men have no souls,—that "successive perceptions constitute the mind,"—that human identity is an imagination,—that "a substance, a me, a soul," is an invention. This treatise set the philosophers in commotion. Kant bent all his acumen to discover a flaw in the argument. Cousin pronounces it irresistible, assuming Locke's stand-point to be correct. This form of scepticism is known as Hume's system, the world over. No one has yet appeared simple enough to attempt to prove that Hume never held any such doctrine, from the fact that in his *History and Essays*, and in his private conversation, he speaks perpetually of men as having souls. We hope, therefore, that no one will undertake to prove that Cousin does not teach the system which we have attributed to him, because he often speaks in the language of ordinary men. He may, and does teach, that nature and humanity are the mere phenomena of God, though he often uses language framed on the opposite hypothesis.

Of Dr Henry we have said enough to show that he is a calumniator of the dead, and entirely incompetent to under-

stand the first principles of a philosophy which for thirteen years he professed to teach. We hold ourselves, therefore, exonerated from the obligation to take the slightest notice of any thing he may hereafter think fit to publish against the *Princeton Review*.

ART. III.—*Miracles and their Counterfeits.*

THE word *miracle*, considered with reference to its derivation, means simply a wonder, or wonderful work. In this, however, as in most cases, usage has modified but not destroyed the etymological meaning. According to this use, which has become universal and classic in Christendom, the strict meaning of the word has been narrowed down to denote a single class of wonders or prodigies. This consists of supernatural works, wrought by God himself, in contravention of the laws of nature, and in attestation of the divine commission of his inspired servants; which includes, of course, the truth of their teachings. This is now the normal and proper sense of the word *miracle*. Other wonderful events and works are, indeed, often called miracles, or miraculous; but this is always understood to be mere hyperbole of speech, employed to express the speaker's sense of the greatness of the wonder; and its expressiveness depends wholly on the strict meaning of the word *miracle* being what we have indicated. In any other view, such phrases as, "I am a miracle of grace," "The miracles achieved by modern inventive genius," &c., would be void of all that now makes them forcible and felicitous.

Such being now the fixed and proper meaning of the word, it is next to be observed, that a class of events is narrated and signalled in the Scriptures which precisely answers to this meaning, while no other word adequately indicates them. They are variously and indiscriminately denominated by words indicating some one of the constituents of a *miracle*. These words are, *σημεῖα*, *τέρατα*, *δυνάμεις*, translated in our version, "signs, and wonders, and mighty deeds."—(2 Cor. xii. 12.) *Δυνάμεις*, however, whether used simply or in connection with the other two, is often translated by the word *miracle*: "A man approved of God among you by *miracles*, and signs, and wonders" (Acts ii. 22); "To another, the working of *miracles*," *ἐνεργήματα δυνάμεων*.—(1 Cor. xii. 10.) *Σημεῖα* is sometimes so translated, as John iii. 2, "No man can do these *miracles* which thou doest, except God be with him." *Τέρατα* (wonders,

prodigies) is seldom if ever found except in connection with *σημεῖα*: the uniform rendering of the two being "signs and wonders." The scriptural designations of these events severally shadow forth the several constituents of a *miracle*. It is, 1. A wonder surpassing the powers of man and nature; therefore, 2. Rightly called a *power*, as being produced by the immediate exercise of supernatural and divine power; and, 3. A sign or token, as proving that he who works it, or by whom God works it, has the seal of a divine commission, of speaking by divine inspiration, and acting by divine authority. In Acts ii. 22, we find a concise, but beautiful and sublime summation of the various parts of the scriptural teachings relative to miracles. The scattered rays are here brought to a focus. With this grand epitome Peter first introduces the name of Christ, in a discourse whose power was attested by thousands of converts, and which may well be studied by those who are now searching for the secret of sacred eloquence: "Ye men of Israel, hear these words; Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved of God among you, by miracles, and wonders, and signs, which God did by him in the midst of you, as ye yourselves also know."

Here it is expressly asserted, in addition to what is implied in the phrase, "miracles, and signs, and wonders," 1. That they are the immediate work of God. Whatever was the connection of the man Jesus Christ with them, "God did them by him." Thus, in harmony with the current of scriptural representations, they are ascribed to the direct efficiency of God, in distinction from those events which he brings to pass by the immediate efficiency of second causes. 2. That they were enacted openly and publicly, when all had opportunity not only to witness, but to scrutinise and test them. 3. That they were such, and so wrought, that the people among whom they occurred could not but know their existence and character,—"As ye yourselves also know." They were so evident, that they might not only be known, but could not be unknown, unrecognised, or misunderstood, without sin. 4. Their purpose was to demonstrate to beholders, and all others cognizant of them, that Jesus Christ was "a man approved of God," ἀπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀποδοκιμαζόμενον—evinced, certified of God, by miracles, signs, and wonders, wrought in the midst of them. 5. Thus miracles are important proofs of Christianity. By them an obligation was laid on the people to believe on and obey Christ, in all his teachings, claims, and requirements, as the Son of God and promised Messiah. For he immediately proceeds to charge home upon them the guilt of crucifying one whom God had certified by such stupendous miracles to be, what he claimed to be, the Lord of glory. The fact that this argument was

made thus fundamental and paramount in this discourse, together with the prodigious effects which ensued upon it, must be a sufficient answer to those who question the value, as evidences of Christianity, of the miracles wrought by Christ and his apostles. On these several points, however, more hereafter.

For the further determination of the ground-principles pertaining to this subject, it is to be observed with some emphasis, that in order to fulfil the foregoing conditions, miracles must be wrought by the immediate efficiency of God, and not by second causes; further, they must involve a suspension or counteraction of second causes beyond the power of man;—so they must be not merely supernatural, but contranatural. What second causes, including creatures with the laws, forces, or powers, inherent in them, can accomplish of themselves, can be no evidence of the immediate agency of God, or of any special divine interposition. No suspension or counteraction of those laws by the natural power of creatures,—*e.g.*, of gravity, by a man uplifting a stone,—can be evidence of such interference by the Almighty. Moreover, that direct interposition of God, which acts, not in suspending or contravening the laws of nature, but in concurrence with those laws, is not a miracle. That the renovation of the human soul is an immediate supernatural work of God, above the power of man and of nature, we shall not here stop to prove. But this work, although divine, neither suspends nor counteracts any proper law, functions, or faculties of the soul. Its rational, emotional, and optative faculties, exist and operate according to their own proper nature, before, during, and after regeneration. The work itself is unseen by the believer, no less than by others. It is known only in its effects; and in these much more imperfectly by others than by the subject of it,—often uncertainly by himself. It manifests itself gradually, not in any interruption, but simply in the gradually developed, orderly activity of his rational nature. While, then, it has this element in common with miracles, that it is supernatural and divine; while it is in a high sense marvellous; while it evinces to the subject of it, however sceptical before, the truth of the gospel; while the whole body of the regenerate, in their holy profession and life, are a standing and ever-growing monument of the truth and power of Christianity; yet regeneration is not a miracle in the proper and scriptural sense,—it is an interposition of God, not in such a sense immediately visible, palpable, suspending and counteracting the powers of nature, that, as beheld by our very senses, it shows itself an incontestable work of God, and so a “sign to those that believe not,” as well as to those that believe. A miracle is this: It is a work done before the eyes of

men, so that they may know it, and innocently cannot but know it, as being what cannot be accounted for by the laws and powers of nature, or on any supposition but the immediate agency of God, exerted in overpowering those laws. So it is not merely supernatural; it is contranatural. Ordinary events of Providence are accomplished by the agency of second causes. Works of grace are supernatural, yet congruous with nature's laws.* Miracles are both supernatural and contranatural.

If we were, then, to set forth the doctrine after the old method, which often has a high advantage, in sharply defining the subject-matter and the true issues of a discussion, and view a miracle according to its material, formal, efficient, and final cause, we would say: 1. That materially considered, miracles are supernatural events. So they are distinguished from the ordinary events of providence; from all the products of occult arts, of jugglery and legerdemain; of scientific discovery and insight; of the dexterous use of laws and secrets of nature, known to the miracle-monger, and hidden from others; and, finally, from all extraordinary occurrences arising by the operation of natural laws from unusual combinations of the powers of nature, in the course of divine providence. An earthquake, or a thunderstorm, occurring in the most extraordinary and unexpected manner, would, in itself, be no miracle; but, should the still sky and earth suddenly and always roar and quake at the bidding of some man, and be quiet the moment he should say, "Peace, be still," it would be a clear and incontestable miracle. 2. In its formal nature, a miracle is not only supernatural, but contranatural. So it is distinguished from the gracious operations of the Spirit in the soul. Moreover, the formal in this case includes, 3. The efficient cause, who is God. A granite rock, although in fact the work of the Almighty, would be none the less granite though it were made by any other being; but no conceivable

* We are not unaware that there is a sense in which miracles of bodily healing may be thought by some to be included in the class of divine acts that are congruous with nature's laws, inasmuch as they restore the body, or the organ cured, to its normal state. Yet it is not without reason that theologians have held to a clear distinction between the two. The one is a moral change, wrought by supernatural power, indeed, yet in no manner interfering with the proper laws and activities of our moral nature. The other is a physical creation, which so suspends or counteracts the natural laws of our material organism, that they are estopped from producing their wonted and due effect. It is true, that, if the distinction be rigorously followed up, it may appear subtle and tenuous; no more so, however, than all rigid analysis of the will ultimately becomes. As we know the will to be free, yet not independent, and still may find it difficult to explicate either of these truths in propositions which do not seem contradictory of the other; so we know that there is a difference in kind, between that divine work which restores the will to rectitude, and that which, by a mere word, makes those born deaf, dumb, or blind, instantaneously to hear, speak, and see. This is none the less so although we may be unable to define that difference perfectly. It is still more evident that the latter fulfils the purpose or end of a miracle, while the former does not.

wonder, nothing whatsoever, can be a miracle, unless immediately wrought of God. Were the miracles of the Scripture just what they are in other respects, but were they not wrought by God, they would not be true miracles. That he is their efficient cause, is not only true, as in respect of many other things, but enters into their essence, their formal nature, without which, whatever else they may be, they are not miracles. So they are distinguished from all superhuman interruptions of the laws of nature, or quasi-miracles, caused by evil spirits, if such there be, in regard to which we will yet show our opinion. 4. The final cause of miracles, the end for which they are wrought, is to furnish proof, and work the conviction, that those through whom God works them are commissioned by him, and speak his truth. So they are distinguished from all prodigies, whether natural or supernatural, wrought in support of error, immorality, or irreligion; while those are contradicted who assert the uselessness of miracles as criteria of truth.

It is obvious that this doctrine of miracles supposes a radical distinction between God and nature; *i.e.*, the real, separate, unconfounded existence of each. It denies Atheism, Fatalism, and Pantheism. It is also in conflict with atheistic and pantheistic theories, such as are sometimes espoused by even theistic and Christian advocates. There have been those among the best theologians, from Augustine downward, who have been jealous of representing the miracles as involving the suspension or counteraction of the laws of nature, lest they should thus seem so far to separate nature from God as to lend some countenance to Pelagian notions of independent and self-sufficient being and power in creatures. Hence they were inclined to construe Christ's saying, "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work," as meaning, that all the laws and processes of nature are nothing else than the immediate agency of God. Of course this view, fully carried out, would be incompatible with the definition of miracles which we have deduced from the Scriptures. It is a solecism to speak of the agency of God counteracting itself. A recent school of theistic advocates, with a wholly different aim, have more deliberately and articulately resolved nature and its laws (save the actions of free agents) into the immediate agency of God. They deny efficiency, whether original or derived, to every thing but will. They thus aim to confute the materialistic or positive school of Atheists, who allow no knowledge of any thing beyond what is given in sensation; consequently, no knowledge of any laws or causality in nature, except mere uniformities of antecedence and sequence; consequently, no knowledge of any First Cause. The Theists to whom we

refer, grant that portion of the premises which asserts our ignorance of any causality in nature or its laws. Some of them go farther, and absolutely deny such causality. They then assert the common doctrine, that it is a first principle that every event must have a cause. They add, that we know from our own consciousness that an intelligent will is a cause; and that human wills are inadequate to the creation of the universe. Thus, by asserting the universality of causation, eliminating all original and derived causality from matter, excluding the human will from acts of causation that are above its scope, the actings of the laws of nature are resolved into immediate forth-puttings of divine efficiency. So Dr Bowen, in his argument for the existence of God, "attributes all changes which take place in the universe, except those which are caused by man, to the *immediate* action of the Deity." * The italics are his, showing that this is no random expression. Accordingly he tells us, "This doctrine places the material universe before us in a new light. The whole frame-work of what are called 'secondary causes' falls to pieces. The *laws of nature* are only a figure of speech; the powers and active inherent properties of material atoms are mere fictions. There is no such thing as what we usually call the 'course of nature.'" †

We notice that Tulloch, in his Burnett Prize Essay in defence of Christian Theism, meets the allegation that the uniformity of the laws of nature militates against the sovereign dominion and providence of God, with some expressions which, if any thing more than mere rhetorical exaggerations, assert the same thing. These laws are, according to him, "The continual going forth of the divine efficiency. . . . The truer view, therefore, would be, to regard the whole course of providence, the whole order of nature, as special, in the sense of proceeding directly every moment from the awful abysses of creative power. To conceive of any order of events, or any facts of nature, as less directly connected than others with their divine Author, is an absurdity. And what, save this, can be distinctively meant by a general providence, we are at a loss to imagine. Only suppose the Deity equally present in all his works, equally active in all, and providence no longer admits of a two-fold apprehension. It is simply, in every possible mode of its conception, the agency of God; equally mediate in all cases, as expressing itself by *some* means; but also in all cases equally immediate, as no less truly expressed in one class of works than in another. According to this

* The Principles of Metaphysical and Ethical Science applied to the Evidences of Religion. By Francis Bowen, Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, &c., in Harvard College, p. 123.

† Ibid., p. 95.

higher and more comprehensive view, the Divine Presence lives alike in all the divine works. God is everywhere in nature.”*

That there is a sound sense in which most of the foregoing may be taken, and in which it was probably intended, we most cordially admit. But if the “Deity is equally present in all his works, and equally active;” if his agency is equally mediate and equally immediate in all; if none are “more directly connected than others with their divine Author;” if all are alike “directly” the products of “creative power,” the immediate outgoing of the divine efficiency; if they admit of no “two-fold apprehension” in their relations to his agency; then where are the second causes which this author appears elsewhere to recognise?† But whether he means to keep pace with Mr Bowen in denying secondary causes or not, we ask, where, on the scheme of either, is the line of demarcation between the natural and supernatural? In what sense are miracles, or works of grace in the soul, supernatural? In short, if the events of the natural world are accomplished by the immediate exercise of divine efficiency, to the exclusion of second causes, how are miracles or regeneration in any sense the *special* work of God? However indifferent these questions may be to a Socinian, they can scarcely be so to an evangelical theologian. Professor Bowen indeed objects to Fatalism, that it renders miracles impossible. So far as we can see, his own scheme does the same. It is not, indeed, incompatible with deviations from the uniform methods in which God commonly exerts his efficiency. But, according to it, such deviations are in no sense peculiarly works of God. How then are they seals of his truth, more than any extraordinary events of providence, which arise from some unusual junction of the uniform laws or forces of nature? The fact is, this theory needs to be pressed but a little farther, to approach a confounding or identification of God and nature, either in the shape of Pantheism or Fatalism, schemes which above all others its abettors detest. None are more strenuous than they for free-will and proper causality in man, up to the point of the most unconditional self-determination. We have sufficiently shown Dr Bowen’s opinions about the will in a former article.‡ Dr Tulloch describes it as “a naturally undetermined source of activity.”—(P. 263.) But he very justly adds, “In our very freedom, we at the same time find our dependency.” The question is, then, If free agents are causes, are they not second, derived, dependent causes? On the other hand, although thus derivative and dependent, are they not true and proper causes, having

* Christian Theism. By the Rev. George Tulloch, D.D. Carter’s edition, pp. 66, 67.

† Quotation from Dr Whewell, p. 50.

‡ See article entitled “Logic of Religion,” July, 1855.

their own separate existence and activity? And if it is competent for God to create and sustain agents of this order, why not to create and sustain laws and forces in the material world, which, though upheld and guided by him, are yet distinct from him, and exert an energy distinct from his? Surely this is the scriptural doctrine. The raising of Lazarus from the dead, the creation of the world out of nothing, is there treated as a work of God, in a far more direct and emphatic sense than the sun's rising. They are no less so in the intuitive judgments of the race. Moreover, the old example of Reid is as good against this class of reasoners as against sensational sceptics and positivists. Night always precedes day—so also does the sun's rising. The movements of a clock's machinery uniformly precede its striking twelve—so does its striking eleven. Does any one doubt in these cases which is the cause, and which is not, of the succeeding event? And is not this enough to show, not only that cause is something more than mere antecedence, but that it is found in material as well as spiritual agencies; and that, whether in intelligent or unintelligent creatures, it is, though dependent and secondary, still a cause? For ourselves, we do not see how the opposite view can consistently stop short of Pantheism or Spinozism, making the only difference between God and nature that of *Natura naturans et natura naturata*.

Other theories, militating against the possibility of miracles, require less notice. We have emphasized the foregoing, rather as a suicidal speculation advanced by their defenders. When it is claimed to be inconsistent with the immutability of God to suspend his own laws, the answer is obvious: Such interruptions of these laws were included in his eternal purpose. If it be alleged that miracles suppose his original plan so imperfect as to require to be improved upon by subsequent variations from it, and that thus his wisdom is impeached, it is a sufficient answer, that the laws of nature are the wisest provision for the ends to be accomplished by them, and their miraculous suspension and counteraction is the wisest provision for the purposes to be thus effected. To meet these and similar objections, a theory has been framed, and has gained currency with a class of Christian apologists, which verges to an extreme, the opposite of that which we have been considering. The scheme is, that miracles, though apparently interruptions of the laws of nature, are but the outworkings of these laws, either of such as we know, acting in strange and occult combinations, or of some more general law as yet hidden from us. This scheme we find sanctioned, if not adopted, as follows, in a late work: "It is no less a miracle when the lower law of nature is modified by a higher law, at the exact time at which

it pleases God to make a revelation of his will, than if the nature which is known to us were modified by his immediate interference. Thus, to illustrate by the calculating engine of Mr Babbage, it is no less a proof of knowledge and of power superior to the engine itself, to predict that a law which has held good for a million and one instances will change at the million and second, than to be able to produce such a change by interfering with the movements of the machine. Suppose it granted that the standing of the sun in the time of Joshua was a phenomenon of a law superior to the ordinary laws of nature which are known to man, and including these laws as subordinate, still it is no less a proof of divine power, and no less an evidence of special revelation." *

This indication of supernaturalism overthrows it. There is no miraculous suspension or counteraction, but only the normal action of the laws of nature. On this supposition, a miracle can in no wise be distinguished from those events which our ignorance disables us from accounting for by any known laws of nature, while they are yet the product of such laws, which science afterwards discovers. On this theory, the first instance of the congelation of water known to a tropical savage, the prediction of eclipses, the galvanic battery, the magnetic telegraph, for all savages have every possible element of a veritable miracle. They are special divine interpositions to authenticate to these savages those who employ them as messengers from God. Nor are they less so, on this scheme, although afterwards they are discovered to be but the mere effect of natural laws, and of man's knowledge thereof. Suppose that the law should yet be discovered which, on this theory, arrested the course of the sun, would that fact alter the nature of the event? Things are constantly occurring, inexplicable according to our present knowledge, as the products of natural laws, which are afterwards explained by a deeper knowledge of those laws. Are these miracles? Are these the seals of God's messengers and truth? And are the mighty signs and wonders which God wrought by the hands of Moses, of Christ and his apostles, to prove their divine commission, only what man could do with sufficient knowledge of the laws of nature, —what a steamboat or hydraulic press is to the savage? Believe it who will.

But what can we know of a true miracle, more than that it is inexplicable by any human power, or any known laws of nature? And what less than this would appear in the case of those who, ignorant that astronomy has taught men how to

* Christian Theism: the Testimony of Reason and Revelation to the Existence and Character of the Supreme Being. (Burnett Prize Essay.) By Robert Anchor Thompson, pp. 344, 345.

predict eclipses, should be told by some one who had got the secret, that they would occur on such days, hours, minutes, seconds, and find the event uniformly and precisely answerable to the prediction? Can, then, miracles be surely discerned as such, and how?

This is a fair question, and on any theory of miracles, an inevitable one. Not only does the question arise, in consequence of our comparative ignorance of the laws of nature, whether any inexplicable phenomenon be the work of God, or the effect of some occult natural law, or of the dexterous use by man of known or unknown powers of nature; it arises from another cause, which, to the best of our knowledge, is now considerably ignored or disbelieved among Christians,—a course whereby not only they, but the interests of truth and holiness suffer loss. We refer to the undeniable scriptural truth, that, within certain limits, evil spirits, the powers of darkness, are suffered, in God's sovereign wisdom, to counterfeit miracles. However any may recoil from such a statement, it will be conceded by all with whom we now argue, that the only appeal is to the law and to the testimony. And it may here be further remarked, provisionally, that should such an inquiry prove that Satan is suffered at times to simulate divine miracles, it is only what he is suffered to do with reference to every divine work in the kingdom of grace.

He becomes, when it suits his purpose, an angel of light; and his ministers, ministers of righteousness. Counterfeits here, as elsewhere, serve to prove the existence of the genuine and put it to the test, to try faith and prove sincerity. There must be heresies, that they who are approved may be made manifest.

Rev. xvi. 14, sets forth "the spirits of the devils working miracles,"—*σημεία*. Chap. xii. 9, describes "the great dragon, that old serpent, called the Devil, and Satan, which deceiveth the whole world." Chap. xiii. 11–14, represents a beast, who "spake as a dragon," and "doeth great wonders, so that he maketh the fire come down from heaven on the earth in the sight of men, and deceiveth them that dwell upon the earth by means of the miracles which he had power to do in the sight of the beast." Again, we are told, chap. xix. 20, "the beast was taken, and with him the false prophet that wrought miracles before him, with which he deceived them that had the mark of the beast." So the coming of the man of sin, predicted in 2 Thess. ii., which the church has so generally understood to be the Papal Antichrist, is declared to be "after the working of Satan, with all power, and signs, and lying wonders, and with all deceivableness of unrighteousness in them that perish; because they received not the love of the truth that they might

be saved." Christ forewarns us, that "there shall arise false Christs and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders, that shall deceive, if possible, the very elect." It cannot be denied that Pharaoh's magicians were enabled for a time to imitate the miracles wrought by Moses and Aaron. Their rods became serpents; the fish of the river died; the frogs gathered upon Egypt at their bidding.

The least that can be made of these and other concurrent scriptural representations is, that infernal spirits have the power to work pseudo-miracles, which give colour to anti-christian delusion and iniquity; that these have a sufficient resemblance to true miracles to deceive those who have not received the love of the truth, but not enough to deceive the children of God. How closely they approached real miracles, as to their supernatural character; whether merely by deeper insight into the laws of nature, devils are enabled to perform what is impossible to man, in the same sense as what is possible to a Morse or a Whitney is impossible to the vulgar; or whether, by their superior might, they have a power that is absolutely superhuman, but under divine control, really to suspend or counteract some of the laws of nature in a degree impossible to man, is not important to determine. But can we infer any thing less than that, in some cases, they exercise the latter and higher of these powers, from the actual performances which we have seen are ascribed to these fell beings? Says Chalmers, in accordance with the prevailing current of doctrine in the church, "They, on the one hand, who affirm that the bare fact of a miracle" (*i.e.*, an apparent interruption of nature's laws) "is, in itself, the instant and decisive token of an immediate forth-putting by the hand of God, must explain away the feats of the Egyptian magicians in the days of Moses,—must explain away the demoniacal possessions of the New Testament,—must explain away certain precepts and narratives of the Old, as a certain passage, for example, in the history of Saul, and a precept, *tôo*, which recognises false miracles by false prophets. Now, all this has been attempted. . . . Why all this tampering with the plain and obvious literalities of Scripture? How is it possible, without giving up the authority of the record, to reduce these demoniacal possessions to diseases?" He also observes, in reference to all this, "It certainly tends to obscure the connection between the truth of a miracle and the truth of a doctrine which is sanctioned by it. It is on the adjustment of this question that the English writers on miracles have expended, we think, most of their strength: and while in Scotland the great labour has been to dissipate the sophistries of Hume, and so to vindicate the Christian miracles as sufficiently ascer-

tained facts; in the sister kingdom it has been, admitting them as facts, to vindicate them as real credentials from the God of heaven, and so as competent vouchers for that system of religion with which they are associated." *

The rejection or overlooking by so many, of the fact that quasi-miracles are sometimes wrought by infernal spirits, is due, we think, to the fact, that we have been so much accustomed to study the subject of miracles in writers of the Scotch school, to which Chalmers refers. Paley, too, has long been the standard authority with great numbers on the whole subject of miracles and Christian evidences. In his argument for the historic verity of the miracles, and the genuineness of the canonical books of the New Testament; in his microscopic detection of undesigned coincidences, and his masterly bringing out of facts, which at once strike every man of sense as inconsistent with the hypothesis that the sacred writings could be the product of imposture or irrational enthusiasm, he is incomparable. This sufficed to confound the sensational infidelity with which he had to deal, and which not only scouted divine miracles, but much more, all lesser supernatural agencies. Their ground was, that the scriptural miracles did not occur,—that the Bible was the offspring of delusion or imposture. They did not deny, that if these miracles were wrought by Christ and his apostles, they were a divine confirmation of their teachings and of their authentic writings. Paley's argument is, therefore, conclusive against them. It may be further observed, that Paley's mind had but one eye, far and sure-sighted as that was. That eye was the sensuous, discursive understanding,—clear, solid, English sense, judgment, and logic. But he had no eye for the higher intuitions, rational, moral, or spiritual,—a fact nowhere more painfully conspicuous than in the ground-principles of his *Moral Philosophy*. Hence, the self-evidencing light which the Scriptures bear of a divine imprint and origin, and which is the great source of conviction to believers, he scarcely recognised or made account of. He, indeed, does not overlook such internal evidence as the prophecies, the morality, the harmony of the Scriptures, afford. These are adduced as subordinate and ancillary to the evidence furnished by miracles. But miracles alone were conclusive proof. He says of the first propagators of Christianity, "They had nothing else to stand upon." † Of course this view, which makes the evidence of Christianity turn wholly on miracles, is incompatible with the supposition that there may be counterfeits of these miracles so expertly done, that they need to be in any degree discriminated by a doctrinal test;

* Chalmers's *Christian Revelation*, book ii., chap. viii.

† Paley's *Evidences of Christianity*, part i., chap. vi.

in short, that the miracle must, to a certain extent, be tested by the doctrine, as well as the doctrine by the miracle. Yet such, as we shall see, is the plain teaching of Scripture.* We have dwelt the longer on these quasi-miracles wrought by evil spirits, which on their face resemble genuine miracles, and on the causes of current scepticism relative to the subject, because we believe that it is afflicted with a false estimate of the various parts of the Christian evidences, and imperfect views of duty in regard to the whole enginery of lying wonders, which is plied from time to time against gospel truth.

However spurious miracles may counterfeit the genuine, there must be certain criteria by which the latter can be surely known, not only to be unaccountable wonders, but to be wrought of God; for both these are requisite to constitute a miracle. This must be so, both because the Scriptures teach that God's miracles may be known as such, and because they would be valueless if they could not.

These criteria are twofold:—

1. Those belonging to the character of the alleged miracles themselves.

2. Those belonging to the nature of the doctrines they are offered to confirm.

I. The alleged miracles of impostors and infernal spirits always differ from true miracles in a twofold way.

1. As to number and variety. Miracle-mongers do not usually attempt or claim to work any preternatural feats beyond some *given* single kind, or, at the utmost, some two or three kinds. For the most, the workers of charms, sorceries, and conjurations, cannot perform even these, except under some peculiar circumstances, or with certain fixtures or arrangements, the failure or disturbance of any one of which instantly disables them and spoils the exhibition. With real miracles it is otherwise. They are of vast number and variety, such, that although each, taken singly, might warrant a doubt whether it were a God-wrought miracle, or the product of some magic or diabolical art, or of some extraordinary providential concurrence of events,—yet, taken together, they inevitably show that they must proceed from the exuberance of creative power and wisdom. If a man give only the sign or wonder of seeming converse with departed spirits, and then

* Says Whately, "The ultimate conclusion, that 'the Christian religion came from God,' is made to rest, as far as the direct historical evidence is concerned, on these two premises,—that a religion attested by miracles is from God, and that the Christian religion is so attested.

"Of these two premises, it should be remarked, the minor seems to have been admitted, while the major was denied by the unbelievers of old; whereas, at present, the case is reversed.

"Paley's argument, therefore, goes to establish the minor premiss, about which alone in these days there is likely to be any question."—(Whately's *Logic*, Harper's edition, pp. 381, 382.)

only in certain magic circles connecting him with a medium or familiar spirit, we may well stand in doubt of him, or rather, we should have no doubt about repudiating and denouncing him as a sorcerer.

But if, at the fiat of his word, all kinds of diseases are instantly cured, in all circumstances, without mediation; if food is created out of nothing; if the dead are raised; if the sea is cloven asunder for his friends to pass safely, and rolls together immediately, to engulf his pursuing enemies; and if all sorts of plagues are immediately, at his command, made to sweep desolation over them; then we cannot doubt the hand of God therein. If a person professing the gift of prophecy, or powers of knowledge beyond the reach of unassisted human faculties, should, in some single instances, or only when in some charmed circle, hit the truth, we might well discredit his pretensions, or refer his power to other agents than divine inspiration; but should he, in all circumstances, when professing to speak under inspiration, accurately disclose hidden, or foretell future events, even for centuries in advance, then we could not doubt his divine inspiration. But just this difference holds between all spurious prophets, dreamers, and wonder-workers, and the authors and miracles of the sacred Scriptures.

2. There are some of the Scripture miracles, such as raising the dead, creating things out of nothing, immediate control of the elements, which surpass all that impostors and magicians, men or devils, have ever given any plausible evidence of having enacted. These emit a radiance of divinity that cannot be mistaken, and that wholly extinguish all counter-pretensions of miracle-workers, by their overshadowing brightness. All the other miracles of Scripture are linked with these, and therefore, in addition to the cumulative evidence arising from their number and variety, partake of the surpassing and irresistible evidences of divinity given in raising the dead and controlling the elements at will. God so works miracles, that they overbear all competition from counterfeits. Pharaoh and his magicians were obliged to confess, "This is the finger of God." Much more then must this be incontestable with candid minds.*

* Says Dr Hill, a divine of eminent learning, judgment, and moderation: "The power of working miracles may descend from the Almighty through a gradation of good spirits; and he may commission evil spirits, by exercising the power given to them, to prove his people, or to execute a judicial sentence upon those who receive not the love of the truth. But both good and evil spirits are under his control; they fulfil his pleasure, and he works by them.

"This is the system which appears to be intimated in Scripture. . . . It is indeed very remarkable, that at the introduction of both the Jewish and Christian dispensations, there seems, according to the most natural interpretation of Scripture, to have been a certain display of the power of evil spirits; I mean in the works of the Egyptian magicians, and in the demoniacs of the New Testament. But in both cases, the display appears to have been permitted by God, that it might be made manifest that there was in nature a superior power. . . . Our faith rests upon works whose dis-

II. The other great criterion of a divine miracle, is the nature of the doctrine purporting to be attested by it. Divine truth, when once fairly before the mind, bears upon itself the self-evidence of its divinity. This is not indeed true of every portion of Scripture. But it is true of its grand distinctive announcements, in which God speaks, as man never spake, in a manner like a God, suited to our need, and worthy of all acceptance. These portions of Scripture, like the greater miracles, speak their own divinity past all dispute, and with these the rest are implicated, as parts of an organic whole, so that their inspiration stands or falls with them.

On the other hand, the doctrines supported by false miracles are invariably either frivolous, absurd, immoral, or irreligious, —at all events, anti-scriptural. The doctrines are as much below the doctrines of the Bible, as the signs and wonders are below the miracles of the Bible. No better illustration of this can be found than in the pretended revelations of our modern spiritualists. To this test, then, must all miracle-workers and their doctrines be brought. The divinity of the Bible is established by the highest possible evidence, external and internal, miracles, prophecy, history; the vastness and duration of its effects; its adaptation to our need; and, finally, by the glorious outshining of divinity on its pages. Does the alleged miracle, however plausible, sustain or impugn the teachings of the Bible. This is the ultimate test laid down in the Word itself. Every doctrine, no matter what wonders may appear to attest it, must be judged by its nature, and its fruits. False prophets, sooner or later, show their true character by the effects of their instructions. Therefore Christ says, "By their fruits shall ye know them." But we cannot always wait for the development of fruits, before our welfare and our duty require us to discern and reject them. And the grand criterion is the doctrinal one. The command is, "Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God; because many false prophets have gone out into the world. Hereby know ye the Spirit of God: every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God: and every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is not of God," but is antichrist.—(1 John iv. 1–3.) This is explicit and unmistakable.

Equally emphatic was the command under the old dispensation: Deut. xiii. 1–5, "If there arise among you a prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a sign or a wonder, and the sign or the wonder come to pass, whereof he spake unto

tinguishing character, and whose manifest superiority to the power of evil spirits, are calculated to remove every degree of hesitation, in applying the argument which miracles afford."—(Lectures on Divinity. By George Hill, D.D. Carter's edition, pp. 48, 49.)

thee, saying, Let us go after other gods, which thou hast not known, and let us serve them; thou shalt not hearken unto the words of that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams: for the Lord your God proveth you, to know whether ye love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul. Ye shall walk after the Lord your God, and fear him, and keep his commandments, and obey his voice, and ye shall serve him, and cleave unto him. And that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams, shall be put to death; because he hath spoken to turn you away from the Lord your God." This is the strongest case of an apparent miracle that can be supposed. A sign or wonder is not only given, but it comes to pass. But, if the doctrine it is offered to support be unscriptural, it is to be repudiated and denounced as the work of the devil. And it is signified to us that such signs and wonders may be given to prove our fealty to God and his truth.

Here arises the common objection, that, if this be so, miracles are nugatory as proof of the divine origin of the Scriptures. According to this, it is said, the doctrine proves the miracle, not the miracle the doctrine. It is true, the doctrine, if corrupt or plainly absurd, disproves the miracle alleged in its support. A real miracle, however, is not proved by a true doctrine. If proved at all, it is by its own independent evidence. Thus it is an additional proof in support of what has indeed other proof,—proof, however, which would often not be duly regarded, unless enforced by this auxiliary evidence displayed to the senses. Besides, the miracles of Scripture are in themselves, as we have seen, distinguishable from all other signs and wonders. They are, therefore, "for a sign to those that believe not," and props to the infirmity of real believers.

Moreover, many doctrines though rational and wholesome, are not in themselves past all doubt, unless corroborated by a sign from heaven. Such is the immortality of the soul, the resurrection of the body, eternal retribution, &c. Miracles are their appropriate confirmation. While, then, a corrupt or absurd doctrine would disprove an alleged miracle, true miracles stand on their own evidence, and prove many doctrines otherwise uncertain, while they confirm all. It would, then, be nearer the truth to say, not the doctrine proves the miracle, but rather, its nature shows whether it is capable or not of being proved by a miracle. A doctrine obviously false, absurd, frivolous, antichristian, is incapable of being proved by miracles, with whatever signs and wonders it may be paraded before us. As to the holy truths of the gospel, they, for the most part, shine in their own light; and, at all events, no impostors, human or diabolic, will undertake by prodigies or

argument to promote faith in what promotes allegiance to God. As to matters in themselves indifferent, such as can be no test of a miracle purporting to be wrought in their support, it is incredible that holy angels should wish to deceive; or that evil angels should be permitted by God to work any wonders in support of error, not otherwise discernible, which cannot on their face be easily discriminated from God-wrought miracles.

Here we are confronted with the whole question, as to the use and value of miracles. Under the influence of Paley, and the school he so ably represented, the value of miracles, as attestations of Christianity, was overrated. They were exalted to the rank of primary and exclusive evidences of the truth of Christianity. According to him, it "had nothing else to stand on." This is false, if there be any truth in the preceding views. It is false in fact. Not one believer in ten ever read "Paley's Evidences," or any equivalent treatise. Their belief that the Bible is from God, is founded on its contents. They find God speaking therein, "as never man spake," and see that its testimonies are "sure testimonies,"—from their very nature, "a faithful saying, and worthy of all acceptance," as from God. Is it asked, How? how do they know that the material universe is the work of God? They know it from circumstances and characteristics of the visible worlds, which are unaccountable on any other hypothesis. But if—

"The spangled heavens, a shining frame,
Their Great Original proclaim,"

much more does the Word of God discover God its author. It is a thousand-fold more radiant with the beams of divinity than the whole creation besides. God hath magnified his Word above all his name, every manifestation of himself. This evidence of the gospel is the fundamental ground on which the faith of believers ultimately rests, whatever auxiliary support it may receive from miracles. Of course, the theory that miracles are the only evidence of the Bible, could never stand, and was bound to be followed by a reaction.

That reaction came. And now a numerous class undervalue them, and deny them to be of any value as proofs of Christianity; because, they say, it is sufficiently evidenced by itself, while miracles themselves must be tested by a doctrinal criterion.

This is the opposite and plausible extreme; but it is fallacious, and overlooks several important facts.

1. The Scriptures constantly assert, that the inspiration of their authors, and the truth of their teachings, were attested or confirmed by miracles; while they no less command us to

reject all false teachers, by whatever signs or wonders they may be supported; assuring us, also, that the elect, the true people of God, cannot be fatally deceived, because they have an unction from the Holy One, whereby they know all things. These several facts are therefore compatible, whether we can see how or not.

2. As we have shown, the Scripture miracles surpass all other miracles in this, that their number, variety, and character, utterly preclude the opinion, in any fair mind, that they can have been wrought by the hands of any creature, much less by wicked men or devils. They, therefore, may serve to demonstrate that those by whom they were wrought were God-sent. They had this effect even upon the ancient magicians, and upon cavillers as well as others in Christ's time.

3. The same truth may be supported by various evidences. These may all corroborate each other, or they may be even interdependent, so that each stands or falls with the other. Or, if equally demonstrated by a plurality of separate and independent proofs, some men may be in a state of mind to be convinced by one class of evidences, others by another, others still by their combined force. A case in court may depend on the testimony of an unimpeached witness, and on a strong chain of circumstances, neither of which alone might suffice to convict a felon. Both united may carry conviction to every juror's mind. And again, of these jurors, some may be more influenced by the testimony of the witness, others by the network of corroborating circumstances. Before we can adopt the conclusion that the motions of the heavenly bodies are produced by the law of gravity, two things must appear: 1. That the law of gravity is a property of matter. 2. That the motions of the planets are precisely such as this law would produce. If either of these points fails, it weakens the other, as well as the general conclusion dependent upon both.

The application of these views to the case of miracles is obvious. A corrupt doctrine destroys a pretended miracle, just as strong counter-circumstantial evidence would invalidate the testimony of a single witness. A miracle, on the other hand, is a divine attestation of a true and salutary, but uncertain or contested doctrine, like the soul's immortality, or eternal retributions. Not only so, but with regard to the Scriptures as a whole, which carry a self-evidence of divinity on their face, there is no question that multitudes are in a moral state which disqualifies them for appreciating this evidence. Many who appreciate in some measure the prophetic evidence, and the lofty morality of the Bible, yet see not the bright radiance of divinity on its pages. Yet, those

whose moral sense is thus dulled, may be alive to those stupendous miracles in which God displays himself to their very senses. Thus, a respectful and candid attention may be gained for the other and higher evidence of the truths so attested, which through divine grace will lead to its due appreciation. That miracles exerted this convictive energy at the first promulgation of the gospel, is the constant representation of the Scriptures. That this influence may have been more important then than now, when the Scriptures in their integrity and purity are accessible to all, and have so long and so widely given proof of their divine origin by their effects, is doubtless true; but that it still continues, and is of power under God to promote faith among men, is past all doubt. Miracles are proofs offered to the eye of sense, where the eye of spiritual insight is wanting or is dim: "Wherefore tongues are for a sign, not to them which believe, but to them which believe not."—(1 Cor. xiv. 22.)

Moreover, true believers often find their faith wavering, and struggling with unbelief. To them even miracles may be a prop for this infirmity. They lean not only on the self-evidence of the Word, but on the miracles which corroborate it; since God thus "confirms his Word by signs following."—(Mark xvi. 20.) Besides, the miracles narrated in Scripture form an integral part of it, and, in the description given of them, emit a divine radiance; which is a part of its self-evidencing light. As truly in the accounts given of miracles wrought, as elsewhere, does the unsophisticated reader of the Bible feel that there is that which no impostor, or evil spirit, would invent, if he could, or could if he would. The doctrines and the miracles of Scripture are given to us together, as one concrete outgoing and manifestation of divine wisdom, power, and goodness, with an "implication of doctrine in the miracle, and of miracle in the doctrine," which goes to the soul through all its avenues of access. They both fasten the obligation to believe and obey the gospel upon all to whom it comes. "For if the word spoken by angels was steadfast, and every transgression received a just recompence of reward; how shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation; which at the first began to be spoken by the Lord, and was confirmed unto us by them that heard him; God also bearing them witness, both with signs and wonders, and with divers miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost, according to his own will?"—(Heb. ii. 2-4.)

If it be objected that this is arguing in a circle, to confirm doctrine and miracle by each other, it is so in a good sense. It is not like arguing that a house is good, because it is built of good materials; and in order to prove this, arguing it to be

built of good materials, because it is a good house. It is rather like showing the excellence of a man's character by the excellence of his works, while the excellence of these is enhanced by the well-known piety and conscientiousness which prompt their performance; like the reputed veracity of a witness and the verisimilitude of what he relates, rendering each other mutual support. The parts of an arch give each other the strongest support, and form the strongest whole, when they follow each other in the line of a circle.

It may be further objected, that on this hypothesis, after all, it is left to the judgment and good pleasure of each one to decide what is immoral and absurd, or stamped with a divine impress, and what is not; that hence, miracles bind none to any belief which they would not adopt without them. The first answer to this is, that this difficulty applies with equal force to all moral evidence, of every description. It is possible for men to blind themselves to its existence, or its force. It is possible to refuse to retain God in our knowledge; to call good evil, and evil good; to put light for darkness, and darkness for light. Men may refuse to acknowledge the most stupendous evidence of miracles, of prophecy, of moral and divine excellence, in support of any system of doctrines. Multitudes do thus hate the light, and refuse to come to the light, because their deeds are evil. Doubtless these things ultimately fall back upon each one's moral responsibility. Every one is bound to be fair in recognising and estimating evidence; just and true in his moral judgments. As it is possible to ignore or pervert truth and evidence, so a woe is upon those who so confound good and evil. And we are expressly assured, that those who are blind to the existing evidence for the Scriptures, would be incapable of conviction by any evidence whatever—"Neither would they be persuaded, though one arose from the dead." It is doubtless possible for a Socinian to reject that as absurd and impossible to be taught in the Scriptures, which is simply unwelcome and mysterious; which has been dear to the saints of all generations, as an adorable life-giving mystery; even as the mystery of godliness, which was hid from ages and generations, but is now made manifest unto his saints. For any to reject such truths as absurd, is simply to proclaim their own hardihood of unbelief. Truth is truth, and it is evidenced by sufficient proofs, the beliefs of any or all men to the contrary notwithstanding. And if any know it not, it is because they seek it not with a right spirit, and in a right manner. They who so seek, shall assuredly find. They who do not so seek, do not deserve to find. If any man will do His will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God. They who desire not the knowledge of his ways, are in danger of realis-

ing their hearts' desire, and being given over to a strong delusion that they should believe a lie.

We are of opinion, moreover, that among the most important uses of miracles, is the guarding of the doctrine of the self-evidencing light of the Scriptures from perversion by enthusiasts, rationalists, and the advocates of intuitional theology. As counterfeit miracles are detected by the antichristian doctrines associated with them; so spurious pretensions to inward light, to inspiration, to a theology self-evidently superior to scriptural doctrine, are as satisfactorily refuted by their want of miracles to attest them. They may, indeed, be refuted by reason of their manifest inherent falsity. But yet on their intrinsic merits, adversaries can dispute interminably, and make the worse appear the better reason to fallen humanity. But all these schemes want the prestige of a miraculous attestation, such as overshadows all other seeming and pretended miracles. The normal authority of the Scriptures, as the objective standard of truth and rule of faith, is constantly assailed by the haters of its doctrines, who assert that these doctrines contradict our first moral intuitions. This class generally seek to attenuate the value of miracles to the lowest minimum. Thus Stuart Mill, after proving that Hume's argument against miracles is of no weight, on the supposition that God exists, and a sufficient exigency arises for his making such interposition, (and surely we need not stop to combat Hume's sophism on this subject, when the ablest writers of his own school confess it,) applauds what he calls the theory of the most advanced thinkers,—viz., that "the doctrine must prove the miracles, not the miracles the doctrine."* Not exactly. They mutually prove each other. And we are persuaded that to assert less for miracles than this, is to surrender one of our strong fortresses to the enemy.

Still the question may arise, why any counterfeits of miracles were suffered at all. Why are not miracles so distinguished and contrasted with all other events, that there can be no more chance for doubt, cavil, or deception, than about a proposition in Euclid? The first answer is, that such is not the decision of Infinite Wisdom. The second is, that had God ordered this matter differently, he would have deviated from his uniform method in evidencing moral and religious truths to men. This he does not after the fashion of mathematical demonstration; but in a way that enforces conviction in every candid mind, while it gives opportunity to the perverse and unbelieving to shield their unbelief under specious pretexts. Such as hate the light can refuse to come to the light. They can hold up false miracles to screen themselves from the convictive

Mill's Logic, Harper's edition, p. 376.

power of true ones. In his revelations, as in all his dealings with us, God's aim is to try and prove us. Such he expressly assures us is his purpose in permitting heresies and lying wonders: "Thou shalt not hearken unto that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams: for the Lord your God proveth you, to know whether ye love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul."—(Deut. xiii. 3.)

We thus reach the last point in this inquiry, for which all that precedes clears the way. We have found that miracles are wonders supernatural and contranatural, and that they are wrought of God; that their use is to serve as seals of the divine commission of his messengers, and of the divine inspiration of their teachings; that in all ages they are evidence, though not the only or the highest evidence, that the Scriptures are the oracles of God; that there are infallible criteria by which they may be known as miracles, and distinguished from all counterfeits; that such counterfeits are perpetrated by wicked men and devils; that they may be known as such, as well by the antichristian, immoral, false, or frivolous character of the tenets they are put forward to confirm, as by their signal inferiority to the miracles of that gospel which they are always employed directly or indirectly to impugn. The question then is, What is our duty with reference to all pretended miracles and miracle-mongers? All are familiar with the boastful pretensions of a low species of necromancy miscalled Spiritualism, and with the wide extent of the mania it has begotten. Papists are constantly parading their simulated miracles, to deceive the simple and unwary. In all ages, wizards, conjurers, and sorcerers, will appear, often commanding followers enough to make the occupation lucrative. What, then, is our duty with reference to them, so far as they come in our way?

1. In regard to all pretended or quasi-miracles which are offered in support of what is unchristian, immoral, absurd, or frivolous, our duty is plain. They are either feats of natural magic, jugglery, and legerdemain, or they are the works of evil spirits. In either case, they are mediately or immediately works of the devil. As such, whether offered to our consideration by Jesuits, conjurers, clairvoyants, mediums, circles, wizards, fortune-tellers, or other sorcerers, our duty with regard to them is very clear and simple. It is incumbent on us to give ourselves the least possible trouble about them, except to abjure and denounce them, and to try to persuade others to do the same. We are not necessarily called upon to investigate the truth or falsity of the wonders alleged to have been wrought. And it is seldom that they are worth this degree of attention. Whether the "sign or wonder come to pass [or not] whereof they speak unto us, saying,

Let us go after other gods," our duty is the same,—to shun and denounce them as antichrist,—to renounce the devil and all his works.

We think a false issue is often before the minds of people on this subject, which arises from ignoring or rejecting the scriptural doctrine in regard to Satanic counterfeits of miracles. Many apparently suppose, that if these performances cannot be explained by natural laws and tricks of jugglery, if they clearly imply any preternatural agency, then there is no alternative but to regard them as wrought of God, and entitled to becoming reverence. Hence they deem it important to investigate them rigidly and seriously; and, if they cannot explain the feats by natural laws, they are sadly perplexed. But this is by no means the issue in regard to pretended miracles in behalf of frivolous, wicked, or unchristian doctrines. Whatever in them cannot be referred to man, is to be attributed to the father of lies. The supposed superhuman is at most only diabolic, to be discarded and stigmatized as such. This is most clearly taught in the Bible, and can never safely be lost sight of, in regard to this class of wonders and wonder-workers.

2. It is dangerous and sinful to participate in these pretended miraculous performances, or in any manner to countenance them, by giving them serious and respectful heed. To enact, to assist in enacting these prodigies, to consult these lying oracles, to repair to them for the purpose of acquiring knowledge not accessible by the due use of our rational faculties or of divine revelation, is a clear case of rebellion against, or of apostasy from that God, who hath said, "Woe to the rebellious children, that take counsel, but not of me; and that cover with a covering, but not of my Spirit, that they may add sin to sin:" who hath put all sorcerers out of his kingdom, and doomed them to the lake of fire, and in every form signified to us that all who use divinations, all observers of times, enchanters, witches, charmers, consultants with familiar spirits, wizards and necromancers, are an abomination to him.—Deut. xviii. 10–12.

And in our judgment, there is more danger, as well as sin, than is often supposed, in meddling with these things from mere curiosity. Deceit, as the Scriptures constantly indicate, is their radical characteristic. This is so great, that if it were possible, it would "seduce the very elect." Now, few can safely volunteer to put themselves under the influence of "all deceivableness of unrighteousness," of those signs and lying wonders wherewith Satan deceiveth the world, unless in obedience to the call of duty, and guarded by the antecedent and scriptural conviction, that they are impious abominations. The state of mind which prompts such approaches to what God

has condemned, to gratify a prurient curiosity, opens all its avenues to the stealthy ingress of delusion and error. Those who forsake the faculties and the revelations which God has given us for our guidance, to heed the processes or utterances of magicians and necromancers, will be quite likely to be left to the guidance of their chosen teachers. Those who give up the guidance of reason and revelation, to familiarise themselves with anties, in which all the laws of nature, God, and reason are defied, will be likely to be forsaken of their reason and their God. If they are not left to lunacy, they are likely to be "given over to a strong delusion that they should believe a lie," because they received not the love of the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness.—(2 Thess. ii. 11, 12.) That those who take this course, put themselves out of the way of the divine guidance and blessing, appears not only from Scripture, but from all experience. It is notorious that lunatics by scores, and we believe hundreds, have already gone forth from the spirit-circles of our land to insane hospitals. It is notorious that multitudes who began by amusing themselves with clairvoyant sports, have ended in this pneumatophobia, which disowns the Word of God, and looks to the thumpings of wizards and jugglers for guidance in regard to the future state. These persons are of all ranks and professions, from the drudge and the scavenger, to the judge, the senator, the scientific savant, and the professed minister of Christ. He who begins to tamper with these impostures, knows not how soon he may become their votary and victim. No degree of worldly knowledge is any security against such a catastrophe. The only maxim of duty and safety regarding these things, for ourselves, and to be impressed upon others, is, "Touch not, taste not, handle not:" "Have no communion with the unfruitful works of darkness, but rather reprove them."—(Eph. v. 11.)

3. It is characteristic of this kind of conjuration and miracles, the operators of which are often not only deceivers, but deceived, that they wax and flourish in proportion to the attention and consideration they command. They wane and die out, if they pass neglected, as being what, *by its very pretensions, on its face, and prior to all examination*, all good men are bound to abhor and let alone. *Spreta vilescent.* It is with reluctance that we have given them the degree of attention requisite for setting forth, what we are sure so many have overlooked, some of the grounds on which they are entitled only to neglect and detestation. This whole thing is only a small and clumsy attempt at what in former times was called witchcraft. A witch has been defined, by a believer in witchcraft, to be a person "that, having the free use of reason, doth knowingly and willingly seek or obtain of the devil, or any

other god [we would add, or extra-mundane spirit], besides the true God, Jehovah, an *ability* to do or know strange things, or things which he cannot by his own human abilities arrive unto. This person is a witch." *

The whole history of demonology and witchcraft shows that it has increased when made prominent by persecution and punishment, or otherwise, and that it has disappeared in proportion as it has been neglected and disregarded. Mather tells us, that the more witches in his day were punished and executed by the civil sword, the more they increased, until "at last it was evidently seen that there must be a stop put, or the generation of the children of God would fall under that condemnation." As soon as the prosecutions stopped, the witchcraft stopped. This is the voice of history with regard to witchcraft and conjuration in all ages. We believe, that all notice taken of these "mediums," familiar spirits, and necromancers, such as implies anxiety to explain their movements and to find the secret of them; and especially, all attempts to give them the dignity of originating in and bringing to light a new power of nature, "odylie" or otherwise, increase rather than abate the nuisance. These things thrive on notoriety and attention, certainly in all cases of attempts which fail to detect and expose the trick, and have been so made as to imply that any thing depends on success. Many who have undertaken to detect the imposture have become its dupes. But let them be utterly abjured on this plain ground, that if mere tricks of man, they are detestable; and if too much for man, they are from Satan, and so are still more detestable. They will not long survive this treatment. The trade will soon come to an end. Those who thus contribute to abate the evil, by denouncing and shunning these pretenders and their works as conjurations of men or devils, will, we think, experience the comfort, *quoad hoc*, of a good conscience, sustained by the Bible and the God of the Bible. No wonders can compare with those that establish its divinity. Though an angel from heaven preach any other gospel, let him be accursed.—(Gal. i. 8.)

In conclusion, it has occurred to us, that it might not be amiss to cite an extract or two from thaumaturgic history, by way of showing that what now passes under the name of spiritualism is closely akin to what mankind have called witchcraft. Henry More, in his "Antidote against Atheism," tries to confute the Materialists, by proving, with other things, the agency of evil spirits in witchcraft and various prodigies. He says, he has been informed, by eye-witnesses, of "bricks being carried round about a room without any visible hand; multi-

* Mather's Magnalia, vol. ii. p. 479.

tudes of stones flung down at a certain time of the day from the roof of a house, for many months together, to the amazement of the whole country; pots carried off from the fire and set on again, nobody meddling with them; the violent flapping of a chest cover, nobody touching it," &c., &c.—(Philosophical Writings, p. 93.)

Cotton Mather gives the following proofs of demoniac agency in a certain house in his day: "Bricks, and sticks, and stones, were often by some invisible hand thrown at the house, and so were many pieces of wood: a cat was thrown at the woman of the house: and a long staff danced up and down in the chimney; and afterwards, the same long staff was hanged by a line and jumped to and fro; and when two persons laid it on the fire to burn it, it was as much as they were able to do, with their joint strength, to hold it there. An iron crook was violently, by an invisible hand, hurled about; and a chair flew about the room, until at last it lit on the table, where the meat stood ready to be eaten, and had spoiled all, if the people had not with much ado saved a little."—(Mather's *Magnalia*, vol. ii., p. 450.)

The visit of the commissioners of the Long Parliament to Woodstock Palace was disturbed by motions of all objects within the palace, far more unaccountable and unearthly than the foregoing. It came out, after the Restoration, that this was the trick of their own clerk, who was fully acquainted with all parts of the edifice. "Being a bold, active, spirited man, he availed himself of his local knowledge of trap-doors and private passages, so as to favour the tricks which he played off upon his masters by the aid of his fellow domestics. The commissioners' personal reliance on him made his task the more easy, and it was all along remarked, that trusty Giles Sharpe saw the most extraordinary sights and visions among the whole party."—(Scott's *Demonology and Witchcraft*, pp. 315, 316; a volume in which much more of this sort may be found.) Many of the most prodigious feats of our pseudo-spiritualists have at length found a similar solution. Whether they all can be brought to it or not, we deem of small moment. Our duty is the same in either case. Though his sign or wonder come to pass, we may not hearken to the prophet or dreamer who would turn us away from the God of our fathers.

ART. IV.—*Mr Lee's Donellan Lectures on Inspiration.*

London: 1854.

IN continuing from our last number* the consideration of the important subject of Christian Evidences, we invite the attention of our readers to the question of the Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. As we intimated at the conclusion of a former article, our first object will be "to justify the position we have assigned to this great question, and to show that it does not involve any reasoning in a circle." In doing this, as well as in discussing the subject itself, we shall largely avail ourselves of Mr Lee's valuable and suggestive lectures.

Inspiration has been sometimes spoken of as if it were the primary question between believers and unbelievers. But this we hold to be a palpable error. The Christian Scriptures must first be established, as to their genuineness, authenticity, and canonicity, on their own proper grounds of rational evidence; and then, and not till then, is the time to approach the question of their inspiration. If it were approached sooner, it would involve reasoning in a circle. Because we must go to the Scriptures themselves for our first information as to the fact of their inspiration; and we can only escape the charge of a *petitio principii*, by so establishing them on independent grounds of evidence, before we thus go to them, that they become sufficient and unassailable witnesses to themselves in this respect.

We are not, then, under the circumstances, guilty of the fallacy so often attributed to Christian advocates, of proving the truth of Scripture by its inspiration, and the inspiration of Scripture by itself. Far from it. As we have already seen, the Scriptures rest on their own vast body of testimony; a testimony so varied and so consentient, so beyond all possibility of collusion or artifice, that it approaches as nearly to a demonstration as any moral evidence ever can. And this being so, we have an entire right to inquire of the Scriptures themselves, under what conditions they were written, and wherein, if in anything, their writers differ from the authors of all other books in the world. There is no reasoning in a circle here. A hundred instances of analogous procedure might be cited, were they needed.

Now, in appealing to the Scriptures for information on this all-important subject, we may most properly place ourselves, in the first instance, on the declarations of our blessed Lord him-

* See British and Foreign Evangelical Review, No. XVI., Art. 5.

self. These declarations look two ways. They have regard to the older Scriptures, and to those also of the New Testament; to the former in the way of recognition, to the latter in the way of promise. And therefore, as regards the fact of the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, they may be fairly considered as covering the whole ground. It is, however, with their latter aspect only that we are here concerned.

There were, then, four distinct occasions on which, before his death, our Lord promised to his disciples the aid of the Holy Spirit. And these four promises are arranged very judiciously, by Mr Lee, in two classes. In the first are to be placed the three found respectively in Matthew x. 19, 20; Luke xii. 11, 12; and Mark xiii. 11, with which is also to be taken Luke xxi. 14, 15. In all these passages there is distinctly promised an objective, positive, external influence of the Holy Spirit, on "all the public occasions on which the apostles could be called upon to defend themselves, whether before councils or synagogues, before governors or kings." And that this promise was fulfilled to the apostles, is made so evident by the course of the subsequent narrative of their acts and words, that even such writers as Paulus and Strauss are compelled virtually to admit it. The words of Paulus are too remarkable to be passed without notice. "If," he says, "we embrace in historic glance the record of the origin of Christianity, from the last evening of the life of Jesus to the close of the fifty days next following, it is undeniable that, in that short interval, something of a nature encouraging beyond what was ordinary must have taken place, to transform the trembling and irresolute apostles of that evening into men exalted above all fear of death, who could exclaim before the imbittered judges of the murdered Jesus, 'We must obey God rather than men.'"

In the second class is to be placed the very remarkable promise (or promises) contained in the 14th and following chapters of the Gospel of John. This promise demands a careful analysis. It will be found to be twofold, though it grounds itself on the assurance, that when the Lord has gone away from his apostles, he will send to them—and here again an objective, external influence is pledged to them—the Holy Ghost, here described as the "Spirit of truth." He is (1) to recall to their minds whatever the Lord had declared to them, and (2) to teach them all things.—(John xiv. 25, 26.) For this great gift they have been prepared, by having been the companions of their Lord, while he abode on earth: and by it, and in it, old truths which they have learned from him, are to be brought back to their recollection, and new truth is to be imparted from above.

We can hardly fail to observe, that our Lord here recog-

nises that distinction to which in a former article we alluded; the distinction, namely, between what have been called the human and the divine elements in the Scriptures. For here are obviously set forth two sorts of truths; one which the apostles already knew, and another which they did not know. The former the Spirit is to recall; the latter, he is to communicate. And thus the Redeemer's promise expresses precisely the conditions under which reason would teach us *a priori*, if the Spirit were to be given at all, it must be given to be effectual and sufficient for the purpose had in view. The former truths had already been directly declared to the apostles by our Lord; the latter were to be declared to them from him by the vicarial agency of the Holy Ghost. He was all along the Revealer; the inspiring Spirit brought back what he had already taught, or what the apostles had already seen, and communicated what, as yet, Christ had not taught them, the many things which he had to say to them, but which they were not then able to bear.—(John xvi. 12, 13.)

Now it seems very clear, upon examining the two promises of our Lord, that there is between them an important difference. The first recorded in the synoptical Gospels, relates to special personal exigencies, in which the apostles were told they would be placed; and in which, as matter of fact, we find they were placed. The promise, therefore, is, so to speak, personal to themselves; intended for their personal encouragement, support, and consolation, when they should stand before Jewish sanhedrims or Roman tribunals. But the latter, recorded by John, presents no such limitations or restrictions. The truths recalled to their recollections, or directly communicated by the Spirit, constitute that gospel which they are to preach to every creature, either by word or writing. And hence it is plain, that even if the first promises have reference to the *words* which the apostles were to speak before kings and rulers in the name of Christ, the latter cannot be so restricted; so that the foolish distinction,—a distinction, let it be observed, which the apostles nowhere recognise,—between their oral teaching and their written instruction, comes to nothing, and may be summarily dismissed.

The apostolic history is a continuous comment on, and verification of, the Lord's first promise. A transformation of the whole nature of the apostles seems to have followed Christ's ascension, analogous to that described in the words of Samuel to Saul: "The Spirit of the Lord will come upon thee, and thou shalt be turned into another man." We find these poor fishermen of Galilee, whose whole tone of thought and line of conduct before their Lord's departure had remained so true to the character of "unlearned, ignorant men," changed on a sudden into the courageous rivals of the philosophers and

rhetoricians of their age. We see them, at first, restless from doubts, and fettered by prejudices; now immovable in their convictions, and alive to each new aspect of the truth. Formerly timid and wavering, they now are fearless and resolved. Their delusive dream of temporal deliverance becomes a real assurance of eternal redemption. Their narrow estimate of the divine covenant with their nation expands, under the influence of the Holy Ghost, into the sublime conception of the "Israel of God." Nor do the apostolic history and the apostolic writings any less explain and indicate the second, fuller, and less restricted promise of Christ. The apostles distinctly claim that the Holy Ghost *and* they, are witnesses to Christ; not independent witnesses, but he witnessing through them.—(Acts v. 32.) They put themselves on the same ground with those "holy men of old" who "spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."—(Eph. ii. 20; 2 Peter iii. 2.) They reject and even anathematize man or angel who shall declare any other doctrine than theirs, (Gal. i. 8;) and this doctrine they never pretend to have discovered by the use of their own reason, but they always refer it to the gift of God, and the illumination of the Spirit.—(Eph. iii. 5.) While if any one should be inclined to fancy that all this relates to the teachings by word, and not to the written instructions of the apostles, John's assertion concerning his gospel, "These *are written* that ye might believe;" and Paul's exhortation to the Thessalonians, to hold fast to what they had been taught by word or *by epistle*, (John xx. 31; 2 Thess. ii. 15); ought to show that no such distinctions existed in the minds of the apostles. But, indeed, reason itself, if rightly directed, leads to the conclusion that such a distinction is as groundless as it is perverse. And, finally, this divine guidance is asserted to extend to the very language of the apostolic instructions.—(1 Cor. ii. 13; 1 Thess. ii. 13.)

Thus broadly and fully, then, was the guidance of the Holy Spirit, call it inspiration or what you choose, promised by our Lord to his apostles, to furnish them what they were to say in all their witnessings to him at every time, and in every place; to recall to their minds his acts, his words, his divine instructions; and to communicate to them such truths as were before unknown;—words, instructions, truths, which were to form that precious heritage, committed to the church, to make men "wise unto salvation." Thus fully does the apostolic history verify these gracious promises. Thus fully do the apostles claim and appropriate them, in all their completeness and integrity.

And now, the sole objection against all this, alleged from the New Testament, is grounded on certain passages in the

7th chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians.* The objection is, that in this chapter the apostle distinguishes between what he says by inspiration and what he says by himself; and the conclusion is, that some parts of the epistles are inspired and some are not; whence, as Mr Greg shrewdly argues, it follows, that “every man must judge for himself *which are which*,—must separate by his own skill the divine from the human assertions in the Bible.” Were this really so, we certainly might as well give up the whole thing at once. But let us proceed to examine the chapter, by the aid of Mr Lee and the writers to whom he refers.

The first five verses contain certain directions to husbands and wives in reference to a matter of mutual duty. Then, in the sixth verse, according to our English version, the apostle says, “But I speak this *by permission*, and not of *commandment*.” There is no real difficulty here. The apparent one arises from the ambiguity of our word *permission*. Had the better word, *indulgence*, or *allowance*, been employed, the meaning of the passage would have been unequivocally presented, namely, ‘I say this by way of allowance *for* you, not of command *to* you.’

In the 10th and 11th verses, the apostle discusses the law of marriage, introducing his decision with the words, “And unto the married I command, yet not I, but the Lord.” Now the idea is, that in this passage he distinguished between his *own* commands and those received by revelation from Christ. But this is not so. He is, says Mr Alford, “about to give them a command resting not merely on *inspired apostolic authority*, great and undoubted as that was, but on that of the LORD HIMSELF; † so that all supposed distinction between the apostle when writing of *himself* and of *the Lord*, is quite irrelevant.” In other words, he is re-stating a command which our Lord gave while he abode on earth; and the contrast lies simply between that and what he, as an inspired apostle, might give; not between different commands of his own, given at different times, and under different conditions. Meyer and even De Wette are obliged to admit this; and the former says, “He . . . distinguishes here, not between his own and inspired commands, but between those which proceed from his own inspired subjectivity and those which Christ maintained by his objective word.” This passage, then, affords no real ground for the objection.

But still, it is urged, in verses 12th and 25th, the apostle says, “To the rest speak I, not the Lord;” and again,

* For it is not worth while to notice the objections arising from unreasonable expositions of Rom. vi. 18, 19, and 2 Cor. xi. 16, 17. Mr Alford, as quoted by Mr Lee, fully explains these passages.

† The command of Christ is in Mark x. 12.

"I have no commandment of the Lord, yet I give my judgment." Now, in the first of these passages he is speaking of marriage, where one of the parties is an unbeliever; and in the second he is giving directions concerning virgins; and by the language he employs, "he is supposed to intimate that, in certain parts of Scripture, the author may write according to his own uninspired human judgment, although guided in other portions of his work by the Holy Ghost." But the fallacy lies in supposing that the expression, "commandment of the Lord," means a communication made by the Holy Ghost to the apostle; whereas it merely signifies an express direction of Christ, given while he abode on earth, and which had now become *historical*. So that again, the apostle is not here contrasting what he says by the Spirit and what he says of himself; but what he says reiterating already expressed commands of Christ, and what he says by the Spirit in reference to cases of which,—since they did not then exist,—our Lord had not, while he was on earth, spoken. Thus, Olshausen well remarks: "We find that the apostle distinguishes between what he says and what the Lord says; between a definite command of Christ (*ἐπιταγή*), and his own subjective judgment (*γνώμη*). . . . Suppose, therefore, that Paul had no traditional command of Christ upon a certain subject; yet we must esteem his *inspired conviction* as equivalent to such a command, for Christ wrought in him by his Spirit."

In all these three cases, then,—and they form the whole foundation of the objection under consideration,—the apostle is contrasting, not his own condition of inspiration at one time and non-inspiration at another; but express commands of our Lord delivered while he was yet on earth, "appropriated and recalled by the assistance of the Spirit," and the inward suggestions of the Holy Ghost, by which he was guided in the work of his apostolate. In the first case, he declares that he is not uttering one of these inward suggestions, but is recalling and reiterating a law once spoken by our Lord's own lips. In the last two cases, he declares that he is not recalling and reiterating such a law, but is giving utterance to these inward suggestions. Still, in each and every case, he is under the guidance of the Holy Ghost, he speaks as an inspired apostle. In the first, the Spirit is fulfilling one part of our Lord's two-fold promise in John, that he should bring all things to the remembrance of the apostles which Christ had said. In the last two, he is fulfilling the other part of the same promise, that he should teach them all things, and guide them into all truth. The objection, therefore, falls; and the witness which the New Testament Scriptures have to the inspiration of their authors is untouched, consentient, and complete.

Such being the testimony of the Scriptures themselves, we may next proceed to inquire, Did the universal church receive the Scriptures in accordance with that testimony, and so continue and carry it on? In answering this question, it is necessary to observe, that we are not to look in the early ages for "any elaborate theory, or series of systematised propositions on the subject of inspiration." The very nature of the case forbids us to expect any thing of the kind. "Distance," says Mr Westcott,* "is a necessary condition, if we are to estimate rightly any object of vast proportions." And the very living consciousness of the Christian body, the very fulness of its gifts and life, while it prevented men in that age from fully realising that the then forming canon contained all that the church could ever need, forbade them also to undertake a dogmatic teaching on inspiration, which the very harmony of opinion rendered needless. But they do make just that distinction between the New Testament Scriptures and their own or other writings, which affords the most valuable proof for our purposes; a proof which, if it were more systematised and dogmatic, might well, by every rule of historical criticism, be regarded with suspicion: while the very absence "of recognised theory or system serves but to exhibit in bolder relief how profoundly incorporated with the Christian consciousness of those times was the belief in the inspiration of Scripture, and undesignedly represents its depth, its fervour, and its source."

Time and space alike forbid us to attempt to exhibit the testimony of the church to the inspiration of the New Testament Scriptures† in detail. We can only refer our readers to the elaborate Appendix of Mr Lee on the "Judgment of the Fathers," where the testimony is drawn out at length, with a minuteness and care which render this one of the most valuable portions of his work. The result alone can be briefly stated. The line is unbroken from Clement of Rome to Augustine, and farther it is not necessary to follow it out; and the voices multiply as time goes on. Through the age immediately following the apostles; through that of the Greek apologists, when Christianity was no longer a work of silence, but of strength, when it conquered the intellect as well as the heart; through the Diocletian persecution, far into the Conciliar age, the line extends. From the great centres of Christendom, from Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria, Ephesus, and

* In his General Survey of the New Testament Canon; a work which forms one of the invaluable Series of Theological Manuals now in course of publication at Cambridge,—not in New England.

† The mention of the New Testament is not intended to imply, that there is not the same testimony to the Old. It alone is named, because it alone is here under consideration.

Rome,—from east and west alike, the witnesses came forth. And while their witness varies endlessly in form, and is accompanied with unnumbered illustrations, still for substance it is all the same. It echoes and continues the witness of the Scriptures themselves, that they who wrote them, wrote them by the Spirit of God. There is a unanimity in the testimony that can only be accounted for by its truth.

And yet, withal, there is just enough of exception to the unanimity to bring it out in bolder relief, and present it with greater distinctness. There are the possible denials of Theodore of Mopsuestia, and the undoubted ones of the Anomœans. Mr Lee certainly makes the case of Theodore more than doubtful. That of the Anomœans, in the fourth century, he does not question. But the indignant manner in which their assertion, that “here the apostle spake as a man,” is treated, as a thing before unheard of, proves that they were herein only denying the consentient belief of the church. It is a case where, most strikingly, the single exception proves the rule. And now we will sum up this testimony of the church in the eloquent words of Mr Lee, feeling that no apology is requisite for the length of our extract: “This belief was no merely speculative tenet; nor did it rest upon some general feeling that the writings which taught the doctrines of revealed religion were deserving of reverence. Their conviction of the divine source of that faith which the Bible unfolds, was not more firm than their conviction that the origin of the records which contain its history was, in like manner, divine. Proofs, equally incontrovertible, were given of both. The soldier of the cross, in our day, goes forth to heathen lands, supported, it is true, by the sense of duty, and animated by his glorious message; but he is also cheered on his path, and stimulated in his toil,—for he is but man,—by the consciousness of universal sympathy and the tokens of public applause. Once this was not so. There were days when the Christian missionary, although in the land of his fathers, and surrounded by the civilization of the world, was encountered on every side, did he suffer his thoughts to dwell upon aught but the task before him, by the certainty of persecution, and contumely, and wrong. ‘If the Tiber,’ says Tertullian, ‘floods to the walls, if the Nile does not irrigate the fields, if the heavens are shut, if the earth quakes, if there is a famine or a pestilence,—at once the cry is raised, CHRISTIANOS AD LEONEM.’ In attestation of the truth and origin of the facts on which Christianity relies, no more convincing proof can be alleged than the endurance of such trials and the triumphs thus achieved. The proof, too, is one of which Christian apologists in every age have not been slow to avail themselves.

But the argument should not pause here. It exhibits the church's belief in the divine character and inspiration of the Bible, no less than in the truth and heavenly origin of its contents. Jew and Christian alike were eager to sacrifice life itself, not merely in defence of the doctrines of revealed religion, but of the very documents in which those doctrines were contained. Within so short a space of time as ten years before the public recognition of Christianity, the persecution of Diocletian carried torture and death to every section of the church. The trial of the martyr's faith was not now to sacrifice to the gods, or to adore the emperor;—the edict went forth, 'Give up your sacred writings, or die.' There was no longer that actual knowledge of the facts of Christ's life, or of the teaching of his apostles, which had cheered the martyr Stephen, and supported the dying Polycarp. The personal recollection of such matters had now ceased; the belief in the facts had become, as with us, but historical: and yet such was the firm conviction of the divine inspiration and heavenly origin of the Scriptures of truth, that death with all its horrors was embraced, rather than resign them to the heathen. To use the profound observation of Pascal: 'This is a sincerity which has no example in the world, nor its root in nature.'

Thus, then, the matter stands, as to the divine origination or inspiration of the New Testament Scriptures. We find the genuineness, the authenticity, the credibility, of those Scriptures, established by a mass of rational evidence such as pertains to nothing else: thus established, these same Scriptures, alike in the promises of Him on whom they rest, and by the recorded lives and words of those whom he commissioned to speak and write his truth, testify to their having done both under the guidance of the Holy Ghost: and this claim is admitted by those to whom their words first, and then their writings, came; and it is carried on and continued, as the *immemorial doctrine of the Church of God*. Well, then, may a late writer say, "When the church is asked for her proofs of the divine authority of the Scriptures, her first word is—Testimony; her second word is—Testimony; and her third word is—Testimony."* And if this testimony is rejected, then with it all historical belief of every kind, and relating to every thing, must be abandoned.

Thus far, we have been concerned with the *fact* of the inspiration of the New Testament writers; we now approach a subject which requires great delicacy of handling, and where

* Of course, this is not intended to exclude the inward witness of the Holy Ghost setting the final seal in individual cases, and lifting the teachings of the Holy Scriptures out of the regions of human testimony into those of divine assurance. But this follows on, and completes the work now under consideration.

there is much room for misapprehension—the *theory* of inspiration; that is, in other words, the inquiry how the Holy Spirit acted upon those who wrote. Here Holy Scripture is silent; and doubtless it had been better if men had followed its example,—if they had contented themselves with the fact, and attempted no analysis or explanation of what, in the very nature of things, must be a profound mystery. For apart from some specific reasons which we shall have occasion to notice farther on, for the multiplication of theories of inspiration in modern times, the very fact of dwelling on and resting in any theory at all, is an indication of the decline of a living faith in, and conscious appropriation of, the thing. And, therefore, it is an evil. Still, men have theorised, and men will theorise, about inspiration; and, therefore, the present view of the subject would be even more imperfect than it is, were all consideration of this theorising to be omitted.

Before, however, we proceed to speak of it, we must premise three important considerations; which, if they are borne in mind, we cannot but think will do much to render theorising on this mysterious subject harmless.

First, then, it must be in the nature of things, that no theory can explain Inspiration. It may say what it is not,—just as in the Creed we can guard against denials of the faith,—but it can no more adequately explain what it is, than in the same Creed, or in any other symbolical determination, we can adequately explain a mystery of the faith. Here, we think, is the great *ψευδος* of Mr Lee's volume; which, while it is in many respects exceedingly valuable, is of very little value in the line which he had in view; in fact, not accomplishing what he proposed, simply because it cannot be accomplished.

Secondly, the failure of any theory to account for the phenomena of the case, makes only against the theory itself, and not against the fact of inspiration. This is nothing more than a corollary from the preceding proposition, if indeed it is not rather a re-statement of it under another aspect. It is merely the application to the matter in hand of a principle admitted, and familiar in science, on which it cannot be necessary to enlarge.

Thirdly, it results from this obvious distinction between the fact of inspiration and any theory about it, that *no theory* has any right to claim such predominance and certainty for itself, as that the denial of it can be regarded as the denial of inspiration. The fact is divine, the theory is human. And however much one may be persuaded of its soundness, and its logical cohesion, still it is a human theory after all. The Scriptures set forth no theory of inspiration; they leave men to construct such a theory, if they *will* have one, by logical de-

ductions from, and rational analysis and synthesis of, the language in which they state the fact. Neither has the catholic church, or any one of its branches, adopted into its creeds, or symbolical collections, any theory so deduced and framed. The matter, then, is left to individuals, strictly and distinctly. And he who shall be so in love with his theory, as to confound it with its underlying fact, and to denounce him who does not accept it, as an unbeliever in inspiration, has pushed his possibly allowable self-complacency into a piece of insufferable self-righteousness. This is Popery in all its essential abomination.

We have passed, then, out of the region of divine truth in regard to inspiration, and have entered on that of human speculation. We have no Scriptures, no creed, no symbol, no confession, to appeal to in the way of a formal statement. We are concerned with the reasonings and opinions of individual men. In considering these, it is but natural that we should go first to the early church. But in regard to this, we have already noticed the singular absence of theory which it presents. There is nothing systematised and arranged. The nearest that the early doctors approach to any theory, is when they employ that favourite comparison, in which they represent the inspired writers as musical instruments played upon by the Spirit; a comparison "obviously suggested by the primary sense of the word *Spirit*." And yet we can more readily find what they did *not* mean by this comparison, than what,—approaching to a theory,—they did intend to express by it. For there were two systems into contact with which they were brought, and whose false claims in the matter of inspiration they were obliged to expose. These were, Heathenism on the one side, and Montanism on the other. Both systems agreed in their views of inspiration. The *μάντις* of Heathenism and the prophet of Montanism, both were supposed to lose their individual consciousness, and to be in a state of unconscious ecstasy; that is, they became mere automatical machines under the inspiring influence. Now, this very idea of a state of unconsciousness is urged by the Christian orthodox opponents of these two systems, as proof that their inspirations could not proceed from the Holy Ghost.* And whatever may be the logical value of the argument, it at least shows,—and we adduce it for this purpose only,—that the inspired Christian writers were not believed to be unconscious machines; that whatever the comparison alluded to meant, it did not mean this; and that the fathers, who from the time of Justin Martyr

* The only instances when inspiration is believed by the fathers to consist with the unconsciousness of the person inspired, are such cases as Balaam and Caiaphas, whose unworthiness made this distinction between them and the sacred writers. But this only brings out more clearly the view here insisted on.

employ it, and many of whom were the opponents alike of Heathenism and Montanism, recognised in the inspiration of the New Testament writers the co-existence of divine and human agencies, the co-operation of the human and divine intelligence. And this much seems to be all, or nearly all, that we can collect in the way of a theory of inspiration, down to the period of the Reformation. The fathers seem to have mainly contented themselves with the fact; which they rested first on the testimony of the Scriptures; next on the continuous and unbroken testimony of the church; and lastly, for individuals, on the internal witness in the believer's soul of the same Holy Spirit which inspired the apostles.

Still, as time went on, influences were coming to bear on all these grounds of belief in the inspiration of the Scriptures, which tended to lead men unduly to value theories of inspiration; and which, doubtless, did lead to the variety of theories which, since the middle of the sixteenth century, have from time to time arisen. To begin with: Scripture itself was greatly out of sight for a long period antedating the Reformation; and its testimony in this, as in other matters, was in a good degree unknown. The *testimony* of the continuous church was supplanted by the *authority* of the *existing* church: while the responsibilities and the position of the individual Christian, together with his individual relation to the Holy Spirit, were to a great extent lost, in that merging of the individual in the whole corporate Christian body, into which the precious doctrine of membership in the church of Christ had been corrupted. It is obvious, therefore, that every element of that foundation, on which the early church rested her belief in the fact of inspiration, was either perverted or obscured. At this juncture the Reformation came;—we speak now not of England, but of the continent of Europe. The Scriptures were restored;—the doctrine of the individual internal witness was restored; for, in fact, the corporate existence of the Christian was soon almost as much ignored as his individuality had been. Two elements of the old foundation were in men's hands; but it was *not* seen that there was any difference between the testimony of the continuous church and the authority of the existing church, so that both were rejected together. And then, to fill the gap thus left between the external testimony of Scripture itself, and the inward witnessing of the Spirit, theories of inspiration were devised, which thus took the place of the testimony of the church. England was, at least partially, an exception to this course of things. There, the testimony of the continuous church was recognised as a different thing from the authority of the existing church. The Church of England, therefore, has contented herself with doing what

the early church did,—namely, asserting the fact of inspiration, without meddling with its theory: while theories themselves have rarely, if ever, originated in her, but have been introduced from outside, as suited the wants or views of those who have brought them in.

Now, we confess, all these considerations cause us to take small interest in theories of inspiration. Those who are interested in them will find much curious information, and many suggestive thoughts, in Mr Lee's Lectures; the great fault of which, as we have already intimated, seems to us to be, that a great deal too much importance is assigned in them to theory, as compared with fact. God help us, if our faith in the inspiration of His holy Word is to be dependent on the construction of a satisfactory and exhaustive theory about it, by the fallible intellect of man! It is a mischievous error to suppose it,—an error fraught with fatal consequences. For what theory, however cleverly contrived, can man devise, in which some more clever theory-monger cannot pick flaws, and point out defects and inconsistencies? And then at once the cry is raised, that the inspiration of the Scriptures is disproved! But it is not so. All the theories as to how the apostles were inspired, that ever have been, or that ever shall be, might be scattered to the four winds of heaven, and the fact of the inspiration of the Scriptures would still remain untouched. That rests on a basis stronger than man's theories,—on the promise of Christ,—the witness of the Scriptures themselves,—the witness of the continuous church,—the witness of the Holy Ghost, lifting man from the regions of earthly testimony into those of a heavenly assurance, changing the persuasions of human witnessing into the certainties of divine attestation. And, while theories vanish in endless succession, this is a foundation which neither man nor devil can destroy.

Still there are certain accessory facts which any theory of inspiration is bound to recognise, and incorporate into itself; so that the right to theorise cannot be regarded as unlimited and unrestrained. And, having stated these, we shall tax the attention of our readers no further.

First, The distinction between revelation and inspiration must be kept in view. The merest glance at the Holy Scriptures shows that there are contained in them some facts and truths which the human mind itself can arrive at it by its ordinary processes and means of obtaining knowledge, and others which can only be known by a supernatural communication. The latter alone belong to revelation, but inspiration deals with both. "By revelation, we understand a direct communication from God to man, either of such knowledge as man could not of himself attain to, because its subject-matter

transcends human sagacity or human reason; or which (although it might have been attained in the ordinary way) was not, in point of fact, from whatever cause, known to the person who received the revelation. By inspiration, on the other hand, we understand that actuating energy of the Holy Spirit, guided by which, the human agents chosen by God have officially proclaimed his will by word of mouth, or have committed to writing the several portions of the Bible."

Secondly, The fact must be recognised, that in the work of inspiration, two distinct elements co-operate with each other; namely, the Spirit of God, and the human intelligence. And it cannot be permitted, that one of these shall be regarded as absorbing and nullifying the other.

Thirdly, It must be admitted that all the New Testament is inspired.* The only alleged scriptural ground for denying this, has already been considered, and shown to be unreal and futile. While the indignant way in which the notions of the Anomœans were denied, shows that the early church knew no such idea as they entertained, that the apostles spoke at one time as men, and at another by inspiration. The notion bears absurdity on its very face, and its ultimate issues can only produce infidelity.

If these subordinate facts are kept in view, we see no reason why those who wish to theorise on this subject, so mysterious,—and so much more a subject for devout thankfulness and meditation, than for discussion and analysis,—may not be permitted to do so to their heart's content; provided always they will remember that their theories are human speculations, but that the *fact* of inspiration is the TRUTH OF GOD.

We feel bound to add a few words in reference to the volume which stands at the head of this article, and of the materials and suggestions furnished by which we have so largely availed ourselves. This underlying fault we have already indicated; the idea, namely, that some satisfactory theory of inspiration must be devised, and the apparent acquiescence in the conclusion, that unless one can be devised, the doctrine of the inspiration of the Scriptures must be given up. This false notion colours and at the same time cramps the whole work; it leads to an unscientific arrangement of materials, and occasional want of sharp definiteness in statement, from fear, it would seem, that some of the corners of the theory may be chipped off.

Still, we do not hesitate to say, that Mr Lee's volume is vastly in advance of any work we have on the subject; that

* We speak of the New Testament only, because that alone is here under consideration; not because there is any difference in this respect between it and the older Scriptures.

it furnishes an immense amount of the most valuable facts and suggestions; that it is singularly calm and uncontroversial; that it will be better liked on the second reading than on the first, and on the third than either; and that the theory which he defends,—we protest against its name “dynamic,” as an intolerable cross between German and Yankee,—is less liable to objection than any with which we are acquainted. But, as has already been urged, the construction of a complete and exhaustive theory of inspiration, is a simple impossibility.

ART. V.—*Memoirs of John Kitto, D.D., F.S.A.* By J. E. RYLAND, M.A., Editor of “*Foster’s Life and Correspondence*,” &c. With a Critical Estimate of Dr Kitto’s Life and Writings. By Professor EADIE, D.D., LL.D., Glasgow. Pp. 697. Oliphant & Sons, Edinburgh. 1856.

MANY facts in the life of John Kitto had already been given by himself to the world, in the form of articles in the “*Penny Magazine*,” and in his singularly interesting volume, “*The Lost Senses*,” published many years since by Mr Knight. Now that his earthly career is ended, Mr Ryland has arranged these materials in order, adding to them much new matter, chiefly gathered from a voluminous collection of letters and extracts from journals; and if we have any ground of complaint at all, it is rather at the redundancy than at the paucity of these quotations, and that a writer at once so practised and so trusted as the biographer of Foster, has perhaps exercised his functions too sparingly, and has kept himself too much in the shade. As it is, he has presented us with a memoir of great value both in a literary and in a Christian point of view: for not only is it true that no man of his times has added more to the stores of biblical interpretation than Dr Kitto, or wrought a fresher and finer vein of scriptural illustration; but his life is a new and stirring chapter illustrative of the pursuit of knowledge under difficulties, of the power of indomitable will and strong faith in conquering every thing but impossibilities, and leaves on the sands of time one of those

“Foot-prints, which perhaps another
Sailing o’er life’s solemn main,
A forlorn and shipwreck’d brother,
Seeing, shall take heart again.”

Keeping in view this double aspect of Kitto’s career, we shall

present our readers with the salient points of his strange and instructive history.

John Kitto was born at Plymouth, December 4, 1804. His father was a mason, who might have prospered, had he not given to the ale-house the time and the means which were due to his business and his family. By the time that John was four years of age, he was transferred to the domicile of his maternal grandmother, who soon contracted for the puny and thoughtful child an intense affection. As the stripling grew, he showed a great fondness for solitary wanderings in the neighbourhood in search of wild berries, and for long musings among the rocks on the sea-shore, from which the rising tide scarcely dislodged him: and to wean him from these inconvenient and dangerous habits, as his grandmother regarded them, she was accustomed to amuse him with long stories, abounding in the superstitious and supernatural; while in the garret of a neighbouring shoemaker, of kindred powers of narrative with the grandmother, new stories only awakened new thirst in the unwearied listener. On being informed that many of the tales which had interested him were to be found in little printed books, John willingly began to lay aside the occasional penny which he had received for the purchase of the rich clotted cream of Devonshire; and when he had accumulated the needed sum, he rushed to the neighbouring book-stall and made the coveted prize his own. A box of some dimensions soon scarcely sufficed to contain the boy's library; his grandmother's ancient store—rich in a family Bible, a Robinson Crusoe, and a Pilgrim's Progress,—was soon exhausted; and ere he entered on his teens, his venerable relative, or his own ingenuity of solicitation, had procured for the omnivorous and insatiable boy-student a reading of nearly all the books of the neighbourhood. Thus early did his awakening literary likings reveal themselves, and his struggles with difficulty begin.

All the school education which Kitto ever received, was comprised within his eighth and his eleventh year; and during this brief period he had attended four different schools. But ere his school-life was ended, one of those little incidents, insignificant in themselves, had occurred which, in the case of men destined for eminence, so often give a sort of prophetic shadow of the future. A young cousin came to him, and informed him that she was on her way to purchase a book for a penny. Young Kitto, as often happened, was just at that time greatly in want of a penny for his own literary projects. He offered to write for her a story better than any which she could buy for a penny, and to accompany the story with a pictorial embellishment also of his own workmanship. The offer was accepted; the story

and the picture were produced on the spot by the child-author and artist; and the penny was transferred to Kitto's hands, to be again transferred ere night to the bookseller's. In the mental energy, the self-reliance, the fertility of resource in difficulty, and the prompt courage to meet it, the boy was in this little incident father to the man.

To a kind onlooker the condition of Kitto at this period would already have seemed hard enough; but new shades were now to be added to the sombre web of his life. His kind grandmother having been smitten with paralysis, and needing, in consequence, her daughter's care, was removed, along with John, to the house of his father, whom intemperance and its attendant improvidence had, by this time, reduced to the position of a journeyman mason. To eke out a precarious subsistence, Kitto, who had previously been withdrawn from school, was employed as a hod-man to his father, when that event occurred which has invested his story with so deep interest alike to the physiologist and to the Christian, and which more than any other outward circumstance gave its peculiar form and pressure to all his future life.

"On that memorable day (Feb. 13, 1817), about half-past four in the afternoon, he was engaged with his father in repairing a house in Batter Street, Plymouth. He had just reached the highest round of a ladder with a load of slates, and was in the act of stepping on the roof, when his foot slipped and he was precipitated from a height of five-and-thirty feet on a stone pavement in the yard beneath, along which was a gutter for carrying off the waste water into the street. No limb was fractured, but consciousness was lost, except for a few moments, during which he perceived that he was borne along in his father's arms attended by a crowd. He then relapsed into unconsciousness, in which he remained for a fortnight. At the close of that period, the first symptom of recovery was his noticing one morning, on opening his eyes, that it was at least two hours later than the usual time of rising; but on attempting to leave his recumbent posture, he found himself utterly strengthless. This proof of debility, and the total silence in the room when his friends were present, convinced him that he was an invalid; but he could not at first detect the real cause of the absence of all sounds, articulate or inarticulate. When he noticed persons apparently in conversation, yet inaudible, he thought it must be carried on in a very low under-tone, from a kind consideration of his state of weakness; and some time probably would have elapsed before the mystery was cleared up, had he not made earnest and somewhat impatient inquiries about a book which the town-crier's wife had lent him just before the accident, and in which he had taken a very lively interest. At length he querulously exclaimed, 'Why do you not speak? Pray let me have the book.' Still there was no reply; the bystanders looked now at each other and then at Kitto, evidently perplexed; at last, it struck one of them to take a slate and write upon it, that the book had been returned to its owner (the town-crier) at

his special desire; and if it had not, he was too weak to be allowed the use of it. The information thus given was, to a certain extent, satisfactory; but how strange that it was not conveyed in tones of kindness, by some well-known voice! 'Why do you *write* to me?' exclaimed the poor sufferer; 'why not speak? Speak! speak!' Again there was an interchange of looks and seeming whispers; the fatal truth could no longer be withheld; again the scribe took his pencil and wrote in characters but too legible—'You are *deaf*.'"

Here, then, was a lad of thirteen deprived of one of the most useful of his senses, and cast entirely upon a parent who was himself indigent. What was to be expected but that he would sink into the condition of one of those ciphers and waifs of society, which the world is only too ready to feel that it can better do without? If his early love of books had ever promised any thing, the promise seemed now effectually blighted, with "knowledge at one entrance quite shut out," especially if there was even a portion of truth in the saying of Varillas, that "of ten things which he knew, he had learned nine from conversation." But his thirst for knowledge did not die in the poor deaf lad, and there is something truly touching in the ingenious shifts to which he had recourse in order to procure the means of having his intellectual thirst gratified. In the black mire of Sutton Pool, at ebb tide, he might have been seen wading knee-deep in search of fragments of iron and old ropes, cast from the ships that lay in that basin, and hastening, when he had heaped together the gatherings of several days, to sell the whole to some neighbouring rag-dealer for fourpence. At other times he was seized with a strong desire for reform in the labels that occasionally appeared in the windows of obscure streets in Plymouth, advertising "*Logins for single men*," or "*Rooms to leet, enquire witheen*;" and offered for a penny labels which he had prepared with an improved orthography and a more ornate penmanship. Like one of those trees which we have sometimes seen in the deep cuttings of a railway, sending out roots and feelers in all directions, and occasionally twisted and curled into the most fantastic shapes for nourishment, Kitto would submit to any toil in order to obtain fresh pabulum for his mind.

But, meanwhile, the question began to press itself yet more painfully, amid the still decaying fortunes of his father, what was to be done to shield the body of the poor lad from the inclement storm, his feet from the flinty stones, and his stomach from gnawing hunger? At length the Plymouth Workhouse was thought of, and, at the age of fifteen, he was placed among the boys in the "Hospital of the Poor's Portion." It was only after he had been introduced by a kind of artifice into the workhouse, that he became aware

of his true position; and, at the first thought of restraint to one who for two years had been allowed a kind of wild liberty of wandering, the prospect of confinement seemed intolerable. But in the kindness of the officials, as well as in the promise of liberty to leave the hospital at times during the day, and employ delicious half-hours in reading at book-stalls, and to sleep at night in his old attic study in his father's house, he found mitigating elements more than enough to reconcile him to the workhouse. After continuing in it for a considerable time, during which he became a proficient in the making of list-shoes, it was thought advisable to bind him as an apprentice to a shoemaker out of doors; a measure which sank Kitto to the lowest deep of suffering, but yet, in the strange leadings of Providence, became the occasion which turned the wheel of his destiny upwards. Shut out by his deafness to so great an extent from communion with his fellows, he held the more communion with himself, and kept a journal in which he found relief in many a silent hour, in expressing his thoughts and sorrows. It will serve to illustrate the singular warmth and depth of his affections, if we quote the record of his feelings on the day of his leaving the hospital for the tripod of his master, Bowden:—

“It occurred to me that this was the last day of my being a workhouse boy; so I went to take a farewell look of the bed on which I used to sleep, the tripod on which I have sat so many hours, and the prayer-room. I shook hands, in idea, with the pump, the conduit at which I washed, the tree against which I leaned, nay, the very stones on which I walked. I felt something like regret at leaving it. Man is an accommodating animal. I had so accommodated or accustomed myself with the workhouse, that I left it with some regret. I have read of a man who had grown old in prison: when he was liberated, on the accession of a new king, he petitioned to be put in prison again. Is not this a case in point, to show that man soon accommodates himself to misery?”

Kitto's master proved himself an insufferable tyrant, who made his deaf apprentice the butt of his discontented and brutal nature,—“a very sapling of the ‘Legree’ stock, that wanted only the genial glow of a Louisiana sun to bring it to perfection.” A wry stitch was punished by a stroke on the face with an old shoe; some awkwardness in his handicraft by a blow from the iron part of Bowden's hammer, which sent him home swollen and crippled to his mother. “I did all in my power to suppress my inclination to weep, till I was almost suffocated; tears of bitter anguish and futile indignation fell upon my work and blinded my eyes. I sobbed convulsively. I was half mad with myself for suffering him to see how much I was affected. Oh that I were again in the workhouse.” He now began to look upon himself as the

child of misfortune, and to wish that he had never been born. Hard thoughts of God obtruded themselves on his mind; and even thoughts of suicide, in the first instance recoiled from with horror, became familiar, and even welcome. At length he summoned courage to inform his old friend, Mr Burnard of the hospital, of his misery and its cause; and inquiry confirmed the worst of Kitto's complaints. It was resolved to remove him back to the workhouse; but ere this could be accomplished, cause must be shown before a court of justice for breaking his indenture. And Kitto himself must be the principal witness; but his deafness, which the sound of seven thunders could not disturb, rendered oral examination impossible, while examination by writing would be tedious. It was therefore determined that he should be required to write out a plain narrative of his case. And this was done with so much distinctness, and command both of thought and expression, as to astonish the bench of magistrates, and to awaken in Kitto himself the first full consciousness of intellectual power, for which some other instrument than the cobbler's awl was surely destined. His indenture was broken, and he was restored to the workhouse; but he was followed now with an interest and friendship that clung to him through life. Some of the *litterati* of Plymouth, with a discrimination and generosity that have won for them merited honour, collected a sum sufficient to emancipate him from the workhouse, and to procure him board and lodging in the house of its governor; at the same time obtaining for him the liberty of gratuitous reading in the public library of Plymouth.

Kitto was now in his element, sitting for long hours in the principal room of a library of 10,000 well selected volumes, on which his mind could banquet at will; though he afterwards acknowledged that he remembered more when his intellectual diet was more scanty, and when he was almost confined for his chief repasts to the sweet stolen waters of the Plymouth book-stalls. Even now, though only one step as yet raised above pauperism, the world of literature spread itself before him as one in which, with all his sad obstacles and impediments, he yet hoped to do exploits. Like the youthful Samson, his spirit began to be moved within him betimes, and, conscious of the strugglings and heavings of long pent-up and depressed mental energy, he formed many a plan of literary achievement, and thus vividly forecast, in his nineteenth year, when he had scarcely emerged from a workhouse, his future destiny. -

"Do you believe in dreams?" says he, in a letter to W. M. Tracey, Esq. "Whether this dream was dreamt sleeping or waking, I leave, Sir, to your sagacity to discover. . . . Methought I was exactly in

the same situation in which I really was before I slept, and indulging the same reflections, when there suddenly appeared before me a being of more than mortal beauty. He was taller than the sons of men, and his eye beamed with celestial radiance; a robe of azure hue, and far richer than the finest silk, infolded his form; a starry zone of glittering gems encircled his waist; and in his hand he bore a rod of silver. He touched me with his rod, and gently bending over me he said, 'Child of mortality, I am the angel Zared, and am sent to teach thee wisdom. Every man on his outset in life proposes to himself some thing as the end and reward of his labours, his wishes, and his hopes; some are ambitious of honour, some of glory, and some of riches. Of what art thou ambitious, and what are the highest objects of thy earthly hopes?' I was astonished at the visit and the words of the angel, and replied not to his demand. 'Thou canst not readily find, O child of earth, words to express the scenes which thy fancy has drawn. It matters not; I know thy wishes, and will give thee possession of the state that is the highest of which thou art ambitious.'

"He touched me with his rod, and my form expanded into manhood; again he touched, and then left me. On looking around me, I found myself seated in a room, two of the walls of which were entirely concealed by books, of which I felt myself conscious of being the owner. On the table lay letters addressed to me from distant parts of the island, from the continent, and from the new world; and conspicuously on the chimney-piece were placed several volumes of which I was conscious that I was the author; and was also sensible that the house wherein I was, was mine, and all that was in it. I went forth into the street. Ridicule no longer pointed her finger at me; many whom I met appeared to know and esteem me, and I felt conscious that I possessed many sincere and disinterested friends. I met a blind fiddler, and placing my hand instinctively in my pocket, I found that it lacked not money. I returned and exclaimed, as I took 'Cæsar's Commentaries,' in their original language, from the shelf, 'Now at last I am happy;' but before I had concluded the word, the angel Zared again appeared before me, and touching me with his silver rod, restored me to the state in which he found me."

Cheer up, thou brave heart of the emancipated pauper boy! In not many years this dream shall have become to thee a reality in every thing save the golden drapery, in which it is of the nature of dreams to enrobe themselves.

Of course, it was never intended that this gratuitous support, provided for Kitto by his Plymouth friends, should be more than temporary; and if an arrangement could be made, which combined remunerative employment with leisure for literary studies, it was greatly to be preferred. An opening of this kind presented itself in the following year, and ended in the removal of Kitto to Exeter, where he was received, at a small salary, into the house of Mr Groves, a dentist, on condition that he should employ himself four or five hours each day in

the formation of artificial teeth from the tusks of foreign animals. It was an engagement of far more ultimate importance than it appeared at the moment; for in Mr Groves he obtained at the critical hour one of the fastest friends of his life, who more than any other was raised up to assist him in schemes and efforts that must otherwise have been impracticable. This gentleman, though marked by various eccentricities both in religious opinion and practice, was evidently a person of deep Christian sincerity and earnestness; and while Kitto had been the subject of genuine religious impressions previously to his coming under his roof, there is abundant evidence, that mainly through intercourse with him, his religion became more decided and his views more definite. As the consequence of this, his literary ambition, from this time, became more pure and elevated, and all his plans of literary toil were consecrated with willing heart to Christ. "If I were asked," he writes at this period, "how the happiness of mankind can be most effectually promoted, I would answer,—By Christianity. I mean not nominal, but real and vital Christianity. Be *this* in future, then, my object as a literary character; and if this object should be in any degree attained by anything I may be enabled to write, say, or do, I shall esteem my honour and my reward greater than any which scientific or literary distinctions could confer." There was evidently much fermentation of mind on the part of both of these men during their connection at Exeter, and much longing to be engaged in more directly Christian labours; the consequence of which was, that Mr Groves, in no very long time, abandoned his lucrative profession, and entered as a student for holy orders at Trinity College, Dublin; and Kitto, loosed from his Exeter moorings, was received as a printer into the College of the Church Missionary Society at Islington, and, in July 1825, found a new home in London.

In some respects this change was not displeasing to Kitto. London has many attractions to a man whose tastes are strongly literary, and many were the love-glances which he now turned to its loaded book-stalls; and besides, his engagement in the printing-office of a missionary society, with the prospect of his being transferred, when qualified, to a foreign station, and elevated to higher work, was congenial with his growing religious feelings and aspirations. It may seem strange, that a deaf man should have any interest in attending on the great missionary anniversaries, which give to London a kind of annual pentecost; but even he could extract enjoyment from such assemblies, and not the least interesting passage in his numerous autobiographical notices, is one in which we are made to look at such meetings from a deaf man's stand-point.

"I took a strange pleasure in attending the anniversary meetings. . . My sources of enjoyment in this were various. It gave me an opportunity of becoming acquainted with the persons, and witnessing the manner of many who were at that time eminent for their eloquence in speech or writing, and of tracing the impression which they made upon their auditors. . . . I found much interest in comparing the manners and persons of such men with the idea which I had previously formed of them from their writings or character. Apart from this, the most animated speakers pleased me most; but I found, that after I had seen enough of one speaker to be in possession of his manner, I soon tired of him, however animated, and longed for him to sit down and another to rise. As my interest was divided between watching the speaker and observing the effect which he produced on the auditors, I had seldom much craving to be able to hear the whole of the speech. But when the audience broke into 'loud cheers,' or when the speaker came to his most vehement points of action, I became keenly alive to my privation, and was most anxious to know the great words which had been so impressively delivered, and by which such effects had been produced. . . . The comparison of my own coolness in *reading* the very speeches which had been delivered, with earnestness, and *heard* with enthusiasm, supplied a measure for, and made me painfully aware of the extent of my privation. It enabled me to realise an idea of the power possessed by the human voice of rendering the communications of man to man more engaging and persuasive, and of investing the intercourse of life and intellect with a grace and energy in comparison with which the dry, hard forms of words, as exhibited in print and writing, are poor indeed."

Misunderstandings, for which neither party was greatly to blame, arose in no very long period between Kitto and his employers. His strong literary leanings, which in his case had something of the intensity of a passion, as well as his unchanging impression, which events proved to be correct, that he was to serve the cause of God mainly by his pen, induced Kitto to devote a portion of his time to reading and study, which those at the head of the College in Islington regarded as seriously unfitting him for his work, and as inconsistent at least with the spirit of his engagement. Kitto's explanation was natural, and, no doubt, satisfied his own mind when he uttered it: "If I attend the specified number of hours in the printing-office, are not my leisure hours my own?" But there was force in the reply, that if he so expended his energies on literature as to diminish his capability for good workmanship, the society which employed him was in the same proportion aggrieved. If you were to hire a horse from a man for the morrow, and he were secretly to work it during the greater part of the previous night, he might keep the letter, but he would violate the spirit of his bargain. Kitto, having been apprized of the committee's dissatisfaction, somewhat rashly resigned his post, which produced a coolness in many of his

old Plymouth friends; but the intercession of Mr Groves eventually effected a reconciliation with the committee, and led in a little time to Kitto's appointment, as a printer, to the important station of the Church Missionary Society at Malta, for which place he sailed July 20, 1827.

We are forbidden by our rapidly diminishing space to detail with minuteness the incidents either of his voyage or of his sojourn; though there is always something interesting in marking the new impressions and feelings of a man of quick observation and ready susceptibilities on his first visit to a foreign soil. And certainly few places could be selected as more completely breaking in upon the mental habitudes of an Englishman, and more rich in its multitude of novel objects and associations, than this military island, with inhabitants that, in the variety of their dress and language, may be said to present an epitome and a sample of two continents,—in its climate and fruits uniting the qualities of Europe and Africa,—in its palace-like houses, with frescoed ceilings and vast lion-guarded gates, telling of the glories of a chivalrous age that has departed,—and in the elaborate and complicated fortifications of its towering Valetta, “making its nest with the eagle,” proclaiming that the nation which holds the key of Malta is mistress of the Mediterranean Sea. All that was new in costume and custom, in climate and scenery, attracted the notice of Kitto, whose powers of observation by the eye seemed to be quickened through the loss of the other sense, and formed the first chapter in that many-coloured book of memories which he had already begun to store up for the future. But, while not unconscious of satisfaction at the proof which Malta gave of the might of England, his feelings, as an English Protestant, were shocked at the manner in which British power in Malta succumbed to Popish influences, and even appointed British soldiers to grace idolatrous processions and carnivals. Protestantism was forbidden the common liberty of proselytism, by the representative of a Protestant state. The tracts and books which were printed in Malta were not allowed to be circulated in the island, which was only a basis for evangelistic efforts in Asia; and the agents of Popery, rendered fanatical by this cowardly compromise, would have punished, by the mortal stab of a stiletto, those whom the British authorities might have spared.

It is not to be greatly wondered at that Kitto's appointment to Malta was in part probationary, and that his continuance in his post was, in the intention of the Society, made contingent on the devotedness with which he gave up his energies to the prescribed manual toils. And once more he failed to give satisfaction to the Society. He wrought, indeed, during the prescribed hours, but his heart did not go with his hand;

it was in his library. Midnight vigils with his books or at his journal, unfitted his body for the toils of the morrow. An excuse could, indeed, have been pleaded now, which was wanting at the earlier rupture. Kitto had formed a love attachment ere he left his native shores, and it had been arranged that the lady should follow and be married to him in Malta. One day he was stunned by the intelligence which reached him in a shape too well authenticated to be doubted, that his betrothed had married another in England. The intelligence doing violence to an affection which, on his side at least, was not only sincere, but ardent and deep, and breaking through dreams of reposing confidence and sympathy, which must have been peculiarly attractive to one whom his deafness so painfully isolated from his fellows, drove him into moody sadness, and, for the time, unnerved him. It was in vain to require him to take more rest, when sleep had forsaken his pillow; and to seek to wean him from his books, when they had become a refuge to him from his own thoughts. Once more the dissatisfaction of the committee was conveyed to Kitto; a second time his connection with it was broken up, and he returned to England in January 1829.

While we cannot but honour the fidelity with which the committee discharged its stewardship, we are constrained to question whether due allowance was made for the isolation of Kitto, who, in the want of those human associations and endearments possessed by other men, made his books his friends, and loved them well, though sometimes, perhaps, not wisely. He found more than one of his Plymouth friends irritated and alienated; and even the most attached were disappointed, and, for the time, displeased. What was now to be done to keep away the wolf of poverty from his door? One favourite scheme was, to turn into books the little parting sum which he had received from the Society, and, along with the books which he had already accumulated, to form a circulating library, which he should open in one of the suburbs of Plymouth; an institution of which it might have been safely predicted, that, like the author who confessed that he was the principal reader of his own writings, Kitto would have been his own best customer. While discussing this and other schemes, an interview with his friend Mr Groves suddenly turned the whole current of his plans, and introduced him into an arrangement which was to fulfil the great mission of his life. Mr Groves had determined to set forth to the East on a missionary expedition, whose centre should be Bagdad. One evening while conversing on this projected scheme, Groves said to Kitto, "Will *you* come?" hardly expecting that the question would be taken in earnest. To his surprise, Kitto answered "Yes." This one word "*Yes*," was one of those al-

most invisible threads in providence which are surcharged with destiny. It was to bear him into the midst of Oriental scenes and usages, in which, with his singularly developed faculty of observation, he was to "catch the living manners as they rose;" and from which he was in due time to return laden with recollections, which were to encircle with a new interest, because to illuminate with a fuller meaning, many a chapter in the Book of God, and to place him first of his own class among the biblical commentators of his age.

It was six months, from the time when Kitto and his party sailed from Gravesend, *via* St Petersburg, till they stood before the gates of Bagdad. It was a journey full of varied and suggestive adventure; and during the whole of it,—especially as he drew nearer to the regions of the East,—he was, consciously or unconsciously, gathering the material which was one day to impart such vivid and unique interest to his scriptural illustrations. Like the famous painter, Gainsborough, who could not look upon nature without receiving hints for his next picture, he was causing even the most unlikely subjects to yield some tribute for his pictorial stores. Through sandy deserts, over high mountains, along the edge of dangerous precipices, across the beds of treacherous streams, in the Calmuk tent and in the Muscovite palace, among fierce Tartars and Kabandian robbers, this patient observer was busy with his note-book and his pencil, and, not the least, with his own thoughts. On some parts of his journey he would travel all night and day, for three weeks together, without taking off his clothes, and snatch sleep while moving. At other times, a couch would be extemporised on benches on the ground, on heaps of sand, on hay in carts, on the tops of slabs, or in waggons, and "tired nature's sweet restorer" would come as soon as called. Narrow escapes, in which a divine protecting hand became almost visible, were not wanting, to keep alive in his heart the grateful sense of that Power without whom a sparrow cannot fall to the ground. "Yes, my mother!" he exclaims in a letter, after recording a moving accident, "God has not done with me yet. I have more yet to do in this world, and more to suffer."

We could wish to transfer to our pages some of his remarks on the social condition of Russia, which confirm much that has been more recently written, and express the lesson which, nearly thirty years afterwards, Russia has needed to be taught by the bitter experiences of war, if she will stoop, indeed, even yet to be a learner. In truth we are ready to assert, that from the sober pages of John Kitto's journal and correspondence, more that is definite and trustworthy may be learnt regarding Russia, pictorially and socially, than from ten more pretentious modern

volumes. Mark how he describes the working of the so-called paternal despotism, and pictures this blindfolded giant and laggard in the race of European nations:—

“For the people little or nothing has been done,—they remain slaves. . . . The great body of the people seem to be as they would have been if no such persons as Peter, Catherine, and Alexander, had ever existed. The higher orders have gained infidelity, and the lower have lost no superstition, but worship St Nicholas as fervently as ever. Their calendar is unreformed; their barbarous language and strange alphabetic characters are unimproved; their calculations are still performed by beads strung on wire; beards remain; the peculiar costume remains; the knout remains; slavery remains; ignorance remains. Their huts are built as of old time, and their way of living is the same; the ancient professions of barber and surgeon remain united, even in the imperial city itself. I do believe that it would be difficult to find a country in which, with such high pretensions to improvement, so little has been done for the people,—the great *many*; nor can I ever bring my mind to contemplate with satisfaction any system of legislation or improvement, from the benefits of which the mass of the people are excluded. . . .

“Upon the whole, the exterior of Russian society is repulsive, notwithstanding the gloss which the courtesy and politeness, natural to all classes of the Russians, throw upon it. The air of military despotism, the strut of office which meets you at every turn, and the abject worship which inferiors render to their superiors, are most disgusting. Government! Government! there is nothing to be done or said without Government! Government must control all your movements,—Government would know the secrets of your chamber. With a feeling of much personal kindness to Russians as individual men, I detest such a system of minute rule and legislation. . . .

“It is a great pity that a fine people, possessing a really fine and productive country, should waste their energy and resources in carrying the brand of war and desolation through the earth; and should not rather be persuaded to enter on the more certain and profitable speculation of cultivating their fruitful fields, and constructing roads by which their internal intercourse may be facilitated.”

By the month of October, Dr Kitto, with his friends, reached the city of a hundred mosques; and during the two years which followed, he became the witness of a succession of calamities almost without a parallel in history. It seemed as if all the evils most characteristic of the East had been epitomised into that short space, and as if this vivid word-painter had the darkest scenes made to pass before him, that they might be transferred on the spot to his store. First came a siege, which was continued for several months, by the Arabs; and which, cutting off the supplies of food from the poorer classes, soon brought gaunt famine in its train. Then at last it was announced that the plague had appeared, and its awful presence soon became self-revealed. The plague of London,

which stirred the strong-winged genius of Wilson, and exhausted even the descriptive powers of Defoe, was, in comparison with the plague of Bagdad, a gentle visitation. In a few days, five thousand perished by the pestilence alone, and these generally the most youthful and robust. Men could not at length be found to inter the dead,—the plague had made the very grave-diggers its victims; and hundreds of bodies cast into the Tigris might have been seen floating slowly down its stream, and aggravating at once the ravages and the horrors of the judgment. At length it entered the house in which Kitto resided, and carried away several of its inmates,—among others, Mrs Groves, the wife of the generous friend who had brought him to the East, and her infant child. Not the least repulsive features in these dreadful experiences were the isolation in which men were constrained to immure themselves, and the indifference to each other which arose out of the constant efforts at self-preservation. Three human beings out of every five of the population are understood to have perished. Two passages very characteristic of Kitto's habits of thought and observation, will convey the most striking and truthful impression of the plague of Bagdad:—

“It is a very awful employment to watch the progress of a plague. It is almost impossible not to personify, in idea, the agent of destruction, as the Bible does, and as Mahometans do. We behold the Angel of destruction first smiting a few. Then he kindles gradually into fury, and his mighty arm smites thousands each day, and few recover from the wounds he inflicts. But at last his arm seems to wax as gradually feeble, and so weak that many recover; till, finally, the few who are smitten, feel no more than a transient and slight indisposition, and then his bared and outstretched arm sinks wearily down, to be raised no more.

“I went out this afternoon, for the first time these five months. . . . The streets I had to pass through are among the most populous of the city; but I doubt if I met more than fifteen persons in going and returning, except in one part of the way which lay through the Bazaar. In fact the difference as to population in the streets seems about as great, to use a comparison which will be understood in Cockaigne, as that which the Strand presents during the time of divine service on Sunday forenoon, and the same street on other days of the week. This desolation was very affecting when its cause struck the mind; when it occurred to one's thoughts, that of the busy and anxious population which went through the streets a few months back in their many-hued and multiform array, plotting and scheming for years to come, three-fourths now lay buried beneath the soil they then trod. I looked round for the accustomed faces, which, from frequent passing, had become familiar; but they were all gone. Most I meet now seem to be strangers.”

The pestilence had not ceased to levy its daily tribute of

death, when the Tigris, overflowing its banks, inundated the city, sapping the foundations of many of its houses, and rendering many more, which it did not destroy, uninhabitable. Then came the earthquake, last in the terrible procession of judgments on the doomed Bagdad, overturning many of the fabrics which had been left tottering by the flood, and converting whole streets into heaps of ruins. When Sir John M'Neill entered Bagdad, soon after the earthquake, he passed from the gate to the British Presidency, a distance of perhaps half-a-mile, through ruined masses, in the midst of which the lines of the narrow streets could no longer be traced. Events like these would have unmanned most men; but in the midst of them all, Kitto continued the habits and the toils of the student, drawing increased knowledge of the East from books when he was shut out from intercourse with men, and making even the plague, the inundation, and the earthquake, his stern instructors.

The education of Mr Groves' children had been superintended by Kitto during their residence in Bagdad, but the death of Mrs Groves rendering new arrangements necessary for their future training, led to the return of Kitto to England. He left Bagdad in September 1832, returning, however, by a new route, which occupied him during the greater part of a year, and increased his acquaintance with the scenery, customs, and peoples of the East,—by Teheran, Tabreez, Trebizond, and Constantinople. A bilious fever laid him prostrate at one part of his journey, and gave him a somewhat sharp experience in Oriental phlebotomy. But, on the whole, his long journey through those historic regions, was one rich in varied and instructive adventure. Some of his days were great days, such as that on which he first gazed on the snowy summit of the venerable Ararat, and stood near to the source of the classic and story-haunted Euphrates.

“Close by Diadin flows a small stream of beautiful clear water, shallow, and easily stepped over. This is the *Euphrates*. I stood astride it a moment, and then passed over. I was never before so near the source of a mighty and famous river; and my thoughts were many, and to me interesting, though perhaps to others they would seem commonplace enough. The water seems to me more pleasant than any I have ever tasted, and I have drunk a great deal of it. It is something to have seen Ararat and the Euphrates in one day! At the fountain there were the maidens of the village drawing water in vessels of truly classical form.”

At one time his letters present him perched in a sort of cradle on the side of a mule, which is balanced by another cradle in which his fellow-traveller is perched on the other side, and whose eccentric and violent motions make even the

taking of a luxurious pinch of snuff a matter of much time, and of no small ingenuity. Again, he is sailing on the Euxine more in the attitude of a student-traveller, seated on the taffarel of the vessel, watching the movements of the mingled groups of Persians, Georgians, Armenians, Turks, and other Orientals on the deck, or reading his favourite Spenser, or tracing the points of local interest on the shore, which are surrounded by historical or legendary associations, for which he has prepared himself by reading the "Argonautics" of Apollonius Rhodius. He is in the Bosphorus, where it seems as if "Europe, at the point where Asia looks upon her, had put on all garments of beauty, and Asia had made herself pleasant to her eyes in return." He gazes with rapture upon Stamboul, which "he who has not seen may be said to want a sense, a feeling of the beautiful which no other object can convey." He is in Constantinople, where the kindness of the American missionaries falls like dew upon the heart of one who has almost been excluded for months from Christian intercourse. A few weeks more, he hails those white cliffs of Albion, which enclose within them so much of mighty talent, and knowledge, and beauty. Hitherto he has been a gatherer of knowledge; now, to the end of life, the deaf Plymouth workhouse-boy is to become one of England's teachers: he comes like the laden bee, which has sipped its stores from a thousand flowers in a thousand fields,—so replenished with the fruits of reading, reflection, and observation, that to write is to be relieved. Nor is this all the preparation which he has been receiving as one whose chief labours are to be consecrated to the illustration of the Word of God; for, as Mr Ryland has remarked finely and truthfully, "the spiritual discipline he had passed through had given him that wisdom of the heart which acts as a safety lamp in the labyrinth of moral and religious investigations. This, combined with his masculine understanding, effectually preserved him from the parade of erudition, and from all irreverent trifling with the highest objects of human contemplation, "the ways of God to man."

His first literary engagement was with Mr Charles Knight, as a writer in the *Penny Magazine*; which was then under the patronage and inspiration of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, introducing a new era in the popular literature of England. The variety of his contributions was amazing, and in a little while more than the half of an entire number often emanated from his pen. He had soon the gratification of seeing his papers ascribed to some of the ablest writers; and, mistaken under his anonymous mask for the versatile Lord Brougham, of drawing upon himself a large measure of misdirected political abuse and caricature. "The

article on *The Vintage*, which moved so much the indignation of the 'New Monthly,' he writes to a friend, "was mine, though attributed to the digestive pen of Mr Craik. And the article on *Manual Alphabets*, which the scurrilous 'Figaro in London' honoured with his special notice, was mine, though attributed to the Lord Chancellor."

The engagement with Mr Knight was sufficiently remunerating, and to all appearance so stable, as to warrant Kitto in forming a matrimonial connection without imprudence. The lady with whom this relation was formed had been the betrothed of a Mr Sheppard, who had travelled with Kitto from the East, but had died on board while in sight of the English coast. Sympathy with the lady, to whom Kitto had communicated the distressing intelligence, had gradually grown into a warmer feeling, and had been consummated in a union of which it would be difficult to say whether it added most to his comfort or to his usefulness. His deafness more than once endangered the gravity of the marriage ceremony; for in his eagerness to perform his part, he frequently got before the officiating clergyman, much to the confusion of the bride, who could not but hear the ill-suppressed merriment of spectators behind. It was therefore with a novel element of gratitude in his words, that he wrote to a friend soon after the ceremony, "I am married at last, thank God."

To be married to a deaf man, with the recluse habits which this deafness as well as a passion for literary labour had engendered, was to be placed in a position which would call for some self-denial in order to harmonious assimilation. And the manner in which this lady accommodated herself to the unique circumstances of her husband, would form an instructive chapter in the history of good wives. Admiring his gifts, and comprehending the peculiar mission of his life, she devoted herself to her husband. She became his partner in study,—the one associate, who, without disturbing him, shared his isolation, and extracted from it the depressing influence of solitude. The nature of his themes demanding the frequent consultation of rare books, such as could only be found in the library of the British Museum, she spent large portions of time in consulting the dusty tomes to which he directed her search, and in making the necessary extracts. He polished the stones and raised the building, but she patiently and bravely bore much of the rough material to the spot; so that there was quite as much of truth as of humour in the name with which he sometimes described her, in allusion, we suppose, to his own early toils, as his *hod-man*. The *Penny Magazine*, however, was too small a vessel for receiving all Kitto's teeming information; and various popular volumes, such as "The Lost Senses," and

"Uncle Oliver's Travels in Persia," were given by him to the world, while he was maintaining his usual rate of contribution to Mr Knight's serials.

This enterprising and accomplished publisher had determined to publish an edition of the Bible with notes and illustrations. It was intended that these should be written by different authors, according to the department in which they respectively excelled, and it occurred to him that Kitto was singularly qualified to write the illustrations from oriental customs. He was requested to prepare a few specimen-pages of the contemplated work; and in doing this, he displayed such a power of novel and vivid illustration, as induced Mr Knight to commit to him the whole undertaking. The result justified Mr Knight's decision, for it ended in the production of "The Pictorial Bible." All Kitto's peculiar powers were now brought into full play, and probably the years in which he was engaged in preparing this great work were the happiest of his life. His previous study of the Bible; his treasured and still glowing recollections of the East; his wonderfully miscellaneous stores of knowledge, accumulating from the days of his down-trodden boyhood; his rare power of making even the most unlikely forms of his knowledge come forth and do service, like a human constitution of great assimilative powers, which can turn everything into alimient;—all these now obtained full and congenial scope. He felt that the question was now to be decided whether he was to hang as a dead weight upon society, or take his place among its active living men. And the result is known. John Kitto's "Pictorial Bible" was not a new compilation, but a new book. It is a shining and substantial addition to our knowledge of the Word of God. Though Harmer and Burder had preceded him in the same kind of illustration, yet, in the fact of his extending his illustrations systematically over every book of the Bible, and in his power of discovering analogies which remained invisible to other minds, of whose happy results his Commentary is so full, it stands out with marked features, recording the beginning of a new era in biblical interpretation. Drawing its stores not so much from lexicons as from living men, more distinguished by what the Germans style *thing-knowledge* than by *word-knowledge*, while it contains much for the scholar, it has matter of stirring interest for all. We can imagine few literary achievements more honourable, than to have shed a new interest upon many a text and chapter of the Word of God, and to have made many a page of the Bible more useful by making it more luminous; and this, especially in the case of the Old Testament, which afforded the largest scope for his peculiar powers, has been the achievement of John Kitto. It

is an honour of its kind, that Barnes and Bush, and other American commentators, have levied *black-mail* on him to a very unscrupulous extent: it is a more gratifying honour, that the "Pictorial Bible" was the chosen companion of Chalmers in those Scripture and Sabbath readings by which that great man has enriched our devotional literature; and that Kitto has since been followed in the same course by such accomplished scholars and travellers as Conybeare and Howson.

Before the "Pictorial Bible" was completed, Kitto had entered into arrangements with Mr Knight for preparing a "Pictorial History of Palestine and the Holy Land, including a complete History of the Jews." Nine months of hard labour were employed in gathering the material for this work, three years of unremitting application in writing it. But there were a thousand things in the world that he dreaded more than work. Even while engaged in incessant toil at this second pyramid, he was planning new works, the production of which would have required an antediluvian length of days. Up to the chin in literary labour on congenial themes, surrounded by a large library of rare and portly tomes, with a young family that gave new scope to his warm affections, with a growing reputation, and an income which met all his wants, he probably felt during these busy years, that the vision which had been conjured up to him in his youthful dreams by the angel Zared had at length become a solid reality.

But no vision that forecasts its scene upon the earth, can promise permanence. The pecuniary embarrassments into which the publishing-house of Mr Knight eventually fell, involved Kitto in serious loss, and cut off from him, with an enlarging family, and with pecuniary obligations already contracted, his usual income. What, then, was this brave man to do, whose only bank was his brain! Many a fine literary scheme was devised at the prompting alike of literary enthusiasm and of stern necessity; but twelve months elapsed from the interruption of his connection at Ludgate Hill, ere he succeeded in forming a new engagement that was at once sufficiently lasting and adequately remunerative. We refer to the production of the "Cyclopædia of Biblical Literature," for the publishing-house of the Messrs Black of Edinburgh,—a work which, while it does not equal in some of the elements of popularity, equals in usefulness, and exceeds in learning, the "Pictorial Bible" itself. Kitto was the editor of this work, but only one in a large list of contributors, among whom were some of the best biblical authors both of Great Britain and of the Continent. The age needed such a work, for "Calmet's Dictionary" had become unwieldy, and overlaid in many places with fancies, which needed the ordeal of a stern criticism that could mercilessly

separate the precious from the vile, and cast the chaff away; while Winer's work, as has been truly said, was "untranslatable." The articles are of considerably varied excellence; and, in some instances, of varied sentiment. The former circumstance was unavoidable; the latter might have been avoided, or rather prevented, and we regard it as a blemish, that Kitto, perhaps from an undue modesty, admitted doubtful sentiments on topics that were not always unimportant. But the "*Cyclopædia*," with these occasional blemishes, is a great standard work, which does honour to Britain, distancing all previous dictionaries of the Bible; and while we can imagine improvements on individual articles, there is no likelihood that in our own age it will be superseded. The "*Journal of Sacred Literature*," which was Dr Kitto's next enterprise, and which aimed to combine some of the best qualities of a quarterly review, with exegetical examinations and discussions, lived through many a year under his editorship, and gave many exceedingly valuable papers to the world; but was greatly more productive of honour to Kitto, than of emolument.

He was still a sufferer from the failure of the great publishing-house on Ludgate Hill, and unable to recover lost ground, so that literary labour was often paid for in advance. It was no easy matter for him to remove with a large family into a smaller domicile; but duty commanded the sacrifice, and it was done. Sixteen hours a-day was now the measure of toil needed to feed those hungry mouths; and so the overtaxed brain kept moving. It is touching to find him gradually isolating himself more and more from society, and even from his children, that the weekly tale of brain-work might be produced, which was to be turned into bread; and even when he was with his children, there was a peculiar element of suffering, the record of which rebukes many parents for their thankless oversight of what are called common mercies. "I never heard," says he, "the voices of any of my children. The reader, of course, knows this; but the fact, as stated in plain words, is almost shocking. Is there any thing on earth so engaging to a parent, as to catch the first lisplings of his infant's tongue? or so interesting as to listen to its dear prattle, and trace its gradual mastery of speech? If there be any one thing arising out of my condition which, more than another, fills my heart with grief, it is THIS: it is to *see* their blessed lips in motion, and to *hear* them not; and to witness others moved to smiles and kisses by the sweet peculiarities of infantile speech, which are incommunicable to me, and which pass by me like the idle wind."

By the time we now speak of, Kitto had entered on the preparation of his final literary work, "*The Daily Bible Illustrations*," which was to issue from the publishing-house of the

Messrs Oliphant of Edinburgh. He intended to produce it in small popular volumes; but the plan which he originally sketched was considerably different from that which was ultimately adopted, and, as illustrative of his shrewdness and fertility, has a curious interest.

“The general title, I purpose to be that of ‘Bible Evenings;’ and, as I incline to think that the book of Ruth affords an appropriate theme for the first portion, the full title of the volume we commence with would be—‘Bible Evenings: The History of Ruth, conversationally explained and illustrated, by J. K.,’ etc.; or, perhaps, ‘Conversations on the History of Ruth,’ would be as well for the second title. The attraction in subjects of this sort is known to be very great; but it is my hope to enhance this attraction by the manner of treatment. It is meant that the interlocutors shall be not *sticks*, but *characters*; and that the progress shall be enlivened and diversified by such scenes, incidents, and circumstances, as might naturally arise among such persons. The leading idea is, that a family in the middle educated classes, devotes two evenings in the week to conversations on the Bible. Of the persons, one may be a biblical scholar, supposed to be able to explain every thing that is not assigned to the other characters; another will be a traveller, who has seen every thing, and been every where, and who is therefore able to supply a lively description of places and products, and to point out the analogous manners, customs, and ideas, of the modern East; a third may suggest practical improvements; and by so doing, he will give the key-note to one man who has a wonderful memory for all kinds of ancient and modern anecdotes, which appear to him to illustrate and bear upon the principles developed, or the conduct followed; and there may be another yet, apt to remember or fabricate all kinds of poetry and snatches of verse, having some kind of connection with the matter in hand. All this is to be produced, not in the stiff A-B-C-style of interlocution, but with all the animating turns and incidents of natural conversation.”

The plan actually adopted, consisted, as is well known, of a short paper on some part of the Bible for every morning and evening of the year. There had been books constructed on the same general plan long before Kitto wrote, as every reader of Jay and Bogatzky is aware; but the execution, in Kitto's case, was felicitously unique. As he himself expressed it in the preface to his second volume, the work is “not a history,—not a commentary,—not a book of critical and antiquarian research,—not one of popular illustration, nor of practical reflection,—but it is something of all these.” Sometimes a custom or a piece of dress supplies the matter of a fascinating paper; at other times the pictorial and moral interest of an entire scene or chapter is skilfully condensed into a brief article; while the sanctity of the Lord's day is duly respected by the appropriation of the Sunday reading to subjects that bear more directly on the inner spiritual life. And as Dr Eadie has said in his discriminating “Estimate,” “Whether

the theme be Abel's death, Lamech's polygamy, Jubal's harp, Enoch's piety, Noah's ark, Sarah's veil, Hagar's flight, Lot's escape, Jacob's pillar, Joseph's bondage, or Pharaoh's signet, each is told with a charming simplicity, surrounded with numerous and beautiful illustrations, and interspersed or closed with pointed and just reflections." With what a rare power of word-painting does he introduce us into Abraham's tent, and make us look as with our bodily senses on the simple majesty of patriarchal life! The effect of his "readings" on many a historical chapter of the Old Testament, is like removing the dust and dimness from some sacred painting by one of the old masters, and making the soiled canvas live. We have been struck by reading his account of his observations on Mount Ararat, as given in his memoirs, when, seated on his mule, he kept gazing for hours on the sublime mountain, that he might fix it the more indelibly on his memory; and by then turning to his remarks on Ararat, as given in the first volume of his "Illustrations" so many years afterwards.

"When our eyes first beheld 'the dread magnificence' of Ararat, we had already seen the loftiest and most remarkable mountains of the old world; but yet, the effect of the view of this mountain was new and surprising. The reason appeared to be this:—most of the loftiest mountains of the world are but peaks of the uppermost ridge of mountain chains. It is these, perhaps, only, that are visible in the distance, and by the time you come near enough to look directly up to the summit, your ascent, however gradual, has been such that you are surprised at the small apparent height of the peak above you. . . . But Ararat is not merely a summit of a ridge; it is a whole and perfect mountain. Whether it be seen distant or near, the whole of its noble proportions, from the level of the plain to the summit, covered with snow even in the height of summer, are taken in at one view. It is, in fact, the culminating point, the gigantic cornerstone, of the ranges of the mountains which bound the three great empires of Russia, Turkey, and Persia. Never had nations a more noble boundary; nor is there, perhaps, another object on earth which, from its mere natural aspect, would seem so worthy to be regarded as a monument of the greatest event in the world's history—the bridge between the ante-diluvian and the post-diluvian worlds."

We are not sure that one feature in these most attractive volumes has been sufficiently marked. We refer to the admirable summaries of facts and contemporary opinions which are to be found in many of the papers on those questions on which science and archæological research touch on the domain of Scripture. Egypt, Babylon, and Nineveh, the catacombs of Rome, and the inscriptions on the rocks of the Arabian desert, are all made to whisper to him their latest secrets. We could name papers which probably would not require many

hours for their composition, but which, while all the forms and processes of scholarship are carefully excluded from them, are manifestly the matured result and reward of many weeks of previous reading and thought. There is not, perhaps, in the whole range of biblical commentary, a more intelligent and satisfactory view of the geology of Genesis, than is given in the earliest papers of this work. Indeed, in the clear and compact manner in which he states his case, and in the skill with which he selects and appropriates the facts which really bear on his point, and casts aside all superfluous and irrelevant matter, he often reminds us of Paley; and we are glad to record another resemblance to Paley, in the steady growth of devotional sentiment with his years.

Long before the last volume of the "Bible Illustrations" was finished, Dr Kitto's constitution had given unequivocal symptoms of breaking up. Dull pains in the back of the head, with frequent neuralgic affections, aggravated by study, and often rendering it impossible for him even to correct his proofs in a bending posture, told but too plainly of an overtaxed brain. Rest became a necessity in order to sustain activity, and even to prolong life. But this rest was not taken. To walk for hours together with no immediate aim, was, in his case, to break in violently upon the habits of a man who had almost lost the practice of placing one leg before another, and to call him to a most uncongenial task-work. And even when the prescribed hours of exercise were taken, and the mind partially soothed, it was only to return to the fresh excitement of new toil. Besides, what but toil was to feed the mouths of that numerous and dependent home-circle? Novelists were making fortunes, and building palaces in the neighbourhood of London; but this unwearied contributor to the solid literature of England, and to the illustration of heaven's own record, could scarcely keep himself one day a-head of want. It is true, that the opportune grant of a £100 a-year from Her Majesty's civil list made the struggle less desperate; but toil, even with this, was needed in order to keep "even with the world." It was in vain, therefore, that his devoted wife seconded, by the most earnest entreaties, the advice of Dr Golding Bird, that he would cease from work for a while. His reply was, "No, I must finish the work for which I have had the money; and if I knew I should die with the pen in my hand, I will go on as long as the Lord permits." He was permitted to finish the work, and, with characteristic devotion, united with Mrs Kitto in thanking God when the closing sentence was written. But the very next morning, on attempting to rise, he exclaimed, "Oh, Bell, I am numb all down my side." It proved to be a slight attack of paralysis, and was

another step in his onward progress to a not far distant grave; for in less than another month he was seized with a violent fit, which produced a state of temporary prostration and insensibility. And though medical treatment soon succeeded in restoring him to consciousness, he continued to be subject to a racking pain, which, combined with general debility, rendered bodily exertion distressing, and mental labour impossible.

It was now that literary and benevolent men, both in London and in Edinburgh, made aware for the first time of the condition of Kitto, came forward by subscriptions to help in the salvation of so valuable a life. The movement was fitly and generously headed by Kitto's old friend and patron at Bagdad, Sir John M'Neill, G.C.B. A sum was procured sufficient to relieve him of existing pecuniary obligations, and to admit of his retiring for a time with his family to Germany and taking unbroken rest.

Accordingly, on Wednesday, August 9th, 1854, Dr and Mrs Kitto, with seven of their children, the other two remaining in England, embarked for Rotterdam, and proceeding thence by way of Mayence and Manheim, and then in one of the Rhine steamers to Stuttgart, reached, on the following Tuesday, the place which the physicians had selected as their residence, in the little town of Cannstatt. The German home of the invalid English scholar, was finely situated. Flowing under his windows was the lovely Neckar; vineyards crowned the distant slopes; a fancy palace, the Wilhelmina, encircled by royal gardens, occupied the foreground; tranquil beauty reigned everywhere: but the favourable results which many anticipated from this change of scene and release from toil, were prevented by bereavements which came in quick succession, and told with sad effect upon his already exhausted frame. Within little more than a month after his arrival at Cannstatt, his infant son, Henry Harlowe, was taken from his arms; and in a few weeks more, his "dear and highly gifted" daughter, Shireen, who, with her strong mental affinities and congenial tastes, had become doubly his daughter, was carried to the Friedhof, or "peace-yard," as the burying-place in that part of Germany is touchingly called. It was remarked that Kitto was very particular in the choice of a site for his beloved Shireen's grave. "He wanted it," he said, "among old things, for he hated new things;" and as they bore her away, myrtle-crowned, according to the custom with the bodies of young unmarried females, he intimated the expectation that he had come to Cannstatt to die, and that he should ere long be placed by her side. Remarkable dreams had marked all the great stages of his life, and one of startling vividness on board the Rhine steamer, in which he had

seen Mrs Kitto in the garb of widowhood, had been regarded by him as the shadow of his grave. And the following words in a letter to a friend are full of sacred premonitions:—"In the short time since I have been in this place, for benefit of health and economy of living, my cup has been filled very high, in the loss of my eldest daughter and youngest son, whom, within three short weeks, I have laid in one grave. But though heart-smitten, I have not been allowed to sorrow as having no hope; and I begin to perceive that, by these variously afflictive dispensations, my Lord is calling me 'up hither' to the higher room in which he sits, that I may see more of his grace, and that I may more clearly understand the inner mysteries of his kingdom."

The expected summons, solemn but not dreaded, soon came. In a few days after the above letter was written, a fresh attack of his former malady supervened, with so violent symptoms as to baffle all the skill of medicine, and to foretell an early and fatal issue; and, on the morning of November 25, 1854, this faithful workman rested for ever from his labours, and entered into the joy of his Lord.

Two days afterwards the mortal remains of Kitto were followed to the grave with religious ceremonies conducted by the decan of Gliessberg. He had lived long enough in Cannstatt to attract towards him a melancholy interest by his afflictions, and universal respect by his high literary reputation; in consequence of which, most of the English residents, and a very unusual number of the German inhabitants, graced the solemn procession. A tombstone, erected in fine taste by the publishers of his last work, and fitly bearing on the upper part of it a monogram taken from the tombs of the early Christians in the catacombs at Rome, which had formed the concluding pictorial illustration of his "Daily Bible Readings," will enable strangers to identify the earthly resting-place of him who will be honourably known to future ages as the author of the "Pictorial Bible."

We have already indicated in the progress of this sketch our view of the peculiar gift of Kitto, and of the specific service which he was raised up by Providence to perform for biblical literature. Belonging rather to the school of Harmer than of Henry, dealing more with the scenery of the Bible than with its sentiment, illustrating its drapery rather than its doctrine, he stands in his own chosen sphere unrivalled and unapproached. What was lost to him in the one sense, was compensated to him in the other by a wonderful faculty of observation and mental reproduction. When complaining of the more than liberal use that had been made of his "Pictorial Bible" by the popular commentators of America,

he himself describes what we conceive to be his characteristic and pre-eminent gift: "Nothing in this line saves me from being smothered by my own children, but the certainty of actual knowledge which my residence and travels in the East confer, and the foundation thus afforded for *the working of a strong faculty of mental association, which enables me to discover illustrative analogies where few would perceive them*, and thus to gain constant accessions of materials from sources not commonly thought of or usually available; and so, between recognition, recollection, and research, to keep my information well a-head in this department." His flowers are not the dried collections of the botanist's herbarium, but the fragrant and waving flowers of the meadow; and his characters are not shrivelled mummies, but living men with bloom upon their cheeks, and passion beating strong within their breasts. We could cite passages, even from his letters and journals, in which the examples of this gift are wonderful. Sitting in his room in Bagdad, and watching the contests of a spider with the long-waisted oriental wasp, he describes the whole with a most vivid distinctness, that makes you feel as if he had concentrated so many sun-beams on their movements, or as if the creatures of which he was writing, were of the bulk of elephants. Let the reader judge for himself, by the following extract, whether our estimate be exaggerated:—

"The spiders here are much larger than I have ever seen in England; but, considering the smallness of body in the largest spider, compared with that of a wasp, I was surprised that they would undertake so large an insect; and not only so, but even a little spider, or one that in England we should call middle-sized, when he sees him entangled, will venture upon him maugre his sting. The strength of wing in a wasp being very great, he often gets away after having been entangled, and sometimes in spite of the efforts of the spider to entangle him further. Then he flies to some standing-place, where he cleans himself from the relics of the web, and very often returns to the window before which the webs are spread, again flying fearlessly about as if in derision of new attempts to ensnare him, till, at last, he is so fairly caught, that he cannot possibly be disengaged, by any effort of wing, till the spider has inflicted the wound, from which there is no recovery; like many other fools, with fewer legs and no wings, who will still sport with the dangers of which they have been fully warned, till they are destroyed at last. I have observed that the spider always takes great care to keep its body out of reach of the sting of the wasp, till it has fairly held him firmly, wing and foot, by the web, its own long legs not being endangered by the operation. Then, when the victim is quite securely fastened, and can move neither to the right hand nor the left, the ogre spider comes behind and inflicts two wounds, one in the neck and the other on the top of the head; and so powerful is the poison, that such wounds, from a moderately-sized spider, kill the strongest wasp in about a minute from

their infliction; indeed, the contortions of body by which it has still endeavoured to disengage itself, have generally ceased on the infliction of the second wound. The spider, then, when it sees it fairly dead, takes it away to some obscure corner to suck out its juices unmolested; but if too large to be so carried, this business is done on the spot. I have been surprised to see a moderately-sized spider carry off, with much agility, a wasp four times its own weight. This business of devouring the marrow and juices takes about eight hours, during which its head is half buried in the body of the wasp; then, all the nutriment being probably extracted, it is either hung up in the web as a trophy, or disengaged from it, and suffered to fall to the ground. I have seen it often happen, that a very small spider has undertaken a wasp, whilst some great hulking fellow of a spider has lain quiet in a corner; and when, with much ado, the poor little creature has, by the sweat of his brow, succeeded in binding the captive, and inflicting the death-blow, that great ‘Q in the corner’ would drop down, and, driving off the little one, secure the prey for himself; acting quite as if he had lived with men and learnt their ways; as more fully appeared when poor Pilgarlick, indignant at such an outrage and injustice, would approach and remonstrate, probably in the hope of being allowed to share the spoil, at least. After repeated repulses, I have seen the tyrant, irritated at his impotency, seize him, bind him as the wasp had been bound, and slay him as the wasp had been slain. I conclude that the little one became defenceless by the injection of its poison into the wasp, else I cannot conceive how the great lubberly fellow could so easily have conquered that brave and desperate little Hotspur. I am sorry to say of the spiders that there is no unanimity among them. Two never concur in undertaking a wasp; though, when too much for one, it might be an easy conquest for two. That they are cannibals, also, I much regret to state; for I often see the hard legs of a spider, standing in the web as they naturally do, or else pinned against the wall, connected by the skin of the back, whilst all the body has been abstracted. I fear, also, that they practise infanticide, as I perceive that many of these skeletons are of very young ones, in places where I had observed pregnant females. I have no doubt that either father or mother had devoured their own offspring. They account, however, a wasp better fare than one of their own species; as, in the occurrence of such affairs as I have just related, after the small spider is killed, the murderer returns to the wasp, and has nothing to say to the other till this is finished.”

Kitto’s latest work, “The Bible Illustrations,” appears to us to have brought into prominence another quality, not absent, indeed, from his earlier writings, but which stands out in this work so fully to observation, as to impart to it one of its greatest excellencies, and to render it most unjust to speak of Kitto as a man of only one gift, unusually developed. We refer to his keen perception of human nature, and to the singularly rich, fresh, and often original, vein of moral reflection, which stands closely related to this power, and is, indeed, in a

great measure its fruit. The extract which we have just made presents something of this quality, relieved and lightened by the play of a most gentle humour; and his letters abound with instances of his power of shrewd observation. His publishers appear to have informed him that his theory about the sons of God having taken to themselves wives from among the daughters of men, given in one of his "Daily Illustrations," had startled some excellent persons from their propriety. Kitto in part regretted the article, but he hints that there is that in human nature which may allay any fears on the merely commercial aspect of the case: "I regret, upon the whole, that I did more than *state* the view among others; but as it is, people will like the book none the less for being able to discover some odd matter here and there, of no *essential* importance, with which they can find fault. It is a great pleasure for readers to be able now and then to think themselves wiser than the author; and it creates a feeling of benignity towards him, which is not experienced with regard to one who is always in the right." With his remarkable knowledge of man, Kitto united a preference for those scenes in which man could be best studied; and, with Dr Johnson and Charles Lamb, appears to have considered a walk along the Strand, from St Paul's to Temple Bar, to be one of the most interesting exercises in the world. Even without his peculiar discouragements and difficulties, John Kitto would have been a very remarkable man; but when it is remembered that he was deaf from the age of thirteen, his attainments and achievements mark him as one of the wonders of his age.

And in this view Kitto is not only a teacher, but himself a lesson. He was accustomed to read with interest the lives of men who had struggled manfully with difficulties resembling his own. Ferguson, the shepherd-astronomer, and Bloomfield, the blind poet, cheered him in his father's attic, when he had returned from the cuffs and blows of the tyrant Bowden. And many a brave heart, standing far down in the fearful pit and the miry clay, will learn from the story of the poor deaf workhouse boy of Plymouth, who rose in no very long life to command the universal respect of the scholars of England, Germany, and America, and to enable men to read the Bible in its own light of oriental scenes and customs,—to struggle on bravely in the great life-battle, and to see that perseverance and faith, "heart within and God o'erhead," can conquer every thing but impossibilities. For faith in God lay at the root of all Kitto's perseverance, and without it he would have become a spiritless serf, a maniac, or a suicide. He did not live, indeed, to spend a calm old age, reposing on his laurels; but he lived long enough to accomplish all that he had hoped,

and to leave behind him this noble testimony, which may be taken as the sublime moral of his life:—

“Thirty years ago, before ‘the Lord caused me to wander from my father’s house,’ and from my native place, I put my mark upon this passage in Isaiah, ‘I am the Lord: they shall not be ashamed that wait on Me.’ Of the many books I now possess, the Bible that bears this mark is the only one that belonged to me at that time. It now lies before me; and I find that, although the hair, which was then dark as night, has meanwhile become ‘a sable silvered,’ the ink which marked this text has grown into intensity of blackness as the time advanced; corresponding with, and, in fact, recording, the growing intensity of the conviction, that ‘they shall not be ashamed that wait for Thee.’ I believed it then, but I know it now; and I can write *probatum est* with my whole heart over against the symbol, which that mark is to me, of my ancient faith.

“‘They shall not be ashamed that wait for Me.’ Looking back through the long period which has passed since I set my mark to these words—a portion of human life which forms the best and brightest, as well as the most trying and conflicting in all men’s experience—it is a joy to be able to say, ‘I have waited for Thee, and have not been ashamed.’ Under many perilous circumstances, in many most trying scenes, amidst faintings within and fears without, and under sorrows that rend the heart, and troubles that crush it down, I have waited for Thee; and, lo, I stand this day as one not ashamed.”

ART. VI.—*A. Commentary on Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi.*

By Rev. T. V. MOORE, D.D., Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Richmond, Va.

It may be safely affirmed, that a new era has dawned on English Hermeneutic Theology, and the fact should be recorded with gratitude. For excellent as are the older commentaries in our language, (and they are so valuable that they cannot be dispensed with, even now, by any one who wishes to be imbued with the spirit of the sacred record,) it is an undeniable fact, one that presses itself on the attention of the student at every step of his progress, that they do not meet and satisfy the wants of the time.

We shall, perhaps, suggest what we conceive to be the new element that gives character to the commentaries that are from time to time coming forth to meet the exigencies of the age, when we say that they are distinguished by a manly criticism,

that does not fear to look a difficulty full in the face. It is not satisfied with being copious and pious on the plain declarations of the living oracles, but the obscure utterings are pondered, and their hidden meaning sought after, and often found and brought forth, to add to the priceless stores of the treasury of things new and old, in which the church of God rejoices. And it is eminently practical as well as critical. It makes a minute, patient, and learned examination of the sacred text the foundation of the development of doctrine and practical inference and remark. It seeks to ascertain the mind of the Spirit in each enunciation of the great Revealer, and thus put into the hand of the Christian warrior the sword of the Spirit, with its heavenly temper and keen edge uninjured.

The writing commentaries of this class is a work of Herculean labour, and no one who has a due sense of the requirements of the case will think of attempting the exposition of the entire Scriptures. That honour is not for any one man. The result, whenever attained, will be a composite one, and will consist of monographs from many hands. The incomparable work of Eadie on the Ephesians, and Hodge's exhaustive commentary on the Romans, will be universally accepted as worthy contributions to this noble effort. And in this galaxy of interpreters of the Word, that shall at once adorn and instruct the church in her latter and better day, this work on the Prophets of the Restoration is entitled to, and we are confident will secure, no mean place. We have no hesitation in saying, that, as yet, there is no German work that we have seen that is entitled to a place in this assembly of worthies. No one can deny the great value and indispensable necessity of such works to every scholar, without exposing his own ignorance or presumption, and perhaps both. But the master-works of such men as Tholuck, and Hengstenberg, and Olshausen, have defects both in criticism and in doctrinal exposition that are felt at every step. Nearly akin as we are, and much as we have in common, there is a radical difference between the Teutonic mind and ours. An argument that is demonstration to a German scholar is often very far from bringing conviction to us; and difficulties that seem insurmountable to him make but very little obstruction in the progress of our reasoning. To use his own hackneyed expression, our "stand-point" is different.

And yet, as we have already said, the aid of our metaphysical and learned brethren is indispensable. The work is to be done by the Anglo-Saxon mind, enriched by German culture. It is a happy combination of the good sense and directness of the one with the patient and learned acuteness of the

other, that is needed. Nor are we willing to give this noble work exclusively into the hands of our theological professors and teachers of biblical criticism. These men, with all their piety and learning, generally look at the world through the loop-hole of a study window, and have far too little acquaintance with the wants and modes of action of that great mass of mind that is to be redeemed and sanctified by the truth. And hence they are not so skilful as they might be in arresting and satisfying those who are engaged so eagerly in the actual struggle of life. Give a pastor a good degree of the professor's learning, and his familiar acquaintance with the busy and fluctuating thoughts of men, as he meets them in the working-day-world, will be of signal advantage in enabling him to guide the sword of the Spirit to the very point most vulnerable. In short, we suppose that the perfection of a commentary must combine the facts of learned research and practical dexterity. No one, we think, can read Eadie's works on Ephesians and Colossians, without perceiving on every page that he is a preacher as well as a professor.

This same most desirable quality attaches, in a highly gratifying degree, to the work before us. While it is complimentary to the author's diligence and self-denial, that such a work has been conceived and brought forth amid the exacting and exhausting labours of a large pastoral charge, it is also the better for that very reason. We see that he looks at truth, and handles it, not as a dead fossil, but as a living, operative reality, that must move as well as enlighten the hearts and consciences of men. Yet, were we in a critical mood, we might suggest that perhaps there is a little too much of the preacher to be seen here. The style is too intense and epithetical and antithetical. There is a trifle too much of flourish and rhetoric for a commentary. But we can readily pardon so slight a blemish when it is but the excess of so good a thing.

And we cannot but hope that the new style of criticism will develop a new style of preaching. We cannot find it in our hearts to depreciate those grand old divines and preachers who adorned and instructed the times (for there were giants in those days), and we bless God for them. But may we not suggest that they were too systematic and general, and that even they would have been improved by the modern culture;—that a minuter criticism would have given greater definiteness and exactness of application; and that a closer study of the forms of belief developed by the time, would have fitted them for a more efficient application of the gospel remedy to the diseases of humanity? We trust that the ministry is getting more into sympathy with the actual world of hoping.

pinning, doubting, struggling men and women; and that this closer acquaintance with present wants will enable the ministers of God more fully and triumphantly to vindicate the claim of the gospel to be rest for the weary and satisfaction for the doubting. At all events, we know that an exclusive attachment to the old forms of preaching truth would greatly disable the modern preacher in his attack on the powers of darkness. It is the same precious, unalterable truth, but its form of presentation and illustration may, and must, be diversified, to meet the infinite varieties of ever-changing error. Our science and our art must keep full abreast of all other arts and sciences. It will not do to go to work with the match-lock and cross-bow, when the enemy is using Minie rifles and Paixhan guns.

Dr Moore has been very happy, we think, in selecting his portion of the Word of God—the closing period of the Old Testament dispensation, that stretches from the return from Babylon to the five centuries of silence that intervened between the promise of the messenger that was to prepare the way of Jehovah, and the startling announcement of one crying in the wilderness, “Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make his paths straight.” It was, as our author most appropriately and suggestively calls it, the period of restoration. It witnessed the rebuilding of the ruined temple, amid the rejoicing hopes of the young and the tearful memories of the old. It was a twilight time—but it was morning twilight, illumined by three bright day-stars, which did not lose their gentle and cheering radiance, but were swallowed up by the full light of the perfect day of the Sun of Righteousness. This whole period has a peculiar and tender interest. It is all tremulous with hope and desire. It stood on the tiptoe of anxious and yet hopeful expectation. It is an old Scotch custom to announce the presence of royalty on the battlefield by a peculiar flourish of trumpets. We hear this in Malachi: “The Lord, whom ye seek, shall suddenly come to his temple, even the Messenger of the covenant whom ye delight in: behold, he shall come, saith the Lord of hosts.” The shout of a King was in their camp.

And is there not a special fitness in the study of this portion just now, when we seem to be about to witness the dawn of a brighter day for the church? For much as interpreters differ in particulars, they agree in the great hope that we are on the verge of great things—that a new era in the administration of Christ’s kingdom is at the door.

But we must not vaticinate. We would rather express our acknowledgments to our author that he has not felt called to enlighten us on unfulfilled prophecy. We rejoice that he

has not been bitten by the prophetic mania of the Armageddonites, who not only locate the arena for the great battle, but call the combatants by name, and kindly suggest the military policy that will lead to victory;—an act of forethought that all the expectant warriors should make a note of for future use.

But it is not simply in the selection of the theme that there is great felicity, but in the whole arrangement and execution of the work. The common version has its proper and yet rarely conceded place in critical commentaries, at the head of the page, without obtrusively taking up too large a portion of it; the new translation is accurate, preserving the Hebrew idiom with remarkable closeness, and not only prefaces each book, but is presented in full in the notes; so that the new and old version, with the commentary, can be seen at a glance. The arrangement of the page is incomparably better than in any other work we have ever seen. And then the notes preserve a happy medium between learned dulness and wearisome fulness of reference on the one hand, and pious but common-place remark on the other. Each portion is finished off by inferences, natural, pointed, apothegmatic, and pregnant. Many of them will stick in the memory of the reader. And hence others than clergymen will find the book an interesting and profitable one. There is no small advantage to our author in the fact that, so far as English readers are concerned, he traverses an almost untrodden field. Those who have made this remarkable trio of prophets a special study, have left their labours for the most part buried in a dead language. We may give information to some, even of our clerical readers, when we record the names of labourers in precisely the same field that Dr Moore has chosen. Such works as Nesi Breves Observationes in Comm., Rab. Davidis Kimchi in Aggem Zechariam et Malachiam, Paris, 1557; and Willii Prophetæ Haggeus, Zacharias, Malachias Comment, illustrati, Bremæ, 1638; and Varenii Trifolium Propheticum, Rostoch, 1662; though covering precisely the same ground with the present work, will most assuredly never jostle it in the competition for public favour. We think, therefore, that this Commentary supplies a deficiency in our apparatus for study. Perhaps no part of the sacred Scriptures is less read than the prophets of the restoration; and yet they are full of hope and encouragement, as well as reproof and warning, for a church called to build the wall in troublous times,—to hold the implements of labour in one hand and the weapons of war in the other, and finding it ever needful to keep alive a loving, trusting heart, in order to give energy and efficiency to both,—in short, for a church which, though now

beset by enemies, looks with steadfast faith to the coming of a better day.

The publisher has done his part of the work well, with the exception of a few typographical errors, and the very remarkable omission of an interclause of the new translation of chap. i. verse 7, of Haggai, and found on p. 60. We are disposed, however, to enter our protest in behalf of the brethren who are low in purse, against the size and consequent cost of the work. It might have been published in a neat and handsome duodecimo, and thus have come within the means of a much larger circle of those who would greatly appreciate its perusal. The price of two dollars for a Commentary on three of the minor prophets would suggest a painful question in the rule of three to many a poor clergyman.

But by far the most striking point in this work is found in the introduction. We have, first, a discussion of the nature of the prophetic gift; which is defined as "something bestowed by God on any one, by virtue of which he was qualified and authorised to speak authoritatively for him." The prophet is one who speaks instead of another, and that without reference to the question whether the announcement refers to present, past, or future. Then follows a new and very striking classification of the different modes of God's manifestations to man. First, the theophanee, in which God revealed himself by visible appearances, and extending through the patriarchal dispensation, and closing with the mission of Moses. The Mosaic dispensation is termed theopneustic, because in it God revealed himself mediately through inspired men. The third dispensation is the Christian, and which is called theologic, because in it God reveals himself permanently by inspired writings. This classification deserves attention, and for a full comprehension of its character and bearings we refer the reader to the extended discussion of it, to be found in this excellent introduction.

In discussing the literature of these three prophetic books, our author pays a deserved tribute to the wonderful genius, learning, and services of John Calvin, in revealing the mind of the Spirit as here recorded. Indeed, it seems that, while many of the older commentaries are becoming mere library lumber or repositories of curious, exploded theories of interpretation, the great thinker and theologian of the Reformation is getting a firmer hold on the reverence and affection of the most advanced minds amongst us. There are some statues so gigantic in proportions, that they are not seen to advantage except at a distance. So it has been with him. For a time after the great impulse which he gave to the generation in which he lived, it was fashionable to neglect him. But now he is again rising above the horizon, a luminary of

the first magnitude, whose calm and serene radiance will, as we trust, shine on the way of life till the end of time.*

We close this work with a feeling of profound satisfaction, and recommend it to all students of the Bible. And a perusal of these three prophets, with the lights that are now offered, is suggestive at once of hope and fear. For as we are cheered by promise of the speedy and glorious coming of the Son of God, we are reminded that when he comes he will inaugurate a day of searching scrutiny. He will be as refiners' fire and as fullers' soap. He brings, therefore, both blessings and cursings. And while we trace the first streaks of the morning light, we catch a glimpse of consuming fire that shall burn the enemies of God.

ART. VII.—*Calvin and Servetus: the Reformer's Share in the Trial of Michael Servetus historically ascertained.* From the French, with Notes and Additions. By the Rev. W. K. TWEEDIE. Johnstone & Hunter, Edinburgh.

HAD Servetus been burned by the Romanists at Vienne, we should probably never have heard his name; or, at most, his case would have excited no higher interest than the thousands of martyrs who have fallen victims to inquisitorial power. His wild speculations in theology, together with his more useful discoveries in physiological science, would have been swept into oblivion by the flames of Papal justice.

We initiate our present effort with this (as some may think) bold announcement, that our readers may bear in mind the proposition which we hope to demonstrate, and that they may fairly and fully weigh all the facts as they shall be given in detail. Rome had consigned myriads of God's most faithful ones to the rack, the fire, and the dungeons of the Inquisition, for the damping heresy of calling in question her dogmas and authority, until these things came to be considered matters of course; and until, from the vast numbers of her victims, a single name, unless one of marked eminence, was lost from public view.

But few of all the distinguished names connected with the great Reformation of the sixteenth century have obtained a

* We notice, with special pleasure, that Dr Schaff, in his new work on Religion in America, acknowledges that Calvinism is the dominant influence in the American Church.

more world-wide renown than that which stands at the head of this article. And for what reason? Not because, like Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, and others, he battled manfully "for the faith once delivered to the saints," and contributed much to the purging of the church from error and delusion; not because of any signal service he rendered to the temporal interests of mankind; not even because he died a martyr at the stake, for the theological opinions he sought to promulgate to the world;—but because he suffered at the hands of *those professing the Reformed faith, under the walls of Geneva*. Men of every shade of faith, from the most orthodox to the most heretical, can easily perceive *now* that the practice of persecution for religious opinions but ill comports with the pure and correct gospel precepts which were taught in that republican city. But then, the chiefest Reformers had not so learned the doctrines of their divine Master as to realise that the weapons of their warfare were not carnal. Those clouds of error and superstition, which had enveloped the church in their folds for a thousand years, had only begun to break away and admit the rays of the Sun of Righteousness to the minds of men. The whole system of truth, as revealed in the precepts of Christ and his apostles, in faith and practice, was not yet fully grasped and clearly understood, even by the mightiest minds and the purest spirits of the Reformation. The consequence was, that Servetus fell before the power of a Protestant tribunal, just as he would have done at the hands of Romanists a few months before, had not circumstances prevented.

But at whose door lies the sin of putting the heretic to death? We anticipate the answer which many, and perhaps the world generally, would give. Romanists, and many Protestants too, for generations past, have unhesitatingly visited the crime on the great Genevan Reformer. By many, of whom we should have expected other sentiments, Calvin has been regarded as the vengeful and truculent murderer of Servetus. And from absence of the necessary testimony in the case, the most ardent professors of that system of faith so clearly set forth in the immortal "Institutes," have been borne along by the tide of public opinion, and only enabled to offer a plausible defence for their adherence to his doctrines, by separating them from the life of Calvin himself.

But justice, though tardy, seems at last to have entered upon its perfect work. The errors of the writers upon this subject heretofore, seem now likely to be corrected. Not a few during the last 150 years have professed to give correct narratives of this, at least one of the most remarkable trials ever had before a human tribunal. De la Roche,

Mosheim, Alwoerden, and Jennebie, during the last century; and Fleury, Trechsel, Valayre, and Audin, of the present; have given the results of their labours. Some of these wrote with undisguised hostility to Calvin and his doctrines; and all, in the absence of the authentic data, which were absolutely necessary to a fair exposition of the solemn procedure. Audin, one of the most recent, and a Romanist, wrote his "*Vie de Calvin*," as a set-off to D'Aubigné's "History of the Reformation." Maunder, too, represents the agency of Calvin in the death of Servetus as leaving an indelible stain on his character.

It is well known that the late Dr Thomas M'Crie contemplated giving the world a life of Calvin, as he had done that of Scotland's great Reformer, Knox; and for this purpose sent his son, John M'Crie, to Geneva, to examine the registers of the city, and thus draw upon original sources for his materials. A biography of Calvin from a Scottish standpoint, to be placed side by side with that of his "true yoke fellow" Knox, would be an invaluable contribution to Presbyterian literature. But the intentions of both father and son were frustrated by a wise Providence, which called them to go up higher; and the work is now in the hands of another of the same family, Thomas M'Crie, D.D., who will, if God permit, ere long give the results of their united efforts to the world.

But our regrets for the loss of the labours of two eminently qualified friends of Calvin, have been more than mitigated by the efforts that have been made by one of a different faith from the great Reformer, and whose testimony, consequently, comes to us divested of the suspicion of prejudice in his favour.

The original records of the trial of Servetus before the "Little Council of Geneva" were, until recently, supposed to be lost. We have now the satisfaction of announcing that this is not the fact. And the discovery of these records is due to the efforts of one not of Calvin's faith. We may then reasonably anticipate that he "will a plain, unvarnished tale deliver." In 1844, Mons. Albert Rilliet, whom we learn to be a Unitarian clergyman of Geneva, published a brochure or treatise on this proceeding, which was based upon the original documents, which had not been before published or examined. In this tractate we now have probably all the light that we ever can have, until the secrets of all hearts shall be made known at the judgment bar.*

* Its title in the original French is, "Relation du Procès Criminel Intente a Geneve, en 1553, contre Michel Servet, redigee d'après les Documents Originaux, par Albert Rilliet."

To present even a cursory view of the life of Calvin, would be both unnecessary and far exceed our prescribed limits. But to do justice to the labours of Mons. Rilliet, we shall find it necessary to notice the principal events in the life of his antagonist before the tragic scene which closed with his death.

Michael Servetus, also called Reves, was a Spaniard, a native of Villanova in Aragon. He first saw the light about 1509, and was, consequently, of about the same age with Calvin. At an early age he exhibited a taste for religious speculations, and a decided aversion to the scholastic theology of the Romish Church. In consequence of these traits of character, his father, who is supposed to have designed him for the church, fearing that his speculations might expose him to the fury of the Inquisition, changed his purpose, and sent him to the University of Toulouse, to study law. Here he became associated with some young men who had imbibed the doctrines of Luther, and at their solicitations applied himself to the study of theology with them. Being now deeply interested in the new doctrines, and ambitious to distinguish himself in the work of the Reformation, he left Toulouse and travelled over Italy, where, in February 1530, he was present at the coronation of Charles V. Passing into Germany, he stopped at Bâle, the residence of Œcolampadius. The latter, who at first welcomed him, soon discovered that he abjured vastly more than the errors of Rome, and differed not less with the Reformed than with the adherents of the Pope. The discovery of his denial of the doctrine of the Trinity detached Œcolampadius from him; and he experienced the same cold reception from Bucer and Capito at Strasburg.

Denounced by these Reformers, he determined now to act for himself, and to form a party of his own through the influence of his writings. In 1531, he published his first work at Hagenau, entitled "*De Trinitatis Erroribus, Libri VII.*" This was succeeded by another work in the following year, entitled "*Dialogorum de Trinitate, Libri II.*" A copy of each of these books is now in the Angelic Library at Rome, in both of which the doctrine of the Trinity is rejected. These writings were not without their influence, both in arresting the progress of the Reformation, and in promoting heresy and schism. To them Dr M'Crie traces the sources of the errors that prevailed in Italy in the sixteenth century.*

The publication of these opinions brought down upon Servetus a storm of opposition from the Reformers at Bâle and Strasburg, which he was ill able to encounter. And not meeting with the success which he had anticipated, he resolved

* History of Reformation in Italy, pp. 150, 151.

to change both his name and profession. Assuming the name of Villeneuve, he went to Paris to pursue the study of medicine. As an indication of the brilliant, though ill-directed genius of the man, it appears evident that he made the first discovery of the circulation of the blood, more than seventy years before the announcement of Harvey.

During his stay in Paris, he still devoted himself to the study of theology, and for the first time sought an interview with Calvin, who was then in the city, but failed in obtaining it. From Paris he went to Lyons, where, to earn the means of support, he became corrector of the press, and published an edition of the Geography of Ptolemy with notes. Returning again to Paris in 1537, he taught mathematics, geography, and astrology,—the last of which drew down upon him the vengeance of the Sorbonne, and a sentence of Parliament. From Paris he went to Charlieu, where he practised medicine. In 1541, he took up his residence in Vienne in Dauphiné, a place destined to be little less memorable in his history than Geneva itself, where he engaged in the duties of his profession, and also in some literary labours.

It was at Vienne that he first entered into correspondence with Calvin. His acquaintance had been cut by the Reformers in Germany, and he now essayed the assimilation of a mind mightier than theirs to his peculiar theological tenets. But as might have been expected, he was foiled here in a more signal manner than before. So far from finding a pliant tool, on whom he should be able to impress his soul-destroying dogmas, he found himself all at once in the hands of an intellectual giant of unyielding principle, and was doomed to mourn over a bitter discomfiture, the mortification of which doubtless, at a later period, instigated him to a retaliation on the Reformer, in a manner which he hoped to find more effectual than a theological dispute. For about six years Calvin endured the discussion of the loathsome errors and the insulting language of his antagonist, in the vain hope of converting him to the truth. At last he denounced him as incorrigible; and, in February 1546, he wrote to Viret that famous letter, in which he avows his determination to render the heretic's visit to Geneva fatal to him, should he exercise the temerity to venture thither: "*Nam si venerit, modo valeat mea autoritas, vivam exire numquam patiar.*"*

Meanwhile the Spaniard was not idle. He was laboriously engaged on the great work of his life,—a work which was destined, ere long, to call forth the thunders of both Popish and

* Henry quotes this letter as written to Farel, then at Metz. Alex. Morus, a personal friend of Calvin, and others, reasoned strenuously against its genuineness. Henry's Life of Calvin, vol. ii., p. 181.

Protestant tribunals, and wind up his earthly career. This book was entitled "*Christianismi Restitutio*;"—not simply a refutation of one particular doctrine, but an entire system of theology, combating alike "the monstrous absurdities of Rome, and the pretended reforms of Protestant doctors." "And had it been able," says Rilliet, "to force itself into publicity, the name of Servetus might not have awakened, as now, only the idea of anti-Trinitarian."—(P. 69.) From a passage quoted from this work by Sigmond, Servetus must have been far from Unitarianism. Though rejecting the doctrine of the Trinity, he uses the following language:—speaking of Christ, he says, "*Ipse non sit creatura, nec finitæ potentie, sed vere adorandus verusque Deus.*" Thus he denied his humanity, and made him the absolute God. This conclusion he arrived at, however, from any other than exalted and correct views of God or the Son of God. He was a thorough Pantheist; with him every thing was a part of the divine nature. The bench on which he sat, and even the devil himself, he avowed before the Council of Geneva, were parts of the divine essence. Christ, therefore, was the "*verus Deus*," and to be adored, in a no higher sense than blocks of wood, and fiends in the nether world. The Trinity he characterised on his trial as a three-headed monster, a "*Cerberus*," the dream of Augustine, and an invention of the devil."—(P. 118.)

After an ineffectual overture to a bookseller at Bâle, Servetus procured the printing of the "*Restitutio*" at Vienne, a printer of that place* having consented to construct a secret workshop for the purpose. The book appeared about the beginning of the year 1553. Five bales of copies were sent to Lyons; as many to Chatillon; still more to Frankfort; and others to Geneva. One of the copies fell into the hands of Calvin, by what means does not appear. It is not probable, however, that he was the first in Geneva to get possession of the work; nor was he the person who furnished the information to the Viennese, which led to the arrest of the author. The paper warfare across the Swiss Alps had for some years ceased, and Calvin was amply occupied in settling the religious faith and political institutions of Geneva, though he doubtless kept a sleepless eye upon one whom he knew to be so dangerous an enemy, so long within less than a hundred miles of him.

How then was the discovery made? Who was the informer? There lived at this time, at Geneva, a French nobleman from Lyons, who had fled thither from persecution, by the name of William de Trie. De Trie had a near relation at Lyons, still in the bosom of the Romish Church, by

* William Queroult, overseer of the Archbishop's press at Vienne.

the name of Arneys. A correspondence between these two persons first led to the disclosures which were followed by such tragical results. The blood of Protestant worthies had been ruthlessly shed in that part of France, and it seemed just ground of complaint on the part of De Trie, that a blasphemer like Servetus should be tolerated under the same authority. Hence, he wrote to Arneys, reproaching him and his church for suffering such evils to exist unmolested within its pale, and claiming that such crimes were more effectually punished in Protestant Geneva. Referring to Servetus and his book he says, "Suppose now that a man should declare that the Trinity in which we believe is a Cerberus, a hellish monster, and should heap upon it all imaginable abuse, and make a mock at all which the ancient fathers have said thereon,—in what light would such a man appear among you? How base a thing it is that they should be led to death who acknowledge that there is one only God, and that prayer must be offered to him in the name of Jesus Christ, while such a man as this (Servetus), who regards Christ as an idol, who tramples on all the principles of faith, revives all the absurdities of the old heretics, condemns the baptism of children, calling it a devilish invention,—should be held in esteem among you, and treated as if he had done nothing amiss! The man to whom I refer is a Spaniard or Portuguese, Michael Servetus by name. But he is known by that of Villeneuve, plays the physician, and has just had a work printed at Arnoullet's office in Vienne." In this letter, De Trie enclosed the title, the register, and the first four leaves of the "*Restitutio*."*

This appeal stung Arneys to the quick, and he immediately placed the letter in the hands of Ory, the inquisitor of the diocese of Lyons. Servetus was forthwith arrested, and underwent an examination at Vienne before Montgiron, the general-lieutenant of Dauphiná. The result of this examination was a failure in fixing the authorship on Servetus. The examination of Queroult and the operatives in the printing-office, was attended with no better success. De Trie was then written to for fuller information; and he was enabled to furnish it. It will be seen here that De Trie, who had brought the charge against Servetus, in a private letter to a friend, was now laid under the necessity of establishing it, or stand convicted of slandering his neighbour. He had asserted that the physician at Vienne, bearing the name of Villeneuve, was Servetus, and the author of the heretical book: he must make good the proof. His only resource was in the hands of Calvin. Servetus, in his letters to him, had acknowledged and explained

* Henry, vol. ii., p. 185.

his change of name, and sufficient testimony was found in this correspondence to satisfy the judges of the guilt of their prisoner, and finally render their verdict against him. It was with much difficulty, however, that De Trie prevailed on Calvin to allow the use of these letters, and a conscientious regard for the cause of truth at last induced him to consent. Servetus, fully realising the consequences that awaited him, when he saw his letters in the hands of his judges, took measures to effect his escape from the prisons of the palace at Vienne, while his trial was still pending. This was on the 7th of April. The process against him, however, was still continued, and on the 17th of June, a sentence was returned by the ordinary tribunal of the Bailiwick of Vienne, condemning him to the flames. The sentence was duly executed the same day, as far as it could be, on the "Place Charneve," by burning the effigy of the criminal, after hanging it on the gallows, together with a bale of his books,* in a slow fire.

For about three months after his escape, Servetus lay concealed in France. But fearing that he might fall into the power of his enemies, he resolved on fleeing to Naples, he himself said, for the purpose of pursuing the duties of his profession. Whether this was his real design or not, he took Geneva in his route, most probably with a view of trying his fortune in a place where the condition of affairs was not unknown to him.

We have now seen what Rome would have done with the heretic, could she have laid her hands on him. Though out of her grasp, her sentence of outlawry and death were still in force against him. Apprehension of his body would have consigned it to the same fate with his effigy and his books. And after he had been apprehended in Geneva, she formally demanded the rendition of the fugitive as the subject of an *auto da fe*, in the market-place of Vienne. And if with her it is a solemn duty to burn heretics, let her and all others remember the precept, "Let him that is without sin cast the first stone."

Let us now follow our hero, and see how he will acquit himself when beyond the reach of the sentence that impended over him. One would have supposed that his recent dangers and hazardous escape would have rendered him wary of similar perils. But Servetus was one of those restless, fiery spirits, that seemed to delight in fomenting strife and courting danger. Coleridge said, that "if any poor fanatic ever thrust himself into the flames, that man was Servetus."

But before proceeding to consider his case, in the hands

* Three copies of the "Restitutio" are still in existence, one of which is in the king's library at Paris, closing with the initials of the author, M. S. V.

of Protestant judges, we must recur for a little while to the state of affairs in the city where he sought an asylum. The Republic of Geneva is little more than a point on the map of Europe, with a few miles of detached territory, washed by the blue waters of the Rhone. And yet, from this point, lying at the western extremity of Leman lake, radiated full three hundred years ago those eternal principles of civilization, state policy, and religious truth, to which we in this far distant age and clime can never acknowledge ourselves too much indebted. One of the first cities of the Allobroges, in the time of Julius Cæsar, Geneva fell successively under the dominion of the emperors of Rome, France, and Germany, and the kings of Burgundy, till the middle of the eleventh century. For about five hundred years afterwards, the government was exercised by the bishops, to whom the emperors had resigned their authority, but who were involved in almost ceaseless contests with the counts of Geneva and Savoy, for the supreme authority. The inauguration of the Reformation ended this quarrel, and in 1534 and 1535, Geneva became a republic, and by degrees obtained that form of government which exists substantially to this day. Consequently, when Servetus entered the city in August 1553, the people had lived in the enjoyment of civil and religious liberty for about eighteen years. But with Geneva, the Reformation was not a transition from a corrupt religion to one conformed strictly to the pure precepts of the gospel. The people had groaned under the tyranny of the crosier, and longed to free themselves from episcopal rule, long before they heard of the doctrines of Luther and Zuingli; and when these doctrines of abjuration of Rome were preached, they were received, partly at least, as a means of freeing them from the supremacy of the bishops, and securing the protective alliance of Berne. The love of independence, far more than a sincere desire to know and practise the truth,—anticatholicism, more than love of the pure principles of the gospel,—opened their hearts to the reception of the new faith, and ranged them on the side of the Reformation. Accustomed, too, to habits of unrestrained licentiousness, and all manner of sensual pleasures, it was no easy matter for them to reform their lives when they changed their constitution. The *noblesse* of the city were, to a melancholy extent, the foremost and most shameless in these libertine practices. A few, and perhaps a few only, of the native Genevese, were truly converted to Christ, and realised that his yoke was easy and his burden light. But Geneva was a free city, and, consequently, an asylum for the people of God who had been exiled for conscience' sake from their own lands. Here Scotland's great Reformer, Knox, in after years, found a refuge,

from the fury of persecution under the bloody Mary. And here, at the trying period of which we now speak, thousands had congregated from various Popish kingdoms, and especially from France, and Italy, that they might enjoy the pure worship of God in safety and peace. So great a number of these refugees hailed from France, like Calvin, that they were commonly designated by the name of *French*, to distinguish them from the native Genevese. Among these, true religion found its faithful adherents; among the latter were the Libertines, who were restive and factious under any strict rule, whether civil or ecclesiastical. The latter being natives, citizens and burgesses, constituted the "General Council," and possessed the law-making power, to the entire exclusion of the stranger inhabitants. To strike down high imaginations like these, and cleanse the city from all its impurities, was found a far more formidable undertaking than freeing it from the thralldom of the Vatican. Farel and Viret had been the instruments, under God, of initiating the work of reform. Farel had preached before the Council, the nuns of St Clair had left the city, and the monks and all the monuments of Popish supremacy had been swept away. But a corrupt religion was banished, and not fully supplanted as yet by a better; and, as a legitimate consequence, violence and faction reigned to a fearful extent.

This state of things prevailed in Geneva, when Calvin, in 1536, fleeing from his native France to Germany, where he might labour in safety for the cause of God and truth, passed through the city. In no portion of Europe was a master-mind like his more needed than at Geneva at this time. He would fain pass on, in spite of the remonstrances of Farel; but the man of God, who had with his own hands torn down the idols and crucifixes in Geneva, denounced the vengeance of Heaven against him, unless he remained and gave himself to the establishment of the truth there. This solemn appeal changed his mind, and Calvin at once set about the arduous work of reforming the morals as well as settling the religious faith of Geneva. But, mighty as were his efforts and his influence, he found "old Adam too strong for young Melancthon." Libertinism was yet too mighty to be brought under the pure and benign reign of the gospel. But with Calvin there was no alternative but the Christianity of the Bible; and for his faithfulness he was expelled the city, together with Farel and Cordeir, in less than two years after his entrance into it.

But Geneva—like France at a subsequent period—made the important discovery, that she could not be governed without religion; the morals of the Libertines could not save the

state. Faction followed faction, and murder succeeded murder; death by violence lessened the number of Calvin's enemies. An erring people, softened by calamities, now saw no way of saving themselves from destruction but by recalling him whom they had exiled. Bâle, Berne, and Zurich, added their influence; and the Council of Two Hundred unanimously voted to press his return from Strasburg, where he now resided. Calvin, with many fears, consented; and an embassy conducted him in triumph to Geneva, after an absence of more than two years.

But his return, in 1540, did not find the power of sin destroyed; and, for a period of thirteen years, he was doomed to struggle with the same unholy influence. A powerful party in Geneva were incorrigible to the religious restraints which were imposed upon them. They would fain enjoy the peace and order secured by the reformer's presence, but they must be exempted from a strict application of the laws of the republic to themselves.

Among those who claimed admission to sealing ordinances was Amied Perrin, the chief syndic and captain-general of the republic,—adding to his official influence, wealth and family connections. His own morals, as well as those of several of his family, subjected them to the censures of the Consistory. This aroused Perrin's pride and resentment, as he had expected exemption for his rank from penalties which he was entirely willing to see visited on others. The contest was fearful; the magistrate arrayed a powerful party in his favour, in resistance to the authority of the Consistory. But Calvin was inflexible; with him the laws must be respected, even by those in power, or he will seek relief in a second exile. In this controversy justice triumphed, and Perrin was banished from the city.

But the serpent's head was not yet crushed. Perrin's faction was still alive, and a plan was laid for embroiling the city, and banishing the reformer. Popular tumults were excited; and into one of these Calvin rushed, and bared his bosom to the swords of the rioters, if they thirsted for blood. The appeal quelled the tumult for the time; but soon after, one of the leaders of the Libertine faction, James Grnet, was brought to the block to atone for crimes which Spon and Jennebier show were such as to outrage all the laws of the state.

In a spirit of pure benevolence, Calvin afterwards proposed to recall Perrin, and reinstate him in all the honours which he had lost, with a hope of allaying the fury of the parties in the city. For a time his efforts were rewarded with peace, but the ground of the evils was not removed. The carnal mind was enmity against God; and those who had long indulged in sin, without new natures, could no more love the

rigid regime of Calvin than the Ethiopian could change his skin, or the leopard his spots.

The Spaniard, at Vienne, meantime was not ignorant of the state of parties in Geneva. He had ventured to measure swords across the Alps with the Reformer to his own discomfiture, and he burned with revenge. In France he could now expect nothing better than concealment, with imminent danger of re-apprehension, and torture to death by a slow fire. In Geneva he could espouse the cause of the Libertines, with whom, if reports be true, he but too fondly sympathised; and by gaining the ascendancy, overthrow the orthodox in Geneva, banish Calvin, revolutionise the government, and restore his fallen fortunes. If these were not his hopes and his designs, how can we account for his temerity in throwing himself into the power of enemies no less implacable than those whose vengeance he had just escaped. In Geneva he had friends, and he was aware of the fact. His prospects, then, were not desperate, of supplanting Calvin, reforming the Reformation as he had designed, and for the "Institutes," embodying the form of sound doctrine, to substitute the "Restitutio," and thus introduce at an early period those baleful heresies which have since overrun that portion of Europe.

In July 1553, Servetus entered Geneva, the residence of the man who he firmly believed had been his accuser in his late trial at Vienne. Here he kept himself concealed for about a month; during which time it is next to impossible to believe but that he was studying more accurately the condition of parties, and holding secret correspondence with the Libertines. At this very juncture there was much to encourage him. Calvin was called to encounter greater difficulties than had ever occurred since his recall to Geneva. Perrin, at the head of his party, was using all his influence to counteract that of the Reformer; and he too fully succeeded. That year he procured the election to seats in the "Little Council" of a number of his friends, and the exclusion of the adherents of Calvin. This election was an undisguised declaration of hostility to Calvin's administration, and he felt the result bitterly. In addition to this, the Genevese proceeded to take from the pious refugees in the city the arms which had been granted them the previous year to aid in maintaining the public safety. And to weaken still more the influence of the Calvinist party, the ministers of the gospel were prohibited from sitting in the "Council General," and from the enjoyment of all political rights, and placed, in this respect, on the same ground with the Romish priests before the Reformation. These three acts of the dominant party,—the exclusion of Calvin's friends from the "Council of Twenty-Five," the disarming of the strangers

who enjoyed no political rights, and the disfranchisement of the ministers,—were heavy blows struck at the cause of truth. And Calvin thus expressed his feelings at the result: “The factions have done all to lead, by degrees, to the overthrow of this church, already very weak. Behold, two years of our life have passed as if we lived among the avowed enemies of the gospel.”

And yet another storm bursts upon the head of the devoted servant of God. This was the contest which he was called to wage with the adverse party, on the subject of ecclesiastical power. Calvin and the Consistory, or Church Session, claimed rightly “the power of the keys,”—the exclusive right to admit and to interdict from partaking of sealing ordinances. The Consistory had exercised the discipline of the church on a leading member of the Libertine party, Philibert Berthelier. The friends of the latter made a violent effort to get the civil power to cancel the sentence of excommunication; and, in addition, to transfer the power of excommunication from the Consistory to the Little Council. And, as we shall presently see, the plan for the time succeeded. During the very time when the trial of Servetus was progressing, the unholy decision was made, and the civil power dared to trench on the sacred prerogative, revoked the sentence, and authorised Berthelier to partake of the Lord’s supper.

But exile, or even death, was a far more preferable alternative to Calvin than yielding to this Erastian principle. And he took the bold and decided stand, to rebuke the unholy act of intrusion from the pulpit, and to refuse to administer the sacrament on the appointed day altogether, willing to abide the consequences if Berthelier persisted in exercising his right. The Council, astounded at the boldness of the man of God, fearing the consequences of pushing their newly assumed prerogatives too far, and yet too proud to revoke their decision, contrived to avoid the collision, by privately requesting the exscommunicated man to decline partaking of the ordinance at that time.

We have thought proper to present the details of this conflict at this place, that we may give due prominence to the fearful difficulties with which Calvin was called to contend, and do justice as far as possible to the motives by which he was actuated. The highest interests of the state, and the cause of God and the truth, were the only motives that nerved his unyielding soul. His own private interests, his ease and popularity, even his personal safety, were as dust in the balance, when weighed against the immutable principles of the Word of God. These considerations, too, are necessary to a proper estimate of Servetus’ visit in disguise to Geneva, his secret sojourn there, and the action of Calvin in

securing his arrest. "We have spoken of them now, because Calvin has told us that among the allies of Berthelier, Servetus found his chief patrons and supporters; while it was necessary to describe the position which Perrin and his adherents, mentioned under the name of *Libertines*, held in Geneva, because their hostility to the Reformer, enabling Servetus to meet such powerful allies at the side of his redoubtable opponent, probably drew him to Geneva, and turned his trial into an episode in the struggle which distracted the republican city."—(Epist. Calv. ad Min., Tigur, 26th November 1553.)*

At the inn, Servetus did not keep himself so entirely secluded as to prevent discovery. Mosheim says, he attended service at one of the churches on the Sabbath; and was there identified and denounced before the sermon was concluded. The part that Calvin took in his arrest he boldly avowed. As soon as he was informed of the heretic's presence in Geneva, convinced that his intentions could not be any thing else than inimical to the interests of the city, he applied to one of the syndics for an order for his imprisonment. This occurred August 13, 1553. The knowledge of the impious and pernicious blasphemies of Servetus, and the attacks which he had made on Calvin before, could not leave the latter for a moment undecided as to the course he should pursue. He was constrained to look upon him in a political as well as a religious aspect,—as an incendiary to the state as well as a deadly enemy to the Reformed religion. "To tolerate Servetus at Geneva, would have been, in some measure, for Calvin to exile himself; it would have been to betray the cause of God without a struggle,—to belie all the past, and render impossible the continuation of his work in Geneva, the rival of Rome."† "The man whom a Calvinist accusation had caused to be arrested, tried, and condemned to the flames in France, could not find an asylum in the city from which that accusation had issued. The honour of Reform, as Calvin understood it, was pledged to that; and never, without a doubt, did he believe he was performing a work more in unison with the interests of a cause which he held so sacred, than when he determined to urge on the arrest of Servetus."‡

Servetus was committed to prison, in the manner prescribed by the criminal edicts of the state, and the regular steps were taken for his trial on the charge of heresy, before the Little Council. || The law required that the accuser should be com-

* Rilliet, pp. 83, 84.

† Ibid., p. 83.

‡ Ibid., p. 89.

|| The sovereign power was vested in a series of three Councils:—

First.—The Large or General Council was composed of all citizens and burghesses who had attained the age of twenty-five. This body possessed the right of making all the laws, and electing the principal magistrates.

Secondly.—The Council of Two Hundred, consisted of two hundred and fifty citi-

mitted to prison as well as the accused, so that if he failed to make out his case, he was liable to suffer the penalty he had attempted to impose on the other.

As it was impossible for Calvin to comply with this requisition, a student of his, Nicholas de Fontaine, became the ostensible prosecutor, and was duly committed to the prisons of the Palace with Servetus, to abide the issue of the trial. Thirty-eight articles were drawn up by Calvin, in which charges were made against the prisoner, to which the latter was permitted to reply. The passages were not quoted from the book printed at Vienne, but from the MS. work, which Servetus had some years before sent to Calvin. The small works on the Trinity, printed at Hagenau, were not used during the process, because the pursuers were not able to procure them. But the "*Christianismi Restitutio*" was deemed altogether sufficient for the prisoner's conviction. And it strengthened the cause of the accusing party, that Servetus soon began to display his bitter hostility to Calvin and his friends, by retorting on them charges which he could not substantiate; and even a disregard of truth, by denying at times his own statements. When charged with escaping from the hand of justice at Vienne, he replied by declaring Calvin and De Trie to have been the authors of his imprisonment there, while there were those in the place who wished him to escape. When required to answer the charge of having his book printed in the office of Geroult, he admitted the fact, while the latter denied it. On the next day, fearing that the statements might prove prejudicial to his cause, Servetus denied his own assertions, and maintained to the last that no connection of the kind had ever existed between them.*

Two days after the arrest, the Little Council convened in the hall of the ancient Episcopal Palace, where they held their criminal courts, for the purpose of issuing the case. Before this body Servetus reiterated, even more keenly than before, his charge against Calvin, of procuring his prosecution at Vienne, evincing by no dubious testimony the object he had in view, of exciting sympathy among the Reformer's enemies, and striking down, if possible, the man who swayed the religi-

zens and burgesses, of the age of thirty years, and had its vacancies filled as soon as they amounted to fifty. The members held their office for life, unless they became bankrupt, or were degraded by a censure annually passed. This Council was the supreme court of justice, and exercised the pardoning power.

Thirdly.—The Council of Twenty-Five, or Little Council, was composed of members chosen from the Council of Two Hundred. In this body was vested the right to try all criminal cases; from whose decision an appeal might be taken to the Council of Two Hundred. It created burgesses; and from it the syndics or magistrates were annually chosen. The government had no criminal code; and hence the verdicts of the Council must be arbitrary.

* Geroult was one of the Libertine party of Geneva, and had been expelled the city two years before.

ous interests of Geneva. For this end he desired of the court the privilege of a public disputation on some of the points in the charge,—one of which was, that infant baptism was a diabolical invention,—and which he acknowledged and offered to defend before a full congregation. The challenge Calvin would not decline, because it was in debate that he was mighty indeed. And he declared, that “there was nothing that he more desired than to plead such a cause in the temple before all the people.” But the Council, from different motives, declined granting the request. The harsh declaration of Servetus on the baptism of infants operated unfavourably for him on the minds of the Council, as it associated him with the lawless principles of the Anabaptists. And his admissions went so far to the establishment of his guilt, that the Council released Fontaine from prison, under bail to attend to the prosecution of the case whenever his presence might be needed.

The meeting of the Council on the following day was marked by the presence of two additional members, ranging themselves on different sides. The one was P. Berthelier, whom we have already mentioned as one of the most violent enemies of Calvin and his rigorous discipline, and on whom the sword of ecclesiastical power had fallen. The object of his presence in the court was soon made obvious. The other character was Germain Colladon, an Israelite indeed, and a friend in whom Calvin and true religion might confide. He appeared, as is supposed, at the request of Calvin, in order to assist Fontaine in the prosecution of the case; and being an able lawyer, and from principle deeply interested, the cause could not have been placed in better hands. The result of the collision of two such antagonists was such as might be expected. A stormy debate ensued, in which Calvin was more prominently the object of attack on the one hand, and defence on the other, than the prisoner at the bar; and the court adjourned, after a short session, without advancing one step in the process. The momentous events of that day called out the Reformer himself. The hour had arrived when he deemed it necessary for him to appear in person. The attack commenced by Servetus, had been followed up by one of his most powerful advocates; and the gauntlet thus boldly thrown down was as readily taken up, by one who was in all respects the most able to wield it. And the following day, when the court resumed its sessions, the two antagonists met face to face for the first time. Here a number of errors charged against the prisoner were proved by reference to his printed works, indisputably settling his guilt, as “a sower of great heresies,” in the minds of the judges. At this meeting were fully brought out, for the first time, the anti-Trinitarian, rationalistic, and pantheistic

principles of the accused. Here he avowed that none of the Christian fathers, before the Council of Nice, had ever used the word *Trinity*; called Trinitarians "Atheists;" and admitted that he had used the blasphemous metaphor of "Cerberus" and "three-headed monster" in reference to the three persons of the Godhead. And on this occasion, in reply to Calvin, he declared his belief that the bench and buffet, and even the devil, and all things else, were part and parcel of God.*

But the heretic learned, to his sorrow, that in this meeting he had presumed too far on the supposed sympathy of his friends in the Council. His shocking blasphemies were unfavourably received; and when this "first act of the trial ended," that day the court decided to liberate both Fontaine and his surety, "finding, by the proofs and facts produced on the part of the pursuers, that Servetus clearly appeared to be guilty."

The next sitting of the Council, on the 21st of August, clothed with a new aspect the now solemn affair in which it was engaged. In the process of inquiry, testimony was elicited sufficient to render the prisoner, in the minds of the members, a dangerous person, both to the church and the state. His case became less a theological battle with Calvin, than a war waged against religion and liberty. And on that day the following was adopted as the opinion of the court:—"Inasmuch as the case of heresy of M. Servetus vitally affects the welfare of Christendom, it is resolved to proceed with his trial; and also to write to Vienne to know why he was imprisoned, and how he had escaped; and after that, when all is ascertained, to write to the magistracy of Berne, of Bâle, of Zurich, of Schaffhausen, and other churches of the Swiss, to acquaint them with the whole." Thus, at this early stage of the proceedings, we perceive that the Council resolved to act independently of Calvin, and also not to rest the responsibility of their verdict on themselves alone; but consult, with due deference, the magistrates and churches of the other Swiss cantons. Rilliet tells us at the very outset, that Servetus was "condemned by Protestant magistrates,"* and not by Calvin or his influence. Calvin was now set aside; the Council undertook the case on their own account; and the attorney-general, Claude Rigot, became the prosecutor in the name of the state. Calvin and the other ministers were introduced "in order to maintain, according to the *proces verbal*, the meaning opposed to that which Servetus had attached to the authors." And in the next meeting of the Council, the Reformer showed that Servetus had incorrectly interpreted the writings of the fathers in their

* Rilliet, p. 119.

† Ibid, p. 62.

use of the word *Trinity*, and quoted Justin Martyr to prove the use of the term anterior to the Council of Nice. Some discussion followed on the use of the title, *Son of God*; after which the court adjourned, Calvin allowing the prisoner the use of some of his own books, and the Council granting him the privilege of purchasing others necessary for the preparation of his defence. His request for paper was limited to a single sheet, for the obvious purpose of preventing his communicating with those outside the prison, as it was known he had friends in the city; and the jailer was ordered to keep him close.

At the same time, the Council carried out their design of writing to the judges at Vienne, to obtain the particulars of the charges which led to his trial at that place; a copy of which letter, in obsolete French, is given by our author. Simultaneously with this movement, there was another executed on the part of the state, which demands special attention. The attorney-general, laying aside the articles of Fontaine, containing the charges of heresy, now framed a new bill of indictment, embracing counts of an almost entirely political complexion. These referred to the prisoner's "previous history,—his connection with other theologians,—the printing of his book, and the fatal consequences that must follow its publication; and, finally, to his object in coming to Geneva, and his connections in that city."

"The details concerning his doctrines had disappeared; theological prosecution gave place to a trial, whose tendency bore less on the actual heresy of the accused, than on the dangerous results of his opinions, and of his persisting in spreading them." "Calvin disappeared before the general interests of the Reformed Churches." "In the public prosecution and condemnation of Servetus, no account was taken of his altercations with the Reformer,—the position of the latter had changed too much for any offence against him to be reckoned a crime. If Servetus had had, in the eyes of Genevese justice, no other fault than that of which De la Fontaine declared him guilty in regard to Calvin, his acquittal had been certain. The Reformer is no longer confounded with the Reformation; and if he alone had been concerned in the affair of Servetus, all his efforts would have been unavailing to secure the condemnation of his adversary." Servetus was "condemned by the majority of his judges, not at all as the opponent of Calvin—SCARCELY AS AN HERETIC—BUT ESSENTIALLY AS SEDITIOUS. POLITICS ACTED A MUCH MORE IMPORTANT PART THAN THEOLOGY TOWARDS THE CLOSE OF HIS TRIAL—THEY CAME ON THE STAGE WITH THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL."*

"These are the sentiments," says the translator, "of one

* Rilliet, pp. 130, 131.

who has thoroughly examined the documentary and historical evidence in this melancholy affair." Calvin was, in fact, no party to the trial in its closing and more painful stages. The charges preferred by Rigot, viewed the prisoner, not in the light of a teacher of religious error, but as a dangerous and fiery spirit, whose constant endeavours had tended to the entire disorganizing of Christendom.* Except so far as religion was inseparably blended with the interests of the state, Servetus was tried exclusively as a political offender. In all governments where religion is established by law, it is impossible wholly to act in reference to the one without trenching on the prerogatives of the other. Such was the state of affairs in Geneva at this transition period, that the impious errors and blasphemies of Servetus,—but little better than the most revolting forms of infidelity,—could not be viewed in any other light than as seditious and revolutionary. His unsparing vituperations against the leading Reformers, and his low, degrading views of the Godhead, and other errors, were eminently adapted to inspire the minds of men with a contempt and disbelief in all religion, and give a loose rein to all the more furious passions of their natures. To cast into contempt the religion of the Reformation, was to revolutionise the state. And though Servetus may have disavowed such intention, the dangerous results of the success of his system of faith were clearly foreseen by the Genevese judges. To overthrow and supplant Calvinism, though many of them did not *ex animo* embrace it, they knew would be to superinduce a train of disasters, such as had followed the exile of the Reformer seventeen years before. Cardinal Sadolet had then endeavoured to bring Geneva back to the bosom of holy mother; and the effort might be repeated. Faction and murder had reigned in the city in the absence of one pure spirit; and the same bloody scenes might be re-enacted under the change that threatened them. Wicked men will endure some of the restraints which religion imposes, if it but secures to them temporal prosperity and safety. Viewing it as an old soldiery or a standing army, they will willingly be taxed for its support, while in their hearts they like it not.

These were undoubtedly the principles which prevailed in the Little Council of Geneva in 1553. A majority of that body were hostile to the Calvinistic faith;† yet they remembered the scenes of 1537 and 1538, and they were unwilling

* Musculus said, in a letter to Bullinger, that Servetus was only wishing to make use of the bad feelings of some great men at Geneva against Calvin, in order to obtain a position whence he might be able to agitate other churches.—(Henry, vol. ii. p. 193.)

† We wish Anti-Calvinists of every shade of opinion would ponder the question, "Who burned Servetus?" Ans. Anti-Calvinists.

to plunge the republic again into a sea of troubles. Napoleon once said, that if left to choose between the tyranny of the Bourbons and the bloody reign of Jacobinism, he would infinitely prefer the former. So thought men two centuries and a half before. And though the counts in Rigot's indictment may have borne on their face that which seemed to savour of the *odium theologicum*, it is manifest that the court looked beyond this to results of a political character. They lost sight of the one, except so far as it was complicated with the other. Citations from the fathers and the inspired writers, by Calvin and the other divines, were *tolerated*, and even called for; but with the prominent design of thwarting in theological combat one whom they viewed as an enemy of their temporal peace. His defeat in the one field they desired to be the end of his career in the other. His design in visiting Geneva was scrutinised with a careful eye; his repeated prevarications of the truth had lost for him the confidence of the judges; and official news from the late scene of his perils, Vienne, was soon to render the cause of Servetus disastrous indeed. That the prisoner himself viewed his trial as a civil rather than a religious one, is evident from his appeals to the magistrates in their official capacity.

During this time, the friends of Servetus in the city were not idle in exciting public sympathy in his favour. And Calvin, on the other hand, nerved all the powers of his Herculean mind to rebuke and denounce the errors of the heretic from the pulpit, to prevent the people being drawn by a false commiseration to favour his cause.

On the 31st of August, the Council received from the court of Vienne a reply to their communication of the 22d. The papers which they requested from Vienne were not granted, because trial had been had and sentence passed; and it was deemed derogatory to the honour of the French judiciary to recognise the necessity of another process. The officials at Vienne, however, sent a copy of the sentence of death, pronounced against Servetus in his absence. And to strengthen the position they had assumed, they made a formal demand for the rendition of the prisoner, that the penalty might be duly executed on him, "in such a way that there would be no need to seek other charges against him." Thus there was a convenient way opened to the Council to rid themselves of their prisoner, without imbruing their hands in his blood. The Viennese claimed it as *their right*, to kindle the flames of retribution around the heretic.

But the Genevese refused to comply with the request, for the reason that they felt themselves capable of doing justice to the cause of truth, as well as their Romanist neighbours.

It was also contrary to their ancient usages, to deliver up prisoners whom they had arrested; but they were required to prosecute their cases to their termination.

Whether this course was the best or not, it is certain that it was the one preferred by Servetus. When he was confronted by his former jailer at Vienne, and asked whether he preferred to remain and stand his trial in Geneva, or return with those who had come to demand him, he threw himself on the ground weeping, and implored the privilege of being tried where he was. In Geneva, there was yet hope; in Vienne, the pile was, as it were, reared to consume him to ashes.

The Attorney-General had closed the prosecution, and nothing seemed now necessary but for the Council to render their verdict. But at this point in the proceedings it was determined, whether at the instance of Calvin or his antagonist is not certain, to grant Servetus another hearing in a written discussion with Calvin, on the theological points at issue. This was doubtless a decided advantage to the accused, as it gave him and his friends time for manœuvring, and complicated the affairs of Calvin. Calvin was to extract the exceptionable passages, verbatim, from Servetus' book, and the accused was allowed to reply at length, that the whole discussion might be intelligible to the Swiss churches. Calvin, in his turn, was to reply.

At this juncture occurred the fearful contest, on the subject of excommunication, to which reference has already been made. In this struggle for the truth, we see the soul of that mighty man amplify its powers to the full extent of the difficulties with which he was called to grapple. In no instance, in the whole of his mortal career, did he present so glorious a picture of the sublime, as when, battling on the one hand with an insidious foe from abroad, he was called to encounter the determined opposition of the very court on which he was dependent for a favourable decision. To maintain his principles, he ran the imminent risk of prejudicing the Council against him, and causing them to find in favour of Servetus. But he was inflexible, because he knew no course but that which the glory of God dictated.

On the 1st of September, P. Berthelier petitioned the Council to cancel the sentence of the Consistory, and admit him to the Lord's table; and his petition was favourably answered. The result has been given. But on the same day on which Calvin was thus defeated, he was called to enter the lists with Servetus, now flushed with the most brilliant hopes of success, supported by the presence of his friends, Perrin and Berthelier, both in the Council. Servetus did not fail to take advantage

of this circumstance. He felt now well-nigh certain of victory, and, as was his wont,—humble when his party seemed weak, and bold and defiant as they appeared strong,—he avowed his design to pursue his opponent, “till the cause be terminated by the death of him or me.” But the Reformer was equal to the emergency, and the Spaniard gained nothing by the contest. He grappled with two adversaries at once,—the Council and Berthelier in the pulpit, and with Servetus’ replies in the written debate which followed. This discussion was characterised by great asperity and invective on the part of Servetus, who believed himself on the eve of a triumph; and severity was not wanting in the replications of the Reformer. At length the contest ended, and the articles extracted from the books of Servetus, his vindication, and Calvin’s refutation, were presented to the Council, on the 5th of September, in order that they might be presented to the Swiss churches. Calvin had opposed this reference, while Servetus desired it; and the wish of the latter was ultimately granted, after a delay of two weeks. But, pending this delay, Servetus, probably at the suggestion of friends in the city, claimed the assistance of an advocate, and the reference of his case to the Council of Two Hundred, to which he appealed, in hope of finding in a more popular body a decision favourable to himself. The Council decided to grant neither request. And as the trial had now been protracted for a month,—the longest period allowed by the criminal edicts,—it was brought to a close, preparatory to referring the case to the Swiss churches for their decision.

During the interval that elapsed between the reference to the Swiss churches and the reception of their answers, Servetus was tossed between alternate hopes and fears as to the result. For a time, he felt sure of being acquitted. It was known that both Berne and Bâle were not on the best terms with Calvin, and it was hoped that Zuingli might influence Zurich to favour toleration. Inflated with such prospects, Servetus even proceeded to institute an action against Calvin, asking the Council to put him on trial, professing himself willing to die if he failed in convicting his enemy. A little while before, he had contested the jurisdiction of the civil court in cases of heresy (like his own), but now it seems eminently proper that this same body should sit on the case of his rival, on precisely similar charges! This ebullition of passion closed with a tissue of invective against Calvin, styling him a magician, deserving to be condemned, exterminated, and hunted from the city. Servetus here avows the common opinion of the age, that it was right to put men to death for their opinions.

The reference of the case to the Swiss churches consumed nearly a month, and on the 18th October an answer was returned. These churches were unanimous in their judgment of the guilt of Servetus. Berne, to which the case was first presented, replied, "We pray the Lord that he may give you a spirit of prudence, and counsel, and strength, that you may put your own and other churches beyond the reach of this pest." This same church had, two years before, counselled moderation in the case of Jerome Bolsec, who had been arraigned for his attack on predestination. A different decision, in the present instance, obviously arose from the fact, that Berne made a wide difference between the nature of the offences, and the individual offenders. The heresy of Bolsec was not of so grave a character as to call for the intervention of the civil power; that of Servetus struck at the foundation of all religion, and the civil institutions based upon it.

The church of Zurich, after complimenting the faith and zeal of Calvin, said, "But the holy providence of God offers to you, at this hour, an opportunity of freeing yourselves and us from that injurious suspicion, if you know how to be vigilant and active in preventing the farther spreading of that poison. We do not doubt but that your lordships will act thus."

The church of Schaffhausen expressed itself thus: "We do not question but that you will repress the attempts of Servetus, according to your praiseworthy prudence, in order that his blasphemies may not waste, like a gangrene, the members of Christ; for, to engage in long reasonings to overthrow his errors, would be to go mad with a fool."

The church of Bâle, after exhorting the Council to endeavour to reclaim Servetus, concluded thus: "But if he show himself to be incurably wedded to his perverse opinions, check him according to your office, and the power which you hold from God, so that he may never more be able to trouble the Church of Christ, and that the end may not be worse than the beginning."

The governments of Berne and Zurich contributed their influence to that of the churches, urging the Council of Geneva not to suffer so gross an offender to escape; and Haller, the pastor of Berne, wrote to Bullinger, that so intense was the feeling against Servetus there, that, if he had fallen into the hands of the Bernese magistrates, they would have committed him to the flames. "The Council of Geneva," says Rilliet, "had still too much the habit of yielding to that of Berne, to refuse a sentence which they prompted, though it was more with a view to their government, and as a matter of policy, than from purely theological motives."—(P. 198.)

On the reception of these opinions, the Council met on the 26th October, to act definitively on the case. Perrin presided, and made a last and powerful effort in favour of the prisoner; first proposing his entire acquittal,—which would have been equivalent to the exile of Calvin, and which the syndic but too earnestly desired; and then moving the reference of the case to the Council of Two Hundred for a final decision. In both propositions he was baffled.

In this meeting of the Council there were twenty members present, only seven of whom were decided Calvinists. But of the other party, only five, including Perrin, could be induced to sustain Servetus. Those very same persons who now cast their votes against him one month afterwards, took as firm a stand against Calvin on the subject of excommunication. The solemn verdict was finally rendered, and the prisoner was sentenced to be led to the heights of Champel, outside the city, and burned alive, and his books with him. And on the following day, in full view of the beautiful waters of Lemman, and the stupendous ramparts of the Jura, this melancholy *auto da fe* of Protestant Geneva was duly executed. Farel was present, having come at the urgent solicitation of Calvin, and attended the prisoner to the place of execution, exhorting him to the last to renounce his errors and save his life.

And now, in conclusion, who was the murderer of Servetus? For, viewing the case as exclusively a religious one, as has generally been done—a trial for heresy—in the light of the nineteenth century, we can hardly characterise it by a milder term. Our proposition, which we now state, and to which we have constantly looked, is, that IT WAS NOT CALVIN. The outline of the whole proceeding we have endeavoured faithfully to give; and a minute examination of the evidence before us, drawn from the registers of the court, justifies us, we think, in taking this stand in favour of the Reformer.

First. The court which issued the case was a civil, and not an ecclesiastical tribunal. Had it been the Consistory instead of the Little Council of Geneva, the agency of Calvin would have appeared in a very different light. But it was not the court of Jesus Christ that returned the verdict, and then delivered the prisoner over to Cæsar to execute the sentence. Calvin was not a member of the council, and was even excluded from political rights with the other clergy, by being denied a seat in the "Council-General." Moreover, Servetus was not condemned by Calvin's adherents in the "Little Council," because they were a small minority, and wholly unable to control the decision of the body.

Secondly. It was not on the ground of heresy mainly that

Servetus was condemned. And we sustain this conclusion by still further reference to the testimony of an unprejudiced witness, who has carefully examined the authentic documents, the records of the court, and a vast amount of historical evidence beside: "The heresy of Servetus had assumed, in the eyes of the Council of Geneva, the two-fold character of blasphemy and sedition. It was at once the outraged honour of God and the peace of society that they believed themselves to be defending, while they punished him. The intimate union that existed in the state between religion and politics, led men to regard in the same light errors which assailed the former, and deeds which violated the principles of the latter. In both, men saw a revolt against the established constitution, and by consequence a crime. The purely theological quarrel had disappeared before this motive for condemnation; and the judicial sentence, in the list of charges brought against Servetus, does not mention at all either the attacks against Calvin or those against the ministers of Geneva." "The magistracy being once thoroughly convinced, by the unprejudiced advice of the Helvetic churches, that the opinions of Servetus implied something more than a mere dissent from Calvin, and that they were most certainly pernicious to religion; the principles of public order, as then understood, did not permit them longer to hesitate as to whether or not they should see in them the crime of treason against society." They forgot "the theologian, to think only of the criminal."* The majority of the Council, as we have seen, were not of Calvin's faith; and even the majority of those who voted the prisoner guilty belonged to the opposite party. Anti-Calvinists burned Servetus.

Thirdly. It was not Calvin's personal influence that caused the Council to render a verdict of guilty, and especially the punishment of the stake. The old ordinances of the emperors, particularly of Frederic II., were still in force in Geneva; according to which, heretics were placed in the same rank, with regard to guilt and punishment, as traitors.† During the whole process, Calvin was used more as an instrument to sustain preconceived opinions, than as an adviser or counsellor. His gigantic mind and vast learning the Council found necessary to press into service, to combat the subtle reasonings of Servetus. At that very time they set him at nought, even at the expense of violating the edicts of Geneva, by wresting from the Consistory the right of excommunication. And from the day of the arrest to the final action of the court, Calvin did not know whether the case would terminate in his own death or exile, or in that of his enemy.

* Rilliet, pp. 204, 205.

† Henry, vol. ii. p. 194.

Geneva had no criminal code, and the decisions of her courts were consequently arbitrary, being regulated by the general sentiments of other nations; and when Servetus was arrested, not only the finding of the court was uncertain, but even the penalty, in the event of his being declared guilty. * Had the Reformer been the blood-thirsty monster that some have represented him, and had he possessed a controlling influence over the Council, the necessity of a reference to the Swiss churches would have been obviated. The responsibility would have been thrown upon him, and the conscientious scruples of the members set at rest.

Fourthly. It will be said, that though the court was a civil tribunal, the case a trial for sedition, and Calvin's influence did not procure the verdict,—still Calvin, like Saul of Tarsus, “was consenting unto his death.” The truth of this we freely admit. But are we to hold one man up as a solitary example of an erroneous belief long since exploded? This were in the highest degree invidious. And it were, moreover, to do what too many of Calvin's enemies condemn *him* for doing. It were, if not to lead him to the stake, to load his memory with infamy, *not for the overt act of persecution, but for the exercise of an opinion.* One of the most recent attacks on Calvin's memory, is by a man† who cherishes the dogma that man is not responsible for his belief. As an *argumentum ad hominem*, we must be allowed the privilege of exculpating Calvin for his belief that heretics might be lawfully punished by the sword. But did he stand alone in this belief in the middle of the sixteenth century? Had this been so,—had Romanists and Reformed, the Christian world generally, avowed the doctrine of free toleration and the rights of conscience,—then might the Reformer at Geneva been held up to the reprobation of the whole church. But to condemn Calvin for this opinion, is to take dangerous ground, both for Papists and Protestants. We have seen what Romanists did, and what they desired still further to do at Vienne; and we are not ignorant of what they have done in other ages and in other places. And we know what many Protestants have done, under the enjoyment of far greater light than shone on the world in Calvin's time. When Cornwallis was fighting the battle of Guilford, and the veterans of Old England were giving way before the bayonets of the “Maryland Line,” his lordship ordered his artillery to load with grape, and fire on the contending masses, sweeping down friend and foe by the murderous storm. To reach his enemies, he fired through his own lines. In like manner, theological disputants of different shades of belief, who think it incumbent on them to regard Calvin as the implacable per-

* *Vide* Reate, pp. 82, 85.

† Lord Brougham.

secutor of Servetus, are liable to be swept down by the discharges of their own artillery. Let it be established as a settled opinion that an indelible stain attaches to all those, who, for the last thousand years, conscientiously believed in the punishment of heresy by the civil arm, and "who can be saved?" Rome and Reformation, Calvinist and Arminian, Socinian and Trinitarian, will fall under one common anathema. This indiscriminating artillery will sweep down for the Romanists, Cardinal Tournon, Inquisitor Ory, and the other functionaries at Vienne, and all other inquisitors since the days of St Dominic. It will lay under the same condemnation, almost without exception, the leading Reformers of Germany and the Swiss Cantons. They thought, "that of all crimes, the most atrocious is the spiritual murder of souls; while vengeance should not be left to God, since that would be, by postponing the punishment, to increase and prolong the influence of evil."* The impetuous Farel, and the benevolent Bullinger, both went further in the affair of Servetus than Calvin did. The latter opposed with all his might the punishment by fire, and pled for the substitution of the sword: the former were of one mind with the council. "It is to him (Calvin) notwithstanding, that men have always imputed the guilt of that funeral pile, which he wished had never been reared."† The amiable Melancthon said, "that the magistrates of Geneva did well to burn the heretic."‡ The Arminian, Bolsec, who had been expelled from Geneva for his attack on the doctrine of predestination, holds this language regarding Servetus: "That he felt no displeasure at the death of so obstinate and monstrous an heretic, for he was utterly vile and unworthy of the society of men; and I would wish that all who aid him were exterminated, and the church of our Lord well purified from such vermin."|| And, as we have seen, Servetus himself avowed the same sentiments only a few days before his sentence was known.

Such indeed were the doctrines of all Christendom at that time, and not particularly of any man or class of men. And we are struck with the coincidence of the remarks of our Swiss author with those of a distinguished Christian jurist and statesman of our own country, Mr Wirt, many years ago, that it was not Calvin, but the age in which he lived, that brought Servetus to the stake.

Montesquieu to some extent justifies the council of Geneva, two ages after the melancholy event. And we can never cast the veil of oblivion over the actions of men claiming the true apostolic succession more than a century after Calvin's death. The dragooning of Puritans and Covenanters may stand in

* Rilliet, p. 179.

† Ibid, p. 209.

‡ Ibid, p. 224.

|| Ibid, p. 173.

the same category with the doings of St Bartholomew's Day. The revolting cruelties inflicted by Laud on Leighton (the father of the archbishop), Prynne, Burton, and Bastwick, under the first Charles, alike with the missions of Claverhouse and Jeffries under the second, indicate that the doctrine was not obsolete then, and should seal the lips of many who esteem it God's service to hold the Genevese Reformer up as a monster to the world. How far the system of theology and ecclesiastical polity which have been embodied in his writings are really responsible for the odium entertained towards him, it would be well to inquire.

The estimation in which Calvin was held by the purest men who knew him personally, and those of succeeding ages, shows that he was not regarded as stained with innocent blood. The reformers on the Continent, both Lutheran and Swiss, the prelates of England, and the Presbyterians of Scotland, looked up to him as a guiding star in the galaxy of religious teachers. His correspondence shows that he kept the consciences of a large portion of Europe. Among his manuscripts is found a fasciculus with the title, "*Lettres par divers Rois, Princes, Seigneurs, et Dames, pour consulter sur les cas de conscience epineaux, ou pour le remercier de ses ouvrages.*" Kings, princes, lords, and ladies, consulted him on the most intricate and solemn questions connected with the piety of the heart. Archbishop Parker, in Elizabeth's name, thanked him for the part he bore in the Reformation in England. His correspondence with Cranmer, and the reference of the liturgy to him for correction, are facts too well known to be repeated. Knox testified that Geneva was "the most perfect school of Christ that ever was in the earth since the days of the apostles." Montesquieu's celebrated eulogium was, "The Genevese may bless the day that Calvin was born." Reate accords him the honour of founding a prosperous church in Geneva, and of having "a great share in forming its political as well as spiritual legislation." To quote the favourable opinions of the most distinguished divines of every age since Calvin's day would exceed our limits, and only repeat what has been often given to the public. His influence is now enjoyed by millions, who know him only in the character of a bigoted sectarian and persecutor. In the republic and in the church, which received their cast under his moulding hand, and in the educational systems which now prevail throughout Protestant Christendom, we recognise the agency of one whom God raised up to be a benefactor to his race, and to transmit a hallowing influence down to far-distant ages. A life of unremitted toil, self-denial, and suffering, which doubtless brought him prematurely to the grave,—a life into which is compressed the work

of ordinary minds for centuries,—a life devoted wholly to the prosperity of the church and the glory of God, should be sufficient to outweigh one erroneous opinion, which he held in common with all the world.

Viewing him in the light of a minister of the gospel, and devoted servant of the Most High, we cannot better characterise him, in closing our remarks, than in the words of his contemporary and friend, Alexander Morus :—"CHRISTUM PECTORE—CHRISTUM ORE—CHRISTUM OPERA SPIRAT."

ART. VIII.—*Essays on the Spirit of the Inductive Philosophy, the Unity of Worlds, and the Philosophy of Creation.* By the Rev. BADEN POWELL, M.A., F.R.S., &c. London: Longmans. 1855.

THIS is a remarkable work, on account both of its author and of the principles and opinions which it advocates. Mr Powell is no ordinary man; and the well-weighed expression of his views on any question of science is entitled to respectful consideration, and is fitted to exert no small influence on public opinion. He has long occupied the high position of Savilian Professor of Geometry at Oxford; he is widely and favourably known by his previous writings, which have gained for him a well-earned philosophical reputation; he is extensively and familiarly versant in many departments both of ancient and modern science; and his works are written in a style clear and popular, distinguished at once by freshness and vigour of thought, and by beauty and variety of scientific illustration. If wanting somewhat in the interest which a warmer and more impassioned temperament on the part of their author might have given to them, his writings possess the merit of bold and independent thought, of lucid argument enriched and illustrated from almost every field of recent scientific research, and of a remarkable facility of philosophical generalization, which, however dangerous it may be, unless when under the restraint of a severe logical method, serves to impart a peculiar charm to his reasonings, and to enlist on their behalf the sympathies of cultivated minds. In this respect there is very much in the volume before us calculated to interest and prepossess in its favour men of thinking minds and scientific tendencies. The publication of it is in some measure the result of the recent controversy which has interested and divided the philosophical world respecting the unity or plurality of inhabited planets. But the author takes

a much wider range of discussion than any called forth or suggested by such a question; and the principles he lays down, and the views he propounds, in regard to the general laws of nature and the philosophy of creation, will be accounted, both by men of science and theologians, as of more real interest and of greater importance than any bearing they may have on that somewhat ephemeral controversy. The existence of other worlds besides our own, the seats of life and intelligence similar to ours, is a question in regard to which the direct evidence is so scanty, and the analogies bearing upon it so remote and incomplete, that few scientific men will be brought to regard it as a part of "the creed of the philosopher," and still fewer religious men will be inclined to rest upon it as "the hope of the Christian." The interest recently excited by such a controversy, and the singular amount and combination of talent, and science, and zeal, which it enlisted in the discussion, only furnish an illustration of the fact, that the disputes of philosophers, like those of other men, are seldom proportioned in their noise and vehemence either to the practical value of the point in debate or to the certainty attainable in regard to it. But the value of Mr Powell's volume is not to be measured by that of the controversy which occasioned it. The subjects treated of, and the principles discussed in it, have in themselves a high interest and a permanent practical importance; they are more interesting and important still from the manner in which they are handled, and from the reputation which Mr Powell enjoys; and many of them have an intimate and very direct bearing on those truths which are commonly regarded as lying at the foundation of our religious beliefs.

The volume is made up of three separate essays, composed, we are told, at different times and with different objects in view. Nevertheless, there is an intimate connection between them, and some principles and ideas prominently advocated are more or less common to them all. It is not our intention to follow Mr Powell through the discussion of the many topics which he handles, always with ability, though not always, as we venture to think, with success. Our interest is rather drawn to those questions in which his science has a bearing upon Scripture truth, and where theology is more especially concerned.

We feel no great temptation, as we have hinted, to enter upon a consideration of the subject of the *second* of the essays contained in this volume, occupied as it is with the question of the unity or plurality of worlds. The controversy has been more than exhausted; and we pass on, with the single remark, that we think Mr Powell has not unfairly held the balance

between the distinguished combatants in a debate in which not a little of exaggerated statement, and of ingenious though unsatisfactory special pleading on both sides, has been employed. The *first* essay is mainly devoted to an examination of the primary grounds of inductive reasoning, and may be regarded as supplementary to Mr Powell's former work on the "Connection of Natural and Divine Truth." In the course of it he has occasion to deal with several topics which have of late years excited considerable interest and discussion both among men of science and theologians, and which bear very directly upon the evidence and certainty both of inductive philosophy in general and of natural theology in particular. We have long regarded the principles explained and illustrated by Mr Powell in his volume devoted to the connection of natural and revealed truth as the foundation on which natural theology as a science rests,—common as these principles are to natural theology and to all inductive truth, of whatever kind it may be. It is no small service done to natural theology to vindicate for it a footing upon the very same ground upon which other sciences, the most sure and the most surely believed, are seen to rest, and to rescue it from the hands of those who would make it appeal for its evidence and certainty to mere fancy or feeling. This service to the cause, Mr Powell, following in the footsteps of our soundest philosophers as well as divines, has ably rendered in the former volume; and he has pursued the same track in the first of the essays before us by a restatement of the case, and by a fuller discussion of those principles of evidence and grounds of argument on which natural theology, in common with all inductive science, must be based. Many of these topics, it must be evident, are open to debate; but there is much, we believe, in the general principles which he has advocated that is valuable and sound.

There is one point, in particular, in connection with the argument from design in the arrangement of nature, which he has brought out in a highly interesting manner, and to which recent advances of science and speculation have given considerable prominence. There can be no doubt that the general method of dealing with the subject of final causes commonly pursued by theologians of the Paley school, has done considerable injustice to the argument, by unduly and unwisely narrowing its range and application. The argument has been too much restricted to instances of arrangement and order in nature, in which an obvious end is served and a purpose seen to be accomplished through the means employed, leaving out of view those manifold cases in which the arrangement and order are equally manifest, but in which the end and purpose are unknown. Order and arrangement wherever found, har-

mony, symmetry, and unity of plan wherever seen, are evidences of mind, whether or not we see them to be connected with a useful or advantageous end to be wrought out, and whether or not, indeed, they are so connected. Interpreting the cases of arrangement, where such end is unknown, by those cases in which it is known, we may perhaps have been too prone to conclude that in all cases some useful end, apart from the arrangement itself, is always and invariably contemplated; and hence, probably, the common tendency among theologians of an older school to limit their consideration, when dealing with the argument from final causes, to those instances in which design as well as arrangement is seen, and a manifest end to be gained, in addition to a manifest order, is acknowledged. And yet, perhaps, if we may argue as to the mind of God from what we are conscious of in our own, made originally in his image, it may be a truer view of the matter to say that the arrangement and order are themselves sometimes the great end contemplated; and that, apart altogether from any useful or beneficent purpose to be accomplished, the unity of plan and symmetry of parts which we see so often in nature, when no adaptation of means to ends can be traced, are themselves good and pleasing to the Divine Mind. If this be the juster, as it is, we think, the higher view of the case, then that unity of composition and harmony of arrangement which so extensively prevail in nature, even in cases where no purpose beyond unity and harmony realised can be discovered, or where the purpose that *seems* to be contemplated remains abortive and unfulfilled, must be due to the unity and harmony of the Divine Mind itself, which in its manifold operations finds an end good and sufficient to satisfy it in impressing upon the universe a counterpart of its own perfections. But whatever explanation be given of the matter, there can be no doubt that order, and symmetry, and unity, wherever manifested, are the fruit of intelligence and mind, and that in narrowing the argument, as has too commonly been done, to those examples in which a useful end, apart from those, could be ascertained and demonstrated, theologians have done great injustice to the evidence of natural theology for a God. Recent discoveries in science, more especially in the department of physiology, have served to draw the very special attention of thinking men to the great law of unity of composition in nature, apart altogether from and beyond the manifest design which may or may not be connected with it. The researches of Professor Owen, in particular, have opened up new views in regard to the homologies of organic life, strikingly contrasted as these often are with the presence of organs whose functions and use are abortive and unfulfilled,—the unity of general plan being appa-

rently the higher and ruling principle of nature to be ever adhered to, and the special end being only the lower and subordinate principle, which may be overlooked or departed from. There cannot be a doubt that the bearing of such investigations on natural theology has been most beneficial in the way of opening up a wider and more enlarged recognition of mind as manifested in the order of nature, and of furnishing a broader foundation for its arguments in favour of the being of a God. We have pleasure in giving an extract or two from Mr Powell on this subject:—

“The old and limited view of final causes will not meet the increasing demands of scientific enlightenment; it will not suffice now to argue solely on the adaptation of means to a known purpose, or a practical design evinced, and an obvious end answered. If we cannot discard the term, we must enlarge its meaning. We may speak of ‘design’ with reference solely to ‘order’ and ‘arrangement,’ without looking to the idea of *practical* utility. Such modes of expression are far preferable as not leading the mind to any undue expectation of what it will not realise. Thus, in reference to physiology, the higher argument acquires an expansion in proportion to the progress of the science. We obtain more enlarged ideas of *design* as we advance from the more confined views of the older schools towards the wider principle of *symmetry and unity of composition*. So that *final causes*, properly understood, so far from receding (as some pretend) before the advance of modern science in the wider and more philosophic sense, eminently derive increasing evidence from its progress. The study of the higher principle of symmetry and unity of composition can in no way prejudice that of *adaptation*; the latter being but a part of the same great argument. Nor is it just to accuse those of the modern school who are engaged, as their special and legitimate objects, in investigating the former, of undervaluing the latter.”

“Professor Owen has justly observed, that the two principles of ‘unity of plan’ and ‘final causes’ are wrongly regarded as antithetical; and on general grounds it must be apparent that these two principles can hardly with propriety be put in opposition to each other, or even be classed together: the latter is in its nature a more particular and restricted kind of *practical* view of the matter, doubtless of some value in particular cases; while the former is of a comprehensive speculative character, fitted to form the foundation of a philosophical system; which the other never can be, as Bacon has so forcibly pointed out. If more particular arguments were wanted, he has shown precisely from instances that the mere investigation of the *uses* of organs continually finds a check in the observation of many cases where organs are introduced whose function or purpose is not fulfilled; and the more anatomical investigation has extended its bounds, the more clearly have such proofs been displayed, evincing that this principle is an insufficient guide. Thus the complex form of a limb, as to number and relative position of the bones, required by the law of conformity to the type, is strictly preserved in cases where it is not needed; as is seen in comparing the expanded human hand, where every

finger is essential, with the 'trowel' of the mole, the 'paddle' of the whale, or 'hoof' of the elephant, where every bone is equally present, but all enclosed in one case. So, again, the abortive teeth of the young whale are of no use except to prove its relationship with terrestrial mammalia. Unity of plan is adhered to in other cases, where only one or two parts are developed, and the rest are merely rudimentary or even altogether deficient, but no new part or formation is added. Nothing is made in vain, if it be only made to preserve unity of system. The view of design has been contracted by the adoption of the false analogy of machines, in which unity of plan is not an object. The attainment of an end by apparently circuitous means, for the sake of obedience to the law of unity, is, in fact, the highest indication of design; special adaptation is but a secondary branch of such evidence; and it is only more striking when brought about in conformity with this higher and governing principle of all animated nature."*

As might be expected from the strain of such remarks, Mr Powell has no sympathy with those objections which have become fashionable in certain quarters against the validity and soundness of the old and well-established argument from design to a designer, although seeking to extend its range and application. Speaking of these objections, he says:—

"But the great argument which we have been considering, it is said, is not one *merely* of design, but must rise *from design to a designer*. And here it is that some objections have arisen. On the one hand, it is alleged that the argument is insufficient; and, on the other, that it proves too much, and tends to identify nature with the Deity. But both objections seem to me equally traceable to the same primary confusion of ideas as to the real nature of the inductive inferences, and of the obvious distinction between moral and physical causation. This confusion of ideas pervades the remarks of many otherwise able writers. Thus Coleridge observes, 'All the so-called demonstrations of a God either prove too little, as that from the order and apparent purpose in nature, or too much, namely, that the world is itself God; or they clandestinely involve the conclusion in the premises, as in the postulate of a First Cause.' Natural theology confessedly 'proves too little,' because it cannot rise to the metaphysical idea or scriptural representation of God. These stand on quite distinct authority. But 'the postulate of a First Cause' is a notion wholly arising from the confusion of ideas just referred to. The common objection to the argument from design to a designer appears to be of this kind. It is alleged that, to take Paley's well-known instance of the watch, we make our inference directly of a watchmaker from obvious comparison with known human works. Even when a person should for the first time witness some work far transcending his own power or knowledge, or any thing previously heard of, still he would perceive the analogy with the more ordinary productions of human skill, differing only in *degree*, and would infer a contriver and an artist

* We would commend to the attention of our readers, in connection with this subject, the valuable work of Dr McCosh and Professor Dickie, "Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation."

of faculties far higher, but still similar to his own. But the works of nature, it is said, differ from these *in kind*; they are unlike any of our works, and suggest no such analogy of an artificer resembling a human artificer, or differing merely in the extent and degree of his skill. In those cases most nearly approaching the nature of human works, such as the varied and endless changes in matter going on in the *laboratory of nature*, the results, even when most analogous to those obtained in human laboratories, yet present no marks of the process or of the means employed, by which to recognise the analogous workman; and in all the grander productions, the incessant evolutions of vegetable and animal life, which no human laboratory can produce, in the structure of earth and ocean, or the infinite expanse of the heavens and their transcendent mechanism, still further must we be from finding any analogy to the works of man, or by consequence any analogy to a personal individual artificer. But the more just view of the case is that which arises from the consideration that the real evidence is that of *mind* and *intelligence*: for here we have a proper and strict analogy. *Mind* directing the operations of the laboratory or the workshop is no part of the *visible apparatus*, nor are its operations seen in *themselves*—they are visible only in their *effects*;—and from effects, however dissimilar in magnitude or in kind, yet agreeing in the one grand condition of order, adjustment, profound and recondite connection and dependence, there is the same evidence and outward manifestation of *invisible intelligence*, as vast and illimitable as the world wherein those manifestations are seen. It is by *analogy* with the exercise of intellect, and the volition or power of moral causation, of which we are conscious within ourselves, that we speak of the *Supreme Mind* and *Moral Cause* of the universe, of whose operation, order, arrangement, and adaptation are the external manifestations. *Order* implies what by *analogy* we call *intelligence*; subserviency to an observed end implies intelligence *foreseeing*, which by analogy we call *design*.

“Again: nothing but the common confused and mistaken notions as to laws and causes could give any colour to the assertion that ‘the argument proves too much;’ that physical speculations tend to substitute general physical laws in the place of the Deity; and that scientific statements of the conclusions of Natural Theology are nothing but ill-disguised Pantheism. The utter futility of such inferences are at once seen, when the smallest attention is given to the plain distinctions above laid down between ‘moral’ and ‘physical’ causation; and to the proper force of the conclusions from natural science establishing the former by means of the latter. This distinction obviously points to the *very reverse* of the assertion that physical action is identical with its moral cause; the essential difference and contrast between them is the very point which the whole argument upholds and enforces. So utterly preposterous, indeed, is the whole idea of Pantheism that the profession of it, if sincere, can but be a mystical fancy of the most perplexed and unintelligible nature, and involving moral contradictions of the grossest kind; at all events, widely alien from any legitimate conclusions of physical science or philosophical speculations based on sound views of causation.

“The whole tenor of the preceding argument is directed to show

that the inference and assertion of a *Supreme Moral Cause*, distinct from and above nature, results immediately from the recognition of the eternal and universal maintenance of the order of physical causes, which are its essential external manifestations. Of the mode of action or operation by which the Supreme Moral Cause influences the universal order of physical causes, we confess our utter ignorance. But the evidence of such operation, where nature exists, can never be lost or interrupted. And in proportion as our more extended researches exhibit these indications more fully and more gloriously displayed, we cannot but believe that our contemplations are more nearly and truly approaching their *source*."

Much of this is in substance the very reasoning of Chalmers, in his "Natural Theology," in answer to Hume. But we rejoice to see it sanctioned by the authority of Mr Powell, and directed effectively against the objections to the argument from design so prevalent in the present day, amid those schools of modern theology that would deny the natural evidence for the being and perfections of God, and would seek to rest the certainty of these truths either upon a mere subjective faith or an outward ecclesiastical authority.

But while thus gratefully acknowledging the value and importance of the contributions made by Mr Powell to the cause of natural theology, more especially in the first of his three essays, we regret that our commendation must here stop. The *third* of the essays which make up this volume, under the title of the "Philosophy of Creation," is wholly devoted to a consideration of what is commonly known as the "*doctrine of development*," and to the illustration of the general grounds and principles of that system; while not a little even of what is found in the two previous essays has a pretty direct bearing on the same question, and looks very like as if it were intended rather to prepare the way for the reception of that theory, than to illustrate or enforce the point immediately in hand. We regret exceedingly to find that a man like Mr Powell, with a name in science to lose rather than to gain, should avow himself to be an adherent of that theory, modified although that adherence be by certain important reservations. It can hardly be regarded otherwise than as an ominous token, that a distinguished professor in one of our universities, having a real reputation in the walks of philosophy, and a divine of standing in the church to which he belongs, should publicly commit himself to the support of a doctrine which, however it may turn out in his hands, has in our own day, and by its most recent and popular advocates, been disgraced by an alliance with Materialism or Pantheism, and only illustrated and supported by the unscientific blunders of the author of the "Vestiges of Creation," and the wild and unintelligible

rhapsodies of Oken. The very touch of that theory has in the case of the one transmuted the facts of science into fables, and in the instance of the other converted its real analogies into incoherent ravings. We have already had occasion to advert to that eminent facility of philosophical generalization by which Mr Powell is characterised, and which gives such a peculiar interest to the volume before us. He has evidently an eye for almost instinctively detecting and following out the hidden and remote resemblances to be discovered among the phenomena of nature, and a mind peculiarly alive to the pleasure found in the contemplation of them, and a strong, if not predominant taste, for the wide and general analogies of physical science. But what in one sense may be his strength, in another may prove his weakness. There is a relevant evidence to be found in the analogies of inductive truth, when these are real, and true, and essential to it; and the discovery of such analogies is almost always the forerunner of the sound generalizations of science. But there is, perhaps, no mental habit more easily acquired, and the indulgence of which it is more difficult to control, than just the habit of hasty generalization from analogies slenderly understood, or in themselves insufficient; and there can be no better test of the sound philosopher, and of a capacity for inductive discovery, than the ability to restrain such a propensity, and the rare power of assigning to the evidence of these analogies the precise meaning, and value, and force, that are due to it. We think we can see in Mr Powell's mental endowments, as manifested more especially in the volume before us, a remarkable facility in discovering and tracing the wide and comprehensive analogies of natural truth, and almost a passionate love of resting in the elevated contemplation of the unity and harmony of creation; but along with this, a very decided and fatal want of that severe and corrective philosophic judgment which alone can regulate and give value to such tendencies, and which enables the true scientific inquirer to discriminate between analogy and induction, and to give with justice and impartiality to the former what is due to its presumptions, and to the latter what is due to its certainty. Add to this, that the very extent and variety of Mr Powell's scientific acquirements, and multifarious knowledge of the results of modern physical inquiry, which indicate the richness of his mind, may also prove its snare in this matter. The rapid advances of recent discovery, and the opening up of new departments of truth on every hand, are imposing more and more upon the labourers in this field the necessity of carrying out the principle of the division of labour to the utmost possible extent, and teaching the lesson, which none is so ready to forget as the philoso-

pher of wide and comprehensive views, that, whatever be his ability and industry in the pursuit of knowledge, no man can be truly a master in any department but his own, and that no one can gain for himself a name of authority in any walk of science, who has not restricted himself to it with a devotion almost exclusive and professional. We have no reason to believe that the Professor of Geometry at Oxford has given himself to the study of palæontology with an attention any thing like so jealous and restricted. The very extent and rich variety of his stores of multifarious scientific knowledge, might suggest the opposite conclusion. And when, in this volume, he draws liberally on those stores to supply the ample materials of scientific facts that enable him to trace and illustrate the physical analogies in which he delights, and to wander at will in the large and comprehensive views of creation in which he abounds, he no doubt adds greatly to the charm and interest of his theories, but, at the same time, leaves upon the mind the unpleasant and unsatisfied impression, that he is sacrificing accuracy to wideness of view, and amusing or misleading us with the hasty generalizations of a science rapidly and imperfectly observed, rather than instructing us in the sure conclusions of a philosophy which the professional student of it has slowly and painfully purchased from nature, at the price of the sweat of his brow and the labour of his hands. We would shrink from doing injustice to a man of the extensive acquirements and high scientific reputation of Mr Powell; but if he has cultivated palæontology with any thing approaching to that exclusive devotion of time and strength, and professional love to it, which are due to the interest and difficulty of the science, and which are not more than necessary to give a man a right to speak with authority in regard to its many unresolved problems, he is certainly the first who has risen from the study at once a master of it, and a disciple of the theory of development.

We have said that Mr Powell gives in his adhesion to the development hypothesis with some important reservations. It is not very easy to gather from his volume the exact form of the theory which pleases him best: with many of its features, as recently revived and delineated by its recognised champions, he is avowedly dissatisfied. He guards himself against being thought committed to any of the scientific details which have been mixed up with the more recent advocacy of the doctrine by such men as Oken and the author of the "*Vestiges of Creation*." The form of the speculation, as sketched either by the one or the other, is not the form favoured and defended by Mr Powell; but while repudiating their views, he declines to give any definite shape to his own idea of the law according

to which the different orders of animate and inanimate being have been developed. As to Oken he plainly tells us, that his theory is "avowedly of a speculative kind, and, bearing a metaphysical aspect in its first principles, is yet put forth as a physical generalization,"—and that from the very "abstract nature of the ideas and language employed, it is difficult to estimate the precise evidence on which it is supported." As to the theory of the "Vestiges," he refers to an able article in the *British and Foreign Medico-Chirurgical Review*, that "refutes many of the minute details of it;" and he willingly admits that its "physiological statements are open to criticism." His more extensive and accurate acquaintance with modern science in most of its branches, has saved him from the errors into which the author of that work so helplessly fell; and perhaps a wise and commendable regard for his own reputation has restrained him from substituting or asserting another form of the theory in place of that which was tried and found wanting in the hands of his predecessors. Nor is it to be supposed that it is only particular points of minute details in the form of the theory, as held by them, that Mr Powell disowns;—some of the leading and most distinctive principles which gave shape and substance to the system of development are expressly repudiated by him. For example, the great and prominent idea which was advocated in the "Vestiges" of a direct advance in successively higher organization in one line, from the lowest zoophyte up to man, as we advance through geological ages up to the present time, "is now," according to the confession of Mr Powell, "acknowledged to be untenable." It was, however, this very law of progression, under the determining influence of physical causes, and not the general fact of a difference observable between the forms of life of earlier and late geological epochs in the direction of advancement from lower to higher organization, *apart from that law*, that constituted the notable peculiarity of the modern theory of development, and was one of the two leading principles which it was the object of the disciples of that theory to establish. And now, while admitting that this law is conclusively disproved, and arguing for the doctrine of development by physical causes still, Mr Powell nowhere lays down any other order according to which this development either has occurred or can take place,—contenting himself with the very vague and indefinite statement, that "it is clearly no longer to be recognised in any single line of ascent from more simple to more complex forms, but must be sought in some new and apparently less obvious train of relation not yet made out." Again, so far from taking refuge, like the author of the "Vestiges," in the pseudo-chemistry of Crosse and Weekes, as experimental evidence of the

production of organic life from inorganic elements, or betaking himself to the dark corners of physiology for light as to the transmutation of species, he unhesitatingly asserts, both in regard to the alleged origin and to the alleged transmutation of life, "that no noticeable instance of it could be expected to take place within the range of our observation," and that "we never could expect to have any experimental evidence of it;" arguing elaborately and with much earnestness that the impossibility of proving the fact is a very strong evidence against those who deny it to be a fact at all. Here, again, it is impossible not to see that Mr Powell disowns the peculiar basis of evidence on which all the supporters hitherto of the development doctrine have been most anxious to rest it, and without which it would have been regarded as having no foundation whatever. After such an amount and kind of repudiation of what was believed to be most important and peculiar in the theory, it may naturally and reasonably be asked, What remnant of it in Mr Powell's hands remains? It is not very easy to give an answer to the question. At all times ill-defined and vague, the theory in the keeping of Mr Powell has become vaguer still. Without a fixed shape, or known form, or definite features, or real substance, it is very much in the case of a phantom, that has nothing but a name. He himself calls it, not a phantom, indeed, but—"a philosophical conjecture." In short, the doctrine of development by physical law, as entertained by Mr Powell, is one that holds itself very much aloof from any inconvenient identification with such a distinct shape, or such definite facts, as would make it amenable to the test of experience, or observation, or argument; it has much more of a negative than a positive character attaching to it; and it consists rather in a denial of any intervention of creating power different from natural causes, for the purpose of accounting for the origin and progress of life upon the earth, than in the assertion or specification of any intelligible law or well-defined process, according to which natural causes might explain them.

But it is right that Mr Powell should have an opportunity of speaking for himself as to the kind of development which he holds:—

"If we admit that the earth, being still hot internally, must have cooled at its surface, and that this cooling must, in its progress, have caused contortions, dislocations, upheavals of strata; and again, that the waters charged with matter must have deposited it; and that the various crystallised bodies and metallic veins must have been formed during certain stages of these formations,—it is only by parity of reason affirmed that the rudiments of all organic as well as inorganic products and structures must have been evolved in like manner, as they were

alike included and contained in the once fused and therefore once vapourised or nebulous mass. In that mass all kinds of physical agents, or the elements of them, thermotic, electric, chemical, molecular, gravitational, luminiferous, and by consequence not less all organic and vital forces, must have been included. Out of it *in some way*, by equally regular laws in the one case as in the other, must have been evolved all forms of inorganic and equally of organic existence,—whether amorphous masses, crystals, cells, monads, plants, zoophytes, animals, or man,—the animal man; the spiritual man belonging to another order of things, a spiritual creation.”

Now, certainly, viewing this statement with reference to the first and essential requisite in any statement of a scientific theory,—namely, accuracy of definition and precision of thought,—nothing can be regarded as more unsatisfactory and unphilosophical. It can be paralleled only by the dreams of some of the ancient cosmogonists, who were not wont to dream in accordance with the demands of the inductive philosophy; and yet we venture to say that although the same ideas are repeated over and over again in the course of the volume, they are never put into a shape more distinct, or defined in terms more accurate and intelligible. We have here plainly the assertion of the origin and production of life from inorganic elements; but no mention made of the law, or process, or conditions according to which this development is made. Further, we have here plainly implied the transmutation of species, but no attempt to explain or define the manner, causes, or antecedents which regulate and determine the change. And yet these are the essential elements of the problem to be solved; in the absence of which the attempt to establish or argue about a doctrine of development is very much a beating of the air. In repudiating any alliance with the more definite law which former advocates of the theory had imposed upon it, and disowning those facts of experience and observation which they had erroneously alleged in its behalf, Mr Powell has, doubtless, disencumbered himself of difficulties which would have broken down hopelessly even his scientific strength; but, in doing so, he has, as the disciple and defender of the development theory, laid himself open to objections no less fatal to his cause. In his hands the theory is evacuated of all substance and precise meaning, and sublimated into an airy nothing, which, under the name of a “philosophical conjecture,” has no real foundation in the experience or discoveries of true inquirers into the phenomena of nature, no affinity with the realities of a sound generalization, and even no positive character which the facts of observation can either prove or disprove. By means of the tactics he has adopted, he has undoubtedly succeeded in masking his own line of defence, and putting his

assailants to a disadvantage, seeing that they have no real or distinct position to attack; but, in doing so, he has incurred the still more serious disadvantage on his side of giving up well-nigh all which its disciples were wont to maintain, and of sacrificing in his statement of the problem to be solved the very elements necessary to its solution.

But vague though the theory be in the hands of Mr Powell, and incapable of proof because of this vagueness, he has set himself with much ability to the attempt. And what is the kind of evidence on which he relies in his attempted proof? It cannot be the evidence of *experience*, for he has already, in regard to the two leading and essential principles of the theory, —namely, the origination of life from inorganic matter, and the transmutation of species,—utterly discarded it. "*We never could,*" says Mr Powell, "*expect to have experimental evidences of it.*" It cannot be the evidence of *observation*, for this in like manner he has no less generously and conclusively dispensed with. "*No reasonable instance of it,*" says Mr Powell, "*could be expected to take place within the range of our observation.*" Of what then does his reasonings consist? Mainly, or rather entirely, of these two,—*first*, of an elaborate attempt to support his theory on the ground of analogy; and, *second*, of an endeavour to invalidate the arguments of his opponents. We must crave liberty for a word or two on each of these.

The argument from analogy in favour of the development theory, on which he dwells at great length, is the *only positive evidence* which he pretends to offer in its behalf. The acknowledged uniformity of natural laws within their own province is dwelt upon largely as proof that they extend with equal uniformity throughout time, and over every region of being; and in particular, the regular and unvarying connection of physical phenomena is made by analogy to imply the dominion of physical causes, in the case of those other phenomena in regard to which all that we know is that no such causes are to be seen. By the force of analogy, every thing in nature, however far removed from our notions of what is material or physical, is brought under the operation and control of natural law, according as that law is established and seen in the physical succession of events,—even in those instances, for example, such as the origin and changes of life, where all that we learn from experience is, that no such order of physical causation can be traced. In support of this wide and sweeping generalization, Mr Powell appeals to the past history of science, which, in the department of physical discovery, exhibits a gradual yet constant progress in the way of extending the order of law over the phenomena within the limits of our experience, and thus gives a promise that even those phenomena

of whose cause we are at present ignorant may ultimately be brought under the same dominion. Taught, perhaps, by the failure of former attempts by his predecessors in the same school, Mr Powell has sought to adduce no new facts* in support of the theory which he advocates. He is contented to rest it on the ground of this vague analogical argument, which, in the absence of direct evidence, is made to bear the entire burden of all the difficulties connected with the origin of new species of life, and the transmutation of old through the operation of physical law. We must allow Mr Powell space to do justice to his own argument:—

“All branches of inductive science continually tend more and more towards a grand *unity of principle*. We perceive this, to a partial and limited extent, in every lesser advance of discovery; in proportion as new facts accumulate and become embarrassing from their multiplicity, sooner or later some happy advance in generalization is always found to occur, by which they are simplified and reduced to some single principle, connecting them at the same time with other classes of phenomena. In the science of the ancients (exact as it was in some limited departments, each within itself) all branches were isolated and disconnected, and all physical principles and causes were supposed of separate and even conflicting kinds. All the first great modern advances were directed towards combining and uniting branches hitherto distinct, and tended to evince a unity of idea and principle pervading them. The first discoveries pointed to the identification of the celestial motions with terrestrial; of astronomy with mechanics; of the fall of an apple with the motion of the moon; of the horror of a vacuum with the laws of equilibrium: as later discoveries have identified magnetic and electric currents, and connected sound, heat, and light, with the mechanism of waves; and, again, the resulting effects of heat with dynamical force. . . . All science, then, is emphatically one: in all its parts and branches, however apparently distinct, or supposed to involve peculiar modes of thought appropriate to each, we find, on close examination, that *all such distinctions are but temporary and provisional*; and that what appears peculiar, is so only because the investigation in different parts of science is in different states of progress. In one, it has arrived at no more than a description and classification of phenomena, or even of the materials whose phenomena we propose to study; in another, we have been able to reduce all phenomena to laws of high generality, and those laws to simple principles of force and

* We do not know, when asserting that Mr Powell has pretended to adduce no new facts in support of the development theory, whether we ought not to make an exception in favour of the notable discovery announced in *note*, p. 501, of his work. He there asserts, or, more properly, insinuates, that a certain skeleton recently discovered in a railway cutting in England, is the fossil remains of a human being that existed long before the human epoch, and had been imbedded “previous to a long series of physical events.” For a satisfactory account of these remains, as well as some pointed strictures on Mr Powell's theory, we would refer to a paper by Mr Thomson of Banbury, in the April number of the *Edinburgh New Philosophical Journal*. As Mr Thomson remarks, he “leaves us altogether in the dark as to whether he regards these bones as those of a perfect or of an inferior man,—whether a specimen of the *Homo Sapiens* of Linnæus, or of the *Homo non Sapiens* of Powell.”

motion, of the most elementary simplicity and the highest generality ; and between these extremes there exist all varieties of intermediate stages. But all sciences approach perfection as they approach to a unity of first principles ; differently applied, indeed, according to the different natures of the material objects contemplated, but in all cases recurring to or tending towards certain high elementary conceptions, which are the representatives of the unity of the great archetypal ideas according to which the whole system is arranged. . . . When the inductive inquirer finds himself involved in some great apparent difficulty, and among phenomena which no existing resources of science are able to explain,—which appear to stand forth as irreducible anomalies, and to baffle all attempts at explanation ; however hopeless the problem may seem, he can never really suppose the case to be in its own nature incapable of analysis, or that the mass of facts is not really reducible to some principles of order, analogy, and causation,—to the dominion of laws as yet, indeed, unknown, and of causes not as yet conjectured, yet as perfectly regular and as strictly harmonious as those which govern the most common daily occurrences,—the fall of a stone, or the ascent of vapour. *A real break in the connection and continuity of physical causes cannot exist, in the nature of things.* If such breaks often appear, they are due solely to our ignorance. Every advance tends to fill them up ; and, indeed, every physical discovery is nothing else than an extension of the evidence of continuity,—a fresh link in the connection of phenomena into one consistent whole. There is no such thing as any class of phenomena really standing out isolated from all others, unconnected by any analogous principle, and truly anomalous in regard to the rest of nature. Yet every class of phenomena has at some time seemed so ; but it is an illusion, in whatever instance it may now seem to be the case ; and one which time will assuredly clear away, as it has already done so many similar or greater illusions. . . . The inductive philosopher is convinced that the universal subordination of causes must hold good equally in *time* as in *space* ;—that as there is no *region*, however distant, in which physical laws do not apply, or in which, if as yet unknown, we are not fully warranted in feeling an assurance that they must apply ; so in *time* there is no *period*, however remote, at which we can legitimately imagine the chain of physical causation to be broken, and to give place to disconnected influences of a wholly different kind.”

The application of these sweeping generalizations to the questions involved in the theory of development is sufficiently obvious. The uniformity of the *law of physical causation* extends over all nature in space and time, and there are no phenomena whatsoever exempted from its order and control. If there are such phenomena apparently standing out from others, and apparently irreducible to the order of physical law, it is an illusion due only to our ignorance. Is the ordinary and well recognised distinction, then, between organic life and inorganic matter to be done away, as a distinction—to borrow Mr Powell's words—“*but temporary and provisional*” ? Are the phenomena of the origin of life, and the differences of animated being, to be accounted the effects of physical causation as much

as the fall of a stone or the ascent of vapour, because "a real breach in the connection and continuity of physical causes cannot exist in the nature of things"? Such are the force and bearing of Mr Powell's analogy. No doubt universal experience, as well as science, seems to contradict the conclusion. Geology tells us of the *beginnings of being* in the absence of all physical causes to account for it; and physiology tells us of the *principle of life* distinct from, and irreducible to, the order of physical phenomena. But, in the opinion of Mr Powell, these facts "are due solely to our ignorance." In reference to the testimony of geology in favour of the origin of life apart from physical causes, he tells us:—

"In such cases the evidence of a violation of the uniformity of nature is purely negative: with all analogy against the reality of the exceptions, they can be such only to our present ignorance: the apparent anomaly is but a part of a more comprehensive law, ill understood;—a modification of its continuous action in reality equally regular, though not as yet fully made out or reduced to law. Geology, thus kept pure from the introduction of fanciful and unphilosophical hypotheses, eminently conforms to the type of unity which binds together the whole range of inductive science."

In reference, again, to the testimony which the facts of physiology bear to the principle of life, as something different from matter, and not to be explained by physical laws, he tells us:—

"The sciences of organization and life are sometimes supposed to involve *a new class and order of ideas*, of so peculiar a kind, that they must stand out as entirely exceptional cases to the general unity of the sciences. Instead of allowing any such prepossessions to paralyse his researches, the inductive philosopher would simply seek, in regular order, first to determine the external conditions and laws of life, themselves as yet far from being well understood. Until these are known, he might reject as premature, or at least as wholly conjectural, all attempts to speculate on their higher laws or physical causes: yet not less confidently would he be assured that these more interior causes will one day come to be known. There have not been wanting, indeed, attempts at theorising on the subject; various hypotheses have been started as to the nature of the 'vital principle,' and the question discussed whether life is the result of organization, or organization of life. Some have referred to more particular modes of action, such as electric currents flowing through the nervous system, or the like; and have represented animated beings as in fact nothing more than walking galvanic batteries. All these, and many similar theories, may be utterly fallacious and erroneous; and the opponents may triumph and revel in the real or supposed refutation of them. But all this in no way affects the conviction of the existence of *some physical principle*, the cause of the vital functions, as yet, indeed, unknown, but which nevertheless will, at some time, become as well determined as the principle of respiration or the circulation of the blood is at present. The truly inductive inquirer can never doubt that there really exists as complete and continuous a relation and con-

nection of some kind between the manifestations of life and the simplest mechanical or chemical laws evinced in the varied actions of the body in which it resides, as there is between the action of any machine and the laws of motion and equilibrium,—the weaving of cloth by a power-loom and the principle of latent heat; and that this connection and dependence is but one component portion of the vast chain of physical causation, whose essential strength lies in its universal continuity, which extends, without interruption, through the entire world of order, and in which a real disruption of one link would be the destruction of the whole."

From these extracts our readers will be enabled to understand the nature of that analogical argument which Mr Powell illustrates and enforces at great length and with much ability in favour of the doctrine of development by physical law, and which, indeed, is the only evidence of a positive kind on which he rests his case. It may not be uninteresting to attempt to estimate the value of it.

Now, it cannot be doubted that the general facts on which Mr Powell's analogy is made to rest are well founded. Apart from the conclusion into the service of which he enlists them, no man in the least acquainted with the history of scientific discovery would hesitate to admit them. In the province of physical truth there is no lesson better taught, by the progress and history of science, than the uniformity of law; and there can be no conviction perhaps stronger, in the minds of all rightly disciplined by modern philosophy, than the conviction that there are no physical phenomena, however unexplained in the present state of knowledge, that may not ultimately be reduced within its limits; and that there can be no real breach in the order and continuity of physical causes. Mr Powell has illustrated this proposition in much detail and with great felicity from the examples of modern discovery; and nothing could be added to what he has so well and eloquently said. But does the foundation thus laid bear upon it the argument he has reared on it? Does the analogy derived from the uniformity and continuity of physical causation extend to those cases under dispute, of the origin of life and of the transmutations of life? We think not, and are satisfied that the argument which asserts this, is fallacious.

In the first place, the analogical argument on which the development doctrine of Mr Powell rests, in so far as it is put forth as evidence of this doctrine, is nothing else than a begging of the question in dispute. Our experience of the uniformity and regularity of physical law is such, that no presumption can be stronger than the expectation that that law will be found, as the boundaries of our knowledge enlarge, co-extensive with all physical phenomena; and that no change of that kind can take place, and no phenomenon of that

nature be exhibited, however ignorant at present we may be as to its origin, which will not come to be referred to some physical cause. Setting aside the case of miracles, which are not properly to be classed in that order, the analogy of all past experience is so close and conclusive as to justify us in asserting, that every physical phenomenon, whether we can explain it or not, must be compatible with physical law, and is not to be referred to any kind of cause beyond its domain. But in regard to the point in debate, as to the development of organised life from inorganic elements, or from pre-existing and distinct forms of life, the question still remains, Are these in the true sense of the terms *physical phenomena*, or not; and do these rank in that order, or do they belong to a class of phenomena altogether distinct and apart? If they are not to be distinguished from other physical phenomena, but have essentially the same character and properties, then, whatever difficulty in the present state of our knowledge we might have in explaining their origin, we would, by the force of the analogy which Mr Powell has pointed out, be bound to refer them to causes within the domain of physical law. But to assume the identity or essential resemblance in nature of these two classes of things, to take for granted that the distinctions between them are not real but illusory, and on the ground of this assumption to apply to both alike the analogies of physical discovery, is nothing else than a begging of the question in dispute.

No one can have read Mr Powell's volume without having been struck with the frequency and force with which he dilates upon the extent, uniformity, and continuity, of *physical law*; and yet no one can have read it with attention without having been painfully sensible of the want of precision with which the terms are employed. Sometimes he uses the expression in the ordinary and restricted sense of the words, as synonymous with mechanical or material, and opposed to mental, moral, or spiritual; and sometimes in the wider and less ordinary sense of *natural*, as opposed to abnormal, irregular, without order or connection, and including under its meaning all kinds of law whatever, material or moral. Now, doubtless Mr Powell has a right to deny the distinction between these two senses of the expression, as one which is illusory and unfounded, and to hold that all law, whether mechanical or moral, is of one and the same kind and identical; but he has hardly a right to do this without due advertisement to his readers; and especially, he has no right to use the term sometimes in the one sense and sometimes in the other, according to the convenience or exigency of his argument. And yet we cannot help feeling that it is to this illegitimate use of the expressions *physical law*, *physical cause*, and such like, that he is

sometimes indebted for much of the plausibility of his reasonings. In pleading for the development doctrine, he frequently argues, that to make the phenomena of organic life an exception to the ordinary phenomena of inorganic matter, and to deny that they are governed by the same mechanical or physical laws, is to make them abnormal and irregular, subject to no rule or order at all, contradictions to the otherwise perfect harmony and uniformity of nature, and running in opposition to all its analogies of unity and law. If such an objection were well founded, it would furnish a strong presumption against the opponents of development. But nothing can be more untrue. The objection proceeds upon the assumption, implied if not plainly asserted, that there is no other law in the universe of God than that physical law which governs the phenomena of matter; and that to refuse to subject the facts of organic life to the control and operation of such a principle, is the same thing as handing them over to the direction and government of chance or lawless disorder. There are other laws, however, in nature, as regular in their order, and marked by as perfect a harmony and uniformity in their operation, as the laws of matter; and some of which can be evinced, by the statistics of their results, to be as fixed in their conditions and their workings. Events due wholly to moral causes often prove, by the observed regularity of their occurrence, the regularity of the laws by which they are governed; as for example, when the statistics of particular crimes, taken from a large field of observation, show from year to year such a sameness of result as to demonstrate the constancy of the moral laws by which they are determined. In refusing, then, to subject the phenomena of organic life to the operation and control of physical law (in the restricted sense of the word), we are not placing them out of keeping with the analogies of nature, and putting them beyond the range of its harmony and settled order; we are only referring them to higher laws than those of matter, and laws no less marked by unity of plan and uniformity of operation. To assume the opposite, as Mr Powell frequently does in his reasoning against the opponents of development, is virtually to take for granted the point in debate.*

But, *in the second place*, there are materials in the general facts upon which Mr Powell's analogy is built suggestive of a very different conclusion from that at which he arrives. In looking at the affinities which bind together sometimes the most remote and unlike phenomena of nature, and at the rapid approximation between sciences before widely distinct, which the advance of modern discovery indicates, when a multitude

* We do not know whether Mr Powell has taken the hint of his reasoning from the author of the "Vestiges of Creation," but it is curious to note, that the same confusion of thought and substantially the same arguments are to be found in that work. "This statistical regularity," says the author of the "Vestiges," "in moral affairs

of separate and independent facts are combined under some one general principle, he is led to speak of the unity of creation as something which, "if any induction could reach it," would realise "*the summum genus of all*," "*an ultimate physical principle of the universe*." But while the marvellous and rapid generalizations of modern science may tempt some of its unwise votaries to indulge in such extravagant imaginations as these, it is not to be forgotten that the *unity of the principles* of nature is not the same thing as the *identity* of the phenomena of nature, —nay, that the unity of creation of which Mr Powell speaks so much is necessarily based *on the diversity of the phenomena of creation*. To make the generalizations of science possible, we must have the diversity of the phenomena of nature just as much as the unity of the common cause or law which binds them together. Without that difference of character, and nature, and essence, which is impressed on the existences of creation, whether animate or inanimate, and which separates between one and another, causing them to be not the same but different things, there would be no foundation laid for the possibility of unity at all,—there might result the *identity*, but not the unity of the phenomena of creation. The grand analogy on which Mr Powell builds his argument, drawn from the unity of creation as exhibited in its laws, is not only consistent with, but actually founded upon a real diversity in all the phenomena of nature,—a diversity which, however much it may disappear in the generalizations of science, is yet permanent and fixed in the nature of actual being. There are lines drawn between substance and substance, between life and life, too deep to be obliterated or effaced; differences which may sometimes be resolved into the unity of a common cause, but which are not less real and true, and not less essential to creation as at present constituted, on that account. The analogy of Mr Powell, then, points in a direction the opposite of his conclusion just as really and as much as it appears to favour it. There are permanent distinctions of character and essence belonging to the phenomena of organic and inorganic being, just as real and necessary as are the unity and uniformity of the principles under which, according to our generalizations, they may be reduced,—the law of unity in creation proclaims not only the real sameness of a common cause, but also the real diversity of the phenomena classified under it.

Much, perhaps, of this Mr Powell might admit. The law

fully establishes the presidency of law. Man is seen to be an enigma only as an individual; in the mass he is a mathematical problem. *It is hardly necessary to say, much less to argue, that mental action, being proved to be under law, passes at once into the category of natural things. Its old metaphysical character vanishes in a moment, and the distinction usually taken between physical and moral is annulled.*"—(Vestiges of Creation, sixth edition, p. 418.)

of unity in creation implies and presupposes the law of fundamental diversity. The unity is to be found in the common cause; the diversity, in the separate and independent phenomena of which it is the cause. Mr Powell's analogical argument affords a presumption in favour of the extension of the law of unity throughout the universe, but at the same time a no less amount of presumption in favour of the extension of the law of diversity; and for this very reason it furnishes no evidence in support of the development theory, which, in its reducing all the phenomena of organic life as well as inorganic matter to the category of physical phenomena, asserts the unity but denies the diversity. But more than this. Do not analogy and experience both teach us to carry the doctrine of diversity much farther than this? Even amid the phenomena of matter we recognise the presence of these two laws. But there is a region beyond the province of material laws, where if law presides at all, as it undoubtedly does, it must be of a wider kind and higher order. There is a spiritual economy, superior to the material, conversant with a higher order of causation, and embracing a wider range and variety of phenomena. And if we be justified in saying, that in this loftier sphere there is to be witnessed the uniformity of fixed causation and the unity of harmonious law, although of a different kind from any witnessed in the order and connection of material phenomena; so also we are justified in asserting that *there* also is found a diversity permanent and essential, similar to what we see in material nature, but only upon a larger scale and of a wider scope. In proportion as the laws which regulate the phenomena of the spiritual world are higher than those which preside over nature, or in proportion as the laws which bind together both the spiritual and material universe in one system of order and connection, are more general than those which govern the physical alone, will the diversities which we meet with in that loftier region be wider and more fundamental. In passing from the physical to the spiritual economy, or in embracing both, analogy teaches us to expect that we shall find in the latter, and also in the relations between the latter and the former, diversities in being as many as before, but only much greater and more essential than before. In that region which lies beyond the domain of physical law as much as within it, there are lines drawn, deep and indelible, which partition off nature and truth into distinct varieties of being and knowledge. No law of physical unity can reach to these. They belong to another order in the universe. They are interwoven not only with the realities of nature, but with the fundamental principles of human knowledge and belief. Of such diversities is that grand fundamental antithesis recognised in nature and in all our beliefs, between *subject* and *object*, and that primary

exemplification of it in the essential and imperishable distinction between the Creator and the creation he has made. Of such kind are the wide diversities exemplified in the phenomena of time and space, of unity and plurality, of cause and effect, of matter and mind, and such like, running through the whole extent of nature, and answering to the fundamental necessities of human thought and belief,—diversities which we believe to be original and essential, and which, at all events, admit of no explanation or reconciliation by means of physical laws. Is there no reason, on the ground of such considerations, to assert that if there be a principle of unity running through creation, although not a unity that depends on physical law alone; so also there is a principle of diversity equally extensive, although a diversity that cannot be conciliated or made to disappear by the help of physical causes? And if the universal experience and belief of all people, as evinced by the testimony of all languages, and if the teaching of science, did not tell us of the fact, would there be no cogent ground in analogy for saying that the deep and mysterious lines drawn between life and life in organic forms, and drawn also between organic life and inorganic matter, were just similar examples of those original and independent diversities in nature, which no theory of physical development could explain, and which by no process could be reduced under the law of physical unity?

To assert the unity of creation in such a sense that there shall be no fundamental and irreducible diversity,—to postulate the dominion of one system of law (say the physical) over every territory of nature,—and to speak of the possibility of reducing all the phenomena known to us to one cause, which shall be “the ultimate physical principle of the universe,” is to affirm a proposition disowned alike by the evidence of experience and the testimony of analogy, and seems to approach very nearly to the principle of Spinoza, as to the essential identity and the merely phenomenal diversity of all substance in the universe. Mr Powell asserts no such principle. On the contrary, he argues powerfully and well against the theory of Pantheism. Nay, in the case of man himself, while he holds that his merely animal life and nature are subject to the same laws of production and development as “*the rest of the material order of things*,” he also maintains that his spiritual nature belongs to “*a different order of things, apart from and transcending any material idea whatever*.” In other words, he holds that the “animal” and the “spiritual” man belong to distinct categories, and to separate departments of nature, falling under different principles, and governed by different laws,—the one physical or material, and the other spiritual. Upon what grounds he comes to this conclusion, which do not equally establish a similar distinction and diversity between organic

life and inorganic matter, he has not informed us. But the admission is a remarkable one, viewed in connection with the development theory which he advocates. It subverts the very foundation on which that theory rests, showing that the analogy as to unity of creation, on which he rests, fails at the very point where failure is fatal to the conclusion at which he aims,—the exception to unity, which he confesses to exist, forming an *instantia crucis*, which demonstrates that there are limits in nature beyond which physical law does not extend. According to Mr Powell's own admission, it is an example of creation, not by natural law, but by supernatural power,—a faulty link in that chain of unity, of which he tells us that “a real disruption of one link would be the destruction of the whole.” It is not necessary to push the argument against Mr Powell to the farther and legitimate extent of asserting, that if man's “spiritual nature” is an exception to the analogy for which he contends, so must also his “intellectual nature” be. The admission, as it stands in his own words, if he would be consistent, is fatal to the hypothesis of the original identity of life, and the physical development and transmutation of species.*

In the third place, it is not alone an appeal to the fundamental and essential diversities of being found in nature that strikes against the development theory of creation, and breaks up the analogy on which it is made by Mr Powell to rest. We have also the fact of the *beginnings of being*, which equally limits the analogy. It is quite true, that if we narrow our view to the field of experience alone,—using the word in its limited sense,—we have nothing that tells us of a beginning in time: we see nothing but a succession of events bound together by fixed material laws, and following each other in an invariable order,—stretching out both into the past and future in an endless line, which speaks of no commencement and of no termination. If our philosophy were bounded by such narrow experience, we could have no notion of a beginning of being. But there *is* a beginning, or else there is no beginning, and it is eternal. There can be no alternative between a commencement and an eternity of the series of life. Come from what quarter it may, we must accept of the idea of *a commencement in time*, as necessarily belonging to the history of creation, even although that idea may not be found among the lessons taught in the narrow school of physical observation; and that idea once entertained, goes to enlarge all our analogies drawn from the study of nature. In the grand fact of creation at first—meaning by that a beginning of being in time and from nothing—we have a precedent and warrant for all those super-

* For a brief view of Mr Powell's system, and an exposure of the inconsistency between this particular feature of it and the others, we have pleasure in referring to Dr James Buchanan's recent work, “Faith in God and Modern Atheism Compared.”

natural interventions of divine power for the origination of life subsequently, which geology has taught us to accept,—interventions not the less truly supernatural that they may have followed the order of some harmonious law with which we are totally unacquainted. Nothing but the theory of emanation, or of the eternity of matter, would justify us in restricting our argument to the analogy which the observation alone of constant physical succession supplies, to the effect of denying the doctrine of a beginning in time as pertaining to creation as well as to a diversity of species. Mr Powell, indeed, talks on this subject in a manner deeply to be regretted, treating it as a question which he is not called upon to decide one way or other. He tells us that “the idea which is often attached to the word creation, as a calling into existence out of nothing, rests wholly upon metaphysical arguments, which it is no part of his design to discuss;” that “it is wholly destitute of any foundation in scriptural authority,” from Genesis or other passages of the Bible,—if, indeed, “other passages do not, in some sense, refer to pre-existent matter:” and, with regard to experience, he informs us that “the idea of a beginning of creation in time is one which no physical philosophy can teach us;” that “no analogy points to a beginning of physical causes;” and that “physical philosophy always supposes, at least, some physical elements in existence,—it cannot investigate or conceive a condition antecedent to nature, or the case of its actual commencement.”

We can put no interpretation upon the following passage, which does not involve a denial of the Scripture doctrine of the proper creation of all things out of nothing. Speaking of the question between the evolution of organised beings out of their inorganic elements, or out of pre-existing forms, he says:—

“The choice between two such hypothetical ideas is a perfectly legitimate subject of conjectural discussion and difference of opinion; but it is inconsistent with all inductive principles not to admit that *one or other of them must be supposed*. But if the idea of the formation of organised beings out of their inorganic elements were to be preferred, still, on any such hypothesis, the process is imagined to be carried on through such a series of steps of gradual evolution, as to differ rather in name than in essential nature from the idea of development out of pre-existing organic forms. And further, even if the very cautious inquirer prefer altogether to dismiss and ignore the consideration of the question, simply on the alleged deficiency of satisfactory evidence, still, in the true inductive spirit, he admits that *it is nothing more than a mere physical question, which at present we cannot solve*. And, on the same grounds, he would as strenuously contend against the admission of *any hypothesis derived from other considerations of a kind incompatible with the great principles of natural order, and of a nature beyond the domain of science.*”*

* See also Mr Powell's article “Creation,” in Cyclopædia of Biblical Literature.

In regard to the Word of God, we believe that there are few who examine it with any measure of attention who can doubt what its deliverance is on this question, or who would be disposed to deny that, on the forefront of the Scripture page, and eminently distinguishing it from every other history of creation, we have the sublime idea of the formation of the universe out of nothing in the beginning. We have left ourselves no space to enter into the scriptural argument by any examination of the various passages which bear upon the point; nor would it be of any importance or avail in so far as it regards Mr Powell, who, both in the volume before us, and in some of his previous writings, has avowed sentiments, and laid down propositions, utterly inconsistent, as we deem it, with almost any belief in the inspiration of Scripture, or any respect for the authority of its historical statements. We do not deny that the word which, in Genesis and other passages of Scripture, is translated "*create*," is in some other places, as Mr Powell says, "a stronger and more intensive form of expression of the idea of *making or fashioning*." But we believe that these three propositions could easily and thoroughly be established on good evidence, viz.,—*First*, The proper and primary sense of the word is that of the divine act of absolute creation out of nothing, and only its secondary and transitive meaning is that of fashioning or remodelling from elements already in existence,—this peculiarity distinguishing the word from others, whose just and proper meaning is, to model or make, and with which it is sometimes associated, or apparently interchanged. *Second*, Apart from any consideration derived from the primary meaning of the word itself, the true and proper exegesis of the opening statements of Genesis requires them to be understood in the sense of absolute creation. *Third*, The same doctrine is to be undoubtedly drawn from a right interpretation of other passages of Scripture. We believe that these three propositions can be properly established by an examination of the Scripture testimony on the subject, deciding the question in a manner not to be misapprehended, except by those under the influence and prepossession of some misleading theory.*

With regard to the conclusions of experience, it is quite true that, if limited to the observation of mere physical succession, they teach nothing about a commencement in time. But this is surely no reason why Mr Powell should ignore the fact, if it be true, or ride his analogical hobby with the same con-

* In connection with this point, we would mention a recent work of interest and ability, forming a valuable contribution towards a sound treatment of some of the theological controversies of the day,—"*Creation and the Fall: a Defence and Exposition of the First Three Chapters of Genesis*, by the Rev. Donald Macdonald." As to the Jewish interpretation of Genesis on the subject of Creation, see *Manasseh Ben-Israel de Creatione*.

fidence and reliance on its suggestions that he might have done if the fact were the reverse of what it really is. It is wretched pedantry, or something worse, to reject a truth, or ignore it, because not taught within the school of "physical philosophy." Our inheritance of truth is not so large that we can afford to dispense with knowledge wherever gathered, or to discard facts wherever they have been found; nor is it the sign of a wisdom either true or enlarged, to shut itself up within the narrow boundaries of some sectional department of science, and to refuse the light that comes from any other. In the great fact of the beginnings of being, as well as the parallel fact of the diversities of being, and neither of them to be accounted for by physical causation or development, we have evidence sufficient to destroy the analogical argument in favour of the theory.

We have left ourselves no space to carry out, as we had wished, our intention, indicated at a former part of this article, of dealing with the attempt of Mr Powell to invalidate or set aside the reasonings of the opponents of the development doctrine. This, however, is of no great importance, as the theory in his hands is mainly made to depend for the evidence in its favour upon the analogical views which we have already considered; and as, in his attempts to attack the position of his opponents, he has not even pretended to adduce a single new fact, and has not, as we believe, been very successful in argument.

It will be recollected that Mr Powell frankly admits, in regard both to the doctrine of the origination of organic life from inorganic matter, and the further doctrine of the transmutation of one species of life into another and a different, that there is no such thing as a *single fact of experience or observation* to be adduced in its support. "We could never expect to have experimental evidence of it," says Mr Powell; and he meets the demand for such evidence, by telling us that not only is there none, but that from the nature of the case it is impossible there could be any. Now, if we were necessitated to make the same sort of confession, and to employ the same sort of argument, in regard to any other of the discoveries of inductive science,—if, for example, we were compelled to say that we had no experimental evidence, and could have none, in regard to the laws of gravitation, heat, light, and such like, and that it were most unreasonable to expect to receive it, when it could not be given; we suspect very much, that instead of having been accepted as the facts of science, they would have been long ago regarded as its fictions. And, in spite of the proposition announced by Mr Powell in this matter, that "want of expe-

rience is no argument, when it is impossible to be had," we cannot see why we should deal with the doctrine of development differently from the way in which we deal with the doctrine of gravitation, and demand the evidence of experiment and observation in the one case, and dispense with it in the other. We regard it as no true representation of the case, and no fair expression of the argument, to say that the only presumption against the development theory, is the absence of experience in its favour, and that the evidence opposed to it is not positive, but entirely of a *negative* character. Mr Powell has said this, and added the further statement, that "*negative evidence by itself is simply neutral.*" But although he can easily put the arguments of his opponents into a negative form of expression, yet the true nature of the evidence in the case is not to be changed by the mere logical mould into which a dexterous reasoner may, for the benefit of his case, seek to cast it. The proper form or statement of the proposition maintained by anti-development men is, that in every case of the origination of organic life, it is connected with life of the same kind, previously existing; or according to the ancient maxim, *omne vivum ex ovo*. This proposition is the proper opposite to the doctrine both of development and of transmutation of species; it is direct and positive in its form and nature; and the experimental evidence in support of it is positive and direct also. Life of the same kind is the antecedent in every case of life; and whenever we have knowledge of the case at all, we have the direct evidence of experience to the fact. It is not, therefore, only the negative evidence of the total absence of all experience in support of the opposite doctrine, but also the positive evidence of direct and universal experience in favour of *this* doctrine, to which we appeal.

No doubt Mr Powell may tell us, that it is impossible from the nature of the case ever to have the evidence of experience for the development hypothesis, and that we ought not to expect or require it, because we can never have such experience of the *two influences*, under which alone it could be realised, namely, the influence of *incalculably vast periods of time*, and that of *great and peculiar changes of condition*. "We cannot say," argues Mr Powell, "that we have no experience of a change of species in a *due length of time*, and under *adequate and appropriate changes of external condition.*" "Any fair and candid statement of the case," he informs us, "must include these qualifications." Now, we are quite prepared and willing to take these two elements into account. *First*, With regard to the element of time, it is admitted by Mr Powell himself, that not only within the *human* period we have proof, from "historical documents and preserved remains, that they have not altered within very high limits of antiquity, but, in fact, we can go

much higher, since we have undoubted evidence of *some* existing species having remained permanent during the *countless* ages since the tertiary deposits up to the present time." If this admission is restricted to "*some*," and not extended to *all* species, it is only because the preserved relics of some enable us to know and speak of them at those remote periods of time; while the absence of such remains in regard to others forbid us a similar knowledge and ability to speak in respect of them. But even as thus limited, we are contented to take the admission of Mr Powell, and to argue that what is true of some species, must, according to his own doctrine of uniformity, be true of all; and that the influence of his first element of time, which has had no effect during the "*countless*" ages since the tertiary deposits, can hardly be reckoned of much account in the argument, if it come into play only in a series of ages that are *more* than "*countless*." And *second*, With regard to the other element of which he speaks as necessary to transmutation of species, namely, *adequate and appropriate changes of condition*, we cannot help saying, that the statement of such an element is, according as it may be understood, either the cover of ignorance or the concession of the whole question in dispute. If, by a change of condition, *adequate and appropriate* to effect the origination of life, or the transmutation of species, be meant a change of *physical* condition, then we have only to remark, that no such physical condition is known to us,—that we are utterly ignorant of any such thing,—that we have no experimental acquaintance with any thing of the kind, and that Mr Powell ostentatiously admits and asserts we have none. If, again, by a change of condition adequate to effect these results, he means such an alteration of things, that not physical, but supernatural influences come into operation; then we admit and know the possibility of such a condition, and under vague and indefinite language Mr Powell is calling to his aid the very doctrine which his opponents maintain.

But we must be allowed to give, in better language than our own, the bearing of the argument from experience on the development doctrine:—

"In tracing the history of the existing organisms," says Mr H. Miller, "which has been pursued upwards far beyond the human period, not a change appears in any of them from the passing time till we lose them amid the hoar antiquity of the past. Cuvier showed that the birds and beasts embalmed in the catacombs were identical in every respect with the animals of the same kinds that live now, and framed an argument for the fixity of species on the fact. But what, it was asked, was a brief period of 3000 years, compared with the geological ages, or how could any real argument be founded on a basis so little extended? We now know that species have undergone no change from the time of the middle tertiary, downward. The native trees of

our country, such as the oak, beech, and Scotch fir, have been traced up beyond the times of the boulder clay, when the great northern elephant pressed its way through their branches and the great British tiger harboured in their thickets. And yet, during a period of such immense extent that all human history is compressed into its nearer corner, none of these woods altered in a single fibre. They were, at their first appearance, just what they are now. The same remark applies to our existing shells, many of which date from the times of the coralline crag. They made their *debut* in geologic history exactly the same shells that they are now ; and when we rise a single step in advance of their period, we find other shells of entirely different species and appearance, from which it is palpably impossible they could have descended. And such, generally, is the history of palæontology on this question,—a testimony so definite that no great palæontologist was ever yet an assenter of the development hypothesis."

But we must bring our remarks to a close with one word as to the theological bearing of Mr Powell's theory. Although the doctrine of development has, in the hands of Professor Oken and some of his continental allies, been associated with a vague and unintelligible system of Pantheism, yet it were unjust to assert that it necessarily contradicts the first truths of natural theology, as to the existence and personality of God. But as defined and advocated by the author of the "*Vestiges of Creation*" among ourselves, it undoubtedly involved a denial of the immateriality of the soul; and whether that denial may be held with the doctrine of immortality or not, it carried with it the inference that man differs from the brutes in nothing that involves *moral responsibility*. The development hypothesis, in the shape advocated by Mr Powell, cannot be charged with any such doctrine; but in making it consistent with the fact of man's moral and responsible nature, he has made it inconsistent with itself,—advocating the notion of an animal man, subject to the law of physical development, and a spiritual man, owing his being to an act of supernatural power. Apart from this, there is very much in Mr Powell's views that we grieve to say runs counter to Scripture representations. He speaks with something like a sneer of the anxiety manifested by some authors, as to how they are "*to place their theology*" in relation to scientific fact; and he rids himself of this difficulty by being careful to have little or no theology to place. We have already seen that he plainly denies the biblical doctrine of proper creation. He denies, also, the scriptural account of the recent origin of man on the earth, and announces his belief that there is no reason why, in deposits of date far beyond that of the Hebrew chronology, there may not be found the remains of "an extinct and lower species" of the human family. He denies, if we understand him aright, that the different races of men are

varieties of one species, and descended, as the Word of God tells us, from a single pair. Further still, he denies, if we read correctly a somewhat vague and indefinite statement of his views, the Scripture doctrine of the creation of man in a state of original perfection. He asserts, in the strongest possible language, the *irreconcilable* contradiction between the facts of science and the statements of the Word of God. And, as we have already intimated, he avows opinions utterly inconsistent with almost any view, even the lowest, of the inspiration of Scripture, or of its infallible authority, in so far at least as regards its historical statements. We mention these things reluctantly; but it is impossible, in any notice of such a volume as Mr Powell's, to speak of them not at all. He himself particularises, and denounces in strong terms, certain religious feelings and prepossessions, which, as he believes, have done much to mislead scientific inquiry in connection with this question of development; and in a manner that might have provoked resentment, if it had not first moved our sincerest sorrow on his own account, he has made an unworthy assault on Mr H. Miller and his writings, as biassed by such influences. Neither the theological opinions of Mr Miller, nor his scientific standing as a palæontologist, needs any defence of ours,—and they cannot be affected by any rude attack, even from Mr Powell. But, with deference, we must be permitted to say, that there are other feelings and prepossessions of an opposite nature, and not at all religious, equally strong, and far more misleading, in the way of biassing a man against the vital and distinctive truths of God's Word; nor is there any exemption found from the influence of such feelings, in the fact that of that very *Word* he may be the professing minister.

ART. IX.—*There must be, and therefore there really is, a Positive Revelation from God.*

[The following tract is translated from the German of the celebrated Roman Catholic Professor, Hirscher, and contains some good thoughts in refutation of a favourite notion of Rationalists.]

Is it merely to the power of his own intelligence that man owes his knowledge of God and divine things, or does he owe it to the grace and instruction vouchsafed by God? This is a question of the highest importance. For if man's own power be the exclusive source of all religious knowledge, then all that is called positive religion is nothing else than the product of the human mind; its doctrines are, like every thing human, subject to error; its commands, without higher

sanction; and its promises and threats mere human words, which, because they proceed from man, can neither comfort nor alarm. Then, up to the present day, we cannot know whether truth be in the world, or how much there is; every one of superior talent has the right to bring into question again that on which men have lived and died for thousands of years, and the millions, who are incapable of independent investigation, are again brought back from nature to faith,—faith, however, not in the infallible God, but faith in fallible man. Of course, all is quite different if there be a positive divine revelation.

What answer, then, are we to give to the question proposed? The majority of men are possessed with the firmest belief that there exists a positive divine instruction or revelation. But many eminent men in the learned world deny it, and in many brilliant circles this belief of the majority is treated as the belief of the mass of the people, and regarded as something antiquated by those above them. What side are we to take? And should we join in the faith of the majority, shall we not expose ourselves to the compassion, and even the derision, of many very learned and celebrated men?

My opinion is, that the believer in revelation need never blush to appear on scientific ground beside the denier of revelation, and be ready, on the right hand and on the left, to give account of his faith to every one. In regard to it, he can justify himself either in this way,—by proving from a definite revelation, placed historically before him, how perfectly reasonable, yea, how necessary it is, to recognise it as divine; or he can justify himself *a priori*,—that is, by showing that there must be a divine revelation, and that the presumption of such a revelation existing in the world is something to which every one feels himself forced by fair reasoning.

The writer of the present tract, who is also a believer in revelation, here endeavours to justify his faith in the second way mentioned above, by stating briefly, how strongly, on reflection, he is impressed with the conviction that there must be a positive divine revelation, and, consequently, that there really is one.

The existence of a personal God is, of course, here taken for granted. Among the deniers of this it is evident that we could not speak at all of *a priori* grounds for the existence of a positive divine revelation. With them the first thing to be done would be to prove the existence of a personal God.

The proposition we have announced is this:—There must be in the world a positive divine revelation, and, therefore, there really is one. What is it that impresses this conviction on the reflecting mind?—

I. The observation of certain general laws and arrangements in the world.

A.—There is a law which prevails through the whole extent of creation known to us, that for every creature that is to be developed, something external is provided to promote its development; and that which is provided for this end is of necessity something congenial to the creature that is to be developed. Thus, for example, the seed springs up, and the flower unfolds itself. But they are developed only by means of the external influence of moisture, light, and heat. It is

true, indeed, that the vital principle is in the grain of seed and the bulb of the flower; but it is inoperative if it be not stimulated from without by light, moisture, and heat, and decisively moved to the development of itself. If we apply this general law of nature to the constitution of man, in this case also something external is needed analogous to it, and homogeneous, by means of which the vital principle in him may be awakened, and its development promoted. What external thing is this? We answer, It is man. It is by those of his own kind,—by men that man is developed. It is by his parents that the child is developed. The mind of the father is the light, the heart of the mother the warmth, by which the child springs up and becomes a man. But now, we should like further to know by what means father and mother have themselves become what they are. If we reply that they have become so by means of those who were once light and heat to them, just as they now are to their children, then we have not answered the question, but only set it aside. We cannot go back for ever. We must inevitably be led to the conclusion, that before and above all the parental feelings of men, there lived a paternal Spirit, who first introduced a father's and mother's feelings among men, and placed them in the world as civilising principles; and that all human development and civilization took their beginning from a Teacher existing before them, and presiding over them. This, indeed, we are told in the most ancient of historical records,—the first man was instructed by God.—(Gen. ii. 19, 20.)

If we, then, find ourselves unavoidably led to the belief, that originally there must have been in the world a positive revelation from God, then we have only further to ask, Whether we can think that such a revelation was still necessary at a later period, after the human race had learned to act the part of fathers, mothers, and teachers? I answer, That although men had learned to act the part of teachers, so far were they from being able of themselves to carry forward their development, they were not able even to preserve what they had originally received. This also we learn from history. It shows that all the old religious systems of the nations contain some truth, and that this truth, and for the most part the purest of the ideas occurring in these systems, are the oldest. It shows how, through speculation and inventions of the human mind; how, through national and climatic influence, what was original and oldest, instead of being further developed, has been deformed in many ways, and sometimes very strangely. And it shows how the revelations which are regarded by the Christian as divine, were nothing else than a contest carried on for thousands of years against the product of the human intellect and heart, which sent forth a progeny of their own.

B.—Let us now look at a second law of nature. What we call religion is found after its sort throughout the whole visible creation. Thus every creature feels itself bound for ever to that power in nature by which it has taken its origin, and by which it is continually sustained and animated. How gladly, for example, does every living thing rejoice at the rising of the sun! Behold, every living being has religion; that is, it feels itself bound to it [the sun], as to the divinity from which it derives its animating ray of life. What do we infer from this? We infer, that in the world of spirits also there is a Sun

and Godhead, which pours its rays of life over all spirits, animating them, and drawing them to itself; and again, that these spirits will feel themselves bound to it, as the supporter of their existence. Even the devils feel themselves indissolubly connected with it; for they, in the language of the Scriptures, "Believe and tremble." But still further: from this we infer, that if the visible sun makes itself known to the eyes and feelings of every living creature in a manner palpable to the senses, and therefore positive, so likewise will the Sun of the spiritual world after its sort do the same thing, and reveal itself to spirits in a positive manner, and therefore in a manner palpable to the mind.

C.—Let us now take a glance at the world of men, its nature and arrangements. There is a general intercourse of all with all. But it is not through the opening understanding that they are intelligible to each other, nor by vague signs and symbols that they communicate with each other; it is by living discourse,—for the law of nature is, that the intercourse between mind and mind be immediate. It is by words that they give themselves to one another. How then? Is the supreme Spirit to be found out by man only through inferences? Had the Creator of the tongue no language? Did he talk with man merely through the words which man develops out of himself, and did he speak to him everywhere only in dark signs and emblems, and not in clear language? No; man expresses his faith and love to his Father in words; and assuredly the Father is no dumb God, but speaks with man as man speaks with him, by means of words. Yes, God speaks with man, and it is he who speaks with him first; as it was he also who first loved man.

If the assumption, that there must be a positive religion, thus commends itself so much to us already, on theoretical grounds, how much more so if we turn our attention to,—

II. *The comprehensive practical interests involved in this question.*

A.—Man seeks truth. The vital questions of his existence press upon his notice, and he wishes to have them solved. But where can he find the solution? The history of philosophy tells us what has been attempted by inquirers in this case. How contradictory with one another are the results of this investigation! How absurd are many of them! How comfortless! But man will have truth. How, then, could God intrust it to him, yea, require of him, to find out of himself the answer to these great vital questions, and yet make this answer so infinitely difficult? No; man is a child, God is a Father. It is the child's part to ask questions, and the Father's to answer them. It is just in this that their relation to one another consists; and just as certainly as the child is constrained to seek after the Father, and after the answers and instructions of the Father, so certainly are answers given by the Father,—answers as definite and positive as the questions are.

B.—Man seeks certainty. He has an existence with the powers belonging to it. What is he to do with it? Perhaps it is of no higher importance than any plant, which shoots up, puts forth its blossoms, deposits its seeds, and fades away, to make room for a successor. But on the other hand, his existence is perhaps of unspeakable importance,

and stretching out into an eventful eternity. The enigma of his existence lies before him. He wishes a solution; and still more, he wishes certainty. Who, then, is to give him this? Who has descended beneath his existence, who has gone out of himself, who has found his way to the birth-place of the world, that he, speaking of spiritual things, might tell what he had seen; and therefore might have certainty, and might give certainty? Ah, scepticism stands at the side of all dogmatism, scoffing and triumphant, and all that the inquiring mind of man can attain is, in all cases, only probability, even at the best! Certainty is only with God, and is among men only when God has spoken to them. What do we say then? Is there in general to be no certainty, and is the greatest of human wants to be left unsatisfied? We feel ourselves constrained, and therefore also justified, in replying: The highest of all human wants, the want of certainty, cannot be left unsatisfied; and therefore God must have spoken. Let one compare what Hegel, in his *History of Philosophy*, says about the development of this science, since the dominion of the scholastic system.

His idea is, that philosophy has been going on in a progressive development, and that its different systems stand in a close and organic connection with one another, so that each of them forms one step on the long way toward the goal. His own system, therefore, he considers, at least in essentials, to be the completion of the whole. But how, then, if the emancipation of the mind from faith, if the transforming of faith into knowledge has, according to the assurance of this master, been first accomplished by him, how did it stand, up to this most recent and happy period, in regard to certainty about the highest questions of man? There was none. And can the Creator still require man to derive it from himself? But is the certainty, which the human mind is to be called to attain of itself, only attained at last by our newest master? Let us turn to the historical development of the speculative philosophy from Kant to Hegel, by Chalybæus, and see what he says. The opinion of Chalybæus is this:—"Hegel's system, like all that precede it, just falls into the advancing movement, as a point or single step on the long way; and if Hegel regard his system as the last stage, he is mistaken, and there has just happened to him what has happened to most of the philosophers, each of whom has believed that he had found the stone of Sisyphus, or we would rather say, the stone of the wise." Then, up to the present day there is still no knowledge regarding the highest things. How is this? And will the world have to wait till this knowledge be perhaps attained some day? And is the satisfaction of the highest and most urgent of man's wants to be put off till he himself be able to satisfy it? Certainly not. How great is the longing after one who can say of himself, "The words that I speak unto you, I speak not of myself. I speak that which I have seen with my Father."—(John xiv. 10, viii. 38.)

C.—Man has a severe conflict to maintain here below,—this conflict he has to carry on in the denial of self and the world; he has to walk through a path of sorrow,—the path of a thousand afflictions, the path of danger and death. Whence, then, is he to derive the conviction that he ought to follow this painful course? Where is he to get the strength needed for what he should and must do,—the

invincible courage, the final victory? My opinion is, that as it is religion which appoints the noble work he has to do, so must it be religion that imparts to him the power and the courage to do it. And I think, moreover, that it is religion which explains the mystery of his afflicted existence, and sends an answer to his sighing inquiries, "Why and for what end is it thus?" And also, that religion will give him a comforting hope in his trials, and a final victory in his conflict. But what religion will do this? Assuredly, none but a positive religion. Ah, how soon do the duties and works, merely prescribed by man to himself, fade away before the sophisms of the depraved mind! The inducements and motives which the reason of man draws merely from itself are feeble and powerless, and vanish before the flame of burning passion; and in regard to the consolations and encouragements which the afflicted address to themselves, how are they dispersed before the fiery wind of suffering, when the body is racked by burning pains, when pleasure and life are swallowed up in bitter death! There is nothing but the positive Word of God that can support and comfort man. To this unchangeable Word, which stands there with everlasting authority, above all passions and their sophisms; which stands there, with everlasting stimulation and encouragement, above all sensuality and its weaknesses; which stands there,—because it is the Word of Him who has all power, and loves all,—with triumphant consolation, above all the troubles of earth and their pressure;—to it, and to it alone, man looks up in faith, full of reverence, willing, undismayed, sacrificing all, conquering all. We must therefore declare, either that there is generally in the world no unavoidable holy duty, no power victorious over pleasure and pain, no decision, courage, and comfort, more powerful than affliction and death; or that there is a positive Word of God, holy and strong enough to communicate these to men. If we, then, require a positive Word of God, we require only what is urgently demanded by the highest wants and necessities of human existence. Or must we say, "O man, weak and discordant in thyself, bowed down and bruised, help thyself as well as thou canst; there is no help for thee from God!" Yet at other times we say, "O man, help thyself, and God will also help thee."

D.—But perhaps God will not help by positive interposition, because he knows, that although millions upon millions perish in their impotence, yet this does not depress, but only stimulates the power of man to gain for itself, and by itself, its highest point and perfection in every direction. No doubt this is a peradventure, splendid in appearance, and flattering to the pride of man. But there is still the question, Whether it be according to the counsel of God, that millions upon millions should helplessly perish, in order that our race may peradventure gain the credit of helping themselves? And it is a question, whether it be the will of God, that men, instead of being attracted to God by their afflictions, should be separated by them from God; that is, whether it be appointed that they, by and with the glory of helping themselves, should acquire the consciousness of being independent of a higher power, and by and with this consciousness should attain to consummate selfishness? Thus much is certain, that if God wished to separate men for ever from himself, and throw them scornfully upon

their own resources, he could do nothing more fitted to accomplish the end, than if he drove them to engage in an endless conflict with sin and misery, and cried out, as he turned away from them, "Be on your guard, and help yourselves." But just for this reason, we ask, Is it possible that God could have done this? See how the better and the best men of all times have thought, that humility is needful for man, and that in humility is love, and in love is life. But just on this account, the better and the best men have also thought, that the afflictions of life, among other ends, especially serve this end, to loosen man from himself, and make him humble and conscious of his need of God. Can it be, that the better and the best men have been deceived in this? Will the burden laid upon our race not justify the presupposition and assumption of a positive help coming from above; or rather, is it sent only for this end, that men may acquire just the opposite of humility, love, and life,—that they may become proud, and therefore, that the final end of this constant burden lying upon us during life must be, the pride of life? No, this cannot be.

E.—The human heart has love, returns love, and seeks love. This is its nobility and happiness. But in what direction, above all others, is man to turn with his love? Undoubtedly, to Him who is most deserving of love, and is the highest good,—therefore, to his Father and his God. But in which of the two cases will the heart turn to him;—if he withdraw himself from man in everlasting concealment; or if he lovingly draw near to man, speak to him, and, advancing, draw him to himself? Assuredly, only when he comes forward and speaks to him, and attracts him by his love. Were it otherwise, could he have a heart himself? And how else could man have the courage to approach him gladly? If, then, the human heart with its love is to draw near to the highest and purest object,—if it is to be sanctified and blessed just in the love of this object,—if, in this sanctification and blessedness it is to attain and possess its moral greatness and destination,—then God must have first loved man, must have spoken lovingly to him, and, making advances, have drawn him to himself. In other words, there must be a positive religion. Yes, positive religion is the means by which human nature is really laid open to love, and thus to sanctification and blessedness. If, therefore, positive religion stand in such close and necessary connection with the highest development and glorification of our nature, then the assumption, that there really is such a revelation, is not at least foolish and superstitious.

F.—There is still a reflection that occurs here. There are millions upon millions before us who believe in God,—who, as they are convinced, has spoken to them, and has made himself known to them as Father, Redeemer, and Author of their blessedness; and who, in faith, attach themselves to him with infinite love. What devotion is there in these millions! what moral decision and fidelity! what comfort and peace! Now I would ask, "Could I persuade myself to go forth among these millions, and say to them, Ye believe in the word of Him who has never spoken; and He, on whom you depend with love and hope, has never revealed himself; it is doctrine invented by men which ye have received and accepted"? Really I could not do it; I should think it harsh to speak thus, and regard it as the murder of a

beautiful and blessed life, hid in God. But can God have done that which I could not persuade myself to say to these millions,—which I could not express before them without being cruel?—that is to say, has nothing proceeded from him of all that which these millions revere as his word and his will, and on which they build their actions and hopes; and, regardless of the virtue and happiness of men, has he really made no revelation to the world, of all that which men keep hold of as his revelation, and by means of which they remain faithful and joyful in darkness and trouble,—in conflict and death? Then the faith of the millions would be a delusion, and what rests on faith would not rest upon God, but upon that delusion. The deceit, therefore, which has invented a positive revelation, and the fancy which has believed it, would be the salvation of the world; and both the one and the other, the deceit and the fancy, would be more compassionate than God, and more concerned about the dignity and happiness of men. What, my friend, is blasphemy, if it be not such a thought as this?

G.—I allow myself, in conclusion, only to draw attention to this, that, as far as history extends, all nations have gloried, and do glory, in a positive religion. How are we to account for this phenomenon? In early times they had either really received from the gods their religious and moral ideas, and the basis of their civil constitution, so that their general agreement in the belief of a positive revelation justifies us in the conclusion that there is something real in this agreement,—that is, that it is founded on an actual immediate communication on the part of God; or we must at least assume, that the demand for a positive revelation is so indelibly impressed on man's nature, that this urgent demand, everywhere felt with equal power, has produced in all places the same belief. But, assuming this, the question again returns, Can this implanted and irresistibly urgent demand have got, and still get, no attention from God, who is the author of it; and can the innate longing in man after light and power from above have no other design but to predestinate our poor race to be a prey for every deceiver, who would make a wrong use of this longing, declare himself to be an ambassador, and promulgate his own views as the word and will of God? No; the power and pleasure of seeing are not given to man that he may become the sport of optical illusions. It is rather because we have the power and pleasure of seeing, that there is a sun, and the objects which it illumines. Can it be otherwise in the spiritual world?

Thus the reflecting mind finds itself led almost irresistibly to the conviction, that there must be in the world a positive revelation from God. And if one with his whole soul hold fast this conviction, he certainly need not be ashamed before anybody. On the contrary, the wisdom of the wise in many cases cannot appear to him so high and deep, that he must become giddy at the sight of its height and depth.

But now comes the next very important question, Which of the so-called positive divine revelations is really from God?

But the reflecting mind sets itself to this further inquiry with more joy and courage, after it is convinced that what it seeks really exists.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

The Man Christ Jesus. By the Rev. ROBERT CRAIG, A.M., Rothesay.
Edinburgh: Thomas Constable & Co.; Hamilton, Adams, & Co.,
London. 1855.

WE have read this work of Mr Craig with great pleasure, and shall rejoice to hear of it obtaining, as it deserves to obtain, an extensive circulation. We were first attracted to it by its title. We felt strongly that, if it proved true to its name, the "*Man Christ Jesus*" would supply an important desideratum in the literature of our practical theology; nor has a perusal of the work disappointed, but rather confirmed, our expectations.

There is a strange tendency in human nature to rush in its opinions from one extreme to another,—a tendency which we perceive not only in individual men, but in sects and parties of men. An instance of it is noticed by Robert Hall, in his review of Gisborne's *Sermons on Christian Morality*. When the peculiar doctrines of the gospel have been long neglected, and a system of semi-pagan ethics has reigned triumphant in the ministrations of the pulpit, the danger is, that on the revival of a more evangelical strain of preaching, the recoil will be so great as to create an aversion to the inculcation of duty and virtue. The preacher becomes afraid even to mention the term *virtue*; and we have heard the exclusion of it from pulpit discourses seriously defended. On the rise of the Evangelical party in the Church of England, a tendency of this sort was observable,—a tendency which Mr Gisborne's *Sermons* were calculated, and indeed designed, to counteract and amend. In the Church of Scotland, the same current, at least to some extent, set in when Moderatism gave way before the labours of Dr Andrew Thomson and Dr Chalmers, together with their coadjutors and successors. Some clergymen began to shrink from the task of enforcing the duties of morality, lest they should lay themselves open to the charge and reproach of *legalism*.

We suspect the existence of a similar tendency in many minds with regard to the person of the blessed Saviour. It is right and proper that Christians should cherish a salutary horror of Socinianism,—a cold and lifeless creed, a system of barren negations, the general prevalence of which would infallibly and speedily banish religion from the world. But there is some, nay, imminent risk, that this dread of Socinianism should lead to a too exclusive contemplation of the divine nature of Christ. We fear, indeed, that in some measure this has actually taken place. In our anxiety to hold by the divinity, we are apt to lose sight of the humanity of the Saviour. We think

of him as God until we forget that he was a man,—a man of like passions with ourselves, who was afflicted in all our afflictions; and who, in his character and life, has left us an example that we should follow his steps. The evil influence which such a state of mind and feeling is fitted to exert, is of no ordinary magnitude. It makes us lose, to a great extent, the benefit of Christ's holy example, and the consolation of his fraternal sympathy. Hence every effort to correct one-sidedness in our habit of thought concerning the Lord is to be encouraged and applauded; and a book which should have this end in view,—a book on Christ's humanity, written by a believer in his divinity,—we have long considered to be one of the wants of the present day. That want is at length supplied. Such a book we have now the satisfaction of bringing our readers acquainted with. Mr Craig is no Socinian, but a true and faithful minister of Christ; and the design of his present performance, so opportunely conceived, and so well executed, is to set the "Man Christ Jesus" before us as the pattern we ought to copy,—the example we ought to follow,—the "model man," to be imitated as well as admired. Our author's aim cannot be better expressed than in his own words, as contained in the preface of his book: "The author," says he, "was induced to take up this subject, by observing a manifest difficulty in the minds of many sincere Christians, when urged to follow the example of Christ; arising, as he conceived, from looking on him too exclusively as a divine person, and, therefore, above all attempts at imitation by them. He has endeavoured to consider him in his holy human nature, and to analyse his character as perfect man, even though he was also the second person of the glorious Trinity."

In the execution of this design he sets out with the general proposition, that Christ is the "Model Man,"—the great exemplar, which his disciples are bound to copy and imitate. In this, the opening prelection of the book, we find the important thought, that "each individual grace (of Christ), standing out, as it were, distinctly in bold relief from all the rest, was meant to be the perfect revelation of this particular grace to every one of his followers." This just and striking reflection, or an idea akin to it, is thrown out in several parts of the volume.

The author proceeds to illustrate, apply, and enforce his doctrine, that Christ is the "Model Man;" which he does, often in a masterly, and always in a highly creditable, and very interesting and edifying manner, in the discourses that follow out the chief and most prominent features and lineaments that distinguished and adorned the character of the Saviour. He never loses sight of the practical end at which he aims. With this end steadily kept in view throughout, he handles and discusses the following attributes of Christ's character:—his innocence, his spirit, his humility, his piety or godliness, his love, his long-suffering and patience, his compassion, his readiness to forgive, his righteousness and justice, his courage, his diligence and activity, his heavenly-mindedness, his self-denial, his wisdom, his unselfishness, his friendship, his incorruptibleness, his sympathy and sorrow, his habit of prayer, and his perfection and glory.

In handling these numerous and varied topics, Mr Craig makes no pretences to originality. Originality on such a subject is out of the question. Here, an author to be original must be paradoxical; and

Mr Craig has too much love for truth to allow of his being guilty of the stale artifice of paradox. His desire and aim is to do good by the exhibition of sound doctrine,—to impart wholesome nourishment to Christians through the sincere milk of the Word. At the same time, though originality was not to be expected, yet there is often a freshness, now in the thought, and now in the turn of expression, which wears an air of novelty, and awakens a feeling of agreeable surprise. A few instances will best bring out our meaning: “We cannot doubt that his kindness, and wisdom, and dutifulness to all, must have made him much beloved, especially by the best of the people in his little village; nor can we doubt that he was often praised by them for his temper and virtues: yet he never was spoiled by this, never lifted out of his place, never made arrogant, or overbearing, or exacting. He never thought he should be exalted to a higher situation in the world; but in the very age in which other youths are most aspiring, and long most to distinguish themselves, he was as meek and lowly in heart as when he was an infant,—as well satisfied with his lowly condition as if he were not aware there was any other awaiting him,—as humble, when in obscurity he was ruminating the most glorious things, and indulging the most glorious prospects, as if he had not had the smallest conception of greatness.”—(P. 52.) “That is a hollow and heartless morality, or conduct, which is prosecuted without devotion, without fellowship with the Father of our spirits. It is a dead body, without the living soul. It is in reality as if it were an obedience to God, without God. There is a hypocrisy of piety; this is the hypocrisy of obedience.”—(P. 61.) “It is well to remember, that it was because evil was brought to Eve under the disguise of generous love, that she did not shudder at the first proposal of sin made by the tempter. On the other hand, it was because Christ could not be deceived, and because he knew all things, that Satan’s temptations, disguised as before, did not, and could not, prevail with him.”—(P. 74.) “He loved, and this very love delighted to be ruled.”—(P. 75.) “It (patience) is a perpetual contest between hope and despondency or despair.”—(P. 91.) “To forgive a wrong, is to overcome it.”—(P. 136.) “He was no magistrate, or ruler, or official judge in Israel; and, therefore, he refused to judge in those causes which God in providence, and by his institutions, had committed to others. This confinement of himself appeared very strikingly, when he was once applied to by an individual to interfere with the regular course of the administration of law, and to judge between him and his brother about the division of an inheritance. ‘Speak,’ said this man to him, ‘speak to my brother, that he divide the inheritance with me.’ He answered him, ‘Man, who made me a judge or a divider over you?’ He had not been appointed to this office, and he would not accept the honour which this man intended to do him.”—(P. 141.) “He had neither leisure nor heart for useless amusements. Indeed, he had no amusements, and felt no need of any. His work was all his delight.”—(P. 173.)

These passages lose much of their beauty and force by being taken out of the connection in which they occur. Yet even in their isolated state, it will be allowed by every reader of taste, that they are at once striking and suggestive.

Were we asked to name the discourses of this volume in which the

writer is most felicitous and successful, we should have little hesitation in pointing to the sixth, on the Love of Christ,—the eighth, on his Compassion,—the tenth, on his Righteousness and Justice,—the eleventh, on his Courage,—the twelfth, on his Diligence and Activity,—the eighteenth, on his Incorruptibleness,—the nineteenth, on his Sympathy with Sorrow,—and the twenty-first, on his Perfection and Glory. These, in our judgment, are the best lectures in the volume. Were we desired to mention the least happy of our author's efforts in this performance, we should be disposed to refer to No. III., on the Spirit of Christ. There is an occasional obscurity in this discourse, arising from a want of precision in the use of the term *Spirit*. We are sometimes at a loss to know whether the writer by that word denotes the Holy Ghost, or the temper and disposition of the Saviour. He has not stopped to define his terms; and in his desire to be brief, he has become obscure.

As a specimen of Mr Craig's style and manner, we subjoin a passage from his Meditation on our Lord's Courage: "We need not dwell on this theme (the Saviour's fortitude), nor further illustrate the glory of this grace of Christ. It transcended all of the kind that ever appeared in the world. It was in him a *perfection*, which can be said of it in no other man. It was a glory in his character which shone brightly from first to last, though it had nothing in or around it to set it off. It was not laid on a ground of insensibility, or pride, or regardlessness of God's anger, or man's hatred. It depended not on the prowess, courage, or obedience of others whom it inspired to contend and suffer with him and for him, that he might have the glory of the victory without working all the work himself. He had no aid from men. He was alone, and of the people there was none with him. Meek as a lamb, he was yet bold as a lion. His courage was never a rage or a fury; it was always an intelligent, calm, collected virtue. It never waxed and waned. It was ever the same, as all his other graces were. It was as steadfast as was his purpose to obey his Father, and to save his people from their sins. That language of Ps. cxviii. 11, well became him to utter, 'All nations compassed me about: but in the name of the Lord will I destroy them. They compassed me about like bees; they are quenched as the fire of thorns: for in the name of the Lord I will destroy them.' The nations of men, the hosts of fallen angels, compassed the man Christ Jesus; but the name of the Lord was in him. And in that name he destroyed them. He quenched their power like the fire of thorns,—trode on the ashes, and ascended triumphant to the right hand of God, expecting till his enemies be made his footstool, and till he receive the full reward of all his victories over sin, and Satan, and death, and hell."—(Pp. 165, 166.)

But for our limited space, we should gladly have given a more full and copious analysis of this book, and reviewed it at greater length and in greater detail. Enough, however, has been said, it is hoped, to convince the reader that the "Man Christ Jesus" is a performance of no common excellence and no small merit. We warmly recommend it to the Christian public. Its sentiments are just and noble; its style terse and forcible; and often, both in sentiment and style, it is characterised by a beautiful and touching simplicity, every way good.

A Commentary, Expository and Practical, on the Epistle to the Hebrews. By the Rev. ALEXANDER S. PATTERSON, Minister of Hutcheson Free Church, Glasgow. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1856. Pp. 564.

MR PATTERSON is already favourably known to the Christian public by his short Commentary on "First John," and other select portions of the New Testament Epistles.

In other departments, also, of sacred literature he has done good service to the interests of practical godliness, and has fully shown his fitness for the successful treatment of such questions as come more peculiarly within the scope of expository writing, by the gravity and chastened temper of his theology.

In his work on "Hebrews," to which we now more especially refer, and which, though of greater extent and amplitude in its range of reflection than his previous expositions, is evidently, in its whole method and style, produced from the same mould, and exhibits the same unmistakable individuality of mental action, there is much valuable matter. If our space allowed, we would willingly extract several passages from various parts of it, in proof of the calm and discriminating manner in which Mr Patterson has handled several questions of acknowledged practical difficulty, as well as of the illustration which, by the aid of his fine exegetical talent, he has afforded to passages which, as read in the authorised version, come but imperfectly before the mind of the ordinary reader.

We heartily recommend Mr Patterson's work, as a safe and interesting guide to the practical use of this most precious portion of New Testament Scripture.

A Biographical Dictionary of Eminent Scotsmen. Originally edited by ROBERT CHAMBERS. Supplement, continuing the Biographies to the present time. By the Rev. THOMAS THOMSON. Blackie and Son: Glasgow, Edinburgh, and London. 1855. Pp. 643.

NOT having read this volume as a whole, we are not prepared to express a complete judgment on its merits. Having, however, selected one or two memoirs which have a more than common interest, by reason of their subjects, to our own mind, we can venture, we believe, on the strength of their great excellence, to recommend with no little earnestness Mr Thomson's work to the careful perusal of our readers.

As a repository of facts which, being recorded within the fresh memory of most readers, are not beyond prompt and easy correction, where there is any inaccuracy in their statement, a work of this kind is almost invaluable. For not only are the substantial materials of general history thus preserved, but the *hooks* and *eyes* of events,—the precise forms of their relations to each other,—are transmitted to the authors of a succeeding age.

We may refer, as indicative of the superior manner in which Mr Thomson handles his materials, to his sketch of the late Dr Robert Gordon of the High Church, Edinburgh. In giving, with so great fidelity and impressiveness, a likeness of that most noble man, who, even in his most serene times, was one of the finest examples of calm,

severe, rigorous discernment, in union with the most lively Christian honour and chivalry, that any age or country has ever produced, the author has displayed peculiar qualifications for felicitous biographical writing.

Occasionally we meet with verbal mistakes, which, it is hoped, Mr Thomson may, by a speedy call for a second edition, have an opportunity of correcting. For example, in the life of David Douglas the traveller, by the successful efforts of whose botanical genius and spirit of enterprise the woods and gardens of Great Britain have been so greatly enriched and beautified, we find, at page 187, the singular, "genus," used, instead of the plural, "genera."

Internal History of German Protestantism since the Middle of Last Century. By C. F. A. KAHNIS, D.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Leipzig. Translated from the German by the Rev. THEODORE MEYER, Hebrew Tutor in the New College, Edinburgh. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 332 pp.

THIS is a very curious and valuable book, and brings before the English reader a great deal of important information, which could not any where else be found in so compendious and accessible a form. It goes over, to a considerable extent, the same ground as the "*Histoire Critique du Rationalisme en Allemagne*," by Amand Saintes; and occupies very much the same stand-point, viz., that of High Church or Puseyite Lutheranism. But Saintes's work was published in 1841, Kahnis's in 1854, and this interval is an age in the history of German speculations; and the later writer seems to be more thoroughly versed in theological matters than the earlier one. An interesting feature of the book is, that it tends to throw some light upon the causes of the recent unexpected prevalence, among many eminent German divines, of Ritualism and Formalism, or Hierarchism and Sacramentalism, under the name and cloak of old Lutheranism. We cordially commend the work to all who wish to acquire a knowledge of one of the most interesting and important chapters in the history of theological speculation. Mr Meyer, the translator, is a thorough scholar, and highly accomplished man, and seems to have done the work all justice.

History of the Westminster Assembly of Divines. By W. M. HETHERINGTON, D.D., LL.D. Third edition. Edinburgh: Johnstone & Hunter. 1856.

WE are glad to find that a third edition of this important work has been called for. It has taken its place as a standard work upon a topic in ecclesiastical history which must ever be one of peculiar interest to the British Churches. Dr Hetherington possesses many of the highest qualities of the historian,—a thorough knowledge of his subject, a cordial sympathy with all that is generous and patriotic, disinterested and magnanimous, great abilities and ingenuity in estimating and developing the causes and connections of events, a philosophic comprehension of the tendencies and bearings of things, and no ordi-

nary power of vivid conception and description. With such powers and capacities as these, exercised upon such a subject as the Westminster Assembly, Dr Hetherington could not fail to produce a work of the highest interest and value ; and this third edition has its interest and value considerably enhanced by the addition of a chapter upon the theological productions of the Westminster Assembly, of biographical notices of the Scottish commissioners, and of some further information about Philip Nye and religious liberty. We are confident that Dr Hetherington's History of the Westminster Assembly will continue permanently the classical work upon this subject, as the subject is one with which it is very important that all the ministers of the British Churches should be well acquainted.

Early Death not Premature ; being a Memoir of Francis L. Mackenzie, late of Trinity College, Cambridge : with Notices of Henry Mackenzie, B.A. By the Rev. C. P. MILES, M.A., M.D., F.L.S., &c. Edinburgh : Thomas Constable & Co.

THE two young men who form the subject of this work, were the sons of Lord Mackenzie, an eminent Judge in the Court of Session ; and grandsons of Henry Mackenzie, the author of the "Man of Feeling." Though both cut off in early life, and while engaged in the prosecution of academical study, they were spared long enough to exhibit a very fine combination of superior talents and acquirements, of amiable and affectionate disposition, of decided piety, and of some measure of Christian usefulness. The subject is thus peculiarly fitted to be instructing and useful, especially to young men. Mr Miles has used his materials with great judgment and good taste, and has succeeded in producing a work which we can very cordially commend.

The Gathering Storm ; or, Britain's Romeward Career : A Warning and Appeal to British Protestants. By the Rev. EDWARD MARCUS DILL, A.M., M.D., Author of "Ireland's Miseries : their Grand Cause and Cure," &c., &c. Edinburgh : Johnstone and Hunter. 1856.

IN his work on "Ireland's Miseries, their Grand Cause and Cure," Dr Dill produced a complete and conclusive demonstration that the grand cause of Ireland's miseries is Popery, and that the only cure is the removal of Popery. But while no statesman, no political economist, no moralist, no theologian, could dispute, or ventured to attempt to dispute, the demonstrative arguments of that work, they continued to act as formerly, leaving Ireland's miseries unalleviated, and her cure unattempted. They did worse ; they gave encouragement, direct or implied, to the very malady under which that unhappy country has so long groaned, and on account of which it has been and is a source of weakness and danger to the British monarchy.

To this course of dire infatuation the attention of the country is again called in Dr Dill's new treatise, "The Gathering Storm ; or, Britain's Romeward Career." The treatise is short, but clear, direct, and strong, —like a trumpet-call, proclaiming danger, and rousing to prompt and

energetic action. It traces, point by point, the numerous steps of Britain's Romanizing progress, marking pointedly their accumulating power, and placing distinctly before the reader the terrible certainty of the downward course, if not speedily arrested. We could not easily point to a more impressive view of the great criminality and great peril, every day increasing, into which Britain is being plunged by her blinded statesmen and politicians, with scarcely a complaint from the apathetic Protestantism of the kingdom. What can this portend? Is the apathy of Protestants so deep, that nothing will arouse them till it be too late? Is every warning voice to be but like the warning of Cassandra,—disregarded till the hour of destruction shall have come? It may be so; but still, it is the duty of every one who descries the danger, to utter the warning, even though it continue to be disregarded. Dr Dill has done, and is doing this, and doing it with clear and strong emphasis. For this he deserves our thanks; and we but discharge our duty to our common faith, when we direct attention to his valuable production. The little work is so brief and closely compressed, that it does not admit of any analysis; but we earnestly recommend its universal perusal.

We have complained of the apathy of Protestants with regard to the danger of Britain's Romanizing progress; and we may add, that at present we do not see the probability that any attempt to arouse the public mind will be successful. It does not follow, however, that no attempt should be made; but it does seem to follow, that all our attempts should be directed in such a manner as the special nature of the case demands. The period of public agitation has subsided, and cannot, perhaps, be recalled till Popery takes some new aggressive step. But intelligent Protestants may, nevertheless, prosecute the all-important work of diffusing sound information, and forming extensive organizations, which shall be ready to start into combined action whenever any public necessity shall arise. Reformation Societies and Protestant Associations should, therefore, be extended and maintained everywhere throughout all Britain, to be ready in the hour of need,—an hour which may come sooner than we apprehend. By their means, also, information so much needed may be diffused, preparing the public mind for a more intelligent resistance to Popery, and for a wiser advocacy of sound evangelical Protestantism, than has hitherto been possible. We have heard of a Female Protestant Association, founded for this very purpose, actively engaged in circulating the needed information, and aiming at a family alliance, by means of which the entire womanhood of the community may be united in the sacred enterprise of protecting household purity against the insidious and degrading artifices of the Popish priesthood, and training up the rising generation in an intelligent and scriptural abhorrence of the pollutions and tyranny of the antichristian system. Could this be adequately effected, it would of itself arrest the progress of Romanism in Britain, and preserve Christian purity and freedom; and to it, and all well-devised measures having that end in view, we wish the utmost success.

BRITISH AND FOREIGN

EVANGELICAL REVIEW.

OCTOBER 1856.

- ART. I.—1. *Synopsis Evangelica. Ex Quatuor Evangeliiis ordine chronologico concinnavit, prætexto brevi commentario illustravit, ad antiquos testes apposito apparatu critico recensuit Constantinus Tischendorf.* Lipsiæ: 1851. 8vo.
2. *Synopsis Evangeliorum Matthæi, Marci, Lucæ, cum locis qui supersunt, parallelis litterarum et traditionum evangelicarum Irenæo antiquiorum. Ad Griesbachii ordinem concinnavit, prolegomena, selectam Scripturæ varietatem, notas, indices adjecit Rudolphus Anger, Phil. et Theol. Doctor, utriusque in Acad. Lips. Professor, &c.* Lipsiæ: 1852. 8vo.
3. *A New Greek Harmony of the Four Gospels, comprising a Synopsis and a Diatessaron, together with an Introductory Treatise, and numerous tables, indices, and diagrams, supplying the necessary proofs and explanations.* By WILLIAM STROUD, M.D. London: 1853. 4to.
4. *A New Harmony and Exposition of the Gospels, consisting of a parallel and combined arrangement on a new plan, &c.* By JAMES STRONG, A.M. New York: 1852: 8vo.
5. *A Harmony of the Gospels in the Greek of the received text, on the plan of the author's English Harmony, with the most important various readings, &c.* By JAMES STRONG, A.M. 1854. 12mo.
6. *The Four Witnesses: being a Harmony of the Gospels on a new principle.* By Dr ISAAC DA COSTA, of Amsterdam. Translated by DAVID DUNDAS SCOTT, Esq. New York: 1855. 8vo.

THERE is something strange in the unwearied constancy with which the church, in every age, has wrought at the great

problem of harmonising the Gospels. While no one Harmony retains its hold upon the public mind for many generations, there is never wanting one or more possessing such an influence. To each successive age the subject seems as fresh as ever; and to some of the best cultivated minds of each the theme is still attractive. A mere glance at the immense amount of mental labour thus expended, not only by the Tatians and Augustines, the Calvins and Osianders, the Chemnitzes and Lightfoots, the Macknights and Newcomes, but by multitudes of later or lesser lights in harmonistic learning, is sufficient to make two impressions, which, at first sight, may seem contradictory, but which are really two aspects of the same thing. One is the grand and comforting impression of the church's strong faith in the absolute consistency of these divine records. The other is the less agreeable impression of continued failure in one specific object usually aimed at, namely, the reduction of these four books to a single narrative, with any thing like certainty as to the precise order of minute details. The fact of failure is apparent from the endless diversity of the results, all reached *secundum artem*, and all held with equal confidence. Nothing of the same kind can exceed the complacency with which each harmonist regards his own arrangement as the true one, even when it differs by a year, or two years, from the corresponding dicta of his predecessor. The reason why this vast disparity and endless contradiction need not shake the faith or trouble the composure of the mere reader or spectator, is, that he can often see, from his position as such, what the harmonists themselves are blind to, namely, that one grand result of all their labours is, to make it highly probable, if not to prove, that these four books were never meant to be reduced to one, but to remain for ever side by side, as four great pictures of the same great object, by four heavenly artists, with something of course common to them all, but with something peculiar to each, and no more admitting of amalgamation than so many literal paintings upon canvas can be made more perfect by being cut to pieces and then glued together. If the mere identity of subject and of ultimate design can never make this process rational in painting, no more can the same cause have that effect in history. Every complete intellectual product has its individuality, which dies by the intrusion of a foreign element, however homogeneous and congenial it may seem. Even the oldest garment may be spoiled by patching with the newest cloth. It is this that has made paraphrase, as usually understood, to the great majority of readers, an unsatisfying mode of exposition.

But even in the case of two or more inspired writings, amal-

gamation is forbidden by a double law, intellectual and moral, as being inconsistent with the unity which is essential to the effect of every rational, coherent composition; and also with the paramount authority, which gave us these books just as they are, and chose to make them four, when it might as easily have made them one. This may be misconceived as an objection to all meddling with the text of Scripture in the way of illustration and interpretation; but the two things are entirely distinct. Let every lawful process of investigation and of exhibition be applied to Scripture; but let the Scripture itself alone. Let the Gospels be compared and explained *ad libitum*; but let them not be displaced and supplanted by another. Let each produce exactly the impression which it is intended and adapted to produce, not only by its substance, but its form; not only by its detached contents, but by their combination. We may not be able to detect or analyse the specific operation of these causes; but all reason and analogy conspire to prove that they exist and act, and that their action must be interrupted and perverted by joining together that which God has put asunder. What then, it may be asked, is the use of all this harmonistic labour, from the second to the nineteenth century? We answer, Much every way; or rather, every way but one, and that the very one on which the heart of the harmonical interpreter is often set,—the undesirable, impracticable, and chimerical reduction of these four inestimable gems to one bright but artificial compound. The true use of Harmonies is threefold,—exegetical, historical, apologetical. By mere juxtaposition, if judicious, the Gospels may be made to throw light upon each other's obscure places. By combination, not mechanical but rational, not textual but interpretative, Harmonies put it in our power, not to grind, or melt, or boil four Gospels into one; but out of the four, kept apart, yet viewed together, to extract one history for ourselves. And lastly, by the endless demonstration of the possible solutions of apparent or alleged discrepancies, even where we may not be prepared to choose among them, they reduce the general charge of falsehood, or of contradiction, not only *ad absurdum*, but to a palpable impossibility. How *can* four independent narratives be false or contradictory, which it is possible to reconcile on so many distinct hypotheses? The art of the most subtle infidelity consists in hiding this convincing argument behind the alleged necessity of either giving a conclusive and exclusive answer to all captious cavils and apparent disagreements, or abandoning our faith in the history as a whole. This most important end of Gospel Harmonies has been accomplished. It has been established beyond all reasonable doubt, that however the evangelists may differ, and however hard it

may be often to explain the difference, they never, in a single instance, contradict each other. This is a grand result, well worthy of the toil bestowed upon it by fathers, and reformers, and divines, for eighteen hundred years; while, on the other hand, the minute chronology which some of these have viewed as the great object to be aimed at, is as far from its complete solution now as in the days of Tatian or Augustine; so that the inquirer may still say to the most able harmonists, with one of Terence's dramatic characters: *Fecistis probe, incertior sum multo quam dudum!*

But why is this failure not to be regarded as a great loss and damage to the cause of truth? For the simple reason, to which many great men in this field of labour have been strangely blind, that EXACT CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER IS NOT ESSENTIAL TO THE TRUTH OF HISTORY. All history, indeed, as the science of events, and therefore implying change, must have a definite relation to time, and must, therefore, to a certain extent, be chronological. But this extent is far less than is commonly supposed by such harmonists as Townsend, who appear to think the life of Christ worth nothing, till the absolute or relative chronology of every minute fact is settled, and the characteristics of the several evangelists confounded in one uninspired narrative, without defined character at all; or by such as Osiander, who chose rather to believe that some of Christ's most unique acts were twice performed without the slightest difference of circumstances, than to admit that any one of the four evangelists had ever departed from the order of time. It is astonishing that an assumption so gratuitous, so groundless, so directly contradictory to ordinary usage, and to the general analogy of Scripture, should have been so obstinately cherished in relation to this matter, even by some who never thought of applying it to any other. No one can deny, that in the historical books of the Old Testament, events are often brought together on account of some affinity between them, or of their common relation to the author's purpose, without detracting in the least from the historical character or credit of the record. If the books of Kings and Chronicles go through with one reign, and then back to the commencement of another partially contemporaneous, why may not the Gospels do the same? If the best biographers of Washington and Bonaparte can treat their private, military, and administrative history *seriatim*, or alternately, without inaccuracy or confusion; if Mr Prescott, in his "Life of Philip the Second," can deliberately and avowedly depart from the precise order of events, so far as to treat kindred portions of the history together, not only without damage, but with great advantage to his ultimate design; why may not the four evangelists have

followed the same method, so far as to have rendered the precise determination of minute dates, and even the precise succession of minute events, not only needless but impossible? If each of the four Gospels makes precisely the impression which its writer and the Holy Spirit had in view; if all the facts designed to be perpetuated are on record, and exactly in the shape and in the order predetermined by infallible authority; if the great phases and conjunctures of the history succeed each other in an order not to be mistaken; why should I care to know which of two parables was first uttered, or which of two miracles was first wrought? If their chronological relation is explicitly recorded, or distinctly ascertainable by inference and combination, so much the better; but such cases are not here in question. If it is not so recorded or so ascertainable, why should I spend my life in reasoning or guessing to discover what, if known, however interesting or worth knowing it might be, would probably add nothing to the strength of my impressions or the clearness of my views, and what can certainly not be essential to the end for which the history was written, or it would have been written too? These views may no doubt be perverted and abused, to the exclusion of legitimate and even necessary efforts to discover what is really contained in the inspired record, although not exposed upon the surface; and the Gospel history abounds in such scarcely-hidden treasures, little suspected by the superficial or the supercilious reader. Between such investigation and the vain search for minutiae of time and order, which are neither needful nor attainable, it may be sometimes hard to draw the line; but that only makes it the more necessary that it should be drawn, and that no *nugæ difficiles* should usurp the place of genuine interpretation.

These few considerations may suffice to show, that the failure of harmonical interpretation to demonstrate the precise chronological succession of the detailed facts recorded in the Gospels, detracts nothing from their credit or historical trustworthiness, nor from the value of the great negative conclusion, reached by these laborious inquirers, often as unconsciously and undesignedly as some of the old alchymists contributed to physical discoveries of later times, although they died without possession of their long sought elixir and philosopher's stone. As men of science now look back upon the toils and speculations of a Raymund Lull and a Paracelsus, so may the biblical interpreter look back upon the labours of that class of harmonists to whom we now refer, with gratitude for what they have accomplished in the vindication and elucidation of these precious books, but with complete indifference to their speculations and their strifes about those *minima*; of which it may be

said, in reference to the law that should control all criticism and interpretation, *De minimis non curat lex*.

But besides these reasons for not overrating the importance of this favourite harmonic problem—the determination of the precise order in which every minute incident took place—there are positive objections of the gravest kind against the more presumptuous attempt to substitute a single compound narrative for the four distinct ones in the canon, not merely in the way of comment, but in that of reconstruction,—an error into which few harmonists of the higher rank have fallen, but which is nevertheless so common, that the arguments against it, though already hinted at, may not without some good effect be more distinctly stated.

The first objection to this practice is, that it assumes some imperfection in the Word of God,—as if the work of revelation had been done only in part, and needed now to be completed,—as if the four evangelists had only left materials in a crude state, to be afterwards digested and reduced to shape by human skill and wisdom. This, though never openly avowed, and seldom consciously admitted, is really involved in every harmonistic scheme which undertakes to substitute a composite narrative of its own for the four canonical Gospels. By a composite narrative, we do not mean a paraphrase, exhibiting the substance of the four accounts in other language, but a combination of their very words into a new texture, different from any one of the Gospels, but purporting to contain them all. If this is not supposed to be a better and more perfect shape than that of the four Gospels, why attempt it? If intended merely to interpret or illustrate, why not do it by reference to the parallels, or by simple juxtaposition? Why such extreme care to retain the *ipsissima verba* of the sacred writers, and even to gather up the fragments wasted by this sacrilegious process, and preserve them in the margin? All this shows it to be, not interpretation, but reconstruction; not the elucidation of an old text, but the manufacture of a new one,—and as such, implying that the work of the evangelists is only half done, and requires to be finished, in order to accomplish its design. Besides the fallacy which lies at the foundation of this undertaking, in relation to what constitutes a true and perfect history, it tends necessarily to undermine the reader's reverence and faith in the completeness of the record which the Holy Ghost has given of the life of Christ.

Again, as history, from its very nature, is eclectic; and as every historian, inspired or uninspired, must choose his own materials; and as every intelligent historian is guided in his choice by a regard to the object that he has in view; it follows of necessity that his omissions and exclusions are as much a

part of his design as his insertions, and that I have no more right to put in what he has left out than to erase what he has written; nay, that I cannot do so in the one case any more than in the other, without thwarting his purpose and disturbing the impression which his composition was intended to produce. And if this is a wrong to any book whatever,—if Boswell's Johnson has been spoiled by Croker as an intellectual production, though enriched as a mere magazine of facts,*—how doubly inadmissible is such a course in reference to writings which are owned and really believed to be inspired, by the very men who thus presume to mangle them! For it is worthy of remark, that this mistaken theory and practice are confined almost exclusively to pious writers of the American or English school. If Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, directed by the Holy Spirit, have selected each a certain number of particulars belonging to the life of Christ, arranged them in a certain order, and wrought them up into a certain shape, it must have been with a design to make a definite impression, perhaps inscrutable by any critical analysis, but not on that account less real, less important, or less sacred. And yet this impression must be greatly marred, if not destroyed, by the adoption of the current fallacy, that the four evangelists were not inspired to write histories, but only to collect materials for Mr Townsend or for Dr Stroud.

The last objection we shall make to this pernicious mode of fusing or amalgamating, under the pretence of harmonising, four complete productions, both divine and human, just as if they were mere fragments or bundles of anecdotes, is, that it hinders and embarrasses interpretation, by depriving the interpreter of that inestimable aid which he derives from a continued context. A collection of inscriptions—such as that which the French Government has gathered from the graveyards of Numidia and Mauritania, and is now publishing in lordly style†—is harder to interpret, as a whole, than the hardest ancient book: the book of Proverbs is more puzzling than the book of Psalms; the Psalms more puzzling even than the Prophecies: and all for the same reason, though in different degrees,—that at least half the light which an interpreter enjoys is shed directly or reflected from the context, and that this is reduced to a *minus* in the lyric, and to a *minimum* in the aphoristic and the lapidary style. It matters

* The "Quarterly Review" has very recently (January 1856) declared this work to be the best edited in the language; which, so far as illustrations and additions are concerned, may be true, but not in reference to the treatment of the text, and of the composition as a whole.

† Inscriptions Romaines de l'Algérie, recueillies et publiées sous les auspices de S. Exc. M. Hippolyte Fortoul, Ministre de l'Instruction Publique et des Cultes. Par M. Léon Renier. Paris, 1855-56, folio.

little whether we can see the *nexus* in a chapter of John or not; however incoherent it may seem, we know that it is just as he composed it, and we therefore look with some degree of confidence to the surroundings of a passage for assistance in deciphering its meaning. But we cannot feel such faith in the artificial context which the harmonist has thrust in, like a wooden leg, among the mangled limbs of the evangelists. He may have hit upon the true chronology, but he may not; and if he has, it may be at the cost of the original connection, and of the associations in the writer's mind from which it sprang at first, and of which it is still the living intellectual expression. This loss can never be made good by any possible amount of chronological precision, even though it should exceed that of an almanac.

Before concluding these remarks, we wish to say a word upon an opposite extreme, which has sometimes been engendered by reaction from the one that we have just described. We mean the flippant and contemptuous ignoring of all harmonising methods, where there seems to be a discrepancy on the surface, and treating them not only as inadequate, and even silly, but as unmanly and dishonest. To those who are at all familiar with the history and literature of the subject, there is something quite amusing in the air with which some recent and by no means first-rate writers try to put out of existence, by a peevish exclamation or a wave of the hand, problems and methods of solution which have been deemed worthy of profound thought and laborious exertion, not merely now and then, or here and there, but by many of the great minds of the Christian church, in every country and in every age.* At all events, this habit of insisting upon cutting, and often with a dull knife, knots which so many strong and skilful fingers have been trying for ages to untie, ought to come, if it comes at all, from those who have acquired the right of speaking *ex cathedra*; and when urged by others, is as little entitled to consideration as the simple faith which it affects to pity, or the honest but mistaken means employed to gain an end which it dogmatically sets aside as wholly unattainable.†

Abjuring, as we do, both these extremes; believing that the Gospels can and must be harmonised, without destroying their unity and individuality; and knowing that the product of such studies includes wheat as well as chaff; we cheerfully

* Such views are less surprising on the part of German sceptics, who have no experience in the practical comparison and estimate of evidence, than in American or English Christians who have ever heard a witness cross-examined, or a complicated case summed up.

† This fault is chargeable, in some degree, on Alford's Greek Testament (vol. i. London, 1849), a useful addition to our English *apparatus biblicus*, though encumbered with a vain parade of textual criticism, and often showing signs of "cramming" rather than digestion.

resume the account of contemporary harmonistic literature, which we began more than seven years ago. In the number of this journal for October 1848, besides stating in another form some of the same views which we have now presented, and enumerating several recent German publications on the Gospel history, we recommended Dr Robinson's "Harmony," as, on the whole, the best with which we were acquainted, and at the same time, as the cheapest and most readily accessible to ministers and students in this country. Repeated re-examinations of the subject, and of many later works respecting it, have only deepened our conviction, that, for judgment, accuracy, caution, and exemption from vagaries and extremes, this fruit of native scholarship is still unsurpassed by any rival, foreign or indigenous. We can say this in consistency with what we have already said as to the failure of all efforts to determine the minute chronology or ἀκολουθία of our Saviour's life; because Dr Robinson's conclusions are collectively as probable as any others; and because, apart from this vexed question, the merits of his work enable it to stand a comparison with any that have followed it, to some of which we now ask the attention of our readers.

The works which we have chosen for this purpose may be said to represent four countries, two being natives of Germany, one of Holland, one of England, and two (by the same author) of America. One of the German works is by a writer who acquired considerable reputation more than twenty years ago, by a Latin treatise on the Chronology of Acts,* which was regarded as a sort of standard until superseded and eclipsed by Wieseler.† The peculiar feature of his synopsis is not the arrangement of the text, in which he follows Griesbach, but the exhibition, in a lower margin, of quotations, references, parallels, and traditional addenda, from the fathers of an older date than Irenæus. This description will suffice to show, that the labours of the editor, however learned, and however valuable they may be, belong rather to patristic than to harmonistic literature. They may, and no doubt will, facilitate the task of the interpreter and critic, but can scarcely be expected to throw much light on the points which are particularly interesting to the readers of a Harmony. The author, indeed, seems to have adopted this merely as a convenient vehicle for his collections from the early fathers, using Griesbach's well-known synoptical arrangement as a text, to which his own patristic parallels might be appended. He has pro-

* De Temporum in Actis Apostolorum ratione scripsit Rudolphus Anger, Philos. D. AA. LL. M. in Academ. Lips. Privatim Docens. Lipsæ, 1833. 8vo.

† Chronologie des Apostolischen Zeitalters bis zum Tode der Apostel Paulus und Petrus. Von Dr Karl Wieseler, Professor der Theologie in Göttingen. 1848. 8vo.

bably accomplished all that he designed, but can hardly be considered as having given a new impulse or advancement to harmonical interpretation.

The name of Tischendorf has been, for some years past, becoming famous, not so much for great ability or general learning, as for strenuous devotion to a single study, and an almost preternatural fertility and diligence in making books for its promotion. As a critical editor of the Greek Testament, and a personal explorer of manuscript treasures in the East and elsewhere, he is commonly allowed the first place in contemporary literature. Although still in the prime of life, he has already published more editions of the Greek text and its Latin versions than Erasmus, Beza, and the Stephensses together. That this is not a speculation or a drudgery, but a passion, may be seen from the unabated zeal with which he can rewrite and reprint the same text and prolegomena and annotations, under a dozen varied shapes, and sizes, and denominations. Of his textual labours we may take another opportunity to give a more particular account. At present we can only say, that the same one idea or ruling passion still inspires him in his Harmony or Synopsis, where a large space is allotted to another reproduction of his critical labours on the text of the four Gospels. The harmonical arrangement varies only in a slight degree from that of Dr Robinson; and whether this be acquiescence or coincidence, it bears a very honourable and important testimony to the labours of his learned predecessor. The arrangement and typography of this Synopsis are, as might have been expected from the author's other publications, tasteful and attractive, but without the lavish ostentation which his own wealth or the patronage of others has enabled him, in many cases, to indulge. The work before us, although neat, is wholly unpretending, and within the reach of any student,—all the contents, except the text and variations, being written in Latin. Beyond this, however, it would not be just to go, in making Tischendorf's Synopsis an important contribution to the harmonising of the Gospels.

Much more attention has been paid to the harmonical arrangement of the text by the American and English writers of a recent date. Both Dr Stroud and Mr Strong appear to have begun the work *de novo*, reconstructing the whole narrative on principles and methods of their own. Dr Stroud, however, goes much farther in the actual amalgamation of the Gospels into a new and compound narrative, which occupies the leading column of his splendid quarto from the press of Bagster. Besides this mixed text, he exhibits those from which it is compounded in parallel columns. The author is

an English physician, previously known, both at home and on the Continent, by a treatise on the "Physical Cause of the Death of Christ," (London 1847.) This special and professional inquiry seems to have directed his attention to harmonical studies. For unwearied industry and conscientious care, in the performance of his task, he is entitled to all praise, as well as for a large amount of useful information in his introduction. We are bound to add, however, that with all the advantage of a faultless typography and artistical arrangement of the page, the result is complicated and confusing, while the infinitesimal divisions and innumerable titles, far from aiding either eye or understanding, only serve to make confusion worse confounded. Besides these empirical objections to the aggregate result, we are constrained to reiterate our strong dissent from the theory and practice of ignoring the four Gospels, as coherent and complete books, and treating them as bundles of materials for book-making. We have no doubt that, like multitudes of similar productions, Dr Stroud's costly volume will do good, especially in wealthy circles, where a book less showy might not find access; but we cannot conscientiously regard it as a sensible advance upon preceding Harmonies, and towards the ultimate solution of the great harmonic problem.

The Gospel Harmony of Mr Strong is now before the public in two shapes. The first, exhibiting the English text, arranged upon a new plan, with accompanying maps, notes, chronological tables, and illustrative engravings, is a large and elegant octavo volume. In addition to some new and independent views, affecting the adjustment of the narrative, this work has two distinctive features of a bold and somewhat novel kind. The first is a "free version," or accompanying paraphrase, "in a straight-forward and modern style" (Preface, p. vii.); the other an original translation of "poetical strains," especially citations from the Hebrew, into English blank verse. —(Preface, p. ix.) Of these we shall say nothing, but exhibit samples, taken almost *ad aperturam libri*. The dialogue between our Saviour and the thief upon the cross is paraphrased as follows:—

"Then looking toward Jesus, he fervently begged, 'Master, remember me [by a participation in the reorganization of that period] when you return [after your resurrection] to establish your kingdom [by the resuscitation of saints and the renovation of Judaism!]' To this diffident appeal] Jesus blandly replied, 'Yes, I assure you, that [without waiting for any future development of my mediation] *this very day* you shall share with me the immortal bliss of *Paradise* [that portion of *Hades* (*i.e.*, the region of departed spirits beneath the earth)

assigned by the Jews to the pious.']"—(*Strong's Harmony and Exposition*, p. 360.)

The prophecy of Micah, quoted by the chief priests and scribes, in Matt. ii. 6, is versified as follows:—

“ [Dark is the cloud impending o’er the land ;
But gleams of happier times break through the gloom.]
Jehovah singles thee, O Bethlehem,—
Ephrathah erst ; though small thy borders seem,
Compared with many towns of Judah’s tribe,
Yet large the honour destined thee among
Its principalities—of ‘ thousands ’ all.
For out of thee will rise the heaven-sent Prince,
A pastoral sway to bear o’er Israel’s fold.”—(P. 22.)*

Of these “ poetical strains,” and this “ straight-forward and modern style,” as well as of the costly plates and maps, the second or Greek Harmony is wholly destitute. The taste of some, however, will be apt to regard it as a much more elegant and scholar-like performance. While the useful part of the accompanying apparatus is retained, the book attracts the eye by its accurate and neat typography, its clear symmetrical arrangement, and the proof which it affords both of scholarship in general, and of learned labour spent upon this subject in particular. The departures from preceding Harmonies, in form and order, though apparently the fruit of independent speculation, and in some cases plausibly defended, are still subject to the general uncertainty which we have represented as involving the minute chronology of this whole matter. One of the most convenient appendages of Mr Strong’s harmonical arrangement, is the clear and simple exhibition, in the margin, of the textual changes which have been *adopted* (not *suggested* merely) by the latest critics. If we do not set as much store by the grammatical notes, it may be from a want of experience in the use to which they were particularly meant to be applied. To us, we frankly own, they seem precisely of the sort which tempts the wish that there were either more of them or none at all.

But the grand peculiarity of Mr Strong’s Harmony, as such considered, and therefore found in both its forms, is yet to be described, and well deserves description for its novelty and ingenuity. Among the parallels, in every case where they occur, he chooses what he thinks the fullest narrative, and prints this in a large type, as the leading column. The other, or others, he displays beside it in a smaller letter. But what strikes us as a really original invention, is the introduction from the parallel columns into the main one, of such words

* This is the result to which the fashionable mode of printing such quotations naturally tends. The next step, we suppose, will be to make them rhyme.

or phrases as may serve to supplement it and complete it. This, which would otherwise be liable to all that we have said against the method of amalgamation, is redeemed from that reproach by printing these interpolations in a smaller type than the rest of the column, so that the eye can instantly detect them, and refer them to their places in the other columns. We must confess that we were greatly taken with these neat contrivances at first sight, and regarded them as sensible improvements in the method of exhibiting harmonical results, and in the means of promoting harmonical study. Closer examination has made no change in our estimate of the talent for ingenious combination and arrangement which is here displayed. We are constrained to say, however, that the more we have examined the result as embodied in this handsome volume, the more misgiving have we felt with respect to its expediency and usefulness. The process of selection and comparison, here finished to the reader's hand, is by far the most improving and delightful part of all such studies. Even the school-boy, who requires this degree of aid, must need a *clavis* to replace his *lexicon*; while students of a riper age must certainly lose much, both of pleasure and improvement, by having that done for them which they can do, and would do, and ought to do themselves. Another objection to the method is, that it destroys the prestige of integrity and unity belonging to the Gospels when presented side by side without admixture. There is something almost morally offensive in the sight of any human hand, however reverent or skilful, tampering with the text of these incomparable records, cutting them into shreds, or mutually patching them, as if by that means we could get a seamless fabric, woven from the top throughout. Especially is this impression made by occasional changes in the form of words and phrases thus transferred, in order to adjust the syntax; a necessity which, far from recommending the arrangement, is itself sufficient to condemn it, or at least to justify a strong predilection for the good old plan of simple tabular synopsis, which exhibits nothing but the matter to be harmonised, and leaves the reader to compare it and combine it at his own discretion.

Very different from all these is the last book named at the beginning of this article. It is not so much a Harmony as a Harmonical Commentary on the Gospels. In its original form, it was a course of popular lectures on the difference and agreement of the Gospels, delivered in Holland more than fifteen years ago, and subsequently published, as an antidote to Strauss' *Life of Jesus*.* It was afterwards translated, with

* Voorlezingen over de Verscheidenheid en de Overeenstemming der Vier Evangelien: door Mr Isaac da Costa. Eerste Deel, 1840. Tweede Deel, 1842. Leiden, 8vo

the author's approbation, and with some modification of its form and a new title, by Mr Scott. This elegant volume, from the press of Ballantyne in Edinburgh, has been since put into circulation in America, at a very reasonable price, and is, we trust, already known to many of our readers. For the sake of such as have not met with it, however, we propose to give a more particular description than we could in a short notice on its first appearance.* Without repeating what we then said, that Da Costa is a Christian Jew, descended from one of the old Portuguese or Spanish families who fled from persecution to the Netherlands some centuries ago, and is equally esteemed by those who know him, for his genius, learning, and peculiarly unJewish piety, we shall simply say, by way of introduction to what follows, that this work shows so much modest independence and originality, with such familiar knowledge of the oldest and the latest speculations, true and false, and the results of ancient and modern exegetical investigations, that we know of no contemporary writer who seems to come so near the character described in Matt. xiii. 52,—a scribe discipled unto the kingdom of heaven, and, like a faithful householder, bringing forth out of his treasure things both new and old.

The radical idea of the work before us is, that THE GOSPELS CAN BE HARMONISED ONLY BY DUE REGARD TO THEIR PECULIARITIES; a principle by which it is immediately distinguished from the English schemes of fusion or amalgamation. This primary or fundamental postulate is verified by separate descriptions of the Gospels, with their several characteristics, followed by mutual comparison or contrast, and the author's mode of solving alleged contradictions.

The first Gospel he regards as the genuine work of Levi the publican, or Matthew the apostle, written probably in Greek, and not in Hebrew, yet peculiarly oriental and Judaic in its character; recording few dates and few minute details, but abounding in quotations from the prophets, as proof of the Messiahship of Jesus; often combining homogeneous matters, without regard to mere chronology, as in the parables, the sermon on the mount, our Lord's instructions to the twelve, and his predictions; *never naming the Samaritans*; peculiarly fond of the word *τότε* (*then*), and of generic plurals (as in speaking of the thief upon the cross); and with a strong disposition to exhibit things in pairs or couples,—on which the author founds a new, but rather far-fetched explanation of the two blind men at Jericho, and the two demoniacs at Gadara, where Mark and Luke have only one.

* See our number for January 1855, pp. 162, 163, where this and another of Da Costa's works are briefly noticed, with a few facts of his history.

With respect to the second Gospel, the author's views are still both "new and old." He believes it to have been written with a full knowledge of the first, and under Peter's influence, embodying many of his vivid recollections; so that words and acts which in the other Gospels are anonymous, are here ascribed to Peter, while his vain attempt to walk upon the water is omitted. Compared with Matthew's Gospel, this has fewer incidents but more minute details, as in the account of the transfiguration, and the miracle that followed. It omits much that was particularly interesting to Jews,—the genealogies, some parables, the woes denounced upon the scribes and Pharisees, Jerusalem, Capernaum, and other cities; it explains peculiar Jewish terms and customs, such as "corban," and washing before meat;—all which show a primary reference to Gentile readers. As characteristics of the writer, he enumerates his fondness for the adverb *εὐθὺς*, and for Aramean or vernacular expressions (*Talitha cumi*, *Ephphatha*, *Abba*), always accompanied by a translation; also his habit of precisely designating persons, (as in the case of Bartimæus, Abiathar, Levi, Boanerges, the father of Alexander and Rufus.) As examples of minuter strokes, not found in Matthew, he specifies the mention of the hired servants at the call of James and John; the crowd being so great that they could not eat; their toiling in rowing; Christ's inviting them to come and rest; the mention of the stone at the sepulchre as great; his looking round with anger, and in general, the frequent mention of our Saviour's looks and gestures, most of which we know only through this Gospel. As minute peculiarities of diction, he refers to his habitual quotation of the very words spoken; his frequent transposition of the words used by Matthew, where the words themselves are just the same; and his fondness for the combination of a cognate verb and noun, (create and creation, astonish and astonishment, blaspheme and blasphemy.) He accepts the old tradition, that the writer was named Mark, but denies that it was John Mark, on the somewhat unsubstantial ground of a perceptible difference of character; while, from the soldierly, laconic style, the precision and rapidity like Julius Cæsar's, the fondness for recording brief and peremptory orders, the obvious reference to Gentile readers, the occasional use of Latin words, and the allusion to military usages, especially the Roman watches of the night, he draws the singular conclusion that the writer was a Roman soldier, Peter's son in the faith (1 Peter v. 13), and therefore not improbably *the same devout soldier who attended him from Joppa to the house of Cornelius in Cæsarea*. As to the view of our Lord himself presented in this Gospel, Da Costa thinks, with many others, that it is pre-eminently that of his humanity, the Son

of man, while Matthew views him chiefly as the Son of Abraham and David, Luke and John as the Son of God. In recording the miracles, he dwells upon the instrumental or accompanying acts, the touch, the clay, the spittle, the sighing, &c., &c. As to the subject-matter of this Gospel, its chief peculiarity is, that it has so little that is really peculiar to it, the facts which it records, with few exceptions, being found in the other Gospels.

The third Gospel he regards as the work of a Greek proselyte and a physician, as appears from his descriptions of disease, and of our Saviour's bloody sweat; not an eye-witness, but a regular historian, paying great attention to minute chronology, as in the case of Anna, and Æneas and others, the duration of whose sufferings is specified, the indication of Christ's age, and of certain intervals occurring in his history; often referring to contemporary persons and events (Herod, Archelaus, Antipas, Philip, Chuza, and Joanna, Pilate's massacre, the tower in Siloam); sometimes restoring the order of time, from which Matthew had departed for the purpose of his argument, as in the sermon on the mount, the Lord's prayer, the parable of the mustard-seed and leaven, the prediction of the downfall of Jerusalem; though a Gentile, dwelling much upon the Jewish history and usages; often coinciding, both in sentiment and language, with Paul in his epistles; fond of exhibiting our Lord's beneficence to publicans and sinners, to Samaritans and Gentiles, to women and children; dwelling much on his devotional habits, and his unction with the Holy Ghost. Compared with Matthew, he exhibits many of the same facts, but with many differences, showing, however, an acquaintance with the older Gospel, and assuming the same knowledge in his readers. His relation to Mark is, according to Da Costa, that he often borrows the details from him, where he follows Matthew as to the main facts, evincing that he knew both, and derived from both precisely what was suited to his own specific purpose.

Besides the great distinctive features of John's Gospel, which are recognised by all, Da Costa points out his peculiar habit of interpolating parenthetical explanations in his narrative ("This he spake of his body,"—"This he spake of the Spirit,"—"He knew what was in man,"—"Jesus himself baptized not,"—"This was that Mary,"—"This was that Nicodemus,"—"This was that Caiaphas,"—"This he spake signifying what death he should die," &c.); his constant use of logical and not mere narrative connectives (therefore, for this cause, &c.); his selection of incidents intrinsically grand, or connected with our Lord's discourses; the paucity but magnitude of miracles recorded; his frequent mention of the

Father and the Paraclete; his disposition to record the speeches even of inferiors (John the Baptist, Nathanael, the Jews at Capernaum, the blind man and his parents, Thomas, Mary Magdalene); his peculiar use of the terms, "Word," "Light," "Glory," "Truth," "Son," "Lamb," &c.; his attention, at the same time, to minutiae (much grass,—much water,—other boats,—barley-loaves,—such and such a day, hour, year,—so much myrrh and aloes,—so many fishes); his careful record of the festivals which Christ attended; his quotation of prophecies not found in Matthew, among which are some by Christ himself.

This, says our author, is a new but not "another gospel." By a bold musical figure, he describes it as the bass of the quartette! As to the other books, John must have known them, and, indeed, he may be said to combine Matthew, Mark, Luke, Paul, and Peter all in one. He is at once prophetic, historical, doctrinal, and practical. He gives no list of the apostles, but he speaks of "the twelve;" he gives no genealogy or record of Christ's birth and education, but he tells us that men called him "Jesus of Nazareth, the son of Joseph;" he repeats none of the parables recorded by the others, but abounds in parabolic illustrations of the same kind (the good Shepherd, the lost sheep, the vine, the harvest); he records no case of dispossession, but he tells us of Christ's saying, "Now shall the prince of this world be cast out;" he omits our Lord's prediction of the downfall of Jerusalem, but records that of Caiaphas. He explains what Matthew, Mark, and Luke left unexplained, as when he tells us that Christ spake of his body, and accounts for the great concourse between Jerusalem and Bethany, by relating the raising of Lazarus, thus explaining Luke's allusion to his mighty works, and Matthew's record of the question, Who is this?

Among his singularities of language is the double Amen, found exclusively in John, which most regard as a real habit of our Lord, but Lightfoot as a mere repetition of the writer, and Da Costa, somewhat mystically, as the echo of Christ's word in the soul of the beloved disciple. He describes, as the grand distinctive feature of this Gospel, its combination of extremes, of grandeur and minuteness, of the Jewish and the Christian, of divine and human.

In determining the author, he adopts the old view, but presented in a new light, that although he never names himself (for John here always means the Baptist), every reader feels that the mysterious, nameless figure which appears in the first chapter, passing from the school of John to that of Christ,—who leaned upon his bosom at the supper, and followed him on his arrest,—who knew the high priest, and brought Peter into

his palace,—who stood beneath the cross, and was entrusted with the mother of his Lord,—who saw his side pierced, and ran before Peter to the sepulchre,—who first knew Jesus on the lake,—and of whom that mysterious rumour went abroad that he was not to die,—must be one of the twelve, must be one of the three; and as no one could be less like Peter, and as James died too soon to be the author of this Gospel, the unanimous tradition of the ancient church is true, that it was written, in his old age, by the last survivor of the twelve, John the son of Zebedee, the disciple whom Jesus loved and yet rebuked, the son of thunder, the perpetual associate of Peter in the Acts, and with him a pillar of the church at Jerusalem long after Paul's conversion.

After giving some account of the modern neological reaction against this Gospel, represented by the "Probabilia" of Bretschneider, and the counter-reaction in its favour, represented by Bretschneider's recantation; and after showing how many of the traits peculiar to this one of the four Gospels may be also traced in the Epistles and Apocalypse, Da Costa takes the only miracle recorded by all four evangelists, the feeding of the five thousand, and employs it to illustrate their peculiarities. He then repeats this process on a larger scale, filling more than a hundred pages (of the English volume) with a thorough analytical comparison of our Saviour's passion, as recorded in the different Gospels. This, though not so satisfactory to general readers, on account of its descending into such detail, is of the highest value to the critical inquirer; even its failures and its over-refinements being not only interesting but instructive. Into this, of course, we cannot enter further, as it does not admit of either abstract or abridgment, but must hasten to present some of the general conclusions which the author draws from these distinctions and comparisons.

His grand result is, HARMONY NOT UNISON,—perfect accordance in design and substance, with the utmost individuality of character and form.

The author's mind, prolific in analogies, exhausts itself in efforts to illustrate this idea, by architectural and musical comparisons, which, like most others, do not always run upon all-fours. Some of his distinctions, if not altogether just, are striking and suggestive; as that Matthew presents Christ as a king and prophet, Luke as a king and priest; Matthew writes as a Jew for Jews, Mark as a Roman for Romans, Luke as a Greek for Greeks, John as a cosmopolite for Jews and Christians.

The chronological relation of the Gospels is presented in a manner equally original, whatever may be thought of its ratio-

cination. He who writes always as a Jew, an eye-witness, an apostle, building on the Old Testament, combining things that are alike, and drawing gigantic outlines,—must be first in time. He who follows the first closely, often using the same words, but omitting, transposing, and particularly filling up the outline with details—must be the second. He who takes outlines from the first, and details from the second, but enriches both with fresh additions, and professes to write *ἑξῆς*—must be third. He who repeats little from the other three, but is ever presupposing their existence, yet continually adding what is found in none of them—must be the fourth. This mutual relation he illustrates and confirms by Old Testament analogies, or rather by the uniform organic progress, which he thinks may be traced alike in nature, providence, and revelation. As the prophecies are, so to speak, evolved out of the Pentateuch and one another; as the New Testament thus grows out of the Old, and each successive part from that before it; so Matthew's argument, though it maintains its place, gives birth to Mark's description, and both to Luke's history, and all to John's *Θεολογία*,—the infancy, youth, manhood, and old age of one and the same revelation,—or, to change the figure, as our author sometimes does without sufficient notice, a quaternion of evangelists, the two apostles marching outside, to cover, as it were, the apostolicals, though clothed at the same time with the authority of Paul and Peter. Whatever may be thought of these particular distinctions and analogies, it must be owned that the ingenious author has established his right to ask the triumphant question at the close, Can all this be the work of chance or human contrivance?

In accordance with his fundamental principle, he holds that these four views of Christ were necessary to produce the requisite effect; that none of them could have been spared; that though the inspiration of the authors was the same, their human gifts were different; that each Gospel is perfect in its kind, but not complete by itself, like the members of the body; that each answers its own purpose, but not God's, which requires and comprehends them all. If we had only Matthew's outline record of some facts, it would be perfect as an outline, yet not all we need. One side of a building may be perfect in design and execution; yet it cannot be the whole, or any other side but itself.

As to apparent or alleged discrepancies, our author holds that they are aggravated, not relieved, by fusion and assimilation; that the actual diversities are not to be ignored or even extenuated, but allowed to give the key (another musical allusion) to the entire harmony, so that the more differences we find, the more distinctly will the Gospels stand forth in

their individuality ; and yet these differences, far from being contradictions, will be found to be the necessary elements and indispensable conditions of the highest unity. However transcendental this may seem in form, we do believe that it embodies an intelligible and important truth, the same that was propounded at the outset of this abstract, as the radical idea of Da Costa's work.

We shall close our crude account of this extraordinary book with the author's own summary harmonic rules, or rather pregnant statements of the consequences flowing from the previous discussion. He concludes, then, that the earlier evangelists were well known to the later, and were used by them, but independently, or only in dependence on the Holy Ghost, whose will was not that they should use precisely the same matter, still less the same manner, but that each should choose from the common material, with a view to his own specific task and calling ; that they consequently might, or rather must, differ widely in selection, arrangement, and expression. Matthew combines like with like ; Mark frequently, by transposition, makes it chronological ; Luke gives it a historical construction, to which John adheres, except for cause, in what is common to them both. As a general thing, Matthew abounds in topics and in words ; Mark and Luke in more minute details ; while John is full in both respects, yet different from all. In speaking of the same thing, Matthew sometimes has the plural,—Mark and Luke the singular ; the former being more generic and collective in his thoughts and words,—the others more specific and individual. Even where John is like the others in his general mode or manner, as in local description or exact specifications of time and number, the details are for the most part peculiar to himself. In recording speeches, all convey the true sense ; but Mark and Luke more generally give the precise words,—Matthew the substance, sometimes with ideas that were not expressed, though really implied,—and John with the echo or reflection of the language from his own soul.

In giving an idea of Da Costa's singular production, we have chosen to retain, as far as possible, his own arrangement and peculiar form, although the one is often desultory and the other odd. But the very fact that these peculiarities are so much out of keeping with the old-fashioned harmonistic methods of the English school, may lead to wholesome action and reaction between systems so antipodal in form, though really concurring in the same essential views of inspiration, and of Christ himself. We should not have thought our author's speculations, striking and ingenious as they are, entitled to be brought before our readers at such length, if they

were not imbued, and we may say instinct, with vital Christianity, with clear and large views of the most important doctrines, and with pure affections corresponding to them.

In parting from the books which have detained us so long, it is pleasing to reflect that every one of them is likely to be useful, in its way, and to a certain class of readers. We are glad to think that Anger will lead some German students of the Gospels to compare them with the fathers of the first two centuries, not only for their own improvement, but for that of others, and not only in the way of illustration, but of critical authentication. We are glad that such a name as that of Tischendorf is here pledged to the possibility of harmonising all the Gospels, and not merely three of them, which is the *maximum* conceded by the modern German theory and practice. We are also glad that a synopsis so coincident with that adopted by our own best harmonists, is thus put into German circulation with a needless but respectable endorsement. We are glad that many buyers of fine books in England will be led, perhaps insensibly, by Dr Stroud, to learn far more than they would otherwise have known about the life of Christ, not only in its outlines, but in its details. We rejoice that our Methodist brethren, of whom we are informed, though not by himself, that Mr Strong is one, have so intelligent and accurate a writer of their own on this important and delightful part of sacred learning. And lastly, we congratulate ourselves and others that such principles and sentiments as those of Da Costa—leaving out of view particular exceptions—are in active circulation through so wide a sphere, in Holland, Britain, and America.

To ministers and students of our own church we recommend as helps in this most interesting study, the Greek text of Robinson, and Scott's English version of Da Costa. We have not compared the same parts of the latter work in Dutch and English; but our strong impression is that the translation is a good one, and its beautiful typography is not the least of its attractions. We have only one defect, or rather one excess, to criticise, which might be deemed too small for notice, but for its doing great injustice to the author's judgment and good taste, merely to gratify a freak of his translator. When we first cast our eye upon the English volume, we were struck with the multitude of *saints* scattered over the surface. Not knowing this to be a Low Dutch fashion, we regretted that the author, however great a stickler he might be for this saintly etiquette, had not sought or seized a dispensation from the rule, if only to save space and spare the reader's eyes. On coming to a sight of the original, we found, to our surprise and indignation, that this host of saints was intro-

duced by the translator, who might almost seem from this officious act to be a convert from dissent to churchmanship, as scarcely any other would have thought of overloading and defacing such a book in such a way, lest either of the four evangelists should once appear without a handle to his name; although it might be hard to say why such a deprivation would be more unjust to them than to the saints of the Old Testament, to whom even Puseyites and Papists do not scruple to refer as plain Noah, Moses, David, and Elijah. Against this absurd exaggeration of a harmless though unmeaning practice, and especially this vast multiplication of words, without the addition of a single new idea, we appeal, not to Scripture or sectarian distinctions, but to taste and common sense. Many a reader, we have no doubt, though accustomed and attached to such formalities in other cases, will consider their use here a work of supererogation, and perhaps be ready to say,—

“Is it a custom?—Ay, marry, is it;
But to my mind, though I am native here,
And to the manner born, it is a custom
More honoured in the breach than the observance.”

ART. II.—*Guido and Julius; or, Sin and the Propitiation, exhibited in the true Consecration of the Sceptic.* By FREDERICK AUGUSTUS D. THOLUCK, D.D., Professor of Divinity in the University of Halle. Translated from the German by JONATHAN EDWARDS RYLAND, with an Introductory Preface by JOHN PYE SMITH, D.D. Gould and Lincoln, Boston, 1854. Pp. 238.

THIS book was published in Germany more than thirty years ago. The demand for five successive editions attests its merits and general popularity. The present translation was published in England in 1836. It may occasion surprise to some, that the work is republished in this country at so late a day. But however desirable its appearance at an earlier period might have been, there was perhaps no time when this book would have attracted so large a number of readers as at the present. The literature of Germany and the United States have, especially of late years, been brought into more intimate and pleasant relations. And much of the theological literature imported from the Continent, that land of scholars, has become naturalised on our shores. The particular object the pious and learned author had in view in the preparation of this work, was to provide an antidote to the more subtle and fascinating

forms of scepticism. And for such a work, there was in Germany, especially in the earlier part of the present century, a loud and imperative demand. Infidelity, in its various forms, had spread like a blighting mildew over the German universities and churches, and threatened, in the very cradle of the Reformation, the total extinction of evangelical truth. When Dr Tholuck was appointed to the chair of theology in Halle, vacated by the death of Dr Knapp, in 1826, Rationalism had an absolute sway in the university, and the amiable professor needed a military guard to defend himself and his dwelling from the attacks of fanatic students, embittered by the appointment of an evangelical teacher. In an address delivered by our author before the theological school in Strasburg, in 1837, he observes, "No one at this time doubts, that in the early part of the century, Rationalism was the only religion of all the more cultivated classes of society. The most that can be admitted is, that on the coast of the Eastern Sea, in Pomerania, or in the most remote parts of Prussia, there was yet here and there an orthodox pastor, and even these were expected soon to follow their more enlightened brethren! There was not even a contest with error; for such was the spirit of the times, so fearful and universal the spread of error, that there were scarcely any found who were able to take up the gauntlet against the host of learned enemies of evangelical truth. What Jean Paul says in a somewhat earlier period, 'There was at one time religion in war, but now, there is not even war in religion,' was literally true of the theological arena in the beginning of the present century." He adds: "In the beginning of this century, it occurred at a celebrated German university, that the theological students, arranged in a formal procession, conveyed the sacred Scriptures to the grave, and in the spirit of contemptuous derision, pronounced over the Book of God a funeral oration!" In this degenerate age, the works of such men as Fichte and Spinoza were far more popular than the holy oracles of eternal truth. Among others, whose productions have contributed to the great apostasy, were Eichhorn, Eck, Eckerman, Paulus, Schiller, Hartman, Göthe, Wegscheider, Röhr, and even De Wette and Gesenius, as well as Hase, Vatke, and Strauss of Tübingen. We do not mean to assert that all these had departed equally far from the standards of evangelical truth, but however widely they may have differed as to particular dogmas, they occupied essentially a common platform—they were of one mind in rejecting the fundamental characteristic *principle* of Christianity. They assumed and professed the principle, that the Christian religion must be construed liberally, and must be accommodated to the growing wants of the times; meaning, that every doctrine and precept

proclaimed by Christ, his prophets and apostles, must be brought to the bar of their own constituted goddess of reason, and only such doctrines as sustained the ordeal of that tribunal were admitted to favour with the polished classes. This principle being once admitted, the legitimate results speedily appeared. For "can a bitter fountain issue sweet streams"? The plenary inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, miracles, prophecy, and all positive revelation, were first covertly, then openly denied. The Bible, as a consequence, was declared to be nothing more than a collection of mythological fables, family tales, national songs, hero stories, political schemes; and at last, a sublime morality, a universal religion, pure Theism, which Jesus framed into an adaptation to all countries and all times.

From this description of doctrinal corruption, it is easy to see the necessity of a suitable antidote,—and such an one is furnished in the excellent volume under review. Dr Tholuck is known as a man of very superior intellect, and of profound and varied learning. In his early history, he was drawn into the whirlpool of infidelity. He even went so far as to maintain in a public thesis the superiority of Mahometanism to Christianity. But through the influence of Dr Neander and a private friend, he was led to see his error, adopted evangelical views, and became a subject of their saving power. The renewal of the heart, the infusion of a new and heavenly life, his humility, love, and earnest piety, now combined with a sound erudition, prepared him to occupy a most important and influential position among the friends and advocates of evangelical truth. Even his former errors, his acquaintance with infidel sophistry and argument, could now be turned to good account in combating error and vindicating truth. As a student, he had listened to the lectures of orthodox and rationalistic professors, had mingled with students and scholars of every shade of sentiment, from the confiding, humble Christian to the impudent scoffer and bold blasphemer. But "God makes the wrath of man to praise him," and he often employs the very weapons of his enemies to discomfit and scatter them. This he did in the present instance. Our illustrious author had become thoroughly acquainted with the manœuvring and tactics of the enemy; and the weapons he had so skilfully employed in the ignoble cause of infidelity, he now used with tremendous and glorious effect against the marshalled legions of the god of this world.

For the American reader, it will be proper to notice briefly the particular circumstances which served as an occasion for the publication of this work. In the year 1832, Dr De Wette published a work in two volumes, with the title, "Theodore ;

or, *The Consecration of the Doubter*," [or *Sceptic*.] The tendency of this book may readily be conjectured, when it is known that the author deduces all religion from an innate propensity in the human mind, cherished and refined by reason and experience; that he sees nothing supernatural in the mission of Moses, of the prophets, of Jesus of Nazareth, and of the apostles; and that, quoting his own words, "the divine excellency of the Christian religion is especially conspicuous in this, that it directs men to seek their salvation within their own breasts, without any foreign aid whatsoever," and that "the soul oppressed by a sense of its sins, ought to seek rest and peace only from its own powers."* Dr Tholuck, detecting the rationalistic character and injurious tendency of this book, and being painfully conscious of the wants of the age, prepared a work to meet these wants with the title, "*The Doctrine of Sin, and of the Propitiator*; or, *The True Consecration of the Doubter*." The method pursued by De Wette, to appease the conscience and silence the doubts of the sceptical student, was by conducting him into a refined but spurious philosophy, and by entirely ignoring a positive revelation and the distinctive character of evangelical religion,—a mystical Deism. Dr Tholuck takes the doubting, perplexed, and unhappy student by the hand, leads him step by step through the most profound investigations, carefully removing every obstacle as he advances, and scattering to the winds the various refuges of lies in which the children of error in their mad infatuation seek to intrench themselves. Thus, with the torch of science in one hand, and the blazing light of revelation in the other, he conducts the bewildered and trembling sceptic to the glorious Source of truth and life.

The work before us is divided into two parts. The first part treats on Sin, and the second on Propitiation. The author introduces to his readers two interesting youths, to whom he gives the names Guido and Julius. These, he tells us, grew up together as intimate companions, and enjoying favourable opportunities for mental culture, they pursued their studies with enthusiastic ardour. But alas for the times in which they lived! Education was rudely sundered from its proper and divinely constituted relation to religion; and even religion itself either ignored or held up to reproach and derision. Still their case was not entirely hopeless. There yet remained some lingering rays of light to conduct them through the dark labyrinths of infidelity and error. But we will now allow the author himself to introduce his interesting youths, and in his own words. He proceeds:—

* De Wette de Morte Expiatoria Jesu Christi, p. 94.

"Guido and Julius, early in life, became friends from a congeniality of disposition. While other boys of their acquaintance were satisfied with finishing their appointed tasks, and then gave themselves up to childish amusements, these two were simultaneously drawn by an irresistible impulse into the higher sphere of intellectual life. The noxious mists of earth were floating on the more delicate eye of their perception, and allowed no view of the distant and the lofty, when the pure air of philosophy invited them to its unclouded hills. That mystic music of sentiment, which, issuing from the interior of each susceptible spirit, attracts it homewards, resounded in the secret recesses of their bosoms; and they followed the magic tones which called them to the depths of religion. The fine arts, also, whose brilliancy casts a transient lustre over sober life, were not seldom the objects which they pursued even to exhaustion. One thing only they could not endure,—the common, the vulgar, the mean. Their noble minds were full of vital sparks, inviting as it were the electrical wand which would relieve them from their charge; but it came not. Within the precincts of their school was no Emmaus; no spring flowers flourished there, no groves of Academus. The new philosophy which they studied had established itself on the mouldering ruins of the ancient Stoa, and the deserted walks of the gardens of Epicurus. The director of the gymnasium, an aged man, revered the pineal gland as the seat of the spirit; and had often indulged the speculation, whether the Creator, instead of a heart, should not have furnished man at his creation with a third hand, or a third foot. It was his office to teach religion. Most assiduously he dragged a skeleton, his own workmanship, day after day, into his lecture-room, and shook the man of bones so often as to fill his pupils with dismay. Nor were the other masters of a better kind; philologists, who, in all their vocabularies, had not one word of life-giving power. The preachers of the town were part orthodox, part neological, but all lukewarm and devoid of energy. What they had of religion was nothing better than cold lava picked up at the foreign volcanoes."

From this extract the reader can form an idea of the circumstances in which our noble youths found themselves whilst pursuing their academical studies. In early youth, they had been taught to reverence religion, and to regard its claims as paramount. But, like many others, they had not been fully brought under its life-giving and controlling influence. Still the truth, which, like a divine seed, had been scattered upon their hearts during a process of early training, however defective may have been their religious education, was not altogether dead and inoperative. They felt in their inmost spirits a want which no human philosophy, no acquaintance with science and literature, could satisfy; and though they loved to linger at the Castalian fount, they felt an intense longing to drink of—

"Siloah's brook, that flows
Fast by the throne of God."

But alas for their noble aspirations! They found themselves in a most uncongenial element. For not even their *longing* after the absolute and real was in the least countenanced. With a new philosophy there had also arisen a new theology, a theology not worthy of the name. All this was sad enough for Guido and Julius. And as might be expected, environed as they were with mountains of ice, the flame of their spirits was found to burn more faintly. But now and again the inward gathering new strength, spoke out in thunder tones, and burst the barriers of religious indifference, and of an undefined, half-conscious scepticism. In the breast of each arose the question in solemn earnestness—*For what purpose have I been born?* This question, it seemed to these noble-minded youths a crime to leave unanswered. Hence they gave themselves to reading and meditation. No one being at hand to direct them in their investigations, and finding in the books they read very much the same diversity as was found among their teachers and associates, their progress towards truth was slow and perplexing. Time rolled on, and the period arrived when they were matured for the university; and here we have their mental posture and condition at this period of their history:—

“They were enriched with solid acquirements, endowed with a sound, correct judgment; but had withal a sense of unhappiness and want, since they were neither able nor inclined to conceal from themselves that the longing for repose (that relic of the divine image in man) was still unsatisfied. With melancholy and deep sorrow they surveyed the past years of their life, and beheld the path strewn with crushed hopes and wishes, with errors and faults; they looked with secret agitation on the floods of tumultuous desires within their breasts, the cataracts of unbounded emotions,—their inward life without a goal, their resolutions but so many fleeting clouds, and their principles a mass of stationary cloud, under which the former were hurrying along. And yet, can there be a life without a centre?—as little as a world without a God.”

Next comes the parting scene, and it is so interesting and touching, that we feel constrained to give it to the reader in the very words of our author:—

“The time for their separation was now come. Guido was about to study theology at the university of X—; Julius to study philosophy and history at Z—. Affecting was the day of their farewell. It was a bright spring morning: the sun had already risen and shone unclouded in the blue expanse. The meadow in which they had their last interview, was the very spot on which, when only nine years old, they had prayed on their knees to God that he would make them truly pious. ‘Now,’ said Julius, ‘who knows whether we shall not in this same meadow rejoice the answer to the prayer of our childhood?’ ‘Who knows?’ rejoined Guido, weeping; ‘with sorrowing eyes I look

forward to the future. Ah, Julius! already the lower region of our life's Etna (childhood and youth) has been fruitful of sorrows; can we expect happier productions of the cold region of manhood and grey hairs? Scarcely will our much-agitated hearts have become tranquillised when old age will precipitate us into the crater!' 'I,' answered Julius, 'I cannot doubt that what we are seeking we shall find, though for the present I see no outlet. Like you, I exclaim, Wanderer! whence? Wanderer! whither? I know not. But I behold the sky full of stars, and the human heart full of secret longings and anticipations. Then let us, here, in the presence of the Omniscient, make a covenant, that we will wrestle and strive till we have attained that peace for which our souls thirst; that we will, faithfully and without wavering, follow the inward voice that continually, in whispers or in louder accents, is calling us to the pursuit.' With these words they embraced each other and departed.

"Guido commenced his theological studies with great ardour. He attended partly neological, partly orthodox professors. In their lectures he first became acquainted with all the sceptical objections which modern times have raised against Christianity. He had formerly expended his energies on the different sciences, and from all had hoped to satisfy the longings of his heart; he now confined his attention, for the most part, to theology. Here he saw an immeasurable field open before him, and he wished, above all things, to obtain certainty respecting the truths of Christianity. None of his instructors satisfied him. Some spoke so coldly and profanely of the characters recorded in the New Testament, that he, though not a believer in its divine origin, perceived something greater and more noble in them than these men could discern."

It is pleasant to notice that our student still retained a measure of respect for the Word of God and the system of religion it reveals. He felt that the sacred volume was pervaded by a mystic element, that it possessed a super-earthly character; and hence, though its claim to be an infallible, divine revelation could not be sustained, still its high moral character challenged a serious and earnest investigation. But to his extreme chagrin and disappointment, not one of his instructors approached in this spirit the book of God. Some, in the spirit of a semi-scepticism, made a half-hearted attempt to prove the truth of Christianity by an appeal to its outward, historical evidences; and this method they pursued with such admissions and modifications, that it carried with it but little force, and utterly failed to produce conviction. Other instructors grounded their whole system on the standards of the church, and sought to bear down every apparent contradiction and difficulty which presented itself to inquirers by demanding an unconditional submission of belief, and inviolable adherence to the letter.

"Theology had now lost all its attractions for Guido. She seemed to him a rude barbarian, who, herself accustomed to a scanty diet, in-

vited guests from the classic soil of beautiful Hellas, for whom she was unable to provide suitable entertainment; whilst she wielded her club in defiance against any who refused her the meed of hospitality. She appeared, still further, to betray her base origin and want of native dignity, when, with engaging airs and obsequious civility, she begged philosophy to allow her to retain a few strips of land from that territory of which she had already been compelled to restore the finest parts to their rightful lord."

Guido now turned away from theology with disappointment and disgust, and sought relief in philosophy, which he regarded the queen of human knowledge. But he soon found himself involved in similar difficulties. For if the holy science of theology must be degraded from her high position, could it be supposed that philosophy would escape the rude intermeddling of presumptuous men? In the reigning philosophy there was a hideous mixture of truth and error. In this miserable abortion, Pantheism and Fatalism were prominent characteristics. Our youth soon found himself on the tumultuous ocean, without chart or compass, not knowing in what moment his frail bark would be dashed to pieces. Having pushed his investigations into the remote regions of speculation, he found himself in the midst of a huge mass of errors and contradictions; and in the agony of his spirit he exclaimed, "Is there truth? is there a God? What am I? have I an immortal destiny?" But he continued to pursue his studies with the greatest diligence, without, however, obtaining rest for his dissatisfied and agitated spirit. From his friend Julius he had heard but seldom. The following we quote as the substance of his several letters. In his first letter he informs Guido, "That he had commenced to read the Bible diligently; that he found it difficult to convince himself of its doctrines; but that the study of history had proved to him the need of an expressly revealed religion, as well as the excellency of the Christian morals, as exemplified in men who had sought uniformly to regulate their lives by the Scriptures." But suddenly, a year before he left the university, after a long silence, Guido received a letter from his friend, stating that he had undergone a great change, which he termed *regeneration*. The whole language and style of the letter were new. Several things appeared obscure to Guido; but as Julius had expressed himself with great interest and firm conviction on several doctrines of the Christian faith, he communicated frankly and in detail his own doubts and scruples; not concealing at the same time his apprehensions that Julius, in a flight of enthusiasm, had united himself to a fancied goddess, but in reality to a cloud; a union which would probably end, like Ixion's, in a progeny of chimeras. The next letter brought the unexpected news that Julius had devoted himself

to theology; but he assured Guido that he might dismiss his fears about chimeras, for his heart had now learnt, by experience the most indubitable, what truth was. That strong desire for clear views which he had always been wont to feel, still continued, and prompted him to the study of theology. He now wished to know the results of his experience in their various connections and relations, and recommended his friend Guido to allow the inquiry respecting evil to take precedence of his other studies; seriously assuring him that from this investigation a new light would speedily break forth. Guido was much affected; on the one hand, by the ardently joyful spirit combined with a firmly settled purpose of soul, of which every sentence in his friend's letter gave evidence; on the other hand, by the hints which Julius had given of several Christian doctrines, which he had hitherto viewed in a totally different light. He himself had fallen of late into a comfortless scepticism,—he had given up all hopes of finding the truth; and in this state had written to his friend, under great discomfort.

Julius, in his answer to Guido, expresses the deepest sorrow in view of his extreme mental perplexity. Guido indicates a spirit almost bordering on despair, doubting whether there exists what is termed *truth*. In this unhappy posture, his friend proceeds to impart, in a most loving and earnest spirit, such counsel and instruction as his peculiar circumstances so urgently demanded. After a suitable and touching introduction he proceeds thus:—

“What I lay down as the *δοξ μοι που στω*, as the hinge of all human knowledge, is the Delphic inscription. Only the descent into the abyss of self-knowledge can render possible the heavenly ascent of divine knowledge; and no pretended wisdom is more to be rejected than that which puts out our eyes, so that we cannot look into the interior of our own being. When I say to you, ‘Learn to know thyself,’ I mean nothing else than to ask, *What lovest thou?*”

Julius now proposes to Guido the grave and important question, *Whence is evil?* And after having stated the different theories, and elaborately exposed those that are false, he says:—

“Let others look for the root of evil wherever they please. For my part, as I have already shown, I can look for it only in the creature himself. I can never suppose evil to be co-eternal with God, nor can I place it in God, as a self-consuming shadow. It is not original, nor is it a necessary defect; it is a deprivation,—a contrariety. The Scriptures inform us that God made man upright;—that I believe. From light, only light will be produced; and God is the Father of lights.—(James i. 17.) God, who is a law to himself, is also a law for all created intelligences.

"Thus I believe that the Scriptures are the solution of the greatest problem in the universe; thus, I conceive, will you also recognise in the 'foolishness of God,' more wisdom than in the whole Babel of human systems. I have spoken to you of that act of the first man, which casts its shadow over the remotest ages. And what is now our condition? Man is truly 'the offspring of God;' but no sooner does he view this aright, and look around, and within him, than all his glorying is at an end; he must throw himself in the dust, and lament that God's image is so shamefully defaced. . . . The more man learns to trace the operations of the living God as a real personal agent, by marking the diversified experience of his own heart, the more indefatigably will he make out, in the apparently confused mass of this world's events, the '*dissecta membra Poetae*,' and thus obtain more frequent glimpses of the divine harmony subsisting amidst all the mysteries of our existence. It belongs peculiarly to those master-strokes of the divine hand by which its skill is most clearly shown, that, in his plan of the universe, evil unfolds itself free and unhindered; but no sooner has it revealed itself distinctly as evil, than it is obliged to enter the service of his wisdom, and to execute his will. Thus it is with the sinfulness of Adam. It appears in the whole race, since all are men; but 'if by one man's offence death reigned by one, how much more they which have received abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness, shall reign by one, Jesus Christ.'"

Julius continues with the subject of sin, and maintains fully the ancient orthodox position relative to its origin and propagation. He sees in Adam the proper representative of the race; and in his fall, the fall and consequent depravity of humanity as such. All Pelagianistic notions are earnestly discarded, and the race is contemplated as in a guilty and hopeless condition.

After the lapse of almost a quarter of a year, Julius received from Guido an answer to his earnest and affectionate letter. He commences thus:—

"DEAR JULIUS,—My soul is becoming calmer. A mild brightness begins to skirt the thunder-cloud, and the sound of the thunder is more distant. 'Suns beyond suns float in the farthest ether; their unknown radiance has been, for thousands of years, darting onwards to our little globe, and has not yet arrived; but thou, O God, inexpressibly great, art also inexpressibly near!'

"My soul is still too agitated; my eyes too full of tears. In a few words only will I unfold to you the history of my heart.

"Yes; now I know it. 'Man can misapprehend, scorn, and retard the truth; but circuitous and perverted as his course may be, he only wanders, and, in the midst of that course, still seeks and means to find it. He cannot do without it; and, when it appears to him, it is impossible that he should not do it reverence.' But what wisdom is more foolish,—to imagine that, amidst a thousand systems devised by human folly, man may find truth during this hand-breadth of life, or to resign himself to the total loss of it in magnanimous despair?"

"Your letter, and the suggestions it contained for the guidance of my inquiries, have had a powerful effect on my mind; and though I bow reluctantly, still I bow. Do you wish for an image of my inward life? Receive it in the words of Schiller:—

"Und es wallet und siedet und brauset und zischt,
Wie wenn Wasser mit Feuer sich mengt,
Bis zum Himmel spritzt der dampfende Gischt;
Und Fluth auf Fluth sich ohn' Ende drängt.
Und ein arm und glänzender Nacken wird bloss,
Und er ist's, und hoch in seiner Linken
Schwingt er den Becher mit freudigem Winken."

SCHILLER'S DER TAUCHER."

"And it whirled, and it boiled, and it roared, and it hissed,
As when water and fire contend;
It sprinkled the skies with its scattering mist,
And flood on flood crowded on without end.
* * * * *
Now an arm, now a swan-like neck is bare;
* * * * *
And—'tis he! in his left hand holding up
With a flourish of triumph the glittering cup."

DWIGHT'S TRANSLATION.

Guido was led to see, in the light of God's Spirit, and in the blessed gospel, what he had never before seen, and what he had all along sought in science and philosophy. The gospel poured upon his spirit such a flood of light, that he saw with deep horror the fearful depravity of his heart, and became a humble, trembling criminal before his holy and righteous Judge. "Henceforth," he says, "I am no longer ashamed to claim brotherhood with 'the publican,' who set little value on the pompous philosophy, the high-flown speculation which harangued from the stage, and preferred the humiliating lessons taught by experience, in the dungeon and the mire.—(Jeremiah xxxviii.)"

"How gratefully the mind receives new lights,
Emerging from the shades of prejudice,
And casting old establishments aside!" *

Guido being slain by the law, and condemned at the bar of his own conscience, and feeling himself bound by the fetters of sin and Satan, he earnestly called upon God from the depths of his misery, as the only one who could free him from wretchedness and ruin. By divine grace he was enabled to believe on the despised Nazarene; and being justified by faith, he had peace with God. And having communicated to Julius the mental process through which he passed, his varied spiritual struggles and experience, and his subsequent peace and blessedness in a living union with the divine Redeemer, he proceeds thus:—

"My beloved friend, I have now made you acquainted with the moulding of my soul. I hold 'the cup high above the foaming flood,'

* Aristophanes, *Nubes*, v. 1331.

yet the billows still break over me. I think that you will already have learnt from my statements that the lofty spirit has been brought low, and the stony heart has been crushed. Yes, I can truly say, I am not great in my own eyes. I am the unworthiest of the children of men. With David I can say, 'Before I was afflicted, I went astray; but now have I kept thy word.' . . . Sometimes, while I am sitting in silence, and bemoaning that the wheat in myself and others is so much choked with weeds, a gentle voice whispers, 'God is thy friend!' A blissful feeling then comes upon me, which I never felt before; I am often constrained to shed tears of joy, and seem as if I had already entered the mansions of the blessed. In my former repose there was an internal disquietude; while now each painful feeling is soothed by the gentle gleams of tranquillity. My inward life resembles the close of a summer's day, when the sun is on the point of setting. . . . Ah, my inexpressibly dear friend, would that I could see you again! then we might unite in joyful thanksgivings on that very spot where we prayed happily together in our childhood. How wisely have you guided my wandering heart to the truth! How rich a blessing has it proved to me, that you first called my attention to sin, in order to gain from that point a comprehensive view of the whole gospel!"

We have now given the reader some idea of the *first part* of our book. With much interest and deep solicitude, we have followed our youths through their various meanderings; we have traced their keen mental struggles, and witnessed their ultimate and glorious triumph. Their spiritual history furnishes a new and very important testimony in favour of the despised doctrines of the cross. When the light of divine truth burst upon the spirits of our young heroes, whole systems of error instantly crumbled into dust. They were delivered from the fearful mazes of neological error, and conducted into the higher and purer regions of gospel truth and freedom.

In the *second part* of the book we have a truly able and most interesting exhibition of the "Propitiator." This part consists of two letters; the first is a reply from Julius to Guido, the one last noticed; and the other is the answer to Julius.

Julius, in the commencement of his letter, gives free vent to a heart overflowing with pure affection and devout gratitude. He now sees in Guido a brother beloved, and at the same time a trophy of redeeming grace. The burden of his letter is a masterly vindication of all the great, cardinal doctrines of Christianity, against Rationalism, and every form of infidelity. His views on the origin of sin, the fall of man, the consequent depravity of our race, and the necessity of such a Mediator as the gospel reveals, together with his views on regeneration and a living union with Christ, are truly refreshing to the Christian heart. It is also gratifying to notice with what skill and consummate ability arguments from science and phi-

losophy are selected and employed against the most subtle and insinuating forms of error. Thus are infidels met on their own ground, and slain with their own weapons.

In answer to the question, What is truth? he says, "This single question reveals at once the extreme penury and the amazing wealth of man. I have repeated even to weariness and disgust, says the wise man of the north, that the philosophers and the Jews are in the same predicament; neither of them know what reason or what law is, or for what purpose they are given; namely, for convincing of ignorance and sin, not for communicating grace and truth, which must be *historically revealed*, and cannot be obtained by the exertion of man's natural powers; which no man can work out for himself, or receive as his birth-right."* We note also with much interest how our earnest inquirers after truth regarded science and philosophy. In relation to these they were no fanatics. They properly regarded God as the fountain of *all* truth. All the light of philosophy, in its different branches, together with the light of science, as well as of the glorious doctrines of natural and revealed religion, emanates from the same great Sun, the central Luminary of the universe. Human learning, therefore, they regarded as by no means opposed to Christianity, since the laws and principles of all science have their origin in God, who is himself the absolute truth. They held, moreover, that a superficial education, especially in the sphere of philosophy, was not desirable,—that every student should seek by all means to be thorough, to make himself master of the different sciences; and hence quote with approbation the words of the philosopher of Verulam,† "It is an assured truth, and a conclusion of experience, that a little or a superficial knowledge of philosophy may incline a man to atheism; but a farther proceeding therein doth bring the mind back again to religion." Says Guido, "You remember, Julius, with what deep emotion we read the noble expressions of the great Plutarch: 'As the initiated at first assemble with tumult and noise, pushing against one another, but when the sacred rites are introduced and exhibited, attend with silent awe: thus also at first, around the gates of philosophy, you may witness a great tumult, forwardness, and talking, among those who are pushing rudely and violently; but whoever comes into the interior, and beholds an awful splendour like that of

* So likewise speaks even Solger ("Philosophical Conversations;" Berlin, 1817, p. 240:) "Thus it is that reason, if left to itself, however perfect it may be, perceives the necessity only of that which, through the goodness of God, is revealed to us; and that the divine benignity reveals it to us as a *living and present* reality, the necessity of which reason acknowledges, while it is utterly beyond her power to create that great reality."

† *Vide* Bacon's "Advancement of Learning," book i. p. 13, of Works, vol. ii., Montague's edition.

a temple, assumes another deportment, is silent and trembles, and humbly and reverently follows reason as a god.' ”* This paragraph is quoted simply for illustration; for our regenerated youths had no mind to deify mere science, however highly they valued it; but they loved to view it in its real character, and in its proper relation to the glorious science of divine revelation.

The last letter, and which closes this deeply interesting volume, was written by Guido. It is full of most precious truths, which shine on every page like dazzling gems. Towards its close he gives us a view of religion as it is actualised in social life. He now mingled with humble, and therefore loving, kindred spirits. He now understood, as he never did before, that beautiful article in the apostles' creed, “*I believe in the communion of saints.*” He not only realised that believers are made partakers of Christ, and all his benefits, that they are animated by his life, but that Christians themselves, being pervaded by a common life,—the life of their glorious Head,—are members one of another. In his fellowship with Christian believers, he gives us the following account of family devotions. He speaks of the father of the family as a most venerable, patriarchal man, whose piety appeared unusually deep and elevating. He says,—

“All the members of the family, and some of the neighbours, were assembled in a small room. First, a hymn was sung. Then the old man, with a dignified voice, read an awakening sermon from a Christian magazine, without making any remarks of his own; for he was used to say, ‘As long as we have the printed sermons of well-qualified instructors, the people need hear none but these: a prayer from a broken and contrite heart often goes deeper.’ Another hymn was then sung, of which the last verses were,—

“ ‘Saviour! see this little band,
Join'd in heart, and joined in hand,
By the sufferings on the tree,
Pledge their souls, their all to thee!

Let our evening sacrifice,
Blest with thy acceptance, rise!
Now renew thy last bequest—
Peace—thy peace in every breast!’

He concluded with a prayer. I could not have believed, Julius, that man could have so communed with God, as this aged disciple in his devotions. His language indicated no enthusiasm, for the deepest humility marked every word. His soul appeared to be lost in abasement in the presence of the Most Holy.”

Guido concludes his letter with a most touching description of a Christian's death. With this description our book closes. The object, no doubt, in introducing this dying scene, was to

* “Plut. de Profectibus in Virtute, Op. Varia,” tom. i. p. 140, ed. H. Steph. 1572.

give a faithful and striking exhibition of the power of religion at the close of life—its glorious triumph over death itself. With this view, the case was well selected. We will quote the dying Christian's last words:—

“‘Lord Jesus! O that I could now, from this cottage, tell the world how happy is he who departs in thy name. For all I praise thee!’ After a few moments’ silence, he again exclaimed, ‘I have overcome by the power of the Lamb!’ These were his last words.”

We have thus endeavoured to notice a book of more than ordinary ability and interest. And most sincerely would we advise the reader to procure the volume for himself, that he may have the pleasure and profit of reading it entire. We would suggest also that a mere reading of the book will not suffice—it calls for retrospection, for careful study. The author, a man of profound and varied learning, is thoroughly versed in metaphysics, the ancient, the scholastic, and the modern; and into those of both the Oriental and the European schools he has plunged deeply. In the work before us, he frequently makes allusions to objects very much out of the range of ordinary literature, and draws from them illustrations singularly felicitous. Though the work is not large, it contains more solid and important matter than many similar publications four times its size.

We have in our possession data which authorise us to say, that Dr Tholuck's book was not published in vain. Its influence has been especially salutary among students in the different schools and universities on the Continent. And who can doubt that it is owing to its influence, in a good degree, that the tide of rationalism and infidelity, which threatened completely to inundate Germany, has begun to roll back? May God make it still a further blessing.

In the commencement of this article we gave a brief sketch of the fearful prevalence of error in Germany, especially in the early part of the present century. We would now present a more cheering picture of that land—the land of the blessed Reformation.* And we prefer quoting the following from the February number of the *North British Review* for 1854, as a portraiture of the religious condition of Germany:—

“The first pleasing symptom of the German Church is the very general and increasing cordial recognition of the principle, that faith is the first of Christian graces, and necessary to love and good works,—nay, what is for Germany much harder to pronounce, necessary to salvation. The so-called formal and material principles of the Reformation, viz., the supremacy of the Scriptures and justification by faith, with all that naturally clusters around them, make up the body of

* We would of course not wish to intimate that Germany is the only Reformation soil; we could not thus ignore Switzerland and France.

doctrine which is now in the ascendant. It is so in by far the most influential chairs of the different universities, probably the majority as to numbers; and the same may be almost said of the pulpits, though here the point of number is more doubtful. No university, except, perhaps, Giessen, remains unsubdued by the movement party. Tübingen is now wrested in a great measure from Baur and his negative coadjutors; and Leipsic has ceased to bow to the sceptre of mere critics and lexicographers. Meanwhile, the men of the middle school, who have constantly approached, by paths of their own, the biblical or confessional orthodoxy of the more advanced, may be said at last to have reached it, in the persons of Nitzsch and Hengstenberg in Berlin. These two sections may be declared so to have been coalesced, as, while retaining their separate colours, to differ in nothing essential. The formation of the minds of the present and of the next generation is in the hands of men—from Heidelberg to Königsberg—who have not only broken with Rationalism, from Theism, and spurious criticism, but actually conquered them; and of whom the most eminent (with rare exceptions) are as distinguished for attractiveness of personal piety as for learning and zeal. The party of unbelief, with the doubtful exception of the Tübingen school, are silent. Every thing but the theology of the Reformation is driven from the field; and the discredit into which speculative philosophy has fallen,—which, indeed, is now numbered with the acts of the Frankfort Parliament,—has greatly contributed to the victory of a pure and unsophisticated Christianity. The great majority of younger theologians are found to hold fast to evangelical truth."

There is good reason to believe that the sanguine hopes of Dr Tholuck, expressed in this book, will ere long be realised. He says, "I see a time coming, in which gifted men will lift up their voice for the truth. Perhaps, after a few decennaries, there will be no one in some parts of Germany who will not wish to be called a Christian."

But, it may be asked, Is a work like this needed on this continent? Is not this country distinguished for its Christian faith, its general orthodoxy? We may safely, and do most cheerfully admit that this, in a general way, is the character of the American people. Still, we must not be blind to our own faults. Human nature is in this country the same as everywhere else; and here, too, though in a limited degree, we have every form of pernicious error. Who can doubt that some of the best minds among us, minds enriched by the most elegant scholarship, are under the withering influence of the pantheistic creed? And so there is no one phase of Rationalism that is not to be found in this country. That this should be so, is by no means strange. The works of Deistical writers, such as Collins, Tindal, Morgan, and others of the same tribe, were translated, and introduced into Germany; and have not these same English works been imported to this country also? In addition to these, we have a large portion of the rationa-

listic literature of Germany; and not a few have already been brought under its blighting and destructive influence. And have we not in our own country Unitarianism, Universalism, and other heresies, whose name is Legion? But not to dwell on these gross and obvious forms of error, are there no errors in the bosom of the professedly orthodox church itself? Certainly it is no breach of charity to maintain the existence of error even in this sacred enclosure. Let us but glance at New England, to say nothing of other sections of our land. And we do not intend to speak particularly of the grosser heresies which have become so fearfully prevalent in Puritanic soil. We do not wish to dwell on the Socinian heresy—to speak of Unitarian institutions and churches, from whose pulpits is proclaimed from Sabbath to Sabbath the denial of our Saviour's divinity, thus attempting to blot the very sun from the ecclesiastical heavens, and burying the hopes of our race in one common grave. We would direct attention to the new views in philosophy and in theology advanced in New England by Dr Taylor and his associates; whose views became known subsequently under the title of "New Theology," as distinguished from the faith of the original Presbyterian and Congregational Churches. In this new theology, a fundamental point of difference relates to the doctrine of original sin. And here we would quote the language of Dr Beecher:—

"The Reformers, with one accord, taught that the sin of Adam was imputed to all his posterity, and that a *corrupt nature descends from him to every one of his posterity*; in consequence of which infants are unholy, unfit for heaven, and justly exposed to future punishment. Their opinion seems to have been, that the very substance or essence of the soul was depraved, and that the moral contamination extended alike to all its powers and faculties, insomuch that sin became a property of every man's nature, and was propagated as really as flesh and blood. . . . Our Puritan fathers adhered to the doctrine of original sin, as consisting in the imputation of Adam's sin, and in a *hereditary depravity*; and this continued to be the received doctrine of the churches of New England until after the time of Edwards. He adopted the views of the Reformers on the subject of original sin, as consisting in the imputation of Adam's sin, and a *depraved nature transmitted by descent*. But after him this mode of stating the subject was gradually changed, until long since the prevailing doctrine in New England has been, that *men are not guilty of Adam's sin*, and that *depravity* is not of the substance of the soul, nor an inherent or physical quality, but is *wholly voluntary*, and *consists in a transgression of the law in such circumstances as constitute accountability and desert of punishment*."*

Such, then, according to Dr Beecher, are the prevailing

* Dr Beecher's controversy with the Editor of the "Christian Examiner in the Spirit of the Pilgrims," in 1828, as quoted in the "Biblical Repertory." See also "Old and New Theology," by James Wood, D.D.

views of New England, on the important doctrine of original sin! And those who are acquainted with the "New Theology," know quite well that this error does not stand alone—that this constitutes a starting-point, from which are deduced legitimately a long series of doctrines, which are very properly regarded as forming a *new system*. Such a Pelagian view of sin must lead to a new conception of human freedom, of regeneration and conversion, and, in a word, must place in a modified aspect every vital doctrine of Christianity. The church itself, in her proper character as a divine institution, the Christian ministry, and the holy sacraments, all must suffer when viewed from this wrong stand-point. And what have been the fruits of this new system, of this departure from the original faith of the church, the venerable standards of the blessed Reformation? Superficial views of sin, defective conceptions of regeneration, and of the union of believers with Christ—not a few, indeed, deny such union altogether. And how do such regard the church, the Lamb's bride? Alas, with but little respect! And the holy sacraments? These, under the influence of such views, are regarded not as *holy seals*, but simply as *signs*—they are stript of all mystery, and thus brought down to an ignoble level with carnal reason. Alas! where will these wrong tendencies end, unless they soon meet with a decided check?

ART. III.—*A View of the Scripture Revelations concerning a Future State*. By RICHARD WHATELY, D.D., Archbishop of Dublin. Philadelphia: Lindsay and Blackiston. 1855. Pp. 300.

THIS work will be found chiefly valuable, not as a contribution to scientific eschatology, but as an earnest effort to clear up the impressions prevailing among the masses in the church concerning death, the intermediate state, the resurrection, the judgment, and the final states of the righteous and the wicked, and to present ideas suggested by the Scriptures on these subjects in a plain way, for the edification of ordinary minds. As such, it is certainly a valuable production; and some portions of it, at least, could not be too highly commended. The name of the author is itself a warrant for a well-considered, honest, cautious, and suggestive treatise, adapted to its design. The great plainness, even homeliness, of the style, we are prepared for by the remark in the preface, that the style, "which was adopted with a view to the instruction of a mixed congregation,

consisting principally of the unlearned, has been retained, as appearing the best suited to meet the wants of various classes of readers, and the most in accordance with the character of a work designed to be, in its matter, plain and popular, without any abstruse metaphysical disquisitions."

The book consists of a series of lectures on the various topics included under the general subject of the Future State, delivered to the people of his parish by a faithful labourer in word and doctrine.

A glance at the history of eschatology shows two things very plainly. First, that the Christian mind is farther from being settled on the subject of the last things, than on perhaps any other; so that this department of theology is likely to be the last to attain scientific maturity. And secondly, that the subject has a perpetual interest for the Christian mind,—the greater, perhaps, because of the indefiniteness in which the Scriptures have left it. There surely is some truth in the idea, which, in one form or another, has haunted at least some corner of the church in all ages,—the idea of an approaching new dispensation, which should be distinctively the dispensation of the Holy Ghost. Wherever an expectation of this sort has been avowed,—as it was avowed with remarkable earnestness by the Abbot Joachim towards the close of the middle age, and as it might be supposed to appear in the rise of such sects as the Swedenborgian and Irvingite,—it has arisen from a sense of imperfection in the present spiritual intelligence of man. It is a faithful and reliable witness, that we do not yet know all that may be known respecting the spiritual kingdom, and that even our Christian conceptions are, in many instances at least, far from presenting us with the ultimate or absolute truth. As the law left the intelligent and earnest Jew anxiously feeling after something more satisfactory than the law, as a revelation of God; so the Christian dispensation thus far seems to leave the Christian mind in darkness, or in uncertain twilight, on many points on which it longs for clear knowledge. Yet, in both cases, this very longing is an evidence of the relative perfection of the existing revelation; for the great object of all earthly revelation is to beget in men a hungering and thirsting after the higher and absolutely perfect knowledge to be attained in the heavenly state.

The work before us is an interesting testimony to the indefiniteness of even the Christian revelation on the subject of the future life; and it is fitted to produce on the mind of the reflecting reader a true and salutary impression of the narrow limits of our knowledge. We do wrong to depreciate, in any degree, the great advantage of the Christian dispensation over that of Moses; but we do equal wrong to push our exaltation

of the present to a fanatical extreme, at the expense of either the past or the future. To give the gospel all the honour which its stanchest friends can wish to claim for it, we need not regard it as opening every thing to view, or settling definite conceptions for us on every point. Respecting the future state, our Lord and the apostles seem to give much information. The New Testament abounds with representations of the judgment, the endless rewards of the righteous, and the endless punishments of the wicked; as it does with prophetic descriptions of the second coming of Christ, and as the Old Testament did with pictures of Messianic times. We take these representations which lie so plain on the surface, as it were, of divine revelation, and form from them views which seem to go quite into detail respecting the course of the soul after death. These we hold as the orthodox views, settled by the Bible. When thoughts are suggested which seem to depart from them, or conflict with them, and leave the language of Scripture in some cases only symbolical, they strike us as opposed to the truth, and as going to undermine the doctrine of Scripture, and they find not entrance enough into our minds to be fairly revolved. The less a man reflects, the more he thinks he knows. Our author writes here like one who weighs all his words. And he finds reason to speak on many points with less confidence than many of his less thoughtful readers would do. The more a man reflects, the less he finds he knows, and the more cautious he becomes both in forming opinions and in expressing them; and we may add, with our eye on the pages in hand, the more suggestive and valuable his productions become. "Our Lord's account," says Dr Whately " (as well as that of his apostles), of a future life, though most clear and positive as to the *fact*, is so scanty and imperfect as to the *circumstances*, that our curiosity is rather awakened than satisfied. We are told, indeed, as much as is sufficient for our practical use, when we have the certain assurance of future rewards and punishments, and the means set before us by which immortal life may be secured; but we are not told, by any means, all that we might naturally wish to know. Much is withheld from us, doubtless for good reasons; but for reasons which we cannot always fully perceive, though we may sometimes in part guess at them."—(P. 45.)

The absence of a positive expression of opinion on several points brought before us in this book, might bring upon the author, from many readers, the reproach of being non-committal, and might excite suspicions of his orthodoxy on these points. But the honest inquirer after truth will fully agree with our author, when he forestalls such a judgment in the language immediately following the above:—

"For instance, we are not expressly told anywhere in Scripture what becomes of a man immediately after death, during the interval between that and the final resurrection at the last day. There are some persons, indeed, who pronounce very confidently on this point; but without, I think, any sufficient grounds for that confidence. It is a more prudent, and humbler, and safer course, not to pretend to be wise above what is written, nor to know what our great Master has not thought fit to teach. To abstain from positive assertions, where there is no good ground for them, may be, to some of my readers, unsatisfactory; but surely doubt is better than error, or the chance of error; and acknowledged ignorance is wiser than groundless presumption. Conjectures, indeed, if cautiously and reverently framed, *may* be allowed, in a case where there is no certain knowledge; but I dare not speak *positively* when the Scriptures do not."

This is certainly a mental posture to be altogether approved, and one which ought to prevail in all students of the mysteries of the spiritual kingdom. The principle thus stated by our author could not fail of good effect, if applied in the whole field of theological thought, to the unsparing mortification of all that narrowness of mind which assumes, whether avowed or not, the infallibility of private opinion.

Connected with this inquiring reserve, which appears to characterise our work, is the absence of glowing, sensuous representations of scenes of the spiritual world; the restraint of that kind of fancy, which, with all its soaring, does not get above the material world, but is still entangled with the cumbrous notions of time and space. It is not uncommon to go quite into detail in descriptions of the resurrection, the general judgment, the enjoyments of heaven, and the torments of hell. Such descriptions may not be false, considered as symbols of spiritual facts otherwise incomprehensible to the finite mind, for the Scripture employs them to some extent; but they may be easily indulged to the hinderance of a truly spiritual progress, and, if too much pressed, introduce perplexing questions without number, founded only in this sensuous fancy, and having really no place in a proper view of an eternal, spiritual state. So long as such representations are used only as aids to edifying meditation, they are safe and useful; but in the sphere of logic and dogmatics they never fail to lead to inextricable confusion, which has the additional disadvantage of being altogether gratuitous. Our author does not indulge them much. He seems not, indeed, fully to reach the *principle* on which they *should* be discarded, otherwise his whole discussion of the "intermediate state" would have taken a different turn; but he gets such glimpses of it occasionally, as make us wonder he does not admit it to wider influence over his thoughts. We mean the principle, that time and space are mere conditions of this earthly, phenomenal

existence, and are not to be imposed upon the free life of the spiritual world. The spirit of the book, in this respect, is very justly expressed in the following paragraph:—

“On this state of happiness, and the society of those who shall partake of it, I propose to offer to you some remarks in the succeeding lectures; in which, as in those you have hitherto heard, you will meet with no such confident assertions as some are apt to throw out, nor be entertained with fanciful theories delivered as Scripture truths; but you will meet with cautious endeavours to distinguish the certain from the doubtful; and where I cannot *extend* the boundaries of human knowledge, I will endeavour at least to point out where they lie. If I cannot give you such full and interesting accounts of divine mysteries as more daring inquirers pretend to do, I trust I can at least promise not to mislead you.—(P. 186, *seq.*)

The book may, therefore, seem meagre and dry to those who consider discussions of the kind here referred to necessary to a proper treatment of the subject, and whose interest in the prospect of the future life is more or less of that sentimental sort, which feeds on the mere husks and leaves of truth. For the same reason, however, its influence on the mind of the earnest Christian reader will be good. It will be found to leave some interesting questions, which many think settled, entirely open: but this very fact will be a profitable suggestion; and what might thus seem to be a deficiency, a chasm, in the author's representation, will prove only a gateway through which the pent-up thoughts may wander forth to exercise themselves in those wide fields of devout speculation which God has after all left open for them.

We feel almost disposed to chide an author so able, no doubt, to do it to edification, for not introducing us more freely, even in such a practical treatise as this is intended to be, to the ancient literature of the subject before him, and especially to some of those spiritual conceptions which have possessed great minds in all ages (though for obvious reasons they have never received symbolical expression in the church), respecting both the present and the future state of man, however “conjectural” or “unsound” he may regard them. We do not propose here to supply this defect, but only to point it out. The opinions of former gifted and pious students of the Scriptures have as rightful a place as our own interpretations (which must always be in a certain sense conjectural) in an effort to exhibit what the Scriptures teach. The real meaning of the phrase: “What the Scriptures teach,” is neither more nor less than: What men have understood the Scriptures to teach. Exegesis can never be separated from the history of Christian opinion without running dry, any more than the waters of the Jordan could be stopped and piled up

at Jericho, without failing in the channel below. The true exegesis must be a growth from the general mind of the church. The individual cannot expect to produce it from the seed in the one summer of a life-time, as if from the hot-bed of his own fancy. He can only hope to contribute; and to do this to the best advantage, he must admit all the accessible impressions of others to a fair influence on his own. His own opinions should be the productions of a mental soil fertilised and impregnated by the rich growths of former ages well ploughed in and decomposed. Perhaps Dr Whately's are so here. But the principle on which he proposes to exclude the speculations of others, in a great degree, from his discussion, is false, and lies at the bottom of much of the theological contention and ecclesiastical division of Christians, though the application of it in the particular case before us may not lessen the value of the work. "He has thought it best to abstain, for the most part, from all reference to these (various opinions of the fathers and of modern writers of high reputation), . . . chiefly because his design was to inquire exclusively what is to be learned from the records of *inspiration* respecting a subject on which uninspired men, he conceives, however learned and ingenious, can know no more than is revealed in Scripture, or may, by short and simple arguments, be deduced from it."—(P. 8.) But let this pass.

The author begins with a brief view of the question as to the revelation of the future state in the Old Testament. Though this is by no means the only interesting point, nor the most interesting and fruitful point, presented in the book, yet it is the point which chiefly draws our attention to the work for the present.

The ordinary Christian reader hardly feels as if, in going back from the Epistles to the Psalms, or from the Gospels to the books of Moses, he were passing from a region of spiritual light into one of comparative darkness. He sees as much true religion in David as in Paul. He finds the words of the one as edifying as those of the other, and as well framed to express the Christian piety of his own heart. In any comparative unfitness of the Old Testament to meet his own religious wants, he finds no hint of a difference between it and the New as to the conception of a future state. The two *seem* to presume equal knowledge both of its certainty and of its general character. And under the power of Christian prepossessions, even some more reflecting minds think the presence of the gospel idea of immortality among the ancient people of God so plain as scarcely to call for formal proof; and when any proof is offered, the simple quotation of two or three sentences containing the word "heaven," or "glory," or "hell," is thought

conclusive. So thoroughly are we possessed with the clear and certain knowledge of at least the fact of a life beyond the grave, that we cannot conceive of a man or a people being religious without some such knowledge. And we infer, that as the ancient revelation was a true religious guide, it must have contained this doctrine. We read the Old Testament, not with the naked eye, but through the glass of the New. On this glass the doctrine of a future state is everywhere inscribed; and when we look at the Old Testament through it, we of course seem to see that inscription still on every page, though it is really not there at all.

On this point our author leaves us in no doubt as to his own opinion; and we think it true: "That neither Jew nor Gentile had, or could have, an assurance of a future state, but through the gospel, is a truth so plainly taught in Scripture, and so fully confirmed by what we read in other books concerning the notions formerly entertained on the subject, that its having been doubted or denied by any Christian, is to me a matter of unfeigned wonder."—(P. 13.) That the heathen could not reach the assurance of a future state without the gospel, is not so likely to be denied, though the immortality of the soul is held by many to be one of the doctrines of so-called "natural" religion. And as, moreover, every argument which may be urged against the revelation of a future life to the Hebrews, will hold still more as against the knowledge of a future life by the Gentiles, we shall not here stop to notice further this latter point. The question as between Hebrews and Christians is of considerable importance; and of a sort of importance which makes the discussion and the proper answering of it a most suitable introduction to the other chapters of this book, not only on account of its general connection with the principal subject, but also by reason of its bearing on a just estimate of our present knowledge. We have already suggested the thought, that the Christian revelations respecting a future state are, after all, much less definite than many think them to be, or presume them to be. A careful examination of the relation between the Old and New Testaments, and of the relation between separate parts of each, will open an interesting and useful view of the natural progress of divine revelation in the world. It will prevent our making relatively too little of the Christian dispensation, by an indiscriminating imposition of Christianity upon Judaism. It will prevent our making relatively too much of our own present stage of religious advancement, at the expense of large and earnest views of present imperfection, and of a strong, and intelligent, and purifying hope for a further unfolding of Christianity even upon earth. When we come to search the Old Testament with a

discriminating eye, if we find that it really must have taught the ancient saints far less than we had supposed, and far less than we had presumed they certainly knew, we shall be prepared to form opinions more cautiously from what, on a superficial view, we might take for direct and positive revelations in the New Testament. A view of progress in the past will show us room for progress in the future. We shall think of the possibility, that the Christian of some distant coming age, standing to us as we now stand to the Hebrew Church, will look on many of our speculations and beliefs concerning an intermediate state, the scenery and occupations of heaven and hell, and on our many fleshly views of the resurrection, the judgment, and the rewards and punishments of the unseen world, with the same sort of interest with which we now look back upon the ancient prevailing notions of Hades and Sheol. And this thought will greatly chasten our speculations, and effectually check the inclination towards overweening dogmatism.

That the revelation of a future life was no part of the old economy, but is peculiar to the gospel, seems quite clear from some such considerations as these:—

In the first place, the undeniable presumption that the divine discipline of mankind is progressive, and moves forward according to the laws of that nature which God has given man. To say this, is only to give a reason for the continuance of our race and of the world by successive generations. It is to give the only satisfactory explanation of the present order of things. We cannot form any satisfactory theory of this ever-changing state without regarding it as one great transition of the first or the old creation towards the new,—of creation towards redemption. Every thing visible betrays this character, in the perpetual process of birth, growth, and decay, going on in all departments of nature. But all is for man. And the history of mankind especially cannot be understood, except as a constant improvement. God is not idly repeating the same work in endless cycles, else the idea of consummation were nothing but that of a mere stopping, which might take place as well at one time as at another, as well now as any number of ages hence. He does not merely save some out of this generation, and then raise up another to save more out of that. Each new generation begins, not where its parent began, but where its parent has stopped. God is gradually working in the whole race, to carry out a plan for the final redemption of mankind as a whole from ignorance, sin, and death.

We see the race, then, growing from spiritual infancy to manhood under the discipline of God, its heavenly Father. This idea of human progress involves the two ideas of a gradual increase in man's capacity for spiritual knowledge, and of a

gradual communication of that knowledge from heaven according to this increase. So the wise parent or teacher watches the unfolding powers of the child, and adapts his instructions to them. Now, the advent of Christ was evidently a great era in the growth of man's spiritual faculties. It was the central era of the world's history—at least of all within the compass of our vision—the point where mankind seems to pass from nonage to majority; from the light-heartedness and waywardness of childhood to the sober self-control of the man, or at least to the sentimental freedom of the youth beginning to get some idea of what a man ought to be; from the dominion of impulse to the dominion of reason. There the race seems to reach years of discretion. It stops in its thoughtless, spontaneous wandering away from God, to smite penitently on its breast, and begin a return to its Father's house. Before that era, those only obeyed who saw the rod of divine authority above them, and they obeyed only as under the rod; since that period, all, who know, seem endeavouring to obey as for themselves. Now, we might well presume that this era would be marked by some important new communications from God, answering to this growth in man; some new revelation both of man's own life and destiny, and of the gracious plan and work of God. The great new revelation respecting God was Christ himself. This fact itself, as well as the evident difference just mentioned between the Mosaic and the Christian periods of history, would seem to require that the doctrine of a future or spiritual state should be at least *one* new revelation, if not *the* new revelation, for this era, respecting man. In the church, the former period was a dispensation of outward laws on the part of God, and a period of subjection to outward authority on the part of man. During this stage of its life mankind needed just this kind of discipline. And its receiving such treatment shows what its capacities for spiritual knowledge were. Men could not see below the surface of things. They were not prepared to comprehend the inward and spiritual, or to feel the force of considerations whose direct bearing on their condition they could not see. Only think how carnal the mass of Christians still is, even at this advanced and comparatively mature age of our race. When told that a certain course of conduct will ruin the soul for ever, and even now impairs true happiness, we have to use effort to keep that in mind and perceive its force. But if we only see poverty, or disgrace, or death a-head, we quickly change the tack. From this actual state of things we may easily go back to one in which men had no susceptibility at all to such spiritual considerations. And if we find so little of it in ourselves, a former age, to have had less, could hardly have had any. We speak

of the mass of the people. The whole history of the Israelites, especially the earlier part of it, exhibits them as, in fact, "a dull, gross-minded, and unthinking people,"—as Dr Whately says,—“who appear to have been (like children) so wholly taken up with the objects present to their senses, that they could hardly be brought to think of any thing beyond the morrow.”—(P. 17.) Any clear revelation of a future, spiritual state, would seem as incongruous with such an age of the world as a metaphysical lecture with an infant school. If there be a progress in the divine discipline of mankind, this fact itself is strong presumptive evidence that the revelation of a future state, as well as of all spiritual things, is peculiar to the Christian dispensation, the more advanced and mature age of the church.

Accordingly—to pass to a proof on which our author lays special stress—we find in the apostle Paul the distinct, unequivocal declaration, that “our Saviour Jesus Christ hath abolished death, and hath brought life and immortality to light through the gospel.”—(2 Tim. i. 10.) No material change can be made in the force of this passage by varying the interpretation of the expression, “brought to light.” Take the phrase as we will, it points to a decided advance in the knowledge of men respecting “life and immortality,” which were before involved in darkness. This latter expression is singular. It evidently means, “everlasting life,” “life eternal.” The word “immortality” would seem intended, not to add a new idea, but only to explain and define the “life;” for the apostle’s use of the word “life” at all here shows that he uses it in its highest, spiritual sense; as when the Saviour says, “I am the resurrection and the life.” By “life” is here meant, that which does not die; for the apostle puts the word in antithesis with “death.” Only death had been revealed before, through the law; and by this we may understand either that spiritual death intended by the apostle when he says he found the law, “which was ordained unto life, to be to death;” or, more probably, the outward and perishable, whose perpetual decay is but a type of this spiritual death. Before Christ, God gave men “the rudiments of this world.” He left them, so far as direct revelation was concerned, without knowledge of that immortal, spiritual essence, which lies behind every thing visible, and forms the support even of its temporary, visible existence. Christ has brought to light not merely things seen and temporal, but things unseen and eternal; not merely outward, earthly things, which, in their incessant decay, are really only one continuous revelation of death, but the inward life of things, that which puts forth the transient appearance in successive generations, and abides after it is gone for ever. This

is the only true way to abolish death; to show that it is not what it appears to be,—that it does not really destroy man, though it destroys his visible body; to reveal an inward man, which is renewed day by day under the crumbling shell of the outward, and whose renewal is completed by the very stroke which shivers the earthly house of clay.

But then we must consider also, that Christ himself, and he alone, *is* this life. He is “*the* life.” Where he is not, there is no life. “By him all things consist.” It is not the believer who lives, but Christ, who lives in him. Hence any revelation of life eternal, or of a future state, must be a revelation of Christ himself. The words of St Paul to Timothy have this deep meaning—that, through the gospel, life and immortality were brought to light by the Saviour in himself; life and immortality *came to light in Christ*. And when, from this point, we say that, if God had intended to reveal a future state to his ancient people, he would have revealed Christ, the Mediator between the earthly and the heavenly, we say what would be found required by other scriptural views of the same subject, which might be pursued. The future state was revealed in the Old Testament no farther than Christ himself was made known as the life.

In entire agreement with this view are such facts as these:—

1. The Books of Moses say nothing directly about future rewards and punishments, even in such passages as the 28th chapter of Deuteronomy, where the prophet would exhaust the whole known catalogue of blessings and of curses. If the future state, as known to Christians, had been known in the times of Moses, it were impossible to account for the absence of the slightest hint of it where the Christian would surely make it most prominent. The fifth commandment breathes the spirit of the whole Mosaic law in this respect: “Honour thy father and thy mother; that thy days may be long upon the land, which the Lord thy God giveth thee.”

2. Eminent saints of the ancient church, whose devotional writings have come down to us, often betray entire ignorance of a future life, and seem to take for granted that man's whole life ends at the grave. It may be hard *for us* to conceive of a truly religious man without the knowledge of immortality. But this cannot alter the fact before us. David was a truly pious man; yet he expresses himself in such words as those of Ps. vi. 4, 5, xxx. 3, 9, xxxix. 13, lxxxviii. 10–12: “Wilt thou show wonders to the dead? Shall the dead arise and praise thee?” Job asks: “If a man die, shall he live again?” And in all his affliction he seems to have had no comforting anticipations of a happy future out of this world. To some of these passages Dr Whately directs our attention; and to

Hezekiah's thanksgiving for recovery, Isa. xxxviii. 9, *seq.*: "The grave cannot praise thee, death cannot celebrate thee; they that go down into the pit cannot hope for thy truth. The living, the living, he shall praise thee, as I do this day." Many such expressions are by some, we believe, regarded as implying only ignorance of the resurrection of the body. But this doctrine and that of the immortality of the soul go together. Or, were either revealed to the Hebrews, the former were certainly more congruous with such an outward, fleshly dispensation, and more fruitful of motives for so sensuous a people.

3. On the death of good men, even where some special notice is taken of their death, and in some cases pious lamentations are recorded,—at the deaths of the patriarchs, and of Moses, and Aaron, and David, even at the translations of Enoch and Elijah,—there appears no reference to their future life, such as the Christian involuntarily makes. So at the destruction of Korah and his company, and in David's lamentations over Saul and Jonathan, and Absalom, there appears no hint of any definite, abiding impression in the minds of the survivors respecting a life beyond the grave. Indeed the peculiar formula of the Old Testament, for recording the death even of the best of men, is simply, "He died;" or, "He was gathered to his fathers;" it never adds, "in the hope of a blessed immortality."

4. The Sadducees of the Christian era denied a future state, or at least a resurrection, and a spiritual world in general, as distinct from the natural and visible. They were the Jewish Rationalists, it is true, or Deists; yet they acknowledged in their way the mass of the Old Testament Scriptures, especially the Law of Moses; and they were acknowledged as Jews by being placed or tolerated in office as sanhedrists and high priests: showing that the writings of Moses were, by many in that day, not understood to contain any unequivocal assertion, at all events, of a future state.

5. Spinoza, the Jewish philosopher of the seventeenth century, could not find the doctrine of immortality in the Old Testament; and, a fact still more significant—Warburton made use of the silence of the Old Testament on this subject in his argument for the divine legation of Moses.

6. The general tone of the books of Proverbs and Ecclesiastes. The writings of Solomon contain the most profound thoughts of a mind distinguished in that whole dispensation for sagacity and depth. And they undoubtedly give a faithful picture of that dispensation as a revelation of spiritual things. But the book of Ecclesiastes could never have been

written by one who possessed the Christian revelation. It is plainly the product of a great mind feeling after the spiritual by the instinct of an immortal, spiritual nature, in an age of darkness respecting the spiritual destiny of man. Only some such view of its origin can account for its peculiar character. Considering the Preacher to be left in entire uncertainty respecting the future state of man, we can understand how he can exclaim, as he contemplates the vanity of sensible things: "What profit hath a man of all his labour, which he taketh under the sun? That which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts; as one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath. . . . I praised the dead, which are already dead, more than the living, which are yet alive. Yea, better is he than both they, which hath not yet been." We are not surprised to find him, at some turns of his thought, almost abandoning all thought and all effort, in despair. But when we consider how many suggestions of spiritual truth he must have found in the mysterious hieroglyphics of the material world and of history, we can also understand how, feeling after the immortal state, as the heathen sages felt after God, he can settle upon this as "the conclusion of the whole matter: Fear God, and keep his commandments; for this is the whole [duty] of man. For God shall bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good or whether it be evil."

These are some of the reasons, as they flow in upon the mind at the suggestion of Dr Whately's pages, for believing his view of this subject to be the true one; though he by no means exhausts the material for its defence. As *fontes solutionum*, might be further mentioned,—

1. The well-known Old Testament signification of the term "Hell," and the whole Hebrew doctrine of Sheol,—quite parallel with the heathen Greek conception of Hades. Nothing more conclusively proves that the Jews were left to form their own ideas of the future state, than the ideas which they actually formed, and especially the constant appearance of these conceptions in the sacred writers of the Old Testament. In fact, the Biblical Hebrew language has no word for the New Testament idea of "Hell," as the place or state of eternal torment for the wicked. It is easy to imagine how the soul's instinct of immortality, with so rude a people as the ancient Hebrews, might be so combined with the notion of the grave in which the dead were laid, as to produce just the ancient idea of Sheol,—a dark and silent subterraneous abode, in which the spirit, like the body in the grave, sinks into mysterious repose,—a vast cavern in the bosom of the earth, untrodden by living man, unseen by any eye, opening its impregnable doors only

to admit the new inhabitants of its dreariness, as they sank beneath the sunny surface of the land of the living. Into this immense mansion all the dead descended, each taking his separate place among the multitude. There they dwelt as ghosts, ("weak") spirit-forms, powerless, inactive, and even without thought or sensation. And this was conceived to be the final abode of all. Of any opening of its mighty gates to restore its spectral inmates to life and activity, whether of happiness or of misery, the Jews in general seem to have had no conjecture; the best of them evidently had no certain knowledge of such an issue.

2. Although the Old Testament contains scattered expressions, which indicate higher views of the future state,—of which the passage, Ps. xvi. 10, *seq.*, "Thou wilt not leave my soul in Hell," &c., may be taken as the best representative,—yet such views, as they lay in the minds of the ancient saints themselves, were plainly as conjectural as that of Sheol. The notion of Heaven which prevailed in such minds as David and Solomon, and is ever before us in the Psalms, was simply that of an invisible world, inhabited by the invisible God and his angels,—whether regarded as differing from the visible world by distance of space or in mode of subsistence;—a world of life and power and enjoyment, as Sheol was the land of inactivity, weakness, and forgetfulness. This divine sphere, being above the earthly in kind or order of life, was naturally conceived to be above in space, as Sheol was placed below. From this higher region all the life that was in the world proceeded. Thence God stooped to the creation. Thence he sent forth angels on their embassies to men. Thence he thundered upon Sinai. Thence went forth the sword of his justice and vengeance against the wicked. Thence he sent down his Spirit into the prophets, and made all his inspired revelations in men. And thither were men's eyes and hands directed, when they would indicate the converse of their souls with God in prayer, and praise, and sacrifice. The invisible wind is the best earthly type of spirit; and the atmosphere, which is everywhere above the earth,—the boundless ethereal region, into which man, with his foot on the grosser soil, raises his head,—well symbolises the relation of the divine order of life to the human. With this view of heaven Solomon prays,—“Hear thou in heaven, thy dwelling-place;” and David exclaims,—“Whom have I in heaven but thee?” It plainly does not coincide with the New Testament idea of heaven as the eternal abode of “the spirits of the just made perfect,” beyond the grave. In fact, the sacred writer to the Hebrews, in the passage just alluded to, is at pains to persuade the Jewish Christians, that under the new dispensation they have come, as they had

not under the old, "to the heavenly Jerusalem, to God the Judge of all," &c.

With this heavenly world the ancient saints, it is true, felt themselves connected, as really and as constantly as with the earthly; and there often drop, from David especially, expressions which, moulded by the Christian doctrine of the future state, would stand with Paul's earnest longings "to be absent from the body and present with the Lord." But one strong evidence of the absence of the New Testament idea of the future state from the old economy may be just the fact, that, among all David's expressions of desire for the presence of God, there are none which show that he regarded death as the way to that presence. We have, therefore, to take that passage of the sixteenth Psalm, for example, as the words of conjecture, moulded into the emphatic form of positive assertion by the vehemence of desire. They cannot otherwise be reconciled with the many passages which betray the presumption that the grave is the goal of life. Peter's declaration, that these words were spoken of the Messiah, by no means involves the supposition that David understood them so, or that he intended to speak them of any other than himself. The indefinite impression of a spiritual, divine sphere of life and happiness, and of man's relation to it as an intelligent worshipper of God,—this impression, combined with the instinct of immortality, which reveals itself even in the gloomy notion of Sheol, may easily be supposed to have urged the more elevated minds of the ancient church to such anticipations of the Christian idea of heaven as these words indicate. We can imagine the inspired psalmist, as he revolves the precious promise of the Messiah to deliver his people out of all trouble, tracing the conquering path of the Redeemer into that future to which his own nature pointed, and opening even the terrible gates of Hades for the deliverance of his people. Or, considering the psalmist entirely unconscious of the reference of his words and spirit to the Messiah, we can think of him as meditating, perhaps in unusual mental elevation, on the present and the promised goodness of God to him; and, as if he could not bear the dismal thought of all this goodness ending at the grave without accomplishing any lasting object, he ventures to add the supplicatory profession of confidence: "*Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, neither wilt thou suffer thine holy one, ('thy pious worshipper and beloved child,')* to see corruption. *Thou wilt show me the path of life; in thy presence is fulness of joy; at thy right hand there are pleasures for evermore.*"

3. The psalmist's numerous imprecations on the wicked,—the enemies of Zion or of himself,—so far from showing a

knowledge of future rewards and punishments, as the language might sometimes be supposed to do, seem rather to indicate entire absence of the Christian idea of eternal punishment from the mind of the writer. These imprecations sound to our ears inconsistent with the devout spirit otherwise pervading the Book of Psalms, and have called forth various efforts to explain them. But the inconsistency is at least greatly diminished, if we suppose the writer to have regarded the death of the wicked as simply finishing them, and putting them out of the way; cutting them off, indeed, from their present enjoyments (and for this, it is not foreign to the Christian spirit to pray), but not involving any further suffering beyond the grave, nor depriving them of opportunities, which they would otherwise have, to secure eternal blessedness in a life to come,—therefore not as a matter of such awful moment as death is to us. As the psalmist did not consider death the gate to a future blessedness for himself, so he did not think of it as bringing with it a future misery to his enemies. This thought alone, it is true, does not entirely remove the difficulty; but it enables us more easily to admit the idea of the psalmist's unduly yielding occasionally to the excitement of anger, as he did on one memorable occasion to the power of lust, and as even St Paul seems to have done before the high priest Ananias.—(Acts xxiii. 3.) This idea it would seem absolutely necessary to admit, to some extent, even though all the passages concerned were translated and translatable in the indicative instead of the optative form, as some interpreters propose.

4. This view of the Old Testament revelation does not at all depreciate the faith of the ancient saints, so as to leave it short of saving faith. Only we must here, as everywhere, duly discriminate between faith and knowledge, or between the principle of faith and the exercise or phenomenon of faith. The principle is always the same; the phenomenon takes various forms according to circumstances. True, saving faith may exist in the soul without any knowledge at all; the principle of faith—the union of the soul to Christ—may be present in a person, without exhibiting any phenomena in thought and feeling; though this can occur only where the physical or temporal conditions of the individual naturally forbid intelligent mental exercises, as in infants and insane persons. The infant, which dies in infancy and is saved, has faith as truly as the most intelligent adult; for “without faith it is impossible to please God.” It has true saving faith in Christ; but it has no knowledge of Christ. And where the conditions of the earthly life admit and favour the development of faith in exercises of thought and feeling, those exercises will of course

shape themselves according to the matter and extent of the person's knowledge; in other words, according to the character of the divine revelations to him; while, under every form it may thus take, the faith will have the same saving virtue. There is, accordingly, no necessity to suppose, nor reason to require, in the ancient saints a knowledge of the future state, in order to see in them that faith which eternally saves, any more than to require or suppose in them a knowledge of Christ. Indeed, it is interesting, and very instructive, to notice, that in that list of examples of faith in the eleventh chapter of Hebrews, all the acts which the writer cites as the out-workings of faith, had respect only to earthly salvation. They in no case indicate any intelligent regard to good beyond this world. And we may remark by the way, that if those ancient worthies had known of a future state, they would have at least betrayed a conscious reference to it in some of their actions; and in this case, such phenomena of faith would be of the sort, before all others, to be presented here. Noah builds his ark, to provide against the flood. Abraham sets out for the land of Canaan, to inherit it. Joseph gives commandment concerning his bones, with his eye on the promised deliverance of his brethren. Moses forsakes Pharaoh's household, to escape the royal vengeance. Rahab harbours the spies, to save herself and her kindred. Yet the faith, which appeared in these earthly forms, could be truly represented by the inspired writer as really, though unconsciously to the subjects of it, reaching forward to an eternal reward.

5. The failure to find the clear knowledge of the future state in the Old Testament, need not, and should not, diminish the practical value of that part of the Bible for us. It should rather, in some respects, increase it. It cannot affect the propriety of our putting as spiritual a construction as we would otherwise do, on, for example, the devotional and many of the prophetic parts; and that, too, without the cumbrous hypothesis of a double sense. The twenty-third Psalm is of no less value, as a legitimate text for the most spiritual meditations of the Christian mind, when we regard the poet as referring in every verse to earthly blessings and dangers, than if we should think him to have spiritual favours all along in his eye. The *spirit* of the production is the same, which *we* should cultivate with respect to both this life and the life to come; though it *there* necessarily had reference to this world, and its *expressions* moved entirely in the sphere of earthly life. How often, in fact, are our own warmest, most spiritual Christian exercises of piety destitute of all conscious reference to the future state! It is altogether gratuitous to suppose that knowledge of the future state is essential to the maintenance

of a truly religious spirit. Rather might it testify to the genuineness of our religion, that we regard God for his own sake, not with a view to future reward; as those ancient saints, with no revelation or intelligible promise of good beyond this world, with only this life in which to expect the favour of God, still implicitly followed the divine direction in a childlike faith, which made them indeed strangers and pilgrims on the earth. More truly still, the regard for God, and the regard to the future reward, are, in every pious mind, identical; for the future reward is God himself.

And here is a suitable place to introduce some remarks which have a more evident and important connection with other parts of Dr Whately's work, which we have thus far left unnoticed, and which we must now leave without such discussion as they demand.

The phrase, "future state," or "life to come," ought to be used with discrimination, at least when any important issue depends on an accurate use of the term. There is ample room for the question, whether, in every truly religious act in which the knowledge of what we call the future state plays no part, there be not, after all, just as real a reference to that state as there is in our thought of it as a future state; whether the thought of a future state be not one among many other forms of religious mental exercise, not involving any more real and definite reference to that state itself than any of the other forms; whether, in fact, the idea of futurity be an essential element of the idea of immortality, or only a condition of the existence of this idea in our finite minds; whether the future life is to be regarded as beginning only when what we call the present life ends; whether the terms "present" and "future" in this case, denote *time* at all, and not rather *state*; whether, at any rate, their application be not limited to this temporal state, so that the term "future," as applied to the eternal state, has meaning only by a sort of negative, reflex reference to the temporal, and not by virtue of any property or condition of the eternal itself, to which it might apply. It is not a mere theory peculiar to this or that school of philosophy, that time and space are nothing but conditions of this phenomenal, earthly life; any more than it is matter of pure speculation that this earthly life is only phenomenal,—the apparent, transient, unsubstantial form of eternal, spiritual, invisible substance. Both are scriptural ideas, as truly as the idea of immortality. The latter we find plainly implied in that passage of Hebrews: "Things which are seen were not made of things which do appear" (literally, "of phenomena"),—*i.e.*, were made strictly, became, or grew, of things which do not appear (literally, "of that which is not phenomenal," of an in-

visible substance) ; and in that of 2d Corinthians : " The things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal ;" and mysteriously pictured in the translations of Enoch and Elijah, the Old Testament angelophanies, the transfiguration of Christ, and the course of his resurrection-body till the ascension. There is even more truth than poetry in those words of James,—“ What is your life ? It is even a vapour, that *appeareth* for a little time, and then *vanisheth away*.” The former is almost in so many words asserted in the solemn declaration of the angel in John’s vision, that “ there shall be time no longer,” (Rev. x. 6) ; in the words of Moses, “ A thousand years in thy sight are but as yesterday when it is past, and as a watch in the night,” (Ps. xc. 4) ; and in those of Peter, “ One day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day.”—(2 Peter iii. 8.) These expressions are not intended simply to say, that time passes more quickly with the Lord than with man,—as it seems to pass more rapidly with us in some circumstances than in others ; nor that God can do as much in one day as in a thousand years, the consideration of time being nothing with him. Both these ideas are included, indeed, in the true one ; but the fundamental thought is, that time is a mere appearance, as is suggested when one dreams over a life time in what is to another but an instant. The doctrine is most strikingly implied in the Saviour’s words, which seem purposely constructed to hint his entire freedom from and mastery over the human limitations of time, in his higher nature : “ Before Abraham was, I am.” So with the idea of space. It must disappear the moment we pass the bounds of this mortal state,—the moment the earthly phenomena cease, and the earthly life goes out, as the floating cloud upon the sunny sky. Death is not a change of place with man, but a change of state or mode of existence. The above-mentioned hints of the Scriptures indicate not only the freedom of *God* from the conditions of space and time, but the entire absence of these conditions from the *spiritual world* ; so that, when *man* leaves this earthly stage, he enters a state in which, to him, time and space are no longer. We cannot even say,—as we believe Swedenborgians do, for example, who profess to be so spiritual in their views,—that, though time no longer really exists to him, yet the *appearance* of time cleaves to him, from force of habit, perhaps, as in a dream. For time is, in any case, only an appearance ; and all that binds man to it, even in sleep, is his actual connection still with the phenomenal world through the body ; and this connection is at death supposed to be entirely dissolved. The common effort, therefore, to comprehend or to illustrate eternity by joining vast periods of time, is an effort

in a false direction, and hence never leads to any satisfactory results,—never finds us nearer the idea, at the end of our effort, than we were at the beginning. For eternity is the negation of time. So with infinity, or immensity, at least in the theological sense. It is not to be conceived by piling one vast region of space upon another. It is the negation of space, as the term itself means. “Infinite, boundless, immeasurable space,” (if the words are intended to be used with philosophical accuracy), is a contradiction in terms; and so is “eternal time.” Every conception of space *must* include the idea of the *possibility* of measurement; the term “immense,” can be applied to space only in a relative sense. Absolute impossibility of measurement or calculation, absolute infinity, can be predicated only of that which is not subject at all to the conditions of space and time, and to which our words of time and place,—our now and then, and here and there,—cannot apply, except in a purely symbolical way. It is in this view that we have suggested that the word “future,” as applied to the spiritual world, is not to be taken in a temporal sense, and does not describe any characteristic of the spiritual state with philosophical precision, but is only a symbolical designation of that state as different from the existing temporal state, not as future *in* time, but as future *without* time, and that the idea of futurity is not an element of the true idea of immortality.

Now this thought, if it be true, (and it is surely *scriptural*, even in Dr Whately's sense of that term,) ought to be carried into all speculations on the future state. This is by no means saying that the terms in question are in such sense false, as to be useless for purposes of ordinary edifying meditation and discourse. We would by no means propose the discarding of physical terms in all our reflections on spiritual things. Pious thought, with the mass of Christians at least, *must* move in the sphere of these temporal conditions, until some new religious era raise the church to a far higher power of spiritual vision than she now has. But to build *theories* of the spiritual state upon these physical notions; to lay down a certain order of events in the history of the departed spirit, not merely as a confessedly symbolical representation, but as the actual reality itself, so that we have questions of time and space to solve in a scientific way respecting them;—to do this is simply absurd. It involves a philosophical solecism throughout. We might as reasonably institute an anatomical and optical inquiry into the organization of the “four beasts round about the throne, full of eyes before and behind.” The Scriptures, indeed, everywhere use such terms, but only for practical purposes; they never theorise respecting the spiritual state, they only suggest thoughts of it in such a way as to bear most effectually on the

present conduct and religious experience of men. Nobody thinks of constructing an astronomical system from such passages as Joshua's command to the sun to stand still, or any of the common forms of expression respecting astronomical motions: though these, too, abound in the Scriptures, to the entire exclusion of the present scientific ideas: yet not even would Newton himself dream of discarding this mode of speech for the common purposes of life. When we do undertake so unreasonable a task in the matter of the future state, no wonder we find ourselves beset at once with perplexing and absolutely insolvable (because illegitimate) questions about the intermediate state, the resurrection, the judgment, &c.; and no wonder we find the Scriptures obscure, and even apparently uncertain and self-contradictory, on such questions as we thus raise.

What we call the future, immortal life, therefore, is not a life which *begins* only when this mortal life ends. "He that believeth on the Son, *hath* everlasting life." Life eternal is not an endless prolongation of life temporal; but it is to know God and Jesus Christ. Hence the mental exercises of the ancient saints towards God may have been just as spiritual without the knowledge of the future state, as they could have been, or as our religious exercises generally are with it. If Abraham and David knew and loved God, and obeyed him in faith, they had knowledge of what is really the future state,—that is, the eternal state of happiness,—as truly as we have; only they had it not under the form of something temporally future, to be fully revealed only by the abolition of time and the separation of the individual from this earthly order of things. In this way the foregoing remarks, which may have seemed a digression, apply to the point from which we passed to them.

We can now only briefly suggest the application of the principle thus stated to several other points in Dr Whately's book, where it would at least change the character of our difficulties, and make them such as we can better bear, though it can by no means clear up the mystery. Our author strikingly and truly alludes to the spirit in which the Scriptures uniformly treat the subject of the future state:—

"The whole passage (2 Peter iii.) is one which illustrates very strongly an observation which I have made more than once (in the course of our present inquiry), respecting the brief, dry, unpretending, uncircumstantial manner in which a future state is everywhere spoken of by the sacred writers. 'The day of the Lord will come as a thief in the night; in which the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall be dissolved with fervent heat; the earth also, and the works that are therein, shall be burned up.' Here we might have looked, if anywhere, for a detailed description of the several cir-

cumstances attending this great catastrophe,—for impassioned exclamations concerning it, and magnificent pictures of the scenes that will occur. No such thing: the apostle immediately proceeds to a practical application of the knowledge he has imparted, to the lives of his hearers.”—(P. 190, *seq.*)

And in another place, he gives as one of the reasons for the silence of the Scriptures on many points of supposed interest, “That most likely there are many things connected with (the subject) which we could not possibly comprehend with our present faculties, any more than a man born blind can understand the nature of colours; so that unless our powers of understanding were enlarged beyond what is fitting for our present state of existence, any attempt to explain to us such mysteries would be likely to mislead or bewilder us.”—(P. 162.) This is a consideration altogether just. But the true ground of it is the principle, that the spiritual world admits not the conditions of space and time. And as our author has not this principle in mind as the foundation of his remark here, we are not surprised to find him in the same way, though not to the same extent, as many others, disregarding the very lesson of reserve thus read from the Scriptures, and endeavouring to conceive the spiritual life in a way not warranted by the representations and hints of the Scriptures as a whole, and not at all called for by any practical need.

In the view above presented, the question of an intermediate state falls out of the sphere of scientific discussion; just as the question on what the earth rests, ceased to be a proper question so soon as the earth was found to be a globe in perpetual motion. The proper problem for science here is, to apprehend clearly that state of things, or those principles, by which this question of an intermediate state is thus excluded. “Intermediate,” “between,” are words of space and time; and where there is no space nor time, these terms can have no philosophical application. Our author comes, in fact, to a certain exclusion of this question, but only by the aid of physical notions; and his view really rests on such notions, instead of beginning and ending independently of them. In Lecture IV., he discusses the arguments for an intermediate state of sleep. He evidently inclines to rest in that doctrine himself, and finds less difficulty with it than with any other view of the intermediate state; and with good reason, viz., because he thus comes as near throwing out the question entirely as he could come while he retained the notion. One of his chief arguments in favour of this view, is in the form of an answer to the objection, that the idea of passing into a state of unconsciousness, perhaps for ages, is too dreary and painful to be admitted into the Christian’s prospect. His answer is: The

objection proceeds from the imagination only, not from the understanding :—

“ When we view things by the light of the understanding, they present a very different aspect. Reason tells us (the moment we consider the subject), that a long and a short space of time are exactly the same to a person who is insensible. All our notion of time is drawn from the different impressions on our minds succeeding one another ; so that when any one loses his consciousness (as in the case of a fainting fit, or of those recovered from drowning, suffocation, or the like), he not only does not perceive the length of the interval between the loss of his consciousness and the return of it, but there is (*to him*) *no* such interval ; the moment at which he totally lost his sensibility seems (and *is to him*) immediately succeeded by the moment in which he regains it. In the case of ordinary sleep it will often happen, when any one sleeps very soundly, that the moment of his waking shall appear to him immediately to succeed that of falling asleep, although the interval may have been many hours. The long and dreary interval, then, between death and the day of judgment (supposing the intermediate state to be a profound sleep), does not exist at all, except in the imagination. To the party concerned there is *no* interval whatever ; but to each person (according to this supposition) the moment of his closing his eyes in death will be instantly succeeded by the sound of the last trumpet, which shall summon the dead, even though ages shall have intervened.”—(Pp. 81–84.)

The fault we find with this representation is, not that it does not sufficiently exclude the consideration of time from the spiritual world, but that it assumes unconsciousness in order to this exclusion, and thus, after all, secretly lets temporal conditions fully into the conception of eternity.

Dr Whately very justly refers to the sensuousness of the prevailing conceptions of spirit, in this way :—

“ It is remarkable, that a great part of mankind, and those not least, who profess to hold, not only the distinct nature of the soul from any material substance, but even its power of continuing active and conscious when disunited from matter, are nevertheless altogether *materialists*, and mean by a *spirit* only some thin and delicate kind of matter, like a cloud or a ray of light, &c., which is an object of the senses, but not of *all* the senses. This is plainly the case, not only with those who believe in the common stories of ghosts (that is, spirits) *appearing* and speaking, but also with those who, though they disbelieve these accounts, yet perceive nothing *contradictory* and inconceivable in the idea of the *appearing of the spirit*,—which of course would appear to them mere words without meaning, if they understood by ‘spirit,’ something which does not consist of matter, and consequently cannot have (as a visible object must) shape, height, colour,” &c.—(P. 59, note.)

This bears well towards the proper liberation of the conception of the future state from the condition of space. Ac-

cordingly, in the chapter on the "Condition of the Blest and their Abode in Heaven," the author says:—

"Indeed, we have no reason to suppose that that great Spirit, whom we call God, and whom we suppose not to partake at all of the nature of any material substance, has any relation to *place* at all, or can be properly said to be *in* any place. Strictly speaking, it is not that God is everywhere *present*, but rather, that all things are *present to him*,—as falling under his perfect knowledge and complete control. When, therefore, we speak of the blest as being admitted into the *presence* of God, we must remember that this has not necessarily any thing to do with change of *place*, but implies rather a change in their *condition*."—(P. 194, *seq.*)

But he seems still encumbered with the same sensuousness which he has disapprovingly remarked in others. He evidently has not the apostle Paul's idea of a *spiritual* body. The apostle takes pains to present this idea in distinct opposition to that of the natural body; and his conception is strikingly exemplified in the resurrection-body of Christ, which evidently was not, as to its proper essence, visible, nor limited to space (only its occasional miraculous *appearances* were), and which would seem to have put forth such phenomena as it did through forty days, ending with the ascension, on purpose to suggest to the disciples its invisible, spiritual nature. This nature was such, that in the very act of exhibiting that miraculous phenomenon of ascension and departure, the Lord could say, without any qualification restricting his language to his Spirit merely, or his higher nature, and evidently intending it to apply to his whole person, "Lo, I am with you alway, even to the end of the world." Quite inconsistently with this scriptural view, and even with his own language, as quoted above, Dr W. says, "The eternal habitation of the blest is described by the apostle as 'new heavens and a new earth;' meaning by 'heavens,' the air we breathe and sky over our heads, as he means by 'earth,' the place on which we dwell. And this description must be understood, in a great degree, at least, literally; since the blest in the next world, having real material bodies as now, though different from their present bodies, must inhabit some *place*, fitted for the reception of such bodies."—(P. 192.) "Although, however, the all-present Spirit, which we call God, has no relation to place, nor can be said to be in one part of the universe more than in another, it must be otherwise with the bodily person of the Lord Jesus, with whom the divine Spirit was mysteriously united. A *body* must be in some *place*, and cannot be in more than one at once."—(P. 196, *seq.*) Here are several fallacies crowded together. One is, that God is represented—contrary to the author's own words on p. 194—as *in* the universe. Rather is the universe in God. Another

is, that a *body* must be *material*, and hence that the blest in the next world, to have real bodies, must have material bodies, and so a place for those bodies. Paul specially distinguishes the bodies of the blest as *spiritual* bodies. A third fallacy, or at least a gratuitous assumption, is, that the person of Christ is divisible, so that his "bodily person" must be in some one *place*, while the divine Spirit, mysteriously united with him, may be in all places, or has no relation to place. Of this the Lord himself gives no hint; but rather hints and takes for granted the contrary in all the expressions of his self-consciousness, especially in his parting words to his disciples. Thus the vain question of the place of heaven must arise, "Whether the *place* of the habitation of the blest will be this present earth, renewed and restored to such a condition as that in which it is supposed to have been created when the first man was placed in Paradise, or altered in some other way; or whether they will be fixed in some other part of the universe, we have no means of ascertaining, nor is it of any consequence that we should know."—(P. 192, *seq.*) This question, like that of the intermediate state, would never be encountered were the principle now before us properly applied. A *spiritual* body must be one which is not merely refined matter, but is of the nature of spirit as distinct from matter. Body or substance is not the antithesis of spirit; else Paul's expression were a contradiction in terms, as "spiritual matter," or "material spirit" would be. *Matter* is the antithesis of spirit, as Dr Whately himself, in one place, puts it. And if in the above passage, where he speaks of the blest as "having real material bodies," we insert the apostle's description of the bodies of the blest, the absurdity of the sentence, and the author's self-contradiction too, will appear: "The blest in the next world, having real material spiritual bodies," &c. According to the note quoted above against the prevailing sensuous notions of spirit, ought not Dr W. to make a remark respecting the glorified saints, like the one he makes respecting God,—that they have no relation to *place* at all, and cannot properly be said to be *in* any place? Then we should conceive of heaven, not as a place, but as a state or condition, viz., the condition of being present with God, of which Dr W. himself speaks in language already quoted. And any one who carefully weighs some of Paul's most profound and philosophical and least figurative expressions,—such as 2 Cor. v. 1, 6, 8; Eph. i. 3, ii. 6,—will be persuaded that his prevailing idea of heaven does not include the notion of place at all.

It may be said,—and said with truth,—that such thoughts do not solve the difficulties in the way of a clear apprehension of that future state, which even to this day lies in the mind of

the church as pretty much an undeveloped matter of faith. It is as hard to comprehend a timeless and spaceless state of being, as to comprehend measureless space and time. Thus we seem only to substitute new difficulties for the old. But surely this may be something worth doing. It is an advance, in every scientific research, to find out that we are on a wrong track, and to leave it for one which seems nearer right, though it should seem no easier. The difficulties thus introduced are worthy objects for philosophy to grapple with, or to stop at. The others were not. These are mysteries; the others were absurdities.* The history of eschatology—of the church's looking for the second coming of Christ—betrays a general tendency to carnal views, like the history of the Jewish expectations of the first advent. We should be well aware of this, and endeavour to guard against it.

We do not leave this subject without a more earnest longing than we had when we entered upon it, for deliverance from the necessity of conceiving spiritual things only by natural analogies, and of dealing in a discursive, logical way with what really belongs only to the sphere of intuition;—which is not only like looking through a glass, but rather like seeing with the ear or hearing with the hand. And we feel that this very effect of such thoughts, as we have now suggested, is a most useful one, and proves that much as they may seem like mere negation, they tend towards earnest practical piety, at least as much as views like those of the book we now close. They help the cultivation of those powers of spiritual vision and of communion with God in love even here on earth, which will at last mould us entirely, when we shall put off this tabernacle, to that perfect state in which we shall see face to face, and know even as we are known.

ART. IV.—*History of the Protestant Church in Hungary from the beginning of the Reformation to 1850; with special reference to Transylvania.* Translated by Rev. J. CRAIG, D.D., Hamburg. With an Introduction, by J. H. MERLE D'AUBIGNE, D.D., President of the Theological School of Geneva, and Vice-President of the Société Evangélique, author of "The History of the Great Reformation," &c. Boston: Phillips, Sampson, & Co. New York: James C. Derby. 1854.

SINCE the noble but unsuccessful struggle of Hungary for her political independence, every item of information about her

past history or present condition has been received with the deepest interest by the American people. All classes have asked, and read, and talked about Hungary.

And yet, how little has been known or thought about the religious element in Hungary! How few have asked the question, Whether the Hungarians were Christians; and if so, whether Greek, Roman, or Protestant! How many have simply taken for granted, that, as they were politically subject to the Emperor of Austria, so they were spiritually to the Pope of Rome! Nor has any work conveying clear and definite information on the subject been accessible to the masses of the people. The Christian community has felt that this was a lack whose supply was most desirable.

That lack has been supplied in a very great measure by the volume whose title we have placed at the head of our article. The introduction to it is from the pen of Dr Merle D'Aubigné. In it he informs us that, in the year 1846, a number of documents relating to the history of religion in Hungary were submitted to him, with the request that he would write the history of the Reformation in that country. On examining them, he found that they for the most part pertained to the period *after* the Reformation. He declined the task, for it would have interfered with his great and cherished design of writing the history of evangelical religion in the *first half* of the sixteenth century.

In the year 1853 the present volume appeared, and Dr D'Aubigné felt that he could not decline the request to write an introduction. In it he speaks of the work, and of the anonymous author, in the following terms:—

“The work that we now offer to the public ought to be considered worthy of attention, were it only for its novelty, but more particularly so, on account of the labour that has been bestowed on its composition. The author is a man possessed of enlightened piety, sound judgment, integrity, faithfulness, and Christian wisdom—qualities well calculated to inspire perfect confidence. He has obtained his materials from the most authentic sources. Government edicts, convent protocols, visitation reports, and official correspondence, have all been consulted with scrupulous attention, as is proved by the numerous quotations which he cites. He has thus sought to place the authenticity of his book on an indisputable basis, and at the same time to render it impervious to the shafts of hostile criticism.”—(Page 5.)

This is sufficient to inspire confidence in it as a reliable historical work. It is also a work of absorbing interest; a record of faith and conflict, of political and ecclesiastical oppression, continued from generation to generation. We propose to follow the thread of the history, and glance at some of the prominent events brought to notice.

The very extensive kingdom of Hungary, for it embraces a territory of four hundred and fifty miles long, by three hundred and forty-five broad, was occupied by the Romans at the Christian era, and afterwards by various barbarous tribes. Some attempts were made to introduce Christianity about the beginning of the ninth century, by monks from England and Italy. Being ignorant of the language of the people, they were unable to instruct them thoroughly in the principles of the gospel. They endeavoured to captivate them by ceremonies, and hence accomplished but little permanent good. The idolatrous Magyars, worshippers of Mars, and of the host of heaven, shortly after came from Asia, led by Almus, and blotted out every trace of their work.

Meanwhile the gospel was introduced into neighbouring countries, and in the middle of the tenth century began to be favourably received in Hungary. The Regent, Geyza, married a Christian princess; Christian captives taken by the Hungarians became teachers of their captors; German artisans and merchants came into the country; and, to crown all, the Emperor Otto sent a bishop to further the work of evangelization. Geyza received baptism, and made strong but unsuccessful attempts to establish Christianity as the religion of the nation. His son Stephen was more successful. Many missionaries were sent through the country, and the people were enjoined, under severe penalties, to receive their instructions. This excited a rebellion, which resulted in the defeat of the insurgents. Stephen built many churches, established schools, and enforced the observance of the Sabbath.

These compulsory measures produced such a determined opposition to Christianity in the minds of the people, that in 1060 they called Andrew to the throne, on the express condition that he should root it out. For a season, persecution prevailed. But Andrew soon repented, and for the remainder of his reign devoted himself to the establishment and defence of the Christian religion. In the closing part of the eleventh century, Ladislaus, during a reign of eighteen years, did much to promote religion, and to improve the social condition of the people.

It need scarcely be mentioned that the Christianity at this time enjoyed by Hungary was the corrupt form of it taught by Rome. It was Christianity without the Bible,—the Christianity of a soul-destroying ecclesiastical tyranny. We now note the introduction of another, and the only true and pure form of the religion of Jesus of Nazareth,—that which recognises the Word of God as supreme authority, and Christ the sole Mediator.

In the latter part of the twelfth century, Peter Waldo,

fleeing from Lyons for the sake of the word of God, came to Bohemia. Of those who were gathered around him, many went into Hungary, and preached the gospel with much success. Persecution at first increased the number of converts, and they increased still more when the troubles of the country drew away the attention of the nobles from them. Besides, the Hungarian constitution did not allow of persecution to the extent that it obtained in some other countries, and many of the nobles favoured the new doctrines.

Now appeared in Bohemia two of the intrepid "Reformers before the Reformation," John Huss and Jerome of Prague, who lifted up their voices boldly for the truth, and heroically died in attestation of it. The shedding of their blood was like the scattering of precious seed broad-cast over the land. Much of that seed fell in Hungary, where thousands of the followers of Huss settled. These were sometimes persecuted, and sometimes allowed rest, according to the temper of the reigning prince, or reasons of state that prevailed. When the great Reformation broke out, they united in the movement; and when the day of bloody persecution came, many went from Moravia to Germany, and at Herrnhut established the Moravian Church under Count Zinzendorf. Many went from Hungary to Wallachia, and there long remained separate, but at last failing to receive preachers, according to their desire, from the Reformed Church of Transylvania, they went some to the Greek Church, some to the Roman.

In the fifteenth century, the corruptions of the Papacy had become intolerable. The bishops were ambitious lords, occupied with state affairs, intent on their own aggrandizement, and better qualified to lead armies than to feed the flock of Christ. The priests were illiterate, covetous, immoral, and rapacious. The people were ignorant, superstitious, devoted to image-worship, and with no conception of spiritual religion. All these circumstances prepared Hungary for the Reformation. The doctrines of Huss, too, had pervaded the land like leaven. The constitution guaranteed freedom, and the nobility and many of the common people detested the clergy. The writings of Luther came at once into Hungary, and as early as 1521, a condemnation of them was read from the pulpits of the principal churches. Notwithstanding this, as our author observes, "the living word, coming from hearts warmed by conviction, produced a wondrous effect, and in a short time whole parishes, villages, and towns, yes, perhaps the half of Hungary, declared for the Reformation."—(P. 40.)

The word of God was preached by John Henkel, the chaplain of Queen Mary, who was a sister of the Emperor Charles V. There is every evidence to believe that she favoured the Refor-

mation. Her chaplain continued to preach when others were silenced; and she carried a Latin Testament with her, which she filled with notes. Luther, on sending a translation of four psalms with one of his own hymns for her comfort, wrote, that "he has with great pleasure seen that she is a friend to the gospel." Afterwards, when she was regent in the Netherlands, it was the constant complaint of the Popish emissaries around her, that she would not take summary measures to crush the Reformation in that country.

The Reformation spread so rapidly that Rome became greatly alarmed, and the Pope's legate induced the young King Louis, in the year 1523, to issue an edict that "All Lutherans and those who favour them, as well as adherents to the sect, shall have their property confiscated, and themselves be punished with death, as heretics and foes of the most holy Virgin Mary."—(P. 44.) This edict, for reasons which we can only surmise, was never strictly enforced. The Reformation received a new impulse. Many young men went to Wittenberg to pursue their studies under Luther and Melancthon, and returned zealous disseminators of their doctrines.

The devastation of Hungary by the Turks was no hindrance to the progress of these doctrines. Though a great national calamity, it resulted in the furtherance of the gospel. On the 29th of August, 1526, the battle of Mohacs was fought between Louis and Soliman. The result was most disastrous to the Hungarians, for they lost their king, seven bishops, twenty-eight princes, five hundred nobles, and twenty thousand warriors. But among those who perished were many of the most bitter enemies of the Reformation. The edicts against the Protestants continued to stand, but they who had been zealous to execute them were gone; and the Turks, despising all Christianity, did not meddle with the differences between Romanist and Protestant.

Louis was succeeded by two rival kings, John Zapolya and Ferdinand of Austria, who involved Hungary in a civil war of twelve years. Both were anxious to secure the favour of the bishops, and therefore issued severe edicts against the Protestants. Ferdinand, especially, issued one which in cruelty does not fall behind the celebrated edict of his brother, Charles V., against the Protestants in the Netherlands. Confiscation of goods, banishment, and death, were the penalties for heresy, according to the aggravation of the crime. Those who received heretics into their houses were to be *ipso facto infames*, deprived of the rights of citizens, and rendered incapable of ever holding office. That these edicts were not faithfully executed must be attributed to the troublous state of the times, the insecurity of the government, and the

favour with which the Reformation was regarded by many of the nobles.

The 25th of June, 1530, is described by D'Aubigné as "the greatest day of the Reformation, and one of the most glorious in the history of Christianity and of mankind." The scene that then took place is most graphically pictured by him in his *History of the Reformation*. On that day the Confession of Augsburg was read before the Emperor Charles V., and the princes of the empire, to the confusion of the Romish bishops and doctors. Many Hungarians were present, and that wonderfully clear and simple statement of evangelical doctrine was carried into Hungary, and gave a fresh impulse to the Reformation there. Men were now raised up who were mighty in the Scriptures, burning with zeal, and valiant for the truth.

Chief among these was Matthew Devay, sometimes called the Hungarian Luther, sometimes the Apostle of Hungary. He had drunk in the doctrines of the Reformation at Wittenberg, from the teachings of Luther and Melancthon. Dwelling in Luther's house, and enjoying constant unrestricted intercourse with him, he became deeply imbued with the spirit of the intrepid Reformer, and, on his return to his native country, he preached with immense power and success. Many nobles heard the truth from him, and embraced it. Whole villages renounced Popery. He was soon complained of for "turning the world upside down," and thrown into prison by King John. Being set free, he received a call to Kashaw, in Upper Hungary, where he preached the more boldly. He was now complained of before Ferdinand, who agreed with his rival, John, in imprisoning this heroic witness for the truth.

On regaining his liberty, he, with the countenance of the nobles, travelled from place to place preaching the gospel. He also translated the Epistles of Paul into the vernacular of his countrymen. In 1536, he went a second time to Wittenberg, to consult and enjoy Christian intercourse with his revered instructors. The state of things in Hungary at that time will be best described in the words of our author:—

"At Wittenberg he resided again with Luther, and was able to tell him how not only the Epistles of Paul had been given to the Hungarians in their native language, but also how the four Gospels had been published by Gabriel of Pesth, on the 13th of July 1536. Entire parishes had declared in favour of the Reformation, as also free cities and villages, and many even of the higher clergy had made great sacrifices by openly professing the truth. He could also tell how great the danger was to which they were still exposed. The penal laws were still in force. The Bishop of Eger, Thomas Szalakazi, had

thrown Antony, a preacher of Eperjes, and Bartholemy, a chaplain, into prison. People did not know what to expect from John and Ferdinand. The latter had sent a decree to Bartfield, which was now entirely reformed, ordering them, under pain of death and confiscation, to abolish all innovations in the mode of worship; to renounce all the heresies which a certain D. Isaiah had taught them; not to recall him, but to be reconciled to their former clergy. This order was issued in 1535, and how much attention was paid to it, we shall soon see. That faith on the Son of God, which overcometh the world, had taken root here, and it knows no fear. Strong in this faith, Devay returned from Wittemberg in the end of the year 1537."—(P. 64.)

Protected by the powerful Count, Thomas Nadasdy, Devay now laboured "in the district between the river Raab and the Balaton lake." His former place of labour in Upper Hungary was occupied by one most worthy to take it, Stephen Szantai, whose arrest was soon demanded, and effected. But Ferdinand would not condemn him without a hearing, and therefore ordered a public discussion of the disputed points. The report of the umpires is curious, for they wished to be honest, and at the same time safe. How to accomplish both these ends was the difficulty. "They reported that all which Szantai had said was founded on the Scriptures, and what the monks had brought forward were mere fables and idle tales." But they added, "Should we state this publicly, we are lost, for we should be represented as enemies to our religion; if we condemn Szantai, we act contrary to truth and justice, and would not escape divine retribution. They begged, therefore, that the king would protect them from the danger on both sides."—(P. 66.)

The bishops and monks were clamorous for the condemnation of Szantai; but as they could give no good reasons for it the king refused to yield to them. In a private audience, the preacher being asked by the king, "What is then really the doctrine which you teach?" made this noble answer: "Most gracious prince, it is no new doctrine which I have invented, but a revealed doctrine, which, by divine grace, I have discovered. It is the doctrine of the prophets and apostles; and every one who really seeks his soul's salvation must obey this truth."—(P. 68.)

On this the king spoke frankly and kindly, not of the falsity of the doctrines, but of the present danger of professing them; told him that it was not in his power to protect him without endangering himself; dismissed him with valuable presents, and ordered him to be escorted by night in safety to his friends.

Yet Ferdinand was far from being a decided friend of the Reformation. The reasons for this are summarily given:—

“His Spanish education, the first impressions of which were carefully nourished by the priests; the example of his brother the Emperor Charles; the constant friendly relation between him and the court of Rome; the moral and physical assistance which Rome gave him against the Turks, and which in his circumstances was indispensable; the falsehoods which were told of Luther; the ignorance of the Word of God, which alone can make fallen man free;—all these wrought together in making Ferdinand what he was.”—(P. 99.)

The unfortunate controversy in regard to the presence of Christ in the supper, which divided the Protestant churches into Lutheran and Reformed, and which stirred up bitter strifes in Germany, also entered Hungary, in a measure, to spoil the work that was going on so prosperously. The rest that followed the civil war, increased the facilities for religious controversy. Devay adopted the views of Zuingle, to the astonishment of Luther and others. This controversy resulted in the formal adoption of the Swiss Confession by the Reformed, and the separate organization of the two bodies in 1566.

During the civil war, and also after the treaty between John and Ferdinand in 1538, Soliman was the virtual ruler of Hungary. This was not disadvantageous to the Protestants. The Turk allowed the Word of God to have free course. There was constant communication with the churches of Germany. In 1541, an edition of the New Testament in the Hungarian language was published by John Sylvester.

The progress of the Reformation awakened Ferdinand to the necessity of a reform within the Romish Church. He saw that without it, her influence would soon be gone. He instructed the deputies sent by him to the Council of Trent in 1545, to propose and advocate measures to secure a reformation in morals and doctrine, and a reform of all prevailing abuses. This resulted in nothing, as the history of the proceedings of that famous council will show.

The free cities of Guns and Ordenberg were prominent centres of the Reformation. In the former, the last Roman Catholic priest left, because his flock had left him. The diet that assembled in the latter place declared in favour of the Reformation, and the town was almost unanimous on the subject. Simon Gerengel laboured there with astonishing success. To show how extensive the change was through Hungary, it is stated that only three families of the magnates adhered to the Pope; that the nobility were nearly all Reformed; and that the people were thirty to one attached to the new doctrine.

What was to be done under these circumstances? Energetic measures were demanded by the falling Papacy. Its strong arm was called to the rescue. The Jesuits were invited to

come in, and work in their peculiar way for the destruction of heresy. They came, and met with some success. With characteristic subtilty they aimed to obtain control over the minds of Maximilian, heir to the throne, and of his wife. With the latter they were too successful, while the former resisted their arts. These efforts only inspired the Protestants with renewed zeal, in which they were encouraged by Maximilian. He established a printing press in Croatia, and approved of the publication of the Augsburg Confession. He permitted an edition of the New Testament in the Croatian language to be printed and dedicated to himself. The expense of this edition was borne by one whose name deserves to be remembered, John Ungnad, who also caused four thousand spelling-books to be printed and circulated among the Croatians. The Jesuits deemed it very important to have this man out of the way, and they succeeded in procuring his banishment. But during his exile at Wurtemberg he remembered Croatia, into which he sent Bibles and other religious books.

The year 1564 was a hopeful one for the friends of the Reformation, for Maximilian ascended the throne in the room of his father. He gave orders to the archbishop "to cease to disturb the evangelical clergy, to consider the times, and to take heed that he did not destroy more than he built up." He directed that the cup should be permitted to the laity, and declared his opposition to all religious persecution. Thus far there had been no formal separation from the Church of Rome. The evangelical clergy laboured within her pale, and of course were subject to very great annoyances. But now synods were called, and Protestant organization effected. The Swiss Confession was adopted by a synod at Debreezin, and thus a complete separation effected, not only between the Romanists and Protestants, but also between the Reformed and Lutheran churches. The Reformed suffered by the introduction and spread of Socinian views among them, especially in Transylvania. Consequently a new confession, called the "Confession of Czenger," was prepared and adopted, which remains the confession of the Reformed Church of Hungary. The reign of Maximilian was noted for the publication of numerous confessions from individual churches and persons.

Maximilian, though a favourer of the Reformation, never left the communion of Rome. Nor did he speak as openly and freely after he became Emperor as he had done before. Still he had many Protestants at his court, and gave them important offices. During his reign, the Psalms were translated into Hungarian verse by Starinus. He died in 1576.

The successor of Maximilian was his son Rudolph, who reigned thirty-two years, and whose policy was to throw down

what his father had builded, and to pluck up what he had planted. His mother, as we have seen, was completely under the influence of the Jesuits. They obtained control of the education of the son; and it may easily be imagined what a character was formed, when it is known that, when only twelve years of age, he was sent to the court of that most cruel bigot and tyrant, Philip II. of Spain. He was taught to consider him a model, and ideas of implicit submission and entire devotion to Rome were carefully inculcated by his tutors, the Spanish priests. He became like Philip, and Philip's name can be mentioned only with abhorrence. He was selfish and tyrannical, caring not for the comfort or happiness of his people. He broke his oaths, trampled on the constitution, banished some of the Reformed clergy and men of note, and gave the Jesuits full scope. The Protestants were also weakened by internal dissensions, and the opportunity was improved by Rome in making strong efforts to bring the wandering sheep back to her fold.

The controversy between the Lutherans and the Reformed became very bitter toward the close of the sixteenth century. The Turks overran the country and laid it waste. A fearful famine prevailed, and the whole land was brought almost to the extreme of distress.

The peace of Vienna, which was ratified in 1606, was of great service to the Protestants. It set aside all decrees that had been issued against them, and guaranteed the rights of conscience. But the death of Botskay, the Protestant champion, encouraged a breach of plighted faith, and the old oppressions were again attempted. At the Diet of Presburg, in 1608, the Popish clergy protested against its guarantee of religious liberty to the Protestants. The archduke, Matthew, however, was firm, and so were the lay nobility. The result was a rupture with Rudolph, and finally the government of Hungary was given to Matthew, and the Protestants were fully confirmed in their religious rights. The Jesuits, with all their art, could not reverse this action. The Hungarians, Catholic as well as Protestant, gladly parted from Rudolph, who had made himself so odious to them.

The second period of this history embraces the century between the peace of Vienna, 1608, and the convention of Szathmar, 1711. Under the peace of Vienna, the Protestants fondly anticipated the enjoyment of full religious liberty. Their rights did not now depend on the will of a king, but were guaranteed by the laws of the land. Moreover, both the king and the palatine were lovers of justice. As the Protestant Church was not entirely free from the jurisdiction of the Catholic, and its members were greatly annoyed by Popish

visitations, demands for priests' dues, &c., the new palatine, George Thurzo, called a synod at Sillein, for the purpose of securing the independence of the Protestants. A church constitution was adopted, and superintendents were appointed. Their duties and privileges, as well as those of pastors, inspectors, deacons, and schoolmasters, were defined. The acts of this synod greatly enraged the high dignitaries of the Romish Church. They pronounced the anathema, which awakened a bitter pamphlet controversy. Efforts were made to produce uniformity in the mode of worship among Protestants, and the Wittenberg Cereimonial and Luther's Shorter Catechism were introduced.

Rest was not long to be enjoyed under the shadow of the peace of Vienna, for Rome keeps no faith with heretics. The new ecclesiastical arrangements were ignored by the king. The newly-appointed superintendents were denied the money formerly given to the Popish archdeacons, and all complaints fell on ears unwilling to hear.

In 1618, Ferdinand II., of Austria, was crowned King of Hungary. He was elected by the Hungarians, for Hungary was not a hereditary possession of Austria, but an independent kingdom, in the habit of choosing the Emperor of Austria as its king. It was a time of wonderful activity among the agents of the Papacy in England, France, and Spain. They did their utmost in Hungary; and Ferdinand, who had promised to protect the Protestants, became a fanatical and heartless persecutor. The Jesuits had every thing their own way. They exercised their power with terrible cruelty; compelled many to join the Church of Rome; excommunicated preachers, and drove them from their flocks into exile. Churches were stolen, and schools were broken up. In the midst of these proceedings Ferdinand died, leaving us as the embodiment of his spirit, the saying, "I will rather have a wasted than an accursed kingdom."

These annoyances continued under his son and successor, Ferdinand III. He was greatly superior to his father in every respect, a man of vigorous mind, and naturally well disposed. But he had been educated under the withering influence of Jesuitism, and how could he have the large and liberal views that we even now vainly look for in princes trained under that system?

The bitter and persevering Lippay, archbishop of Gran, was the chief persecutor. The persecuted looked to Prince Rakotzy, of Transylvania, for help. He declared war against Ferdinand, and, after a short but bloody contest, the peace of Linz was effected. This peace secured full religious liberty to the Protestants; their banished preachers were allowed to

come back to their congregations, and all churches and church property that had been seized were ordered to be restored. But to pass decrees was one thing; to get them fairly and honestly carried into effect was another. With difficulty did the Protestants recover ninety churches out of four hundred, of which they had been robbed. This partial restitution was accompanied with the comforting remark, "That in time to come not one single church more would be given up." Still, although more than three hundred churches were lost, something was gained by the adoption of several favourable articles. Some quiet was enjoyed, which was improved by the perfecting of discipline, building of churches and school-houses, and doing what seemed necessary for the internal prosperity of the church.

The latter half of the seventeenth century is covered by the reign of Leopold I., sometimes called "the Great," and which is denominated, "the beginning of the golden age of the Jesuits on the one side, and the gradual progressive decay of the Protestant Church on the other." He was heartless, bigoted, and slavishly devoted to Rome. Some of the Romish nobles were, during his reign, guilty of the most cruel oppressions of the Protestants living on their estates. All the complaints of these suffering people were dismissed by the king as an annoyance. The Protestant deputies in the National Diet made repeated applications to the king, that the affairs of the Protestant Church might be considered. They were treated in the same heartless and contemptuous manner, until they felt that they could no longer remain in the Diet, and they accordingly withdrew.

The oppressions of the country and the arrogance of the foreign nobles were so great, that many of the Hungarians (and chief among them were some who had been the most bitter persecutors of the Protestants) resolved to attempt to throw off the yoke of Austria. A conspiracy was formed to poison Leopold, which was discovered; but the whole affair was adroitly turned against the Protestants, so that every one of them was made subject to arrest as a conspirator or rebel. The truth, however, was soon learned, through the seizure of some papers that were in the hands of the widow of Vesselenyi, the leader of the conspiracy. The result was the execution of a large number of nobles, both Catholic and Protestant.

Advantage was nevertheless taken of this to carry on the work of persecution, and the old system of robbery of churches and schools was practised. The Archbishop of Gran signalled himself by citing thirty-three pastors before the vice-regal court, to answer to the charge of having excited the people

to rebellion. After a mockery of a trial, they received sentence. To avoid torture, some went into exile, and some remained at home, on condition of ceasing to exercise their ministry.

Encouraged by the result of this, the archbishop now summoned three or four hundred more to answer for two seditious anonymous letters that had been written. Sentences of beheading, confiscation, infamy, and outlawry, were pronounced. The first was not executed. But these poor men were so tormented, that two hundred and sixty-six signed their resignations, and most of them went into exile. The remainder were treated with great inhumanity, until almost all had yielded, and some even entered the Roman Church.

At Leopoldstadt, the Jesuit Kellio exercised extreme cruelty toward five pastors imprisoned there. After incredible abuse and suffering, they were, in company with thirty-six from Komorn and other places, sent under an escort to Italy. Some died by the hardships of the way, and some escaped. Of the forty-one, thirty reached Naples, where they were sold for fifty Spanish piastres each, and chained to the benches of the boats with the galley-slaves. They were followed by others, who shared the same fate.

It is delightful to mark the interposition of God in behalf of his suffering people. We have now come to a spot where we must linger a little, and see how God brought deliverance. The case of these Christian pastors, and "companions in tribulation," attracted the attention of princes, but nothing was effected. George Woltz, a wealthy citizen of Naples, and his brother Philip, alleviated their condition by visiting them twice every week, and supplying their necessities. They also endeavoured to purchase their freedom. Appeals were made in their behalf to Switzerland, Germany, Holland, and England. Many distinguished men advocated their cause. Charles II. of England ordered contributions for their relief. The clearest proof that they were innocent of rebellion was shown to the Prince Regent of Naples; but all in vain. And even the offer of Woltz to buy them, supported by the English ambassador, was met with the cool reply, "They are not Roman Catholics."

Here was a case that decidedly called for intervention, and it came. On the 12th of December 1675, a Dutch fleet, under Vice-Admiral De Staen, sailed into the harbour of Naples, and the chaplain was despatched to the prisoners to get exact information of the case, "so that the Vice-Admiral might, by divine assistance, and by the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, labour more efficiently on their behalf." He, with some other officers, waited on the Regent, and were so well received that

they ventured to promise the prisoners that in three days they should be at liberty. The hope thus excited was disappointed, for the fleet was obliged to leave the harbour immediately, on account of the war with France. The heroic and Christian Admiral, De Ruyter, however, was in the neighbourhood, and he had been commanded by the States-General of Holland to take up the case of the prisoners. He referred it to Cornelius Wandelen, the Dutch ambassador, and George Weltz; who procured a court of assize, which, after a thorough examination, declared that the prisoners were innocent of the crimes alleged against them, and ought to be set free. The report that the Dutch fleet was about to return home was fast turning their joy into sorrow, when De Ruyter, with full sail, entered the harbour.

"On the 11th of February 1676, the chaplain of the Dutch fleet, accompanied by several superior officers, went on board the boats; and, as in a dream, the prisoners forsook the place of their confinement, singing the 46th, the 114th, and 125th Psalms. Having reached the ship of the Vice-Admiral, he received and embraced them with unspeakable joy; and, after the tears of gratitude had freely flown, they knelt down together to thank God for their deliverance, and sung once more the 116th Psalm. Refreshed and strengthened, with hearts overwhelmed with gratitude, and their lips with praise to God, they spent the night in the Vice-Admiral's ship.

"The next morning they were brought before the Admiral. The veteran hero received them with every possible kindness, and exclaimed, 'that of all his victories, none had given him so much joy as the delivering these servants of Christ from their intolerable yoke.' He would not listen to their thanks, 'for,' said he, 'we are only the instruments—give all the glory to God.' The noble Admiral had clothes provided for them at his own expense, and took them with him. Of the thirty who entered the galleys, twenty-six were still remaining; and they went to Switzerland, Germany, England, and Holland, till such time as they were permitted to return to their native land."—(P. 263.)

At this time, the Protestant Church of Hungary was in a truly sad condition. Worship could be celebrated only with the utmost privacy. The blood-hounds of Jesuitism everywhere tracked the scattered sheep. The pastors met the remnants of their flocks in woods, and dens, and caves. A little light and liberty remained at Ordenberg.

In 1681 the Diet of Ordenberg was held, at which the Protestant deputies presented a strongly-written paper, setting forth the grievances of the church, and demanding redress. This was answered by a paper from the Romanists, repeating the old story, that there was no persecution on account of religion; that rebellion only had been punished; that no churches had been seized except such as had been originally

built by the Catholics, and which the Protestants had stolen from them,—than which no falsehood could be more barefaced. The emperor at last, urged by many Roman Catholic deputies, issued a decree, granting to the Protestants some of their rights, but making no mention of restitution. Another paper was presented, in which, to show their reasonableness in demanding restitution of stolen property, they stated, that since the accession of Leopold, they had lost eight hundred and eighty-eight churches, without counting chapels and houses of prayer.

Very far were the Protestants from receiving full justice at this diet, but they obtained some relief. The exiled pastors were allowed to return home, and no one was to be disturbed on account of his religion. Seized churches, that had not yet been consecrated to Rome, were to be restored. Obstacles in the way of the burial of the dead were removed, and encouragement was given to ask for more favours at the next diet. They were much indebted for what they received to the lay Roman Catholic deputies, among whom they had many firm friends, while the higher clergy were their most violent oppressors.

Meagre as were the promises of this diet, the fruits were more so. The old form of oppression was renewed, alleviated in part by Tokely's success at the head of the rebels, to be repeated with greater severity after his defeat; so that the Protestants, in their petition to the diet of 1687, had to complain that the "free exercise of the rites of their religion is almost universally prohibited." The old expedient of charging conspiracy and rebellion was resorted to, and many of the nobles of Upper Hungary, chiefly Protestants, suffered death. When the Protestants complained to the emperor, he coolly informed them that they had forfeited their rights entirely, because they were dissatisfied with what had been granted. So far from getting help, a new interpretation was made of the article of 1681 concerning the restitution of churches, by which they lost those which had been surrendered to them. The article provided, that all the churches taken by either side since a certain date should be restored. Some which had been taken by the Catholics were restored to the Protestants. This was interpreted to be a seizure by the Protestants, and restitution was demanded. Here was, truly, logic invented for the occasion.

The work of proselytism and persecution was carried on with vigour and cruelty until the death of Leopold, in 1705. The constitution was trampled under foot. This independent kingdom was treated as a province of Austria. It was devastated by Turks and rebels. The Jesuits were everywhere at

work. Foreign powers threatened. The kingdom was on the brink of ruin. Leopold saw it, and advised his son to conciliatory measures.

His son and successor, Joseph I., followed that advice, and conciliatory measures were adopted during his brief reign. The Protestants gathered up the scattered remnants of their institutions, and proceeded to reorganise churches, schools, &c. Joseph, by his pacific conduct, won the hearts of many Protestants. He would not allow the clergy to play their old tricks, nor suffer the Protestant pastors to be disturbed. His death occurred in 1711, and shortly after the peace of Szathmar was concluded.

A universal amnesty was granted, and returning prosperity was anticipated. But alas! the Jesuits and the spirit of Jesuitism were still there.

Charles VI. ascended the throne in 1712. He was decided and energetic in his efforts to stay the hand of persecution. He endeavoured to administer justice without respect of persons. This incited the priests to be crafty and vigilant in order to entangle the heretics. The pastors were closely confined to their districts. Charles did all that seemed to be in his power to protect his Protestant subjects, but he was obliged to yield by little and little, until at the close of his reign they were in no better condition than they had been under Leopold. At last it was resolved that a new court of commission should be established for the settling of all differences in religious matters. But the hopes raised by this were disappointed. The experiment failed. The Popish and Protestant members could not agree on the rules by which they were to be governed. They differed also in the interpretation of past decrees. Confusion was produced, and this court became an engine of oppression to the Protestant pastors. The censorship of the press was given to the Jesuits; public preaching was forbidden; and at last the king, in disgust, adjourned the commission.

A new court, consisting of twenty-two members, and called the Deputy Privy Council, was now established; and it was abused just like the commission. The king's influence in favour of his Protestant subjects continually decreased. Wearied, he at last issued a number of resolutions by which their rights were greatly abridged. They remonstrated, and the Catholic clergy were also dissatisfied because he did not go far enough. The result was, that all the churches that had not been expressly guaranteed to the Protestants were confiscated. The pastors were driven from their homes in mid-winter by officers void of sympathy. This cruelty drew appeals from Frederic William of Prussia, and the ambassadors of England, Holland,

Denmark, and Sweden. These availed not. The Jesuits were supreme. Charles had become a cipher. The Protestants were compelled to observe Romish ceremonies, and even family worship was interfered with. The sick and dying received a visit from their pastors only by special favour, while the priests exacted the usual fees.

Maria Theresa succeeded her father in 1741. The empire at this time was wasted by war. She threw herself at once on the Hungarians, who nobly rallied around her, hoping for brighter and better days. They had confidence in her gentle and humane character. The Protestants resolved to make their case known without delay, and presented a petition containing a recapitulation of the oppressions of years, with a prayer for redress and the future security of their rights. They also proposed that any difficulty that might arise should be decided by a mixed commission, composed of an equal number of Catholics and Protestants. The petition was signed by "Her Majesty's most obedient and ever faithful subjects of the Augsburg and Helvetic Confession residing in Hungary."

By the advice of her council, the empress made no reply whatever to this petition. She was under the complete sway of the Jesuits, and all the hopes that had been excited by her accession vanished. The persecuting spirit was awakened, and the oppressive resolutions of her father confirmed. Protestants were virtually debarred from office, because an oath by the Virgin Mary was required. Obstacles were put in the way of young men who desired to study at foreign universities. Candidates of theology were called home, and books and churches and school-houses were seized, and pastors and teachers were driven away. Those who went out of their own district to a distance to hear preaching were beaten, or otherwise abused. The bishops persisted in a visitation of the Protestant churches, for the regulation of their internal affairs, the examination of their pastors, &c. Many families, in which the husband and wife were one Catholic and the other Protestant, were greatly annoyed by the impudent interference of the priests in the education of their children. Many children were abducted. Many were forcibly made Catholics by thrusting a consecrated wafer into their mouths. The pastors were closely watched, and severely punished if they stepped out of their own bounds to visit the sick and dying.

There was little encouragement to offer petitions, but what could the bleeding church do? It was tried again, with similar results. The last step that remained was an appeal to the foreign powers which had guaranteed the liberties of Hungary; and this was taken. The Dutch and Hanoverian ambassadors wrote repeatedly to the empress, and Frederic the Great of

Prussia wrote a noble letter to Count Schaffgotsh, Cardinal and Prince Bishop of Breslau (p. 400,) in which he clearly shows that he understood the Catholic clergy to be the root of all these troubles. This letter the Cardinal, under the conviction that nothing could be done at Vienna, transmitted to the Pope, Benedict XIV. The Pope expressed his dissatisfaction with the doings of the priests, and directed the bishops in Hungary to exercise great caution.

A letter also came from the Archbishop of Canterbury, signifying that the King of England had directed his ambassador to inquire into the case, and that he (the archbishop) was ready to be the advocate of his poor brethren in the faith.

Of this interference little fruit came. Those who were supposed to have applied for it were rebuked; the oppressions charged were, as usual, indignantly denied; promises were freely made, and then things went on as usual.

It was a good day for Hungary when Maria Theresa, after the death of her husband, gave her son Joseph a share in the government. He at once read the characters of the Jesuits who were about his mother, and he became the uncompromising enemy of the order. He was not able to accomplish much during her life, but he prepared the way for the sweeping reforms which he afterwards effected.

He travelled through Hungary, made himself familiar with the condition of the people, conversed with the superintendents of the Protestant Church, and by his gentle, affable manners, gained every heart. He saw that the Jesuits were at the bottom of all the troubles, and in 1770, when Choiseul, the prime minister of France, contemplated a dissolution of the order, Joseph wrote to him that no reliance could be placed on his mother, for "the affection for this order of monks is hereditary in the House of Hapsburg," but that if he were emperor he might be relied on for co-operation. He wrote,—“Choiseul! I know these people well. I know their plans and exertions to spread darkness over the earth, and rule all Europe from Cape Finisterre to the North Sea.” In a letter written to a Spanish nobleman, after the suppression of the order, he says, after praising Clement XIV. for the act,—“Their influence over the House of Hapsburg is too well known. Ferdinand II. and Leopold I. were their protectors and patrons even with their latest breath.” In 1773 the order was suspended in Hungary.

The Protestants now began to consult about measures for the internal prosperity of their churches. They met on the Lord's day for worship; the authority of the priests over them was limited, and from time to time they were relieved by new decrees. Even law-suits were sometimes decided in their

favour, and restitution of stolen property was ordered. Their orphan children were allowed to be educated in the faith of their parents.

Maria Theresa was a woman naturally of kind and amiable disposition, but this was coated over by superstition. Conscience was perverted. The weightier matters of the law were nothing, in comparison with ceremonies and traditions. She verily thought that she was doing God service, while she oppressed his saints. Her death gave her noble and energetic son, Joseph II., an opportunity to carry out his just and liberal views.

He directed his energies to what had years before been proved an impossible thing, viz., the cleansing of that Augean stable, the Church of Rome. She cannot be reformed, for her corruptions are her life. He was supported in this by many of the higher clergy, and opposed by the whole body of monks and priests. He struck at the Papacy. He would have the church in Hungary free from foreign influence, and subject only to her own bishops. He did not allow papal bulls to be published in the kingdom without his sanction; and he broke up the monasteries.

He wrote the following letter to his minister at Rome:—

“MY LORD CARDINAL,—Ever since I mounted the throne, and assumed the first diadem of the world, I have made philosophy to be the lawgiver of my kingdom. It is necessary to remove out of the category of religion some things which never belonged to it. As I hate superstition and Phariseeism, I shall deliver my people from them. To this end I shall dismiss the monks, abolish their monasteries, and bring them all under subjection to the bishop of the diocese. In Rome, they will call this an aggression on the divine rights. They will cry and lament that the glory of Israel is fallen. We shall hear that I am taking away the tribunes of the people, and am drawing a line between dogma and philosophy. Bitterer still will be the rage, when they hear that I have done all this without consulting the servant of servants, and awaiting his opinion.

“We must thank him for the degradation of the human intellect. Never shall we bring these servants of the altar, voluntarily, to keep their place, and confine themselves to the preaching of the gospel; never will these children of Levi be willing to give up the monopoly of wisdom and knowledge. The monastic principle has been from the first directly opposed to reason: they give to the founder of their order a degree of honour approaching to divine worship; so that in them we see the antitype of the Israelites, who went to Dan and Bethel to worship the golden calves. This false system of religion has taken possession of the mass of the people, who, while they know not God, expect all from their patron saints!

“I shall restore the rights of the bishops; and give the people, instead of the monk, the regular priest; and instead of the legendary romance, a preached gospel. Where there is a difference of religion, there shall be a preaching of morality.

"I shall take care that my plans serve also for the future. The seminaries are the schools of my priests, where they shall come forth enlightened, and prepared to communicate knowledge to the people; and in a period of less than a century we shall have Christians; my people will understand their duty, and children's children shall bless us for having freed them from a too powerful Rome, and for having shown the priests how to keep their proper place."—(P. 438.)

In accordance with these views, he issued "the Edict of Toleration," forbidding the exclusion of Protestants from office on account of their religion, their compulsory observance of the ceremonies of Rome, and the intermeddling of priests with the internal affairs of Protestant churches, and granting the Protestants liberty to build churches and exercise worship.

Proportionate to the joy of the Protestants were the dissatisfaction, and even rage of the priests, who used every means to change the mind of the Emperor; but they could not. Even the Pope visited Vienna for that purpose. He was treated very politely, but accomplished nothing. Joseph signified to his Holiness, that he would be very happy to have his approval of the measures of reform, but that if he could not have it, he was prepared to dispense with it.

The Protestants did not at once get all their rights, but they were gradually delivered from oppression. They obtained permission to print Bibles and religious books. Confiscated books were restored, and priests, and even bishops, were called to account for attempting their accustomed Jesuitical operations.

In amazement they inquired, whither these things were tending, and whether Joseph was not going to join the Protestants. The feeling was so strong, that he made a public declaration, to the effect that he intended to adhere to the Church of Rome, and wished that all his subjects were Catholics; but that he would not suffer any man to be forced contrary to the dictates of his own conscience to join *any church*; and that if a Romanist wished to join the Protestant Church, he must give six weeks' notice, which time was to be devoted to his religious instruction.

Although the emperor desired to do justice, yet his eyes could not be everywhere. The execution of the laws was in the hands of subordinates, and the churches still suffered numerous grievances, on account of which they complained. It was not in vain. Justice was done them, and further measures were adopted to free them entirely from priestly jurisdiction and interference. In the district beyond the Danube, a new superintendent was elected, and the Presbyterian form of church government was revived.

Much excitement was raised by the "School Question,"

which is not, in these latter days, a new thing under the sun. The Protestants had always had their own schools, though they had been much interfered with, and often broken up during the troubles. At this time a national school system was introduced, which was applied to the Protestant schools in existence. But various practical questions arose. It was not questioned whether religious instruction should be given in them, but how, and to what extent. The Protestants were very jealous on this subject, for they felt that the system of education was closely connected with the good of the church. It was agreed that the Protestants should retain such schools as they had in operation; that where they had none, and their children were in the other schools, the precentor should go in and instruct them in the Protestant faith; and where Protestant teachers were employed they should be paid out of the national fund. "In mixed schools, such prayers should be used as made it consistent for the children of all confessions to come and to leave at the same time." The times for communicating religious instruction were to be fixed and published; the feelings of Protestant children were to be tenderly regarded, and everything offensive to them was to be removed from the school-books.

But the Protestants, remembering the past, were suspicious; they declined to co-operate in these schools, or to send their children to them. This resulted in some modifications. Among other things, it was provided that the Scriptures should be carefully read, and parents should be held responsible for the non-attendance of their children of suitable age.

Just before his death, which occurred in 1790, advantage was taken of the weakness of Joseph's mind, and he was persuaded to revoke a few of the measures which he had introduced.

The reign of his worthy successor, Leopold II., was short. He was firm in the maintenance of the right. He early issued some resolutions which, after a warm debate, the diet adopted by an immense majority, and recorded among the laws of the land. These confirmed the privileges which Joseph had given to the Protestants. Then they were dependent on the good pleasure of the sovereign, now they were guaranteed by the laws of the land. This was followed up by conventions of both the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, to consider plans for co-operation.

Francis I., the son of Leopold, did not walk in the steps of his father. Many of the most glaring abuses of the olden time were revived. The French Revolution broke out, and it was charged to the infidel, licentious spirit engendered by Protestantism. Popery was cherished as the bulwark of the

throne. The Protestants in a long petition rehearsed their grievances, supporting them by a citation of numerous particular instances of oppression. The church also suffered from internal difficulties. She lacked well-qualified preachers and schoolmasters. The former had often more zeal than knowledge, and the latter were frequently taken from among the young and inexperienced.

All petitions for relief were disregarded. So great was the fear of conversions, that pastors were forbidden to allow any Roman Catholic to be present at worship. Children were required to be sent to the Roman Catholic schools, and seven hundred Bibles, sent by the British and Foreign Bible Society, were confiscated. Still some advantages were secured. A college was founded, and great sacrifices made for it; a church was formed in Pesth; and a new edition of the Bible was introduced.

The Protestants determined at last to send a deputation to the Emperor, to lay their grievances before him. It was composed of Privy Councillor Peter Balogh, general inspector of the Lutheran Church; and Count Ladislaus Telekey, of the Reformed Church. Having secured the favourable regard of the Palatine, they laid their cause before the Emperor. He received them civilly, but signified that he could not tolerate sectarians, and alleged that the Protestants in Hungary were driving the Roman Catholics out of the civil offices; which was simply a lie of the priests. When the confiscation of the Bibles was spoken of, he made the profound remark, "that too much reading in these books was dangerous to the stability of the state." They also had an interview with Prince Metternich, who acknowledged that they had suffered great injustice, and tried to excuse the government. He went so far as to declare his opinion, that Protestantism was more advantageous to rulers than Popery, and promised his endeavours that justice should be done them.

The Protestant Church not only suffered these annoyances from without, but there were unfavourable elements at work within. Distracted counsels defeated all plans that were prepared for the improvement of the schools or the advancement of the church. Then, too, the government became bankrupt—the great famine followed—and while the value of money was greatly depreciated, the cost of the necessities of life was proportionably enhanced. This was the cause of great suffering among pastors and people. Great disregard of ecclesiastical order was also manifested.

The celebration of the jubilee of the Reformation (1817) stirred up the spirit of intolerance. Students of theology were forbidden to study at foreign universities, and Protestant pas-

tors were annoyed in the discharge of their duties. A deputation was sent to the emperor, which accomplished nothing, for he could not be made to believe that their representation of the state of things was not overdrawn. He visited Hungary in 1822, and was waited on by a deputation of Protestants. He heard them kindly, expressed his disapproval of persecution, and assured them that he would attend to their matters. But he seems to have been afraid that the toleration of Protestantism would lead to the indifference on the entire subject of religion which he witnessed in Germany, and of which he frequently spoke. He was sincere, but misled and deceived.

A great advantage was secured at this time by the opening of the Theological Institution at Vienna (1821). Efforts were made to collect information about the church, and much was done. Many valuable papers were secured. Agents at Vienna were directed to report annually what was done in ecclesiastical matters at court. This was important, for the three million Protestants had not a single organ for circulating ecclesiastical information. A normal seminary and educational institution were established at Oberschutzen, which are now in a prosperous condition.

The king died in 1835, and was succeeded by Ferdinand V., who followed the policy of his father, and continued Metternich in the ministry. Still there were many Roman Catholic members of the diet who were firm advocates of justice to the Protestants.

Count Charles Zay, having been chosen general inspector of the Protestant Churches, endeavoured to introduce some reforms. He wished to unite the German, Slavie, and Magyar elements, and effect a union of the Reformed and Lutheran Churches. But this was next to impossible, for there had always been bitter enmity between the Slavies and Magyars. This was now increased by very injudicious attempts to encourage the study of the Magyar language, and to introduce it into the schools, church courts, &c. Some Slavie preachers, with Paul Jasophy, one of the superintendents, at their head, went to Vienna to complain. This was unfortunate, for it gave the court a pretext to interfere in the internal affairs of the churches. Much ill-tempered controversy arose, and no progress was made toward a union of the churches. The nearest approach was made by the issue of a periodical, in 1842, under the joint editorial care of one member of the Reformed Church and one of the Lutheran. This did good service in circulating information, advocating missions, and defending sound, scriptural principles. It was suppressed after the Hungarian reverses, in 1848.

In 1843, some decided advantages were gained. A royal

resolution gave equal rights and privileges to members of different confessions; and in case of mixed marriages, allowed parents to determine in what faith their children should be educated. This satisfied neither party. The Catholic Church considered such children as her property, and denied the right of even parents to interfere with it. The Protestants dreaded the influence of the confessional on the decisions of parents. The magnates recommended that the decision should in all cases be left with the father. The disputes arising from this prompted the Protestants to apply to the Palatine, who expressed very liberal sentiments.

In their petition, they detailed the history of their past grievances, and the bad faith with which they had been treated. The result was the passing by the diet of an act granting them all that was demanded on the subject of mixed marriages, and exercise of worship. This being secured, the attention of the church was called to its internal affairs. The constitution of the Lutheran Church was revised, and schemes adopted for her prosperity. But the spirit of persecution was not yet dead. Pastor Wimmer was arrested, and tried for publishing a translation of Barth's "Church History," on the ground that it represented Rome unfavourably. How could it have done otherwise, if truthful? The death of the Palatine was a great calamity to the Protestants; for, though a Catholic, he was anxious that they should enjoy their rights. His pious widow, who had been as a guardian angel to the persecuted church, was, in violation of the will of her husband and of the marriage-contract, not allowed to remain in Hungary, but required to fix her residence at Vienna.

Glorious things now seemed at hand for Hungary. The thrones of Europe were tottering. The shock, as of an earthquake, starting from Paris, was felt in a moment at Vienna. The despots were willing to concede anything to the rising people; but it was only to gain time to mature their plans for crushing them at last. The revolution at Vienna brought the court to terms. Long had it been attempted to make Hungary a mere province of Austria, though it was, in fact, an independent kingdom, with a constitution of its own, and a king constitutionally elected. But now, an independent ministry was given to Hungary, and full religious liberty was introduced. The resolutions of the diet were all sanctioned by the king. Bathyani was made prime minister. Devout thanksgivings were offered in the churches. A bright day had suddenly burst on the nation.

But all was given with secret reluctance, to be withdrawn as soon as a favourable opportunity should offer; and perfidy at once laid plans to bring about such an opportunity. A

serious question had now to be decided by the church: Should she become the servant of the state; surrender her schools and institutions to the state, and derive her support from it? The General Assembly of the Lutheran Church decided that her internal government and the schools should remain entirely under her own control, subject to the laws of the land. Though there was little harmony between the various parts of the Protestant Church, owing to difference of nationality or of faith, yet all, Saxon, Magyar, Selave, Lutheran, Calvinist, and Unitarian, agreed that the independence of the church must be maintained. All bribes and lures in the form of endowment were therefore rejected.

This was wise and well, for trouble now came in like a flood. Jellachich, Ban of Croatia, was on his way to Pesth. The imperial commissioner was murdered. Kossuth was made governor, and issued his proclamation. The people were in arms. The pastors were obliged to read Kossuth's proclamation from the pulpit. For this they were reckoned traitors by Windischgratz, and tried by court-martial wherever his army was successful. They were then required to read his proclamations, for which they were punished in turn by the revolutionists, when they got the mastery. Görgy's treachery, and Haynau's approach, soon finished the work. The prisons were filled. Vengeance was taken on the Protestant Church, as if it had been a special fomenter of rebellion. Haynau took its liberty away by a single stroke, removed its superintendents, appointed others, furnished endowments, and endeavoured, as he expressed it, "to bind the Protestant Church closer to the state."

Both the Lutheran and Calvinist Churches in Hungary were, from the first, organised on the principle of self-government. A pastor and lay-inspector presided over every local congregation, chosen by the suffrages of its members. Delegates elected by the members formed the senorial meetings, over which a senior or dean, with a lay-inspector, presided. Above these were the districtual conventions, four belonging to the Lutheran Church, and four to the Reformed, presided over by as many superintendents. Besides these, the Lutherans also had a General Assembly. But, at this day, the Protestant Churches in Hungary, embracing three millions of people, are virtually without self-government. Free suffrage, and independent church courts, have given way to consistorial administration, by men nominated by the government. Under pretence, too, of re-organising the schools, many have been broken up, while a few have been saved by incredible sacrifices. Let us hope and pray, for God only can reach the case, that the day of deliverance for the bleeding cause of Protestantism in Hungary may speedily come.

ART. V.—*History of the Old Covenant.* By J. H. KURTZ, Ord. Prof. at Dorpat.* Vol. II. 1855. 8vo. pp. 563.

THE first volume of this work traced the history of Israel as a family to its close in the death of Jacob, their last common progenitor. The next period regards Israel as a nation, and, according to the epochs marked by our author, extends to the establishment of the kingdom. This period is divided into four unequal parts, severally represented by the residence in Egypt, the wanderings in the wilderness, the conquest of Canaan, and the residence in Canaan. Each of these has its own distinctly marked character and aim. First, the family was to expand to a nation and to attain a separate and independent existence. Secondly, they must receive their national form and constitution; they are not to be like other nations, but God's peculiar people. Hence he concludes a covenant with them and provides them with their code of laws. Thirdly, in order to realise the destiny thus set before them, and to develop themselves in their newly imparted character, they need to come into the possession of a suitable land. Fourthly, this scheme, thus constituted, is set in actual operation. Hitherto the divine agency has stood in the foreground. Now the people are called upon to act their part, to make use of what God has imparted to them, in his gifts, his revelations, his gracious leadings,—to exhibit the spectacle of a nation in covenant with God, and living in subjection to his laws. But the people are unfaithful to their trust, they are perpetually forsaking the true path; and the history becomes the record of alternate acts of judgment and of grace. The people are now punished by being given into the hand of the heathen around them, now delivered by judges specially raised up on their behalf. The second of these parts, which covers the legislation of Moses, is by far the most important, and the richest in the materials for its exhibition. Kurtz considers it under two divisions: 1. The historical basis of the law and the circumstances of its promulgation; 2. The subject-matter of the law. This volume embraces the residence in Egypt, and the first division of the wandering in the wilderness. The contents of the Mosaic legislation, reduced to systematic form, are to occupy the next volume, or, as he prefers to call it, the second part of this volume.

Kurtz adopts and defends the chronology which understands Exod. xii. 40 in its most obvious sense, and makes the abode in Egypt to have been 430 years; although he seems to think it

* *Geschichte des Alten Bundes*, von Joh. Heinr. Kurtz, u. s. w. Berlin, New York, und Adelaide.

necessary to assume an error in the text, Num. xxvi. 59. Three centuries and a half of this period are passed over with the simple mention of the only fact which they presented of consequence to the sacred historian—the immense multiplication of the people. He then proceeds at once to the circumstances which paved the way for their leaving Egypt and entering upon their separate existence. The people must have amounted, in the aggregate, to two millions when they left Egypt, as they numbered 600,000 capable of bearing arms. These were not all sprung from the 66 lineal descendants of Jacob who entered Egypt, but from their entire households and retinues, which no doubt amounted to several thousands. Abraham was able to summon from his household 318 men to pursue after the captors of Lot; and Jacob, returning from Padan-aram, had accumulated a sufficient retinue to divide them, on encountering Esau, into three bands. Their entire households were circumcised, and their condition was favourable to an easy fusion of their descendants. Even thus, however, the multiplication is unexampled; and it is necessary to have recourse, in explanation, not only to the surprising fecundity of Egypt, celebrated in ancient and in modern times, but to the special operation of the divine blessing.

In Egypt, also, Israel learned to exchange a nomadic for an agricultural life, and to practise the various arts which that involved, and many others; as is apparent from 1 Chron. iv. 14, 21, 23, where potters, weavers, and carpenters are mentioned; and especially from the construction of the tabernacle, which required skill in working various metals, in polishing and engraving precious stones, in weaving and embroidering costly stuffs, &c. They possessed themselves, in fact, of the civilization and refinement of Egypt; and God's promise to Abraham, that his seed should come out from the land of their oppressors with great substance, was fulfilled in a sense yet higher than in the gold and silver which they carried away with them. They preserved, nevertheless, their patriarchal form of government, and their ancestral religion and worship. Although in itself a trifling fact, it is nevertheless interesting and worthy of note, how many of the proper names preserved from this period are compounded with the name of God. Yet even in religious ideas and usages it is evident that the people were not uninfluenced by the circumstances in which they were placed; partly to their injury, as is shown among other things by the affair of the golden calf; partly not, as is shown by symbols and institutions receiving the sanction of God himself, which contain elements that point to Egypt as the land of their origin. The barrier of a different nationality, language, and

religion, kept them separate from the Egyptians; yet this did not wholly prevent intimacy of intercourse and even intermarriages to some extent.—(Lev. xxiv. 10.) One of Pharaoh's daughters even was married to a man of Judah (1 Chron. iv. 18), and, as appears from her name, was a convert to Jehovah's worship. That they constantly looked to Palestine as their future home is not only probable in itself, but receives positive confirmation from the fact recorded in Chronicles (if the passages are correctly interpreted) that some of the people, without waiting God's appointed time, sought prematurely at their own instance to take forcible possession of the promised land. 1 Chron. vii. 20–24 speaks of sons of Ephraim, who had established themselves in Canaan and made an unsuccessful predatory excursion against Gath; and of a granddaughter who built Beth-horon, not very remote from Gath. Also, 1 Chron. iv. 22, some descendants of Judah made themselves masters of Moab.

The object of the residence in Egypt was thus accomplished. The servitude and the sufferings consequent upon the rise of a new dynasty (so Exodus i. 8 is understood) effected the subjective preparation of the people for the exodus by awakening intense longings for release. Meanwhile God was training a deliverer, first at the court of Pharaoh, then in the wilderness of Midian. When this training was complete, and the proper time had arrived, Moses received his formal commission. God spoke to him upon Horeb, where subsequently the law was to be delivered, from the midst of a bush burning with fire but unconsumed. Upon this holy ground he is forbidden to tread with his shoes, which are designed to guard the feet from an impurity that could not there be contracted, and which, moreover, were themselves defiled by the common earth upon which they had trodden. Kurtz departs from the ordinary explanation of the burning bush, which refers it to Israel marvellously preserved in the furnace of affliction, and adopts that of Hoffmann. According to this, it is a symbol not of the past or present, but of the future, of the dispensation shortly to be inaugurated at that very mountain. Israel is the bush; God in his holiness is the flame that comes down into the midst of it; and it is only by a perpetual miracle that, offering such fuel, as in their sinfulness they did, for this flame to fasten upon, they were not consumed. But this indwelling hallowed the bush and the very ground on which it stood. It might have been despised before, in comparison with more stately trees; it might have been broken down and trampled upon with impunity; but now God is in the midst of it, and it must not be touched. It can only be approached with reverence.

The backwardness, carried to an excess, of Jethro's* son-in-law to undertake the task to which he is called, stands in striking contrast with the rash forwardness and vain self-confidence displayed by the adopted son of Pharaoh's daughter, and shows that a lesson of humility and patient waiting has been learned. It bears, too, an incidental stamp of truth in its contrariety to all that is ever told of mythical heroes. God condescendingly removes, one after another, his misgivings and his objections; gives, as indicative of the character in which he was about to reveal himself, the sacred name Jehovah, not unknown, indeed, to the patriarchs, but the meaning of which was now to be unfolded by new and unheard-of disclosures; furnishes him with miraculous signs; promises to be with his mouth; and not until he faint-heartedly declines without a remaining reason, is the Lord's anger kindled, and a peremptory command given him to undertake the work in conjunction with his brother Aaron.

In the three miracles given to confirm his own faith and to accredit his commission to others, is found not only an evidence of supernatural power, but a further significance; the first relating to himself, the second to the people, the last to Pharaoh. The shepherd's staff, which he held in his hand, was an emblem of the peaceful vocation which he had been hitherto pursuing. His casting it down to become a serpent, before which he flees, represents the threatening dangers in which he would be involved by laying down his present quiet occupation for the task before him. His taking it boldly at the command of God, and its becoming once more a staff in his hand, showed that these perils might, by divine grace, be surmounted, if courageously met. This rod has now become the rod of God; not the simple shepherd's staff that it was before, but emblematic of his new vocation, as shepherd, no longer of the flock of Jethro, but of the flock of God. With this rod in his hand, he shall chastise, by heaven-inflicted plagues, the chastisers of God's people, and drive the gods of Egypt in their impotence before him. As performed subsequently in the presence of the people, the meaning of this sign was so far modified, as to represent the increase of peril and suffering temporarily occasioned to them by the intervention of Moses, but from which they were soon to be delivered.

He next puts his hand into his bosom. The bosom is a place of protection, where the hand is warmed and cherished. Thus Israel went to Egypt to be protected under the favour of the

* Reuel, or as it is spelled in our version, Num. x. 29, Raguel, is thought to be his proper name, and Jethro a title of distinction, equivalent to "his excellency." The apparent discrepancy of the account in Exodus with Num. x. 29, and Judges iv. 11, is explained either by making Reuel the grandfather of Zipporah, or Hobab, by a different rendering of the Hebrew word, the brother-in-law of Moses.

Pharaohs. But they had been enslaved there, and treated as though they were utterly vile ; this is the leprosy of the hand. But another bosom was preparing, in which it should be cleansed of its leprosy and purified to be a holy people to the Lord. As this action indicated the relation of God and his people, it was one with which Pharaoh had nothing to do, and it was not, like the others, exhibited before him.

The third miracle, of converting water into blood, was not to be performed until Moses reached Egypt, for its significance lay in the water being taken from the great river of that land. The source of blessing should be converted into a curse, the object of worship into loathing and aversion. This was to be performed upon a cupful of the water, as a sign to the people that God had the power ; it was performed in the presence of Pharaoh, upon an immensely greater scale, on all the waters of the Nile, not as a sign, but as a plague, to exhibit the reality of God's determination to smite the gods of Egypt.

Moses was the first man by whom miracles were wrought. The divine power, which had in former times always been exerted independently of the agency of men, was brought down and placed in him, to be exercised at his bidding ; making him thus, in a sense never before exhibited, a type of Him in whom dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily.

When Moses is directed to solicit for the people the liberty of three days' journey into the wilderness in order to sacrifice, it might at first thought be supposed that leave to go to Horeb was the thing intended, this having been already designated as the place where worship should be offered. But it was 140 miles from Suez, a distance which so immense a host could not possibly have traversed in that space of time. The thing asked for could consequently only be permission to go just beyond the boundaries of the land. The request was presented in this moderated form for the purpose of showing to what lengths Pharaoh would carry his refusal. Not granting this, much less would he have granted them license to leave Egypt altogether. His refusal, which God foresaw, annulled any limitation as to distance, or any obligation to return, which might have been involved in their acting upon his permission, had he given it. And when they finally left Egypt, it was not under any conditions imposed upon them, but as conquerors dictating their own terms.

The request to leave the land for the purpose of worship seems in itself to have created no surprise ; and it is probable, from remains found in the Sinaitic peninsula, that pilgrimages of this kind were not unknown to the Egyptians. The reason assigned by Moses, when subsequently making the request of Pharaoh, that if they sacrificed the abomination of the Egyp-

tians they would be in danger of being stoned, cannot mean, as it is frequently explained, that they would sacrifice animals accounted sacred in Egypt; for sacred animals could not be called an "abomination," and the Egyptians themselves sacrificed the same animals that the Hebrews did. But as the Lord had not revealed what new regulations might be required in this grand national sacrifice, it could not be known how much there might be in conflict with Egyptian ideas and usages.

As Moses is now to be the champion of God's covenant with his people, his own negligence in respect to the seal of that covenant can no longer be tolerated. One of his sons, probably on account of Zipporah's opposition, had not been circumcised. For this the Lord sought to slay Moses on his way to Egypt; but on the performance of the omitted rite his life was spared; whence Zipporah called him a "husband of blood,"—one restored to her by means of blood.

Pharaoh refuses to let the people go, defies Jehovah, and summons to his aid, not the material but the spiritual forces of his realm, the magicians, clothed with the power and interpreters of the will of his gods. The contest, therefore, is one between Jehovah and the gods of Egypt. To the deities of heathenism Kurtz ascribes objective reality and supernatural might: and he thinks it contrary to scriptural representations to regard them as non-existent and merely imaginary. Upon this subject he quotes with approbation the language of Crusius: "*Sacræ literæ a Mose usque ad N. T. constanter docent deastros esse dæmones.*" Not that each heathen deity represents some particular demon, nor that every demon has his own distinct representative in the heathen mythology; but the worship paid by the heathen to their divinities does in fact pass over to a really existing, personal, supernatural power, by whom it is accepted, and who enters into a real communion with the worshippers. Paul says, that the things which the Gentiles sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils; and in thus sacrificing they have fellowship with devils, just as the Christian, in partaking of the Lord's table, has fellowship with him. When the same apostle speaks of an idol as nothing in the world, and when false deities are called by Hebrew words signifying nonentities and vanities, this is understood to be, not a denial of the existence of such beings, but of their not being what they give themselves out to be, and what their worshippers suppose that they are. Such passages as Jer. x. 5, Ps. cxv. 4-8, are not referred to at all. The ground-form of heathenism is stated to be Pantheism, the forsaking of the one true and living God for the adoration of Nature. The boundless variety of forms in which the powers of nature display themselves, the countless manifestations of the all-per-

vading Deity, lead next to Polytheism. The different systems of mythology are the joint product of impressions from nature, speculative reasoning, and a lively imagination." The names and forms of the gods, with the functions and attributes ascribed to them, are in the first instance sheer figments of the imagination, having no objective existence; and the service paid them terminates on no real correspondent being. But these phantasms are taken possession of by spirits of wickedness, in whom they attain reality, and who make the scenes of this self-devised worship their special seat. And here they exhibit such powers of magic and divination as show them to be possessed of a real might, and as confirm the heathen still more in their delusion. It is equally erroneous, therefore, to regard the heathen deities as having originally and in themselves a distinct personal existence, and to suppose them to be, as found in the actual life of heathenism, non-existent phantoms.

With this view of the heathen deities in general, it follows of course that our author believes in the existence of supernatural magic, as a phenomenon pervading the pagan world. With this there may be much imposture. There is also a native magical virtue resident in the human soul, which may be developed by occult arts, as in Mesmerism, or by certain physical conditions inducing strange presentiments. But, in addition, there is a supernatural power imparted by the spirits of darkness for the working of signs and lying wonders. This is the case with the magicians of Egypt, who wrought what they did under demoniacal influence, as Moses acted with power given him from God. It would be expected from this that the magicians converted actual wooden rods into serpents, and that the superiority of Aaron's miracle consisted alone in his rod swallowing up theirs, annihilating thus the insignia of their office, and symbolically putting an end to their office itself. This Kurtz does not say, however; he regards it an undue pressing of the letter of the passage, to suppose the rods to have been actual rods of wood, though if that conclusion were forced upon him, he would feel no skinking from the result. He nevertheless prefers upon the whole, the explanation which Hengstenberg and others have adopted, as illustrated by feats of snake-charmers at the present day, that the magicians, who knew very well the purpose for which they were summoned, and had ample time and opportunity to make their preparations, brought with them seeming rods, which were in reality serpents stiffened by their incantations, but which resumed their life and motion on being cast to the ground. In this miracle, the victory was the greater, as it was gained on that territory in which the skill of Egyptian sorcerers chiefly lay.

The ten plagues, which with ever-heightening intensity were inflicted upon the obdurate monarch, exhibit a striking relation to the natural characteristics of the land upon which they were sent. The miracle is in no case wholly dis severed from the analogy of what is proper to that region, as, for example, an irruption of polar bears, or the bursting forth of a volcano, would have been. Sceptical writers have made use of this circumstance to do away with the miraculous. They assume an extraordinary concurrence of calamities, and in unwonted violence, where the calamities themselves are not unusual; the meeting at one point of what commonly do not occur in conjunction, is alone remarkable. All beyond this is figurative, or fabulous. To those who accept the historic truth of the narrative, the miraculous character of the events is too obvious to be questioned. The intensity, the extent, the multiplicity of these plagues, their coming and going at the bidding of Moses, and the marked distinction made in several of them between Egypt and Goshen, show beyond a doubt that they were sent by the immediate operation of God.

At the same time the natural features of these plagues are too obvious and too important in their design to be overlooked. One aim may have been, to leave to unbelief, if it was determined at all hazards to resist the evidence of supernatural power, some shadow of a ground to which to cling. But there were other and more direct bearings upon the issue of the conflict here carried on. Had these plagues possessed a character out of analogy with anything that ever occurred at ordinary times in Egypt, Pharaoh would have been compelled to accord to Jehovah a might and a supremacy in the land for the time being. But by using as his means of chastisement, scourges which, in lighter and more restricted forms, were of frequent occurrence, the Lord showed that these too were from him; that he was not temporarily, but permanently God in Egypt; and not the present devastating judgments alone, but the ordinary evils which afflicted the land, were sent by him. The Egyptians also deified both the natural features and the natural products of their land: these were made to bring destruction upon their worshippers. The author of the Book of Wisdom says to this effect (xi. 15, 16,) —“For the foolish devices of their wickedness, wherewith being deceived they worshipped serpents void of reason, and vile beasts, thou didst send a multitude of unreasonable beasts upon them for vengeance; that they might know that wherewithal a man sinneth, by the same also shall he be punished.” Hengstenberg also makes the remark, that their bearing this character is a voucher for the reality of their occurrence, and that they were not pure inventions; as in this case the narra-

tor would have been apt to exalt the miracle, by making it as little like natural events as possible.

The duration of these plagues cannot be certainly determined. Several writers, who connect the first with an appearance that the Nile presents annually in July, assume that the whole occupied a period of nine months. According to the sacred record, one week intervened between the first plague and the second. The seventh plague occurred when barley was in the ear and flax was balled; which in that climate must have been in March; about three weeks, consequently, from the time of the tenth plague, showing again about the space of a week between each of the last four plagues. If the same interval be assumed as the average in the case of the remainder, it will yield in all nine weeks, or from about the beginning of February to the beginning of April.

The Nile every year, at the period of its inundation, assumes a reddish appearance, from the earthy matter mingled with its waters. When the overflow first begins, it sweeps along great quantities of dried grass and filth of various sorts; which makes the water unfit for use. When it assumes a reddish colour, however, it is again potable; after standing for a short time in jars, it deposits its sediment and becomes as clear as at any other season. This phenomenon has been thought by many to furnish the natural basis of the miracle of Moses. But that this cannot be so, is shown by several considerations. If the duration assigned above to the plagues as a whole be correct, that will furnish an argument; for this redness of the Nile is seen, not in February, but in July. This only occurs, too, at the time of the annual inundation; but there is no hint of such an inundation in the narrative, while there are statements at variance with it,—*e.g.*, Pharaoh's going to the brink of the river, the Egyptians digging about the river, &c. The sinking of the river indicates stagnation, which is just the reverse of its inundation. The change was produced, not gradually, but suddenly, and that even in water already drawn and standing in their houses, in vessels of wood and stone, as well as in the river itself. The reddening of the water, in ordinary cases, so far from being deprecated, is eagerly looked for as a symptom of potability. Kurtz suggests, very plausibly, that the actual material phenomenon in this miracle may have been the presence of immense quantities of microscopic *cryptogami* and *infusoria*, which gave the water a blood-red colour, and whose decomposition corrupted it, and destroyed the fish that were in it. This explanation is based upon the scientific investigations of Ehrenberg, who found blood-like appearances in Egypt, Arabia, and Siberia, resulting from this cause.

The question, whence the magicians obtained water for their

enchantments, after Moses had already changed it all to blood, has sometimes been answered by saying, that *all* is not to be taken in its most unlimited sense, or that the magicians waited till the plague had first been removed: a better explanation is, that it was the Nile, with the artificial channels and ponds connected with it, and even water previously drawn from it, which was the object of the plague; for the double reason of the great value of that river to Egypt, and the divine honours which were paid it. But that water from other sources was not affected, appears from the Egyptians finding it by digging about the river.

In the plague of frogs, the chief thing was its exceeding loathsomeness. There was no way of escaping the contact of these disgusting creatures. They could not set down their foot without trampling them. They filled even their chambers, and beds, and ovens, and kneading-troughs. The third plague was not lice, but gnats, or mosquitoes, whose stings are the complaint of every Egyptian traveller. The previous plagues had come from the Nile. This was from the land which brought forth their food, and was also an object of worship. Hitherto the magicians had maintained their credit. They had been able, on a small scale, to imitate the miracles of Moses, though they had thus only increased the intensity of plagues which they could not remove. Here they give up the contest, and say to Pharaoh, "This is the finger of the gods;" which is not understood to mean what the common rendering implies, "Here is an evident display of the divinity of Jehovah." If the victorious power of God were intended, the "arm" would be more appropriate. The finger warns, instructs. That they cannot bring forth lice, they would represent as due not to the weakness of their gods, but to their want of will. They are indisposed to sustain Pharaoh in refusing the demand of Jehovah, and consequently, by ceasing longer to lend their aid, virtually bid him to desist.

The word which describes the fourth plague is derived from a root signifying *mixture*, and probably denotes all sorts of noxious insects. The Septuagint renders it "dogfly," as one of the most tormenting; Aquila and the Vulgate, "every kind of flies;" the Targum of Jonathán and Saadiah, "various kinds of wild beasts;" Jarchi, "every sort of evil beasts, and serpents and scorpions." Others have supposed it to mean devastating worms and caterpillars.

The furnace from which ashes were taken to create the plague of boils, is by some thought to have been a place where Hebrews were compelled to work in metals for their Egyptian masters; and the curse proceeding from such a spot would plainly indicate the reason of its infliction. Kurtz prefers an

allusion to the religious rite of purification by ashes (comp. Numb. xix. 9, Heb. ix. 13), which is based, no doubt, upon its alkaline properties. This ashes, from which they expected cleansing, should prove, instead, the source of defilement and disease.

The explanation of Hengstenberg and others is adopted, though with some hesitation, in regard to the plague of darkness, that it was a violent sirocco, lasting not for a few hours merely, but for three successive days. Laborde says of this explanation, that it is comparing the crack of a pistol to the roar of thunder.

Egypt refused to release the first-born of the Lord, and her own first-born was the forfeit. Israel was Jehovah's son, not by virtue of their creation alone, nor of their formation into a numerous people, but by that spiritual and covenant generation which made them his own distinct from all the nations of the earth, and by which they became not his only, but his first-born son; other nations, to be subsequently brought within the same gracious covenant, are the later born members of the family. This plague was, in an eminent sense, a judgment upon the gods of Egypt.—(Exod. xii. 12, Numb. xxxiii. 4.) The sacred animals, kept in the temples with the greatest care, and lamented when they died with the wildest demonstrations of grief, belonged mainly, no doubt, perhaps exclusively, to the rank of the first-born. It may be imagined what a panic would be created, when to the private grief of every household was added the sudden and simultaneous death of all the religiously venerated animals in all the temples, and thousands more that were deemed sacred besides. The first-born of the monarch, also regarded as an incarnation of the Deity, was not exempt. These were put on a precise level with ordinary men and ordinary animals; all were indiscriminately involved in the same catastrophe. The paraphrase of Jonathan is, therefore, gratuitous and unnecessary: "Against all the idols of the Egyptians I will execute four judgments;—the molten images shall be melted, those of stone shall be broken down, those of clay shall be dashed to pieces, those of wood shall be reduced to ashes, that the Egyptians may know that I am the Lord." This was no ordinary pestilence, following, perhaps, in the track of the simoon, and in which it is not to be supposed that all the first-born, nor they alone, perished. The inspired narrative is not consistent with the idea of its being originated or guided by any ordinary laws of infection; it was an immediate and miraculous infliction by the destroying angel, directed exclusively and universally upon all the first-born. Of these, there may have been more than one in the same family: for the first-born that were slain in Egypt, like the first-born consecrated

in Israel, were reckoned by the mother's side, *primogeniti sanctitudinis*, as distinguished from those by the father's side, *primogeniti hæreditatis*.

The plagues thus ran their fearful round. God demonstrated his supremacy by making the river, the land, the air, serve each in turn as ministers of his wrath; even surrounding lands were laid under contribution: Arabia sent her locusts, and the Sahara perhaps her simoon. Gods, men, beasts, plants, all were scourged. The last of these plagues, however, was the sorest of all; the others were but preliminary warnings of this, the real judgment.—(Exod. iv. 22, 23.) But when the Lord arises to judgment, it must be executed with strict equity, and without respect of persons; and it must begin at the house of God. If there be sin in Israel, if any interruption of its covenant relation, this sin must be put away, and the covenant relation restored, or Israel cannot be saved. Hence, before the judgment comes, the passover is instituted to secure the people's safety.

As the Lord's supper in a sense occupies the place of the passover, Romanists have argued that the sacrificial character of the latter establishes that of the former. Some of the early Protestants took the ground, in opposition, that the passover itself was not a sacrifice, but was simply commemorative and sacramental, inasmuch as זבח means not only a sacrifice, but a slaying for other purposes also, and there was no imposition of hands, no sprinkling of blood upon the altar, no burning of the animal, or any of its parts, upon the altar; whilst on the other hand, many of the prescriptions regarding the passover were such as had place in none of the various kinds of sacrifices. The atoning efficacy of this blood, however, which in the absence of an altar was sprinkled upon the door-posts, to shield from death all who had passed within that entrance, plainly distinguishes it as a sacrifice. That the Apostle Paul so regarded it, appears from 1 Cor. v. 7. It is called an offering, Num. ix. 7. And although in the first instance this could not be done, yet in after times it was to be slain at the place which God should choose (Deut. xvi. 5, 6); and its blood sprinkled on the altar.—(2 Chron. xxx. 16.) Although the imposition of hands is nowhere mentioned in connection with the slaying of the paschal lamb, its performance is unquestionably to be taken for granted. The passover was a special modification of the peace-offering, as the services of the great day of atonement were of the sin-offering. The true answer to the Romish argument is to be found in the typical character and inherent insufficiency of the passover sacrifice, necessitating its constant repetition; and in the all-sufficiency of the sacrifice of Christ, which may be commemorated, but which need not and cannot be repeated.

The commands to roast (not boil, which would dissolve and disintegrate) the lamb whole, to break none of its bones, to eat it in one house, without carrying any part abroad, and to leave none till the ensuing day, were intended to give prominence to the idea of unity. The lamb was an undivided whole; so they who partook of it were indissolubly united in communion with each other, and with God, whose guests they were, since it was his offering that lay upon the table. Comp. 1 Cor. x. 17. The bitter herbs added relish to the meat, as the past servitude made the present deliverance more joyful. Leaven was forbidden, as fermenting and corrupting. Upon the first celebration of the passover, the solemnity lasted but a single day, and leaven was prohibited for that day alone: the haste and urgency with which they left Egypt, however, confined them to unleavened bread still longer, possibly until they had crossed the Red Sea, which Jewish tradition asserts to have been just seven days from the night of the passover. In later times, the commemorative celebration was expanded into seven days, during the whole of which leaven was interdicted.

That the children of Israel should, by God's command, borrow silver, gold, and raiment, from the Egyptians, when they were leaving, never to return, has caused no small embarrassment among interpreters. Among the answers which have been given to the casuistical question, how this was consistent with truth and honesty, are such as these: that God, as universal proprietor, can take from one and give to another as he pleases; that Israel had a right to reprisals for the unrighteous and unrequited servitude to which they had been subjected; that they left their houses and lands in exchange; that God, as the author of the law, could dispense with it at his pleasure; that the Israelites borrowed these things with the honest intention of returning them, had not subsequent events rendered this impracticable; or that the Egyptians forfeited them by their treacherous and hostile pursuit. After all, however, the difficulty is not removed. How could the people honestly borrow what they must have known they were never to return? But this difficulty lies only in a false translation. The Israelites were directed to solicit these things, not as a loan, but as a gift; and God gave his people favour in the sight of the Egyptians, that they lavished upon them all that they asked, without the thought or expectation of having them returned. The articles thus given, were not sacrificial vessels and priestly robes, to be used in the anticipated sacrifice, but undoubtedly jewels, and valuable articles of apparel. It was a matter of divine decorum, that God should not lead his people out of Egypt a poor and starveling multitude, but laden with wealth and in festive array. The victory was complete, and the spoils immense.

The discussion respecting the locality of the passage of the Red Sea, as well as the geography of the various places mentioned in the journey through the wilderness, is very elaborate and thorough. Our limits admit of no more than this passing notice of what forms one of the most valuable features of the book before us.

The interesting but difficult question is here raised, To what period of Egyptian history, as this is known to us from profane sources, are the residence of Israel in Egypt, and their exodus from it, to be referred? The decision will be dependent upon the view taken of two brief extracts from Manetho, found in the treatise of Josephus against Apion. In the first, he speaks of an invasion of Egypt by a people from the East, of ignoble birth, but of great courage, who subdued the land, burned its cities, demolished its temples, and treated its inhabitants with the utmost barbarity. They made one of themselves king, by the name of Salatis, who lived at Memphis, exacted tribute of both Upper and Lower Egypt, and garrisoned several cities, particularly in the eastern portions of the land, as he was apprehensive of an Assyrian invasion. He fortified Avaris in the Saitic nome, east of the Bubastic channel, and garrisoned it with 240,000 men. Thither he came every summer to provision the place and pay his soldiers their wages, as well as to exercise them, and thereby terrify foreigners. This people, whom some regard as Arabs, were called Hyksos, or shepherd-kings; *hyk*, in the sacred dialect, meaning *king*; and *sos*, in the popular dialect, meaning *shepherd*. In another copy of Manetho, Josephus says, the meaning of this word was given as captive-kings. After the Hyksos had kept possession of Egypt 511 years, the kings of the Thebais made an insurrection against them, and a long and terrible war ensued. By a king named Alisphragmuthosis they were beaten, and shut up in Avaris. Here they were besieged by his son, Thummosis, who allowed them to capitulate on condition of their leaving Egypt. They accordingly, with their families and effects, to the number of 240,000, marched through the wilderness for Syria. But fearing the Assyrian power, they settled in Judea, and built a city, which they called Jerusalem.

In the second passage, Manetho says that Amenophis, who was king 518 years after the departure of the shepherds, was desirous of seeing the gods. He was told that he might, if he would first rid the country of lepers and all unclean persons. This he did, sending them, to the number of 80,000, to work in the quarries east of the Nile. Subsequently he granted them the city of Avaris, which lay in ruins from the time of the shepherds. Here they appointed, as their ruler, a priest of Heliopolis, by the name of Osarsiph, subsequently called

Moses, who gave them laws contrary to Egyptian usages. With 200,000 men sent to his aid by the shepherds, he made war upon Amenophis, defeated him, and ravaged Egypt for thirteen years; after which Amenophis, and his son Rameses, returned from Ethiopia to Egypt with a large army, and drove the shepherds and the lepers out of the country into Syria.

Josephus identifies the Hyksos with the Israelites, and makes use of Manetho's account to establish against Apion the high antiquity and greatness of his nation. How he reconciles it with the Scripture narrative he nowhere explains. The story of the lepers, which is drawn, according to Manetho's own statement, not, like the other, from the sacred records of Egypt, but from popular tradition, he utterly discredits, as inconsistent with the former, in the origin which it assigns to the Jews.

Delitzsch adopts the identification of Josephus, and actually maintains the strange and paradoxical theory, that the Israelites really did what is ascribed to the Hyksos,—that during the period over which the sacred historian passes in silence, they made themselves masters of Egypt, drove out the native princes, and held sway in the land, until they were subdued and enslaved in their turn.

Hengstenberg does not attribute the slightest weight to the testimony of Manetho. He charges him with the grossest ignorance and error on points of Egyptian mythology, geography, and language; with betraying a bias that can only have found place in the times of the Roman emperors; and with meeting no such confirmation from the monuments, as was to be expected if he were an honest and credible historian. Instead of being, as he has commonly been regarded, the head of the priests at Heliopolis, and preparing his History from the temple archives, by order of Ptolemy Philadelphus, B.C. 260, he considers him an intentional falsifier of much later date, in whom no confidence whatever can be reposed. The story of the Hyksos and of the lepers he thinks to be purposely garbled accounts, caricatured from the Scripture history, in order to flatter the national vanity of the Egyptians.

Kurtz pronounces this judgment unjust, and expresses his belief that the statements of Manetho, though containing some errors, are yet in the main reliable. The Hyksos, he thinks, are evidently a different people from the Hebrews. The points insisted on by those who maintain their identity are, that they were shepherds from the East; that the name of their city, Avaris, is Hebrew; so is that of their king, Salatis, which is but a Greek form of the title applied to Joseph, Gen. xlii. 6; he is spoken of as provisioning (*σιτομετρῶν*) or measuring grain; the oppressions alleged to be practised are but distortions of

his buying up the land, &c., during the famine; they finally marched through the wilderness to Syria, and founded a city, which they called Jerusalem. On the other hand, Kurtz maintains that the account given of the Hyksos is utterly irreconcilable with the supposition of the Israelites being intended. The former come in great numbers to Egypt, as enemies and conquerors; they murder, plunder, desolate the land, and rule it for 511 years; are then subdued, and forced to retire from the country. The Hebrews come, few in number, peaceably, and by invitation, but are oppressed, maltreated, enslaved; they crave permission to leave the country, but are refused. In the intention of Manetho, the lepers are the Israelites; and what he says of them shows how the facts have been distorted by Egyptian tradition, from which alone this is professedly drawn. They are expressly distinguished from the Hyksos, who left the country 518 years before.

Among those who give partial or entire credit to Manetho, and who think the Hyksos to have been distinct from the Israelites, there is again a diversity of views.

Lepsius dates the Hyksos invasion, B.C. 2100, during the 12th (or second Theban) dynasty. At length, B.C. 1661, the native kings, who had maintained their independence in Ethiopia, and partially also in Upper Egypt, penetrated farther north, and after a war of 80 years, succeeded, in the reign of Thuthmosis III., in driving the Hyksos out of the country. With them, however, the Israelites had nothing to do. They came into Egypt in the 19th dynasty. Joseph was brought there under Sethos I., the Sesostris of the Greeks, who, according to Lepsius's assumption, reigned B.C. 1445-1394. Moses was educated at the court of his son, Ramses II., Miamun the Great (1394-1328); and his son, Menephtes, (1328-1309,) was the Pharaoh of the exodus. The abode in Egypt, instead of being 430 years, was only about 90. The absurdities which follow upon this hypothesis, and the slenderness of the grounds on which it rests, are well exposed by Kurtz. The expansion of Jacob's family to 2,000,000 of people, must then have taken place in 90 years! Within the same space of time there must have been seven generations in the family of Judah, and ten in that of Ephraim. Moses must have been born about ten years after Jacob came into Egypt, and sixty years before the death of Joseph. Whoever, in the present inextricable confusion which reigns in Egyptian chronology, makes the merely conjectural identification of a few uncertain names a ground for introducing such havoc into a history certified like that of Moses, would sacrifice Baneroff to Gulliver. Egyptian scholars get so into the habit of giving free play to their fancy, deducing from the monuments what

results they please, and constructing facts and dates *ad libitum*, that they really seem to forget that there is such a thing as solid, well-attested history, which criticism cannot explain away, and where theorising must yield to testimony.

Saalschütz supposes that the new king, under whom the oppression of the Israelites began, was the first of the Hyksos dynasty, and that the Pharaoh who perished in the Red Sea was the last. Bunsen has not fully explained his views as to the origin and history of the Hyksos, and their relation to the Israelites. He follows an account of Julius Africanus, which makes the period of their domination to have lasted upwards of 900 years.

The view adopted by Kurtz is essentially the same with that of Bertheau, Lengerke, and Knobel. He thinks them to have been Semitic tribes, possibly driven from their original possessions in Canaan, prior to the days of Abraham, by some invasion similar to that recorded of Chedorlaomer. Thus precipitated upon Egypt, they subjugated that country. At first they may have committed great enormities, but the result followed which is usual in the case of barbarian invaders of civilised lands. The conquerors adopted the language, manners, culture, and religion of the conquered. Hence, when Joseph was brought before one of the monarchs of this dynasty, every thing wore the air of a native Egyptian court, more so than in the days of Abraham, when this assimilation had but imperfectly taken place. Such an alliance as Pharaoh contemplated with Abraham could not have been thought of at the time of Joseph, when Egyptian courtiers could not even eat with Hebrew shepherds. Still, some things, even at this later period, are thought to betray that it was not a native but an adopted civilization which prevailed at court. The introduction of Joseph, a foreigner of shepherd stock, into the highest office, next the king, and his intermarriage with the priestly caste; the welcome extended to his shepherd-father and brothers; the rich portion of the land assigned them; and the wealth of Pharaoh in cattle, but not in lands, till Joseph's measures procured them; are alleged, as showing that they had not even yet forgotten their Hyksos predilections and habits.

The new king, who knew not Joseph, was the first of the revived native dynasty, consequent upon the expulsion of the Hyksos. The Hebrews, now grown to a mighty people, as they had been favoured by the Hyksos, naturally fell under the suspicion of being friendly to them and favourable to their return; and, which made them the more dangerous, Goshen lay in the quarter from which the Hyksos would invade Egypt, if at all. Hence the apprehension, Exod. i. 10, and the mea-

asures adopted to reduce their strength. That the Hebrews were not expelled along with the Hyksos, as their friends and allies, was, perhaps, because the native princes lacked the power, and also, that they might be retained as slaves and helots, to be employed upon the erection of the vast public structures of the period. Kurtz is of opinion, that numbers of the lower ranks of the Hyksos population were probably retained for a similar purpose, and that they may have constituted the great mixed multitude who left Egypt with Israel, attaching themselves to them in their deliverance, as they had shared the burden of their servitude. Even the statement, that the expelled Hyksos built Jerusalem, is put into connection with the remarkable changes of name which that place underwent at different periods of the sacred history. In the days of Abraham, it was called Salem. When we hear of it in the times of the Judges, its name was changed to Jebus; could the Jebusites have been a branch of the Hyksos? When Kurtz says that the city was not called Jerusalem until its conquest by David, he forgets Josh. xviii. 28.

The period of the wilderness, which was one of instruction, trial, chastisement, and purification, falls into three divisions, each of which found the people in a distinct locality. They may be respectively described as Israel in the wilderness of Sinai, Israel in the wilderness of Paran, and Israel in the plains of Moab. To the first of these belongs the concluding of the covenant between God and the people; to the second, the consummation of the people's unbelief, and their doom to forty years' exclusion from Canaan; in the third, the new generation has reached the termination of its wanderings, and the border of the promised land.

The manna, which at the present day exudes from the Tarfah bush, in the vicinity of Sinai, offers some interesting analogies to that with which Israel was fed in the desert; but they are plainly not identical. It is not only the enormous difference in quantity,—between five and six hundred pounds per annum, gathered from the entire peninsula in the most productive years, and two millions of pounds per day,—but the properties are so different, that they are evidently quite distinct things. The modern manna could not be beaten fine in a mortar, nor be made a substitute for bread, nor does it breed worms on being kept. It is only found during two or three months of the year, while Israel were supplied with it all the year round; and during thirty-eight years of the period that it was furnished them, they were in parts of the desert where no Tarfah bush now grows, and where, probably, none ever did grow.

That they did not subsist solely upon manna during the

entire forty years, is plain from the direct statement of the inspired record, and might, without such statement, have been inferred from the circumstances of the case. The wilderness now scantily supports less than 5000 inhabitants; and these could not subsist but for the aid afforded by travellers and caravans. It must, in the days of Moses, however, have been better furnished with springs and oases than at present. History makes it certain, that it once contained a far more numerous population than it does now. The flocks and herds which Israel possessed, would supply them to some extent with milk and flesh. After the sentence had been announced to them, that they were to remain in the wilderness, they would, no doubt, cultivate all such spots as were capable of tillage. They purchased provisions in passing along the borders of Edom, and they may have done the same from trading caravans which traversed the desert.

The posture of Moses, holding in his uplifted hand the rod of God, in the battle with Amalek, is thought to represent, not the attitude of prayer, but the gesture of command; just as when, with the same rod, he divided the sea, or turned the waters into blood. The direction given to Moses, to write the doings of that day in the (not *a*) book, shows that he had either then commenced, or had in contemplation, the history which he wrote of Israel's journeyings. Jethro's visit, though paid to Moses at the mount of God, is related before mention is made of Israel's removal from Rephidim to Sinai, in order that when that is mentioned, the way may be clear to proceed at once and uninterruptedly with the divine communications there given.

Arrived at Sinai, Moses goes up into the mount to God, and the stipulations of the covenant about to be formed are given him, to be laid before the people. These terms being accepted, preparations are forthwith made for its solemnization, and for the establishment of the theocracy.* Here, at the outset of the Mosaic economy, as in the promises to Abraham, are found intimations that this temporary restriction is in order to an ultimate diffusion. The stipulation on the part of God, "Ye shall be a peculiar treasure unto me above all people, for all the earth is mine," is the farthest possible from the narrow notion of a national God, interested only in this single people, and doing what he does for their sakes alone. And the constituting Israel a kingdom of priests, indicates it as their voca-

* This technical designation of the Hebrew state is borrowed from Josephus, who first employs it, *Cont. Apion.* ii. 16: "Some legislators have committed the power of their states to monarchies, others to oligarchies, and others to the government of the masses: but our legislator had no regard to any of these forms; he ordained our government to be what may be termed a theocracy, vesting the power and authority in God."

tion to be the mediators of mankind, and to dispense to the world the blessings of God's grace;—a vocation which, not being itself an end, but only means to an end, is in its nature temporary, and must, when its aim is accomplished, cease of itself.

The fundamental law of the covenant proclaimed from Sinai is called "the ten words;" but the precise limits of each of the commands is nowhere indicated in Scripture. Three different modes of enumeration have been proposed. According to the first, "I am the Lord thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt," is the first commandment; the prohibitions of the worship of false gods and of images are combined to form the second; and the prohibition of coveting is the tenth. This division is found in the Targum of the pseudo-Jonathan, is mentioned but disapproved by Origen, was accepted by the emperor Julian, George Syncellus, and Cedrenus, and is universal among the modern Jews. A sufficient proof of its incorrectness is, that the first commandment will then be no commandment at all. According to the second mode, the first commandment respects the worship of others than the true God; the second, the worship of images; the tenth, coveting. This is the division of Philo, Josephus, Origen, and the Greek fathers generally, and of the Latin fathers until the time of Augustine. It has always prevailed in the Greek Church, was adopted by Calvin and the Reformed Church, and though not accepted by the Lutheran Church, its propriety is admitted by not a few modern Lutheran theologians. The third mode, in which the prohibition of other gods and of images is the first commandment, and that of coveting forms two, the ninth and tenth, is first found in Augustine. He was led to it by the desire to find three commandments in the first table, "*quia Deus trinitas.*" He does not, however, consistently adhere to this division in all his writings, but in his "*Epistola ad Bonifacium,*" and elsewhere, adopts the second mode. It has sometimes been alleged that Clemens Alexandrinus favoured this last mode of division. But a simple inspection of the passage adduced in evidence is sufficient to show that there is an error in the text. The prohibition of image worship is included in the first commandment; taking God's name in vain is made the subject of the second; and the sanctification of the Sabbath the subject of the third; the fourth is omitted entirely; the injunction of obedience to parents is called the fifth; and it is expressly said that *all* coveting belongs unto the tenth. Augustine found the ninth commandment in the first clause of the prohibition of coveting, as it appears in Deuteronomy, "Thou shalt not desire thy neighbour's wife." But as the form of the decalogue given in Exodus is obviously

the original one, uttered by the mouth of God and engraved on the tables of stone, the Romish and Lutheran Churches assign to the ninth commandment the words, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house," leaving the coveting of the wife, man-servant, maid-servant, &c., to constitute the tenth. It is obvious that there is no ground in reason for such a division as this; and that the distinction made by the old Lutheran divines of concupiscence into original and actual, the former without and the latter with the previous consent of the will, does not relieve the difficulty. Kurtz adopts Augustine's division, in spite of his admission that the different arrangement of the clauses in Exodus and in Deuteronomy absolutely precludes it, provided the text in Exodus is correct. Its correctness, however, he ventures to call in question, although not the semblance of any evidence of error is furnished by the manuscripts, and although it would be more reasonable to suspect an error in any other part of the Scriptures than here. The fact that the Septuagint names the wife first in Exodus, is balanced by the Samaritan placing the house first in Deuteronomy: and instead of this showing that there was any doubt about the true reading, it shows precisely the reverse,—that the text was then just as we have it now, and that the authors of these versions sought to reconcile the seeming discrepancy of the two books, and produce uniformity, each in his own way. The chief motive of Kurtz in this unwarrantable assumption seems to be, that thus the ten commandments, as divided into the two tables, will exhibit the significant numbers 3 and 7. It was a motive of like character which induced Hengstenberg, who follows the Reformed Church in his numbering of the commandments, to assign five to each table, obedience to parents, as the representatives of God, being classed with our duties to him.

The curious fancy of Hitzig, copied without acknowledgment from a juvenile production of Goethe's, that the tables of stone contained, not the ten commandments, but the series of laws, *Exod.* xxxiv. 12–26, scarcely deserves the serious refutation which Kurtz and Hengstenberg have given it.

Terrified at the voice of God, the people request that Moses may be their mediator, and further commands and directions are given to him.—(*Exod.* xxi.–xxiii.) These he repeated to the people; and, upon their solemn engagement to perform them, the covenant was ratified by sacrifice; the sprinkled blood by its atoning virtue removing the obstacle to communion; and the communion itself being set forth by seventy elders, as representatives of the entire people, going up into the mountain where God was, and there, in his presence, and as his guests, feasting upon the flesh of the offerings.

The direction to make the altar of earth, or of whole stones, is thought to signify that it should be what Mount Sinai was, in miniature. It was to be constructed of materials ready furnished from the hand of God; expending upon it the workmanship of sinful man could only pollute it. The altar was the place where God recorded his name, and where he came to bless his people. The twelve pillars surrounding it were the twelve tribes assembled around their heavenly King. The altar of burnt-offering subsequently erected for the tabernacle and the temple, was most likely composed of the same material with that just spoken of. The frame of wood and brazen plates was merely to enclose the earth and stones, which formed the real altar.

The promise to send hornets to drive out the Canaanites, has been understood by most interpreters in a figurative sense, as designating the various inflictions which were employed for this purpose. A few, however, have understood it literally; so the Book of Wisdom, xii. 8, Theodoret, &c. Bochart, who adopted this view, brought his vast erudition to its support, and has adduced from ancient authors a multitude of passages, showing that even such diminutive creatures as frogs, mice, snakes, wasps, &c., have forced whole tribes of men to emigrate. And he finds a direct confirmation of the scriptural account, as he understands it, in a statement of Ælian, that the Phaselites, who dwelt in the vicinity of the Dead Sea, were driven from their homes by wasps.

As God was henceforth to dwell in the midst of his covenant people, a dwelling-place was needed for his reception. Moses was, therefore, called up again into the mountain, and the necessary directions given him. His forty days' absence put the constancy of the people to a test which they were unable to bear: and God's just anger at their apostasy furnished an occasion to prove Moses' fitness for the office of mediator, with which he had recently been invested. In the language used of Aaron (Exod. xxxii. 4), commonly rendered, "He fashioned it with a graving tool," Kurtz follows the translation of Jonathan and Bochart, based on a comparison of 2 Kings v. 23. They translate the verse, "And he received the ear-rings at their hand, and *bound*, or collected *them in a bag*, and made them a molten calf."

God's refusal to go with the people, though consenting to send an angel before them (Exod. xxxiii. 2), stands in contrast with his previous promise to send the angel in whom his name was.—(Exod. xxiii. 20, 21.) The evident distinction here made between a created and an uncreated angel, between one whose presence was identical with that of Jehovah, and one whose presence was consistent with Jehovah's absence, is pro-

perly regarded by most interpreters as intimating that mysterious relation of persons in the Divine Being which was subsequently unfolded in the doctrine of the Trinity. In the first volume of this work, Kurtz had maintained in the first edition that the angel of the Lord was the uncreated Logos. In the second edition he abandoned that ground under the leadings of Hoffmann, and assumed that a common created angel was meant. This view he endeavours to carry through this passage, in the face of what appears to us to be its obvious meaning.

The tabernacle which Moses pitched without the camp, to symbolise God's removal from the midst of it, was a provisory tabernacle made for the purpose, and designed to serve as a sanctuary, until the one which he had been directed to build should be prepared.

By the intercession of Moses, the breach between God and the people is healed: the sanctuary is then constructed and set up, the priesthood consecrated, the ceremonial service instituted, and the various regulations given which are contained in the Book of Leviticus. The camp is next organised into a military host preparatory to the conquest of Canaan; the tribes are numbered, the order to be observed in marching and in encamping specified, and the signals to regulate their movements arranged.

Israel had now been at the foot of Sinai almost a year. They had been organised into the people of God, and had received his laws. It was time for them to proceed to their destination. Three days brought them into the great and terrible wilderness of Paran. From this time onward there is a constant succession of murmurings on the part of the people, and of judgments on the part of God. Their weaknesses and discontent before arriving at Sinai were borne with patience and long-suffering; but the case is altered now, and fearful penalties avenge the violated covenant. The burning at Taberah, the plague at Kibroth-hattaavah, and Miriam's leprosy at Hazeroth, were followed by the sentence at Kadesh, that that whole generation should die in the wilderness. This place was probably the scene likewise of the rebellion of Korah, Dathan, and Abiram. The narrative leaves the children of Israel at Kadesh, in the second year after their departure out of Egypt. When it is resumed in the first month of the fortieth year, they are again at Kadesh.—(Num. xx. 1.) Over this interval, in which no progress was made toward realising their mission, the sacred historian passes in silence. Kurtz supposes that the people were allowed to scatter over the wilderness, and to settle in all the oases and productive spots they could find, until, near the close of their sentenced term,

they were summoned again to Kadesh. The stations summarily recorded in Numb. xxxiii. 19–36, between Rithmah (the same with Kadesh) and Kadesh, are thought to indicate the movements, not of the entire congregation, but of the headquarters of Moses and the sanctuary, as he visited the various sections of the people to prevent their total dismemberment.

The statement in Ezekiel xx. 25, 26, relating to this period, has given no little trouble to commentators. The Lord there says,—“Because they despised my statutes I gave them also statutes that were not good, and judgments whereby they should not live; and I polluted them in their own gifts, in that they caused all their first-born to pass through the fire.” Not to mention the Manichees, who used this passage to justify their rejection of the Old Testament, these “statutes that were not good” have been supposed to mean commandments of men, such errors and superstitions, for example, as those which fill the Talmud,—laws imposed by victorious enemies into whose hands God delivered them,—threatenings denounced by Moses in the name of God,—the Law itself as opposed to the Gospel,—ceremonial as opposed to moral law,—heathenish and idolatrous statutes and practices to which they were given up, in punishment for their ungodliness. This last, which is the one adopted by Calvin, Vitranga, Hävernicks, and others, is, without doubt, the correct view of the prophet’s language. It finds parallels in Acts vii. 42, “God gave them up to worship the host of heaven;” Rom. i. 24, etc., “God gave them up to uncleanness”—“to vile affections”—“to a reprobate mind;” 2 Thess. ii. 11, “For this cause God shall send them strong delusion.” Kurtz adopts this view as modified but not improved by Umbreit, and supposes that the statutes referred to are the ceremonial enactments given by God himself, but which the people perverted in the performance, fulfilling them only in a sinful, heathenish manner. They perverted, for example, the law of the consecration of the first-born, by making of it a command to sacrifice their children, as was done by the heathen, to Moloch. As far as this view is correct, it is already involved in that of Calvin before given; and as far as it would base itself upon the language of the prophet, that God gave these statutes, it is not true either that they were not good in the sense in which God gave them, or that they were given in punishment of the wickedness of Israel. It is not surprising that, in their dispersion and separation from the sanctuary, many corruptions should have found place among the people. And yet the language of Ezekiel must not be unduly pressed, as though the people had universally or prevailingly abandoned themselves to idolatrous or anti-theocratic practices. It was sufficient that such practices

did exist, although, at the same time, the mass of the people may have been faithful to their duty.

The difficult and much-disputed passage, Amos v. 25-27, also bears upon this period. After the Lord had expressed in the previous verses his aversion to the self-righteous and hypocritical services of the people, he proceeds,—“Have ye offered unto me sacrifices and offerings in the wilderness forty years, O house of Israel?” To this question Kurtz assumes, not an affirmative reply, contrasting the pious past with the idolatrous present, but a negative; and this not as censuring Israel in the wilderness for offering sacrifices, not to God but to idols, but to exhibit how little consequence attaches to the outward performance compared with the inward state. When set over against the abundant and multiplied sacrifices of his own day, those which the circumstances of Israel admitted of their offering in the desert were as nothing. And yet that was a period of marked divine favour; so little does the mere quantity of external service have to do with its procurement. The next verse is then referred, not to the past, as descriptive of idolatry practised in the wilderness,—not to the future, as a punishment, “Ye shall in flight before your enemies carry your miserable idols, unable to protect either themselves or you,”—but to the present, as giving the reason why the multiplied sacrifices were detestable, while the meagre sacrifices of the past were accepted. It is because the abominations of idolatry co-exist with the outward pomp of God’s worship. “Ye bear the tabernacle of your king, the stand of your images, the star of your god which ye have made to yourselves: therefore will I cause you to go into captivity beyond Damascus.”

The translation given is no doubt the true one, saving the tense of the first verb. But we do not see that this view of the passage, though preferred by several modern scholars, is any improvement upon the old interpretation of Stephen (Acts vii. 42, 43) and the Seventy. There is no difficulty in admitting an extent of ungodliness in the desert, which the Pentateuch does not expressly assert, but allows us to suppose. The apostasy rebuked by the prophet is not of recent origin. His contemporaries have followed their fathers in sin, and they shall perish by a like judgment. Their fathers were prevented from entering the holy land, they shall be driven from it.

The omission to circumcise the children born in the wilderness (Josh. v. 4-9), was, in the opinion of Kurtz, due, not to a temporary suspension of the covenant during the period of the sentence, which is an explanation frequently given, but simply to the circumstances of the people; the rite could not be per-

formed with safety when they were incessantly liable to be on the march.

We pass to what our author says respecting Balaam and his prophecies. The view taken of Balaam corresponds in the general with that of Hengstenberg in his treatise devoted to this subject. It is an attempt to mediate between the extreme views of regarding him as a prophet of the devil, an ungodly and idolatrous enchanter, and a true and real prophet of the living God seduced to his fall by an inordinate love of wealth and honour. He is supposed to have stood upon the border line of these two antagonistic territories, with one foot as it were upon the soil of heathen magic and sorcery, and the other upon the soil of religion and true prophecy. He is a sooth-sayer (Josh. xiii. 22), and makes use of enchantments (Num. xxiv. 1); and yet, on the other hand, he has some correct knowledge of God, makes confession of him, inquires after and receives his will, obeys it, though with half his heart, is possessed of a real inspiration, and utters actual prophecies. This half-way character is thought to make a transition period in his history, from which he must either rise to a full declaration of himself on the side of God, or fall back to absolute heathenism. Analogies are found in the history of modern missions, as well as in the New Testament,—*e.g.*, in Simon Magus, Acts viii. 9–11; the seven sons of Sceva, Acts xix. 13, 14; and the children of the Pharisees casting out devils in the name of Christ. (So Matt. xii. 27 is explained, comp. Luke ix. 49.) Balaam's knowledge of God was chiefly attributable, no doubt, to the reports which had been spread of the recent displays of his power and grace in Egypt, and in the wilderness; though it need not be denied that some feeble remains of the true religion may have been preserved in the region of Abraham's ancestry. That Balaam had addicted himself to the service of this new and potent Deity was the grand reason why Balak courted his services. He thought by this seer's potent incantations to withdraw from Israel, and secure for himself, the aid of their God, whom he saw to be mightier than his own. Thus Pliny relates, on the authority of older writers, that it was the practice of the early Romans to solicit the gods of cities which they attacked, by the promise of equal or greater honours than they now enjoyed; and they concealed the name of the deity under whose guard Rome was placed, lest he should be enticed from them by similar means.

It is a natural sequence from the views of Kurtz already given in relation to heathenism and Egyptian sorcery, that he supposes the charms of diviners to possess a real, and not a merely pretended or imaginary potency, by means of which

the gods are in a measure subjected to the control of their worshippers. The deities of the heathen, though real, personal, and powerful, are created beings; and as such, subject to the limitations and laws of creatures. Their priests and magicians are not only their servants, but in a sense also their lords. To them it is that they owe their credit and standing as gods: just as the priests and magicians again owe their credit and standing to the supernatural powers imparted by their deities. The gods and their worshippers stand thus to each other in a relation of mutual dependence; and the demons of heathenism are obliged for the sake of their own interest to subject themselves to the incantations employed upon them. Besides which, there may be some inherent power in these spells and enchantments, which such spirits are unable to resist.

Apart from these most doubtful notions, however, the stress laid by the sacred writer (*Deut. xxiii. 5*, and elsewhere) upon the benefit conferred by God in changing Balaam's anticipated curse into a blessing, is justified by the fact that Balaam was not only a heathen diviner, but a prophet of the Lord; and it was in this latter capacity, as the organ and representative of Jehovah, that his curse was desired. A curse uttered in the name of God, and by his authority,—which was what Balak wanted and Balaam hoped to effect,—would have been as efficacious for evil as the blessing he was compelled to pronounce was for good.

The speaking of Balaam's ass, Hengstenberg had endeavoured to explain away, as having taken place only in vision and in impressions supernaturally made upon the prophet's mind, without any sound audible to others proceeding from the mouth of the beast. Kurtz stands upon the only tenable ground of the literal occurrence, as it appears upon the face of the narrative, and refutes in the most ample and satisfactory way all the arguments and objections which have been alleged against it. He lays down the canon, that "a dream, vision, or ecstasy, is never to be assumed in the Scripture history, unless it is distinctly and unequivocally indicated in the narrative."

Balaam's desire to die the death of the righteous is not thought to involve any clear knowledge on his part of the rewards of the future state. It only designates the death of a true Israelite, as happier in his esteem than that of a heathen; which it will be, even though it be regarded less as the opening of a new life than as the close of the present. He asks for himself a death surrounded by the tokens of the divine favour and love, with the retrospect of a happily spent life, and the prospect of continued blessings to be vouchsafed

to his posterity; although whatever views were dimly possessed of that futurity, when he should be "gathered to his fathers," need not be excluded. Num. xxiii. 23 is translated, "For there is no enchantment in Jacob, and no divination in Israel; at the (proper) time, to Jacob and to Israel is told what God performs;"—"They do not practise arts of divination, and they do not need them. God himself reveals to them his purpose regarding the future as far as they have occasion to know it."

The most remarkable of Balaam's prophecies is the fourth and last, Num. xxiv. 15-24, in which, after Balak had ordered him away in a rage, at his utterance of a three-fold blessing, he volunteers to advertise him what should befall his people in the latter days. In ver. 15, "The man whose eyes are shut" (Eng. Ver., mar. ver. 3), is thought to refer, not to Balaam's failure to see the angel, on his way to Balak, nor to his previous ignorance of the future, now disclosed to him, but to the physical condition in which he received or uttered his prophecy, with the eyes of his body closed and all disturbing sights shut out, perhaps in a swoon, or state of unconsciousness as to all external objects, but the eyes of his spirit open, ver. 16. This is put in connection, likewise, with his falling, into a trance, or rather to the ground, under the might of the spiritual influence which had seized upon him and overmastered his strength.

The star and the sceptre that shall rise out of Jacob and smite the corners of Moab, are, in the view of Kurtz, an individual ruler. They meet a preliminary fulfilment in the person and conquests of David. But as the spirit of the prophecy requires not only the reduction or subjugation of the particular nations named, but of all in whom the hostility to Israel which characterised them shall be perpetuated, it must have a higher fulfilment in Christ, by whom all the foes of his people shall be finally destroyed or changed to friends. In the mind of Balaam, however, these are not accurately distinguished. It is not given to him to see them apart, and to separate what shall be done by the one from what shall be done by the other. The event, however, teaches that such a separation must be made. The view of Hengstenberg, that the prophecy is generic, and intended to apply to the kingdom in Israel as such, of which David and Christ stand out as the two main representatives, the culminating points, Kurtz strenuously resists,—all the more strenuously, as it would seem, because Hengstenberg has maintained it. The star of Balaam was prophetic of Christ's future coming, as the star of the wise men was symbolic of his actual appearance. "The children of Sheth," whom this star and sceptre shall destroy, are not all mankind

as the descendants of the patriarch Seth; but the word is taken in its appellative sense, "children of tumult," the tumultuous foes of Israel.

Amalek is called "the first of the nations," not in the sense of the oldest, nor the chief, most distinguished, most powerful, but as the first which displayed that character in which the heathen nations are here especially contemplated—that of hostility to Israel. The Kenites are supposed not to be the same with those mentioned Gen. xv. 19, there put for the Canaanites generally, but a branch of Midian put for the whole nation. The prediction which follows, of the invasion by Assyria of Western Asia, and the subsequent extinction of Assyria and Eber (the trans-Euphratic power) by an invasion from the West, shows what a far-sighted gaze into futurity was granted to the Mesopotamian seer. The discourses of Balaam present an insoluble puzzle to those who hope by feats of critical legerdemain to escape the admission of prophetic foresight. For though, with the contempt of historical testimony belonging to this school, they could by the magic of their art transfer the composition of this passage to any point of time they choose, the trouble is, that no time can be found which will answer the conditions required. The plain references to the conquests of David would make its composition in his reign, or shortly after, very convenient. But, on the one hand, this is much too early, for the predicted spread of the Assyrian power will yet remain to be accounted for, and especially that precipitation of the West upon the East which could not have been conjectured even in the days of Malachi. And, on the other hand, it is already too late; for "His king shall be higher than Agag" (chap. xxiv. 7), had already lost its meaning from the days of Saul, by whom the power of Amalek was for ever broken.

The prediction, Deut. xviii. 15–19, of a prophet like unto Moses, Kurtz understands not of the prophets collectively, Christ, the seal of all, included (Hoffmann); nor of each of the prophets individually (Hävernicks); nor of the ideal prophet, embracing both the imperfect and the perfect realizations, (Hengstenberg); but specifically and solely of Christ.

The most unsatisfactory thing in the volume before us, is what is said of the authorship and composition of the Pentateuch. While insisting rigidly upon its inspiration, canonicity, the authentic character and Mosaic origin of its contents, the consistent and well-ordered plan of the whole, and its forming the undoubted basis of the entire after-history, literature, and religion of Israel, the ground is taken that Moses, although the author of considerable portions of it, could not have written it all as it now stands; that its present form was attained

in the lifetime of Joshua, or shortly after. It is astonishing upon what slender and precarious grounds some men can persuade themselves to dismiss, as of no account, such a unanimous and unvarying testimony as tradition gives to the authorship of the books of Moses, confirmed as it is by so many internal considerations, and sanctioned by the explicit language of our Lord himself. Our surprise is heightened in the case of Kurtz, from its opposition to his general tendencies, and even to his previously published views in relation to this very subject. He has, however, taken Delitzsch as his leader, who, in his "Commentary on Genesis," seems to have made trial of his ingenuity to see how far he could adopt the arguments and conclusions of the "higher criticism," and yet hold fast whatever was essential to faith and orthodoxy. So far it may possibly be of use, in disarming the school whose weapons he has borrowed, by showing that even if their arguments and deductions were legitimate, faith in the Scriptures could be maintained. But as a rational account of the origin of the Pentateuch, it is no better than ingenious, we cannot even say specious, trifling.

ART. VI.—*History of Plymouth Plantation.* By WILLIAM BRADFORD, the Second Governor of the Colony. Now first printed from the Original Manuscript. Boston: Published for the Massachusetts Historical Society. 1856. 8vo., pp. xx., 476.

THERE have been many literal fulfilments of a very remarkable and happy character, as regards historical facts and documents, of the promise that "there is nothing hid that shall not be known." True, there is still a long list of lost treasures, comprehending works in every department of literature, the fate of some of which we know, and of others of which we fear that they have been hopelessly snatched from our use. Fire has been the chief agent in destroying the treasured manuscripts which would have been invaluable to the publishers of this age of countless readers. Many of us may join in the lament of Ben Johnson over the burning of his *History of Henry the Fifth*, as, in his "Execration on Vulcan," he tells us what noble fellow-labourers he had in the composition of his work:—

"Therein was oil, besides the succours spent,
Which noble Carew, Cotton, Selden, sent."

Perhaps, however, our known losses have been compensated

by the unexpected discovery, from time to time, of works of whose existence we had no knowledge, and by the occasional restoration of treasures that had long been regarded as destroyed. Past experience has taught us that there are still, and always will be, hidden materials enough in existence to render probable, and even necessary, the re-writing of all important histories at successive intervals short of the term of centuries.

It was well known that the most distinguished of the governors of the old Plymouth Colony, like the honoured Winthrop of the Bay, had not only intended, but completed, an historical journal, covering nearly the whole period of the years spent by him on this soil. No more impressive token could be offered of the deeply cherished conviction in the hearts of both these excellent men, that they were engaged in a work for all time,—a work of whose beginnings posterity would gratefully cherish the memorials,—than the fidelity with which they committed to record the incidents of the day of small things. Equally remarkable, too, are the modesty, the humility, and the dignified reserve, of both of them, in making their office of annalists of dark or hopeful incidents superior to any personal objects of their own. It is utterly impossible to gather biographical materials concerning themselves from their writings. Indeed, it would be difficult to prove, by any direct evidence unassailable by the modern sceptical tests, that Winthrop and Bradford wrote their respective histories. When we learn, too, from other sources, that each of them had rivals in their magistracy, and were occasionally subject to hasty and ill-advised reproach, and met with some sharp issues raised by their own independence and fidelity, we may justly pronounce their reserve touching their personal affairs a high and peculiar exhibition of magnanimity. These noble qualities of Winthrop had long been manifest to the readers of our history; the recovery of Bradford's History proves his full title to them.

It is proper that we should give some account of the manner in which this long-lost treasure was brought to the light. Secretary Morton, nephew of Governor Bradford; Governor Hutchinson, our historian; and the Rev. Thomas Prince, of the Old South Church, Boston, our annalist, had used the manuscript of the Plymouth governor in compiling their respective works. Had Prince been contented to take for granted the creation and the flood, and a few more of the remote antiquities of the world, he would have saved himself time for bringing down his own Annals to a period nearer to that of his death, which occurred in 1728, a century after the death of Bradford. The rich materials in print and in precious manuscripts which he had gathered and deposited in the

tower of the Old South Church are said to have furnished the means of lighting the fire in the stove, when that edifice was desecrated by the British soldiery in our Revolution, with a riding-school on its floor and a dram-shop in one of its galleries. A portion of the books which were rescued are in the library of that parish, and the remainder are committed to the keeping of the Massachusetts Historical Society. Prince brought down his digest of our annals, from Bradford, Winthrop, and other sources, to August 1633. Governor Hutchinson, the second volume of whose History was published in 1767, gives from Bradford's manuscripts "A Summary of the Affairs" of Plymouth Colony; and here was the last mention made by any of our writers of a work which we had regarded as destroyed. Besides his History, Governor Bradford left a "Letter-Book," which, from the brief portions of it that he had transferred to his History, and from the fragment of it which has been most strangely rescued from a mean use, we may safely say would have been invaluable to us. This fragment was found in a grocer's shop in Halifax, and occupies some fifty pages in the third volume of the Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society. It may be idle to speculate upon the agencies or the methods of the fate which befell these manuscripts of Bradford. It is pretty certain, however, that that fate turned upon the events of our revolutionary war; and the only reason—by the way, a very cogent one—for concerning ourselves with the matter is, that we might be led to search after more such treasures. These manuscripts may have been either in the possession of Governor Hutchinson, when, at the sack of his house in the north end of this city [Boston], his papers were scattered by a mob of his indignant townsmen; or they may have been in the tower of the Old South Church. In either case their value might have been known to some Tory, or to some British officer. A Tory would naturally have carried them to Halifax, while an officer of the army would have taken them to London,—these two places having proved to be respectively the localities in which the Letter-Book and the History were discovered. We should incline to the opinion that Hutchinson had both the manuscripts with him at his house in Milton, from which he fled with some of his effects; and the only misgiving we should feel about this supposition would be, that in that case we should have looked to hear of the manuscripts as in the possession of his grandson in England, with the other family papers.

Some portions of Bradford's History, coming down to 1620 only, had been copied into the Plymouth Church Records by Secretary Morton, and had been published, for the most part, as if from his authorship, by Mr Hazard. The late Rev. Dr

Young incorporated all these extracts by Morton, and added valuable annotations to them, in his "Chronicles of the Pilgrims," published in 1841.

We will now make a very interesting quotation from the editorial preface of the work before us, that we may fulfil a grateful duty to a gentleman whose zeal, and pains, and fidelity to his task, have justly entitled him to have his name associated with Bradford's History. The editor of the volume, and the writer of the modest but most valuable preface to it, is Mr Charles Deane of Boston, Chairman of the Committee of Publication of the thirty-third volume of the Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, who hardly knew what a responsible and exacting service would be required of him when appointed to that trust. Mr Deane says:—

"On the 17th day of February 1855, the Rev. John S. Barry, who was at that time engaged in writing the first volume of his History of Massachusetts, since published, called upon me, and stated that he believed he had made an important discovery,—it being no less than Governor Bradford's manuscript History. He then took from his pocket a duodecimo volume, entitled 'A History of the Protestant Episcopal Church in America, by Samuel, Lord Bishop of Oxford: Second Edition, London, 1846,' which a few days before had been lent to him by a friend; and pointed out certain passages in the text, which any one familiar with them would at once recognise as the language of Bradford, as cited by Morton and Prince, but which the author of the volume, in his foot-notes, referred to a 'MS. History of the Plantation of Plymouth, &c., in the Fulham Library.' There were other passages in the volume, not recognised as having before been printed, which were referred to the same source. I fully concurred with Mr Barry in the opinion that this Fulham manuscript could be no other than Bradford's History, either the original or a copy, the whole or a part, and that measures should at once be taken to cause an examination of it to be made."—(Preface, p. v.)

Mr Deane immediately addressed a letter to his correspondent, the Rev. Joseph Hunter, one of the vice-presidents of the Society of Antiquaries of London, and a corresponding member of the Massachusetts Historical Society, calling his attention to the extracts and the reference made by the Bishop of Oxford, and asking him to examine the Fulham manuscript, with a view to having it copied if it should prove to be Bradford's. An original letter of Bradford's was enclosed by Mr Deane, as a test of the handwriting. Mr Hunter—who, in his "Founders of New Plymouth," in his persevering investigations connected with our early colonists, and in his ready attention to the numerous epistles of inquiry addressed to him from this country, has shown his own zeal in our behalf—was the very best person that could have been applied to on this

occasion, and he entered heartily upon the commission. Fulham is a village four miles from Hyde-Park Corner. Its manor has belonged to the see of London for nearly a thousand years, and contains a very valuable library. The Bishop of Oxford, on the application made to him by Mr Hunter, kindly promised to convey his message and request to the Bishop of London; and the result proved that the Fulham manuscript was the long-lost History by Bradford. At the risk of appearing somewhat ungracious, we will venture the remark, that it would have been quite a handsome thing had the offer of a present of the manuscript been made to our Historical Society. Seeing that the volume bears on its cover to this day the book-plate of the "New England Library," which library has a legal successor and heir in this good city, and that it was (shall we write the word?) stolen!—beyond all question unlawfully purloined and carried off; seeing also that it is hardly becoming in a bishop to keep that sort of property, except for safe keeping, that it may be restored to its rightful owners,—we will allow what we have written to stand. But we must acknowledge the courtesy of the Bishop of London, in at once putting the volume into the hands of Mr Hunter, to take home with him, and to keep for an unlimited time, that it might be copied for our use. We must also acknowledge our indebtedness to Mr Hunter for his own hearty and laborious response to the favour asked of him, in procuring an accomplished transcriber of the manuscript, in overseeing his work, in collating and verifying the transcript, in obtaining a fac-simile of a page, and in co-operating with Mr Deane through the whole progress of the transaction. To Mr Deane we are under larger obligations. He directed that the transcript should be made by a complete imitation of the original; and he has so given it to us, allowing the antiquated record to appear in typography as it came from the pen of the honoured Governor. He has also prepared a body of very necessary and useful notes, remarkable alike for conciseness, accuracy, and good taste. Letters from him have crossed the ocean in large number, for the purpose of assuring faultless exactness in the transcript. We may feel quite sure that, with Mr Hunter and Mr Deane as scrutinizers of every step in the progress of the undertaking, it is submitted to us in a perfectly reliable form. This painstaking devotion has no other reward than that which a true lover of the memories and virtues of good men finds in renewing the memorials of them and of their services. After the copy had been received in this country, Mr Deane devoted himself to the preparation of the proper notes, and then supervised its publication at the University press, in Cambridge, where he found willing coadjutors in securing the elegant im-

print now before us. The Historical Society passed an especial vote of thanks to the editor for his highly appreciated services.

We are indebted chiefly to Cotton Mather among the ancients, and to the recent researches of Mr Hunter, for our knowledge of the incidents of Bradford's personal history before he came to this continent. The record of his birth, on March 19, 1589-90, is found on the register of Austerfield, a hamlet in Yorkshire, near Scrooby, the residence of Elder Brewster, and the place where Robinson's Puritan Church was gathered. Bradford, being left an orphan in his early years, received a small inheritance from honest parents, which enabled him to elevate a life apparently destined for husbandry, by some attainments in the rudiments of good learning. His earnest mind led him on to some "skill in diverse tongues," and he attained considerable proficiency in after life in French, Latin, and Greek. His residence in Holland made him a master of the Dutch language. Within the covers of the autograph volume, though forming no part of the History, as Mr Hunter writes to Mr Deane, there, "is a rather long piece, being Hebrew roots with English explanations." There are eight pages of these exercises, including extracts from the Hebrew Scriptures, in the handwriting of Governor Bradford. Prefixed to them is the following note of the good man, which, for the touching sweetness of its tone, and the grateful strain of its piety, is a gem of literature. The pen that wrote it must have been dipped in the dew of Mount Hermon:—

"Though I am grown aged, yet I have had a longing desire to see, with my own eyes, something of that most ancient language, and holy tongue, in which the law and oracles of God were written; and in which God and angels spake to the holy patriarchs of old time; and what names were given to things from the creation. And though I cannot attain to much herein, yet I am refreshed to have seen some glimpse hereof (as Moses saw the land of Canaan afar off). My aim and desire is, to see how the words and phrases, lie in the holy text; and to discern somewhat of the same, for my own content."—(Preface, p. xiv.)

He imbibed his Puritan sentiments from the ministry of Mr Richard Clifton; and having received the then despised and obnoxious religion of a godly people, he faithfully cherished it, in spite of the wrath of his relatives and the scoffs of his neighbours. He withdrew from the English communion, and joined that of the outlawed Separatists. His church removed to Holland when he was about eighteen years of age. He was one of those who were arrested by the "chatch poule officers," and imprisoned in Boston, Lincolnshire, on the failure of the first attempt of the persecuted flock to get

away into Holland. He was afterwards arrested in Holland as a fugitive from England, but secured his liberty. During the transient sojourn of the church at Amsterdam he served "a Frenchman at the working of silks." On the removal to Leyden, he converted his little patrimony in England into money, and set up for himself. We find, in his History, the following record of his election to the chief magistracy of the little wilderness colony, soon after its settlement at Plymouth. It was at a dark time in their fortunes, as half of the company were then resting beneath their rude graves, and most of the living were stricken with severe weaknesses and diseases. Governor Carver's government was a short one, extending only from the cabin of the *Mayflower*, on its arrival, to the spring of the first year of the settlement. He left no descendants. The date is 1621:—

"In this month of April, whilst they were busy about their seed, their governor (Mr John Carver) came out of the field very sick, it being a hot day; he complained greatly of his head, and lay down, and within a few hours his senses failed, so as he never spake more till he died, which was within a few days after. Whose death was much lamented, and caused great heaviness amongst them, as there was cause. He was buried in the best manner they could, with some volleys of shot by all that bore arms; and his wife, being a weak woman, died within five or six weeks after him.

"Shortly after, William Bradford was chosen governor in his stead; and being not yet recovered of his illness, in which he had been near the point of death, Isaac Allerton was chosen to be an assistant unto him: who, by renewed election every year, continued several years together; which I here note once for all."—(Pp. 100, 101.)

Mr Bradford was annually re-elected to this very responsible office up to his death, May 9, 1657, with the exception of only five years, when slight jealousies and colonial "politics" relieved him.

The man, the magistrate, and the Christian, appears to us in his own pages as the historian of other men's doings and experiences, and of what Heaven destined for the beginning of a noble work. He has nothing to say of himself, save as the reader infers his own agency, and notes on every page the occasion for the exercise of great virtues in all who shared the perils and straits of a forlorn enterprise, and the need of special graces of soul in their trusted chief ruler. Bradford impresses us most deeply and most tenderly, as one of the noblest of men. He was great in his goodness; eminent in his practical wisdom; honourable in his large exercise of magnanimity, forbearance, patience, and gentleness, under many exciting trials; and venerable for the calm fervour and constancy of his piety. We take him with the honoured Winthrop to our

hearts, and enshrine the two in our admiring regard and love. They were much alike in the high qualities of their souls,—in native dignity, in spotless purity, in habitual self-control, in generosity, and in the elements and the strength of their Christian faith. They both encountered rivalries and jealousies in their magistracies; and both met them with discretion, meekness, and a spirit wholly forgetful of all private ends, aiming only for the public good. They had both to maintain their own personal rights against envious and disorderly men; but they did so in a passionless and Christian temper, which confounded their opponents, and won them such esteem as ever afterwards was to them more than a body-guard, more than all the pomp of courtly ceremonial, as they presided over their rude wilderness courts in the garb of husbandmen. They both have to relate offensive and disgusting particulars, as the deeds of “inordinate and unsavoury persons,” who found their way through the defences of their Christian commonwealths; but these iniquities are recorded by them in a way which shows that their own pure thoughts were unsullied, and that the monstrousness of foul sin was to them but a new constraint to the sanctity of holy virtue. Both these worshipful Christian magistrates embarked their all of worldly wealth, hope, and prospects, and pledged their confidence in the heavenly inheritance, and spent the years of their mature lives in the humble toils connected with the first settlement of the most inhospitable regions of the New World. Neither of them once looked back. Neither of them seems even to have entertained a wish to revisit the land of their birth. There is a sweet fragrance of piety about their memories. They need no apologists for anything they said, wrote, or did. One who should undertake to vindicate them in their policy, their peculiarities, or their consistency, would only prove that he started with some misconception or ignorance on his own part, which would utterly disqualify him as their champion. Bradford and Winthrop saw the good hand of God in the work to which they gave themselves with such singleness and heroism of soul. Let us recognise the same divine providence in its instruments. That heart is outside of the influences of any common or peculiar power to move all human sympathies, which can put itself into communion with Bradford and Winthrop through their pages, and not feel the glow of an admiring love, or yield the homage due to rare excellence and lofty piety.

Bradford began to write his *History* in 1630, ten years after his arrival with the first-comers at Plymouth; the last entry in it made by him was in 1650, seven years before his death. As already intimated, he gathered a mass of letters, which he preserved for historical use. Some of these he has

incorporated at length, and others by extracts, or in substance, in these pages. He begins by a brief sketch of the introduction and working of Puritan principles in England, when the minds of some sincere and pious persons were learning to exercise that soul-freedom which, they had learned from the Bible, was alike their gift from God and the root of their accountability to him. What a pregnant sentence was that for earnest and believing men and women to read in the pages of the unsealed, unclasped English Bible, in which the apostle tells disciples that Christ has made them all "to be KINGS and PRIESTS unto God"! thus committing to each disciple the two most august prerogatives of temporal and spiritual dominion,—centring in each soul a royal and a priestly sway, making each to be his own monarch and his own sacrificer! Bradford tells us how truths of that depth and compass wrought in souls that felt their power. He sketches the origin of the two Puritan churches in the north of England;—Mr Smith's, which was afterwards scattered in the Low Countries; and Mr Clifton's, which, under the subsequent ministry of the noble Robinson, was the mother of our New England churches. The historian relates, with a subdued pathos, the hard buffetings of the flight to Holland,—the first attempt in which was unsuccessful, and the second of which barely failed of the darkest catastrophe.

Their residence in Amsterdam was brief, being but "about a year." A fear of being involved in the contentions between Smith's church and that of which Johnson and Ainsworth were pastor and teacher, suggested a removal to some other place in Holland. We will make an extract from Bradford at this point, for the sake of copying his beautiful tribute to Robinson:—

"For these and some other reasons they removed to Leyden, a fair and beautiful city, and of a sweet situation, but made more famous by the university wherewith it is adorned, in which of late had been so many learned men. But wanting that traffic by sea which Amsterdam enjoys, it was not so beneficial for their outward means of living and estates. But being now here pitched, they fell to such trades and employments as they best could; valuing peace and their spiritual comfort above any other riches whatsoever. And at length they came to raise a competent and comfortable living, but with hard and continual labour.

"Being thus settled (after many difficulties) they continued many years in a comfortable condition, enjoying much sweet and delightful society and spiritual comfort together in the ways of God, under the able ministry and prudent government of Mr John Robinson, and Mr William Brewster, who was an assistant unto him in the place of an elder, unto which he was now called and chosen by the church; so as they grew in knowledge and other gifts and graces of the Spirit of

God, and lived together in peace and love and holiness. And many came unto them from divers parts of England, so as they grew a great congregation. And if at any time any differences arose, or offences broke out (as it cannot be but some time there will, even amongst the best of men), they were ever so met with, and nipped in the head betimes, or otherwise so well composed, as still love, peace, and communion was continued; or else the church purged off those that were incurable and incorrigible, when, after much patience used, no other means would serve,—which seldom came to pass. Yea, such was the mutual love and reciprocal respect that this worthy man had to his flock and his flock to him, that it might be said of them as it once was of that famous Emperor Marcus Aurelius, and the people of Rome, that it was hard to judge whether he delighted more in having such a people, or they in having such a pastor. His love was great towards them, and his care was always bent for their best good, both for soul and body: for besides his singular abilities in divine things (wherein he excelled), he was also very able to give directions in civil affairs, and to foresee dangers and inconveniences; by which means he was very helpful to their outward estates, and so was every way as a common father unto them. And none did more offend him than those who were close and cleaving to themselves, and retired from the common good; as also such as would be stiff and rigid in matters of outward order, and inveigh against the evils of others, and yet be remiss in themselves, and not so careful to express a virtuous conversation. They, in like manner, had ever a reverent regard unto him, and had him in precious estimation, as his worth and wisdom did deserve: and though they esteemed him highly whilst he lived and laboured amongst them, yet much more after his death, when they came to feel the want of his help, and saw (by woful experience) what a treasure they had lost, to the grief of their hearts and wounding of their souls; yea, such a loss as they saw could not be repaired; for it was as hard for them to find such another leader and feeder in all respects, as for the Taborites to find another Ziska. And though they did not call themselves orphans, as the other did, after his death, yet they had cause as much to lament, in another regard, their present condition and after usage. But to resume: I know not but it may be spoken to the honour of God, and without prejudice to any, that such was the true piety, the humble zeal, and fervent love, of this people (whilst they thus lived together), towards God and his ways, and the single-heartedness and sincere affection one towards another, that they came as near the primitive pattern of the first churches as any other church of these later times have done, according to their rank and quality.”—(Pp. 17-19.)

The historian then gives us a very particular narration of all the stages and reasons connected with the enterprise of an exile beyond the sea, to plant on this continent. We are let into the councils of those steadfast but prudently deliberate men, who shrunk from no sacrifice, but whose faith included the sage conviction, that one way in which God helped men was in blessing their use of all their own resources of forethought,

discretion, and calculation. No enterprise ever projected by men would seem to have engaged a more just regard to temporal and spiritual considerations; while the temporal, though subordinated always to the spiritual, received the attention which barely sufficed to save the bold and venturesome undertaking from absolute failure. In the thoroughly honest and candid rehearsal of all the deliberations, misgivings, and frequent disappointments, involved in the preliminary negotiations in Holland and England, and of the discomfitures attendant upon the actual commencement of the voyage, the honoured governor seems to open the very hearts of his associates to our study. So true and single was his own spirit, that he cannot wholly repress severity of judgment in dealing with some who fell away; and his honest rebuke and censure of the few who in England, and afterward here, mingled selfish ends or imbittering strifes with the common undertaking, will be acknowledged by his readers to have been richly deserved.

There is a real eloquence in many of the pages which record so quaintly, but so touchingly, the straits and trials of the colonists, when, at the close of their tedious voyage, and actually destitute of the necessities of life, they wore through the first year of their exile. More than once starvation stared them in the face. The terms of their association, through a joint stock furnished by "adventurers," only a part of whom came hither, entailed upon them infinite perplexity. They were soon compelled to discriminate between the labours which were to be "*in perticuler*," and those which were to go into "*the general*." The governor is led into some searching processes here, followed by some painful disclosures as to characters over whom there was a cloud, the full reason for which was till now unknown to the readers of our history. Mr Cushman clears up his character, for the most part; but Mr Isaac Allerton passes into a deep shadow.

These pages will effectually settle all doubts as to the justice of the imputations which have heretofore rested upon the fame of the Rev. John Lyford, the Episcopal intruder, and Mr John Oldham. The former, especially, makes a sad figure, as drawn by the honest yet forbearing governor.

We must indulge ourselves in one more extract, for the sake of transferring to our pages his exquisitely touching and affectionate delineation of Elder Brewster. It is under the date of 1643:—

"I am to begin this year with that which was a matter of great sadness and mourning unto them all. About the 18th of April died their reverend elder, and my dear and loving friend, Mr William Brewster, a man that had done and suffered much for the Lord Jesus and the gospel's sake, and had borne his part in weal and woe with

this poor, persecuted church above thirty-six years, in England, Holland, and in this wilderness, and done the Lord and them faithful service in his place and calling. And notwithstanding the many troubles and sorrows he passed through, the Lord upheld him to a great age. He was near fourscore years of age (if not all out) when he died. He had this blessing added by the Lord to all the rest, to die in his bed, in peace, amongst the midst of his friends, who mourned and wept over him, and ministered what help and comfort they could unto him; and he again re-comforted them whilst he could. His sickness was not long, and till the last day thereof he did not wholly keep his bed. His speech continued till somewhat more than half a day, and then failed him; and about nine or ten o'clock that evening he died, without any pangs at all. A few hours before, he drew his breath short, and some few minutes before his last, he drew his breath long, as a man fallen into a sound sleep, without any pangs or gaspings, and so sweetly departed this life unto a better.

“ I should say something of his life, if to say a little were not worse than to be silent. But I cannot wholly forbear, though haply more may be done hereafter. After he had attained some learning, viz., the knowledge of the Latin tongue, and some insight in the Greek, and spent some small time at Cambridge, and then, being first seasoned with the seeds of grace and virtue, he went to the court, and served that religious and godly gentleman, Mr Davison, divers years, when he was Secretary of State; who found him so discreet and faithful as he trusted him above all other that were about him, and only employed him in all matters of greatest trust and secrecy. He esteemed him rather as a son than a servant; and for his wisdom and godliness, (in private) he would converse with him more like a friend and familiar than a master. He attended his master when he was sent in embassy by the Queen into the Low Countries, in the Earl of Leicester's time, as for other weighty affairs of state, so to receive possession of the cautionary towns; and in token and sign thereof, the keys of Flushing being delivered to him, in her Majesty's name, he kept them some time, and committed them to this his servant, who kept them under his pillow, on which he slept the first night. And, at his return, the States honoured him with a gold chain, and his master committed it to him, and commanded him to wear it when they arrived in England, as they rode through the country, till they came to the court. He afterwards remained with him till his troubles, that he was put from his place about the death of the Queen of Scots, and some good time after, doing him many faithful offices of service in the time of his troubles. Afterwards, he went and lived in the country, in good esteem amongst his friends and the gentlemen of those parts, especially the godly and religious. He did much good in the country where he lived in promoting and furthering religion, not only by his practice and example, and provoking and encouraging of others, but by procuring of good preachers to the places thereabout, and drawing on of others to assist and help forward in such a work; he himself most commonly deepest in the charge, and sometimes above his ability. And in this state he continued many years, doing the best good he could, and walking according to the light he saw, till the Lord revealed further unto him. And in the end, by the tyranny of the

bishops against godly preachers and people, in silencing the one and persecuting the other, he and many more of those times began to look further into things, and to see into the unlawfulness of their callings, and the burden of many antichristian corruptions, which both he and they endeavoured to cast off; as they also did, as in the beginning of this treatise is to be seen. After they were joined together in communion, he was a special stay and help unto them. They ordinarily met at his house on the Lord's day (which was a manor of the bishops), and with great love he entertained them when they came, making provision for them to his great charge. He was the chief of those that were taken at Boston, and suffered the greatest loss; and of the seven that were kept longest in prison, and after bound over to the assizes. After he came into Holland he suffered much hardship, after he had spent the most of his means, having a great charge, and many children; and, in regard to his former breeding and course of life, not so fit for many employments as others were, especially such as were toilsome and laborious. But yet he ever bore his condition with much cheerfulness and contentment. Towards the latter part of those twelve years spent in Holland his outward condition was mended, and he lived well and plentifully; for he fell into a way (by reason he had the Latin tongue) to teach many students, who had a desire to learn the English tongue, to teach them English: and by his method they quickly attained it with great facility; for he drew rules to learn it by, after the Latin manner: and many gentlemen, both Danes and Germans, resorted to him, as they had time from other studies, some of them being great men's sons. He also had means to set up printing (by the help of some friends), and so had employment enough; and, by reason of many books which would not be allowed to be printed in England, they might have had more than they could do. But now removing into this country, all these things were laid aside again, and a new course of living must be framed unto; in which he was no way unwilling to take his part, and to bear his burden with the rest; living many times without bread or corn many months together, having many times nothing but fish, and often wanting that also; and drunk nothing but water for many years together, yea, till within five or six years of his death. And yet he lived (by the blessing of God) in health till very old age. And besides that, he would labour with his hands in the fields as long as he was able: yet when the church had no other minister, he taught twice every Sabbath, and that both powerfully and profitably, to the great contentment of the hearers, and their comfortable edification; yea, many were brought to God by his ministry. He did more in this behalf in a year than many that have their hundreds a-year do in all their lives. For his personal abilities, he was qualified above many; he was wise, and discreet, and well spoken, having a grave and deliberate utterance, of a very cheerful spirit, very sociable and pleasant amongst his friends, of an humble and modest mind, of a peaceable disposition, undervaluing himself and his own abilities, and sometimes overvaluing others; inoffensive and innocent in his life and conversation, which gained him the love of those without, as well as those within; yet he would tell them plainly of their faults and evils, both publicly and privately, but in such a manner as usually was well taken from him. He was tender-hearted,

and compassionate of such as were in misery, but especially of such as had been of good estate and rank, and were fallen unto want and poverty, either for goodness and religion's sake, or by the injury and oppression of others; he would say, of all men these deserved to be pitied most. And none did more offend and displease him than such as would haughtily and proudly carry and lift up themselves, being risen from nothing, and having little else in them to commend them but a few fine clothes, or a little riches more than others. In teaching, he was very moving and stirring of affections, also very plain and distinct in what he taught; by which means he became the more profitable to the hearers. He had a singular good gift in prayer, both public and private, in ripping up the heart and conscience before God, in the humble confession of sin, and begging the mercies of God in Christ for the pardon of the same. He always thought it were better for ministers to pray oftener, and divide their prayers, than be long and tedious in the same (except upon solemn and special occasions, as in days of humiliation, and the like). His reason was, that the heart and spirits of all, especially the weak, could hardly continue and stand bent (as it were) so long towards God as they ought to do in that duty, without flagging and falling off. For the government of the church (which was most proper to his office), he was careful to preserve good order in the same, and to preserve purity both in the doctrine and communion of the same; and to suppress any error or contention that might begin to rise up amongst them: and accordingly God gave good success to his endeavours herein all his days, and he saw the fruit of his labours in that behalf. But I must break off, having only thus touched a few, as it were, heads of things."—(Pp. 408–414.)

The good governor records the merciful providence of God, as exhibited in the longevity of many of the colonists, and evidently regarded the facts which he relates under this head as an equivalent to all the disasters of hardship and mortality which were visited upon the first year of the settlement. He gives us, what we have now for the first time, a perfectly accurate list of the original pilgrims, their families and servants, with brief memorials of some of them. We cannot close these remarks without another expression of our obligations to all who have been concerned in the restoration and publication of this precious work.

ART. VII.—*Free Seats?—or Pews?*

FREE seats and pews have long been struggling together in the church; and to many, the contest, even in argument, seems yet to be doubtful.

There has been, on the one side, perhaps an overstraining of particular principles, or too much of mere reliance on the private interpretation of some text of Scripture, or a somewhat curt dogmatism in assuming as indisputable the very point to be proved. On the other, there has been so great a quantity of dust thrown into the air, that it is difficult, at first, to distinguish between a church and an auction-room, between an offering and a purchase, between giving an alms and paying rent. Yet when the matter is carefully reduced down to that which is of the *essence of the difference*, it will be found so plain, that the only wonder is, how Christian men, and sensible men, could ever raise any contest about it.

The first thing needful is, to disentangle the question from side issues, and considerations which may, indeed, (and most happily do,) modify the pew system as commonly carried out among us; but which have nothing to do with the *comparative* merits of the two systems, because they *belong equally to both*.

Thus it will not do for the advocate of pews to urge, that frequently it is *not all* the pews that are rented; or, that a certain portion has been reserved by the vestry as *free seats*. This will not do, we say; for the *principle* of renting *covers the whole*. The *character* of the church as a "pewed church" still remains. Probably the only reason a part is free, is because renters enough for all have not yet been found. And at any rate, the permanence of the arrangement is utterly unreliable. The vestry may at any time, by a majority vote, sell or rent the whole.

Besides: it is no argument for pewed churches, *as against free churches*, to say that in the former "*part of the seats are free*." Instead of an argument for pewed churches, this is really a fatal concession to their opponents; for if it be so good a thing to have *a part* of the seats free, *how much better to have the whole!* And again: if any particular proportion of seats in a pewed church are free,—say one-third,—it is no argument against a free church; for in a free church one-third of the seats are free also. Where there is no difference, there is nothing gained on either side, and nothing is to be argued either way. The *real difference* is to be found in the *remaining two-thirds*, all of which are *free* on the one side, and *every one* of which is *sold or rented* on the other. This plea in abatement, so loudly urged by the advocates of pews, must therefore be at once ruled out of court. It is rather too much to expect that the free church system will consent to be struck down by *its own thunder*—and *stolen at that*.

The modified practice dilutes the evils of the pew system, we grant, and thus renders its ordinary form, as existing

among us, somewhat less injurious. But the general admission of any such dilution, is itself a general confession on the part of these very pewed churches that the evils of their own system were intolerable without it. And their borrowing the remedy from the free church plan, is a confession that they *know* very well where to look for the best cure. In arguing, therefore, the comparative merits of the two principles of action, we must go upon the undeniable ground that *all* the seats in pewed churches are, or may be, *rented* or *sold*, just as in free churches they are *all free*.

Again: there is no distinction worthy of the name of *principle*, to be taken between seats sold and seats rented. The former is *practically* much the worse of the two. But they are identical in essence. They differ only as the small pox and the varioloid differ. The latter is merely the milder and more manageable form of the disease.

Again: when we come to the question of the offertory, and the duty of *giving*, as therein enjoined, it will not do to point to the large "plate collections" made in pewed churches on communion occasions, and for various church or benevolent objects; for *these things are likewise done in precisely the same manner in free churches*. Their being done to some extent in pewed churches is therefore no argument *against* the free. It is only, as before, an *unwitting concession*. For if it be good to raise a *part* of church funds on these high and scriptural grounds, how much *better* to raise *the whole* in that manner! *And free churches thus raise the whole*. This is only another specimen of the old trick:—taking an admirable practical feature from those whom they are opposing, and then immediately turning round and using it as a weapon *against* the very system from which it was "borrowed."

Again: it is urged that "courtesy" is always sure to give a seat to those who have no pews. Is "courtesy" confined to pewed churches? Is there no courtesy in free churches? Besides: that courtesy, as we all know from experience, cannot *always* be relied on to make strangers at home in seats paid for by other people. It cannot safely be depended on even for well-dressed strangers—*gentlemanly* strangers—nay, nor yet for handsome and fashionable-looking "*ladies*." And the meanly-clad poor? Let *them try it*, if they think there is invariable "courtesy" for *them*! They will soon find out their mistake! But even granting that "courtesy" occasionally, or even frequently, is found in pewed churches, and makes strangers "feel at home;" what argument is that *against* free churches, where that delightful "courtesy" is not left to depend upon the momentary caprice of individuals, but is the fundamental *law of the whole house*? If Christian "courtesy" is thus charming on

a small scale, what must it be when made universal, so that *every* stranger may at *all* times "feel himself at home" in *any* seat he pleases!—Or is this "courtesy," in pewed churches, valued, like diamonds, *only because of its rarity*?—Here, again, it will be seen that the pew system has been compelled to steal another small pinch of free church salt, in order to give even the semblance of a savour to its own utter insipidity.

We do not wonder, indeed, at such adroit tactics. Realising so thoroughly as we do what a miserable, stale crust this vaunted pew system is, we do not wonder that its advocates cannot resist the temptation to purloin a little somewhat more toothsome to make their dry bread go down. Nor, considering the spirit in which their favourite system originated, are we at all surprised when we find them, like economical boarding-house keepers, spreading this sweet butter *as thin as possible*, to see if they cannot make a very little of it go a great way. All this, we say, occasions us no surprise. Their sapless system needs it so intensely, that the craving is irresistible. Indeed, they never consider themselves now-a-days as fit to be seen, except when they have covered their dust-coloured coat with so many fresh-looking free church patches, that they have great hope of preventing any discovery of the mean and coarse cloth it was originally made of.

But in fairly carrying on the contest between these two antagonistic systems, no such mixings and borrowings can be tolerated on the field of equal and honourable warfare. One champion has no business to come upon the ground buckrammed and padded out to imposing proportions, by what he has cribbed from his opponent on the sly. The contending principles on each side must be *stripped to the bare buff*, if we wish to see anything like *fair play*.

We therefore discard altogether the plea of "part free;" or, of "large offertory collections;" or, of "individual courtesy;" as urged by the advocates of pews. These have no business in the controversy whatever, *except as virtual, and important, and overwhelming concessions in favour of the free church plan*; for these features, thus "borrowed" from that free church plan, are the only things that make the ugly face of the pew system tolerable, even to its own best friends.

Stripped to things essential, then, the two opposing schemes may be thus stated:—

The free church plan offers the preaching of the gospel *free to all*. It asks no one to contribute for the "support of the church," except such as have first *heard and received* the gospel. It asks them to give *then*, only from their *faith* in God, their *hope* of heaven, and their *love* both towards the Lord Jesus who hath given unto them salvation, and towards

their brethren who are one with them in Him. And the standard of "how much" each one shall give, is no other than that which Holy Scripture has set forth,—"*According as he is able.*" In other words: the *free hearing* of the gospel is a condition *precedent* to the duty of "*supporting the church*;" and the *measure of that duty* is *God's Word*.

The pew system, on the other hand, does not offer the gospel free to any; but furnishes it only to those who have paid for the privilege. It asks a certain rent for the "support of the church," and asks it, not from Christian, but from commercial considerations, the seat being worth just as much "rent" to the church whether its occupant love God or not. The standard "how much" each shall pay, is regulated solely by the prominence, convenience for seeing and hearing, and general "eligibility," of the pew, having nothing whatever to do with the "ability" of the giver. In other words: the *paying* for the "*support of the church*," is a condition *precedent*, without which no man can expect to *hear the preaching of the gospel*; and the measure of that duty is regulated by *the world*.

These are the points in which the two systems meet and contradict one another. And therefore it is within these limits, and on these grounds, and no other, that the contest between them must be fought out. In the above statement and definition, we have neither inserted anything outside the essential antagonistic issues, nor omitted anything important to their full comprehension. We have, it is true, given rather a large margin to the pew system, out of mere kindness. We shall be compelled to pare it much closer down to the quick, before we get through; but this will do to begin on.

Let us first try the question *historically*, relying upon the saying of the wise man; "*The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be.*"

When the Holy Ghost descended on the day of Pentecost, and the apostles preached with tongues, and gathered in the first-fruits of full-grown Christianity, we find not a syllable in Peter's sermon about the "duty of supporting the church," as if *that* was the first thing to be provided for: but the *resurrection of Christ crucified* was the element of power with which his hearers were pricked to the heart. And when the converts said, "Men and brethren, what shall we *do*?" the answer was not,—"*We have sittings in our upper room, which we are about to rent. It is your duty to take pews there, at so much a year, that each one of you may keep his own family from contact with any other family during time of divine worship. And we will also have 'respect of persons,' so that the differences of your position in the world may be carefully*

perpetuated in the church. The richer, therefore, shall have the best seats, at the highest price; and the poorer shall have those not so desirable, at a lower price. Moreover, if we cannot rent the whole, there will be a few of the worst seats, next the door, which may be occupied by paupers, and where they can hear the gospel without money and without price." The apostles, on the day of Pentecost, said nothing like this. If they had, the gospel would have fallen still-born, at the hour of its birth, and would never have been heard of after. Yet, on the pew system, this is substantially the first proclamation made when a new church is built. The consecration of the house of God is scarcely over,—the sound of the voice of the *successor of those apostles who preached on the day of Pentecost* has scarcely ceased to echo under the roof,—when the lay auctioneer enters, hammer in hand, and knocks down the seats to the highest bidder.

Nevertheless, the church in Jerusalem was "supported," although it had not the aid of the pew system, which is now thought to be so indispensable. For several years the whole college of the apostles abode there, and gave themselves wholly to the ministry of the word and to prayer; many of the elders were also permanently labouring there; while seven deacons were appointed and maintained besides, and employed more or less as missionaries and evangelists through all the region round; and large companies of "widows," moreover, both of Greeks and Hebrews, were daily ministered unto out of the treasury of the church. No such powerful financial system has ever since been devised. Distribution was made to *every man*, according as he had need. And the church *grew*. The Lord added thereto *daily* such as should be saved. In a very brief space of time the number of them that believed was about *five thousand*. Now we would like to ask a question:—How long would it take for a parish of an hundred and twenty members to grow to *five thousand*, supporting *twelve* apostles, a *large company* of elders, and *seven* deacons, besides distributing to all the needy,—*on the pew system?*

This wonderful growth of the church in Jerusalem is an epitome of church growth everywhere else, and ever since. Never, on the face of the whole earth, has the gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ *first* bargained for a temporal maintenance, and *then* proceeded to minister unto the souls of the perishing the treasures of heavenly grace. Throughout all the Roman empire the voice of *free* grace was freely heard. Whether in the Jewish synagogue, or the open market-place, or the upper chamber, or the private hired house, or the lonely seashore, the unbroken law of *freedom* was everywhere the same. And it was in a great measure *because* the millstone of Mam-

mon was *not* hanged about the neck of the glorious gospel, that its innumerable enemies were utterly unable to drown it in the depths of the sea. From city to city it ran, with unshackled, mysterious, electrical speed. Province after province was overrun with the sacred contagion. No tax nor tariff checked its course from mouth to mouth, from heart to heart. Even the enormous boundaries of the Roman empire were not enough to exhaust its energy of conquest; but it overflowed on all sides, and carried the rivers of salvation afar off into places inaccessible to Roman arms, making the wildernesses and solitary places of barbarism to blossom as the rose. Not alone during the lives of the apostles, during the ages of miracles, during the bloody seed-time of martyrdoms and pagan persecutions, was this the universal mode of the growth of the gospel throughout the nations. Even during the gathering darkness of the middle ages, this grand old inviolable tradition of Christianity was handed down from century to century, uncontaminated by the touch of filthy lucre. Whether obscurely exploring the vast labyrinths of Tartaric tribes in the interior of Asia, or winning a wide yet transient domain in the Flowery Empire, or breaking the coarse idols of the English Saxons, or subduing the rough Gothic tribes of Europe, or softening the more fiery hordes of Sarmatian blood, or lighting up the gloom of the black forests of Germany, or melting the savagery of Scandinavian sea-kings, or fertilizing deeply the cold clay of Russian serfdom: everywhere the same invariable watchword has invariably led the warriors of the cross to victory. The preaching of the gospel was *free to all comers*. No *price* was ever charged anywhere in the whole world, as *first* to be paid, *before* the preaching of the gospel should be even *heard*. Rich or poor, Jew or heathen, publican, heretic, hypocrite, or harlot,—all were welcome to come and hear the words of life, without first *hiring a pew*.

“But,” it may be said, “times and men have changed since then. That plan did well enough in those countries and for those ages of the world; but the nineteenth century needs a different mode of proceeding, and men must now be wrought upon by different and more practical methods.”

Our appeal, be it remembered, is now not so much to principles in the abstract, as to the *actual history of the church*. We are arguing, not on private interpretation of scriptural texts, nor on philosophical considerations, nor on theoretical hypotheses. *We are building only upon notorious and indisputable facts.*

And on the ground of notorious *fact*, this alleged “change of times and circumstances” we boldly deny. It is no such thing. The phrase is empty,—it is a mere delusion and a snare.

For how is the gospel propagated in this our day? Where has it spread at all, with a solid and *bona fide* growth? Let us look closely at it and see.

During this nineteenth century thus far, the gospel has made conquests of no small magnitude in India, in Africa, (both on the West coast and at the Cape,) in New Zealand, in Australia, and in these United States, besides a most wonderful revival within these twenty years in England. If we go beyond the bounds of our own communion, and somewhat further back than the opening of this century, we find the great phenomenon of Methodism sweeping onward, with a breadth and force truly astonishing, the Whitefield revival, the rapid rise of the Baptists, the successful missions of various bodies of Dissenters in India, in Burmah, in the Sandwich Islands and those of the South Pacific, and elsewhere. *What had the pew system to do with any one of these?* Did Wesley make people pay pew rent *before* he would allow them a chance to be “converted”? Are East Indians first required to pay for the support of missionaries, *before* they are persuaded to destroy their hideous idols, and turn to the living God? Are the dusky New Zealanders, or the coal-black Africans, *first* brought up to the contribution box, *before* the gospel has taught them to “repent and be baptized for the remission of sins”? All these senseless absurdities are necessarily involved in the pew system, which requires people to *pay* (or promise to pay) *beforehand a certain price, after which, and in consideration of which, they are entitled to hear “the stated preaching of the gospel.”*

Nor is the church movement in England, or the spread of the church in this country, any exception to the universal experience of all the rest of Christendom. One great leading feature of the movement in England,—one chief element of its power, and of its success,—has been its deadly hostility to the pew system, and the remorseless and unflinching war which it has waged with pews, and pew sales and pew rents, in every varied form of the abomination. The measure of popular growth among the masses has been in direct proportion with the successes gained in this war against the heartless exclusiveness of pews. Without this, that movement would have been strangled in its infancy. With it,—that is, *with this large destruction of the pew system*,—the Church of England has grown more, in numbers, church buildings, schools, and voluntary offerings of all sorts, for all purposes, ecclesiastical and benevolent, foreign and domestic,—she has grown incomparably more, we say, in *twenty-five years* than in the *three hundred years previous*.

In these United States, the church has spread very rapidly,

indeed, though not near so rapidly as she might have done on a more scriptural, more sensible, and more powerful plan. The pew system has prevailed to a very general extent in almost every quarter of our land. In some dioceses the common rule has been to sell the pews in fee, so that they might pass, like so much bank stock, into the hands of schismatics, heretics, or even infidels. Such owners charge rent to the occupants of their pews, but pocket the whole as they would the rent of a house. Not a cent of it goes to the "support of the church:" the minister's salary, meanwhile, being paid by voluntary subscription. In other, and the more numerous cases, the less injurious mode of annual renting has been preferred. The *dilutions* we have spoken of have also very extensively been resorted to, thus giving much more of life to the total than the pew system could ever rightly claim as its own. And yet our *growth* has been sadly hindered. The church has often, through large sections, felt the tone of her system somehow impaired, and has suffered severely without knowing or suspecting what it is that hurts her. Look at the veteran, time-honoured citadels of the pew system,—the old and old-fashioned pewed churches,—how hard and dry they are! There is no more elasticity, life, or growth in them, than in an ancient oyster-shell. They can run on in the old ruts, but they are perfectly certain that ruin will overtake the church, if those old ruts should ever be departed from. These are not the parishes, nor are such the men, to lead the van of the church's conquests. No. After waiting year after year, until our very souls are weary,—and waiting in vain,—for such men to *move on*, it is at length agreed, on all hands, that not among the old pewed churches, but in its *mission-work*, is the true *life of the church*. The time for the moving in the valley of dry bones is not yet.

And what is the operation of *life* in this mission-work? How does it act? By what method is the church *first started* in a *new place*? Do men begin with the pew system full fledged? They are not such fools. Arrangements are invariably made whereby the multitude of strangers to the church may first attend freely. There is not a lisp about pew rent. Seldom is even the plate passed round *after* preaching. *Free seats* are the lure, whereby to get men to come within the sound of the preacher's voice. *Free seats* are relied on to fill the room; and without them, a beggarly account of empty benches would be the sole reward of the admirer of pews.

True, it is too generally the case, that when a good beginning has been made on the free system, the congregation, of its own accord, adopts the other. *That* part of the question we shall consider presently. We only wish to show *now* that

the beginning is made, and must be made, invariably on the *free* plan. Take, for instance, a case mentioned only a few weeks ago, in the *Episcopal Recorder*. Christ Church, Dupont's Mills, Delaware, was started in 1851, and has now one hundred communicants. An humble school-house has all this while served them for a church,—*seats free*, of course. They have now completed a beautiful Gothic stone church, 120 feet long, with a spire 140 feet high, and a fine organ, &c. All this has been done in *five years*, with *free seats*. Now, however, the people are so eager for pews, that they were nearly all taken before the church was completed. The *Recorder*, with strange unconsciousness of the bearing of its words, remarks upon this case, that, "without in any degree shaking our confidence in the *free* system as *the first stage in a missionary enterprise*, it seems to indicate, with an unusual degree of clearness, the period in which it seems desirable to change the *free* into a *pewed* church." The *Recorder* is too profound for us to fathom its occult philosophy of what is "desirable." To our common-sense way of looking at things, it would seem that a system which had gained one hundred communicants, and built a beautiful stone church, in five years, to *begin with*, was precisely the best system in the world to *go on with*. But more of this hereafter. We here have at least the broad admission that the "free system" is the true plan for "the first stage in a missionary enterprise;" that is, that the "free system" is the *only system* upon which *true missionary work can be effectively carried on at all*.

The uncontradicted voice of all history and all experience, primitive, mediæval, modern, European, American, is therefore this, that in carrying forward Christianity, men are not to be expected, or asked, to *pay in advance* for the gospel, in order that thus it may be preached to them; but that, to gain any sure foothold anywhere, it must first be *preached FREE*. And this is equally true everywhere, and in all places, and in all ages, from the day of Pentecost in Jerusalem, down to the farthest western settlement in these United States, in the middle of this nineteenth century; or to the remotest islands in the South Sea.

Having now found what the *facts of history* tell us about free seats, let us consult the same incorruptible oracle about pews.

We imported the system from England. Occasionally, from about the time of the Reformation or a little before, the lord of the manor, on building a church all by himself, and retaining the patronage in his own hands, would erect a large pew in a prominent position, for his own family; leaving, however, all the rest of the church perfectly free, as of ancient and univer-

sal custom. When Puritanism began to prevail, and men were willing neither to bow in the creed nor kneel in the prayers, they began to build the back and sides of church seats very high, that these indulgences of stiff-necks and stubborn-knees might pass undiscovered. As sermons were also of very wearisome length in those days, these new-fangled boxes were admirably contrived, so that, during the discourse, the whole congregation might sink down behind the tall pew-backs into invisibility and slumber. The exclusiveness of this system more and more shut out the masses from the parish church. The wealthiest and most respectable families had possession of the pews—the respectability of the family being generally measured by the size of the great pew, and the amount of lumbering furniture, stove, table, settees, and stools, which it contained. The system grew harder and harder, the more it flourished. The great body of the excluded were too ignorant to know that all this was a violation of English law; and too poor and of too little social consideration to be able to enforce their legal rights, even if they had known them. The ale-house and the cock-fight, therefore, were the only Sunday solace for *them*, until some ranting Dissenter came along, holding forth by the roadside—*where there were no pews*; or in the “chapel,” or “Bethesda,” or “Ebenezer,” where *all the seats were free*; and thus stole away the hearts of the people from the church of their fathers!

So far the results of this miserable innovation—this shameless usurpation—this misbegotten spawn of spiritual pride and social superciliousness,—were only evil, and that continually. The clergy were supported, not by pews, but by tithes; and whether their churches were full of worshippers, or only full of pews, made little difference in their income. As for those who had pews, they, of course, paid nothing for the privilege, the churches being, *by law*, free to all. A new refinement was the idea of *renting seats for money*. This was of course illegal in the parish churches, but it was practicable in proprietary chapels; that is, chapels which were the private property of one or more individuals. These chapels, if served by a clergyman who was popular enough as a preacher to draw large congregations, were found to be a good speculation. The pew rents would suffice to pay the minister, and the current expenses, and a handsome per centage on the invested capital besides. This unhappy development *doubly rivetted all the mischief of the former abuse*. It made the *income of the clergy* depend upon the pew system, thus making them interested in continuing it; and besides that, it made the people feel that they were not merely illegal “squatters” and usurpers of other persons’ rights, but it gave them the proud consciousness

that they had "paid" for their seats, and had "a legal right" to get "the worth of their money" in return. This, of course, made them even less likely to grant, than the clergy were to ask, a change.

And such is the shape in which the evil has become general among us. Its supposed financial certainty and convenience; its facility for keeping families together; its securing a *quid pro quo*, as the something gained for a man's own self in return for the amount he gives to the church: all these are urged, and urged powerfully, by clergy and by laity, in its behalf.

The certainty is imaginary; for the pew rent is as likely to be in arrear as any other church money—so experience testifies. But at any rate, the church has always been more liberal on the right system than the wrong, and is even now ready to become so again, as we shall show presently.

Its convenience is a deceptive plea, as hundreds of parish treasurers can tell, who from the unpleasant reminiscences of years know how much more laborious, and in every way disagreeable, it is to dun delinquents for unpaid pew rent, than simply to carry the alms-basin round on Sunday morning.

Its facility for keeping families together is a euphuistic deception. It means in reality, that the hiring a pew of one's own renders punctuality unnecessary; and enables a man, with wife and children, to make a most irreverent and inexcusable irruption into the congregation in the midst of public worship, and yet be perfectly certain that their pew will be *kept empty for them until they arrive*. It is very rarely that, on coming to church betimes, a family of moderate size will find any difficulty in securing seats together. And for the few times during the year when it may be otherwise, what is the real difference? For the most part one seat's distance is the farthest remove required. And is this so great a matter? One might suppose that even a young new-married couple, while yet their honeymoon was at the full, might consent to sit some *three feet apart*, and endure this limited absence even for an hour and a half, without being rendered altogether inconsolable by the cruel separation. Nothing, indeed, proves the emptiness of the advocates for pews more glaringly, than the amount of noise they make about this "separation of families." Those who have practised the system find no serious trouble from any of these things, which are such formidable hobgoblins in the imagination of those who are determined *not* to practise it.

Many reasons, indeed, might be given for the powerful hold which this particular bugbear has taken on the fancy of some people; but it will suffice to notice the two most powerful. In this country of legal equality, the only chance of securing a

“position” in society, is by the union of public display with social exclusiveness. A pew in an eligible part of a church gives a certain position of respectability among respectable people, especially if it is handsomely upholstered and furnished with richly-bound books. And the legal right to *keep other people out of it* is absolutely indispensable to the full enjoyment of those who have paid for the right to be in it. The other, and perhaps stronger motive, is the instinctive rebellion of “respectable” fallen human nature against that truth which proves the power of the incarnation,—that “there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female,” but we “are all one in Christ Jesus.” Respectable baptized sinners, in broadcloths and silks, do not like to feel as if they were “all one,” in any sense, with other baptized sinners in homespun and calico; and therefore they prefer to keep the less respectable sinners on the other side of a stout plank, in a pew by themselves, or on a hard bench in the alley, or somewhere far behind them down by the door. These two are the main roots out of which this great tree of difficulty grows. The less said about the “separation of families,” therefore, the more certainly will that objection receive *all the attention it deserves*.

The argument based upon the *quid pro quo* is now all that remains. And we freely own that there is something in it. But that something utterly destroys the new claim so loudly set up, that pew rent is to be reckoned as an alms, and as having quite as much of the nature of an “offering” and of “sacrifice” as if it had actually been laid upon the altar of pure free-will. We, however, must be permitted to insist upon it, that *quid* is *quid*. The man who rents or buys his seat, pays for something, and gets something for his money. It will not do to say, “He only gets the occupancy of a seat, and *that* he would have at any rate on the free church plan; so where’s the difference?” This will not do, we say; for we are now considering that argument in favour of pews which urges that “men are more willing to pay towards the support of the church when they *get something* for their money.” They therefore *get something*; and it will not do to avoid our reply by turning round in the same breath and protesting that they *get nothing* after all. Will they confess that the pew system squeezes money out of people on false pretences?—that it swindles? No; that will not do. They *get something*. And the fact of their *getting something* is just the difference between an alms and a *bargain*. If a poor man comes to Mr John Smith for help, Mr John Smith may have the kindness to make him a present of twenty dollars. But suppose that, not being minded to so large a generosity, he says to the poor man, “I

can't afford to *give* you the money; but if you have a mind to part with that cow of yours, I'll let you have twenty-five dollars;”—and the poor man consents: who would say that John Smith had *made him a present* of the twenty-five dollars? Since he *got something for his money*, it was not a present, but a *bargain*;—a good bargain or a bad bargain, according to the worth of the cow; but in either case a bargain, and nothing more than a bargain.

Nor will it do to say that “the *occupancy of the seat is the same in either case.*” We have a right to walk in a public park, and sit on a bench under the trees all day long if we like, and nothing to pay for the privilege, because it is a free park—public property. But suppose that we take such a fancy to one particular part of the park, that we wish to have it for our own, and be able to keep other people out of it,—what then? If we can succeed in being allowed to purchase, will it not cost us a pretty penny? And even if, after we get it, we do not build on it, but only sit on the bench and enjoy the shade as we did before, can it be asked with any common sense, “Where's the difference?” We have *bought and paid for the right to keep other people out*, who, before that purchase, had *as good a right there as we*. This exclusiveness is of the essence of all property. A man's house would not be his own house if other people had as good a right to use it as he had himself. It is his own, because he can *keep all others out of it*. His field is his own field, not so much because he can do in it what he will, as because no other man can set foot in it against his will, without committing a trespass. No area can be common property and private property at the same time. The essence of common property consists in the fact that no one man has any more right there than another, and none can therefore exclude another. The essence of private property is, that some one man has *more* right there than anybody else, and can *exclude* all others if he pleases. It is this exclusiveness, and this only, which makes a *pew of their own* so sweet a morsel under the tongue of those who “always like to *get something for their money.*”

And yet we are gravely told that this price, thus willingly paid for the right to keep other people out of a pew, and which would not be willingly paid under any other consideration, is to be reckoned as an “offering of a pure heart” unto God! and the treasurer of the parish—so it is hinted—after collecting the pew rents, may keep them in his pocket until Sunday morning comes, and then place them in the alms basin, and have the prayer for the church militant said over them on the altar! If the pew rent is *alms*, what is to be said of the cost of the pew carpet and cushions, and morocco-bound books with

gilt clasps, and all other furniture of the pew? These sums, we suppose, in the private cash-book, will be charged to the "*Charity Account*,"—that sort of *charity* which begins at home and ends there, without ever being seen or heard of elsewhere. It would need but a slight extension of the same principle to include the cost of all the Sunday dresses of the family. Why not? They are for "Sunday" use, and to be worn "to church;" surely they might just as well be reckoned on the "charity account" also. And thus a skilful accountant may cipher up no very inconsiderable amount of charity in the course of a year,—a mode which none, however, are likely to adopt except those whose annual "total" on the charity account would otherwise be but a cipher. This new mode of calculating "charity" would be, indeed, valuable, if by thus making it stretch more surprisingly than caoutchouc, it could only be induced thereby to cover the greater multitude of sins. We cannot help, in this connection, inquiring whether a charity of this generously expansive sort would not suit those upon whose "religious sensibilities" the "chink of the money" given at the offertory "falls as disagreeably as the tap of the auctioneer's hammer." It is a very characteristic symptom of the deep perversion which taints the whole system, that under its debasing and debilitating influence, that very act which God has ordained whereby to sanctify to us the possession of property, should actually come to be regarded as a *desecration* of the pure spirituality of his worship! Surely such "sensibilities" have been refined to the most penurious point of delicacy; and we should not wonder, some fine day, to hear that religion of so exquisitely attenuated a texture "had died of a rose in aromatic pain."

But the worst feature of this popular plan of supporting the gospel is, that it furnishes selfish men with a very plausible "dodge" for shirking a duty which is proclaimed in Scripture, and re-echoed constantly by the church, in tones as loud, and terms as plain, as language can make them. Men are required to *give unto GOD according to the ability that GOD hath given THEM*. The *ability of the giver* is the standard of God's Word, and therefore the standard of free churches. The pew system takes, as *its* standard, not a man's ability, but the nearness of his pew to the chancel or the door, as the case may be; or, whether it be in the middle alley, or a side alley, or behind a pillar, or in the gallery. Is *this* the standard for "charity,"—for "alms,"—for "an offering unto God of a sweet savour"? We trow not. This standard has about as much to do with "charity," as the standard by which a seat in the parquette of a theatre may be had at one price, a place in the boxes at another, and a ticket to the amphitheatre at less than either.

Yet this miserable "standard," which regulates all that is done on the pew system for the support of the church, wretched and mean as it is, acts like an opiate on the conscience, and blinds it to all further seeing of that standard which is divine. It covers a man up from the power of Holy Scripture, and of scriptural preaching, as a water-proof cloak covers him up from the rain. Sitting comfortably in his cushioned pew, (for which the rent has been duly paid and charged to "charity account,") the solemn reiterations of the offertory glide by him unheard, or enter in at the one ear and go out at the other; or at most, whenever they rub roughly on some spot yet left sensitive in the deadening soul, they stimulate him only to drop a dollar bill—or even a five-dollar bill—into the plate at some casual collection, instead of the usual twenty-five cents. Whereupon the poor man goes home with as much of a glow in his bosom as if he had been *liberal* that day. And yet, poorly as they are, for the most part, responded to, the church is deeply indebted to these extra-parochial collections and private appeals for aid; for they breathe a little free-church life and love into a system that has none of its own. Without this portion of our ordinary operations shining before men, there would be, in the working of the pew system, only light enough to make "darkness visible."

The standard of the *world* being thus set up in the church itself, to the exclusion of the standard unfolded in the *Word of GOD*, the question naturally arises, "How can the pew system be so efficient for 'the support of the church?'" This is its one great boast,—that it "supports the church;" and that it is "the only plan on which the church can be supported." If this claim be true, then the church ought to be better supported in this country than in any other; because in this country the pew system is more generally adopted than in any other. Let us look at *facts* once more.

The church in Jerusalem had all things common; but the abundance of this support did not come from pew rents. St Laurence, at Rome, fed 1500 widows and poor from the treasures of the church; but there were no pews rented in those days in St Peter's. From thenceforward, in many lands, the clergy have been many times more numerous than with us; have often been rolling in wealth, living in palaces, vested in silks and velvets, purple and fine linen, and rich in silver and gold and precious stones; bishops have been barons and princes, and received the revenues of principalities: but all this while no man had yet invented pews. In England, pews have seldom brought in any revenue, except in proprietary chapels and among some of the dissenters; while the wealth of the church—such as it is—comes partly from tithes, and partly

from landed endowments,—the present remnant of the real estate given by the piety of individuals in former generations, and of the *whole* of which the church has *not yet* been plundered by the state. But surely *this* country must make a better showing. This country, where the pew system is more general than it has ever been in any other, must certainly “support the church” better than was ever done elsewhere. You really think so? Then open your ears and hear *the whole land re-echoing, from one end to the other, with doleful complaints as to the starvation point of support* which is the *general result* of the generally adopted PEW SYSTEM. Let these two notorious facts—the general pew system, and the general *starvation* “support of the clergy”—stand up cheek-by-jowl together,—where they belong. Let any man deny either the one or the other,—if he dare. Let him prove that the one does not *account* for the other,—*if he can*.

The testimony of history as to the *facts* of the two systems, is now, we trust, sufficiently clear. To measure their full significance, however, we must go below the facts, to ascertain the *great and leading principles* which are embodied in them. In no other way can we fairly and fully bring the two systems up, broadside against broadside, to try their metal with one another.

In the history of the creation of the world, when we read of the making of man, male and female, there is immediately added the first great law of humanity as given to the first Adam: “Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth.” And when the second Adam came to redeem that humanity which had fallen under the first, the great law of the new creation was the perfect parallel to that of the old. The church, which is Christ’s body, was by him commanded to “go and teach *all nations*,”—“Go ye into *all the world*, and preach the gospel to *every creature*.” The ministry were sent forth to be catchers of men; not to organise a system which would keep the greater part of them from all chance of being caught. St Paul, in the true spirit of a fisherman, was all things to all men, that by all means he might gain some. Christ died for *all* men, and it was the business of the church to bring this saving gospel home to *all*. Therefore, “*Come ye*,” is the universal invitation. The volume of Holy Writ closes its tremendous appeals to men with this its latest voice,—one which was intended to re-echo without ceasing until the dawning of the day of judgment:—“The Spirit and the bride say, *Come*. And let him that heareth say, *Come*. And let him that is athirst, *Come*. And whosoever will, let him take the water of life *freely*.” And with such invitations, thus given, it is no wonder that the Lord *added* to the church *daily* such as should

be saved—no wonder that nations flocked to the ark of God, as doves to their windows. To increase, to multiply, to grow, to gain, to gather in,—this is the chief work the church is ordained to do. She is the great treasure-house of God's grace, and she must draw all men unto her, that they may receive of Christ and be saved. Growth by the Spirit; growth by the bride; growth by the ministry; growth by the voluntary labours of the laity; growth by the spontaneous coming of "whosoever will," that he may take the water of life *freely*;—this is the one, prime, all-controlling, all-overwhelming instinct, the indispensable and ineradicable *law of life*, to the church of the living God. This must be obeyed *first*, no matter what else may be postponed or neglected. It is impossible that any *practical* consideration can ever, under any circumstances, be for an instant weighed against it. Whatever clashes with this, therefore, must be done away. Whatever impedes it must be cut asunder. Whatever smotherers out the life of it, must itself be destroyed.

The pew system, on the contrary, says "Come" to nobody, except to those who have bought or rented pews. The essence of it is not, as we have already shown, in obtaining the right to *use* a seat, for *that* exists equally on the other plan; but its essence is, that it gives, for money, the right to *keep other people out* of a seat. The legal right to *exclude*, is the soul of the system. We boldly appeal to the experience of every rector of a large and "successful" pewed church, who "has not a single pew that is not rented," whether his attempts to get the poor and needy to come to church have not been almost wholly paralyzed by the impossibility of getting over the repugnance of these people to "intrude" into "other people's seats." Poor folks will not thrust themselves upon that "courtesy" which, even if it utter no rude word, yet constantly greets them with a *look* that says, as plainly as any tongue could speak,—“What business have *you* here? This is not *your* pew!”

And the strong tendency of the system to promote *staying away*, operates largely even on those who take pews. Every rector of a pewed church knows how common it is for heads of families habitually to absent themselves from the worship of the church. They *pay* for a pew; and then, satisfied that they have done their share for "the support of the church," they feel as if they had a right to be absent as often as they please. Thus, even when the pews are all "taken,"—except the preacher or the occasion be an extraordinary attraction,—they are on an average *not half filled*. "There is room," indeed, as truly in our pewed churches as in the King's festal hall at the marriage supper; yet the hungry crowds in the streets and

lanes of the city, instead of being "compelled to come in," are carefully *kept out*. In vain does the patient and laborious clergyman say, *Come*. In vain do the Spirit and the bride say, *Come*. The pew system, like Satan under the tree in paradise, impudently contradicts the Spirit and the bride, and, with cold-blooded yet eager mercilessness, reiterates, in hoarse yet energetic whispers of indignant selfishness,—"*Stay away! stay away!*"

Hence it follows, as a matter of course, that while the free church plan is a full embodiment of that first great law of the church's life—*growth*—the pew system has never been so much as suspected of any such tendency. Not even the most fanciful or the most ingenious of its many advocates has ever hinted that the pew system was a valuable auxiliary in a *missionary* enterprise, or an efficient ally in carrying on the church's *conquests* from the domain of the world, the flesh, and the devil. It is much more powerful in bringing a *flood of worldliness into the church*, than in converting worldlings to a life of faith. So long as there is any stomach for vigorous conquest for the church, free seats carry the day. When conquests are over, when no further growth is looked for, and when a congregation is ready to repose from past toils and payments, and begin respectably and comfortably to *stagnate*; then, as the *Recorder* expresses it, "it seems desirable to change the *free* into a *pewed* church." Certainly; by all means. The pewed church is incomparably *better to stagnate in* than the *free*. That process may there be carried on without any fear of serious disturbance; for in that system not a pulse beats, nor a nerve thrills, nor a fibre of its frame can feel, in any true sympathy whatever, with that which is the FIRST GREAT LAW OF LIFE in the church.

There are difficulties, of course, in the working of the free church system, as in all others; and they are worthy of a full and patient investigation, which we may hope to give them at some future time. One of these is the difficulty of maintaining a definite pastoral tie, a recognised and tangible connection, between the priest and the people of his flock. Another is the mode by which such churches shall hold and administer their temporalities, and be represented in convention. The full tabularization of statistics would also be very valuable, could full statistics only be obtained. But these are matters of subordinate importance, and we cannot dwell upon them now.

But this whole question of "support," though satisfactorily disposed of even by what we have said, must rightfully be placed on far higher ground. "The church *must be supported*," says one. "How can the clergy labour and preach the gospel

if they be not *supported*?" asks another. "The first requisite for success," chimes in a third, "is a *competent support* for the minister." In England, they will not even consecrate a new church until there is some endowment secured for the permanent *support* of the parson. The odious prominence thus given to the matter of "*support*," is a very characteristic commentary upon the profound scheme of successful finance, which the church of our day so generally adopts, namely, the selling her birthright of a *free gospel* for that wretched mess of potage known as the pew system. She devours the proceeds with as little satisfaction as Pharaoh's lean kine experienced on swallowing their fatter fellows; and finds, at length, that one mess of potage—and such thin potage too—is not enough to prevent for ever after the pangs of returning hunger. "Give! give!" is the cry of the famishing clergy, from Dan to Beersheba. The ministers of Christ's church are almost starving, because this pew-renting church does not give her *reverend* "scholars and gentlemen" as much to live on as men of the world give to draymen, and third-rate clerks, and French cooks. This state of things is disgraceful. The half-suppressed cry of pinched-up clerical poverty is too sadly reluctant to be feigned; is too real to be longer disregarded. And yet that such a cry should be raised in the midst of, and everywhere throughout, a church so abounding in wealth as ours, is a burning shame. There must be "something rotten in Denmark." What is it? Who can tell us? Let us examine it for a while, patiently and honestly, and we shall find out.

"How shall they hear without a preacher?" saith Paul. And that is what we all say. There is a great deficiency in ministerial supply. What remedy is proposed? Everywhere we hear but one: "Pray ye to the Lord of the harvest." Very good advice,—none better. Men therefore pray, or appear to be praying, very earnestly: but they do *nothing more*,—and there is an end. The deficiency is *not remedied*.

We have not yet reached the cure, then. Let us go on to the next step with Paul: perhaps we may learn something of him. *He knew*. He then continues:—"How shall they preach, except they be sent?" These words are nothing new to us; we have heard them a thousand times before. But stop a moment, and let us think what they really mean. "Except they be *sent*." "*Sent*?"—Well, that *does* sound strangely, come to think of it. That is not the way *we* talk now-a-days. What has the *sending* to do with it? Of course a man must be ordained before he ought to preach: but will his ordination find him in bread and butter? Will it pay house rent and coal bills? Will it support him, and his wife and family? "How shall they preach, *except they be sup-*

ported?"—*that's* the way we talk in this nineteenth century! Yet Paul said nothing there about being *supported*. Curious that he should seem to *take it for granted* that they would be supported;—is it not? We never take *that* for granted! We know better! Paul must have lived in a very enthusiastic age! It was an age of miracles then!—and so we shrug our shoulders, and let it pass: when, if we would but push the matter a little farther, we might chance to light on a grand discovery.

Paul evidently could not have forgotten the duty that lies upon Christians to "*support*" their clergy, as we call it. Anybody that has ever heard the offertory read, knows those unsparing words of Paul to the rich and luxurious Corinthians: "*If we have sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great matter if we shall reap your worldly things?*" And again, to the same: "*Do ye not know, that they who minister about holy things live of the sacrifice; and they who wait at the altar are partakers with the altar? Even so hath the Lord also ordained, that they who preach the gospel should live of the gospel.*" And again, to the "foolish Galatians" he says, with a short, sharp, and searching severity, which ought to stir the hearts and consciences of both preachers and hearers to the depths every time they say or hear it: "*Let him that is taught in the word minister unto him that teacheth in all good things. BE NOT DECEIVED, GOD IS NOT MOCKED: FOR WHATSOEVER A MAN SOWETH THAT SHALL HE REAP.*" This is Paul's doctrine about supporting the clergy; and it is strong enough, in all conscience. But why did he not mention it in the other place first quoted?

It was simply because Paul understood the gospel so much better than we do. It was because he never conceived of such madness as trying to get men to *bargain how much they would pay* for the gospel, *before* the preacher was to begin to preach! It was because he was determined not to let the first impression of such mercenary filthiness blind the eyes or stop the ears of that city of merchant princes—those revellers in all that was exquisite in art, wealth, and refined sensuality,—it was for this reason that he chose *that very city* as the place where to labour with his own hands at his humble trade of tent-making, so that he might not be chargeable to any of them, but give them the gospel FREE, *in every sense*. St Paul knew that *works*, to be truly good works, must be works of *faith*. He knew that faith cometh *by hearing*, and not *before they can begin to hear*. He does not, therefore, tell them to support their preacher, *in order* that he *may* preach unto them. And the preacher is not to wait for a support, *before he shall begin to preach*. But he *must* preach because he is

sent, not because he is “supported.” And he *must* be supported, not in order that he may preach, but *because he does preach*. It is not a bargain on either side, but a *duty* on both sides. Preaching comes *first*. Faith follows as the blessing upon hearing the Word. And then the good work of supporting the ministry comes last of all, as one of the fruits of faith. To put this good work as one that can by any possibility be rightly done *before faith*, is to reverse the gospel, and turn it *completely inside out*.

Therefore, in all Paul’s strong commands on this subject, he never leaves us in any doubt as to which comes first. A man “planteth a vineyard” *first*, before he “eateth of the fruit thereof.” He “feedeth the flock” *first*, before he “eateth of the milk of the flock.” The apostle says, truly, “We have sown unto you spiritual things,” *before* he asks, “Is it a great matter if we shall reap your worldly things?” Men *first* “minister about holy things,” *before* they have any right to “live of the sacrifice;” they *first* “wait at the altar,” *before* they are “partakers with the altar.” So “preach the gospel” comes *first*; “live of the gospel” comes *afterwards*. Men must *first* be “taught in the word,” *before* they are bound to “minister unto him that teacheth in all good things.” And then comes the stern, clear-ringing warning against precisely what the pew system has done:—the apostle straitly charges us, “Be not deceived, God is not mocked; for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he reap.” He must sow *first*, and reap *afterwards*. To reverse this heavenly order, as the pew system does throughout, is to *deceive ourselves*, and to *mock God*. We deceive ourselves, when we trust to that pew system, which paralyzes us, as the main reliance for the “support” of the church. And we mock God, when his church, though rolling in wealth, leaves his priests to starve.

But priests may learn, as well as people, from these sharp, soul-cleaving words, “*Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he reap.*” *The clergy have sown cowardice, and reap starvation.* So long as they speak with weak lips and with a stammering tongue upon the *duty of giving*, and giving with that abundance which is required by the *law of love*; so long will poverty pinch their cheeks, and leanness scarce cover their bones. So long as they “fear to offend the laity” by preaching what they ought; so long the laity will *not* fear to offend both God and them, by doing what they ought *not*. If the clergy, therefore, reap emptiness, let them look to it, whether they have not sowed *chaff* instead of wheat.

The church, with instinctive fidelity, follows closely after Holy Scripture. She does not pretend to any ability to improve upon St Paul. Preaching first, practising afterwards.

The true old-fashioned mode of pewed churches, is to make the collection *before the sermon*, lest something in the sermon might perchance move the conscience to be more liberal than "Mr Worldly-Wisdom" has determined on beforehand. The church, however, orders the offertory *after* the sermon, not before; and *immediately* after, in order that the preaching of the word may be *immediately* embodied in works of faith. She does not believe that there is any virtue worth relying on in works done "*before the grace of Christ, and the inspiration of his Spirit.*" She says of them, in words so admirably descriptive of the beauties of the pew system, that we cannot resist the temptation to quote them in full,—she says (Article XIII.) that they—

"Are not pleasant to God, forasmuch as they spring not of faith in Jesus Christ; neither do they make men meet to receive grace. . . . Yea, rather, for that they are *not done as God hath willed and commanded them to be done*, we doubt not but they *have the nature of sin.*"

Thus, then, the two systems stand compared. On the one side, the first thing sought is the *preaching* of the gospel; on the other, the first and foremost object is the *pay*. On the one plan, the duty of supporting the church follows as a *consequence* of preaching: on the other, the preaching follows as an enjoyment *consequent* upon supporting the church; in strict accordance with that popular axiom which embodies the whole philosophy of the pew system in its proper relative order,—"*No pay, no preaching.*" On the one hand, the *motive* for paying to "support the church," is love to God and love to man: on the other, the only motives are selfish, selfish—for one's own exclusive comfort, or for that of family, or for the respectability of social position. On the one hand, the *standard* of the amount to be given is God's own standard,—*the ability of each man*, according as God hath given him: on the other, the standard is the voice of *the world*,—how much other people give for similar pews; or, how much *that* pew will fetch at auction.

In *history*, the one is of Pentecostal birth, and from thenceforward the invariable path to all the real conquests the church has ever gained in any age, even in this our own land, and in these our own days. The other is of Puritanic birth, stealing surreptitiously and illegally into the church, and thenceforward invariably blighting her growth, stifling the breath of her freedom, stiffening the pliant energy of her members, starving her clergy, and so choking up the river of life,—of which she is the appointed channel,—that its irrepressible waters are forced over their lawful banks, and run to waste in strange pastures, whose irregular fertility shames the barren-

ness of the very "garden of the Lord." Even in the mildest form of the evil, we find that all its real ornaments are jewels stolen from the very system it would fain destroy; while, at the moment of its loudest boasts about its success in "supporting" the clergy, there is a more universal and more undeniable outcry against the "starvation-point" of that "support," than ever any part of the Christian church has been compelled to raise before.

In *argument*, we have seen that the advantages of a "certain income," and "keeping families together," and "getting something for one's money," are no sufficient justifications of the pew system. Even granting that the assertion as to income were true, will they ask us to weigh the *souls of men* who are now *kept out*, against a few more *dollars* to be *gotten in*? And shall men's souls be made to kick the beam, as of less weight in the scales of the church than mammon? That some respectable families may say their prayers more comfortably, is no sufficient reason for excluding hundreds and thousands of other families from any chance to worship at all. Nor is it any comfort to think that a few well-to-do men "get the worth of their money;" when thereby the masses of the poor outside are kept from getting even so much as a *hearing* of that gospel which may open to them the gates of paradise.

In *essential principle*, we have found that the one system follows the order of Paul; the other reverses it. The one puts faith before works; the other, works before faith. The one publishes the gospel in the order in which Christ and his apostles delivered it; the other turns it wrong side out. "*Free grace*" is the motto over the doors of the one: "*Grace sold here*," over the doors of the other. The one, with the Spirit and the bride, says, "*Come!*" the other, with the flesh and the devil, says, "*Stay away!*" The quickening principle with the one is the love of God; with the other, the love of *money*. The instinct of the one is life and growth; of the other, stagnation and death. The one plants the mustard-seed of faith, and waters and trains it up to a goodly tree, with great boughs, and leaves, and fruit; the other takes the well-grown tree, turns it upside down, buries its leafy boughs deep in the earth, leaves its naked roots to harden in the dry air; and then wonders why it does not grow!

In *practical results*, we find that the one *preaches the gospel to the poor* as fully as can be desired; while the other has clothed us, in popular estimation, with the wretched reproach that we are "*the church of the rich*,"—a reproach which is, in God's sight, as loathsome a covering as the shining white scab of the leprosy. And it appears, also, that even in income, the free system is the better of the two; and that, as in other

cases of compact with the devil, men's *souls* are *sure* to be *lost*, while the arch-fiend, at the same moment, cheats his dupes out of the very price which tempted them to ruin. The devil's gold-pieces turn to slate stones. The clergy who cling to the pew system for a "support," cry aloud from hunger. And no wonder! How should it be otherwise, when, in the very house of God, Mammon sits aloft upon the throne of *love*; *exclusion* is the law of the temple built for *communion*; and the sound of the voices of Paul and James,—nay, of the Lord Christ himself,—is drowned by the soulless, galloping gabble of the auctioneer. There is but one more step to be taken in this direction. Tear down the glorious standard, bearing the monogram of Christ and his cross, which of old gave the empire of the Roman world to a follower of the Lamb, and which has ever since led Christendom to victory. Tear it down, we say. Run out, in its place, the *little red flag*. And inscribe upon *that*, if you dare, the trumpet-toned watchword of Christian warfare,—Εὐ ΤΟΤΩΙ νικά, —*Conquer, in THIS!*

The two systems, then, stand opposed to one another, somewhat mixed and mingled in practice, indeed; but the one, in essence, a service of God; and the other, of Mammon. Like Gerizim and Ebal, the mountains of the blessing and the curse, so these two gigantic foes stand up face to face, in deadly earnest, giving the lie to one another. On the broad and generous shoulders of the one rests a robe of the richest perennial verdure, ever watered by the dew of Hermon which falleth upon the hill of Zion. On the bald and peeled scalp of the other, blight and barrenness are spread out, like the dreary drought and desolations of Gilboa, where the Lord departed even from his own anointed, and left him whose love passed the love of women, to fall beneath the sword of the uncircumcised.

It is high time, moreover, for the church of America to take her choice between them. "How long halt ye between two opinions?" might as startlingly be asked of us now, as of ancient Israel on the slopes of Carmel. All round us are multiplying rapidly the signs that it is to the "little flock" the Lord God is making ready to give the kingdom. All round us the old and numerous foes of the church are preparing to make themselves an easy prey when the day of the Lord shall come. Rome has at length repudiated her lying claim to antiquity, thrown off the mask of impudent deceit, and *now* dates her creed, not from Christ, and Peter, and Paul, but from the decree of Pope Pius IX, on the 8th of December 1854. In this land, Romanists are largely deprived of their aggressive power, being compelled to dilute their Popery so extensively with Protestantism, that its best friends in *Italy* would

hardly know it. They are weakened, also, by the political suspicion under which they labour, being the only body of Christians which invariably mixes itself up with politics; while our rapidly growing *prestige* among the wiser men of all parties is solely due to the fact that we confine ourselves wholly to religion, and *let politics alone*. Therefore it is that the threefold cord of the church is, even now, the strongest band that binds this Union together. And finally, the innumerable desertions from the ranks of Romish immigrants are a fearful foretaste to them of the falling away in their numbers, by the time another generation shall have still further transformed their ignorant masses by the education and the atmosphere of freedom. And the tens of thousands thus falling away,—who shall gather them in?

ART. VIII.—*The Acts of the Apostles—Schaff and Baumgarten.*

THE designation, “Acts of the Apostles,” though ancient and universal, is not only inadequate, but erroneous. It is true, that of two Apostles we have extended notices in this book: yet even of them there is nothing which can bear the name of a memoir; whilst of the ten, who, with Peter, formed the Apostolic college at the beginning, not an important incident is recorded. On the other hand, an Evangelist and Deacon are brought prominently forward, and for no inconsiderable space the interest of the narrative centres in Philip and Stephen.

Some, accordingly, have ventured to suggest, that it is not the Servant, but the Master himself, we should look for here; and they are unquestionably right. The Old Testament directs our eye to Jesus as waiting to assume our flesh and visit earth. In the Gospels, Jesus walks among the sons of men, full of love, yet laden with sorrow. Jesus is within the veil when we meet him in the Acts, and having received for us the gift of the Holy Ghost, he administers the church from off his Father’s throne. Whilst the Apocalypse leads back to these scenes Him whom the heavens for a season had concealed, and Jesus is King of kings for ever.

“*The Acts*,” then, related in this book by Luke, are the acts of Jesus in his estate of exaltation, even as what he communicates in his Gospel were the acts of Jesus in his estate of humiliation; and by “this second treatise he made to Theo-

philus," he carries on the history of redemption, by completing his view of the Redeemer.*

Yet, though the design of its author in preparing these "Acts" is obviously what we have now expressed,—and well fitted was his work to keep the faithful in quickening contact with their Head,—the old traditional title, only brought "Apostles" into sight, and in this way, instead of being read as a fifth Gospel, the book fell into strange and pernicious neglect. So far back as the fourth century, Chrysostom† lamented that "the Acts" did not secure the attention nor enjoy the esteem they ought.—And the complaint would be valid against more recent times. Students of the Word, who were not slow to labour on a synoptical Gospel, or a dogmatic Epistle, felt sure they could blast all the rocks of difficulty, and gather all the ears of truth, scattered over this book, by a single perusal; and, if we except Limborch's painstaking Commentary, it has not been the subject of a rigid and effective investigation until within these few years.

It is otherwise now; for Germany and America have of late, and almost contemporaneously, combined with Britain to maintain the credit, search out the treasures, and repel the assailants, of these archives of the Christian Church. Milman, in his "History of Christianity" (1840), without aiming either at research or erudition, has struck off a bright and graceful image of Apostolic days, and opened important veins of speculation. Neander's "History of the Planting and Training of the Christian Church" (1841), reviewed the entire field of "the Acts," and gave a most decided and beneficial impulse to inquiry in this direction. His labours cannot be too gratefully acknowledged by those who have built on the space he cleared out for them with such conscientious diligence. Conybeare and Howson's (1854) "Life and Epistles of Paul," is a mature

* "The Acts and Gospel of Luke" together, form a whole, of which the latter is the first part, and the former the second. In the Gospel he presents the history of Jesus till his ascension: in the Acts he resumes the thread of his narrative where he had dropped it in his former history. Thus Luke himself regarded the two works. The Gospel he calls the *first treatise*, or first part; the object of which was, to acquaint us with the actions and doctrines of Jesus—"what he began to do and teach." This could be called a first part only in reference to a second. The Acts, consequently, are the second treatise; the object of which is, to inform us respecting the results of our Saviour's designs after his death."—*Fosdick's Hug.*, 488.

† Chrysostom's "Prolegomena" begin thus:—"This book of the Acts is not so much as known to many,—they know not either the book, nor by whom it was written." And Dr Mill even goes the length of saying, "The book of the Acts, being of somewhat less usefulness than the Gospel of Luke, as containing the history, not of Christ, but of his apostles, or rather, indeed, only of Paul, was neither read in the churches nor wrote out but by very few." At the same time, this last statement does not accord with the assertion of Erasmus, "that he found more various readings in the manuscripts of this than any other of the sacred books." In "Curio's Defence of Christ's Church," when replying to Antony Florebell, he tells us, "But Florebell contemptuously clepeth the second book of Luke, which he writ of the Acts of the Apostles, a little commentary." So we see that this portion of Scripture had not acquired its due rank even in the sixteenth century.

and masterly work; and though their new translation of the Epistles is not all we might wish, they have brought to their task no common endowments of scholarship and taste. Their narrative is perspicuous, and their notes pregnant though brief. Hackett, of Boston, has furnished us with "a Commentary on the Acts" (1852), which displays genuine aptitude for exegesis, and throws light upon many passages. It is superior to Olshausen on the same book, and is a good specimen of acute but sober-minded and conservative criticism.

Beyond all dispute, however, the authors who have done most, whether in modern or former times, for the defence and elucidation of "the Acts," are SCHAFF, Professor in the Theological Seminary of the German Reformed Church at Mercersburg, Pennsylvania; and BAUMGARTEN, Professor in the University of Rostock.

SCHAFF'S work is entitled "History of the Apostolic Church" (1854); and Swiss though the author be by birth, he does, in some points, betray his German training and Lutheran tendencies. To us such passages as the following are, to say the least, obscure: "Each susceptible hearer, at Pentecost, felt his own inmost peculiar nature appealed to, so that his soul was released from its natural disability by the ecstatic language, and operated in a miraculous manner!"—(Vol. i. 238.) "The Christology of the church conceives the union of the divine and human natures in the Redeemer as something already accomplished—a finished fact. This is the theological way of viewing it. But with this there is also a historical and ethical view, which coincides in its result with the other, but at the same time forms its necessary complement. This regards the union in its progress—its development as a perpetually growing incarnation of God and deification of man."—(Vol. ii. 101.) We would fear, too, that in less devout minds than that of the author, a sentiment like this would turn to evil, and not good: "All the elements of truth, and beauty, and virtue, in the religion, science, and art of ancient Greece and Rome, we must refer to the working of the Divine Word before his incarnation; and at the same time regard them as the testimonies of a soul naturally Christian,—a soul leaning, in its deepest instincts and noblest desires, towards Christianity, and predestined for it, as the fulfilment of its hopes."—(Vol. i. 168.) Nor can we deem it either a felicitous or a correct mode of expression, to say of Stephen (vol. i. 253), "The idea for which he died was the free, evangelical conception of Christianity, as opposed to the stiffness of Judaism." It is something more than suspicious, however, to disparage, if not burlesque Paul's miracles at Ephesus, by gravely holding "That to the apostle's hand-

kerchiefs and aprons the people attributed a healing power, and God graciously condescended to their superstitious notions, though without approving them.”—(Vol. i. 328.) And who does not see that to pronounce “the election of Matthias (vol. ii. 193) a well-meant yet hasty and invalid act—done without any special divine direction, but merely upon the motion of the precipitate Peter,”—is to condemn the Holy Ghost, who ratified the deed at the time, by showing to Peter the true interpretation of a prophetic Psalm, and afterwards by descending on Matthias, along with the other apostles, at Pentecost? We must also take exception to the estimate Schaff has formed of Popery, when he cautions us, “That the best defence of the Reformation (vol. i. 168) consists, not in a wholesale denunciation of mediæval Catholicism, but in showing that the whole middle ages *looked towards* the Reformation as the necessary result of their labours, and fulfilment of their desires.” Nay, he bids us hope for “the final *reconciliation* of Catholicism and Protestantism—the blending of the truth and virtues of both in the ideal church of the future,”—(vol. ii. 385); as if Babylon were to be healed, and not consumed, and Christ yet find rest on the bosom of Antichrist. Finally, we must express our surprise that Schaff should, without offering a single reason, affirm that “Barnabas was one of the two candidates for the vacant place of Judas” (vol. ii. 194),—thus identifying him with Barsabas, another person, to all appearance; whilst, with equal confidence, not to censure it as dogmatism, he assumes (vol. i. 357) “That the Epistle to the Hebrews was written, not by Paul, but by one of his disciples,” and will not even leave this an open question.

We call attention to these defects, or errors, in our author, that our readers may understand that they are not to commit themselves to him obsequiously. But even with every qualification, we do not hesitate to pronounce Schaff a superior writer, and his “Apostolic History” an interesting work. His acquaintance with the literature of his subject is extensive and minute. His power of arrangement and condensation is conspicuous. His narrative is always succinct, but in no wise superficial or obscure. His candour never fails him. His discrimination is acute without being subtle. His sympathies are quick and genial. He is a patient critic—a conscientious divine—a lucid thinker; and has succeeded in giving us a sketch of the church, from the date of Christ’s ascension, as vivid in its outline as it is faithful in its details.

DR BAUMGARTEN denominates his work “The Acts of the Apostles; or, the History of the Church in the Apostolic Age” (1854); and if we have entered a caveat in regard to some of Schaff’s opinions, we must dissent from several of this author’s

views also, and notice, what to us appear as deductions from his excellence. Need we say that these volumes stand much in want of compression; and that more will be deterred from them by the prolixity of their style than attracted by their exuberance of thought? The chain of argumentation is in all cases thoroughly forged, but the links are often so bulky,—there is one not shorter than eight and twenty pages,—that we have dropped the first ere we have got hold of the last. Could the author abridge his thirteen hundred pages down to half the extent, his lightened vessel would be sure to make a splendid run; but at present it will be difficult to float her, from the mere quantity of timber which is built into her. Though for the most part our author is quite intelligible, there are some passages which are deficient in clearness, and others that we strive in vain to master. Thus, when alluding to Paul's declaration, that "he was sent not to baptize, but to preach," he remarks (vol. ii. 118), "The thought which lies at the bottom of this antithesis can be no other than this, that in the work of preaching, the subjectivity of the Preacher comes out more prominently than that of the Baptizer; the more, therefore, that the personal character of any one has become prominent in preaching, so much the more unfitted was he subjectively to administer the rite of baptism, lest, in any way, he should allow to fall into the background the objective rite of baptism—the sacramental presence and operation of the Lord." Then, in speaking of faith in Christ, he defines it in these words (vol. iii. 160):—"Faith is the ethical completion of the receptive faculty, over which Satan has not received any power. Just as in the way of nature, by the deed of the active human faculty, all have been brought into connection with the sin and death of Adam; so, by the receptive faculty, in the ethical way, that is, by faith, all may be received into the communion of the life of Christ." Or, let us quote this statement, "Scriptural truth (vol. ii. 20) is not in any case a notion, not a proposition, not a system. It does not exist first at all in thought, and for thought—in its essence, it is history."* Our author is fond of indicating the events and individuals in the Old Testament which adumbrate like events and individuals in the New; and his ingenuity is but seldom at fault on this domain, though he be not one who greatly dreads its snares. Yet when he affirms that "Ahiathophel (vol. i. 37) was the natural type of Judas;" that "the royal Saul was a figure of the apostolic Saul" (vol. i. 222); that there was an analogy between "the law being

* "Christianity," says Guizot, "came into the world as an idea, rather than an institution." Not exactly so. Jesus says, "I am the living truth." Christianity, therefore, is an idea embodied in the person and work of Christ, and it was for Christ in the truth, equally as for the truth in Christ, that Stephen died.

committed to writing at Sinai, and the decrees of the Council of Jerusalem being also committed to writing" (vol. ii. 81); that "Paul's bearing witness for Christ during three weeks at Thessalonica, had more than a resemblance to Daniel mourning and fasting three weeks" (vol. ii. 243); that as "Nimrod founded four cities, and Abraham had to contend with four kings, and the power of the world always appears under four representatives, so our Lord founds the four cities, Antioch, Lystra, Iconium, and Derbe, that light may go forth among the Gentiles" (vol. i. 454); and that "Paul saw his exact counterpart in Balaam" (vol. i. 407);—we can apprehend that his typology borders upon the fantastic, and that he mistakes a limited coincidence for a full-orbed parallel.

Penetrating and profound though Baumgarten is as an expositor of the Word, we are disposed to think that he has repeatedly sacrificed exegesis to originality; and we only stand amazed at his temerity when he expects us to acquiesce in his interpretation. In opposition to all commentators, he maintains that when Jesus reminded Paul that "it was hard to kick against the pricks," he meant the struggle of conviction, (vol. i. 231); whereas the context refers the expression, beyond all doubt, to the arm of the Saviour encompassing the righteous as with a shield.* The "thorn in the flesh" he interprets as "Paul's grief at the thought of Israel being hardened by the offer, and cast away through the rejection, of the gospel" (vol. i. 407),—not remembering that such a state of mind could neither be termed "a messenger of Satan," nor described as "in the flesh," and that an assurance of apostolic success was not the consideration, of all others, fitted to "buffet him into humility." We cannot see that any thing is gained by making "the prudence" of Sergius Paulus, spiritual discrimination, instead of common-life shrewdness, as is done vol. i. 368;—and had Peter wished to ascertain "the susceptibility" of the lame man whom he healed at the Beautiful gate of the Temple, as is affirmed vol. i. 83, instead of furnishing him with the means of identifying his benefactors, he would not have said, "Look on us," but would have looked at him. In his discussion of Paul's bearing before Ananias, the high priest, our author recurs to the view advanced in Lightfoot's "Hebrew and Talmudical Exercitations" (Works, vol. viii. 483), and contends that "I wist not" is equivalent to "I cannot

* Baumgarten seems to have forgotten that recent investigation has expunged the words, "It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks," from Acts ix., where the narrative has a strictly personal bearing, and where they would have undoubtedly found a place, had they belonged to the apostle's spiritual experience. It is in his defence before Agrippa (Acts xxvi.), when it was needful to convey a delicate hint to the imperial representative as to the danger of opposing the kingdom of Christ, that Paul introduces these words, and presents the unseen Head of the church as still its guardian and avenger.

acknowledge such a person for high priest." But a simpler solution of the entire difficulty relative to this incident is at hand, if, with Howson (vol. i. 160), and Alford (vol. ii. 234), we regard the mistake as caused by the imperfect sight under which Paul had laboured ever since his three days' blindness at Damascus, and which infirmity may, indeed, have been "the thorn" that stuck so sharply in his flesh.

Perhaps few have ever asked why it is that Paul's voyage from Cæsarea to Rome is narrated with such technical exactness, through a long chapter of forty-four verses, though we are told nothing of his visit to Arabia, or the circumstances of his Martyrdom. But with this question Baumgarten deals at great length, and, in a discussion which extends over more than a hundred pages,—omits not a single incident in the apostle's journey,—touches on every region of science,—and is pre-eminently characterised by originality, he strives to show that what we usually read as a nautical log, is in truth a profound allegory. Let us give the sum of this most unique speculation:—

"In the inmates of the ship a representation of the whole heathen world is given; and in the ship driving on the waves of the sea we must recognise the condition of the Gentile nations. It was the crew, with their commanders, who, by their pride, had brought danger to the ship, and cargo, and their own lives. And just so is the condition of all the Gentile world. Everywhere the Gentiles had incurred guilt, and that not only as individuals, but as large communities. Hence it is that not individuals only are endangered, but the larger communities also. There is one hope only, in this general danger, for the whole heathen world, namely, the communion into which the church of Christ enters with this death-threatened world, and which is distinctly represented by that of Paul and his companions with all the men in the vessel. But this communion of Paul is the fulfilment of that to which the history of Jonah points; and seeing Paul in Jonah, we see Christ in Paul. The only hope of the Gentiles, then, is Christ, who comes into the midst of them, and descends to them in all their depths. Yet as Paul interested himself for the ship and the cargo, as well as for the men, Christ's love is not directed to individuals merely, but to large communities. Neither by labour nor prayer could Paul secure the ship and cargo,—the lives of the individuals alone are given him. And this feature comes out in the kingdom of the Spirit, where single individuals, and not states, receive the promise of salvation. But as it is not merely the master and the mate of the vessel who have cared for the preservation of the ship and cargo, but Paul more than all; so the church of Christ also has embraced, with cordial love, all the nations and states among the Gentiles to which she has come, and has laboured much for their preservation. As to those who are saved from the wreck, they point to none other than the life of the sanctified from among the Gentiles; and as the life of them who escaped the sea has a life again on earth, so beatified souls will be connected with the body and the earth. For this reason, the land to which the saved ones

come is surrounded by the sea, and beyond the sea, an island,—a notion under which the Gentiles were accustomed to conceive of the abode of the blessed. When on the island Paul shook off a viper from his hand, and received no harm. And by the power over evil which thus dwells in the apostle, the island is represented as the earth, in which the evil being overcome, the kingdom of God is able to manifest its sacred powers without restraint. It is added that Paul healed all manner of disease in Melita: so that here is, for the first time, a territory on which the promise of Jehovah is fulfilled, that there should not be any disease among his people; and this is a new confirmation of the idea, that on this island we have to expect a representation of the completed kingdom of God.”—(Vol. iii. 290.)

No one can deny, after reading this synopsis of our author's theory of Paul's Mediterranean voyage, much more if they have perused the whole dissertation, that it is a rare specimen of speculative criticism, grand in its conception, and wrought out with dexterous plausibility of argument and a lavish profusion of thought, yet not more instinct with genius than replete with erudition. After all, however, we are not satisfied with the theory, but are inclined to view it as a diffuse parody on a hint given by Quintilian (viii. 6), as to an ode of Horace:—

“O navis! referent in mare te novi
Fluctus? O! quid agis? fortiter occupa
Portum. Nonne vides, ut
Nudum remigio latus,
Et malus celeri saucius Africo,
Antennæque gemant.”—(Lib. i. 14.)

In these vivid lines the bard described his unhappy voyage from Philippi to Italy. His commentator, however, would assure us, that “the ship” means the state,—“the waves,” the first civil war,—“the shattered mast,” Pompey,—“the Straits of the Cyclades,” the remains of a vanquished army,—“the swinging yards,” the senators,—“the port,” peace,—and every foot of the ode must shade some political allusion. Here, then, is very like the germ of Baumgarten's elaborated parable, and it seems as if the German critic had borrowed more than he owns from the Spanish rhetorician. But both are too ingenious—and especially the former. With a poem some freedom may be taken, and no evil accrues; but in the case of a historical relation, it is wholly different, and we emphatically agree with Schaff when he says (vol. i. 212), “This mode of treating the Scriptures leads very easily to contempt of the letter, and thus to an unhistorical, abstractly spiritualistic tendency.” Had such an episode as that of which we are now writing met us in a volume of F. W. Krummacher, we would not have demurred. But what we look for in the popular teacher is quite irrelevant in the scientific critic;

and were such a method of interpretation to take wing among us, under the high name of our author, we would be on the point of substituting the impregnable exegesis of Bengel for the glittering distortions of Origen, who, in the words of Jerome, "*ita allegorizat, ut historiae auferat veritatem.*"

Should it appear that these remarks are too stringent, we must remind the reader that Smith's "*Voyage and Shipwreck of Paul*" was in our author's hands, and that from that work we can discover ample reasons for the 27th chapter of "*Acts*" having been written, without acceding to the perilous conjecture, as is suggested (vol. iii. 224), that Paul's voyage is the right side of the tapestry,—for this is really what Baumgarten means,—and Jonah's the wrong. From the terms and contents of the narrative itself, Smith has shown it could have been prepared only by one who was on board; and by comparison of the "*Acts*" with "*Luke*," he has made it not less patent, that the Evangelist must have been the eye-witness. But if Luke wrote the 27th chapter of "*Acts*," then there is no difficulty in demonstrating that he is the historian throughout,—the significant "*we*" unifying the whole; and thus, as Schaff solidly remarks (vol. i. 371), "the apparently useless minuteness of this account must go to confirm the credibility of the Book of Acts, and put to shame the airy speculations of its modern opponents." Let the roving pirates of Tübingen, then, only lay their skiffs alongside of the amateur yachtsman of the Clyde, and they will soon prove that this long neglected chapter carries forty-four guns of the heaviest metal. Paul's voyage fixes the historian,—the historian fixes the date; and the date fixed, all is fixed that Baur and Zeller have so sedulously sought to unfix.

If we have deemed it requisite to depreciate Baumgarten's fascinating but fallacious view of Paul's voyage, we must do more when we examine his opinions upon two other subjects, both deeply important. We protest in the strongest terms against the definition he gives (vol. i. 402) of that central formula in Paul's writings, "*The righteousness of God*," when he frigidly tells us "that it is the Pauline designation for the contents of the gospel." Nor less strenuously would we oppose our author's views of baptism, in regard to which he writes (vol. i. 239, 240), "*Paul's baptism was the great turning-point in his life*,"—"his body of sin and death is baptized into the name of Jesus by means of the water poured upon him;" "for thereby communion with Christ was perfected, and all individual members are incorporated into the body of Jesus Christ, as well as inaugurated into a substantial organic fellowship one with another."—(Vol. i. 282.) With regard to the first statement, we think it can be established, that "the

righteousness of God" imports nothing short of the Divine Righteousness created for us by the merit of Christ's active and passive obedience. And if, in support of the second error, it be alleged that Ananias said to Paul, "Arise and be baptized, and wash away thy sins, calling on the name of the Lord;" let it be observed, that from the term and tense employed, it is plain Ananias addressed Paul as one who had already "called upon the name of Christ," and that his baptism was to proclaim an existing faith, not either to create or ratify it.

We cannot close our notice of what we deem fanciful, vulnerable, or erroneous, in Baumgarten, without expressing our regret at the insufficient estimate he has of Scripture, both as to its formation and use. "All Scripture," he reminds us (vol. iii. 72), "is breathed through by God;"—and to the same effect Schaff also says (vol. ii. 248), "The Scriptures are theopneustic; that is, pervaded by the Holy Ghost." Nay, the latter critic distinguishes on this subject in the following manner (vol. ii. 298): "The Gospels and Epistles proceeded from a *state* of divine illumination,—the Apocalypse, from an *act* of inspiration, dictated by the Holy Ghost." Bessemer has shown how iron may be converted into steel by a stream of air sent through the boiling metal; and, by a like process, these theologians would have us to believe that a divine afflatus passed through the thoughts of a man will transmute the human into divine. It would be exceedingly difficult, however, in that case, to say whether the product was divine or human; and, beyond a doubt, it would be untrue to designate it exclusively divine. Indeed, if but *one* word not selected by God, and simply chosen by the writer, could be proved to exist in the Bible, then would it not *all* be the word of God; and just as great would be our difficulty in finding out what was inspired, and what not, as if the entire discovering of truth had been left to ourselves. We greatly prefer the deliverance on this subject of the Popish Estius to that of the Protestant Baumgarten;—for whilst the Professor at Rostock sticks fast in the etymology of "theopneustic," the Chancellor of Douay boldly says, "All canonical Scripture is written in such a manner, that not only the ideas, but the particular words, and their very arrangement, is from God."—(Comment. on 2 Tim. iii. 16.)

But if our author has indistinct enough views as to the *formation* of Holy Writ, his ideas as to the *use* it is meant to subserve are even more alien from what generally prevail among us. In the one question, Baumgarten is a German, but in the other he is a Lutheran, and an ultra-Lutheran, maintaining as he does, "It is a false theory to hold that, in the deve-

lopment of the spiritual life, Scripture should occupy the first, and not the second place, as Protestants commonly do " (vol. iii. 78);—"the 'Formula Concordiæ' takes good care not to remove Scripture from the second place, due to it, to the first; for it does not make Scripture the origin and fountain of life, as was afterwards unsoundly done, but as a rule for doctrines which had arisen in another way" (vol. iii. 80);—"the Scriptures, according to God's design, were not intended for *creating* the truth; but their true purpose is to furnish that *warrant* to the truth which is needful for it, in order to possessing perfect certainty in the church."—(Vol. ii. 42.)

Montesquieu (b. xxiv., c. 5) remarks, that Calvinism aims at conforming to what Christ has spoken,—Lutheranism, following what the apostles have done. But this is no more than half the distinction, for the extracts given above show that whilst the Reform *derive* all truth from the Word, the Reformation only *judges* of all truth by the Word. To the one, the Bible is both storehouse and steelyard, an oracle and a lawgiver; with the other, it is lawgiver, and not oracle. But that book which we obey as a *rule*, we consult as a *revelation*; and by that very name, we avow that it is the Alpha as well as the Omega, the origin as well as the judge, the factor as well as the warrant, of our spiritual life. That there is a mutual reaction between the subjective and the objective in theology, the inward consciousness and the external doctrine,—nay, that there is a point at which they meet, and sometimes appear to exchange places,—we admit. But to limit the use of the Bible, as our author does, and represent it as a test or standard only, is tantamount to saying, either that a man can originate saving knowledge without the Holy Ghost, which is infidelity,—or, that the Holy Ghost produces it without the medium of Scripture, which is enthusiasm.

Convinced that they are not veins in the marble, but flaws in the gem,—defects more than blemishes,—we have specified candidly various points in which we would consider Baumgarten by no means a safe guide; and just because such aberrations are now almost looked for in a German work, and too readily excused, we thought it best to be explicit. Even with all these drawbacks, however, the volumes of the Rostock Professor teem with the most admirable merit, and are at once an armory and garner,—alike rich in thought and triumphant in controversy.

In 1835, Strauss published his "Life of Jesus," in which he exerted all his criticism to disprove the divine origin of Christianity,—averring that the history of our Lord, as recorded by the evangelists, is a purely ideal sketch, formed by imagination out of traditions connected with the Jewish Messiah. Jesus has not a personal existence, but an ideal personification.

The pupil was in this case bolder than his master, and it was not till ten years after, that he, at whose feet Strauss had learned his daring methods, took the field himself. But in 1845 Baur set himself to do for "the Acts of the Apostles" what his scholar had done for "the Gospels;" and, aided by Schwegler, Zeller, and others, all of Tübingen, he sought to demonstrate that Christianity took its rise in the middle of the second century. Starting with the postulatium, that, in the mind of Jesus and his apostles, Christianity was only a mitigated Judaism, he next asserts that Paul was the first to deliver it from the Mosaic element and give it the form of a new system. But to such a modification Peter was vehemently hostile, as is shown in the Epistle to the Galatians, and by the altercation at Antioch. This difference, however, was sopited by the council of Jerusalem, and industriously concealed by the author of "the Acts." That book is indeed attributed to Luke, but without foundation, it being written in the middle of the second century, and not as a record of facts, but with a view to justify Paul, and bring together the conflicting parties, one of which sided with him, the other with Peter. For this end, Peter is made, in the first part of the narrative, to come as near as possible to the sentiments of Paul; and in the latter, Paul is quite assimilated to Peter. The epistles of Peter, and the later ones of Paul, are designed to help on the same compromise; and at length, after a long struggle, the antagonistic elements of Petrinism (that is, Jewish rigour) and Paulinism (that is, Gentile freedom) become reconciled—as the result, giving to the world the Christianity that now prevails.

The distinctive idea, then, of Tübingenism, is simply that "the Acts" are not a narrative, but an apology—a specious Irenicum, not a veritable Record—written a century after the apostles were gone, by no one knows whom,—having for their object to amalgamate Jewish and Gentile Christians into one organic system,—and for the accomplishment of this design, making Peter and Paul act and speak in any way that suits the forger's end.

The drift of this theory, it will be perceived, is, to prove that the Acts of the Apostles is a pious fraud; and in amount, it come to this, that Peter and Paul are historical names without a history,—the clothes without the man. Now, such a theory we feel warranted in refusing, first of all, because it is wholly gratuitous,—uncalled for either on hermeneutical or historical grounds. It disposes of no difficulty, and secures no advantage; but it so embarrasses the narrative that the entire book becomes no better than an obsolete fiction, heartlessly conceived and stupidly executed. But for another reason we cannot entertain the hypothesis;—it rests on nothing tangible or conclusive. Without even the surmise of a necessity, or a

likelihood, it is based on subjective inferences apart from external evidence; its foundation is purely ideal, and all documentary proof is ignored. In the next place, we affirm, that instead of Paul being a counterpart of Stephen and Peter, as Baur contends, he is, in the whole conception of his character, and the minutest detail of his course, absolutely and unapproachably original, and that we can only explain the incidents of his life by admitting their reality. Put all together, the antecedents of his history, the specialties of his call, the scope of his mission, the trophies of his success, and the scars of his endurance—it must be felt that among the servants of Christ he stands without an equal. He is not a supplement to the twelve apostles, but, in energy, labour, suffering, accomplishments, influence, rectitude, courage, magnanimity, disinterestedness of motive, and grandeur of enterprise, he is all the twelve in one. Stephen was for Jerusalem, Peter was for Judea, but Paul was emphatically for the world. “It is impossible to imagine Cæsar great enough,” writes Niebhur; and what we must deny to the tyrant we accord to the apostle. He bore witness for Christ in Jerusalem, and Athens, and Rome—the respective capitals of sacerdotal bigotry, and lettered refinement, and military ambition; and more of the world’s history at this moment is associated with Paul than with any other, beside his Master, who must in all things have the pre-eminence. The very idea, therefore, of such a man, and such a career, stamps “the Acts” as an authentic book; and to insist that Peter is merely reproduced in Paul, is as perverse as it is untenable.* Let us observe, in the fourth place, regarding the theory now under review, that instead of Peter and Stephen having the appearance of being forged, or foisted in, with little other aim than to set off Paul, or fabricate a story, they are essential to the perfection of the narrative, and that without them both its interest and continuity would be seriously impaired; for it is the history of Peter which fills up the space between the ascension and the epoch of Paul;

* It would be interesting to trace the marked distinction which can be shown to exist between Peter and Paul, even as apostles, but our limits will allow of us only hinting at one or two points in which these servants of Christ characteristically differ. Peter had known his Lord in flesh and humiliation; and so he alludes to his glory after suffering. But Paul knew only the ascended Christ, and so it is always as Head and Ruler that he seems to think of him. Peter regards the church as scattered in the wilderness, without honour or rest; but Paul can only view the church as in Christ, betrothed to him as his bride, and owned by him as his wife. Peter’s neck was often galled with the yoke of Mosaism, long after he had been taught that all was done away in Christ; but from the moment that Paul entered into gospel liberty, he never ceased to manifest the power and maintain the rights of Christian freedom. Peter was often qualified and impaired by those around him; but Paul, from the beginning to the end of his career, shows that he acknowledged no one above him, save Christ. Peter, as Baumgarten remarks (vol. iii. 167), was placed at the head of the church for her development during the first age of her existence, whilst Paul is introduced as exclusively intrusted with the guidance of the church for the subsequent period. And may we not add, that if it is to Peter that all who would mingle Judaic elements in the dispensation of Christianity appeal, Paul is uniformly associated with the vigorous freedom and evangelical simplicity of Protestantism?

whilst the notice of Stephen was requisite to lead the apostle of the Gentiles upon the scene. At the same time, we admit that Peter and Paul do possess some features in common, but remark, fifthly, that if this constitutes an argument to prove that unjustifiable liberties have been taken by the writer of the Acts in the delineation of these individuals, it would be far easier to show that Pompey is the basis of Cæsar (for such a parallel would hold good in twenty instances); and that Plutarch could not have written the lives of those heroes, but some one in the fourth century who wished to vindicate the commonwealth against the patricians. Lastly, it is fatal, we maintain, to the theory of Baur, that it fixes the date of the Acts somewhere in the middle of the second century; for though the book is in striking and demonstrable unison throughout with the theology of the Apostolic age, its style, and doctrine, and entire mould, betray no shade of resemblance to the era of Valentinus, Carpocrates, and Tatian.

A scheme like this may call forth admiration for its novelty, thoroughness, and grasp. But it is the witchcraft of sophistry—meant to unsettle all that we value,—and by leaving us without a past, fitted to annihilate all trust in the present, and all interest in the future. Having disowned faith as the guide of reason, in divine things, these Critics are given over to credulity in all its humiliation; and strikingly does their case show that to be an unbeliever is impossible,—the only alternative being either belief in the truth of God or in the lie of Satan. Honest minds, especially if they are generous too, we always expect to assist in unravelling the web that their ingenuity has woven; but all the discrepancies, enigmas, and anachronisms, which the Baurian school has raked together, we find left across the path, without one attempt at an effort to remove them, as if these indagators had even a dark delight in creating stumblingblocks over which a brother might fall. Nor can they claim so much as the equivocal praise of consistency or candour, for what they concede to-day they withdraw to-morrow, and no sooner are they confronted with conclusions they cannot evade yet will not embrace, than they recall their premises without shame.

The root of the evil lies in the Lutheran view of Holy Writ; and until that church raises Scripture to its function of discovering as well as determining truth, we do not hope to see the academies of Germany gathered back from their perilous excesses, but feel certain that even now new slides, with more fantastic caricatures, will be preparing for the magic lantern of Rationalism. Fifty years ago, Eichhorn led the way into the labyrinth of Neology—unsound but faltering. Then came Semler, with no trace of caution or reverence. But more daring still, Strauss succeeded him, like a spirit from the land of dark-

ness. And now, in the exact line of the same priesthood, Baur, with even less scrupulosity than his predecessors, has spent his intellect in striving to remove all the landmarks of history, drain off all the rivers of truth, and quench every star of hope. "Thus withers," says Schaff, "beneath the simoom of a purely dialectic process, that glorious garden of the Lord, the history of the church and her doctrines, with its boundless wealth of flowers, with its innumerable fruits of love, of faith, of prayer, of holiness. All becomes a sandy desert of metaphysics, without a green oasis—without a refreshing fountain."—(Vol. i. 135.)

One cannot but feel a strong desire to know something of the moral idiosyncrasy of individuals who can thus make a pastime of unbelief; and we wonder what joy can be theirs who leave no joy to others. Even could verisimilitude be predicated of their hypothesis, it would not be enough to warrant them in divulging it without the ground of demonstration and the plea of necessity, when it scorches every green thing from the earth, and reduces us all to the condition of the hapless spirit, "seeking rest, and finding none." But even likelihood cannot be pleaded in this case; and we do grieve to think of so much mind expended, so much doubt infused, so much controversy wasted, so much wretchedness engendered, for what turns out to be as hollow as it is inauspicious. We do not believe, that though "each new sceptic on the former shuts the grave," the soil, thus ploughed and manured, is fertilised. The noxious weeds may have been dug down, and are now rotting where they grew. Their winged seeds, however, are carried over all the land: and if it took the divine strength of many revivals to root out the effects of one Hume from Scotland, we think Germany may well feel anxious as to her future, with her unbroken succession of Semlers and Baur's.

Nevertheless, if "offences must come," it is well that there are at hand those who can rebuke and chastise the offender. The Tübingen fleet have boldly stood out to sea, and the challenge has been promptly accepted by the Professors at Mercersburg and Rostock, with an immense command of resources. Schaff, solid and athletic, brings the old tactics of controversial warfare to bear against his opponents. Baumgarten, brilliant, enterprising, and impulsive, has a method and weapons of his own: And between the two the most recent effort of unscrupulous Rationalism is beat back with the most decisive effect.

There is nothing that Baur and his accomplices are more anxious to have credit for, than the independence and originality of their views. To be ingenious is with them more than to be accurate. But Schaff does not fail to remind them that they have studied at the feet of Marcion, and have *borrowed*

their heresy from the Gnostics and Ebionites. "The self-contradictory productions of the second century," he writes (vol. i. 138), "Ebionistic and Gnostic whims, and distortions of history, are made the sources of the knowledge of primitive Christianity. Generally speaking, this whole modern construction of primitive Christianity is, substantially, but a revival, with some modification, of ancient Gnosticism. So that Baur and his followers are, in the principles of their philosophy and criticism, the Gnostics of German Protestantism. It was not, therefore, a mere accident, that Baur, in the very beginning of his theological course, paid so much attention to the Gnostic and Manichean systems. His affinity with the anti-Judaistic and pseudo-Pauline fanatic, Marcion, is particularly striking. In criticism he seems to have taken this man for his model, only going beyond him."

Though it is not at first sight quite apparent, yet much hinges on what is understood to be *the design* of "the Acts;" for if they be viewed in relation to "the Apostles," the Tübingen critics have some material to work upon; whilst if it be Christ who bears sway throughout, the ground is cut from under their feet. Accordingly, at the outset of his work, Baumgarten sets himself to prove that Luke's "Acts" are no more than a sequel to Luke's "Gospel," and that the "ascending Jesus is properly the active subject of the history."—(Vol. i. 28.) Dr Gordon has with much precision and power traced "Christ in the Old Testament;" and no one can rise from the studious perusal of his volumes without thenceforth associating Messiah with all the scenes of earth, and all the æras of time, up to the days of Malachi. To realise him in like manner interwoven with the history of our world during the period of his actual sojourn among the sons of men, when his feet pressed our soil,—his words floated on our air, needs no further help than "the Four Gospels." But with the cloud that received him, when he rose from Bethany, he is allowed, for the most part, to vanish from our sight; and an unseen Saviour is deemed equivalent to an absent Saviour. Perceiving, however, this tendency, even in the Christian mind, to separate the Son of God from our world at the very moment when he placed himself in the closest relation to us, and rightly judging that a misconception such as this was alike unscriptural and unsafe, Baumgarten's chief object in these volumes is to show that the same personal Christ who originated the church still rules it.

It was Scheckenburger who first called attention to this characteristic of the book, and shed upon it the ray which invests it with such beauty. But Baumgarten has completed the demonstration, and shown us the absolute unity of the

entire work, through its reference to Christ. To look, then, for a continuous life of Peter or Paul here, and if we miss this desideratum, to stigmatise the book as “artful and false,” is neither acute nor straightforward. Christ is the thought of the historian, and the subject of his history,—Christ reigning for the advancement of his kingdom; and so Apostles will come into view only as connected with this object, whilst even Private members will take precedence of the Twelve, if the church owes anything to their labours. This argument is developed with great clearness by Baumgarten at the outset of his first volume; and by means of it he enables us to understand how it is that “the Acts” are written as they are, and close just where they do. No doubt we would have liked to hear more of Paul, and wonder that he vanishes so rapidly from the scene. But as Jerusalem was the centre of the Jewish world, and Jesus stretched his sceptre over it,—so Rome is the centre of the Gentile world, and Jesus must be also acknowledged here. This, however, was done. Paul preached Jesus under the throne of the Cæsars. The banner of the cross is waving on the Capitol, and waving on Zion. The triumph is achieved, and the curtain falls:—

“At the very beginning Luke places the Acts before us in contrast with his earlier narrative, which recounted those earlier labours which laid the foundations of that kingdom. We accordingly draw from that the conclusion, that it is his purpose in this second narrative to set forth the further labours of the same Jesus. We here also receive an intimation regarding the final goal of his heavenly influence, just as the limit of his earthly labours was pointed out. And we shall, therefore, be justified in drawing the conclusion, that the second narrative will, like the first, be carried to a definite end.”—(Baumgarten, vol. i. 28.)

Had Dr Samuel Davidson, by means of this clew, understood the exact nature of the unity that “the Acts” will develop, he would not have bootlessly groped for a vinculum wherewith to bind all the details in intimate coherence; and never could he have hazarded the remark, that “on the whole there is a looseness of junction” (Intro. to New Testament, vol. ii. 24) “between several paragraphs in the book, rendering it highly probable that Luke put his materials together without much carefulness. In employing various memoirs, he was by no means solicitous to alter the beginning of sections, so as to make them fit exactly with what he had already written. And it would appear that he has furnished a very meagre extract from the source which was before him.” At all events, a deeper and wiser apprehension of this whole problem is furnished in this passage of Baumgarten:—

“Justly may we feel surprised that Luke, with such niggardliness of words, and almost in silence, should hurry us over this highly important moment in the labours of Paul, his departure from Corinth, where he had sent a ray through the dark night of a heathendom which counted a duration of more than a thousand years. This, however, is the sublime objectivity we notice in the composition of sacred history, that it places before our view the most majestic heights, and the most awful depths, without seeking to excite for one moment our feelings. And we can only understand its silence on the point alluded to as having been induced by the assumption, that the everlasting import of the sacred history, both generally and specially, was sufficiently set forth in the facts themselves, and that these facts had been communicated by both, in sufficient completeness and in consistent order. Hence this historical narrative makes this demand on us, that we should be ready to give due attention to *all* its facts, even *the very least*, inasmuch as *not even one* is without its significance and important bearing on the whole. And it may very well happen, that a fact wholly unpromising *in itself*, may yet, considered in its due relation, acquire an extraordinary importance in the whole system.”—(Vol. ii. 221.) “Although it is unquestionable, that Paul’s labours did not attain the same result in Athens as in Macedonia, yet a full report is given of his proceedings in the former place, and especially of his speech. In fact, however, the same reason which in the one case moved Luke to silence, has in the other instance caused him to speak out, viz., that he does not measure events by their momentary significance, but exclusively by the consideration how far they will be of importance for the future.”—(Vol. ii. 153.) “What is internal is preserved, what is but outward is left to fall aside.”—(Vol. i. 385.)

Of course, it is on internal evidence alone that the Congregational Professor relies for the support of his empiric theory of Written documents from which Luke compiled “the Acts;” and his main argument is this, “That while there is a substantial similarity of style in the book, there is a perceptible difference between the first and last divisions of it.”—(New Test. ii. 22.) But the verdict of Schaff—a very competent witness on such a matter—must qualify, if it does not cancel, so loose a statement; for he writes (vol. ii. 295), “The Acts, as may be seen from the very affinity of language and style, are the work of the same author as wrote the third Gospel,—that is, in the parts composed by Luke himself. For his reports of Peter’s discourses bear a marked resemblance to the doctrinal system and style of Peter; and the discourses of Paul, an equally striking affinity with the epistles of that apostle;—no trifling proof of the historical fidelity and the credibility of the book of Acts.”

The fathers,—and in some respects Grotius followed them,—used sometimes to establish the truth of Christianity before they asserted the divine authority of Scripture,—holding that the substance of Christian truth could be gathered out

of the Bible even though inspiration were denied to the writers. And such a course might be pursued regarding the Acts. Baumgarten and Schaff, however, prefer cutting down the adversary in detail, to overpowering him at a single charge; and step by step they keep rigidly in his track, though at times it is devious enough. It will, however, be sufficient for our purpose to indicate what is assumed and denied by these writers as to the structure of the narrative, its style, its facts, and its omissions.

With regard to *the structure of the history*, the Tübingen position is, that it is easy to trace the closest resemblance between one section of the Acts and another; and that Paul is merely the repetition of Peter and Stephen. Appealing to the speech made by Paul to the Jews at Antioch, Scheckenburger declares it "to be nothing more than a mere echo of the speeches of Peter and Stephen;" and Baur even adds, "that the address was never delivered, but originated with the author of the Acts." The same assertion Baur makes regarding the cure of the lame man by Paul at Lystra; "which," he says, "is just what Peter and John had previously done." Nay, when Paul and Silas allow themselves to be scourged and imprisoned at Philippi, though Romans, yet next day take their stand upon their citizenship, Baur avers that "they omitted their appeal in the first instance with a view of shining as brightly as Peter among the apostles at Jerusalem." Now to these statements the reply is, first, that it was not possible for two apostles to run the same course without touching upon each other at various stages; and, second, that He who sent forth Peter before Paul, did of set purpose parallelise their history to an extent, that the apostle of uncircumcision might not be esteemed inferior to the apostle of circumcision. But let us give Baumgarten's argument as he states it himself:—

"It cannot be denied that the similarity between Peter and Paul cannot, in many cases, be explained without the hypothesis of its being designed. Nor have we any wish to question the fact, that in the respective spheres of their miraculous operations a striking correspondence is perceptible. The healing of the lame man, by the word of Paul at Lystra, suggests a comparison with that healing of the lame man in Jerusalem by the word of Peter; the resistance offered by Paul to the sorcerer Elymas reminds us of what took place between Peter and Simon Magus; the cure of the paralytic by Peter has its analogy in the case of the man sick with a fever healed by Paul; the healing power which is ascribed to the shadow of Peter corresponds to the miraculous efficacy of the handkerchiefs and aprons taken from the body of Paul; Peter, too, resuscitates a young damsel from death,—so Paul calls to life a young man; lastly, just as superhuman honour is shown to Peter on the part of Cornelius, so that Peter is

forced to refuse it, here also divine honours are intended by the heathen for Paul, and he is compelled to declare that he is but a man.”—(Vol. i. 448–9.) “But is there no way of explaining this correspondence in the history of these two apostolical men, than by regarding these parallel passages merely as the work of the narrator and writer? Yes. When Jesus had settled as the order of his kingdom, that as Peter was the apostle of the circumcision, so Paul should be the apostle of the uncircumcision, are we not naturally led to expect that He would also allow a similar parallel to appear in those deeds which he permitted them to perform in manifestation of their apostolic authority? The men of Lystra see nothing in the healing of the lame man,—nothing further than what the Jews formerly recognised in the miracle of Peter—a divine work. But the believers who remembered Peter’s deed must, so soon as they heard of the miracle wrought by Paul in Lystra, have discerned in it a sign that it was the will of their Lord to set forth and magnify Paul in the face of the heathen, and therefore to have him regarded exactly in the same light as He had formerly set forth Peter to the Jews. And as Paul tells us, that though Jerusalem had seen that he had been intrusted with the gospel to the uncircumcision, in the same way as Peter had been intrusted with that to the circumcision, we have every ground for referring the conviction thus experimentally acquired in an essential measure to their knowledge that the miraculous agency of Paul resembled that of Peter. Accordingly, Luke does nothing more than search out the works and signs of the ascended Lord; and by putting them on record, he rescues them from oblivion. This is the truth which Baur advances when he says, ‘that in the Acts, Peter appears as Pauline as possible, and Paul as Petrine as possible.’”

An objection has been raised against the Acts, and the fidelity of the narrator, from *the style* in which the discourses there reported are given; and it is asserted that there is too much sameness of idea and expression to warrant the conviction that they are genuine. But it is to be considered, that though the speakers were distinct, yet if the truths they proclaimed, and the circumstances in which they were placed, and the habits in which they had been trained, and the effect they sought to produce, and the multitudes they addressed, were the same, it ought to excite no surprise that they often followed the same line of illustration, and employed the same words. The apostles and apostolic men of “the Acts” were of the same nation and the same church,—their faith was one and their baptism one,—they spoke in Hebrew, and they spoke to Hebrews,—and therefore it could not but happen that they would have much in common. Blowing the same trumpet, they of necessity awoke the same echoes; and it is really much in favour of the historian, as well-informed and credible, that he has represented them in this manner. We greatly doubt, however, if a critical examination of the book would not bring out a very different result from what is indicated in this objec-

tion, and are inclined to think that Moses Stuart is much nearer the truth when he affirms, "that the preaching of Peter, the addresses of Stephen, and Paul, and James, instead of being conformed to one model, present respectively all the distinction of style and manner which we could have expected originally from their authors. And thus they show with what fidelity they are related. In Xenophon and Livy we find all the various speakers adopting the style of the author himself, showing that all their speeches were composed by him; but it is not so in the Acts of the Apostles."

The facts which are impugned are such as these:—Baur regards the statements in the Acts respecting the rapid growth of the church, as intentional exaggerations; and rests this assertion upon the apparent contradiction between Acts i. 15, where the original number of the disciples is given as only a hundred and twenty, and the statement of Paul, 1 Cor. xv. 6, that Christ was seen of above five hundred brethren at once.

"But Luke," replies Schaff, "says not that the church consisted of a hundred and twenty members, but that just then so many were assembled in one place to choose a successor to Judas. Besides, it is even possible that the appearance of which Paul speaks took place *after* the day of Pentecost, for Paul in fact mentions, in the same place, the appearance of Christ to himself on his way to Damascus."—(Schaff, vol. i. 246.)

It is stated in Acts iv. 5, 6, that the apostles were summoned before the Sanhedrim, to inquire by what power John and Peter wrought their miracle; but Baur and Zeller regard the account given of this citation as exaggerated, and hold that it was purposely falsified. Baumgarten, however, repels the cavil in these few words:—

"These scholars have no idea of that which has actually taken place, and thus are quite incapable of appreciating the interest which both Luke himself would naturally take in the whole matter, and would also wish to excite in his readers. But essentially *the question to be decided was this grave one, Were the apostles prophets of God or seducers to idolatry?* and for our part, having learned, from the consistent course of history up to this point, to see how in Israel everything had been bringing on the necessity of a decision of the matter; and when we now see the open hostility of Israel here manifesting itself for the first time against the preaching of the apostles; we cannot but expect the present crisis to be looked upon as a moment of unwonted gravity. And does not Luke seek to impress us with the importance of the sitting, by giving the names of four who composed the council?"—(Vol. i. 96.)

The frenzied enthusiasm of Lystra at the healing of the lame man is a great offence, and Baur insists that the "child-like faith of the Homeric world, evinced in the proposal to treat Paul and Barnabas as gods, is not to be thought of for

one moment, in the times within which the narrative moves." Baumgarten, however, reminds the objector (vol. i. 446), "That nothing more was exhibited here than what was common to all the Hellenic nations of antiquity; for while heathendom in general was incapable of drawing any line of demarcation between God and man, with the Hellenic heathens especially the divine and the human ran into each other, and were easily confounded. And it is precisely of this we have here a manifestation." As might be anticipated, *all* miracles are arraigned by the men of Tübingen; but when it is related of Paul at Ephesus, that "from his body were brought to the sick handkerchiefs or aprons, and the diseases departed from them," they will not limit their indignation: and Zeller declares that this incident is the most incredible of all we find in the New Testament; and adds, that he does not know what legends or relics we need be ashamed to credit, if these are not repugnant to our belief. Our author's vindication (vol. ii. 286) of the miracle is lengthened, but the substance of it is this, and is eminently ingenious:—

"Baur alludes to relics, and Zeller to legends; but the essential point in the belief in relics is not concerned with the external things absolutely, but in these external things separated from the personal grounds. And the legends are not merely accounts of miraculous facts in and by themselves, but such accounts apart from any traceable connection with well-accredited history. The legend, and the worship founded on the legend, of the holy shirt of Treves, is to be rejected for this very reason, that the shirt is not, as was in the case with the woman having the issue of blood, regarded in its known connection with the person of Jesus Christ, but merely as a sacred thing by itself, and also because the legend stands in palpable contradiction to the truth of history. In the present case, on the contrary, the account is clearly in harmony with the history of the early church. The woman with the issue of blood touched the garment of Christ, the Jews in Jerusalem placed their sick so that Peter's shadow might fall over them. And so the clothes and aprons in Paul's case are viewed purely in their connection with the apostle, and it was in such a light they were sought for. But it is not easily conceivable that the employment of such objects belonging to Paul could have taken place without the apostle's consent; and if with his consent, must there not have been the will on Paul's part to imbue these articles with the divine power of healing, with a view to the very object for which they were sought. But let it, at the same time, be noted, that there was perfect confidence in the ability of the apostle; so that it was faith on the part of those who came to him that secured their healing."

Our space will allow us to notice only another fact which is impeached by the Baurites; and that is, Paul's vow as a Nazarene. From such a vow he released himself at Cenchrea (Acts xviii. 18); and under such a vow he placed himself by the advice of James at Jerusalem.—(Acts xxi. 22–26.) Now, in

both these instances, says Tübingen, Paul has been Judaized at the expense of historical veracity, and in deference to the prejudices of a Jewish party in the church, during the second century. For how, it is asked, could he that had proclaimed that if any one submitted to circumcision Christ would profit him nothing, submit to the yoke of the Nazarite devotee? The objection is plausible, and we are not sure if hitherto it has met with an answer that has settled the difficulty; but the solution proposed by Baumgarten (vol. ii. 225, 251) is perfectly new and seemingly conclusive:—

“The Nazarite abjured wine, as the symbol of joy; and allowed his hair to grow, as the emblem of weakness. This was the deep import of this ritual observance. It was the sign of grief and infirmity. But at the time when Paul assumed this badge, he was stricken in soul above measure, because of the persecution he met with from his brethren at Thessalonica, and inasmuch as his eye was now carried forward to the day when Antichrist would arise. Accordingly, when he reaches Corinth, he is all sadness and debility,—‘I was with you in weakness, and in fear.’ But he is not ashamed to let this be known, and so he attires himself as a Nazarite. It is truly, as he says, a shame to a man if he have long hair, for he proclaims (1 Cor. xi. 14) his weakness, and lays himself at the feet of another. But from this shame Paul will not shrink, when God may be glorified by his abasement. He feels that, in relation to all his fellows, he is independent and strong; but in relation to God, that he stands in the same position as woman does to man, and that therefore one who is pervaded with this consciousness may becomingly wear the long hair of opprobrium, and count the badge of shame his glory,—the symbol of weakness his strength,—the emblem of dependence his freedom.”

The whole dissertation on Paul's Nazarite vow is fresh, ingenious, elaborate, and almost satisfactory. It must, however, be acknowledged that it is somewhat circuitous and complicated; and, as a much simpler reading of the enigma, we would take leave to suggest, that not Samson, but Ezekiel, was in Paul's eye when he appeared shaven in Cenchrea and Jerusalem. When on the banks of the Chebar, the son of Buzi, we are told (Ezek. v.), shaved his head as a sign to his countrymen of the judgments their unbelief had provoked. Filled with Ezekiel's spirit, and, like him, bowed down with grief, because of the treatment he had experienced at Corinth from the Jews, Paul rent not his garments, as he had done for a sign at Lystra; nor shook the dust off his feet, as he had done at Iconium; but he shaved his head,—and thus, bareheaded and bald, would he pass through Achaia and Judea, an emblem of man's guilt and an earnest of God's vengeance. Might we not go farther, and trace the sign which Agabus (Acts xxi.) gave to Paul, with the apostle's own girdle, to “the bands” which Ezekiel (chap. iii.) was told would be bound on him? And as it was immediately after

this symbolic prediction of Agabus, suggested by the history of Ezekiel, as we suppose, that Paul stood shaven in the temple, was not this the great apostle exhibiting himself to all Jerusalem as the herald of approaching ruin? No Jew could see Paul, not with his robes torn, or dust on his head, but with his hair shaven off, without reverting to Ezekiel, and foreboding evil to his land. Let us add, that though not Paul's model, yet Ezekiel almost seems to be Paul's prototype. They both had a vision of Christ in fire as they entered on their course; they both ministered to Jews and Gentiles alike; and if the individual, from the moment he was called, was sunk in the prophet, so was it with the apostle.

Regarding *the omissions* which are complained of in the Acts, we shall offer but a single specimen, from which it will be apparent that nothing can be based on them. Paul and Barnabas, it is well known, disagreed on one occasion, and assuming that this disagreement relates to the same matter as Paul touches on, Gal. ii. 13, the Critics infer that "the more serious cause of the dispute is kept back, and another that is not true alleged." Nay, Scheckenburger assumes that it is clearly made out that the history of the Acts had set itself the task not to make the slightest mention of the important quarrel between Peter and Paul at Antioch; and on this ground he avers, that, by the pointed statement of Paul and Barnabas separating, it was intended to conceal the far more grievous dissension between Peter and Paul. To all this conjecture, however, so gratuitous, unauthorised, and perverse, Baumgarten (vol. ii. 88) replies:—

"There is one thing only surprising in this objection, even that so many persons should concur in adopting so artificial a system. For the whole argumentation of these critics rests on two manifest prejudices, with regard to the design of the Acts: the one, that it was its author's object to furnish us with a history of Paul; the other, that it was intended to serve some party end. But to us a fresh attestation is ever being brought, and it is shown in this passage, that if, in the third portion of his work, Luke gives us a circumstantial account of Paul, it is simply because the foundation of the church among the Gentiles was mainly laid by him. And the separation of Paul from Barnabas obtains a mention here, for no other reason than to exhibit the last step taken by Paul to complete the independence of his apostolical work. But how far the history of the Acts is from giving way to the paltry considerations of party, has been ever and again confirmed by the exalted prospect which at its very opening it placed before its readers, and this present passage supplies a further testimony to this fact. For how easily might this squabble of the two apostolical men be represented in an offensive light! How untoward for the beginning of the full apostolical independence of Paul, and for the beginnings of the Gentile church! Luke, however, takes no pains to guard against the evil impression. Nay, not only does he simply state the incident without inserting that afterwards the two men were reconciled, but

he even designates the difference by the very strongest terms he could employ."

Like "the Isle of Serpents," barren in itself, yet important for strategical purposes, not a few of the points on which we now have touched possess no great interest in themselves; but as links in the chain which would transform the book of Acts from a historical narrative into a fraudulent romance, they are worthy of profound attention; and we cannot feel too grateful to our authors for the incalculable service they have rendered to Christian truth in this contest with unbelief. Opposing exact learning to ill-assorted erudition, scholar-like exegesis to wanton criticism, indomitable research to desperate conjecture, masculine thought to exorbitant fancy, they have rescued an important fortress from the enemy, and handed to us a well-stored arsenal.

But this is not the only fruit of their toil. On the other hand, there is hardly one question connected with Christian duty, and peril, and hope, which these volumes do not embrace and satisfactorily elucidate. With well-assured step our authors traverse the entire field of Biblical inquiry; and with unstinted liberality, cast at our feet what their diligence has reaped. And though they may not announce their conclusions in the very words of our formula, in all that is vital they speak for us, and we can sympathise with them.

Both Schaff and Baumgarten have lucid and wholesome views in regard to the value of the Old Testament, in its connection with the New; and with laudable energy and skill they have sought to bring the church back to Augustine's axiom: "*Novum Testamentum in Vetere latet, Vetus in Novo patet.*"

"People," says Baumgarten, (vol. iii. 66,) "in modern times have got much into the habit of thinking that in Paul we possess an authority for disregarding the Old Testament; but in the New Testament time, which is the time of completion and fulfilment, there is nothing which had not been prepared in the time of the beginning, and of which the authentic account is given in the books of Moses and the Prophets: so that we arrive at the proposition, that the relation between the Old and the New Testament is so thorough and comprehensive, that there is nothing in the Old Testament which is not in the New also; and that there is nothing in the New Testament which the Old Testament also does not contain."

"Paganism," says Schaff, (vol. i. 42,) "as opposed to Christianity, is a false religion. But Judaism is only a direct preparation for Christianity, which is its completion. And hence it is that the Christian can attain clearer views of Judaism than the Jew; even as the man is able to understand the child, while the child can have no proper apprehension of himself."

In connection with this principle, Baumgarten brings for-

ward most pertinently the hollow claims and mischievous character of the *Romish system*. For in speaking of the five prophets and teachers in the Church of Antioch, who were placed in contrast to the twelve apostles in Jerusalem, to minister unto the Lord, (vol. i. 358,) he remarks,—

That “if ‘minister’ is to be taken in its high sacerdotal import, then is the seed here sown from which the tree of the Romish hierarchy subsequently sprang up. But nothing less than a great wrong is done to the Old Testament, when people will not understand that the *object assigned to the whole of Judaism in the Old Testament is to become Christianity*. It is forgotten that not only was the whole of the Old destined to become the New Testament, but that it will do so; and that, consequently, every repetition of what belongs to the former is directly opposed to the design of the earlier revelation. Even, therefore, though the Romish clergy were able to establish a far closer connection than they actually do between the high priest’s office and their own system, as the continuance of the Aaronic priestly family and the Jewish sacrificial service; still the very letter of the law would furnish an everlasting testimony against the wrong done by the Romish system to the Christian community, and against the way in which they dim the lustre of the divine righteousness. Accordingly, that which was done in later times is essentially different from that which now lies before us. What was here begun in the spirit is there continued in the flesh. Here the Old and the New Testaments are conceived of in this divine reciprocity,—there, whilst an attempt is arbitrarily made to suppress the substance of the New Testament by means of the shadow of the Old, the danger is incurred of losing not only the New, but also the Old.”

Schaff traces the origin of *Puseyism* correctly, when he informs us, (vol. i. 153,) “That the study of ecclesiastical antiquity, and the discovery that its prevailing spirit was far more akin to Catholicism than to Protestantism, contributed greatly towards the final transition of the theological leader of the movement, J. H. Newman, and a considerable number of the clergy, like minded, from the Anglican to the Roman Church; and the remarkably ingenious work of Newman, on ‘Development of Doctrine,’ shows us the logical course from Anglo-Catholicism to the more consistent Roman Catholicism. Puseyism assuredly rests to a considerable extent on illusions, and should warn against that undiscerning and extravagant admiration of the ancient church, which makes it the golden age of Christianity, and in every respect the model for our own.”

Having pointed out the unclean fountain whence this foul stream proceeds, Schaff adverts (vol. i. 276) to the claim of *apostolic succession*, on which this schism so proudly enthrones itself, and remarks, “That the strict hierarchical view, which looks for an outward, palpable succession, admits of no satisfactory explanation of the fact that the apostles

had no share in the ordination of Paul after his conversion, and in his being sent to the Gentiles by the church at Antioch. The divine irregularity of his call, and the subsequent independence of his labours, make Paul a prototype of evangelical Protestantism." But Baumgarten (vol. i. 182–296) pushes the argument with still greater decision and point, when he reminds us, "That those persons by whom the gospel was first published beyond the limits of Jerusalem possessed no official character; and it is not to be overlooked, that their preaching did not take place at any time and anywhere, but precisely at the moment when the apostles had ceased to preach to the people, and exactly in those regions where the apostles were originally called to preach. By the opposition of Israel, the apostles are compelled to waste their divine powers on an unfruitful ground; but the persecuted Christians enter upon the work and office of the apostles. No one had called them, no one had instituted them, no one had given them their commission, and yet they preach while apostles are silent." "By an extraordinary instruction of the Spirit, Philip had been called to baptize the chamberlain from Ethiopia. Saul of Tarsus had received his appointment to be the apostle of the Gentiles; and upon the preaching of the men of Cyrene and of Cyprus, the Gentiles in Antioch had been converted in great numbers. Now, all these events tended to make it quite clear that it was decidedly the will of the Lord to allow the outward ordinances to be pushed into the back-ground in the enlargement of the church." "The apostolate may appear weak, if only the Lord in heaven, whose might is made strong in the weak, is glorified, —thus may official dignity retire out of sight, if only the Spirit, from whose holy breath all have life, manifests himself in his illimitable freedom and omnipotence."*

The large, elevated, unshrinking views in regard to the Church which pervade these volumes, we cordially appreciate and adopt.

* It is with regret we find even Alford, in *Hulsean Lectures*, vol. ii., part 10, lect. vii., urging views the reverse of these, and which would sanction the highest pretensions either of the Anglican or Papal hierarchy; for, when commenting on the election of Matthias, he argues,—“By the address of Peter, we have clearly brought out the teaching and interpreting office of the ministry, deduced immediately from its divine Head. The authority by which we do these things is not any supposed or real state of our own hearts and lives, or by mental power, fitting us for the work, however desirable these qualifications may be; but it is, above and beyond these, that setting apart to teach and to preach, of which this occurrence furnishes us with the first example, and which shall consecrate and ennoble the ministry of Christ's church even to the end of the world. When I see the multitude of believers humbly waiting in Jerusalem for the promise of the Father, and observe my forerunners in the ministry even then standing forward teaching and preaching, electing and ordaining, all this too under the superintendence of him to whom the solemn office of pastor had been thrice committed,—whose very name, bestowed upon him for no character of his own, but in virtue of his sacred office, was symbolic of firmness and prophetic of endurance,—how can I doubt the origin, how can I lower the dignity of that ministry which I have received of the Lord?”

"The church," says Schaff, "is a society of men, yet it is by no means a production of men, called into existence by their own invention and will, like a political or literary association. It is founded by God himself through Christ,—his incarnation, his life, his sufferings, his death and resurrection, and the outpouring of the Holy Ghost,—for his own glory and the redemption of the world. As the body of Christ it is the dwelling-place of Christ, in which he exerts all the powers of his theanthropic life, and also the organ through which he acts upon the world as Redeemer. Through the Holy Ghost the Lord is present in the church in all its ordinances and means of grace, especially in the Word and sacraments,—present, indeed, in an inapprehensible way, but manifestly present in his complete theanthropic person."—(Vol. i. 9.)

The very object of Baumgarten in his work, was to awaken in every believer the consciousness that an ascended Jesus is on the throne for behoof of his redeemed, and to unfold that consciousness in all its bearings. Accordingly he writes:—

"The ascension of Jesus is not to be looked upon as a withdrawal from his people and work, but rather as a higher kind of communion with them. As from the beginning he had declared himself to be King and Lord, the ascension must be his sitting on the throne of his glory. But the kingdom begins as soon as the King is enthroned. In what, then, does the government of the heavenly King manifest itself? Human affairs are essentially in the same condition as in the time of Daniel. But there is a region over which the kingdom of the world possesses no power; and this is the domain of the Spirit. Thus does the withdrawal of Jesus into the depths of heaven consist with his influence and operations in the depths of Spirit on earth."—(Vol. i. 26.)

If, however, Jesus administers the church on the throne of his glory as much as in the days of his flesh, then to him alone she is in all things amenable, and we welcome Baumgarten's explicit utterances on this head as alike independent and seasonable:—

"Since the church is fully conscious of her present position, and of the gravity of the obligation now lying on her to decide what shall be the future course of her development, nothing else remains for her than in her collective body to seek the Lord, and to content herself with no answer, however holy an appearance it may present, than that which it would receive from the Head of the church himself."—(Vol. ii. 27.) "Paul speaks of the elders at Ephesus as overseers and pastors whom the Holy Ghost hath appointed; and this declaration involves not only the truth that the Holy Ghost is the source of the Gentile churches,—by which fact their whole basis is placed out of the system of mere natural development,—but also the truth that the same Holy Ghost pervades and governs its constitution and further development. At the same time, human agency cannot be dispensed with; but this agency is employed by the Spirit, and we must allow him to control it according to his will. The greatest

security, however, we can have for the harmonious co-operation of the Holy Ghost and the church, is furnished by that human agency in which the common action of the individual members and the representatives of the church is maintained in free development. And it is in accordance with this, that we hold that the selection of those elders and pastors does not take place without the co-operation of the church communities themselves.”—(Vol. ii. 358.)

Nay, when speaking of the election of the deacons, and the origin of this appointment in envy and bad feeling, Baumgarten well observes,—

“The fact, that notwithstanding the striking weakness just exhibited at this time by the community, the apostles had, however, more trust in the Spirit of the church than in the sufficiency of their own office, and set to work upon this conviction, was not only a remedy for an immediate evil, but a plenteous blessing also flowed upon the whole development of the church from this very belief and confidence.”—(Vol. i. 134.)

Nor is our author one who thinks that the liberties which Christ purchased for the church, and the Spirit preserves, should be mildly surrendered to any assailant; for, when referring to the apostles preaching the gospel in defiance of the interdict of the Sanhedrim, he speaks out in these intelligible sentences:—

“Without delay the apostles oppose to this objective authority the subjective authority of their own conviction, as established by the operation of the Holy Spirit. And since this happened in the first conflict of the church, with the highest earthly authority, we ought to recognise therein a principle. We should observe that the fundamental power of the Spirit is associated with a powerful earnestness; and this earnestness contains a wonderful power, capable of overcoming all worldly obstacles. Though human malice, then, may threaten to frustrate the divine intention in the establishment of the kingdom of God, we need not fear. For if evil does acquire liberty to pervert a noble instrument of God, originally designed for the furtherance of his kingdom, and we might tremble to think what is now to become of the church, we yet see in the unshaken firmness of the apostles a power of the Spirit, which, as it rests upon itself, possesses in itself a sure guarantee for organization, beyond any, even the holiest and most divine, institution that could be formed out of mere worldly elements.”—(Vol. i. 102.)

In a word, Baumgarten “sets up the Christian conscience as the supreme court of appeal in all cases of collision with human authority;” adding, “This was the cause of Paul’s joy when he was so cheered by the Christians who met him on his way to Rome. He saw in them men who did not recognise in the visible Emperor the bearer of the highest power among the nations, but in the invisible Lord, who occupies heaven, and who, as the crucified one, departed from the world. This proves that Satan’s firmest stronghold is taken.”

Perhaps there may be a tendency among us to lay fully enough of stress upon Organization as a means of elevating the church; but we are not without those who, adopting another line of sentiment, decry all organization as carnal, and an interference with "the Free Spirit." To such we commend these observations of Baumgarten on the creation of Deacons at the request of the apostles:—

"It may indeed be very specious to say, that in spiritual things nothing essential can be done by means of a regulation and ordinance, because in this domain every thing must ultimately depend on the Spirit, and in whatever measure the same is present he will make his influence felt, independently of all laws and means; whilst, if the Spirit is absent, it is not possible for any regulations or ceremonies to bring him back, or compensate for his absence.* But it is easy to say, even with unction, selfishness has at length forced its way into the sanctuary of the Christian brotherhood: it is an evil spirit which only can be cast out by the Spirit of God; whoever has the Spirit of God let him fight against it, when and how he can, and from outward forms let no one expect any amelioration. However, the Spirit which spoke in the apostles is a stranger to such spiritualism! The Holy Ghost censures a defective regulation, even though censure may derogate from the official authority of the apostles; and he brings forward a better one, although that is to be built up out of the community itself where the dissension had broken out."—(Vol. i. 130.)

There is equal force and sobriety in these views, and our authors have at once described the origin and estimated the privileges of the church with philosophical discrimination. But the problem of the church is not exhausted, nor its relations all provided for, by the principles just quoted. There lies beyond the church, the World; and even they who are at one as to its internal arrangements, feel embarrassed as to its political conditions. It is one thing to determine what a church must do for the state; another wholly, to fix what the state may do for the church. No doubt if both could be welded without destroying the properties of either, but only fortifying and re-enforcing each, we would have reached our goal. As yet, however, no such instance of harmonious combination has been arrived at, but in the attempted fusion, we either invade the prerogatives of the state, or we paralyse the functions of the church. We heartily respond, therefore, to these wise and scriptural views of Baumgarten:—

"So long as the secular power does not employ all its powers and

* Nothing can be more unwarranted than the severance which Moberly contends for in the spheres of Christ and the Holy Ghost, when he asserts, "The Scriptures teach of the sacred Presences, that the Holy Ghost dwells in the heart of separate baptized Christians, and Christ in the community of the church; that the bodies of Christians are one by one temples of the Holy Ghost, but that all together are the temple of Christ; that each Christian is a separate stone, but that all together make up Christ's temple."—*The Great Forty Days*, p. 84.

resources in impeding and restraining the free movement of the church, the all-conquering spirit of love furnishes the possibility for the union of the several members, wherever an opportunity is presented.—”(Vol. ii. 359.) “But by that form of universal selfishness which ever constitutes the power of the world, not only will it be able to set aside whatever is suggested to it on the part of the church, so soon as it has recognised the opposition of the church to its own essential character; but inasmuch as it pretends to see in the church a power whose hostility is unceasing, inasmuch as the church is never weary of seeking to establish the form of the kingdom committed to her against all the distorted counterfeits in the kingdoms of the world, the secular power will by degrees become more desirous, and will be able to bring things to such a pass, that the very esteemed of the church will be more and more oppressed and brought low. By this means the church will be obliged to set forth within itself, with ever-growing clearness, its archetypal model of the kingdom, and to assure herself more and more of its truth and divine origin. This, again, will furnish the antagonistic kingdom of the world with a new ground of animosity, and recklessly will it employ all its weight against the church, the herald and minister of the divine kingdom. This reciprocal influence between the living idea of the kingdom of God in the church, on the one hand, and the supremacy of the kingdom of the world on the other, will arrive finally at the point where the hostility of the secular power results in a bloody persecution of the heralds of God’s kingdom.”—(Vol. ii. 362.) “So far, then, is the establishment of this kingdom from being placed in man’s power, that with all his thoughts and efforts he must pursue some other object, and leave the realization of the kingdom wholly in the hands of the Supreme Ruler of the world. Many think that the church has for its task gradually to assume this shape, and to set itself up as a kingdom. But to our mind it seems clear, that as the Lord himself has retired from the sphere of earth, so, too, he is not disposed to surrender to his church the government of the external relations of the world, but that, on the contrary, he has determined to expose it to the world’s opposition. The kingdom, then, in the full extent of the Biblical idea, we must not expect to be set up until, by means of his omnipotence, God shall have ordered the times and seasons.”—(Vol. ii. 356.) “But the earthly kingdom of Christ will attain to its perfect configuration, and the realization of all national and social relations, whenever that people, who in the beginning were formed for it, are led back and attain to their original vocation; for Christ’s earthly kingdom is finally to arrive at its consummation in the kingdom and people of Israel.”

Schaff (vol. i. 17), when he tells us “history is to end in a theocracy, in which all dominion and power shall be given to the saints of the Most High,—all nations be united into one family, and joyfully yield themselves to the divine will as their only law,”—agrees substantially with what Baumgarten maintains. But the latter is fain to recognise Israel as the root and basis of the heavenly kingdom which is to be established upon the earth; and with somewhat of indignation he rebukes the Gentiles for usurping the rights of the Jews.

"The Gentile Church (vol. iii. 376), even in her most glorious epoch, has not given to the people of God the standing which, according to Scripture, is due to them; and this violation of the divine right which is due to the Jews is closely connected with the mixing together the order of church and state. Indeed, the obstinate denial of the right due to the Hebrews by divine promise has, in the Gentile Church, its ultimate reason in the circumstance that she erroneously claims for herself that portion which is due only to the converted people of God." "The kingdom of Jesus presupposes the personal faith of all the members; which, however, is nowhere assured to us within the times of the Gentiles, and which, according to our real position, we are not justified in expectation. For it is on this very account that, at the commencement of the redemption among the Gentiles, it is so distinctly stated that only so many believed as were foreordained of God; inasmuch as this election of individuals was to be the order of God's kingdom among the nations. After the restoration of Israel, but not before, will the nations of the Gentiles attain to a sanctified form,—one that is acceptable to God, and suitable for their admission nationally into the heavenly kingdom. It is erroneous, then, if, on account of the influence which Christians among the Gentiles have exercised upon the general condition of nations, we regard and treat them as Christian nations. Scripture knows of no distinction but that between Israel, the people of God,—and the Gentiles, as the rest of the nations of the earth."—(Vol. i. 443.) "The Gentile Church conceives itself to be the continuation of the people of Israel, in such a sense that the latter comes not into view, in reference to salvation. But such an idea is as little countenanced by the Old as by the New Testament. For, if the ten tribes, after having been carried into the countries of the Gentiles, on account of their apostasy, had been so lost that their future were now erroneously merged in the history of the Gentile nations, then on this territory sin would have triumphed, and the power of the adversary would have maintained itself against Jehovah's mercy. The momentous fact of the final victory of the ungodly powers would thus have been recorded in universal history. But just for this reason, the whole assumption is annihilated. The ten tribes will be recovered,—and Paul's expression (Acts xxvi. 7), 'Our twelve tribes,' is a guarantee that not only the Old Testament declarations regarding Israel's future were viewed by the apostle as sure, but that, even in the present, he regards in a lively manner the people in their full integrity, so that in his love and hope he embraces no less than James does, the ten tribes, removed though they were from the external connection."—(Vol. iii. 123.)

Baumgarten has throughout called attention to the interesting fact, that for a time God employed the Roman empire, in all its organizations, for the shelter of his ambassadors, and furtherance of his cause. "A power" there was, he says, "in the very centre of Paganism, which opposed itself with an energy of restraint and coercion to the full display of injustice,—namely, Rome."—(Vol. ii. 308.) And thus military Rome keeps in check for a season sacerdotal Jerusalem. But that which now "letteth" will relax its check, and when the priestly element

combines with the political, there will be days of tribulation, if Baumgarten's views are well founded :—

“The bloody persecution of the apostles by Herod now stands forth as the foreshadowing of difficulty and sorrow to the church in future times. We see here the impulse to such persecution no longer arising from the personal character of individuals, but founded on that of a kingdom which has taken a new beginning, and assumed a form peculiarly seductive,—of which we also know from other quarters that it will endure as long as time shall last. Herod's persecution of the apostles (Acts xii.) carries us out of and beyond itself, and points to the future. The power of the Herodian dynasty is not independent,—it is a vassal of Rome. If, therefore, even this Herodian kingdom thus rages, what will the Roman itself do, when once it begins to deck itself out in the guise of a kingdom of God, and when the horn of the beast shall lift up itself to see with the eyes of a man, and to speak with the mouth of a man?”—(Vol. i. 341.)

But if there rests a cloud upon man's future, according to this representation, both Schaff and Baumgarten take care, in all their eschatological statements, to represent the day as shining beyond. For in his remarks on “Pentecost,” and the prophecy of Joel which Peter quoted on that occasion, the latter writes :—

“Does not the quality of the time that has now dawned appear to be a very peculiar one, and even such a one as was destined to contain the final close of the development of man's nature? Throughout the whole course of former periods, there had been a constant struggle for the attainment of some single end. But this end, as often as it appeared to be gained, eluded the grasp, and has withdrawn farther into the remote distance. Now that the Spirit has descended, this ceaseless agitation has found a resting-place,—time is for once satisfied, and concluded by eternity. Here, therefore, is the true end; and nothing remains but that this end should spread itself over all the human race. And although this movement cannot go on except in that form of time within which the development of all human things is comprised, still it is the movement of the end, and stamps this period as the final period, and these as ‘the last days.’ That this last period has commenced, Peter is certain from the outpouring of the Spirit; but he is confirmed in his view by a consideration of all that Joel has associated with it,—the threats against the heavens and the earth,—the denunciation of the dissolution of the heavenly system,—the change of the sun and moon,—and the laying waste the earth by fire and sword. These signs are to precede the great day of the Lord; and so that day must bring with it nothing less than the destruction of heaven and earth. But if that which is only temporal ceases to be, then that also is an end—it is only another aspect of the end, since therewith time itself apparently comes to its end. And if the outpouring of the Holy Spirit is the commencement of the end, the dissolution of the heavens and earth forms the completion of that end. But supposing that these signs and the dissolution of the heavens and earth belong to that period of time now commencing, then all who hear these things are threatened, for all are mixed up with the things of heaven

and earth. So long, therefore, as man in his whole being and nature stands on the platform of heaven and earth—on the platform of this world—so long does this last time possess a terrible aspect of threatening towards him. He has entered into the time which is incessantly bringing him nearer and nearer to the dissolution of the heavens and the earth, and consequently, also, to his own. But that this is not man's only position in this last time, is testified simply by the existence of the pentecostal community. Upon them 'the last days' have burst amidst an unutterable feeling of bliss; by them the dawning of this era was hailed with songs of praise, such as never had been heard before from human tongues. And Peter's sole object in dwelling on the threatening and awful character of the era about to commence, was in order to turn the attention of his hearers to the only satisfaction from this last extremity."—(Vol. i. 66.)

We have now indicated our opinion as to the character and value of the works which stand at the head of this article; and, though we may have entered a caveat in regard to some positions which, it seemed to us, were either ambiguous or unsound, we cannot hesitate to advise our readers to possess and master these volumes for themselves, as eminently fitted to shed light on all subjects connected with doctrine, ecclesiasticism, and eschatology. In their main object our authors have triumphantly succeeded, and the church at large is deeply indebted to them for preserving to the Acts of the Apostles its place in the canon, in spite of the Tübingen critics, in the first place; and, in the second, for restoring Christ to that place in the Acts from which commentators, for the most part, have so strangely united to exclude him.

There are various *παρρησια* interspersed throughout these volumes, of unusual interest; and we would recommend the remarks of Baumgarten (vol. i. 336) on "Satan," and his excursus on "Paul's speech before the Areopagus," as deserving special consideration. Schaff's "Recapitulation" (vol. i. 215), and "Greek Civilization" (vol. i. 170), likewise contain much that is calculated to gratify and impress. But our limits will only admit of this single extract from the latter writer, in which, with as much unction as beauty, he portrays a Christian:—

"The name Christian expresses most briefly, but clearly, the divine destiny of man, and always holds up before the believer the high idea after which he should strive,—that is, *to have his own life a copy and continuation of the life of Christ, and his threefold office.* Man, indeed, in virtue of his inherent likeness to God, is already by nature, in some sense, the prophet, priest, and king of creation. Sin has obscured this original quality of his nature, and checked its development. But regeneration and vital union with Christ will deliver it from the power of sin and death, and gradually unfold it in all its glorious proportions."—(Vol. i. 266.)

May all who admire this beautiful idea be enabled now to realise the image it describes, and, in the end, inherit the elevation to which it points!

ART. IX.—*History of the Jewish Nation after the Destruction of Jerusalem by Titus.* By the Rev. ALFRED EDERSHEIM, Ph. D., Old Aberdeen. Edinburgh: Thomas Constable & Co.

THE history of the Jews subsequent to the destruction of Jerusalem has been strangely overlooked by ecclesiastical historians. The Jews belong in reality to the church. Both their past and their future vitally connect them with the kingdom of God. They have at least equal claims on the historian of the church with any of the great heretical sects. And not merely the outstanding facts regarding this singular people,—fulfilling to the eye prophetic words,—avail in the apologetic argument. The history of the Jew in his apostasy has all through an apologetic value. The wonders of his later days demand the wonders of his earlier as their explanation. The Jew of the Christian centuries would be an utterly insoluble problem, without some such antecedents as the Biblical books record. And we welcome Dr Edersheim's work as a valuable contribution in supplement of an important deficiency.

Dr Edersheim's volume is a first one. He brings down the history of his people to the year 425, the period at which the "Palestinian Patriarchate finally ceased." Another volume is to follow, coming down to our own time.

The external history of the Jewish people during the three centuries and a half the work we review embraces, is one of sad and often of tragic interest. The generation which rejected the Son of God, no experience could teach. Equally frivolous and fanatic, smitten with a strange childishness of intellect,—great only in their passions, they rushed from one madness to another. For forty years after the great catastrophe the Jews remained in a state of comparative quiescence,—exposed, no doubt, to indignities they ill could brook, but upon the whole having no great reason to complain. It seems difficult to make out a very hard case either for Jew or Christian during the reigns of Titus, Domitian, and Nerva, or even perhaps during the earlier portion of the reign of Trajan. Dr Edersheim represents Judaism in the time of Domitian as even vigorously proselytising, and winning distinguished converts to its ranks. But the instances given hardly substantiate his representation. One of these, to say the least, is very uncertain. That Flavius Clemens, a relative of the emperor, was a Jewish, and not a Christian proselyte, is assumed

against the opinion of the most recent and distinguished writers of church history. It is not the case that the Clementines are the only authority for the Christianity of Clemens,—the Clementines are, in truth, an authority for nothing. Eusebius, making reference to a heathen writer, distinctly states that Clemens was martyred as a Christian; and the statement of Dio Cassius is at least interpreted with great probability to the same intent. As far as *we* know, there is no ground for Dr Edersheim's assertion, that Domitilla was first banished as a Jewess, and then put to death as a Christian; his reference, instead of supporting, contradicts him. But under outward quiescence, under apparent submissiveness, there were purposes of revenge and plans of insurrection. It is probable, that during the whole of the period to which we have referred, the Jewish leaders had been scheming and preparing a rising; they only bided their time. Matters at last came to a head. The fanaticism of the Jews was thoroughly roused, on the one hand by the preaching of a celebrated rabbi, on the other by an irritating persecution, whose origin does not seem very clearly ascertained. The antagonist selected is the great soldier, Trajan. He is absent conducting his second Parthian war,—working out his vain projects of Oriental ambition. Almost at the same moment, on some preconcerted signal, the Jews rush to arms in various parts of the Roman empire, and obtain the execration of the world by unheard-of atrocities. Of the insurrection in Cyrene, where the flame first broke out, Dr Edersheim thus writes:—

“Then commenced a series of the most shocking cruelties against the heathens, such as only deep-rooted hatred could have suggested, or long-restrained vengeance perpetrated. Would that we might throw a veil over the particulars of this war of creeds! The mixed multitude which follows in the wake of every religious movement, destitute of principle, has only passions. If these are no longer restrained, the result must always be terrible. In the present instance, these passions had long only awaited an occasion for their outburst. Now that the Jews were victorious, they fell upon the Greeks and Romans. They literally tore them in pieces, they sawed them asunder, they ate their flesh, they wallowed in their blood, they wound themselves round with their entrails, and dressed themselves in their skins. It was comparatively a mild fate awarded to some of the heathen captives to fight against each other, or with wild beasts in the arena. Though some Jewish historians have attempted to cavil at these details, none has ventured to deny their substantial accuracy.”

In the island of Cyprus, it is said, 240,000 Greeks were massacred. A movement of which the soul was evidently a

fierce and revengeful fanaticism, could only issue in a dreadful failure. Trajan's generals ere long overcame the undisciplined masses of rebels,—retaliating massacres with massacres if possible more frightful.

The insurrection in Judea was scarcely mastered when Hadrian mounted the imperial throne, and hastened to adopt a policy of peace and concession. That policy seems to have been fairly carried out in regard to the Jews. Perfect religious liberty was established in their country. Permission was even given them to rebuild the sacred city; but not, as it appears, the temple. But the past had taught no wisdom. The imperial exception was neglected. And when Hadrian took means to enforce it (and that only partially) the Jews prepared again to revolt. For a season, through the ascendant influence of the chief rabbi, the outbreak was hindered; but when the supreme authority came into the hands of the old crusader, Akiba, there was no more secrecy or indecision. We can hardly wonder at the imperial wrath, though we cannot justify the imperial deeds. Hadrian, no doubt, saw that terms and temporising were alike impossible. He at once began the conflict, hoping, we may think, by the energy of his proceedings to awe his rebellious subjects. The edict went forth that Jerusalem should become a heathen city, and a heathen temple stand on the heights of Zion. Circumcision was forbidden, and, it is supposed, even the study of the Law. The Jew was not slow to seize the gauntlet the Roman had thrown down. And the last, and, in some respects, most terrible and tragic of these conflicts began. They who rejected the Messiah of God rallied round a wretched impostor, who has come down to us only under the Messianic title he assumed—Bar-Cochab. The chief of the Sanhedrim, the celebrated Akiba, authenticated the claims of a brutal soldier,—even bore his standard on the field of battle. A vast army—it is estimated as high as half a million—gathered under Bar-Cochab's leadership. For a time the Jewish arms won signal successes. "Within a year the Jews held 50 fortified cities, and 935 open towns. It was in vain that Hadrian sent legion after legion, and general after general to Palestine. They were obliged to yield to or retreat before the Jews." But success led only to surer and more fearful ruin, for it only made the Jew more madly self-sufficient and the Roman fiercer. Once more, amid scenes of frightful horror, the Jew was crushed; but not till the resources of the empire had been seriously tasked. The blood of the conqueror was up. Rome was politic enough often to be merciful, but her heart was of iron. The vanquished Israelites found no mercy at her hands. The eclectic Hadrian had no forgiveness for Hebrew fanatics. He was giving expression to the vital instincts of

his earthly, sceptical nature, when he heaped every sort of contempt on the Hebrew faith. Where the altar of Jehovah was wont to stand a statue of the emperor was erected. A pig's head was wrought in relief over the Bethlehem gate of the holy city. All practice of Jewish rites, all profession of Jewish religion, was forbidden under terrific penalties. It may be worth the notice of the sceptical sciolists of our time, that one of their number, the philosophic liberal who now wore the imperial purple, claims the glory of forestalling the skilful persecuting methods of Decius and Diocletian,—claims a place beside the Dominics of history as an inventor of tortures. The grand aim was the destruction of the rabbis,—their utter extirpation. “Smite the shepherds, and the sheep will be easily dealt with,”—such seems to have been the imperial motto. Hunted by a keen-scented police, and by still keener scented apostates, many distinguished teachers were captured, and died deaths of fearful suffering. “Red-hot balls were placed in their armpits, pointed canes were thrust under their nails, the skin was torn off their bodies.” Among others Akiba was taken. A signal example must be made of *him*. His flesh was ordered to be torn off with iron combs. He died in the hands of his torturers offering up one of the prayers of his people. And no doubt there was much of heroic endurance,—much even of a martyr spirit in this hard time. Yet we cannot but contrast the persecuted Jew under Hadrian with the persecuted Christian under Marcus Aurelius or Diocletian. What a difference there is between the lofty tones of Justin, Tertullian, Origen, and that of the rabbins at Lydda! We are not aware that in any Christian writer of the first three centuries there is any thing like declaring it lawful “in cases of extreme necessity even to simulate compliance with heathen practices.” Such is the difference between selfish fanaticism and Christian conviction when you bring them thoroughly to the test.

With the death of Hadrian, and the accession of Antoninus Pius, came days of peace to the Jewish people. “A rod for the fool's back,” says the wise man; but the fool is often none the wiser. One result of the pacific policy of Antoninus, was the return of the rabbins to their post in the synagogue and the sanhedrim. Shortly after their return, we are told of a sort of general assembly of sages on the plain of Rimmon. Unawed, unsubdued by the past, they met to squabble on paltry questions of rank and precedence. It is not any hard-learned wisdom of the Jew that brings better days. But better days withal are given. Occasional *emeutes* there were during the next century and a half—scarcely more than that; there was no grand struggle for

national independence. There was still the same bitterness of soul,—there was still the same restless fanaticism,—but the means and opportunities were less. Compelled into quietness, the Jew prospered. The chief of the sanhedrim became a prince among his people; Jehuda the First, and his successors in office, actually assumed that title. Almost regal in their wealth, the Jewish patriarchs, under the later heathen emperors, were permitted to exercise a measure of regal power. A sort of miniature popedom arose in Palestine, and something more than a shadow of national existence seems to have been attained. It is altogether a singular and interesting chapter of Jewish history. Thus quietly prosperous, shut up in his national and sectarian seclusion, the Jew scarcely appears on the stage of general affairs. When he does appear, his appearance is sad enough. Forgetful of his own tragic sufferings,—of Hadrian's edicts,—of Hadrian's tortures,—he is, during the era of the church's most tremendous conflicts, the vile accuser of the Christian, a main instigator of the Christian persecutions. It is likely enough that many of the Jews who shouted the aged Polycarp to the stake had been hunted fugitives after the overthrow of Bar-Cochab. Dr Edersheim quotes, and sharply reprimands, a sentence from Jerome, giving expression to feelings of bitter dislike against the Hebrew race. It seems to us that the words would not have been wonderful from a mild Origen, or a philosophic Augustin, not to speak of the most acrid of the fathers.

Under the successors of Constantine, the position of the Jews in the empire grew gradually worse. If the spirit of the state in the main was tolerant, such was not the spirit of the people. Nor was that spirit softened by the bearing of the disciples of the synagogue. Theodosius the Second sympathised with his subjects; and, under a sufficiently feasible pretext, stripped the Jewish patriarch of all his honours in the year 415. With the death of Gamaliel V., ten years afterwards, the Palestinian patriarchate terminated. At this period there are symptoms everywhere of a dark future for the sons of Abraham—imperial disfavour, burnings of synagogues, Alexandrian massacres, and the like; “the storm of heathen violence has passed away, but the much more terrible and prolonged tempest of mediæval persecution is impending.” It is at this period of intense interest, that, with somewhat of dramatic skill, Dr Edersheim closes the first volume of his History.

The history of the Jews during these centuries,—especially as it is told at length,—suggests many striking thoughts. How singular is the dearth of great minds, and that in cir-

cumstances so peculiarly fitted to call them forth and develop them! There is no great military leader,—no Joshua, no David, no Maccabæus. We have not even the skilful guerilla chief. Nor is there any one great in counsel, gifted with a statesman's wisdom. Dr Edersheim would, indeed, make a hero of Akiba. But even if we accepted all that is told of this famous rabbi, as historic reality, we cannot share his admiration. If he knew how to set on fire the easily-kindled fanaticism of his countrymen, he never shows himself gifted with the wisdom of a great leader, or the strength of a great deliverer. There must have been an utter want of loftiness of soul, to say no more, in the man who could, whether honestly or dishonestly, pledge himself to the Messiahship of a vulgar impostor, who, so far as we can gather, had nothing to recommend him but his bodily prowess. Yet how wonderful, too, the energies put forth in those great struggles,—put forth by a people fallen far from their pristine vigour! There must be some great past to explain them. What must that national life *have been* of which this is the decadence! Egypt and the desert,—prophets and miracles,—become rather historical necessities than scarcely credible marvels. It seems to us that these last struggles of the Jews for national liberty have been underestimated. In reading Dr Edersheim's book, it has strongly impressed us, for example, that they have not been sufficiently ranked among the causes of the decline of the Roman power. Besides their immediate effect on the military strength of Rome, the effect cannot have been slight of a series of insurrections, not put down without difficulty,—of protracted, and sometimes even successful warfare, carried on against the great world-power within its own dominions;—the effect, we say, of this, cannot have been slight in weakening Rome morally, especially in the perilous circumstances in which the empire then was placed. The subject seems, at any rate, worthy of reflection.

Perhaps the most interesting portion of Dr Edersheim's work is his account of the synagogue—of its peculiar activity and its more distinguished men. The synagogue dates with the Babylonish captivity. Israel failed to use aright that judgment of the Lord. If idolatry of images was put away, for idolatry of images there came idolatry of Halachas. At first, no doubt, the idea of the synagogue was simple enough,—the well-disposed would meet together for social worship and reading the Scriptures; but it soon became greatly more than that. When the so-called Great Synagogue has sunk or developed into the sanhedrim, and our information

become more authentic and distinct, we find throughout Palestine, and among the Hebrew communities of the Dispersion, a vast synagogue system of authoritative teaching and rule. At the head of that system was the sanhedrim.

"The sanhedrim was the supreme court. All juridical and theological questions were in the last instance submitted to its decision. It consisted of seventy-one members, with two clerks. The honour of membership was not reserved for the priestly order.* Persons belonging to any trade or profession, except those which were supposed to be degrading, or to have a tendency to harden, might aspire to this distinction. The members of the sanhedrim were chosen for life, and regularly ordained by the imposition of hands. When they were convened, they sat in a semicircle, with the *Nasi* or president in the middle; the *ab-beth-din* (the father or head of the juridical college) or vice-president at his right, and the *chacham* (wise man, perhaps the head of the theological department) at his left."

The elaborate system of which the sanhedrim was the head is thus described by our author:—

"Every considerable synagogue had its sanhedrim, or college of justice, consisting of twenty-three ordained members, who were entitled to pronounce sentence even in capital cases. The smaller synagogues, or those in towns with fewer than 120 heads of families and ten synagogue officials, possessed an inferior college of justice, which consisted of three members, who were only allowed to adjudicate on civil cases. From the college of three an appeal might be taken to the nearest college of twenty-three, and from the latter to the lowest of the three sanhedrims of twenty-three in Jerusalem (said to have been in connection with as many synagogues in that city), and so on, till the case reached the great sanhedrim, which must be viewed as the college connected with the temple."

The synagogue became more and more the centre of national life; from it sprang the singular intellectual and religious phenomenon, Rabbinism. The Jewish rabbin (as Dr Edersheim sufficiently explains) was in his distinctive character a canonist and casuist, rather than a theologian. His great business was, to be thoroughly learned in the vast aggregation of traditional ordinances and traditional interpretations which had gathered round the complicated ritualism of the old economy—to be a perfect body of the deliverances of sages on hard questions of ritual and ceremonial casuistry. It was as narrow a school for religious thinkers as can well be imagined. They sought relief and compensation in the Hagada,† or the method of fan-

* A striking proof of how little the notion of a priestly *caste*, possessed of the special favour of the Deity and of an esoteric doctrine, belongs to Judaism. On the other hand, the fact that the Mosaic economy has a class of sacred persons, to whom the temple services belong, shows the utter folly of the rationalist hypothesis in regard to the late origin of the Mosaic writings.

† "Every separate traditional legal ordinance was termed a "*Halacha*." The

ciful interpretation, which could bring all sorts of diverse doctrines from the same simple statement—weave systems of theology from particles and vowel points. Cramp man's intellect, and it is sure to have its revenge. It is interesting to find in the synagogue the great divergent tendencies of human thought we are so familiar with in the church. The synagogue had its high church and its low church,—its strict and its latitudinarian parties, between whom there was a vehement antagonism. *Rabbinism* on its liberal side even came to friendly terms with Heathenism; *Rabbi* Meir had closer relation with the Neo-Platonic theosophy than Philo had with Plato. The two opposing schools of the synagogue are known by the names of their founders, Hillel and Shammai,—the former liberal, the latter strict. Hillel is the great name of the early synagogue, the chief of the Talmudists. Whatever be his real merit,—and it is very hard to obtain any valid estimate of him,—there can be no doubt of his having exercised a great influence on Jewish thinking at a critical and important era. We present this famous rabbi in the description of Dr Edersheim:—

“Of all persons mentioned in the literary and religious history of the Hebrew nation, few, if any, equal Hillel in fame. He may well be singled out as the man who gave its peculiar tone to the religious thinking, not only of his own period, but to that of Jewish theology in general. His personal history is exceedingly interesting. He was born in Babylon about the year 112 B.C., of poor parents, although descended in the female line from the house of David. It is said that at forty years of age Hillel emigrated into Palestine, where he studied and taught for forty years; at the termination of which period he was elevated to the rank of Nasi, which he is supposed to have filled for other forty years. Like many other sages, he was poor, and obliged to support himself by the labour of his hands. It is asserted that he earned daily a very small sum, the half of which he gave to the door-keeper of the college, in order to be admitted to the lectures of Abtalion and Shemaja, and that with the rest he supported himself and his family. The mode in which he attracted notice is curious. One day his supply of money had failed, and the janitor would not admit him into the lecture-room. Although in the depth of winter, the zealous scholar, rather than lose the day's instruction, climbed from the outside up to the window, where he sat till he was completely covered with snow, and rendered insensible by the cold. Sabbath morning dawned, and the teachers wondered why the light remained excluded

Halachas, or traditional ordinances, in their scientific arrangement, constituted the Mishna; of which the Talmud or Gemara was the commentary, the explanation, illustration, and application.”—(P. 409.)

“The Hagada was intended to explain and apply the hidden meaning of the text. It was either attempted to explain (sometimes to play upon) merely the words of a passage, or else to elicit the secrets, not of its letter but its contents; in short, the doctrines and spiritual facts which the text either indicated or to which it alluded. . . . It was the fundamental principle of Hagada interpretation, that a number of diverse comments might lawfully be attached to one and the same passage of Scripture, and that all were equally correct.”—(P. 413.)

from the school-house. On examining the window they discovered their zealous hearer. Glad for the sake of so promising a student even to break through the sanctity of the Sabbath, the requisite remedies were applied, and to the joy of all present Hillel was restored to life. From that time his fame increased. When, after the death of Hillel's teachers, and during the troublous times which followed, the sons of Bethera, or as some would have it, in lieu of a regular sanhedrim, the elders of Bethera, presided over the deliberations of the Jewish sages, the question arose, Whether, as the Passover occurred that year on the Sabbath day, the solemnities of the feast were to take precedence of those of the Sabbath or not? The question does not seem to have been discussed at any previous period, and the sons of Bethera confessed their inability to decide it. Hillel was now sent for, as having been a distinguished pupil of Abtalion. His arguments failed, indeed, to convince the members of the college, but his appeal to the authority of Shemaja and Abtalion settled the question. The sons of Bethera resigned their office, and Hillel was elevated to the presidency of the sanhedrim. The learning of Hillel was celebrated in hyperbolic language. It was said to have embraced not only Scripture and tradition, but languages, geography, natural history,—in fact, all sciences, human and superhuman. To show the extent of his influence on the rising generation, it is reported that Hillel had not less than a thousand pupils, of whom eighty were said to have been specially distinguished. Hillel was extremely simple in his mode of living, modest, meek, patient, and kind. The mildness of his principles, which generally betokened a rather rationalistic turn, often degenerated in the hands of his followers into laxity. The most prominent, though perhaps least tangible consequence of his teaching, was the peculiarly speculative direction he gave to Jewish theology, to which he imparted that bias it has ever since preserved. The following are among the sayings of this sage which have been handed down to us:—'Do not separate thyself from the congregation, and do not put confidence in thyself till the day of thy death. Judge not thy neighbour until thou art in his situation. An ignorant man cannot properly abhor sin; *a peasant cannot be pious*; a bashful person cannot become learned. *Where there are no right men, see to it that THOU prove thyself such an one.*'

Another distinguished rabbi was the Akiba we have already had occasion to mention. Akiba is Dr Edersheim's hero. We quote his enthusiastic words:—

"Amongst the many pupils of Joshua, none was more justly renowned than Akiba ben Joseph. Indeed, it may well be doubted whether, in some respects, he did not surpass even Hillel the Great. Combining originality and even genius, with moral earnestness and integrity, he could not have played a secondary part in any community. If to these natural qualifications we add delicacy of feeling; a glowing enthusiasm, which invested with a halo every conviction, and made it as much matter of the heart as of the intellect; and finally, the necessary condition in his circumstances—extensive and thorough erudition; the picture is complete. His early history is almost as romantic as his

end was tragic. Tradition makes him a proselyte, and derives him ultimately from no less a personage than Sisera. Born in humble circumstances, and nurtured in ignorance, we first meet the youth as a shepherd in the service of the celebrated Kalba Shabua, one of the richest men (of the three rich men) of Jerusalem, who had undertaken to keep the city in provisions during a siege of many years' duration. His beauty, if not his mental qualities, attracted here the attention, and at last secured for the young shepherd the affections, of Kalba's daughter, the beautiful and accomplished Rachel. It was in vain that her father opposed a union apparently so unsuitable, and at last disowned his child with a vow. Rachel gave her hand to Akiba. Only one condition did she attach to it,—that he should in future devote himself to theological studies. Akiba had formerly equally hated theology and theologians. His proud spirit could ill brook their pretensions, or the contempt which they heaped on him and others, whom circumstances alone had prevented from attaining to equal, if not greater distinction. According to his own statement, he could have killed them; but now every thing was changed. Akiba departed immediately after his marriage, by desire of his wife, for the college,—determined to show himself worthy of her he loved; and poor Rachel had to leave her father's abode. And now began a period of unexampled devotion on the part of the faithful bride. Twelve years, it had been agreed between them, was Akiba to stay away. Meantime Rachel lived in a wretched hovel, in extreme poverty. She had been delivered of her eldest and only child on a straw litter. Such was her destitution that she had even to cut off and sell her beautiful tresses to procure a miserable subsistence. Meantime her father, bound by his vow, was unable to assist her unless she renounced her husband. The twelve years of separation had elapsed, and Akiba was hastening to his beloved Rachel. He had reached her abode, when he overheard a conversation in which Rachel replied to the objections of her father, by expressing a desire that her husband should remain with the sages other twelve years. Without entering the cottage, Akiba immediately returned to his studies. At the close of the second period, he returned the most famed amongst the sages. Rabbi Akiba first arranged the Halachas according to their contents; as, for example, into those concerning Sabbath days, marriage questions, &c. Besides this arrangement of the Mishna, he also grounded its text on Scripture, or at least made the first systematic and consistent attempt towards it. He not only adopted but went much beyond the exegetical principles of Hillel and Nahum of Gunso. He maintained that every *sentence, word, and particle* in the Bible, must have its use and meaning. He denied that mere rhetorical figures, repetitions, or accumulations, occurred in the Bible. Every word, syllable, and letter, which was not absolutely requisite to express the meaning which it was desired to convey, must, he maintained, serve some ulterior purpose, and be intended to indicate a special meaning. Among the more remarkable of Akiba's sayings are the following: 'Man is loved of God, for he created him in his own image; but the love which made this fact known to man was even greater than that which so created him. Convert thy holidays into work-days, in order not to become dependent on others. Keep always shoes on thy feet, that every person may be aware of thy

approach. Take care to choose as thy companions those on whom fortune smiles.”

A host of other rabbis are mentioned in Dr Edersheim's book, many of them persons of real mark in their day. There are some interesting names where the individual features are more distinct, and there is less appearance of the legendary, than in the two cases we have selected for fuller presentation. Generally, the prominent characteristic of the synagogue is its want of deep moral conviction. We mark this in the case both of Hillel and Akiba. Hillel, for example, taught loose views about marriage, holding that the man might divorce on the most trivial grounds. Akiba went even farther in this direction than his great predecessor; the man whose moral earnestness Dr Edersheim so strongly praises, thought that a husband might put away the wife of his bosom for another whom he had merely found more attractive. Not but that there were noble moral views among the rabbins. We have quoted some of these. Still, it is ever an unerring sign of moral decay, when fundamental convictions are giving way before wretched ingenuities. Acute enough, no doubt, were these Jewish teachers. One might have found them awkward antagonists at an intellectual sword-play. But they had no soundness of mind. What a contrast, in this respect, between a chapter in the Mishna and a chapter whether in the Old or New Testament! In truth, one of the great lessons we may learn from the synagogue—a lesson for our own time—is, that *mental cleverness (or even power)* and *mental soundness* have no essential connection. A giant is blind, or fever-stricken, or lunatic, as well as a dwarf. The singular *pride* of the rabbis is worthy also of our notice. Hillel the Great (as we have seen) gave it forth, *ex cathedra*, “that a peasant could not be pious.” The ritual antinomianism of an earlier gave place to a knowledge antinomianism in later times. “Knowledge puffeth up.” It always tends to do so where there is not vital Christian belief. The rabbins of philosophy, science, literature, are all after the same mould in this respect with the rabbins of the synagogue. It suits the rabbin of an unchristian literature to profess himself a “man of the people” in these days. Human nature does not deceive us,—at heart he is “aristocratic.”

While the synagogue did not give itself distinctly to doctrine, and was not wont to issue doctrinal as it did Halachic sentences, a great mass of doctrines, or of doctrinal thinkings, in course of time grew up within its schools. Dr Edersheim has given a full and interesting account of these. The synagogue held in a peculiar form the doctrine of the Trinity; the rabbins were as familiar with the “Memra,” or “Logos,” as the theosophists of Alexandria; though, like the latter, strangers to the idea of the “Word made flesh.” The views on

original sin were closely akin to those of evangelical orthodoxy. In regard to the method of man's pardon and acceptance, the poorest and grossest notions of work-salvation prevailed. One of the most singular things in the doctrinal developments of the synagogue, is the rise of some of the peculiar dogmas of the Romish Church. Rabbinism had its purgatory, its superfluous merits, its penance. When in the latter part of the second century the Jewish patriarch was in his glory, claiming, as president of the "sacred college," an absolute and infallible sway over his race,—both in dogma and government,—the Ultramontane ideal was almost attained.

The narrowness and letter worship of the Jew led, by way of compensation or revenge, to the Hagada;—from the Hagada the passage was easy to the speculative mysticism of the Kabbalah. The Kabbalah was a system of theological metaphysics, learned by the rabbi from the schools of paganism; in which withal he supremely gloried,—which was even supposed to give supernatural power. It bore a strong resemblance to some of the pantheistic philosophies of our own day. It spake about a primal Nought developing itself into consciousness in its manifestations. All subordinate existence returned into the original substance from which it emanated.

"In one of the most secret and glorious parts of heaven is a palace, called the *palace of love*, where the deepest mysteries are enacted. There all souls are whom the heavenly King loves; there dwelleth the heavenly King, the holy and blessed One, together with the souls of saints, and unites himself with them by kisses of his love. . . . The kiss of God is the union of the soul with the substance from whence it had proceeded. Every thing of which this world consists, both body and spirit, will return to the principle and root whence they issued."

These are the words of the "Sohar." There can be no stronger proof of the extrabiblical origin of the Kabbalah,—and, too, of its *antibiblical* character,—than its teaching, with so many of the ancient pagan philosophies, that "matter is sin." The Kabbalist, in short, sought to solve the "insoluble problem,"—to find an absolute theoretic basis for his religious belief, instead of contenting himself with the sufficient and practical, if broken, light of his holy books. He succeeded no better than those who went before him; and not much worse, perhaps, than those who have come after him. It is withal a noticeable thing, this speculative direction of the Jewish mind. In the days of his glory and his strength the Jew was no speculator. Metaphysical theology is altogether foreign to the age of David and Solomon, as it is altogether foreign throughout to the books of the Hebrew canon. He becomes metaphysical only in his decline,—when both his intellect and his convictions are enfeebled. Whatever be the explanation, we learn this,—that a mere turn

for metaphysics, for logical manipulation with the deepest problems of thought, is no sign of mental superiority. And so far certain popular instincts and ways of speaking on this subject are correct. The truth is, that a man's turn or genius is of little account, unless with respect to an underlying mass of mind to make his turn or genius availing. I may have a genius for poetry, or painting, or metaphysics, or mechanics,—that is, more of a turn for that than any thing besides; but what avails it unless I have the underlying vigour, breadth, solidity, sense? On the other hand, the metaphysical gift is the crown of the thinker,—that without which philosophical intellect is like a truncated Alp. There is another view in which the Kabbalah has a singular interest. These rabbins seem to us a set of gabbling mystics, as perhaps in the main they were. Yet have they exercised a great influence on the world. Thus, for example, we see where Spinoza got his doctrines; he is a child of the Kabbalah. But has not Spinoza, above all others, acted on and given direction to German speculation? And is not German speculation influencing the philosophy, the theology, even the social and political movements of our time? It is strange to think of it. "Salvation is of the Jew." Some of the most vital elements of antichristianism around us may be said also to be "of the Jew."

Often than once Dr Edersheim asserts that the Jewish Kabbalah is the origin of the Christian Gnosticism. He differs in this from the great church historians; and, as it appears to us, without any sufficient grounds. That there was a Jewish Gnosis in the church is indubitable. But that all "Gnosis" was of the Jew is against all the probabilities of the case. The Marcionite Gnosticism was anti-Judaic to the core. How should it have come from the Kabbalah? It is even more likely that the Gnosticism of the Samaritan Simon had a Heathen than a Hebrew source. In truth, there was no need to go to the Kabbalah. The Kabbalah itself was only "second-hand." Gnosticism seems to have been the prevailing theory of the universe among eastern pagan speculators.

We must briefly allude to Dr Edersheim's ninth and tenth chapters, in which he describes the social condition, customs, and culture of the Jews. These chapters are a perfect store-house of important facts, and give one a very high idea of Hebrew civilization. We select a few sample-extracts. . . . There is no surer sign of a high civilization than a great division of labour,—than a complication of trades. Well:—

"Among the craftsmen we find artificers in wood and all kinds of metal—the precious metals being fused with lead or some of the alkalis,—tent makers, masons, tanners, tailors, shoemakers, jewellers,

coach builders, &c., who busily and successfully plied their trades, although with tools much inferior to those now in use. The potters and glass-workers produced flat and deep plates, cups, looking-glasses, spoons, tumblers (holes in which were covered with pitch or tin), bottles, and smelling-bottles, which were filled with scented oil. Some, as tailors and copy-writers, would go about to procure work, or do it in the houses of their customers. Hats, caps, shirts, napkins, towels, pocket-handkerchiefs, veils, and many other articles which we could scarcely have expected to find in Palestine, seem to have been in common use. The washers were properly fullers, who first cleaned the clothes with water, and then took out the stains by various chemical agents, such as alum, chalk, potash, &c. Dyeing and ornamental work of various kinds, whether with the brush, the needle, or in wood, ivory, stucco, and metal, were also known and practised."

The following is a sample of municipal wisdom it were well to see copied; in the modern phrase it is the evidence of an "advanced" state of society:—

"Not only were the inhabitants of towns guarded from intrusion or inconvenience, but sanitary regulations, which outstrip those of our own cities, protected them from the carelessness, selfishness, or folly of their fellow-citizens. Thus a certain space had to intervene between the dwelling of a neighbour and what could occasion annoyance to him, while cemeteries, tanneries, and similar places, which might endanger the health or prevent the comfort of the citizens, had to be removed at least fifty cubits from towns. So careful in this matter were the authorities, that bakers' or dyers' shops, stables, &c., were not tolerated under the dwelling of another person."

Elementary education was well attended to, at least in the later times of Jewish history:—

"The institution of elementary schools was ascribed to the high priest, Jesus of Gimlo, who fell by the hands of the zealots during the siege of Jerusalem. . . . A Jewish legend states, that at its destruction Jerusalem possessed no fewer than 480 schools, each consisting of three classes. This account is evidently exaggerated, and indeed another authority ascribes the fall of the city to the neglect of the education of the young. Probably, while ample educational provision had been made, the schools were, during this and the following period, allowed to fall into neglect. *The schoolmaster was a regular officer of the synagogue*, paid from the treasury of that synagogue to which he was attached, and within the precincts of which the children usually met. He was not allowed to take any fees, lest favour should be shown to the children of the rich, or the teacher become dependent on individuals. To discourage an unwholesome rivalry, parents were interdicted from sending their children to schools in other towns. The number of children committed to one individual was not to exceed twenty-five; for any greater number (short of fifty) an assistant was to be provided. The teacher was to endeavour to secure the confidence, the respect, and the affection, both of parents and children. The latter he was to treat rather with kindness than with rigour. Beating, if necessary, with a strap, never with a rod, was to be the principal means

of correction ; and an instance is mentioned where a teacher was deposed for too great severity. The alphabet was taught by drawing the letters on a board till the children remembered them. In reading, well-corrected books were to be used, and the child was to point to the words as he spelt them. In teaching the Bible, the schoolmaster was to begin with the Book of Leviticus, and after the Pentateuch to take up the Prophets, and then the Hagiographa. In the case of more advanced pupils, the day was divided into three portions, one of which was set apart for the study of the Bible, and the other two for the Mishna and the Talmud. The Mishna was begun at ten years of age, the Talmud at fifteen."

The Jews had made considerable attainments in medical and surgical science. Dr Edersheim has the following statements :—

" Blood-letting was also resorted to. The operation, according to circumstances, was performed on the upper or the lower part of the body, either by scarificators (in a manner analogous to our cupping), by opening a vein, or as arteriotomy by a lancet, or by the application of leeches. Artificial issues and setons were also known. An unskilful surgeon was amenable to justice ; a skilful one bore the designation of doctor. A variety of surgical operations are referred to in the Talmud ; and in cases of amputation the deficiency was, if possible, supplied by artificial limbs. In fractures of bones, splints of woods or metal plates were employed. The excision of tumors and cancerous swellings, and even of the spleen in the case of runners, was practised. Dislocations were treated by cold water bandages ; other wounds, by the application of vinegar and wine, or by surgeons' lint, soft cotton, &c. Three interesting operations are recorded by which dislocations of the jaw, of the neck, and a hernia, were reduced. Of the obstetrical operations, we may mention the gastrotomia, or *side-operation*, and the *Cæsarian*,—the latter only practised when the mother was dying,—the partition of the infant, and in certain cases the introduction of a tube. At the time of our Lord, physicians seem to have resided not only in the larger towns, but even in the country."

We make one extract more. We commend it to the notice of those who are interested in the subject of commercial morality, and who think that something higher than the *material* principle of supply and demand should regulate the relations of buyer and seller :—

" A bargain was not considered closed until *both* parties had taken possession of their respective properties ; but after one party had received the money, it was deemed dishonourable and sinful for the other to draw back. *It was declared downright imposition, no matter what the state of the market, to charge 100 per cent. of profit on any article.* In such cases the purchaser had the right of returning the article, or of claiming the balance of the money, provided he applied for it after an interval sufficient to show his purchase to another merchant, or to a relative. Similarly the rights of the merchant were protected. The

money-changer was allowed to charge a fixed discount for light money, or to return it within a certain period if below the weight at which he had taken it. A merchant might not be pressed to name the lowest price of an article which the questioner had no serious intention of purchasing; nor might he, by way of inducing him to lower his prices, be reminded of any former overcharge. Different qualities of goods might not be mixed, even though the articles added were equal or superior in value to those originally exposed for sale. For the protection of the retailer and of the public, the agriculturist was interdicted from selling wine diluted with water to the dealers in any of the cities of Palestine where such was not in general use."

But we refer our readers to these chapters at large—to their ample information, so laboriously gathered (as the author assures us) from original sources.

We draw to a close. We have followed Dr Edersheim over a portion of the ground he has traversed; but we have given, of course, an altogether inadequate conception of the contents of his thick and closely-printed volume, whose perusal we cordially recommend. It gives access to stores of knowledge which should be familiar to every clergyman and student of theology. Dr Edersheim writes, in the main, a good historical style; his style is easy, fluent, sometimes vigorous,—if too often careless, seldom dull. The spirit of his narrative is fair and candid;—a Christian, his sympathies are still strongly with his people. There is no ostentation, yet no lack of thoughtful comment. In a word, the Scottish Churches are poor in books of learned research; here is a book in which there is much of that, and we hope it will meet with countenance. There are some points withal to which we would call the author's notice, in prospect especially of another volume: 1. The long introductory account of the Jews *previous* to the destruction of Jerusalem is out of place. It does not belong to the theme, and, like a disproportioned porch on a building, it only tends to obscure and mar other excellences. 2. The arrangement strikes us as sometimes careless. We are not sure, indeed, that we understand the theory of the position of many of the chapters. The ninth, tenth, and eleventh chapters, for example, belong historically to the whole of *the time* whose events are narrated, and they are placed in the middle of that time. This withal may be merely a matter of historical æsthetics; and it is of more importance to observe, that these valuable chapters would be rendered greatly more valuable if they were thoroughly *organised*. The eleventh chapter is on the progress of the arts and sciences among the Hebrews. Well, after keeping for a time to its title, it ends with taxation, and the keeping of roads, and marriage-contracts, which

had been partly and properly spoken of elsewhere. And, to say the least, a greater concinnity in that mass of interesting statements might be achieved. 3. Dr Edersheim has a tendency to go off into episodes which are somewhat foreign to his subject, and which mar one's sense of continuity. If the intimate connection of a Titus with the destinies of the Hebrew nation might justify even a disquisition in a Jewish History on his personal appearance, there is no justification of a minute account of the conspiracy against, and murder of, Domitian. The conversion of Epiphanius from Judaism to Christianity is an interesting event, claiming record at the hands of the historians of both faiths; but it seems to us an unhappy instance of our author's episodical tendency, when he narrates at length the Gnostic temptations of the Christian and the religious success of the bishop,—his vehement anti-Origenism,—his bitter conflicts with John of Jerusalem and John of Constantinople. We feel convinced that this is a matter worthy of Dr Edersheim's earnest attention. 4. Critical scepticism is not much the want of our time. We are disposed to think, however, Dr Edersheim has scarce enough of it. Take the account he gives of his favourite Akiba. That story of the twenty years' study of the Law in separation from his wife,—that crusade among the Jews of the Dispersion when he was considerably more than a century old,—have to us, we confess, a legendary aspect. Both may be true. Dr Edersheim seems not in the least to doubt them. But one would need to have very valid evidence. Or, taking an instance of a somewhat different kind: Among the men of note in the synagogue in the times immediately succeeding the destruction of Jerusalem, was a Rabbi Tarphon. Following some of the older and more uncritical writers, Dr Edersheim judges, from the resemblance of the names, that this Tarphon is probably the Trypho of Justin's well-known Dialogue. Now there is no indication in the Dialogue itself that Trypho was a rabbin,—on the contrary (as Semisch shows), there are various indications that he was not;—it is not at all likely that a fugitive rabbi after the Bar-Cochab war would have made himself known in a public place to a stranger; it is extremely improbable that one who appears to have been an older contemporary of Akiba should have been alive at a period when the latter had reached the great age of an hundred and twenty; there is no positive statement in any ancient writer. Slight blemishes of this kind,—not affecting the solid mass of a work,—apt enough to slip in *per incuriam*,—are yet not to be overlooked. They are the "dead flies" of criticism, and give "offence," where, by greater care, it might have been avoided. We would, in conclusion, add here, that it is greatly to be desired Dr Edersheim should (say in a brief

appendix) give some critical statement in regard to his authorities, and some estimate of their worth.

ART. X.—*Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform: chiefly from the "Edinburgh Review." Corrected, vindicated, enlarged, in Notes and Appendices.* By SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart. "Truth, like a torch, the more it's shook, it shines." Second edition. 1853.

WHEN the April number of this journal, containing, in a review of Archdeacon Hare's "Vindication of Luther," an exposure of Sir William Hamilton's attacks upon the great Reformer, was published, we were not aware that the health of the distinguished individual on whose statements we commented so freely was worse than it had been for some years past. We did not know that he was less able to defend himself, or to repel any attack that might be made upon him, than he was when he published the second edition of his "Discussions." It was with surprise and sincere sorrow that soon after we learned that he had, somewhat suddenly, been called away from this fleeting scene. We could not but be struck and solemnised by the unexpected intelligence of his decease, when we had been so recently adducing serious charges against him at the bar of public opinion, and labouring to prove that these charges were well-founded. We were not conscious, indeed, of being influenced by any ill-will or vindictiveness towards Sir William Hamilton; and we have not, and never had, any apprehension that we had done him any injustice. We are deliberately persuaded that every charge we adduced against him was true and proved, and that the whole of the indignation we expressed was most amply merited by the conduct on his part that called it forth. But while justice to truth and to ourselves requires us to say this, we must at the same time confess, that in some parts of the article referred to, we were tempted to speak of our antagonist in a tone which, though in ordinary circumstances it might have been excused by the very peculiar provocation furnished, his speedy and unexpected death has led us to regret. The knowledge, if we had possessed it, that he was to die so soon, would assuredly have modified somewhat the tone in which the discussion was conducted,—would have shut out something of its lightness and severity, and imparted to it more of solemnity and tenderness; and the knowledge which we did possess, that he, as well as ourselves, was liable every day to be called out of this world and sum-

moned into God's presence, *ought* to have produced this result. Alas! alas! how little are we in the habit of living fully under the powers of the world to come, and of realising and remembering, with reference either to ourselves or others, that we do not know what a day or an hour may bring forth! It would surely infuse a much better tone and spirit into controversy, if those who engage in it were more in the habit of remembering, that it is quite possible that the next thing they hear of him with whose statements they are dealing so freely, may be, that he has been summoned into the presence of his final Judge.

Sir William's death has, of course, not shaken, but on the contrary has confirmed, our conviction of the propriety and necessity of plainly exposing all that is erroneous in his statements upon theological and ecclesiastical subjects. It is manifestly indispensable, that the errors he may have put forth on these subjects be now conclusively stripped of whatever credit they may have derived from his acknowledged eminence as a philosopher, and from the unbounded confidence with which he was in the habit of propounding them. We have the highest opinion of Sir William's talents and achievements as a philosopher. We deeply lament that, while he has left his labours in philosophy in a very imperfect and incomplete condition, he should have wasted so much time and strength upon matters with which he was not called upon to intermeddle, and with which he was very imperfectly and superficially acquainted. But these considerations furnish no reason why the errors he may have put forth on theological and ecclesiastical subjects should not be exposed; they only make the duty of exposing them the more imperative. His death did not lead us to hesitate about fulfilling the pledge we gave in the conclusion of the article in our April number, to expose the blundering and inaccuracy of an elaborate statement of Sir William's, on assurance, faith, and justification. We rather shrunk, indeed, from returning to the subject immediately after his decease. But now that some months have passed by, we have no hesitation in proceeding to fulfil the pledge we then gave; and while we will not scruple to say whatever the interests of truth and righteousness may seem to require, we trust that we may be enabled to conduct the discussion under a feeling of becoming solemnity and seriousness.

Sir William, in the course of his attack upon Archdeacon Hare, introduced a lengthened and elaborate historico-theological statement, chiefly upon the subject of Assurance. In the conclusion of our former article we quoted this statement at length. We asserted that it abounded in

blundering and inaccuracy, and we undertook to prove this. We must quote the passage again, as it is the text of our present discourse :—

“ Assurance, Personal Assurance, Special Faith (*the feeling of certainty* that God is propitious to me, that *my* sins are forgiven,—*Fiducia, Plerophoria Fidei, Fides Specialis*), Assurance was long universally held in the Protestant communities to be the criterion and condition of a true or *saving faith*. Luther declares that ‘ he who hath not assurance spews faith out ;’ and Melancthon, that ‘ assurance is the discriminating line of Christianity from Heathenism.’ Assurance is, indeed, the *punctum saliens* of Luther’s system, and an unacquaintance with this, his great central doctrine, is one prime cause of the chronic misrepresentation which runs through our recent histories of Luther and the Reformation. Assurance is no less strenuously maintained by Calvin; is held even by Arminius; and stands, essentially, part and parcel of all the Confessions of all the churches of the Reformation, down to the Westminster Assembly. In that synod assurance was, in Protestantism, for the *first*, indeed *only* time, formally declared ‘ *not to be of the essence of faith* ;’ and, accordingly, the Scottish General Assembly has subsequently, once and again, condemned and deposed the holders of this, the doctrine of Luther, of Calvin, of all the other churches of the Reformation, and of the older Scottish Church itself. In the English, and more articulately, in the Irish establishment, assurance still stands a necessary tenet of ecclesiastical belief. (See *Homilies*, Book I., Number iii., Part 3, specially referred to in the eleventh of the *Thirty-nine Articles*; and Number iv., Parts 1 and 3; likewise the sixth *Lambeth Article*.) Assurance was consequently held by all the older Anglican churchmen, of whom Hooker may stand for the example; but assurance is now openly disavowed without scruple by Anglican churchmen, high and low, when apprehended; but of these, many, like Mr Hare, are blissfully incognisant of the opinion, its import, its history, and even its name.

“ This dogma, with its fortune, past and present, affords, indeed, a series of the most *curious contrasts*. For it is curious, that this cardinal point of Luther’s doctrine should, without exception, have been constituted into the fundamental principle of all the churches of the Reformation, and, as their common and uncatholic doctrine, have been explicitly condemned at Trent. Again it is curious, that this common and differential doctrine of the churches of the Reformation should now be abandoned virtually in, or formally by, all these churches themselves. Again it is curious, that Protestants should now generally profess the counter doctrine, asserted at Trent in condemnation of their peculiar principle. Again it is curious, that this, the most important *variation* in the faith of Protestants, as, in fact, a gravitation of Protestantism back towards Catholicity, should have been overlooked, as indeed, in his days, undeveloped, by the keen-eyed author of “*The History of the Variations of the Protestant Churches*.” Finally, it is curious, that, though now fully developed, this central approximation of Protestantism to Catholicity should not, as far as I know, have been signalled by any theologian, Protestant or Catholic; whilst the Pro-

testant symbol, (*'Fides sola justificat,'*—'Faith alone justifies,') though now eviscerated of its real import, and now only manifesting an unimportant difference of expression, is still supposed to mark the discrimination of the two religious denominations. For both agree that the three heavenly virtues must *all* concur to salvation; and they only differ, whether faith, *as a word*, does or does not involve hope and charity. This misprision would have been avoided had Luther and Calvin only said, '*Fiducia sola justificat,'*—'Assurance alone justifies;' for on their doctrine assurance was convertible with true faith, and true faith implied the other Christian graces. But this *primary* and *peculiar* doctrine of the Reformation is now harmoniously condemned by Catholics and Protestants in unison."

We hope to be able to prove that this elaborate statement contains about as large an amount of blundering and inaccuracy as could well have been crammed into the space which it occupies; and, if we succeed in doing this, we may surely expect that Sir William's authority upon theological subjects will henceforth stand at least as low as zero.

It may help us to form an estimate of the accuracy of Sir William's history of this subject, if we begin with a brief statement of what were the views of the Reformers and the Romanists upon this point, and of what was the general course which the discussions regarding it followed. That the Reformers generally held very high views upon the subject of assurance,—that they were in the habit of speaking very strongly of the importance and necessity of men being personally assured about their own salvation,—is of course well known to every one who has the slightest acquaintance with their history and writings. The causes that tended to produce a leaning towards what may be regarded as exaggerated views and statements upon this subject, were chiefly these two;—1st, Their own personal experience as converted and believing men; and 2d, The ground taken by the Romanists in arguing against them.

The Reformers, speaking of them generally as a body, and with reference to their ordinary condition, seem to have enjoyed usually an assurance of being in a state of grace and of being warranted to count upon salvation. God seems to have given to them the grace of assurance more fully and more generally than he does to believers in ordinary circumstances. And this is in accordance with the general course of his providential procedure. The history of the church seems to indicate to us two positions as true, with reference to this matter, viz.,—1st, That assurance of salvation has been enjoyed more fully and more generally by men who were called to difficult and arduous labours in the cause of Christ, than by ordinary believers in general. And, 2dly, That this assurance, as enjoyed by such persons, has

been frequently traceable to special circumstances connected with the manner of their conversion as its immediate or proximate cause. So it certainly was with the Reformers. The position in which they were placed, and the work they were called upon to do, made it specially necessary that they should enjoy habitually the courage and the strength which spring from a well-grounded assurance of salvation. This, accordingly, God gave them; and he gave them it in many cases, as he has often done in subsequent times, by so regulating the circumstances which preceded and accompanied their conversion as to satisfy them, almost as if by a perception of their senses, that they had passed from death unto life. The Reformers having been in general, for these reasons and by such processes, assured, ordinarily, of their own salvation, were not unnaturally led, from this cause, to give great prominence to the subject of assurance, and to regard and to represent it as in some way or other necessarily connected with the Christian faith, and as an indispensable constituent element of the Christian character.

But, in the second place, the Reformers were the more induced to adhere to this view, and to exert themselves to establish and defend it, in consequence of the ground that was taken up by their Popish antagonists. The Romanists then, as well as now, were accustomed to allege that it was impossible for Protestants to have any *certainty* of the soundness of their views, or of the safety of their position,—that though they might be able to produce plausible and apparently satisfactory pleadings in support of what they taught, they could have no adequate ground for perfect assurance of its truth; while Romanists had a firm ground for absolute certainty in the testimony or authority of the church. There were three important subjects to which chiefly the Romanists were accustomed to apply this alleged point of contrast between their position and that of the Reformers, viz.,—1st, The divine origin and authority of the books of Scripture; 2d, The meaning of scriptural statements, or the general substance of scriptural doctrine, upon any particular point; 3d, Assurance of personal salvation. They were accustomed to allege, that Protestants, upon Protestant principles, could have no certainty, and nothing more than a probable persuasion, 1st, That the books generally received, or any particular books specified, were possessed of divine authority; or, 2d, That *this* and not *that* was the meaning of a scriptural passage, or the substance of what Scripture taught upon a particular topic; or, 3d, That any particular individual was now in a state of grace and would be finally saved. The more reasonable Romanists did not deny that there were rational considerations bearing upon the establishment of the divine authority of the books of

Scripture, sufficient to silence and confute infidels; or, that by the ordinary rules and resources of exegesis, something might be done towards settling the meaning of many scriptural statements; or, that men, by a diligent and impartial use of scriptural materials, combined with self-examination, might attain to good hope with respect to their ultimate salvation. But they denied that Protestants could ever attain to full and perfect certainty upon any of these points,—could ever reach such thorough and conclusive assurance as the authority of the church furnished to those who received it. Protestants, in dealing with this allegation, were not unnaturally led to maintain, that upon all these subjects they had, or might have, not merely a probable persuasion, but a strict and absolute certainty, and to labour to unfold the grounds of the certainty to which they laid claim. It was here that many of the Reformers were led to propound views which appear to have been somewhat extreme and exaggerated, both in regard to the kind and degree of the certainty they contended for, and the grounds on which they professed to establish its reality and legitimacy. Protestants are not infallible any more than Papists. Neither the great Reformers of the sixteenth century, nor the great systematic Divines of the seventeenth, are to be implicitly followed. The truth is, that God has never yet given to any body of uninspired men to rise altogether, and in every respect, in their mode of dealing with the doctrines of his Word, above the influence of their circumstances. There has never been any uninspired man, or any company of uninspired men, that has not given some indication of the imperfection of humanity, in their mode of dealing with some portion or other of divine truth. The Reformers, as a body, are unquestionably more entitled to deference in matters of theological doctrine than any other body of men who have adorned the church since the apostolic age. But there can be no reasonable doubt that there are some doctrinal points on which many of them have gone astray, either from retaining something of the corruption of the Popish system which they had abandoned, or, what is about equally natural and probable in consequence of the imperfection of human nature, from running into an extreme opposite to that which they had forsaken.

It is pretty evident that the Papists, by taunting the Reformers with their want of certainty on the three points to which we have referred, drove them into the assertion of extreme and untenable positions. The Reformers claimed for their convictions and conclusions, on these questions, a kind and degree of certainty which the nature of the subject did not admit of, and they fell into further errors in endeavouring to set forth the grounds or reasons of the cer-

tainty or assurance for which they contended. They contended that they had, or might have, a perfect and absolute certainty in regard to all these matters,—a certainty resting not only upon rational grounds and a human faith, as it was called, but upon supernatural grounds and a divine faith, such as their Popish opponents were accustomed to ascribe to the authority of the church, when it set forth any doctrine and called upon men to believe it as revealed by God. And as a substitute for the authority of the church, the Popish ground for an absolute assurance and divine faith, the Reformers were accustomed to bring in the agency of the Holy Spirit, as producing certainty or assurance; and they did this not unfrequently in a way that seemed to be liable to the charge at least of confusion and irrelevancy.

The Reformers ought not to have allowed the Romanists to drag them into perplexed metaphysical discussions as to the nature and grounds of the certainty with which they held their convictions upon the important topics to which we have referred. They would thus have escaped the temptation to which, we think it must be admitted, they sometimes yielded, of straining matters in order to get something like a ground for a kind and measure of certainty which the nature of the case did not admit of.

It was enough that they could produce adequate rational grounds for all their convictions,—grounds which fully satisfied their own minds, and which they could defend conclusively against the objections of gainsayers, as being sufficient and satisfactory reasons of assent. This was all that their opponents had a right to demand; and this was all that could legitimately come into a controversial discussion. The *vividness and efficacy* of these convictions might be somewhat affected by the kind and degree of evidence bearing upon the particular topic under consideration, or by the qualities of their mental constitution and habits, or by other collateral and adventitious influences. But a real conviction or assent, based upon rational grounds, which were perfectly satisfactory to their own minds, and the relevancy and validity of which they could triumphantly defend against all opponents, was quite sufficient, whether this might be called a certainty of faith or not; and if this conviction did not produce in their minds such a sense or feeling of assurance as they desired,—if it did not prove so practically efficacious as they wished,—it would be quite reasonable that they should ask the special blessing of God, the agency of the Holy Spirit, to bring about these results. And their prayers might be answered, the Spirit might be given, and the strongest, the most vivid, and the most efficacious certainty or assurance might be produced, without any thing like a special revelation, and without the introduction of any new or additional

grounds or reasons for the conviction. The Reformers, however, in their eagerness to claim for their convictions the very highest certainty or assurance, and to assign an adequate cause for this, by substituting the Holy Spirit instead of the church, went sometimes to the unwarrantable extreme of ascribing to the Holy Spirit not merely a subjective influence upon men's understandings and hearts, but an objective presentation of new and additional grounds and reasons for belief.

These general observations apply to the way in which the Reformers met the allegations of the Romanists about their want of certainty or assurance in regard to all the three subjects formerly mentioned, viz., the divine authority of the books of Scripture, the meaning of scriptural statements, and the certainty of personal salvation. In order to have a sure, and at the same time a compendious way of getting the highest assurance, even the certainty of faith, upon all these subjects, they substituted the Holy Spirit instead of the church; and to make this serve the same purpose in argument as the church does among Romanists, they were led to employ some modes of statement about the Spirit's operation which are not sanctioned by Scripture, though exhibiting perhaps rather confusion of thought than positive error. But we cannot dwell upon this general topic, and must return to the special subject of the assurance of personal salvation, with which alone we have at present to do.

The Reformers in general enjoyed ordinarily the assured belief that they were in a state of grace, and would be finally saved. They felt the importance of this grace in the arduous work in which they were engaged. They saw abundant ground in Scripture for the general position, that believers might be and should be assured of their own salvation. They inculcated this position upon their followers, persuaded that personal assurance would at once tend to preserve them from the perverting influence of Popish sophists, and fit them for doing and bearing all God's will concerning them. The Romanists, on the other hand, laboured to show that believers could have no full and well-grounded assurance that they had attained to a condition of safety, except either by special revelation, or by the testimony of the church; their object of course being to make men feel themselves entirely dependent upon the church for security or certainty on all subjects of interest and importance, and to deprive them of the energy and confidence which a well-founded assurance of personal salvation was fitted to produce, in contending against the prestige of ecclesiastical authority and influence. The Reformers, in order to show that the assurance which might be attained without either a special revelation or the testi-

mony of the church, was full and perfect, were led to identify it with our belief in the doctrines of God's Word, and to represent it as necessarily included or implied in the act or exercise of justifying and saving faith; nay, even sometimes to give it as the very definition of saving faith, that it is a belief that our own sins have been forgiven, and that we have been brought into a state of grace. This seemed to be an obvious and ready method of giving to the belief of our personal safety for eternity the very highest degree of certainty, and hence many of the Reformers were tempted to adopt it.

This view was certainly exaggerated and erroneous. It is very evident that no man can be legitimately assured of his own salvation simply by understanding and believing what is contained or implied in the actual statements of Scripture. Some additional element of a different kind must be brought in, in order to warrant such an assurance; something in the state or condition of the man himself must be in some way ascertained and known in order to this result. It may not, indeed, always require any lengthened or elaborate process of self-examination to ascertain what is needful to be known about men themselves, in order to their being assured that they have been brought into a state of grace. The circumstances that preceded and accompanied their conversion may have been such as to leave them in no doubt about their having passed from darkness to light. Their present consciousness may testify at once and explicitly to the existence in them of those things which the Bible informs us accompany salvation. But still it is true, that another element than any thing contained in Scripture must be brought in as a part of the foundation of their assurance. And when they are called upon to state and vindicate to themselves or to others the grounds of their assurance, they must of necessity proceed, in substance, in the line of the familiar syllogism, "Whosoever believeth in the Lord Jesus Christ shall be saved; I believe, and therefore," &c. There is no possibility of avoiding, in substance, some such process as this; and while the major proposition is proved by Scripture, the minor can be established only by some use of materials derived from consciousness and self-examination. There are no positions connected with religion which can be so certain as those which are directly and immediately taught in Scripture, and which are usually said to be believed with the certainty of faith, or of divine faith. The introduction of an element, as necessary to the conclusion, derived from a different source, viz., from the knowledge of what we ourselves are, must be admitted in fairness to complicate the evidence, and to affect the kind, if not the degree, of the certainty or assurance that may result from it. It is un-

warrantable to give as the definition of saving faith, the belief that my sins are forgiven; for it is not true that my sins are forgiven until I believe, and it holds true universally, that God requires us to believe nothing which is not true before we believe it, and which may not be propounded to us to be believed, accompanied at the same time with satisfactory evidence of its truth: and if so, the belief that our sins are forgiven, and that we have been brought into a state of grace, must be posterior in the order of nature, if not of time, to the act of faith by which the change is effected, and cannot therefore form a necessary constituent element of the act itself, cannot be its essence or belong to its essence.

It is not very surprising that Luther should have made rash and exaggerated statements upon this subject as he did upon others. But it is certainly strange, that a man of such wonderful soundness and penetration of judgment as Calvin should have said, as he did say, (*Instit.* l. iii. c. ii. sect. 7,) "We shall have a complete definition of faith, if we say that it is a steady and certain knowledge of the divine benevolence towards us, which, being founded on the truth of the gratuitous promise in Christ, is both revealed to our minds and confirmed to our hearts by the Holy Spirit;" and that this in substance should have been pretty generally, though not universally, received as a just definition or description of saving faith, both by Lutheran and Calvinistic divines, for the greater part of a century. We cannot but look upon this as an illustration of the pernicious influence of men's circumstances upon the formation of their opinions,—a view of the matter decidedly confirmed by the fact that neither Luther nor Calvin, nor the other eminent divines who have sanctioned this notion of the nature and import of faith, have been able to carry it out in full consistency, but have become entangled in contradictions. Luther, indeed, contradicted himself very explicitly upon this point; for while there are passages in his works which very unequivocally represent personal assurance as necessarily involved in saving faith, and while this doctrine is taught in the Confession of Augsburg (*Art.* iv.), and in the Apology for it (*Tittmann's Libri Symbolici Ecclesiæ Evangelicæ*, p. 13 and 58),—both which works are symbolical in the Lutheran Church,—it is easy enough to produce from his writings passages in which a broader and more correct view is given of the nature of saving faith, as having respect directly and primarily only to truths and promises actually contained in Scripture, and, of course, only secondarily and inferentially to any thing bearing upon our personal condition and prospects. Calvin never contradicted himself so plainly and palpably as this. But in immediate connection with the definition above given from him of saving faith, he has made

statements, with respect to the condition of mind that may exist in believers, which cannot well be reconciled with the formal definition, except upon the assumption that the definition was intended not so much to state what was essential to true faith and always found in it, as to describe what true faith is, or includes, in its most perfect condition and in its highest exercise. As the passage is valuable in itself, and is well fitted to throw light upon the real views of the Reformers, and to impress the danger of judging of what these views were from a superficial examination of their writings or of isolated extracts from them, we shall quote it at some length, though we fear most men will be of opinion that Calvin has not very fully solved the difficulty which he started :—

“ But some one will object that the experience of believers is very different from this ; for that, in recognising the grace of God towards them, they are not only disturbed with inquietude which frequently befalls them, but sometimes also tremble with the most distressing terrors. The vehemence of temptations to agitate their minds is so great that it appears scarcely compatible with that assurance of faith of which we have been speaking. We must, therefore, solve this difficulty, if we mean to support the doctrine we have advanced. When we inculcate that faith ought to be certain and secure, we conceive not of a certainty attended with no doubt, or of a security interrupted by no anxiety ; but we rather affirm that believers have a perpetual conflict with their own diffidence, and are far from placing their consciences in a placid calm never disturbed by any storms. Yet, on the other hand, we deny, however they may be afflicted, that they ever fall and depart from that certain confidence which they have conceived in the divine mercy. The Scripture proposes no example of faith more illustrious or memorable than David, especially if you consider the whole course of his life. Yet that his mind was not invariably serene appears from his innumerable complaints, of which it will be sufficient to select a few. To render this intelligible, it is necessary to recur to that division of the flesh and the spirit which we noticed in another place, and which most clearly discovers itself in this case. The pious heart, therefore, perceives a division in itself, being partly affected with delight through a knowledge of the divine goodness, partly distressed with sorrow through a sense of its own calamity ; partly relying on the promise of the gospel, partly trembling at the evidence of its own iniquity ; partly exulting in the apprehension of life, partly alarmed by the fear of death. This variation happens through the imperfection of faith ; since we are never so happy during the present life as to be cured of all diffidence, and entirely filled and possessed by faith. Hence those conflicts, in which the diffidence which adheres to the relics of the flesh rises up in opposition to the faith formed in the heart. But if in the mind of the believer assurance be mixed with doubts, do we not always come to this point, that faith consists not in a certain and clear, but only in an obscure and perplexed knowledge of the divine will respecting us ? Not at all. For if we are distracted

by various thoughts, we are not therefore entirely divested of faith; neither, though harassed by the agitations of diffidence, are we therefore immersed in its abyss; nor if we be shaken, are we therefore overthrown. For the invariable issue of this contest is, that faith at length surmounts those difficulties from which, while it is encompassed with them, it appears to be in danger.”—(B. iii. c. ii. s. 17, 18.)

Other proofs might be adduced that the Reformers, when judged of as they should be, by a deliberate and conjunct view of all they have said upon the subject, did not carry their doctrine of assurance to such extremes as we might be warranted in ascribing to them because of some of their more formal statements, intended to tell upon their controversies with Romanists regarding this matter. And more than this, the real difference between the Reformers and the Romanists upon the subject of assurance, when calmly and deliberately investigated, was not quite so important as the combatants on either side imagined, and did not really respect the precise questions which persons imperfectly acquainted with the works on both sides, might naturally enough regard it as involving.

With respect to the nature of saving faith, the principal ground of controversy was this, that the Romanists held that it had its seat in the intellect, and was properly and fundamentally assent (*assensus*) while the Reformers in general maintained that it had its seat in the will, and was properly and essentially trust (*fiducia*). The great majority of eminent Protestant divines have adhered to the views of the Reformers upon this point, though some have taken the opposite side, and have held faith, properly so called, to be the mere assent of the understanding to truth propounded by God in his Word; while they represent trust and other graces as the fruits or consequences, and not as constituent parts and elements, of faith. This controversy cannot be held to be of very great importance, so long as the advocates of the position, that faith is in itself the simple belief of the truth, admit that true faith *necessarily and invariably* produces trust and other graces,—an admission which is cheerfully made by all the Protestant defenders of this view, and which its Popish advocates, though refusing in words, are obliged to make, in substance, in another form. There is an appearance of greater simplicity and metaphysical accuracy in representing faith as in itself a mere assent to truth, and trust and other graces as its necessary consequences. But the right question is, What is the meaning attached in Scripture to the faith which justifies and saves? Upon this question we agree with the Reformers in thinking, that in Scripture usage faith is applied, in its highest and most important sense, only to a state of mind of which trust in Christ as a Saviour is a necessary constituent

element. *This* question about the nature of justifying faith is not determined in the Westminster Confession, the leading symbol of the great body of Presbyterians throughout the world; and it is well that it is left in that condition, for if it had been settled there in accordance with the views of the Reformers and the compilers of the Confession, this would have excluded from the Church of Scotland Dr John Erskine and Dr Thomas Chalmers.

There was not among the Reformers, and there has not been among modern Protestants, unanimity, as to what is involved in the *fiducia* which is included in justifying faith. The generality of modern divines and some of the Reformers held that this *fiducia* was just trust or confidence in Christ's person, as distinguished from mere belief of the truth concerning him, and as involving some special application or appropriation to ourselves of the discoveries and provisions of the gospel, but not, directly and immediately, any opinion or conviction as to our actual personal condition; while the generality of the Reformers, and some modern divines, especially those known in Scotland as Marrow men, have regarded it as comprehending this last element also, and have thus come to maintain that personal assurance is necessarily and directly included in the exercise of saving faith, or belongs to its essence.

But though a considerable number of the Reformers held this view, and although, as we have explained, they were probably led into the adoption of it by their controversy with the Romanists, yet the truth or falsehood of this view did not form the real or main subject of controversy between them. The leading topic of discussion was this, Whether, without any special revelation, believers could and should (*possent et deberent*) be assured of their justification and salvation? This was *practically* the question that was controverted. It is one of great practical importance, and orthodox Protestant divines, in general, have continued ever since to concur with the Reformers in answering it in the affirmative. But though this was practically the real point controverted,—though the Papists were most anxious to persuade men that they could attain to no certainty upon this point, except either by a special revelation or by the testimony of the church,—yet this was not just the precise form which the question assumed in the controversy; and the reason of this was one which we have already hinted at, viz., that the more reasonable Romanists shrank from meeting the question, *as thus put*, with a direct negative, and fell back upon the topic of the *kind or degree* of the assurance or certainty that was ordinarily attainable by believers. Into this discussion of the nature and grounds of the certainty that might attach to this matter,

the Reformers were unfortunately tempted to follow their opponents. In the heat of controversy many of them were led to lay down the untenable position, that the certainty or assurance ordinarily attainable by believers was of the highest and most perfect description,—that it was the certainty of faith, or, as they sometimes expressed it, the certainty of divine faith, the same certainty with which men believe in the plainly revealed doctrines of God's Word. And then, again, *it was as an argument or proof, in support of this extreme and untenable position as to the kind or degree of certainty*, that they were led on to assert, that this personal assurance was necessarily involved in justifying faith,—nay, was its distinguishing characteristic, and belonged, of course, to its essence.

That the account now given of the subordinate, and as we might call it, accidental, place held in the doctrinal system of the Reformers by their extreme views of the nature of the certainty or assurance which they asserted, and of the argument which they advanced in support of it, is well founded, may be shown by the important fact, that while many of them taught these views in their private writings, and in some of their polemical and practical treatises, they did not introduce them into their Confessions of Faith, into compositions intended to be symbolical and to define the terms of ministerial communion. They are taught, indeed, as we have mentioned, in the Confession of Augsburg, and the Apology for it. They are also set forth pretty explicitly in the Saxon and Wirtemberg Confessions, which are both Lutheran documents,—the first having been composed by Melanethon, and the second by Brentius (*Harmonia Confessionum Fidei*, Genevæ, 1581, p. 154–5, 160, 207–9.) But they are not taught in the Confessions of the Reformed or Calvinistic Churches. The earliest Confessions of the Reformed Churches are the two Confessions of Basle, and there is no statement of them to be found there. Calvin had undoubtedly taught in his Institutes, and also in his Catechism of Geneva, that saving faith necessarily includes or implies personal assurance. But he did not introduce any statement to this effect into the Confession of the French Protestant Church. It is doubtful, indeed, whether Calvin composed the French Confession, or only revised and sanctioned it. But this latter view is enough for our present purpose; and besides, if the Confession was not originally composed by Calvin, it was composed by Antony Chandieu or Sadeel, and he had taught in his own writings the same views as Calvin upon this subject, though neither he nor Calvin seems to have thought of introducing them into the Confession. In the Palatine or Heidelberg Catechism, which was not originally intended to be symbolical, but was rather adapted for popular

instruction, 'faith is described (Q. 21) as necessarily comprehending assurance.* The Belgic Confession, composed in 1563, contains no assertion of these views, though its authors probably believed them, as they afterwards added the Heidelberg Catechism to their Confession as symbolical. The latter Helvetic Confession, composed in 1566, and approved of by most of the Reformed Churches, gives no countenance to these peculiar opinions. And lastly, the Synod of Dort, in 1618, representing almost all the Reformed Churches, not only gave no sanction to these views, but made statements which can scarcely be reconciled with them, and which form part of the evidence by which it may be shown, that a more careful and exact analysis of these matters was leading men's minds rather in a direction opposite to the views of the Reformers upon this subject, and thus paving the way for the more explicit rejection of them by the Westminster Assembly.

Now, let it be remembered that we do not assert that the authors of these documents did not hold the same views as Luther and Calvin upon the subjects of faith and assurance, and the relation subsisting between them. We concede that, generally speaking, they did hold the same views as these leading Reformers. We concede, too, that in some of these Confessions there are expressions employed which indicate plainly enough to competent judges that they held these views. But these concessions being made, we still think it a consideration of great importance that they did not distinctly embody them in their Confessions of Faith, as this proves that they did not really occupy any such place in their system of theology as some of their statements, made in the heat of controversy, might lead us to suppose.

The account we have given of the views of the Reformers and the Romanists upon the subject of faith and assurance, and of the course which the discussion regarding it took, is

* It seems to have been chiefly the Geneva and the Heidelberg Catechisms that Perkins had in view in an interesting passage in his "*Reformed Catholic*," published in 1598. Perkins was a very eminent divine, a thorough Calvinist, and a man of distinguished piety. The passage we refer to may be regarded as an evidence that, before the end of the 16th century, some of the most competent judges were seeing that the language of the Reformers upon this subject required some modification. It is as follows:—"This doctrine (that of implied or infolded faith) is to be learned for two causes: First of all, it serves to rectify the consciences of weak ones, that they be not deceived touching their estate. For if we think that no faith can save but a full persuasion, such as the faith of Abraham was, many truly bearing the name of Christ must be put out of the roll of the children of God. We are, therefore, to know that there is a growth in grace as in nature; and there be differences and degrees of true faith, and the least of them all is infolded faith. Secondly, this point of doctrine serves to rectify and in part to expound sundry *catechisms*, in that they seem to propound faith unto men at so high a reach as few can attain unto it,—defining it to be a certain and full persuasion of God's love and favour in Christ; whereas, though every faith be from its nature a certain persuasion, yet only the strong faith is the full persuasion. Therefore faith is not only in general terms to be defined, but also the degrees and measures thereof are to be expounded, that weak ones, to their comfort, may be truly informed of their estate."—*Perkins' Reformed Catholic*, pp. 274-5.

sufficient, at once and of itself, if it be well founded, to overturn some of Sir William's leading positions in his history of this matter. But we must now look at his statements more closely and directly. His first leading position is this:—

“*Assurance*, Personal Assurance, Special Faith (*the feeling of certainty* that God is propitious to *me*, that *my* sins are forgiven,—*Fiducia*, *Plerophoria Fidei*, *Fides Specialis*), Assurance was long *universally* held in the Protestant communities to be the criterion and condition of a true or *saving faith*.” Here the first thing to be noted is the assumption, that “*personal assurance, special faith,—fiducia, plerophoria fidei, fides specialis*,” do, in the writings of the Reformers, all mean one and the same thing; and that this one thing is “the feeling of certainty that God is propitious to *me*, that *my* sins are forgiven.” We could easily show that this assumption involves great ignorance of the *usus loquendi* of the Reformers, that the different words are used in different senses, and that the same word is used in different senses by different authors. But it is not worth while to dwell upon this point. The statement, that “assurance was long *universally* held in the Protestant communities to be the criterion and condition of a true and saving faith” is untrue. For it has been proved, that Peter Martyr, Musculus, and Zanchius, three of the most eminent divines at the period of the Reformation, did not hold this view of the nature of saving faith. The allegation, that “assurance is the *punctum saliens* of Luther's system” is one which no man acquainted with Luther's writings can believe. The assertion, that “assurance stands, essentially, part and parcel of *all* the Confessions of *all* the Churches of the Reformation, down to the Westminster Assembly” is utterly untrue, and is, indeed, a specimen of marvellous recklessness. We have already explained how this matter stands as a question of fact, in regard to the earliest and most important Confessions. If Sir William's assertions had any foundation in truth, the passages teaching the doctrine of assurance might easily be produced. But no such passages have been, or can be, produced, because they have no existence. A regard to the interests of truth compels us here to call upon our readers to observe and to remember, what the fact that Sir William made this assertion, suggests and implies.

Sir William is, in substance, right in saying, that in the Westminster Assembly assurance was formally declared not to be of the essence of faith; and he is right also in saying, that this was then done for the first time by an ecclesiastical synod, though, as we have already remarked, the Synod of Dort paved the way for it. It is of more importance to remark, that this decision of the Westminster Assembly has been generally

acquiesced in ever since by the great body of Calvinists and Presbyterians over the world.

Sir William's next statement, viz., that on the ground of this deliverance of the Westminster Assembly, "the Scottish General Assembly has once and again deposed the holders of this, the doctrine of Luther and Calvin, of all the other Churches of the Reformation, and of the older Scottish Church itself," is a curious mixture of truth and falsehood, though the falsehood preponderates. If the doctrine that assurance is not of the essence of faith be plainly asserted in the standards of a church, and be thus explicitly assented to by every minister as a condition of his ordination, it does not appear why it should be held up as something monstrous, that men who may come afterwards to reject this doctrine, should forfeit their office as ministers in that church, though it would no doubt be a very painful thing to have to cut off a brother who held no erroneous views except upon this one point. Sir William's statement is plainly fitted and intended to convey the impression that cases of *this* kind have occurred in the Church of Scotland, or, that men have been deposed merely because they held the views of the Reformers upon this point, while they were not charged with any other doctrinal errors. This impression is erroneous. No such cases have ever occurred. In the only instances, and they have been very few, in which ministers holding that assurance is of the essence of saving faith, have been subjected to ecclesiastical discipline, this error was held in conjunction with the much more serious one of universal atonement, or universal pardon, which it naturally tends to introduce; and it was no doubt the maintenance of this second and more serious error that reconciled the heart and conscience of the church to the infliction of discipline.

Sir William's assertion, that the doctrine of assurance being of the essence of faith was that "of the older Scottish Church itself," has an appearance of truth about it, but it is fitted likewise to convey a false impression of the facts of the case. There is sufficient evidence that the older Scottish Church, or the first generation of Protestant ministers in Scotland, held in general the same views of faith and assurance as were taught by Luther and Calvin. But they had not embodied these views in any public symbolical documents, or required the belief of them as a term of ministerial communion; and yet this is plainly the impression which Sir William's statement is fitted to produce. In the old Scottish Confession of Faith, prepared by John Knox, and adopted by the General Assembly in 1560, these views are certainly not asserted. It contains nothing on this, or any other subject, which might not be assented to by men who had subscribed the Westminster Confession. The only

thing bearing upon these views that can, in any sense, be regarded as a deliverance of the church, is, that the National Covenant of 1581 contains a condemnation of the "general and doubtful faith of the Papists;"—a statement which, whatever we may know otherwise of the opinions of its authors, is far too vague to commit the church, or any who subscribed the document, to the definite doctrine, that assurance is of the essence of saving faith.

Sir William's next statement is an astounding one: "In the English, and more articulately in the Irish Establishment, *assurance still stands a necessary tenet of ecclesiastical belief.*" This, we presume, will be a piece of news to the clergy of the English and Irish Establishments. We venture to assert, that not one of the 18,000 or 20,000 clergymen who represent the United Church of England and Ireland, has ever imagined that he had come under an obligation to believe and to teach "assurance;"—by which, of course, Sir William means, as the whole scope of the passage shows, notwithstanding the obscurity and confusion of his language, the doctrine that assurance of personal salvation is essential to, is necessarily included or implied in, justifying faith. But Sir William has referred to proofs and authorities upon this point, and what are they? He gives them thus:—"See Homilies, book i., number iii., part 3, specially referred to in the eleventh of the Thirty-nine Articles; and number iv., parts 1 and 3; likewise the sixth Lambeth Article." The authorities here referred to are two, viz., the First Book of the Homilies, and the Lambeth Articles.

Now, in regard to the Books of the Homilies, we think it can be shown, 1st. That they are not properly symbolical books of the Church of England, so that the clergy are to be held bound to maintain and teach every thing contained in them; and, 2d. That though the Homilies contain plain enough indications that the views entertained by most of the Reformers were held also in the Church of England, they do not exhibit distinct and definite statements of these peculiar opinions.

The extent to which the Church of England is committed to the Homilies is this, that in her 35th Article she has declared that "the second Book of Homilies doth contain a godly and wholesome doctrine, and necessary for these times, as doth the former Book of Homilies; and therefore we judge them to be read in churches by ministers diligently and distinctly, that they may be understood by the people:" and that the 11th Article refers to one of the Homilies for a fuller setting forth of the doctrine of justification. Now this does not necessarily imply, and has never been regarded as implying, that the Church of England took her ministers bound to

believe and to teach every thing contained in these books. The Homilies were intended to furnish materials for popular instruction, and not to regulate the terms of ministerial communion. A conscientious man who had subscribed the Articles, would not, indeed, consider himself at liberty, without first renouncing his position, to oppose the general scope and main substance of the views of doctrine and duty contained in the Homilies; for by subscribing the Articles he has declared this to be godly and wholesome: but the most conscientious men would deny that they were committed to all and every thing contained in the Homilies. And they would take this ground, not from loose views of what subscription to symbols implies, but because they have never subscribed the Homilies, or done any thing equivalent to this. In short, what is said in the Articles about the Homilies does not make the Homilies Articles, does not raise them to the same level, does not incorporate them with that primary and fundamental symbol. The statement in the 7th Article, that "the three Creeds ought thoroughly to be received and believed, for they may be proved by most certain warrants of holy writ," no doubt incorporates the Creeds with the Articles, and makes them equally binding; but nothing like this is said about the Homilies, and therefore they stand upon a different footing. On these grounds we contend, that an incidental statement of the doctrine of assurance in the Homilies, would not have afforded an adequate ground for Sir William's allegation, that this doctrine "still stands a necessary tenet of ecclesiastical belief."

We have now to remark, in the second place, that any thing said about this doctrine in the Homilies is not only incidental, but indefinite. The principal passages bearing upon the point are these:—"For the right and true Christian faith is, not only to believe that the Holy Scriptures and all the foresaid articles of our faith are true, but also to have a sure trust and confidence in God's merciful promises, to be saved from everlasting damnation by Christ; whereof doth follow a loving heart to obey his commandments." And again: "And this [a quick or living faith] is not only the common belief of the articles of our faith, but it is also a true trust and confidence of the mercy of God through our Lord Jesus Christ, *and a steadfast hope of all things to be received at his hands.*" While these statements are quite explicit in rejecting the idea that saving faith is the mere belief of the truth, they do not definitely decide in favour of any one precise view of the nature, object, and grounds of the *fiducia*, or trust, which they describe. When these matters came to be more exactly and elaborately discussed in the seventeenth century, distinctions were introduced and applied, which tended

to throw much light upon the subject, and which now require to be known and kept in view, in order that we may form a right estimate of the true import even of the vague and indefinite statements of former writers. It may be proper to illustrate this point by a specimen or two, as it admits of extensive application. Le Blanc, professor of theology at Sedan to the French Protestant Church, of whom we shall have afterwards occasion to speak more fully, gives the following statements of the differences which have been exhibited among Protestant divines upon this subject:—

“Hic observandum est, *fiduciam* apud doctores Reformatos pluribus modis sumi, adeoque plures eorum qui hâc in parte diverse loquuntur, idem reapse inter se sentire; alios vero qui videntur eodem modo loqui, revera tamen quoad sensum inter se discrepare.”

If this be so, it would require a great deal more of careful and patient research than Sir William ever gave to this or to any other theological subject, to enable him to thread his way through its intricacies, and to entitle him to speak with confidence of his success in doing so. Again, Le Blanc says, more particularly,—

“Præcipui vero scholæ Reformatæ theologi de fiducia varie loquuntur, dum quidam dicunt fiduciam esse partem fidei primariam, et proprium illius actum, alii vero istud negant et docent fiduciam esse quidem fidei prolem atque effectum, sed non tamen actum ejus proprium; ac præterea fiduciæ nomine, alii quidem istud, alii vero aliud, intelligunt.”

He then mentions four different senses in which this *fiducia*, trust or confidence, has been understood by Protestant divines, the first two of which are thus described:—

“Primum ergo, fiduciæ nomine intelligitur actus ille per quem in Deum recumbimus, illi innitimur, ei adhæremus, tanquam fonti et auctori salutis, ut vitam et salutem ab eo consequamur. Secundo, fiducia apud multos designat firmam persuasionem de gratia et venia a Deo impetrata et de nostra cum eo reconciliatione.”—(Theses Sedanenses, de fidei justificantis natura et essentia, pp. 213, 224.)

Turretine explains the distinctions applicable to this matter with his usual masterly ability, in this way:—

“Diversitas quæ inter orthodoxos occurrit oritur ex diversâ acceptione *fiduciæ*, quæ trifariam potest sumi. 1. Pro fiduciali assensu seu persuasionem quæ oritur ex judicio pratico intellectus de veritate et bonitate promissionem evangelicarum, et de potentia, voluntate, ac fidelitate Dei promittentis. 2. Pro actu refugii et receptionis Christi, quo fidelis, cognita veritate et bonitate promissionum, ad Christum confugit, illum recipit et amplectitur et in illius meritum unice recumbit. 3. Pro confidentia seu acquiescentia et tranquillitate animi quæ oritur ex refugio animæ ad Christum et ejus receptione.

Primo et secundo significatu fiducia est de essentiâ fidei et bene a theologis dicitur ejus forma; sed tertio, recte ab aliis non forma sed effectus fidei dicitur, quia nascitur ex ea, non vero eam consequitur.” —(Loc. xv. qu. x. s. 3, v., also qu. xii. s. 4.)

We have made these quotations chiefly for the purpose of illustrating the position, that as these distinctions were not present to the minds of the Reformers, but were the growth of later speculation, we should not attribute to them any one of these distinct and definite opinions, without specific evidence bearing upon the precise point to be proved, and should not allow ourselves to be carried away by the mere words, *trust* and *confidence*, *certainly* and *assurance*, without a full and deliberate consideration of the whole evidence bearing upon the meaning of the statements. The statements may be so definite as to indicate what of the views that were subsequently developed were held by the parties under consideration, or they may not. The statements of the Catechisms of Geneva and Heidelberg are so expressed, as to convey the doctrine that personal assurance is of the essence of saving faith; the Confessions of the Reformed churches do not in general teach this doctrine; and the Homilies of the Church of England resemble more the Confessions than the Catechisms. Even if they were symbolical and authoritative, they would not make “assurance,” in the precise and definite sense in which Sir William here uses the word, “a necessary tenet of ecclesiastical belief.”

Sir William’s second proof of his position is the “sixth Lambeth Article.” The history of the Lambeth Articles affords an irrefragable proof that Calvinism was the generally received doctrine of the great body of the highest authorities in the church and universities of England, and of the mass of the English clergy, in the latter part of the reign of Elizabeth and of the sixteenth century: while nothing is more certain and notorious than that they never received the sanction of the church in its public, official character; that they never were imposed by any authority, civil or ecclesiastical; and that there is not a shadow of ground for alleging, that any Anglican clergyman is, or ever was, under any appearance of obligation to believe or teach any thing contained in them, the sixth Article or any of the other eight.

But even if the Lambeth Articles were symbolical and authoritative, they would not impose an obligation to teach the precise and definite doctrine which is the subject of Sir William’s allegation. The sixth Article is in these words:—“Homo vere fidelis, id est, fide justificante præditus, certus est plerophoriâ fidei, de remissione peccatorum suorum et salute sempiterna sua per Christum.” It would manifestly require

something much more definite than this, to tie down men to the maintenance of the position, that personal assurance is necessarily included in saving faith and belongs to its essence. It simply says, "A true believer is certain with the assurance of faith." It does not say that every believer is so, at all times; it defines nothing about the nature of the process by which the certainty is produced, or the ground on which it rests; it specifies nothing of the relation subsisting between faith and assurance: and on these grounds it is totally unfit for the purpose for which Sir William referred to it. The truth is, that a man might honestly subscribe this Lambeth Article, without being thereby committed to more than the position which, as we have explained, formed the real subject of controversy between the Reformers and the Romanists, viz., that the believer may and should be assured of his forgiveness and salvation.

Sir William, however, not only asserts that assurance, in the sense in which it has been so often explained, "still stands a necessary tenet of ecclesiastical belief" in the English Establishment, but he further says, that it does so "more articulately" in the Irish. He gives no other references than those we have examined, to the Homilies and the Lambeth Articles, and of course none bearing upon the alleged greater "articulateness" of the Irish Church in this matter. The truth probably was this: Sir William must have known that the Lambeth Articles are not, and never were, of any authority in the Church of England; and he would scarcely have ventured to refer to them as establishing any thing about the obligations of the clergy of that church. But he had probably read somewhere that the Lambeth Articles, though never imposed upon the Church of England, were, through Archbishop Ussher's influence, sanctioned and adopted in the Church of Ireland,—a statement which is true in substance, though not strictly correct; and this was probably the whole of the knowledge, on the ground of which he thought himself entitled to assert the greater articulateness of the Irish Church, and to refer to the sixth Lambeth Article. In "the Articles of Religion agreed upon by the archbishops and bishops, and the rest of the clergy of Ireland, in the Convocation holden at Dublin in the year of our Lord 1615," the whole of the Lambeth Articles are embodied, though with some additions and verbal alterations. The subject of assurance is thus stated in No. 37, under the head "Justification and Faith:"—

"By justifying faith, we understand not only the common belief of the articles of Christian religion, and a persuasion of the truth of God's Word in general, but also a particular application of the gra-

cious promises of the gospel to the comfort of our own souls; whereby we lay hold on Christ with all his benefits, having an earnest trust and confidence in God, that he will be merciful to us for his only Son's sake. So that a true believer may be certain by the assurance of faith of the forgiveness of his sins, and of his everlasting salvation by Christ."—(Hardwick's History of the Articles, Appendix, No. VI. pp. 347, 348.)

It is somewhat difficult to say whether this could, with truth, be said to be more "articulate" than the statements quoted from the "Homilies." The first sentence does seem to embody rather more of the tone and spirit of the Catechisms of Geneva and Heidelberg, though it is very far from being explicit in declaring their peculiar views upon this point. But then, in the second sentence, which is in substance a translation of the sixth Lambeth Article, there is an alteration which rather tells on the other side,—“may be certain,” instead of “*certus est*,” a change which confirms the view above given of the real meaning of the Article, and brings it nearer to the great fundamental Protestant position, *vere fidelis potest et debet certus esse*. There is nothing, then, in these Irish Articles of 1615 to commit any one who may receive and adopt them, to the doctrine that assurance is of the essence of faith. Sir William, however, probably meant the greater articulateness, which he predicated of the Irish Church, to refer to the more formal ecclesiastical sanction given to these statements in the Irish than in the English Establishment; and our answer to this is, that for two centuries past neither the Irish Church nor any of its bishops or clergymen, have furnished any ground whatever for the allegation, that they were under any obligation to teach the doctrine of assurance, beyond what is implied in subscription to the English Articles. There was a period, indeed, when the Irish Articles, and, of course, the Lambeth Articles, were invested with some authority in Ireland, but that period was brief, and has long since gone by. An investigation into the history and standing of the Irish Articles can now possess a merely historical value, and determines no question of present duty. It is curious and interesting, however; and we would refer those who desire full information upon this subject to Hardwick's "History of the Articles of Religion,"—a book which, notwithstanding its strong anti-Calvinistic prejudices, we cannot but commend most highly for ability and learning and general fairness,—(C. viii. and Appendix vi.) We must again request our readers to notice and remember what is suggested by the fact, that Sir William made this assertion about the Churches of England and Ireland.

But perhaps Sir William's grandest display is to be found in the second paragraph of the passage on which we are

commenting, where he brings out the "series of the most curious contrasts" which "this dogma, with its fortunes, past and present, affords." He swells the number of these curious contrasts, by repeating what is really one and the same idea, in two or three different forms. He gives five "curious contrasts," but the first three turn upon a single point, and the substance of them may be embodied in one position, which, indeed, is the sum and substance of what Sir William is most anxious to establish, viz., that the whole of the Reformed churches have not only abandoned the doctrine of assurance, the fundamental doctrine of the Reformation, but have all adopted the opposite Popish doctrine, which was taught by the Council of Trent when it condemned the doctrine of the Reformers.

Before adverting to this leading position, we may notice his fourth and fifth specimens of "curious contrasts," which are of little importance except as very remarkable instances of the combination of ignorance and presumption. He states them thus:—

"Again, it is curious, that this, the most important *variation* in the faith of Protestants,—as, in fact, a gravitation of Protestantism back to Catholicity,—should have been overlooked, as, indeed, in his days undeveloped, by the keen-eyed author of 'The History of the Variations of the Protestant Churches.' Finally, it is curious, that, though now fully developed, this central approximation of Protestantism to Catholicity should not, as far as I know, have been signalled by any theologian, Protestant or Catholic."

If this variation was undeveloped in Bossuet's time, it does not seem "curious" that it should have been overlooked by him, even though he was "keen-eyed;" while we admit that it is "curious," if true, that "it should not have been signalled by any theologian, Protestant or Catholic," until Sir William Hamilton discovered and promulgated it. But the truth is, that this variation,—for there was a doctrinal variation upon this point, though certainly it was not of such magnitude as Sir William alleges,—was developed in Bossuet's time, and was not overlooked by him, but was distinctly set forth, though not much enlarged upon, in his "History of the Variations." Indeed, all Sir William's assertions upon these points are wholly untrue. That this variation was *not* overlooked by Bossuet, is proved by the following extract from his "History of the Variations," liv. xiv. s. 90:—

"Les ministres qui ont écrit dans les derniers tems, et entr'autres, M. de Beaulieu (Le Blanc), que nous avons vu à Sedan, un des plus savans et des plus pacifique de tous les ministres, adoucissent le plus qu'ils peuvent le dogme de l'inamissibilité de la justice *et même celui de la certitude de salut*: et deux raisons les y portent: la première est l'éloignement qu'en ont eu les Luthériens, à qu'ils veulent

s'unir à quelque prix que ce soit : la seconde est l'absurdité et l'impïété qu'on decouvre dans ces dogmes, pour peu qu'ils soient pénétrés. Toutes les fois que nos Réformés *désarouent* ces dogmes impies, louons-en Dieu, et, sans disputer davantage, prions les seulement de considérer que le Saint Esprit ne pouvait pas être en ceux qui les ont enseignés et qui ont fait consister une grande partie de la Réforme dans de si indignes idées de la justice Chrétienne."

So far from this variation not having been signalised before, it actually formed one leading subject of a controversy that was carried on between theologians of distinguished eminence, both Protestant and Romanist, before the publication of Bossuet's "History of the Variations;" and as this topic not only conclusively disproves Sir William's assertions, but is fitted to throw light upon the general subject under consideration, we will give a brief notice of the controversy referred to.

In 1665, Louis le Blanc, Lord of Beaulieu, Professor of Theology in the College of the French Protestant Church at Sedan, a man of great ability and learning, published "*Theses Theologicæ de Certitudine quam quis habere possit et debeat de suâ coram Deo justificatione.*" In these Theses, he described it as a misrepresentation of Papists, to allege that Protestants held, among other things, that personal assurance was necessarily comprehended in justifying faith and belonged to its essence; and explained what he held to be the doctrine generally taught by Protestants upon this subject. He represented their doctrine as being substantially this, that believers can and should be assured of their being forgiven and being in a state of grace, and that the want of this assurance was faulty and sinful; but that this assurance was not the proper act of justifying and saving faith, and did not belong to its essence, since faith might exist for a time without it; that it was a result or consequence of faith, posterior to it in the order of nature, and frequently also of time; that though this assurance might be called an act of faith, it was but a secondary and reflex, not a primary and direct act of faith; and that while the certainty attaching to this personal assurance might be called a certainty of faith, it was so named in an improper sense, since it did not rest immediately and exclusively upon what was actually contained in God's Word, but partly also upon a reflex act concerning ourselves. These are, in substance, the views, in regard to faith and assurance, which are set forth in the Westminster Confession, prepared twenty years before; and Le Blanc, without any parade of proofs or authorities, declared them to be then generally prevalent among Protestants. The prevalence of these views, of course, implied, and was seen and admitted to imply, a variation, or a departure from those held by the generality of the Reformers.

About seven years after, in 1672, the famous Antony Arnauld, Doctor of the Sorbonne, the friend and associate of Pascal and Nicole, published his work entitled, "*Le Renversement de la Morale de Jesus Christ, par les Erreurs des Calvinistes touchant la Justification*;" and as he meant to make the doctrine of assurance play an important part in proving that the Calvinists overturn the morality of Jesus Christ, he adduced at length (liv. ix. c. iii. and iv.) the evidence that Calvinists teach that "every believer is assured with the certainty of divine faith of his own justification and salvation;" and in liv. x. c. iv., he gives "a refutation of a professor of Sedan, who had abandoned the common sentiments of his sect concerning the certainty of divine faith which they think that every believer has of his justification and salvation." Arnauld's evidence in support of the ascription of this opinion to Protestants is derived chiefly from the writers of the sixteenth century, and terminates with the Synod of Dort, in 1618, which, he alleges, sanctioned it; and as Le Blanc in his *Theses* had not produced any authority, Arnauld, in refuting him, just referred to the evidence he had already adduced. In 1674, Le Blanc published "*Theses Theologicæ de fidei justificantis natura et essentia, in quibus variæ Protestantium sententiæ referuntur et expenduntur, et breviter refelluntur quæ super eâ re quidam liber recens Scriptori harum Thesium imputat.*" These *Theses* as well as the former ones were afterwards embodied in his great work commonly called "*Theses Sedanenses*," of which the third edition was published at London in 1683. In these *Theses* concerning the nature and essence of justifying faith, he goes very fully into the whole subject, examines the authorities bearing upon it, and defends himself from the charges which Arnauld, in his "*Renversement*," had brought against him, of abandoning the common views of Protestants, and of concealing and misrepresenting their true doctrines. Le Blanc, of course, did not deny that there had been many eminent Protestant divines who taught that personal assurance was necessarily included in saving faith. But he contended, and proved, that from the time of the Reformation downwards, there had always been some eminent Protestant writers who had taken a broader and more correct view of the nature of saving faith and of the relation between it and assurance,—that, in recent times, the number of divines who held this view had been progressively increasing,—that, nearly thirty years before this, it had obtained a great triumph, by being distinctly set forth in the Westminster Confession, whose sentiments upon this point had been generally approved of by Protestant writers; and that, on all these grounds, Arnauld and the Papists were acting unwarrantably in asserting that the

opposite view was that which had always been, and still was, held by Protestants. He claims in support of his views the concurrence of Zanchius, Peter Martyr, Musculus, Perkins, Bishop Davenant, and the other English divines who attended the Synod of Dort, Ames, Du Moulin, Walæus, Wittichius, Mestrezat, &c. He expresses his concurrence in the statements of the Westminster Confession of Faith, and repeatedly refers to it (pp. 211, 216, 221, 222, 229), in disproof of the allegation of the Romanists, that opposite views had up till that time been generally maintained among Protestants. Le Blanc admitted that, in the earlier period, views different from his, and from those of the Westminster Confession, were more generally prevalent; but he contended that, in later times, matters had changed, and the balance had turned to the other side. He, of course, did not deny that there had been a variation here in the history of Protestant doctrine, though he did not think the change which had been brought about was one of great intrinsic importance, and maintained that, from the beginning, there had been some Protestants who held the views which had ultimately gained the ascendancy.

This elaborate dissertation of Le Blanc was not only approved of in general by Protestant divines, but it convinced an eminent Romish theologian of that period, Le Fevre, a doctor of theology of the Faculty of Paris, that Arnauld had misrepresented Protestants, in ascribing to them generally the doctrine of assurance. He expressed this opinion in a work written against Protestantism; and this again called forth the redoubtable Jansenist, who published, in 1682, "*Le Calvinisme Convaincu de Nouveau de Dogmes Impies contre ce qu'en on ecrit*, M. Le Fevre, &c., et M. Le Blanc," &c. In this work Arnauld went over the ground again without throwing much additional light upon it, or shaking any of Le Blanc's main positions.

In the meantime a new combatant had entered the field. This was the famous Peter Jurieu, a man of singular talents and activity, who had formerly been professor at Sedan. In 1675 he published his "*Apologie pour la Morale des Reformés, ou Defense de leur doctrine touchant la Justification, la perseverance des vrais saints, et la certitude que chaque fidele peut et doit avoir de son salut*," in reply to Arnauld's "*Renversement*." This work Claude, the most distinguished defender of Protestantism in France, pronounced to be "one of the finest books that had appeared since the Reformation." The first two books of it treat of justification and perseverance, and the third and last of certitude or assurance. He takes very much the same ground as Le Blanc, denying that Arnauld was entitled to charge upon Protestants in general the doctrine that assurance is of the essence of faith, though admitting that this

doctrine was extensively taught among them in the sixteenth century. He adduces a portion of the evidence of this, referring to Le Blanc's *Theses* for additional testimonies, and shows very ably and ingeniously, that neither the earlier nor the later doctrine was chargeable with the odious consequences which Arnauld had laboured to fasten upon them. He takes some pains to bring out the difference between the belief men have in articles of faith, and the assurance they have of their own forgiveness, and to show that men might doubt about their salvation without ceasing to be true believers. He exposes very ably and conclusively the futility of the attempt of Arnauld to draw an argument in favour of Popery from the concessions made by Le Blanc and others, as to the variations in the doctrine of Protestants, and even an approximation again in some minor doctrinal matters to the Church of Rome; and points out the folly of making so much ado about differences of so little intrinsic importance as those which had been exhibited, or might still subsist, among Protestants on the subject of assurance.

Le Blanc and Jurieu were both men of very fine talents and of extensive learning. Both have rendered important services to the cause of truth, and both have also done it some injury. Le Blanc had a great desire to reconcile the differences of contending sects and parties, and laboured to show that the points of difference among them, when calmly and deliberately examined, were not of great importance, and resolved many of them into mere logomachies. He applied this principle to some of the topics controverted between Protestants and Papists, and not merely to topics so unimportant, comparatively, as assurance, but even to some branches of the great doctrine of justification,—a circumstance of which Nicole has skilfully availed himself in his work entitled, "*Prejuges Legitimes contre les Calvinistes.*" As Le Blanc brought extensive theological learning, and a singularly ingenious and discriminating mind, to bear upon this object, his "*Theses Sedenenses*" must be regarded as a dangerous book for the young student of theology, who might be in danger of being misled by it into an under-estimate of the importance of having clear views and definite convictions upon many topics usually discussed in polemic divinity; while it is certainly a work of the very highest value to the more mature theologian.

Jurieu is probably very much under-estimated by those whose knowledge of him has been derived, not from the perusal of his own writings, but from other sources. His reputation has suffered greatly in consequence of his having quarrelled with Bayle, who, after having formerly praised him and his writings in the highest terms, pilloried him through the whole of his

Dictionary, making frequent occasions for assaulting him. Jurieu had some qualities which laid him open to such assaults. With great ability and penetration, and great mental energy and activity, he had a rashness and recklessness about him that often led him into scrapes, and afforded many a handle to his enemies,—to personal enemies, as Bayle,—or to opponents in controversy, as Bossuet. He threw himself with such eagerness into every one of the many controversies in which he engaged, that he seemed for the time to see every thing through that medium, appeared to contend for victory quite as much as for truth, and was ever anxious to turn every thing to the account of the present controversial occasion. All this produced sometimes a carelessness and rashness both in the statement of facts and in the employment of arguments, which his friends could not defend, and which his enemies skilfully improved. This was just the kind of man whom Bayle was peculiarly qualified to expose; and he has done his best to turn his opportunities to good account. But all who are acquainted with Jurieu's works, know that he was a man of very fine powers, that he has rendered very valuable services to truth in the discussion of some important questions, and has inflicted some deadly wounds even upon such opponents as Bossuet, Arnauld, and Nicole. Though his reputation has been damaged by Bayle's Dictionary, yet the mischief has been in some measure repaired by a very full, elaborate, and interesting life, in which justice is done to him, in *Chauffepie's Supplement to Bayle*, vol. iii.

Arnauld, Le Blanc, and Jurieu, are all first-class names in theological literature. Their labours ought to have been known to a man of Sir William's pretensions, and yet we have seen that he has asserted, that a topic which formed a subject of formal and lengthened controversy between them, was unnoticed and unknown until it was "signalised" by himself. We could easily prove that this variation has been "signalised" by many theologians. But it is unnecessary to dwell upon this point. We shall quote one specimen, as it embodies at the same time a good summary of the chief reasons that tended to produce the change. It is taken from a common work of an eminent divine, published in the latter part of the seventeenth century, "*Marckii Compendium Theologiæ*," c. xxii. sect. 23.

"Non diffitendum interim, de hac ipsâ fiduciali applicatione diversum sentire quoque nostros, dum *antiquiores* juxta catachesim nostram faciunt hunc Actum fidei essentialem, ad justificationem et salutem necessarium, sed non absque antecedenti amplexu et connexa respicientia concipiendum; *Recentiores* vero plures volunt potius esse eam fidei ipsius et justificationis consequens, quod abesse possit, fide et

salute manente, 1. Tum ob multorum verè Christum apprehendentium perpetuas dubitationes; 2. Tum ad vitandas magis Pontificiorum, Arminianorum, et schismaticorum strophas, quæ vel homines ad securitatem hoc fidei actu duci, vel obligari ad falsum credendum cum remissio fidem sequatur, vel prò omnibus juxta hoc officium credendi mortuum esse Christum, clamant; 3. Tum denique, quod hæc fiducia magis Dei beneficium speciale paucioribus proprium, quam officium commune sit."

We should now proceed to the more formal consideration of the leading position which, as we have seen, forms the substance of Sir William's first three "curious contrasts," viz., that the whole of the Reformed churches have not only abandoned the doctrine of assurance, the fundamental doctrine of the Reformation, but have all adopted the Popish doctrine which was taught by the Council of Trent when it condemned the doctrine of the Reformers. But our want of space prevents us from going so fully into the discussion of this position as we would have liked to have done, and had collected materials for doing. This, however, is not now very necessary, as the explanations already given, if well founded, are sufficient to prove that Sir William's position, with a slight appearance of verisimilitude, is utterly destitute of truth. We would have liked, indeed, to have opened up more fully the true *status quæstionis* between the Romanists and the Protestants, both of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; to have brought out the evidence of what we believe to be the truth upon this point; and to have illustrated the bearing of all this upon the explanation of the statements on this matter contained in the Westminster Confession: but we have now space only for a few hints.

Sir William calls the doctrine of assurance,—that is, of course, the doctrine that assurance of personal salvation is necessarily included in saving faith,—“the fundamental principle of all the churches of the Reformation,” “the common and differential,” “the primary and peculiar,” doctrine of the Reformation. Some of the Reformers made strong and exaggerated statements about the importance of their peculiar opinions upon this point; and Nicole, and other old Popish controversialists, in dealing, as with a known and familiar thing, with that variation, which was unknown to all theologians until Sir William “signalised” it, have endeavoured to show that a change upon a topic so important should have led men to return to the Church of Rome. Yet neither Reformers nor Romanists, even in the heat of controversy, have ever put forth such extravagant exaggerations upon this point as those we have quoted from Sir William. To represent the doctrine of assurance as “the fundamental principle of all the

churches of the Reformation," is really, in plain terms, nothing better than raving. It carries absurdity upon the face of it. From the very nature of the case, no doctrine upon such a subject could be the fundamental principle of the Reformed churches. Even if the Reformers had been contented, as they should have been, with asserting the general position that believers can and should be assured of their own salvation, and if the Romanists had ventured to meet this general position with a direct and unqualified negative,—even in that case, no sound-minded man, whatever he might have been tempted to say in the heat of controversy, could have deliberately regarded this difference as fundamental. But while this was really and practically the controversy between them, yet, as we have explained, the formal or technical ground of contention was reduced within still narrower limits, the Papists professing to deny the doctrine of their opponents only with this explanation, that by assurance they meant the infallible certainty of divine faith, by which men believed the great doctrines of religion; and many of the Reformers, injudiciously and incautiously accepting this explanation, and bringing forward the notion that personal assurance is necessarily included in saving faith, as an argument in support of it. The controversy thus turned in form upon the kind or measure of the certainty attaching to men's convictions on the subject of their own state and prospects, and the grounds on which the actual certainty contended for might be established. It is impossible that any particular doctrine upon such points as these could "have been constituted into the fundamental principle of all the churches of the Reformation;" and, therefore, Sir William's position might be safely and reasonably rejected, even by those who have no great knowledge of these matters, as an incredible absurdity.

Sir William plainly asserts, that a precise and definite doctrine upon this subject was, in opposition to the Reformers, laid down by the Council of Trent, and that this Popish doctrine has now been adopted by all the Protestant churches. But this notion, though not altogether destitute of an apparent plausibility, has no real foundation in truth. It is no doubt true that in so far as there has been a deviation from the views generally held by the Reformers, it has proceeded in a direction which tends to diminish the differences between Protestants and Papists. But, indeed, it can scarcely be said with truth, that either the Reformed Churches or the Church of Rome were formally and officially committed to any very definite doctrine upon this subject. There is nothing, as we have seen, precise and definite upon this topic in the Confessions of the Reformed churches. There is nothing so definite in any of the Calvinistic Confessions of the sixteenth century, in favour of

assurance being of the essence of saving faith, as there is in the Westminster Confession on the other side. With respect to the deliverances of the Council of Trent upon this subject, we have to remark, 1st. That they condemned several positions which had not been laid down by the Reformed churches, but merely put forth by individual Reformers, and which Protestants, both at the time and since, have thought untenable and exaggerated; 2d. That a difference of opinion existed in the council itself, and that this prevented their giving any very definite, positive deliverance. Catharinus, one of the most eminent divines of that period, maintained in the council views upon the subject of assurance substantially the same as those held by the generality of the Reformers; he continued to hold these views; and after all the deliverances of the council had been passed, he maintained that none of his positions had been condemned, and that he was still at liberty to profess them. Indeed, while the whole tone and spirit of the deliverances of the council upon this subject is adverse to the views of the Reformers, its chief formal deliverance is just this, "Nullus scire valet certitudine fidei, *cui non potest subesse falsum, se gratiam Dei esse consecutum*" (sess. vi. c. ix.); where the matter is thrown back very much upon the point, that the certainty claimed is the certainty of faith, and where some additional materials for metaphysical speculation are provided, by the clause we have put in italics.

The view we have given of these points, in their bearing upon the state of the question, is fully confirmed by what we find in Cardinal Bellarmine when treating of this topic. (De Justific., lib. iii. c. ii. et iii.) After admitting the existence of different opinions on the subject in the Council of Trent and in the Church of Rome, he gives this as the doctrine held by the great body of Romish theologians in opposition to the errors both of Protestants and Romanists, "Non posse homines in hac vitâ habere certitudinem fidei de suâ justitiâ, iis exceptis quibus Deus speciali revelatione hoc indicare dignatur;" and in giving more formally the state of the question, he puts it in this way, "Utrum debeat aut possit aliquis sine speciali revelatione, certus esse *certitudine fidei divinæ, cui nullo modo potest subesse falsum*, sibi remissa esse peccata." Here we see the controversialist stands intrenched behind the "certitudo fidei divinæ cui nullo modo," &c., and calls upon his opponent to prove that the certitude or assurance to which he lays claim, is possessed of such qualities, and is based upon such grounds, as these phrases are understood to indicate. But while the great Popish controversialist takes care at first to intrench himself behind these safeguards, he afterwards brings out somewhat more fully and freely, though still not without precaution, the whole

of what he and Romish writers in general have inculcated upon this point. In c. viii. he lays down and undertakes to prove the four following positions: "1. Non posse haberi certitudinem fidei de propriâ justitiâ,"—a denial of the Protestant "potest;" 2. "Neminem teneri ad illam habendam etiamsi forte posset haberi,"—a denial of the Protestant "debet;" 3. "Non expedire ut ordinariè habeatur;" 4. "Reipsâ non haberi nisi a paucis, quibus a Deo specialiter justificatio propria revelatur." These positions formed then, and in substance they form still, the real points of divergence between Protestants and Papists upon the subject of assurance. *The technicalities of the controversy are somewhat altered, while its substance remains the same.* The grand question still is, as it has always been, Is it practicable, obligatory, and expedient, that believers should be assured of their justification and salvation? Upon this question the Reformed churches have always maintained, and still maintain, the affirmative; while the Romanists, for obvious reasons, have always taken the other side. Modern Protestants, as the result of a more careful, deliberate, and unembarrassed examination of the subject, than the Reformers were able to give to it, have become indifferent about the question, whether this assurance should be called *the certainty of faith*, or have plainly admitted that this designation was an improper one; and they have modified also an extreme view about the precise relation subsisting between assurance and saving faith,—a view which seems to have been suggested by a desire to establish the warrantableness of this designation. This is really the sum and substance of the variation, of the change which has taken place.

We are confident that no one who is competently acquainted with this subject, and who surveys the history of the discussions regarding it with calmness and deliberation, can fail to see that this is the true state of the case. And if this, or any thing like this, be indeed the true state of the case, what an extraordinary mass of unaccountable misrepresentation must be the view given of the matter by Sir William Hamilton! His view is to be exposed and overthrown by establishing these two positions: 1st. That from the nature of the case, no doctrine upon the subject of assurance could have been the fundamental principle of the Reformers; and, 2d. That the difference between the Reformers and the generality of modern Protestant divines is not one of fundamental importance, even when regarded merely in its relation to this non-fundamental subject, and of course sinks into insignificance when viewed in its relation to the general system of Protestant doctrine.

Sir William seems to have been half conscious of the absurdity of making such strong and tragical statements upon such

a subject as this; and therefore he makes an attempt, in conclusion, to involve the great Protestant doctrine of justification in one common ruin with the comparatively small doctrine of assurance. He represents it as a consequence of the change which he alleges has taken place in the views of Protestants in regard to assurance, that "the Protestant symbol ('Fides sola justificat,—Faith alone justifies'), though now eviscerated of its real import, and now only manifesting an unimportant difference of expression, is still supposed to mark the discrimination of the two religious denominations. For both agree that the three heavenly virtues must all concur to salvation, and they only differ, whether faith, *as a word*, does or does not involve hope and charity." This would be the most dangerous of all Sir William's misrepresentations, were it not rendered innocuous by its extravagance and absurdity. Even if the deviation from the views of the Reformers, and the return to Popish notions upon the subject of assurance, had been as great as Sir William represents it, this would not have affected the differences between Protestants and Romanists upon any thing really involved in the doctrine of justification. Sir William's statement, though applied only to the doctrine that faith alone justifies, seems fitted and intended to convey the impression, that the whole Protestant doctrine of justification has been exploded and abandoned; and, therefore, the first remark we have to make upon it is this,—that there are some important differences between Protestants and Romanists on the subject of justification which are not directly touched by the position, that faith alone justifies. We refer, of course, to the vitally important questions, 1st, as to the meaning and import, and 2d, as to the cause, or ground, or foundation, of justification. Even though the doctrine that faith alone justifies were "eviscerated," Protestants might and should maintain their whole controversy with Romanists upon these fundamental points. We remark, in the second place, that all that is important in Protestant doctrine, as comprehended under the head that faith alone justifies, is untouched by any change that has taken, or could take place, in regard to assurance. The two main questions usually discussed between Protestants and Romanists *under this head* are these: 1st, Is there any thing else in men themselves which stands in the same relation to justification as faith does?—Protestants answering this question in the negative, and Papists contending that there are six other virtues, as they call them, including, of course, hope and charity, which stand in the very same relation to justification. Protestants admitted that all these virtues do and must exist in justified men, and might thus in a sense, be said, to use Sir William's phrase, "to concur to

salvation;" but they wholly denied that they have any such bearing as faith has upon the justification of a sinner. 2d. In what capacity or respect is it that faith justifies? Is it as an instrument, or as a condition, or as a meritorious cause? Surely it is quite plain, that even if a man had come to believe all that is taught by the Council of Trent upon the subject of assurance, he might still, without any inconsistency, maintain all the doctrines of the Reformers upon these important points.

Sir William adverts to the fact, that the deviation from the views of the Reformers upon the subject of assurance, which he represents as an abandonment of "the fundamental principle of all the Reformed churches," is embodied in the Westminster Confession; and yet there can be no doubt that the whole doctrine of the Reformers upon the subject of justification is set forth with most admirable fulness and precision in the 11th chapter of that document, while no ingenuity, however great, could devise even a plausible pretence for alleging that there is any inconsistency in this.

We have some apprehension that the controversial spirit is rising and swelling in our breast, and therefore we abstain from making any reflections upon the extraordinary scene which we have considered it our duty to unfold.

We are sorry that so much space has been occupied with a mere exposure of Sir William's blundering and inaccuracy, as we would have liked to have attempted something in the way of expounding and inculcating the great truth taught in Scripture, and set forth in the Westminster Confession, upon the subject of assurance. That it is practicable, obligatory, and expedient, that believers should be assured of their justification and salvation, was not, certainly, "the fundamental principle of all the Reformed churches," but, the fundamental principle of the teaching of the Reformed churches *on the subject of assurance*. It is fully and clearly declared in the Westminster Confession. It has been held professedly by the whole body of Calvinistic divines, both before and since the variation which Sir William has signalled. And yet we fear it has at all times been too much neglected, both theoretically and practically, viewed both as declaring a truth and enforcing a duty. We believe that the prevailing practical disregard of the privilege and the duty of having assurance, is, to no inconsiderable extent, at once the cause and the effect of the low state of vital religion amongst us,—one main reason why there is so little of real communion with God as our reconciled Father, and so little of real, hearty devotedness to his cause and service. Some sense of the sin and danger of neglecting this subject occasionally arises in men's minds, and is from time to time pressed upon the notice of the church. But in many

cases, such attempts have only led to controversial discussions, and have failed in producing any beneficial practical results. It is not easy to keep the exact high road of truth; and men, filled with some one important idea or object, are very apt to run into exaggerations and extremes. Upon no subject has this been more conspicuously the case than on that of assurance; partly, perhaps, because of the influence of Luther, Calvin, and their associates. It has happened repeatedly in the history of the church, that pious and zealous men, impressed with the importance of getting a larger share of attention to the subject of assurance, have been led into the adoption of untenable and erroneous positions concerning it. Then the champions of orthodoxy have buckled on their armour, and have demonstrated by irrefragable logic that these positions are characterised by, it may be, confusion, inconsistency, and error; and then men, satisfied upon this point, settle down again upon their lees, and think no more of the importance of coming to a decisive adjustment upon the question as to what is their present relation to God, and what are their future prospects. This is the abuse, not the use of controversy. The uses of theological controversy are, to expose error, and to produce and diffuse clear and correct opinions upon all points of doctrine. It is the church's imperative duty to aim at these objects, and controversy seems to be as indispensable with a view to the second as to the first of them. But it is an evil and an abuse, when the exposure of error is made to serve as a substitute for the realization and application of what is admitted to be true. This has repeatedly, in the history of the church, taken place in regard to the subject of assurance; and this result, again, has, we are persuaded, been productive of injurious consequences to the interests of true religion, and tended to keep the church at a low point in the scale of devotedness and efficiency.

Sir William has another theological demonstration of a somewhat imposing description, which seems to require notice and exposure. It is contained in the following passage:—

“Averments to a similar effect might be adduced from the writings of *Calvin*; and, certainly, nothing can be conceived more contrary to the doctrine of that great divine than what has lately been promulgated as Calvinism (and, in so far as I know, without reclamation), in our Calvinistic Church of Scotland. For it has been here promulgated, as the dogma of this church, (though in the face of its Confession, as in the face of the Bible), by pious and distinguished theologians, that man has no will, agency, moral personality of his own, God being the only real agent in every apparent act of his creatures; in short (though quite the opposite was intended), that the theological scheme of the absolute decrees implies fatalism, pantheism, the nega-

tion of a moral Governor as of a moral world. For the premises, arbitrarily assumed, are atheistic; the conclusion, illogically drawn, is Christian. Against such a view of Calvin's doctrine, and of Scottish orthodoxy, I for one must humbly, though solemnly, protest, as (to speak mildly), not only false in philosophy, but heretical, ignorant, suicidal in theology."—(Discussions, p. 628.)

This is intended as an assault upon Dr Chalmers, and upon his views on the subject of philosophical necessity. We think we can easily prove that this assault is unwarranted, and that the grounds on which it rests are utterly untenable; while, at the same time, we do not altogether approve of the way in which the subject of philosophical necessity has been represented and applied by Edwards and Chalmers. These topics may perhaps form the subject of a future article.

CHAPTER I
THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA
The first discovery of America was made by Christopher Columbus in 1492. He was an Italian explorer who sailed across the Atlantic Ocean in search of a new route to the East Indies. On October 12, 1492, he landed on the island of San Salvador in the Bahamas.

Columbus's voyage was sponsored by the Spanish monarchs, Isabella and Ferdinand. He was the first European to reach the Americas, although he believed he had reached the East Indies. His discovery opened the way for European exploration and colonization of the Americas.

After his first voyage, Columbus made two more trips to the Americas. On his second voyage in 1493, he discovered the island of Hispaniola, which is now divided between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.

On his third voyage in 1498, he discovered the mainland of South America, specifically the Gulf of Paria. This voyage confirmed that the Americas were a new world, separate from the East Indies.

Columbus's discoveries led to the establishment of Spanish colonies in the Americas. The Spanish government granted him the right to establish colonies in the newly discovered lands.

The discovery of America had a profound impact on the world. It led to the exchange of goods and ideas between the Old World and the New World, a process known as the Columbian Exchange.

Over time, the Americas became an important part of the world economy. The discovery of America is one of the most significant events in world history.

THE END





SERIAL

